1

Corporate governance and bank performance: Empirical evidence from Nepalese financial

institution

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of corporate governance on bank performance in the context of

Nepal. Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are dependent variables for bank

performance, and board size, female board members, financial institutions, CEO duality,

independent directors, firm size, firm age, earnings per share, and the capital adequacy ratio are

independent variables for corporate governance. Data are collected from Banking and Financial

Statistics of Nepal Rastra Bank, NRB Directives, legal provisions incorporated in the Companies

Act of 2006, relevant bylaws regarding corporate governance, provisions in the Bank and

Financial Institution Act of 2006, and supervision reports of Nepal Rastra Bank. According to

the results, corporate governance has significant effects on the ROA and ROE of financial

institutions, indicating that various elements of corporate governance, including the presence of

independent directors and firm size, have positive effects on firm performance. However, female

board members, board size, board members, and board member compensation have negative

effects on firm performance based on ROA.

Keywords: Board Size, Board Composition, Duality, Audit Committee, Firm Size, Firm

Performance, Capital Adequacy, Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Listed Firms, Nepal

1. Introduction

Corporate governance is a system by which firms are directed and controlled. If there is no

effective corporate governance, then firms may face some difficulty. Similarly, setting a good

corporate governance policy can produce many benefits at various levels of management and

thus help firms avoid management-level corruption, thereby enhancing firm value and

shareholder value by reducing investment and financial risks. Therefore, a sound corporate

governance policy is a key criterion in investing in a firm (Shen, Shu, & Chen, 2006).

Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify a theoretical relationship between corporate governance

and firm performance by combining elements of agency theory, property cost theory, and finance

2

theory for a theory of a firm’s ownership structure. They clearly define the firm, the agency cost,

and property rights, analyze the agency cost of equity and debt, and find that a decrease in the

manager’s ownership claim reduces his or her incentive to make efforts to maximize the firm’s

value, thereby increasing the agency and reducing the firm’s net value. That is, an increase in the

manager’s ownership percentage increases firm value.

Considering the Korean banking industry for the 1994-2000 period, Weon (2005) examines how

the effectiveness of managerial ownership is affected by regulatory regimes in the industry and

banks’ moral hazard incentives and finds that bank managers in the high-moral-hazard group are

more likely to have the incentive to collimate their interests to those of stockholders by taking on

a higher level of risk with an increase in managerial ownership. However, the period is relatively

short, and therefore the agency problem of a bank is characterized by changes in its holdings or

ownership structure when the bank has more moral hazard incentives and faces lax banking

regulations. In addition, the model reveals that the higher the risk taken, the worse the bank

performance.

Corporate governance can be defined as relationships between shareholders, the board of

directors, and top management in the determination of the firm’s direction and performance

(Wheelen & Hunger, 2006). It may also include relationships between many players (i.e.,

stakeholders) and goals of the firm. Principal players include shareholders, management, and the

board of directors. Other stakeholders can include employees, suppliers, customers, banks and

other lenders, regulators, the environment, and the community at large. Ruin (2001) states that

corporate governance reflects a group of people getting together as one united body with the task

and responsibility to direct, control, and rule with authority. In this regard, Thomas (2002)

describes corporate governance as the means by which the government of a firm (directors) is

made responsible to its electorates (stakeholders).

Mariana (2006) investigates the relationship between ownership concentration and performance

by accounting for effects of hostile takeover threats on this relationship in publicly traded firms

in the U.K., the Czech Republic, and Poland in 1999 by using the generalized method of

moments (GMM) and finds that this concentration is not a significant predictor of firm

performance in both developed and transition countries. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) use

data from 175 publicly traded firms in Greece to empirically identify any strong evidence of

3

effects of the ownership structure on firm performance measured by profitability and find a

significant positive relationship between profitability and the ownership structure. More

specifically, they suggest that the more the shares are concentrated in outside or inside

shareholders, the more efficient the firm’s management as well as the higher the firm’s

performance.

The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities across

various stakeholders of the firm, including boards, managers, shareholders, and others, and spells

out rules and procedures for the firm to operate on a sound basis. The concept of corporate

governance has become popular with the emergence of the agency problem when the ownership

of the firm is separated from control. Mahfuja and Imam (2007) stated that the need for corporate

governance arises from the potential conflict of interest between participants stakeholders in the

corporate structure. Such conflicts of interest often arise because different participants have

different goals and preferences. In this regard, corporate governance has been introduced to

ensure that agents of owners of a firm control that firm in ways that serve the interest of the

firm’s shareholders.

Delfino (2007) examines the effects of control changes (due to privatization, foreign acquisition

and merger and acquisitions) on efficiency and productivity in Argentina’s banking sector by

using panel data for the 1993–2000 period to construct the regression model and concluding that

state-owned banks are less efficient than private ones, bank privatization provides only short-

term efficiency gains, foreign acquisitions increase the productivity acquired banks (although it

does not affect efficiency), and mergers and acquisitions have a negative impact on bank

performance.

Heiss and Koke (2004) investigate the determinants of changes in corporate ownership and firm

failure for German firms by considering 1,510 German firms for the 1986–1995 period based on

firm performance, the capital structure, the ownership structure, and firm size and show that

many determinants of failure affect ownership changes in the bank-based economy, including

poor performance, weak corporate governance, high leverage, and a small firm size. In addition,

the ownership structure plays a role in both events. Größl and Levratto (2008) examine the

effects of private ownership on bank performance in Bulgaria and Hungary at a theoretical level

by taking into account the principles of corporate governance and find that, in both transition

4

countries, private ownership plays a crucial role, particularly if it is combined with the principles

of good corporate governance, which depends on accepted social norms derived from cultural

values such as rule the of law and accountability. Focusing on Bulgaria and Hungary, which are

different in their value orientation, Grosl and Levratto (2008) conclude that Bulgaria hinders the

privatization process of banks as a result of corruption, the absence of appropriate laws, and the

maximization of owners’ interests, whereas Hungary, which is based more on the Western

system, supports the creation of private banks.

Hallward et al. (2006) examine 1,500 Chinese enterprises in five cities to investigate the

components of the investment climate and their effects on firm performance and reveal that both

the ownership and investment climate measures influence firm performance, more specifically

productivity and growth. In particular, with firm performance as a dependent variable, they find

that it is positively correlated with foreign and domestic private ownership, light regulatory

burdens, limited corruption, technological infrastructure, and labor market flexibility.

Finally, Capon, Farley, and Hoenig (1990) summarize based on a meta-analysis of 320 empirical

studies of the financial performance of industries and firms for the 1921-1987 period by counting

the occurrence of qualitative relationships and conducting an ANCOVA of regression

coefficients associated with eight frequently studied casual variables. They find that most studies

highlight significant positive relationships of firm performance to industry concentration, sales

and asset growth, capital investment intensity (of the industry), and advertising. On the other

hand, they find a negative relationship between firm performance and debt but no significant

relationship between firm performance and size (measured by assets and sales) and firm control

(owners vs. managers).

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in

context of Nepal’s banking sector. More specifically, it examines the effects of board size, the

number of female board members, the type of financial institution, CEO duality, the number of

independent directors, firm size, firm age (the year of establishment), leverage, earnings per

share and capital adequacy ratio.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample, data, and

methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes with a discussion

on important implications.

5

2. Methodological aspects

This paper employs secondary data from 25 financial institutions (20 commercial banks and 5

development banks) in Nepal. The data are obtained from Banking and Financial Statistics of

Nepal Rastra Bank, NRB Directives, legal provisions incorporated in the Companies Act of

2006, relevant bylaws regarding corporate governance, provisions in the Bank and Financial

Institutions Act of 2006, and supervision reports of Nepal Rastra Bank, among others. The data

include return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), board size, the number of female board

members, the types of financial institution, CEO duality, the number of independent directors,

firm size, firm age (the year of establishment), leverage, earnings per share, and the capital

adequacy ratio.

A pooled cross-sectional data analysis is conducted, and the research design involves causal

comparison because it addresses relationships between corporate governance and control

variables for bank performance. More specifically, the paper examines the effects of board size,

female board members, financial institutions, CEO duality, independent directors, firm size, firm

age, leverage, earnings per share, and the capital adequacy ratio on ROA and ROE as the

dependent variables. The data are collected for the period from 2008/2009 to 2012/2013. Table 1

shows a list of commercial and development banks selected for the analysis as well as the

analysis period and the number of observations.

Table 1. Commercial and development banks selected for the analysis

S. No List of Banks Year No. of observation

1 Kist Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

2 Mega Bank Nepal Limited 2010/2011-2012/2013 3

3 Siddhartha Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

4 Bank of Kathmandu Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

5 Everest Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

6 Standard Chartered Bank Nepal Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

7 Laxmi Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

8 Sunrise Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

9 Himalayan Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

6

10 Nepal Investment Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

11 Grand Bank Nepal Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

12 Machhapuchhre Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

13 Nabil Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

14 NMB Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

15 Global IME Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

16 Sanima Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

17 Kumari Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

18 Nepal SBI Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

19 Citizen Bank 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

20 Prime Commercial Bank Limited 2008/2009-2012/2013 5

21 Vibor Development Bank Limited 2010/2011-2012/2013 3

22 Ace Development Bank Limited 2010/2011-2012/2013 3

23 City Development Bank Limited 2010/2011-2012/2013 3

24 Siddhartha Development Bank Limited 2010/2011-2012/2013 3

25 Clean Energy Development Bank

Limited

2010/2011-2012/2013 3

Total # of observations 113

The model

The estimated model assumes that bank performance depends on several corporate governance

and control variables. The variables for corporate governance are board size, female board

members, financial institutions, CEO duality, independent directors, firm size, firm age,

leverage, earnings per share, and the capital adequacy ratio, and the dependent variables are

ROA and ROE:

7

Bank performance = f (CG variables, control variables).

There are various measures of bank performance. Jeon and Miller (2006) measure bank

performance by bank profitability and productivity. This paper measures bank performance as

bank profitability in term of ROA and ROE:

ROE = β0+ β1BS+ β2FI+ β3FBM+ β4DUL+ β5ID+ β6FS+ β7FA+ β8LEV+ β9EPS+ β10CAR + e ,

ROA = β0+ β1BS+ β2FI+ β3FBM+ β4DUL+ β5ID+ β6FS+ β7FA+ β8LEV+ β9EPS+ β10CAR + e .

The following hypotheses are tested:

H1: Board size (BS) is negatively related to bank performance,

H2: Female board members (FBM) are negatively related to ROA and ROE,

H3: CEO duality (DUL) is positively related to bank performance,

H4: Leverage (LEV) is negatively related to bank performance,

H5: Financial institutions (FI) are negatively related to bank performance,

H6: Independent directors (ID) are positively related to ROE and ROA,

H7: Firm size (FS) and age (FA) are positively related to bank performance,

H8: Earnings per share (EPS) are negatively related to bank performance,

H9: The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is positively related to ROA and negatively related

to ROE.

8

3. Presentation and analysis of data

Descriptive statistics

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for effects of various independent variables on bank

performance, including the maximums, minimums, ranges, means, and standard deviations for

all variables.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

Particular Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation

ROE 93.52 -31.63 61.89 15.51 12.73

ROA 13.11 -1.28 11.83 1.66 1.73

BS 6.00 5.00 11.00 7.80 1.25

FBM 2.00 .00 2.00 .30 0.58

DUL 1.00 .00 1.00 .85 0.35

ID 2.00 0.00 2.00 .49 0.62

FI 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.26 0.44

FS 9.81 .01 9.82 1.51 2.17

FA 33.00 2.00 35.00 12.55 8.10

LEV 76.45 .00 76.45 1.80 9.15

EPS 120.30 -11.30 109.00 21.34 24.33

CAR 18.37 10.04 28.41 13.66 3.51

As shown in Table 2, ROE ranges from -31.63% to 61.89% (average = 15.51%), and ROA

ranges from -1.28% to 11.83% (average = 1.6605%). BS ranges from 5 to 11 (average = 8), and

the maximum number of FBM ranges from 0 to 2 (average = 1). DUL ranges from 0 to 1 and 2,

and ID ranges from 0 to 2, FS ranges from 0% to 10% (average = 2%), and FA ranges from 2 to

35 years. Leverage ranges from 0% to 76%, and EPS ranges from -11.3% and 109%. The CAR

ranges from 10.04% to 28.41% (average = 13.66%).

Correlation analysis

Pearson correlation coefficients are computed (Table 3). According to the results, FI and FS are

positively related to ROE and ROA. An increase in the ratio of book values to total assets

increases bank performance. FS is positively related to FBM, ID, and FI but negatively related to

BS and DUL. An increase in the net income to total assets increases ROA and ROE, that is, bank

performance. FA is positively related to FBM, ID, FI, and FS but negatively related to BS and

9

DUL. LEV is negatively related to ROE and ROA, indicating that banks do not prefer debt. A

decrease in the ratio of total debt to total equity increases bank performance. There is a positive

correlation between EPS and bank performance. That is, an increase in EPS increase ROA and

ROE, that is, bank performance.

EPS is positively related to DUL, ID, FI, FA and FA but negatively related to LEV. Finally,

CAR is negatively related to ROE. That is, an increase in CAR reduces bank performance. On

the other hand CAR is positively related to ROA, indicating that an increase in CAR increases

bank performance.

Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix

VAR ROE ROA BS FBM DUL ID FI FS FA LEV EPS CAR

ROE 1

ROA .101 1

BS -.039 -.056 1

FBM -.24** -.060 -

2.24*

1

DUL .36** .1 -.104 -

.35**

1

ID .405* .29** .179 -.042 -.047 1

FI .58** .044 -.098 -.038 -.04 .39** 1

FS .151 .040 -

.31**

.200* -

.203*

.106 .312** 1

FA .567** .094 -.149 .101 -.007 .308** .521** .291** 1

LEV -.107 -.070 -.081 -.049 .061 .131 -.100 -.018 -.160 1

EPS .654** .136 -.109 -.114 .157 .526** .517** .337** .315** -

.108

1

CAR -

.400**

.179 -.126 .132 .041 -.040 -

.356**

-.027 -.28** .084 -.2* 1

10

Regression analysis

Table 4 shows the regression of corporate governance and control variables on bank

performance. As shown in the table, the results for ROE show that BS, FBM, and CAR are

negatively related to ROE. That is, an increase in BS, FBM, or CAR reduces ROE, that is, a

decrease in bank performance. DUL, ID, FI, FS, FA, LEV, and EPS are positively related to

ROE (FS, FA, LEV, and EPS are significant at 5%). In addition, an increase in the ratio of book

value to total assets increases bank performance, and an increase in the ratio of total debt to total

equity or EPS increases bank performance.

R-squared value in the table 4 measures the percentage of variation in dependent variable i.e.

ROE by the independent variables. Only 1% of the variance in the ROE is explained by BS.

Whereas 62%, 58.5%, 56.75% of the variance in ROE is explained by FBM, FI, and FA

respectively. But, only 13%, 15.1%, 1.1%, and 16% of the variance is explained by DUL, FS,

LEV, and CAR respectively. While 40.5% of the variance is explained by ID in ROE and 42.8%

of the variability is explained by EPS in ROE. While 53.9% of the variability is explained by BS,

FBM, ID, and FI in ROE. Similarly, 59.9% of the variability is explained by FA, EPS, and CAR

in ROE. But only, 7.1% of the variability is explained by the variables BS, and FBM.

Table 4. Stepwise regression coefficient between ROE and the independent variable

The results are based on pooled cross-sectional data including 113 observations from 25

financial institutions for the period from 2008/2009 to 2012/2013. The models is ROE = β0+

β1BS+ β2FI+ β3FBM+ β4DUL+ β5ID+ β6FS+ β7FA+ β8LEV+ β9EPS+ β10CAR + e.

S.N Inter-

cept

Regression coefficient R2 SEE F

BS FBM DU

L

ID FI FS FA LEV EPS CAR

1 18.55

(2.44)*

-

.389

(.40

5)

.01 12.7

8

.164

2 17.16

(12.9)

-5.43

(-

2.6)*

.62 12.3

9

7.25

3 4.32

(1.44)

13.0

6

(4.0

.13

0

11.9 16.4

2

11

5)

4 11.4

(8.18)

8.2

(4.65)

.40

5

11.6

9

21.6

2

5 -22.50

(-4.40)

16.76

(7.57)

.58

5

10.3

7

57.3

5

6 14.17

(9.7)**

.885

(1.60)

*

.15

1

12.6

4

2.57

8

7 4.33

(2.35)

.891

(7.21)*

.56

7

10.5

4

52.0

72

8 15.78

(-.149)

12.88

(-

1.1)*

.01

1

12.7

2

1.27

5

9 8.20

(6.7)**

.342

(9.06)*

.42

8

9.68

1

82.1

8

10 35.30

(7.905)

-1.4

(-4.0)

.16

0

11.7

3

20.9

1

11 25.11

(3.2)**

-

1.00

(-

1.04

)

-5.92

(-

2.0)*

*

.07

1

12.3

8

4.18

12 11.33

(1.44)

-

1.16

(-

1.37

)

-3.12

(-

1.61)

11.5

8

(3.6

6)

8.798

(5.40)

.33

1

10.6

1

13.0

13 -29.16

(-

3.0)**

-

.124

(.86

4)

-2.08

(-

1.28)

4.44

(2.9)*

*

14.56

(6.9)

.53

9

8.84 24.0

14 -20.94

(-

2.6)**

.34

(.44

4)*

11.92

(4.83)

-.457

(-

.97)*

.594

(4.40)

.44

5

9.66 21.4

9

15 10.69

(2.7)**

.576

(5.55)

.259

(7.49)

-.57

(-2.4)

.59

5

8.22 52.8

6

Note:

Dependent variable: ROE.

Figures in parentheses are t-values.

*and** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

12

Table 5 shows the stepwise regression of corporate governance and control variables on ROA.

BS is negatively related to ROA. That is, an increase in BS reduces ROA, that is, bank

performance.

Table 5. Stepwise regression coefficient between ROA and the independent variable

The results are based on pooled cross-sectional data including 113 observations from 25

financial institutions for the period from 2008/2009 to 2012/2013. The models is ROA = β0+

β1BS+ β2FI+ β3FBM+ β4DUL+ β5ID+ β6FS+ β7FA+ β8LEV+ β9EPS+ β10CAR + e.

S.N Interce

pt

Regression coefficient R2 SE

E

F

BS FBM DUL ID FI FS FA LEV EPS CA

R

1 2.265

(2.19)*

-.077

(-

.592)

.00

3

1.7

4

.35

2 1.71

(9.22)

-.180

(-.634)

.00

4

1.7

4

.40

2

3 1.23

(2.841)

.497

(1.0)*

*

.00

1

1.7

3

1.1

2

4 1.25

(6.2)**

.820

(3.2)*

.08

8

1.6

6

10.

63

5 1.26

(1.473)

.17

3

(.46

5)

.00

2

1.7

45

.21

6

6 1.612

(8.018)

.032

(.424

)

.00

2

1.7

45

.17

9

7 1.407

(4.6)**

.020

(.990

)

.00

9

1.7

39

.98

1

8 1.685

(10.6)

-.013

(-.740)

.00

5

1.7

42

.54

8

9 1.453

(6.667)

.010

(1.43)

*

.01

8

1.7

3

2.0

64

10 4.49

(.686)

.089

(1.91

1)

.03

2

1.7

18

3.6

53

11 1.884

(1.712)

-.141

(-

1.10)

.518

(1.164

)

.884

(3.0)*

*

.11

1

1.6

6

4.5

1

13

12 1.443

(4.604)

-.225

(-

.77)**

.023

(.278

)

.020

(.935

)

.01

4

1.7

5

.52

9

13 1.329

(4.384)

.881

(3.25)

-.005

(-

.23)

-.022

(-1.23)

.10

1

1.6

71

4.0

33

14 -.810

(-.552)

.017

(.131)

.025

(1.19

)

.012

(1.72

6)

.129

(2.59

)*

.08

0

1.6

98

2.3

37

15 -.138

(.705)

.871

(2.88)

.005

(.067

)

-.024

(-1.37)

.001

(.090)

.102

(2.16

9)

.14

1

1.6

49

3.4

86

Note:

Dependent variable: ROA.

Figures in parentheses are t-values.

*and** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

FBM and LEV are negatively related to ROA, indicating that an increase in FBM and LEV

reduces ROA, that is, bank performance. This suggests that banks should reduce FBM and LEV

to enhance their performance. DUL, ID, FI, FS, FA, EPS, and CAR are positively related to

ROA. That is, these variables enhance bank performance. This suggests that banks should

increase DUL, ID, FI, FS, FA, EPS, and CAR to enhance their performance. DUL is significant

at 1%, whereas ID and EPS are significant at 5%.

R-squared value in the Table 5 measures the percentage of variation in the dependent variable

i.e. ROA as explained by the independent variables. Only 0.3% and 0.4%of the variance in ROE

is explained by BS and FBM respectively. Whereas only 1%, 8.8%, 0.2% of the variance in ROE

is explained by DUL, ID, and FI respectively. While 1.8% of the variance is explained by EPS in

ROE and only 0.5% of the variability is explained by LEV in ROE. While 11.1% of the

variability is explained by BS, DUL, and ID in ROE. Similarly, 14.1% of the variability is

explained by ID, FS, and LEV, EPS, and CAR in ROE. But only, 1.4% of the variability is

explained by the variables FBM, FS, and FA.

4. A summary and conclusions

This paper employs data on 25 financial institutions (20 commercial banks and 5 development

banks) in Nepal for the 2009-2013 period for commercial banks and for 2010/2011-2012/2013

14

period for development banks. The paper employs descriptive analysis, correlation analysis, and

the multiple regression methods to measure bank performance based on ROA and ROE.

Noteworthy is that BS is negatively related to both ROA and ROE. That is, an increase in the

number of board members reduces bank performance. FBM is negatively related to ROA and

ROE, indicating that an increase in the numbers of the females on the board of directors reduces

bank performance. Likewise, DUL is positively related to ROA and ROE, indicating that bank

performance is better when the chairman is different from the CEO, that is, when decision

makers are different. ID is positively related to ROE and ROA, indicating that professional

directors on the board enhance bank performance. In the case of commercial banks in Nepal,

there is no CEO duality.

CAR is negatively related to ROE but positively related to ROA. That is, an increase in CAR

reduces bank performance in terms of ROE but increases it in terms of ROA. LEV is positively

related to bank performance, indicating that banks pursuing leverage are more likely to perform

better than those using their own capital. In sum, these results suggest that financial institutions

should emphasize corporate governance for better performance.

References

Capon. N, Farley & S. Hoenig, (October 1990). “Determinants of financial performance: A

meta-analysis, “Management Science 36, 3, 10-19.

Delfino, M. E. (July 2007). “Control Changes and Firm Performance in Banking,” International

Journal of the Economics of Business, 14, 2, 261-281.

Größl, I. & N Levratto, (2008). “The role of social norms for the relationship between private

ownership and the performance of banking sectors in transition countries: The cases of

Bulgaria and Hungary as examples, “Corporate Ownership and Control 5, 2, 68-86.

Hallward, M.D., S. Wallsten, & X. L Colin, (2006). “Ownership, Investment climate and Firm

performance, “ Economics of Transition 14, 4, 2006.

Heiss, F., &J Koke, (2004). “Dynamics in Ownership and Firm Survival: Evidence from

Corporate Germany,” European Financial Management, 10, 1, 167-195.

15

Jensen M C & W H Meckling, (1976). Theory of the firm: “Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs

and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 12, 305-360.

Kapopoulos, & S Lazaretou, (March 2007). “Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm

Performance: evidence from Greek firms,” Corporate Governance, 15, 4, 144-158.

Mahfuja Malik & Osman Imam Mahmood, (2007). Firm Performance and Corporate

Governance through Ownership Structure Evidence from Bangladesh Stock Market.

International Review of Business Research Papers, 3, 4, 88-110.

Mariana, (2006). “Ownership concentration, market monitoring and performance: Evidence from

the UK, the Czech Republic and Poland,” Journal of Applied Economics. 9, 1, 91-104.

Shen, M J. & Chen, M. C, (2006), A Study of Ownership Structures and Firm Values Under

Corporate Governance – The Case of Listed and OTC Companies in Taiwan’s Finance

Industry, The Journal of American Academy of Business Cambridge, 8, 1, 184-191.

Thomas, Tommy, 2002. Corporate Governance and Debt in the Malaysian Financial Crisis of

1997-98. Working Paper Series. Centre Secretary.

Weon (2005). “Moral hazard, agency problem and ownership structure,” Corporate Ownership

and Control 3, 2, 116-124.

Wheelen, T. L., & J. D Hunger, (2006). Strategic Management and Business Policy. 10th Ed.

United States of America: Pearson Prentice Hall.