dissonance-congruence and the perception of public opinion

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Dissonance-Congruence and the Perception of Public Opinion Author(s): Kenneth W. Eckhardt and Gerry Hendershot Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Sep., 1967), pp. 226-234 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2775800 . Accessed: 27/05/2014 05:46 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Journal of Sociology. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 15.227.185.72 on Tue, 27 May 2014 05:46:20 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Dissonance-Congruence and the Perception of Public OpinionAuthor(s): Kenneth W. Eckhardt and Gerry HendershotSource: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Sep., 1967), pp. 226-234Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2775800 .

Accessed: 27/05/2014 05:46

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toAmerican Journal of Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org

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Dissonance-Congruence and the Perception of Public Opinion'

Kenneth W. Eckhardt and Gerry Hendershot

ABSTRACT The discrepancy between prevailing public opinion and what various community mem-

bers estimate as public opinion has traditionally been explained through either the social or psychological characteristics of respondents. In this paper we attempt to account for degrees of public-opinion awareness through a model based on the relationships among an indi- vidual's opinion, his cognitive set, and the majority opinion of public members. A theory of imbalance is developed and tested in the context of public opinion in a college community.

Public opinion on social issues is seldom unanimous, and, while its development is a collective process, not all individuals con- tribute equally to its formation, nor are all members of the public equally informed as to the character and direction of the com- posite opinion.2 The discrepancy between one's estimate of public opinion and the actual distribution of opinion in the com- munity has been the focal point of research for several decades.3 Working primarily within the traditions of their own fields, psychologists and sociologists have been

developing complementary but disparate theories in an attempt to explain the differ- ential assessments of public opinion held by individuals. Theorists approaching the problem within the framework of psychol- ogy have tended to emphasize attitudinal and personality components in their search for explanatory variables,4 while theorists in the tradition of sociology have stressed interaction variables and especially the in- dividual's position in the communication network.5

As the evidence has accumulated, it has become increasingly evident that as self- contained theories neither approach offers much promise. It is generally established that attitudinal and personality components enter into an individual's perception and assimilation of information6 and that situ-

' We gratefully acknowledge the financial assist- ance provided by the Committee on Faculty Devel- opment at the College of Wooster.

2 Conceptually the term "public opinion" is ambiguous. Although most theorists recognize the social-interaction dimension in the development of public opinion, the concept has been opera- tionally defined in a variety of ways, e.g., (1) as the summation of individual opinions on a social issue, (2) what individuals think are the opinions of others, and (3) what a collectivity of individuals has quasi-formally decided to be the "view" of the public. In this article we treat public opinion as the summation of individual opinions on a social issue as they have been shaped by social interaction. For discussions of the theoretical and methodologi- cal issues in the concepts "public" and "public opinion," see G. D. Wiebe, "Some Implications of Separating Opinions from Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII (Fall, 1953), 328-52; H. H. Hyman, "Towards a Theory of Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXI (Spring, 1957), 54-60; and E. Freidson, "Prerequisite for Participation in the Public Opinion Process," Public Opinion Quarterly, XIX (Summer, 1958), 91-106.

3 The most recent treatment of the problem appears to be W. Breed and T. Ktsanes, "Pluralistic Ignorance in the Process of Opinion Formation," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXV (Winter, 1961), 382-92.

'An adequate review of psychological variables and processes is contained in Arthur R. Cohen, Attitude Change and Social Influence (New York: Basic Books, 1964).

'An enlightened sociological perspective is pre- sented by J. WV. Riley and M. W. Riley, "Mass Communication and the Social System" in R. Merton et al. (eds.), Sociology Today (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 537-78.

6D. Kretch, R. S. Crutchfield, and E. Ballachey, Individual in Society (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962), pp. 17 ff.

226

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DISSONANCE-CONGRUENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION 227

ational and interactional variables influence the individual's exposure to communica- tion.7 What is required, therefore, if we are to move toward explaining the differen- tial assessments of public opinion held by individual members, is a general theory which incorporates both perspectives. Such a theory must be flexible enough to include both psychological and sociological vari- ables and yet remain logically consistent and empirically sound. In this paper we attempt to provide such a theory.

Our purpose is to present a theoretical model which generalizes the findings of past research and permits the deduction of em- pirically testable hypotheses. The body of the paper is divided into two sections: Part I is concerned with theory construction, while Part II presents empirical data sup- portive of the model.

I. GENERAL THEORY

The model proposed herein is constructed on the basis of two familiar and widely accepted assumptions.8 While it is recog- nized that the assumptions require qualifi- cation in certain contexts, they are stated in a universally valid form for purposes of discourse. Assumption 1: Individuals seek to validate their attitudes, opinions, and behaviors. Assumption 2: Individuals seek to make related attitudes, opinions, and be- haviors consistent.

Assumption 1 accepts as valid the social psychological notion that individuals are continually engaged in a process of relating their ideas and behaviors to experience.

When one speaks of an individual as seek- ing to validate his behaviors (mental or physical), the reference is to the notion that the individual is continually referring his behaviors to either (1) cognitive pat- terns he has developed through socializa- tion, (2) group opinions, values, and norms which serve as points of reference, or (3) both cognitive patterns and group opinions, values, and norms.

The level of validation or support re- quired by an individual is, of course, varia- ble and is related to (1) the significance of the behavior to past cognitions and (2) the relevance and centrality of the behavior to membership-reference groups.

Assumption 2 provides the necessary mo- tive power for the individual to either (1) reorganize his cognitive set or (2) orient himself to new reference groups if a dis- crepancy occurs between his action and sources of validation.

These assumptions and their implications permit the development of a four-cell para- digm which locates the position of an in- dividual for any given point in time.9

RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIONSHIP OF BEHAVIOR TO BEHAVIOR TO COGNITIVE SET

GROUP OPINIONS,

NORMS, AND VALUES Consonant Dissonant

Congruent..... Consonant- Dissonant- congruent congruent (situation a) (situation b)

Non-congruent. Consonant- Dissonant- non-congru- non-congru- ent (situation ent (situation c) d)

An examination of the paradigm reveals that it is constructed on the basis of rela- tionships which exist between the individu- al's behavior and (1) his past cognitions and (2) reference-group opinions, values,

9 In this paper we are not concerned with the dynamics of opinion change but only the in- dividual's ability to assess public opinion at a given time. Only in situation a, however, is the individual not under some pressure (either psy- chological, social, or both) to change his position.

7A summary of structural variables can be found in R. E. Lane and D. 0. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 33 fif.

8 These assumptions are drawn from the literature and are given extended treatment in the theories of Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Disso- nance (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957); Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Re- lations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958); and C. E. Osgood and P. H. Tannebaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," Psychological Review, LXII (1955), 42- 55.

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228 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

and norms. Where an individual's behavior finds support in his cognitions, the relation- ship is one of consonance; where it does not, it is one of dissonance. Where an in- dividual's behavior finds support in group opinions, values, or norms, the relationship is one of congruence; where it does not, it is one of non-congruence.

A hypothetical illustration of these events is provided below.

Type Consonant- The discriminatory opinion of

congruent a prejudiced southern white (situation a) is consonant with his cog-

nitive set and congruent with southern public opin- ion.

Dissonant- The discriminatory opinion of congruent a non-prejudiced southern (situation b) white is dissonant with his

cognitive set but congruent with southern public opin- ion.

Consonant-non- The liberal opinion of a non- congruent prejudiced southern white is (situation c) consonant with his cogni-

tive set but non-congruent with southern public opin- ion.

Dissonant-non- The liberal opinion of a prej- congruent udiced southern white is (situation d) dissonant with his cogni-

tions and non-congruent with southern public opin- ion.

According to the assumptions on which this paradigm has been constructed, the consonant-congruent individual is the only person who finds it possible to validate his opinion on both dimensions. Individuals who find themselves in any of the three remaining situations-(b, c, and d) dis- sonant-congruent, consonant-non-congru- ent, or dissonant-non-congruent-are in either a partial or total state of imbalance -that is, they lack support either from cognitive set or public opinion or from both.10

Since we have posited that the individual finds the state of imbalance psychologically

and socially uncomfortable, we infer that the individual will attempt to reduce the imbalance in predictable ways. As we are primarily interested in the relationship be- tween individual opinion and public opin- ion, we analyze the situation of an individ- ual who holds an opinion which may or may not be in balance with his cognitive set and public opinion (group values and norms).

In situation a (consonant-congruent), the individual's opinion can be validated by reference to either his cognitive set or public opinion. Since his opinion is con- sonant with his cognitive set, he experi- ences no psychological strain, and since his opinion is congruent with public opinion, whatever interaction he has with others who share similar views only reinforces his own position. Unless his position in the social system requires an assessment of the public position, there exists little or no need for him to actively ascertain and assess the position of others." In terms of psycho- logical utility, the individual is under no pressure to determine accurately the dis- tribution of public opinion, since such knowledge is of little reinforcement value.

In situation b (dissonant-congruent), the individual's opinion can be validated only along one dimension: its relationship to public opinion. As the individual has offered an opinion contrary to his cogni- tive set, he experiences discomfort. This discomfort or dissonance, however, can be reduced, if not eliminated, by seeking the support of others. Since we have posited a relationship of congruency, the individ- ual fi-nds it rewarding to assess the opinion

'?Here we are considering only the relationship between personal opinion and public opinion. Although the individual may lack support from the public, he may find support in other membership- reference groups.

' Clearly some individuals find it more nec- essary to be informed of group public opinion than others. See K. Chowdhry and T. M. New- comb, "The Relative Abilities of Leaders and Non-Leaders to Estimate Opinions of Their Own Groups," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy- chology, XLVII (1952), 51-57.

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DISSONANCE-CONGRUENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION 229

of the public. In fact, the more aware he becomes of the congruence between his opinion and the opinions of others, the greater the validation or support he obtains for his own opinion. Other conditions be- ing equal, therefore, individuals in a dis- sonant-congruent relationship have greater reason to be more aware of the distribution of public opinion than persons in a con- sonant-congruent relationship.

Persons in situations c and d differ mark- edly in their relationships from persons in situations a and b. In situation c, the indi- vidual's opinion and cognitive set are con- sonant, but he is non-congruent with public opinion. The more visible his deviance, the greater the negative sanctions he experi- ences from the public. Not only are nega- tive sanctions increased with the visible display of deviance through interaction, but the greater extent to which the public serves as a reference group, the greater his psychological discomfort. His discomfort is reduced by validating his opinion with his cognitive set and by remaining ignorant of public opinion and avoiding interaction on this issue. Whatever motivation the indi- vidual originally possessed for determining public opinion is reduced through contact with the public. In a sense, awareness of public opinion is psychologically and so- cially punishing. Consonant-non-congruent individuals are therefore less likely to be informed concerning public opinion than consonant-congruents who in turn are less aware than dissonant-congruents.

Individuals who find themselves in situ- ation d (dissonant-non-congruent) are con- fronted with a double dilemma. Validation for their opinions can be found neither through reference to their cognitive set nor through reference to public opinion. Per- sons in this situation are likely to be un- stable in their opinions, cognitive sets, or reference groups. Precisely which relation- ship will change and under what conditions is subject to a variety of variables, and their examination is beyond the scope of this paper. For reasons developed above,

however, the dissonant-non-congruent is unlikely to seek out public opinion, and his assessment of its distribution will be mis- informed or distorted. As he is also con- fronted with a discrepancy between opin- ion and cognitive set, we can predict in- stability and a general unwillingness to consciously focus on the issue being dis- cussed by the public.

The general hypothesis generated from the theory concerning the rank order of prediction is as follows: Assuming structur- al equivalence of social position and access to communication, dissonant-congruents should be the best estimators of public opin- ion, while dissonant-non-congruents should be the least informed. The rank-order pre- diction for persons in situations a and c is less clear since they are intermediate types, but the theory suggests that consonant- congruents should be better predictors of public opinion than consonant-non-con- gruents, since information acquired by the latter is punitive and serves only to increase discomfort. The rank order for prediction of public opinion is hypothesized to be as follows: best predictors: (1) dissonant-con- gruents, (2) consonant-congruents, (3) consonant-non-congruents; poorest predic- tors: (4) dissonant-non-congruents. Hav- ing developed the theory, the remainder of this paper is devoted to the presentation of empirical data testing the model.

II. AN EMPIRICAL TEST

In order to test the rank-order predic- tions genera)ted by the theory, it was neces- sary to collect data on one dependent and two independent variables. The dependent variable was the accuracy of an individual's estimate of public opinion, while the in- dependent variables were the individual's cognitive set and his opinion on a given issue.

SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

To collect the necessary data, a question- naire was constructed and administered to a stratified random sample of two hundred

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230 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

undergraduates at a midwestern coeduca- tional liberal-arts college in the fall of 1965. The variables under consideration were operationally defined and measured in the following ways.

Cognitive set.-Prior to the collection of data, a series of opinion items was sub- mitted to a panel of judges composed of students and faculty (N = 80). From this series, the panel selected ten items which in their judgment formed a cognitive pat- tern, that is, were internally consistent along a liberal-conservative dimension. As a reliability check on adequacy and con- sistency, the items were pretested on sev- enty-five students. Respondents in the pre- test were scored and Likert-scaled accord- ing to their responses on the items.'2 Using the upper and lower quartiles as test aggre- gates, the items were deemed adequate as an index to liberal-conservative cognitive set, since no item possessed a discriminative power of less than .90.

In similar manner, the two hundred re- spondents in the final sample were scored and Likert-scaled according to their re- sponses to the test items. Respondents in the upper quartile of the Likert scale were classified as possessing a liberal cognitive set and respondents in the lower quartile as possessing a conservative cognitive set.

Individual opinion.-Personal opinion for each respondent was measured by his response to the ten opinion items. Respond- ents were asked to indicate the strength of their opinions for each item on a four-point scale ranging from strong endorsement to strong opposition. Endorsement or non. endorsement of the item measured his opinion on the issue.

Public opinion.-The distribution of public opinion for each issue,considered by the sample was computed by summing indi- vidual opinions on the items. Using the ran- dom sample (N = 200) as a base, the pa- rameters of public opinions in the college community (N = 1482) were estimated.

By treating each item as a social issue around which publics were forming, the distribution of ten public opinions was as- certained.

Table 1 presents the items utilized in measuring cognitive set,'3 individual opin- ion, and the strength and direction of public opinion.

Public-opinion estimates.-For each item on which a respondent recorded his own opinion, he was also asked to estimate the percentage of students in the college com- munity who would basically agree with the stated opinion. In this way it was possible to measure the strength and direction of public opinion of ten issues as they were perceived by the respondents in the sample.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The first step in analysis consisted of classifying individuals according to the re- lationship between personal opinion and public opinion. The relationship was con- gruent when an individual's views were in the same direction on a given issue as the majorty of the population. The relationship was non-congruent when an individual's views were in the opposite direction from the majority of the population.

This procedure entailed an important as- sumption. We assumed an empirical equiva- lence between 'the notion of reference group and public. Our decision to classify indi- viduals as congruent or non-congruent to the public as a reference group follows from that assumption. From a theoretical per- spective, the concepts "reference group" and "public" are neither conterminous nor mu- tually exclusive. Standard usage in sociolog- ical theory indicates that reference groups are real or imaginary collectivities utilized by the individual for self-evaluation and goal direction,'4 while a public is viewed

' W. J. Goode and P. K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), pp. 270 ff.

13 Endorsement of items A, D, E, H, and I and opposition to items B, C, F, G, and J measured the conservative cognitive set, while the reverse pattern constituted the liberal cognitive set.

"'See, e.g., Tamotsu Shibutani, Society and Personality: An Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 249 ff.

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DISSONANCE-CONGRUENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION 231

as a large number of persons interacting on a socially open issue through initiating and reacting to communications and opinions.'5 It follows that when public opinion is formed, individuals may utilize the public as a reference group. The empirical ques- tion is whether a particular public is serv- ing as a reference group for the individual.

We have taken the position that, for our sample of college students, fellow student peers serve as both the public and the refer- ence group. The utility of this assumption has been demonstrated in several articles in order to explain empirical findings.16 The basis for assuming an identity between reference group and public in our own study stems from the characteristics of the institution and population from which the sample was drawn.'7

From the theory developed in Part I of this paper, we hypothesized that congruents are more accurate estimators of the direc- tion of public opinion than non-congruents. Table 2 presents the resulting distribution.

An examination of Table 2 reveals that congruents in general were more accurately informed than non-congruents concerning the distribution of public opinion. On the basis of interaction theory, congruents

TABLE 1 THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC OPINION ON TEN

SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY (N = 200)

Strengtb of Majority Opinion

Direction of Majority Opinion (Per Cent) Statements majority agreed with:

A. The United States has a definite responsibility to the free world to prevent the spread of com- munism .................... 36

B. Red China must be admitted to the United Nations if we are to move toward establishing a lasting world peace .......... 70

C. The President of the United States should use the power of his office to influence the price policies of our major industries whenever necessary .......... 53

D. The Medicare program would be a better program if it were not compulsory for all citizens 59

Statements majority disagreed with: E. Even if the majority of the

members of the United Nations favor the admission of Red China, the United States should continue to oppose Red China's admission ................... 74

F. The seat on the United Nations Security Council now held by Nationalist China should be given to Red China .......... 74

G. Labor unions have a right to re- quire new employees to join the local union .................. 79

H. Management should be allowed to settle its differences with la- bor without government inter- vention ..................... 57

I. Medicare represents just one more step toward a socialized society where a government makes decisions which proper- ly belong to the individual.... 54

J. The Medicare bill was a signifi- cant step toward meeting the needs of American citizens without encroaching on the sphere of individual freedom.. 53

15 Cf. Arnold Rose, "Public Opinion Research Techniques Suggested by Sociological Theory," Theory and Method in Social Sciences (Minne- apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 210-19.

16 See, e.g., Theodore M. Newcomb, Person- ality and Social Change (New York: Dryden Press, 1943); Peter Blau, "Orientation of Students toward International Relations," American Journal of Sociology, LIX (1953), 205-14; and James A. Davis, "The Campus as a Frog Pond," American Journal of Sociology, LXXII (1966), 17-31.

' The sample was drawn from a small, liberal- arts, residential institution which restricts the opportunity for students to interact with others and therefore to form significant membership- reference groups beyond the college community. The social-class and ethnic homogeneity of the stu- dent body further constrains the development of multiple student subcultures of the type available at larger, more heterogeneous universities. In a study of a similar type, Blau remarks on the social pressure of student peers: "These findings suggest that it is not primarily the logical in- consistency of a student's political ideology but rather the influence of his or her associates which induces a strain towards consistency" (op. cit., p. 210).

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232 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

should be more aware of public opinion than non-congruents. Theoretically, non- congruents not only fail to receive support or approval for their own opinions but, since their actions are non-rewarding to others in the public, the result should be reduced communicative interaction.'8

At this point we invite the reader's atten- tion to an alternate interpretation which also accounts for these findings. It could

be assumed that people project their views on others (in this case the public) and that non-congruents simply have the "wrong" opinions, thus resulting in misperception of public opinion. This assumption accounts for the observed differences between con- gruents and non-congruents, but it does not account for the observed variations within each group.

Some congruents perceived public opinion inaccurately, while some non-congruents perceived public opinion accurately. In the

projection interpretation, these would have to be regarded as deviant cases. The theory we offer provides an explanation for the differences between congruents and non- congruents and for the differences within each group. Additional support for the dis- sonant-congruent model was obtained by correlating the proportion of non-congruents correctly perceiving public opinion with the size of the majority in the public. We

hypothesized that if interaction was a sig- nificant variable, the proportion of non- congruents-those not agreeing with the majority-who failed to accurately per- ceive public opinion should decrease as the size of the majority increased. If projection accounts for the misperception of non- congruents, there should be little change within the category of non-congruents as a function of the strength of majority opin- ion. The latter interpretation did not find support, as r = .74 (P < .01). Thus the size of the majority constituting public opinion significantly influenced the ability of non-congruents to correctly identify

TABLE 2

PROPORTION ACCURATELY PERCEIVING PUBLIC OPINION AMONG CONGRUENTS AND NON-CONGRUENTS

CONGRUENTS AND NON-CONGRUENTS Ac- CURATELY PERCEIVING THE DIRECTION

OF MAJORITY OPINION*

DIRECTION OF MAJORITY P OPINION Congruents Non-Congruents

Per Cent N Per Cent N

Statements majority agreed with:

A .................. 96 160 79 19 9.64 .01 B .................. 63 129 64 53 0.03 .90 C .................. 55 88 42 92 2.66 .20 D ..74....... . 74 106 49 74 9.22 .01

Statements majority disa- greed with:

E .................. 61 136 55 47 .47 .50 F ................... 80 132 60 50 7.92 .01 G . 65 141 40 35 7.46 .01 H .... 47 106 27 71 7.45 .01 I................ 61 100 36 81 11.37 .001

J................ 53 92 38 87 2.60 .20

* Sample size varies, since not all respondents answered each item.

18 S. Schachter makes this point very clear in his article "Deviation, Rejection and Communica- tion," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVI (1951), 190-207.

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DISSONANCE-CONGRUENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION 233

public opinion.19 In view of the supporting data and in the -absence of a crucial test of the two theories, our interpretation seems to have greater explanatory power.

The next step was to determine whether introduction of the relationship between individual opinion and cognitive set had any impact on public-opinion awareness. This was accomplished by comparing the individual's opinion with the opinion pre- dicted on the basis of his cognitive set. A

respondent's cognitive set had previously been determined by the extent of his en- dorsement or non-endorsement of a series of liberal-conservative items. To strengthen the analysis, we selected only respondents classified as having a highly liberal or con- servative cognitive set-the upper and lower

quartiles of the liberal-conservative scale. We then compared the individual's opinion on a given item with his predicted opinion on the basis of his scale score and opera- tionally defined the relationship as one of consonance or dissonance.

If the opinion was in the same direction as his cognitive set predicted, the relation- ship was defined as consonant; if the opin- ion was in the reverse direction, the rela- ti'onship was defined as dissonant. This

resulted in the classification of individuals into four role situations: consonant-con- gruents, dissonant-congruents, consonant- non-congruents, and dissonant-non-con- gruents. The percentage of individuals in each category correctly predicting the dis- tribution of public opinion for each issue was then determined. These data are pre- sented in Table 3.

Formally the hypothesis read: The rank- order prediction of public opinion would descend from dissonant-congruents to con- sonant-congruents, to consonant-non-con- gruents, to dissonant-non-congruents. The data were organized according to the hy- pothesis and cast into the form presented in Table 4.

Examination of Table 4 discloses that the

TABLE 3

PROPORTION ACCURATELY PERCEIVING PUBLIC OPINION AMONG DISSONANT- CONGRUENTS, CONSONANT-CONGRUENTS, CONSONANT-NON-CONGRUENTS,

AND DISSONANT-NON-CONGRUENTS*

DISSONANT- CONSONANT- CONSONANT- DIssONANT- CONGRUENTS CONGRUENTS NON-CONGRUENTS NON-CONGRUENTS

ITEM I II III IV

Per Cent N Per Cent N Per Cent N Per Cent N

A .. 98 50 88 43 91 11 25 4 B ... 81 16 79 63 74 31 ........ ........ C ... 83 23 59 59 68 28 33. 3 D ... 86 29 77 44 69 35 33 3 E . 50 44 73 41 2 52 21 F.... 45 47 29 24 57 23 23 13 G. 43 35 39 33 61 28 36 14 H. 75 54 64 58 38 40 25 4 I ... 67 39 76 21 50 44 38 8 I ... 46 11 56 43 37 51 25 4

* The upper and lower quartiles of the liberal and conservative scales are used in this analysis. Group size varies, since not all respondents answered each item.

19M. J. Rosenberg and R. P. Abelson make this point indirectly when they suggest that another way of coping with imbalance is to "stop thinking" about the elements which have fallen into an imbalanced configuration. To "stop thinking" about the imbalance requires at a minimum avoiding communicative interaction about the discrepancy (M. J. Rosenberg, C. I. Hovland, W. J. McGuire, R. P. Abelson, and J. W. Brehm, Attitude, Organ- ization and Change: An Analysis of Consistency among Attitude Components [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960]).

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234 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

hypothesis was upheld. Of the ten items tested, two (D and H) resulted in perfect rank ordering of the four dissonant-con- gruent types, while four others (A, C, I, and J) contained only one error. If these are defined as "successful" outcomes, then the probability of the observed ranked orderings is less than .001. It should be noted that dissonant-congruents always predict more accurately than dissonant- non-congruents but that the rank order for consonant-congruents and consonant-non- congruents is less stable.

TABLE 4 RANK ORDER OF DISSONANT-CONGRUENTS

CONSONANT-CONGRUJENTS, CONSONANT-NON- CONGRUENTS, AND DISSONANT-NON-CON- GRUENTS CORRECTLY PERCEIVING DIREC- TION OF PUBLIC OPINION*

Consonant- Dissonant- Item Dissonants Consonant- Non- Non- Congruents Congruents Congruents Congruents

A 1 3 2 4 B 1 2 3 ........ C .... 1 3 2 4 D . . . 1 2 3 4 E . . . 3 1 4 2 F . . .. 2 3 1 4 G . . . 2 3 1 4 H . . . 1 2 3 4 I . . . 2 1 3 4 J . . . . 2 1 3 4

Total 16 21 25 34

* Z score for number of successful rank orderings = 3.69; P < .001.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study we have attempted to an- alyze the relationship between awareness of public opinion (dependent variable) and personal opinion and cognitive set (inde- pendent variables) according to a balance model related to the work of Festinger, Heider, and Osgood.20 In many ways it parallels the efforts of Cartwright, Davis, Newcomb,21 and others to develop a struc- tural model embodying social psychological postulates.

By comparing personal opinion and cog-

nitive set, we arrived at a structural rela- tionship of consonance or dissonance; by comparing personal opinion and public opinion, we arrived at a structural relation- ship of congruence or non-congruence. Com- bining these relationships led to a typology of four types: dissonance-congruence, con- sonance-congruence, consonance-non-con- gruence, and dissonance-non-congruence. Given the assumption that people seek to balance these relationships, we derived a model which permitted prediction of which set of relationships led to accurate percep- tion of public opinion.

The model was then tested on a series of public-opinion issues using a random sam- ple of college students. Statistical analysis confirmed the hypotheses generated from the model. Although social position in the communication network was relatively un- controlled, the theory permits these vari- ables to enter into analysis by linking social psychological theory to the relationships between an individual and others.

The theory is an improvement on those models which explain awareness of group opinion solely on structural position. The latter, for example, fail to explain the dif- ferences between persons occupying a simi- lar structural position, that is, why some leaders are more aware of group opinion than other leaders or why some non-leaders are better predictors than leaders.22 In these instances it would seem necessary to introduce variables which account for the individual's failure to exploit his structural position or for his distorted perception of public opinion. It is toward the solution of this type of problem that our theory ap- pears to offer promise. COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

' Festinger, op. cit.; Heider, op. cit.; Osgood and Tannebaum, op. cit.

' Dorwin Cartwright and Frank Harary, "Struc- tural Balance: A Generalization of Heider's The- ory," Psychological Review, LXIII (1956), 277-93; James Davis, "Structural Balance, Mechanical Sol- idarity, and Interpersonal Relations," American Journal of Sociology, LXVIII (1963), 444-62; and Theodore Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts," Psychological Review, LX (1953), 393-404.

22See, e.g., Chowdhry and Newcomb, op. cit.

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