Dr. Marcel M. Baumann Prof. Dr. Reinhart Kößler

Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg im Breisgau Arnold Bergstraesser Institute Department of Political Science for socio-cultural research Section for International Relations at the University of Freiburg Rempartstr. 15 Windausstr. 16 79085 Freiburg im Breisgau 79110 Freiburg im Breisgau Germany Germany Phone: +49-761-203-3483 Phone: +49-761-88878-23 Fax: +49-761-203-9185 Fax: +49-761-88878-78 marcel.baumann@politik.uni-freiburg.de r-koessler@gmx.de

Contested “Amnesias”: Remembering, Forgetting or “Non-

Addressing”?

The “Victim-Perpetrator-Formula” and the Normative Dimension of Deal-

ing with the Past

(First Draft. Do not quote or cite without the consent of the authors)

Conference Paper

6th ECPR General Conference, University of Iceland, 25th – 27th August 2011

Section 53 - Human Rights and Transitional Justice in post-conflict societies and periods of democratization

Panel 508 - The Role and Impact of Norms in Transitional Justice Processes

Panel Session: 12 - Saturday, 27 August, 17.00-18.40

1. Introduction: Normative changes of memoralization

[...] in the house of the hangman one should not speak about noose, otherwise one might seem to harbor resentment (Adorno 1970: 10).

Theodor W. Adorno asked the basic question what the popular term “dealing with the past”1

means for the situation in Germany after the Holocaust. His critical remark about ropes in the

house of the hangman wants to provide a raison d’être for public memory or memoralization.

In his analysis, the political reality of post-war Germany was characterized by a tendency to

fend off any thoughts of guilt; a tendency that is linked to the question of dealing with the

past. For Adorno, this linkage is “paradoxical” and has informed his thinking about dealing

with the past (Adorno 1970: 20). On the one hand, he acknowledges a need of post-war soci-

ety to get rid of the past, because you cannot live under the shadow of the past “horrors” –

indeed, the horror, in Adorno’s words, is seemingly unstoppable because guilt and violence

continue to be “paid off“ with further guilt and violence. On the other hand, however, he criti-

cizes the attempts to write off the past because the past is “highly alive” (ibid.). The fascist

past is still alive despite all the attempts of dealing with the past. They did not succeed, but

only led to “empty and cold forgetting” with the severe consequence that the societal condi-

tions that led to fascism do still persist (ibid.: 23).

Adorno’s famous essay “The meaning of working through the past” exerted some consider-

able impact on the public perception of the legacy of the Holocaust and its memoralization in

post-war Germany. His statements marked the beginning of a new phase in dealing with Ger-

man history, because his analysis contributed towards a new norm of memoralization for the

“second German democracy” (cf. Jureit & Schneider 2010: 110ff.), i.e. to a normative change:

the past must be remembered as a way of “constant warning”. Thus, within the decade be-

tween the publication of Adorno’s essay and his death in 1969, a sea change of perceptions

and awareness regarding the public memory of the past occurred in German society (ibid.:

110ff.).

Adorno’s analysis of public memory and his critique of the strategy of “empty and cold for-

getting” is of enormous relevance for processes and strategies of memoralization also beyond

the case of post-war Germany: Memory, the image of the past, is of vital importance for the

ways individuals and societies view themselves and also for the building of consensus and

1 Space does not permit to go into the intricacies particularly of German terminology, such as Vergan-

genheitsbewältigung or Vergangenheitsbearbeitung.

3

shared ideas that work towards the integration of societies and nation building especially in

post war and postcolonial periods. Particularly in war-stricken societies there is a need to fill

the given framework of the nation state with some broadly acceptable meaning and a culture

of coexistence that in some way reaches over the various social cleavages, besides working

for the minimal material gratifications and the distributional justice conventionally dubbed as

development.

From this perspective in particular, it is important to stress the processual and contentious

character of the memory processes in question (cf. also Bangerter 2002). In recent debate, as-

cription of individual or collective identity to various forms and contents of memory is quite

commonplace. However, the controversies and struggles involved specifically have received

markedly less attention (see in particular, interventions in A. Assmann 2002). This circum-

stance constitutes a challenge, since approaches of how to understand and conceptualize pub-

lic memory play a vital role in any process of dealing with the past. Public memory must be

conceptualized or re-conceptualized as a reflection in particular of the fragmented situation in

which societies affected by civil war or marked by colonial experiences find themselves.

These dynamics extend not only to remembering, but also to forgetting (cf. Renan 1882: 294-

295).

Inevitably such processes and implicit as well as explicit choices involve silent or outright

controversy. Ulrike Jureit and Christian Schneider have made the strong claim about “per-

ceived victims”: In their view, the memoralization of post-war Germany was dominated by

the wish of identification with the victims. Germans perceived themselves as victims. This

wish of identification has become “a new norm for memory politics” (Jureit & Schneider

2010: 10).

A further perspective is supplied by contributions of the highly-respected German historian

Christian Meier who delivered a comprehensive analysis of dealing with the legacies of war

(Meier 1996, 2010). Meier challenges the common normative orientation, which, in his view,

dominates the modern thinking about remembering and forgetting: In this view, successful

dealing with the past is premised on keeping the memory of the past, in particular of past in-

justice, alive. Meier goes back to Greek antiquity and explores what societies undertook in

order to find “reconciliation” after violence and war. He tries to make a contentious argument:

Since ancient history, the world’s cure to overcome the past was forgetting. Forgetting be-

came something like a “golden rule” or even long-established norm in the history of warfare.

4

Meier then poses an intriguing question: Can we argue that forgetting is a better strategy of

dealing with the legacies of the past than remembrance or public memoralization?

The former German president Richard von Weizsäcker would probably reject Meier’s analy-

sis. On 5 May 1985 he made a remarkable speech in the Bundestag during the Ceremony

Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the End of War in Europe:

The young and old generations must and can help each other to understand why it is vital to keep alive the memories. It is not a case of coming to terms with the past. That is not possible. It cannot be subsequently modified or made undone. However, anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the present. Whoever refuses to remember the inhu-manity is prone to new risks of infection. The Jewish nation remembers and will always remember. [...] The experience of millionfold death is part of the very being of every Jew in the world, not only because people cannot forget such atrocities, but also because re-membrance is part of the Jewish faith. “Seeking to forget makes exile all the longer; the secret of redemption lies in remembrance.” This oft quoted Jewish adage surely expresses the idea that faith in God is faith in the work of God in history. [...] If we for our part sought to forget what has occurred, instead of remembering it, this would not only be in-human. We would also impinge upon the faith of the Jews who survived and destroy the basis of reconciliation (see the original document at: http://www.mediaculture-online.de/fileadmin/bibliothek/weizsaecker_speech_may85/weizsaecker_speech_may85.pdf, last accessed: 1.7.2011)

This speech, which was broadcasted live on West German public TV and was subsequently

translated into more than 20 different languages, had an extraordinary impact on (West) Ger-

many as well as on Europe and the world. In particular, there were massive positive responses

in Israel. The speech laid the foundation for the first state visit of the West German president

to Israel, which took place in October 1985. Weizsäcker’s speech initiated a major normative

change in thinking about how to deal with the past: redemption became the central promise

for memoralization of the “second German generation”. However, Jureit and Schneider

(2010) criticize Weizsäcker’s “promise of redemption” as misleading. Their intervention

proves once again that still today, the question of public memory remains a bone of conten-

tion that regularly causes stormy debates within society and the “scientific community”.

In our paper we intend to take part in this lively political and scholarly debate. We want to

address the normative dimension of dealing with the past: as a theory reflection on victimiza-

tion and the politics of victimhood by incorporating the concept of “non-addressing” (“Nicht-

Thematisierung”). The German term “Nicht-Thematisierung” can be referred to Aleida Ass-

mann, who used it to describe the “policy of forgetting” in Germany after 1945 (Assmann, A

2011: 307). This policy consisted of “acts of communicative silence” which aimed at estab-

lishing a protected “cocoon of non-addressing”: the biographies of many Nazi stalwarts were

simply not addressed. To do so, would have been considered as a danger to the unfolding

process of democratization during the early stages of the Cold War (ibid.: 37).

5

In this paper, we want to understand the term “non-addressing” not quite in the sense of Alei-

da Assmann – i.e. not in terms of communicative silence, but shifting the term to, so to speak

to, the flipside of amnesia. The concept of non-addressing shall serve as a new perspective

within the vast literature on public memory and transitional justice by elaborating on the idea

of amnesia: Amnesia can be reduced to simple “forgetting” only in very superficial thinking;

from a dialectical perspective, it rather translates into “non-addressing”: By the very admon-

ishment to forget, the past is precisely not forgotten; rather, it is not addressed within society.

And by such “non-addressing” the past becomes a festering issue. Non-addressing is about

officially repressing memory content from public discourse. Nevertheless, this memory con-

tent that remains is in fact publicly well known and thus capable to resurface time and again

on the political or societal agenda.

In this paper, we want to examine memory practices and the consequences of distinctive me-

moralization strategies for post-war societies. We will also look at memory issues and memo-

ralization strategies on sub-national levels and identify examples of “non-addressing” as a

form of amnesia: in Rwanda, Namibia, Spain and elsewhere. Thus, this paper also aims to

make a serious contribution to a political theory of victimhood and victimization. The central

normative argument of this paper claims that amnesia must be (re-)constructed as a form of

“non-addressing”: it reaches beyond a strategy of mere forgetting and may, by contrast, in-

deed contribute to a process of dealing with the past. This paper wants to contribute to the

theoretical toolbox: amnesia as a form of “non-addressing” serves to include a new feature

within debates surrounding transitional justice and ways of dealing with the legacy of crimes

against humanity and serious violations of human rights. Therefore, “non-addressing” is ad-

ded to the transitional justice toolbox.

2. Halbwachs versus Nietzsche? Disputed versions of public memory and memoralization

2.1 Philosophical orthodoxies of public memory

The significance of memory in conflicts (cf. Cairns & Roe 2003; Diner 1996; Crenzel 1997)

as well as the collective determination of public memory is largely undisputed within schol-

arly debates (cf. Assmann, A. 1996, 1999, 2006, 2011; Assmann, J. 1999, 2000, 2005; Ham-

ber & Wilson 2003). The term “memory” shall be defined here as the creation of meaning and

significance to the past in order to reconstruct the past, but also to be able to sequence the

presence and the future (Assmann, J. 1997: 77, 42, 296). Public memory and memory politics

involve processes of social integration and conflict, with reference to a “shared history”, of

6

myth creation by specific groups and of reinterpretation and selection of past collective ex-

periences. The concept of the collective memory of a community goes back to the French so-

ciologist and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs (Halbwachs 1966, 1967). To him, social mem-

ory refers to events that can be experienced publicly as well as communally. Accordingly,

remembering and forgetting are always social processes; within a given society, there are as

many collective memories as there are communities or ethnic groups. Put simply: The indi-

vidual memory is unthinkable without reference to some collective.

Any memory is a fundamentally social affair, constituted and reproduced by a specific group

(Halbwachs 1966, 1967). To Halbwachs, such groups can vary in composition and size, and

may also include national social nexuses. The meaning of specific compo-

nents/stances/elements/holds that enable such groups to remember certain events or person-

ages is linked, in the first instance, to this intra-group communication. Further, memory proc-

esses are an important means of constituting and reproducing the social nexus and ensuring

the integration of the group concerned. Halbwachs emphasized the enormous significance of

the community as a context of communication and symbolization of memories of the past as

well as the role that memories play for the cohesion of the communities: Social memory be-

comes a central facet of the ideological armory of the group, helping it to legitimize and ra-

tionalize difference (Halbwachs 1980). Memory is therefore neither individual nor inherited;

rather, it is woven into the social fabric and is bound to the process of social construction:

Memory is socially constructed and reconstructed over time and is intimately related to people’s sense of identity in the present context. This sense of identity was viewed as a product of social interaction as well as individual consciousness (Devine-Wright 2003: 11).

Through the collective imprinting of memory, memory is not just reduced to merely immedi-

ate first-hand experience, rather, a major part is made up of the individual experiences of oth-

ers in one’s own community as well. These are experiences which have been passed on, told

in stories and have become tradition. Remembrance is therefore an active cultural process and

the memory must always be recreated and kept alive:

Memories, as a medium for understanding the past, are a part of the wider cultural prac-tices that are continually being adapted and rephrased to meet the needs of the present. Social memories are not recollections of times past but part of the present understandings of the past, people use images of the past as a justification for the present relationship and not “images from the past” (Jarman 1997: 4f.).

The memories are monitored, tested and evaluated in an ongoing process in order to transform

the past to fit in with the present needs of the community. Consequently, certain historical

events and symbols are removed from the collective memory. Additionally, a process of sim-

7

plification takes place in which the chosen events are mystified and de-contextualized, i.e.

they are taken out of their concrete historical context. For that reasons, public memory may be

said to rely on the translation of experiences or historical records into societal myths.

Halbwachs, in particular, stressed the discontinuity that exists between social memory and

history, where memory refers to the actualization of fixed states and events which frequently

are enshrined as venerated objects of group memory, while history and notably, academic his-

tory (cf. Nora 1989: 12f) refers to processes viewed in a secularized perspective. This in-

volves also the transfer of memory contents, or elements of historical knowledge to contexts

that differ from their contexts of origin, a process that has been identified by Roland Barthes

(1964) as the core operation in the creation of myths. The transposition of events and images

from their temporal, and sometimes also their spatial, contexts of origin into a different one,

defined according to needs and purposes of the present, clearly may be considered as such an

operation. Public memory, then, may be understood as being concerned with the production

and reproduction of such myths. These myths may diverge and even compete with one an-

other for acceptance and validity e.g. in postcolonial constellations and nation building. It

goes without saying that public memory being a process involving power relations, such

myths and their prevalence are also subject to change and contention.2

In this sense, public memory would appear to thrive on the invention of traditions, in the pre-

cise sense indicated by Hobsbawm, i.e. of taking up historical material (cf. Hobsbawm 1983:

6) which is then interpreted and remolded in ways suitable to contribute towards construction

of a self-image for the group in question, such as the nation, and to back up its coherence. In

Southern Africa, among other world regions, resolution of long-term, structural conflict and

national reconciliation form essential dimensions of the construction of national memory.

This is not just on account of the deep social cleavages inherited from colonialism and Apart-

heid, but even more so because of fierce political and social confrontation, including a state of

war, over the determination of a common future. In this context, memory politics is linked to

the controversial issues of amnesty and amnesia (cf. generally, Smith & Margalit 1997), and

also to routines of construing conflict in terms of “thinking war” (Shaw 2003: 101, 112-115).

The specific processes of selection and reinterpretation which are involved in the construction

of public memory can be outlined with reference to the distinction between functional mem-

ory and storage memory (cf. A. Assmann 1999, 2006, 2011). This stresses the difference be-

2 Note also in this perspective the differentiation between historiography and heritage which cannot be broached here.

8

tween actually active memory contents on the one hand and memory resources that may be-

come available under changing circumstances or by specific efforts on the other. In particular

with respect to the public use of memory contents, storage and even more, transfer of content

to active memory therefore entails selection. In keeping with the contentious character of pub-

lic memory noted above, such a process is informed by the dominant concepts of memory,

and also, by the goals of memory politics. One important conceptual challenge thus consists

in interrogating public memory practices according to their conceptualization and valorization

of the past.

In order to identify memory processes, Friedrich Nietzsche provided us with a different fra-

mework of memoralization strategies. In his “Untimely Mediations” (1964), he made a dis-

tinction between the three versions of memory: monumental, critical and antiquarian. The

monumental memory reassures a community or a nation by presenting it with the image of the

greatness of its history. Critical memory – the “critical method” in Nietzsche’s words – tries

to challenge this “monumental image”. It is faced with the scrutiny of “scientific” history; his-

tory that is written by historians trying to establish historical facts not fiction. In his chapter

“On the Use and Abuse of History for Life”, Nietzsche also elaborates his understanding of

antiquarian memory. It consists “of a blind mania for collecting, a restless compiling together

of everything that ever existed” (Nietzsche 1964). The antiquarian memory leads to “a desire

for everything really old”, it has negative consequences for the understanding of the future:

[...] antiquarian history hinders the powerful willing of new things; it cripples the active man, who always, as an active person, will and must set aside reverence to some extent. The fact that something has become old now gives birth to the demand that it must be immortal, for when a man reckons what every such ancient fact, an old custom of his fa-thers, a religious belief, an inherited political right, has undergone throughout its exis-tence, what sum of reverence and admiration from individuals and generations ever since, then it seems presumptuous or even criminal to replace such an antiquity with something new and to set up in opposition to such a numerous cluster of revered and admired things the single fact of what is coming into being and what is present (Nietzsche 2007: 25).

It can be argued, that the antiquarian way of memoralization is actually a form of amnesia: the

contentious part is “archived”, it is not dealt with critically and constructively but left in the

archives.

According to the French philosopher Bernhard-Henri Lévy antiquarian memory is a form of

absurd, pathological memory; it is anxious and lazy, febrile and idle. In his highly controver-

sial book “American Vertigo: Traveling America in the Footsteps of Tocqueville” (2006),

Lévy claims that antiquarian memory is the predominant way of public memory within cur-

rent American society:

9

[...] this memory that is, at the bottom, “un-American” since, by a singular reversal of roles, it is in the process of turning that great America of the Enlightenment, the America about which Goethe wrote that it had freed itself both from its European past and from the European obsession with the past, into a country even more enslaved to the past than the most past-obsessed European countries (Lévy 2006: 239).

Lévy follows the conclusion of Nietzsche that antiquarian memory will be the “grave digger

of the present time”, and will be a “harbinger of identity crises.” Lévy argues that it is exactly

this identity crisis which can be identified within American public memoralization strategies:3

How can remorse for the Indians, the rightful obligation to remember the genocide and segregation of Indian tribes, the brash of intolerance, the social and cultural desire of ex-termination, which continued to persecute them until quite recently – how can these con-tradictions come to be embodied in the admirable Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian in Washington, while at the same time, throughout the desert states, a parade of phony memorial sites, each more garish than the next, border the road: here the fake grave of a fake Lakota chief; there a reconstructed Oglala village; there again, a small exhibit of vintage Cheyenne feathers; then a pharmaceutical museum, a conserva-tory of thirty-million-year-old fossil trees, and a retirement home for authentic wild horses, whose upkeep is subsidized by the states of Oklahoma and Idaho – all of which antiquarian piety ultimately places on the same level? (ibid.: 240)

In this sense, merely “archiving” historical memory – as collective memory in the tradition of

Halbwachs – is a form of amnesia because the issues at stake are not addressed. It might thus

be called “negative non-addressing”. Archiving is the strategy of forgetting in disguise.

The question needs to be asked, which actors are behind such memoralization strategies.

Amongst collective subjects that shape public memory, the nation state figures prominently.

Specifically within the context of post-colonial African states (cf. e.g. Bayart 1989, Hauck

2001) and the associated importance of public display (cf. Mbembe 1992), the staging of offi-

cial memory appears as a decisive component of the staging of power and is inserted into the

dominant or hegemonic discourse of power. As a main feature of the post-colonial situation,

the state and its functionaries appropriate, a great part directly or through networks of clientel-

ism and patronage, and frequently the bulk of available resources at least in the formal sector.

Under such conditions, control of the state apparatus and of para-state institutions, in particu-

lar in the media sector, still affords tremendous power in the sense of the hegemonic defini-

tion of prevalent public discourses. The state obviously occupies a pivotal and strategic role in

the shaping of official memory, as a vital and central aspect and portion of public memory. It

may be surmised that the staging of power takes on even greater importance once the precari-

ous power base is a precarious one. Given both the importance and fallibility of post-colonial

3 For detailed analyses of memoralization strategies in the United States cf. Siedenhans’ (1994) analysis of the Civil War and Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz’ (1994) of Vietnam.

10

state apparatuses, articulated, staged public memory is one of the prime means for established

as well as countervailing powers to seek material as well as discursive forms of representa-

tion.

In terms of countervailing actors, groups in civil society easily come to mind, in particular

where communal or cultural groups are included into the concept. While not coterminous with

the state, civil society may be seen, from the background of a Gramscian understanding (cf.

Bobbio 1988), as a vital instance in the organization of public discourse in general and there-

by, of exercising and contesting societal and cultural hegemony. Civil society initiatives,

along with those of communal formations, sometimes also political parties or trade unions

therefore merit particular attention, even though they may be far less conspicuous than under-

takings sponsored by the official state. In particular, these are avenues that may be expected to

articulate and develop alternative perspectives. If these may be considered as “popular coun-

ter-memorialism” (Werbner 1998: 8), it is to be hypothesised that under the concrete circum-

stances of the post-colonial in particular, this pertains to a whole range of shadings. Again,

similar conclusions can be drawn from seemingly quite different historical settings such as

Wilhelmine Germany (cf. Hoffmann 1994; Ackermann 1994).

While in the Halbwachs tradition, collective memory is referred to rather strictly circum-

scribed groups, a conception taking into account a rather wide range of civil society actors

besides the agents of official memory will both widen and loosen the concept. By this, a range

of societal nexuses or, of collective subjects and actors of memory comes into view. As a rule,

such groups evade clear-cut definitions and delimitations. Any individual will form part of a

number of different such memory communities on the level of the national state as well as on

some subnational levels as communal or local or ethnic or gender groups. Again, these groups

dispose of differential resources and access to media, as well as to differential cultural regis-

ters, all of which impacts their potential (and sometimes, willingness) to project their memory

concern and policies. This forms an important dimension – also of the controversial process of

public memory definition against the background of violent history – for societies emerging

from long periods of settler colonialism have to cope with.

11

2.2 A fundamental challenge: is “forgetting” possible?

In a similar line of thinking as the German historian Meier, Connerton made the assertion that

“forgetting is not always a failure” (Connerton 2008).4 To underline his argument, Connerton

tried to develop a typology of forgetting. He distinguishes seven types of forgetting:

1. Repressive erasure

2. Prescriptive forgetting

3. Forgetting and the formation of a new identity

4. Structural amnesia

5. Forgetting as annulment

6. Forgetting as planned obsolescence

7. Forgetting as humiliated silence

Repressive erasure can be referred to as a strategy employed by totalitarian regimes. Such re-

gimes are almost hostile to public memory and therefore condemn it:

As the condemnation of memory (damnatio memoriae), it was inscribed in Roman crimi-nal and constitutional law as a punishment applied to rulers and other powerful persons who at their death or after a revolution were declared to be “enemies of the state” […] (ibid.: 60)

The second form of forgetting, prescriptive forgetting, is also initiated by the state. But it is

perceived by the state as a positive measure, from which the whole society may benefit. In

this view, this type of forgetting seems to be in the interest of all conflicting parties (ibid.: 61).

Like Meier, Connerton assumes that the Ancient Greeks employed this strategy of forgetting

in order to maintain peace on the polis:

[…] since the memory of past misdeeds threatened to sow division in the whole commu-nity and could lead to civil war, they saw that not only those who were directly threatened by motives of revenge but all those who wanted to live peacefully together in the polis had a stake in not remembering (ibid.: 61).

Connerton repeats Meier’s analysis regarding peace treaties: mostly they include references to

the wish that the violent past should not be just forgiven but forgotten. The third type of “for-

getting” is a type of forgetting that is constitutive in the formulation of a new identity (ibid.:

62). This practice perceives forgetting not solely as a loss, but as a gain. Forgetting then refers

4 In fact, Connerton explicitly refers to Meier’s previous work, e.g. Meier (1996).

12

not to the inability to remember, but to the ability to get rid of certain memories that serve no

practicable purpose “in the management of one’s current identity”:

Forgetting then becomes part of the process by which newly shared memories are con-structed because a new set of memories are frequently accompanied by a set of tacitly shared silences (ibid.: 63).

Connerton uses the example of the forgetting of details about previous marriages or sexual

partnerships, which could affect a present partnership negatively. The fourth type of forget-

ting, structural amnesia, refers to a person, who tends to remember only those links in his

family background that are socially important (ibid.: 64). With the fifth type, “forgetting as

annulment”, Connerton tries to draw a comparison with Nietzsche’s analysis of the antiquar-

ian memory (see above): “the great archivalization” (ibid.: 65).

The sixth type of forgetting is “planned obsolence.” This type of forgetting is built into the

capitalist system of consumption (ibid.: 66).5 This type of forgetting is of less relevance for

the analysis of memory practices in post-war societies and will therefore not be further ex-

plored here. Much more significant is the seventh type of forgetting: forgetting as “humiliated

silence.”

This type of forgetting is certainly not solely, and may in large part be not at all, a matter of overt activity on the part of a state apparatus. It is manifest in a widespread pattern of behaviour in civil society, and it is covert, unmarked and unacknowledged. Its most sali-ent feature is a humiliated silence (ibid.: 67).

Connerton argues that it is often easier to forget physical pain than to forget humiliation. He

elaborates on what he calls the “collusive silence brought on by a particular kind of collective

shame” (ibid.: 67). He uses a quite controversial example to illustrate this type of forgetting:

the destruction of German cities by bombing in the Second World War.

[…] more than 50 years following the war, the horrors of the air bombardment and its long-term repercussions have not been brought to public attention either in historical in-vestigations or in literary accounts. German historians have not produced an exploratory, still less an exhaustive, study of the subject. […] A colossal collective experience was followed by half a century of silence. How is this to be explained? (ibid.: 68).

Connerton’s answer to his rhetorical question is that it is the silence of humiliation and shame.

5 “Given the limits to the turnover time of material goods, capitalists have turned their attention from the production of goods to the production of services. Most goods, not by accident known as consumer durables – knives and forks, automobiles and washing machines – have a substantial lifetime. Services – going to a rock concert or movie – have a far shorter lifetime. With this shift to the provision of services, the turnover time of capital is accelerated. The evolution of a product from its first design and development to its eventual obsoles-cence – a time span referred to in marketing as the ‘product life cycle’ – becomes shorter. Long-term planning becomes less important, the facility to exploit market fashions more crucial. Time control focuses more on con-sumer desire than on work discipline” (Connerton 2008: 66).

13

Singer and Conway (2008) provided a sophisticated critique of Connerton’s typology.6 Al-

though they agreed with the broad argument that “forgetting is not always a failure” (Singer &

Conway 2008: 279), they challenged him from the perspective of neuroscience. The finding

of very recent research on memory suggests that the term or concept “forgetting” should be

substituted with the concept of relative degrees of accessibility of information, because infor-

mation cannot truly be forgotten (ibid.: 280). The neuroscience of memory has found the exis-

tence of two memory systems, a mid-brain limbic circuit, and a later evolved neo-cortical sys-

tem, which operate independently (ibid.). Information processed by a more sensory and per-

petual mid-brain system is more likely to register incoming stimuli in iconic form and less

likely to be linked to conscious and linguistic memory cues:

If such episodic images are not integrated with the autobiographical memory knowledge base and the conceptual self (as mediated by the neo-cortical structures of the brain), they may persist but only in a highly inaccessible form (ibid.).

From this perspective, Connerton’s typology of memory may be translated into a reflection on

how memory accessibility can be manipulated (ibid.: 281). Singer’s and Conway’s conclu-

sions run counter to the popular orthodoxy of forgetting, because they challenge the very idea

of forgetting itself:

In our view of how memory works, such true forgetting would hardly be possible, even if they tried. The past in the individual and in culture is available, the question is: Can we access it? (ibid.: 283)

Thus, the accessibility of the past can be manipulated or controlled, but the past cannot be tru-

ly forgotten. It can resurface again. Singer & Conway refer to the landmark study of Margalit

(2002), who argued that the memory of violent and painful past is a critical ingredient that

allows the individual or a society to acknowledge its authentic history and understanding of

unique identity in the world. Societies are not exclusively determined by their past legacies,

they do learn to move forward and perhaps even to forgive, but they never completely forget.

Therefore, we are left with no alternative than to elaborate on how to deal with public mem-

ory: “Forgetting” does not offer the easy escape from the difficult and conflict-stricken proc-

esses of dealing with the past that sometimes is associated with the term.

6 See also the critique by Wessel & Moulds (2008).

14

3. Towards a Political Theory of Memoralization and Victimization

As the previous section has shown, it is disputed whether forgetting – as part of an antiquarian

public memory or not – can be qualified as a strategy of dealing with the past. To make the

case for this argument, the following section will explain why “amnesia” constitutes more

than mere “forgetting”, why it addresses an inherently dialectical operation. It is one aspect of

this dialectic, namely the strategy of “non-addressing”, which will show that amnesia can be

an effective form of public memoralization and a sufficient transitional justice approach.

3.1 Transitional Justice and the Dialectic of Amnesia

The International Center for Transitional Justice defines the term “transitional justice” as a

“response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights.” In this sense the “Ency-

clopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity,” understands the concept of transitional

justice as a collective term including a variety of activities:

Transitional justice refers to a field of activity and inquiry focused on how societies ad-dress legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just, or peaceful future. The concept is commonly understood as a framework for confronting past abuse as a component of a major political transformation (Bickford 2004: 1045).

A lot has been written on “dealing”, “managing” or “overcoming” the past (“delete as appro-

priate”), and since the South African experience, quite a number of ‘truth commissions’ were

designed around the world. Priscilla Hayner compared 15 truth commissions that were estab-

lished world-wide until 1994 (Hayner 1994, 1995, 2000). During the past 25 years, truth

commissions used as a tool for political and social stabilization of post-conflict societies re-

ceived increasing worldwide attention and since sometime has been standardized to a consid-

erable degree (Hayner 2000; Rotberg 2000; Rotberg & Thompson 2000; Gutmann & Thomp-

son 2000; Villa-Vicencio 2000a, 2000b, 2003; Crocker 2000; Oettler 2008; Buckley-Zistel &

Moltmann 2002; Buckley-Zistel & Oettler 2011).

Within the transitional justice debate, attention is mostly directed at the search for truth and

justice for the victims on the one hand and to the battle against impunity on the other. This

often shrouds from view the circumstance that impunity in itself also is employed as a means

to deal with a violent past. It then takes the form of formally or informally ordained amnesty

or amnesia, stemming from explicit acts or decisions of incumbent authorities, or also from

their mere inaction and silence. In spite of the little attention particularly amnesia as such a

strategy has received, various forms of amnesia quite frequently mark the practice of govern-

ments and other state institutions.

15

At first sight, the advantages of the strategy appear to be almost self-evident. If the state dis-

penses with the opening of barely scarred wounds, the argument runs, the stilling of remem-

brance by simply not dealing with its contents will contribute towards pacifying a societal

nexus that is politically defined, most often in terms of the nation state. In this way, a fragile

transition process may be underwritten where internal peace is still particularly prone to risk.

However, amnesia also informs approaches to the heritage of much longer-term conflict, in

particular in post-colonial settings (cf. Kössler 2011; Hughes 2011).

Arguably, issues of remembrance, especially when they are linked to violent conflict, are con-

tested terrain. Contest is about “justice” and “history” in the sense of an “historical truth”

which may be seen as virtually unassailable by all contending – and opposed – parties. Debate

therefore concerns the establishment of relevant facts and also the ways and means to deal

with them. In other words, it revolves around how to achieve “reconciliation” and how inter-

nal peace might become stabilized (cf. Doxtader & Villa-Vicencio 2004). This addresses a

central concern of transitional justice, namely the restoration or the guarantee of a destroyed

or seriously endangered societal nexus which in the cases of modern states is largely con-

nected to the re-assertion and re-definition of the nation.

One might say with a bit of hyperbole that two strategies are at stake here that are distin-

guished: at first sight, merely by a few letters. On the one side stands, amnesia, informed by a

hope that an authoritative decision or possibly also a silent consensus to oblivion might con-

sign a painful past that still might generate fresh conflict, as it were through isolation by a

consistent refusal to address that past (cf. Meier 2010). The opposed strategy, amnesty, ties

the forgetting of such injustice to its prior acknowledgement – suffering afflicted and sus-

tained must be made explicit. Here, memory is not wiped out or repressed but injustice is pub-

licly confessed or at least, established. Only upon this condition can punishment be waived,

also as a means to ensure internal peace (cf. Nippel 1997). Obviously, this latter way of pro-

ceeding falls among the broad range of approaches that form part of Transitional Justice and

the relevant debate.

Even where punishment is formally waived, the quest to find and tell the truth is maintained,

precisely as a prerequisite for amnesty. Amnesia, on the other hand, means that impunity is

not granted on precondition of confession of guilt, but either silently implied in authoritative

inaction or accorded by a blanket decision which also aims at not touching past wrongs and

trespasses. Thus, the strategy of amnesia is clearly distinct from Transitional Justice, even

though many of its proponents claim to share the same concerns about the political as well as

16

social risks involved in memory politics and also the need to deal with and pacify past con-

flict.

Therefore, within the context of transition processes, amnesia is not a rare, though certainly

not always an explicit strategy of dealing with past state and political crimes. However, the

attention given during the last 15 or 20 years to forms of public quests for truth within transi-

tion processes may have pushed such cases into the background – all the more since they do

not necessarily involve active action and decision making, and can evolve rather unnoticed

and implicitly precisely by non-action.

However, the expectation that crimes and other forms of a painful past will actually be forgot-

ten or at least, their memory will be avoided and feared conflict might thus be stilled, fre-

quently is proved illusionary, at least in the longer run. In such cases, engagement with past

and repressed atrocities breaks up the studied silence even after a considerable number of

years. Amnesia ordained from above or on the basis of some social consensus may prove as

merely a temporary device to avoid serious confrontation during a transition period for a cer-

tain time. However, this does not imply that memory content linked to this painful past were

disposed with once and for all. Rather, more recent experiences in Spain, with grandchildren

and great-grandchildren literally digging up the remains of their forebears who perished in the

Civil War of the 1930s, graphically demonstrates the potential of resuscitated memory and

unfinished business (cf. Mühr 2010, see chapter 4.4).

Such consideration relates the strategy of amnesia to classical concepts of national integration.

Significantly, in 1882, Ernest Renan, in his classical text on the concept of the nation as a

community of daily re-confirmed will, saw that nation less as a community of remembrance

than as one of forgetting. As he argued, remembering, i.e., explicitly engaging, the Wars of

the Midi in the Middle Ages or the Bartholomew’s Day massacre of 1572 would undermine

the national cohesion of France and must therefore be expunged from the nation's fund of re-

membrance (cf. Renan 1882). This famous plea underlines what actually is at stake here: ra-

ther more a consensus of keeping silent than actual forgetting. Obviously both events, sepa-

rated from Renan by 300 and 500 years, were quite present to his mind. Otherwise he could

not have seen them as menaces to national cohesion. This means that publicly ordained amne-

sia actually implies a silent reference to the events and facts in question, even though this oc-

curs in the form of explicitly not addressing historical atrocity. Non-address in this sense does

not actually expunge memory content, but rather keeps memory content out of the realm of

what may legitimately talked about in public.

17

Thus, the strategy of amnesia is one of systematic denial of acknowledgement of past wrong

and suffering. The inscription of past atrocity into national memory appears as risk-laden on

account of recently pacified violent conflict. The construction of the nation, which by the very

fact of pacification and transition is explicitly or implicitly placed on the public agenda also

warrants some common and if possible, integrating vision of the past. In such cases, the strat-

egy aims at avoiding by all possible means potential conflict that might be brought about

through those operations.

The linkage between a state nexus and some form not only of a community of communication

(see Deutsch 1978), but also of commemoration (cf. Liebert 2010; Kissel & Liebert 2010)

thus points to at least two distinct possible strategies. Engaging the past, in particular “dire

past” (Meier 2010) derives its meaning and importance not least from the risks involved for

internal peace that remains precarious for considerable time after transition. It is our conten-

tion that such risks are linked both to addressing and to non-addressing such dire past, and in

both cases, they are linked recursively to that consensus that in minimal form at least predi-

cates societal cohesion. Be it noted, however, that such consensus is hardly ever devoid of

constraint and domination, but rather formed by relationships of social hegemony (see Kössler

& Melber 1993: ch. 3).

Addressing and non-addressing may not even be mutually exclusive strategies. If we take the

historical perspective, both strategies may appear during different historical periods of a na-

tion. The cases of Israel and Germany after 1945 are two examples to illustrate this point (cf.

Assmann, A. 2011: 305ff.).

The Israeli society after 1945 was dominated by the policy of “forgetting”. The nation did not

emerge from a civil war. The collective rationality was focused on the project of state-

building in order to create a new start for the survivors of the Holocaust and to create a lasting

future for the coming generations (Assmann, A. 2011: 305). After two decades, the survivors

started to turn their attention towards the past – the non-addressing period started to crumble.

It was after the successful completion of state-building project and after several wars that the

Israeli society had transformed itself into a “community of memoralization” (Assmann, A

2011: 305). This trajectory is obviously also linked to the differential generational experiences

and memory practices of Holocaust survivors, where the past is actively addressed by second

and third generations rather than by the first who actually had to experience it directly (see

e.g. contributions in Apitzsch 1999).

18

Thus, the alternative between memoralization or forgetting is not a mutually exclusive choice,

or a decision that lies down officially accepted memory contents once and for all, as the ana-

lysis of Meier suggests. Indeed, both strategies may not even be contradictive: non-addressing

as a conceptual framework may encompass both.

This observation points back to the dialectic of non-addressing mentioned above, which dif-

fers from merely being silent or from forgetting in the naive sense of the word. Non-

addressing is inseparably bound up with addressing the past, indeed in may be understood as a

form of addressing. One way of conceptualizing this relationship may consist in a reference to

the concept of boundary that by the very act of delineating and therefore including and ex-

cluding, always contains and carries with it both the included and the excluded (cf. Luhmann

1998). This parallel may serve on the one hand to highlight the physiological properties of

human memory noted above: Complete erasure is well-nigh unthinkable. Furthermore, refer-

ring to the more complex issues of societal and cultural memory and its inherently contentious

nature, we can conceptualize non-address as a conscious, if not active, form of action that al-

ways has to take into account memory contents that still reside in minority or subaltern sec-

tions, to be articulated at some contingent moment. Aimfully preventing such articulation in

actually noting its potential and purportedly harmful implications, actually validates memory

even in the act of silencing, rather than erasing memory.

By not being addressed, the horror of the past therefore cannot be expected to be effectively

expunged from public consciousness, even if it may be excluded from official memory. Any

ban on public articulation actually implies a silent discourse of memory that is prone to resur-

face.

3.2 “Victimhood nationalism” and the politics of victimhood

Beyond the “cult of the fallen” (“Gefallenenkult”)?

The collective determination of public memory and its relevance for the political theory of

victimhood and memoralization strategies become apparent by the comparison “war memori-

als”7 and their function for public memory. They are an integral part of modern political cul-

ture within all nations: the “political iconology of violent death” (Koselleck 1998, 1994). Ac-

7 We are confronted here with a language problem, which might even be a language “barrier” (cf. the helpful analysis of Hettling 2009: 176): The German term Kriegerdenkmal” puts the individual soldier at the centre, while the French term “monument aux morts” focuses on the “dead” in general. The common English expression “war memorial” emphasizes the “war” itself. There are three different “translations” of the same phe-nomenon; however, they incorporate different meanings: the soldier, the dead or the war itself.

19

cording to the well-known research by Koselleck, “war memorials” play an important role of

identity-formation for the survivors (Koselleck 1979a, 1979b, 1994, 1998). His research was

reflected by other analyses, for example of debates within Germany (cf. Meyer 2009; Dülffer

2009; Hoffmann 1994) – especially the debates surrounding the Holocaust memorial (cf. Leg-

gewie & Meyer 2005) –, in France (Becker 1994; Ackermann 1994) or in the United States

(Siedenhans 1994; Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz 1994). In Koselleck’s comparative analysis

between German and French “war memorials” he identified unexpected and striking similari-

ties:

The violent death, the “sacrifice”, was the pledge for the survival, for the liberation, the death or even the redemption (Koselleck 1998: 6).8

Acts of attaching meaning and gaining significance (“Sinnstiftung”) can be observed in al-

most all war memorials throughout the centuries. The political iconology of violent death, in

Koselleck’s words, accompanies the history of mankind like a “non-losable shadow” (ibid.).

The most striking similarity between German and French war memorials is that they almost

always express for what the “fallen” has or have died for: the homeland, unity, pride and free-

dom of the homeland etc. (ibid.: 8). Even beyond the German-French comparative perspec-

tive, it is one major result of Koselleck’s comparative work that structural similarities of war

memorials in Europe and beyond are bigger than national distinctiveness would suggest

(Koselleck 1994: 10). Almost every memorial has one common feature: the “fallen” have lost

their lives for the unity of the nation – may it be called “home”, “nation”, “nation-state”,

“Reich” or “republic” (Koselleck 1994: 11). There is one “minimal consensus” in all memori-

als: the names of the individual persons have to appear on the memorials because the individ-

ual has sacrificed his live for “everybody” (ibid.: 15).

The wide-ranging analysis of Koselleck also shows that memorials systematically included

obvious cases of “non-addressing”: While it is often said what the “fallen” has died for, it is

almost never said how he or she has died. The death is memoralized, but the suffering of the

act of dying itself, which is hard to imagine and can hardly be expressed as part of a memo-

rial, is covered up in silence (Koselleck 1998: 8). In addition to that, it is almost nowhere said

or expressed, why somebody died or had to die. Indeed the reasons of violent death, war or

civil war, can hardly be visualized as part of a memorial. This leads Koselleck to the conclu-

sion:

8 See the original quote in German: „Der gewaltsame Tod, das ‚Opfer’, war Unterpfand des Überlebens, der Befreiung, des Sieges oder gar der Erlösung.“

20

The visible legitimation, what somebody has died for, swallows the explanation, why someone has died (ibid.).9

The eminently important legitimatization strategies make the many “cults of the fallen” into

easy pretexts for dealing with the past: they are collective (Halbwachs) as well as monumental

ways (Nietzsche) of memoralization; but they are not critical (Nietzsche) or challenging the

status quo within post-war societies. Although memorials do not count for the archivizing

memoralization strategy (in Nietzsche’s terms), but they can restrict the accessibility of mem-

ory (see Singer & Conway 2008, cf. the comments in chapter 2.2); they pretend that forgetting

is possible. This restriction is not forgetting, but an intentional selection of memory: particular

circumstances, contexts, reasons of war and death are ignored (see above). However, memori-

als don’t lead to forgetting, but uphold “non-addressing”. Thus, “war memorials” itself, as

integral parts for the construction of identity, perpetrate a sense of “victimhood nationalism,”

in which sentiments of exclusive victimhood dominate. Jie-Hyun Lim suggested to use the

term “victimhood nationalism” as a working hypothesis to explain the competing national

memories for the position of collective victims in “memory wars” (Lim 2010: 139). This also

means that nations or communities remain almost unable to accept the “legitimate victim

status” of their former “enemies”. The traditional “victim-perpetrator-formula” becomes seri-

ously eroded through victimhood nationalism

What is most stunning in victimhood nationalism is the magical metamorphosis of the in-dividual victimizer into the collective victim. It is through this process that individual perpetrators can be exonerated from their own criminal acts (ibid.: 139).

War memorials function as exclusive and not inclusive symbols of the past. Therefore, they

have the potential obstruct the process of dealing with the past, if they can’t reach beyond the

cult of the fallen and remain unable to address the reasons of war.

Subjective enlightenment: a turn toward the subject

If war memorials are allowed to be used or manipulated by simply reducing them to a “cult of

the fallen”, and, thus, inhibiting a process of dealing with the past, then the question of actors

of memoralization becomes central – and the question of how to deal with the “actors of pub-

lic memory” and with those actors, who were responsible of or involved in the violent past.

The latter is the main focal point of Adorno’s pedagogical approach within his critical theory

of dealing with the past.

9 See the original German quote: „Die sichtbare Legitimation, wofür gestorben worden sei, verschluckt die Begründung, warum gestorben worden ist.“

21

Adorno made clear that he doesn’t believe that a process of dealing with the past could be

successfully established by community meetings or encounters between young Germans and

young Israelis (Adorno 1998: 101). He rejects the notion that anti-Semitism could be chal-

lenged though concrete experiences with Jews because the “genuine anti-Semite” is defined

by his incapacity for any experience, i.e. by his “unresponsiveness” (ibid.). This unrespon-

siveness leads Adorno to his central idea of “subjectivization,” which is basis for the “subjec-

tive enlightenment”:

As far as to combat anti-Semitism in individual subjects is concerned, one should not ex-pect too much from the recourse to the facts, which anti-Semites most often will either not admit or will neutralize by treating them as exception. Instead one should apply the argument directly to the subjects whom one is addressing. They should be made aware of the mechanisms that cause racial prejudice within them (ibid.: 102).

To make themselves aware of those mechanisms, a turn toward the subject becomes neces-

sary:

A working through the past understood as enlightenment is essentially such a turn to-

ward the subject, the reinforcement of a person’s self-consciousness and hence also of his self (ibid.: 102, our emphasis).

Subjective enlightenment is the essential element in order to “work through” the past and deal

with it constructively. It is a lasting challenge and an urgent task at the same time:

The problem of how to carry out practically such a subjective enlightenment probably could only be resolved by the collective effort of teachers and psychologists, who would not use the pretext of scholarly objectivity to shy away from the most urgent task con-fronting their disciplines today (ibid., our emphasis).

The indispensable “turn toward the subject” leads to the consequences which might itself

sound radical or even “dire” – the “dire” past leads to “dire” consequences of how to deal

with the past: One crucial consequence is to abandon the victim-centered approach in dealing

with the past. The subjective enlightenment of the “perpetrators” leads the traditional distinc-

tion between “victims” and “perpetrators” into an analytical cul-de-sac: Who defines a “vic-

tim”? On what ethical basis can the category of “victim” be identified? Or in other words:

Who can proclaim the moral authority to distinguish victims and perpetrators?

At this point, we should note that there is once again a language barrier: the German word

“Opfer” translates two English terms: “victim” and “sacrifice.” This has repercussions for the

debate because the German term “Opfer” is inherently ambivalent and so is the German de-

bate surrounding the contentious question of “victimhood”: it becomes difficult to distinguish

the memory of the heroic or “monumental” (Nietzsche’s term) soldier, who died during active

service in war, and the memory of the innocent civilian, who died as a mere “passive object”

(cf. Assmann, A. 2006: 237). Both would be classed as “Opfer” in German terms.

22

Having reached this analytical point, the traditional “formula” of distinction between victims

and perpetrators starts to erode, the victim-centered terminology becomes a rather uneasy dis-

tinction. Thus, as a result of the “turn toward the subject” we need to find alternative formula.

Recognition: Understanding the other’s “understanding” of violence

In order to find an alternative formula, the sociological concept of “recognition” is a helpful

tool: In this ground-breaking study, the German philosopher Axel Honneth argued that the

“struggle for recognition” is, and should be, at the centre of social conflicts.

Being at the centre of the conflict, the “journey” towards mutual “recognition” within society

as a whole also puts the concept at the centre of the transformation of the conflict. The debate

that followed Honneth’s publication is quite illustrative: Honneth’s philosophical considera-

tions were strongly challenged by Nancy Fraser who criticized that within the philosophical

debate there was too much emphasis on “recognition” while the important questions sur-

rounding the idea of redistribution were marginalized (Honneth & Fraser 2003). Leaving

aside the Honneth-Fraser-debate, mutual recognition comes into play as a “soft factor” within

the realm of conflict transformation and acquires an enormous potential for post-conflict so-

cieties. The main focus must be put on the mutual recognition of victimhood while acknowl-

edging the suffering and loss on both sides.

This leads to a very important conclusion of this analysis: Not only should we abandon the

cognitive hierarchies of victimhood, but abandon the concept of victimhood as essential part

of the theory of transitional justice itself. Put bluntly, the concept of victimhood is of no use

for a conceptual approach to transitional justice because it always ends up in a conflict on

how to define a “victim”: The distinction will be made between the innocence of a “guilty

victim” versus the guilt of an ‘innocent victim’. However, in order for post-conflict societies

to deal with the past in a constructive way, these distinctions cannot be upheld: There is no

such thing as an “illegitimate victim.” A transformation of this conflict over victimhood can

take place when the conflict is understood as a “tragic expression of unsatisfied needs.” The

same basic assumption is made by Kelman, who perceives conflict as a process driven by col-

lective needs and fears (Kelman 1990, 1997; cf. Burton 1969, 1987, 1990, 1995, 1997; Burton

& Dukes 1990). These needs are primarily of an individual and human nature; however they

are articulated and demanded through groups which represent certain interests (Kelman

1997). The concepts focusing on the needs of the conflicting parties leads us to the following

conclusions: All victims war have the same need, namely the recognition of their suffering.

23

For this reason, all victims of violence must be given an equal status in the sense of an “inclu-

sive definition of a victim”: Lives lost are lives lost.

Thus, recognition serves as a conceptual alternative to the concept of victimhood. It has the

potential to avoid victimhood nationalism; combined with “subjective enlightenment”, it may

function as a new imperative of dealing with the past. At this point, the dialect of amnesia

moves beyond forgetting: “non-addressing” that leaves behind the cult of the fallen and en-

ables subjective enlightenment can put post-war societies in the moral and psychological posi-

tion to be able to understand the other’s “understanding” of violence.

4. Case Studies of Non-Addressing

4.1 Rwanda: the forbidden words

The genocide of 1994 resulted in 800.000 killed: people classified as Tutsi as well as moder-

ate Hutu. The reasons and historical circumstances that led to the genocide are complex and

go back some decades. Since the upheavals of the 1960s, Tutsi regularly took refuge within

neighboring states. Suffice to say that prior to this, Belgian and German colonial rule rede-

fined fundamentally the differentiation between a Hutu majority and Tutsi minority and

greatly added acrimony to this ethnic cleavage (cf. the overviews by Viebach 2010; Straus

2006; Prunier 2008).

The post-1994 era witnessed serious measures aimed at restoring stability and strengthening

the socio-economic situation as well as to achieve political regeneration. Positive examples

include significant economic and social policies that reformed the system of education, tack-

led the spread of Malaria, and initiated programs for poverty reduction; all of which have

been made possible by massive international assistance (Viebach 2010). These developments

reflect the international donors’ increasing emphasis on so-called “sustainable development”

(cf. Reyntjens 1996). However, in spite of these demonstrable achievements, the country is

progressively descending into new dictatorship, sometimes called “developmental dictator-

ship” (N.N. 2010).10

The most prominent aspect in Rwanda’s political system is exclusion, since political power is

almost exclusively associated with the Tutsi establishment. The ruling establishment is in con-

trol of the media, political opposition is increasingly subject to repression. Political opponents

are either criminalized or killed. For example, the deputy leader of the Green party, Frank

10 The author of this article, who lives in Rwanda, wanted to remain anonymous for security reasons.

24

Habineza, was found decapitated outside of Butare, a southern city close to the Burundi bor-

der, in July 2010. These developments are in line with the dubious legal judgments handed

down against Victoire Ingabire Umuhora, who was a presidential candidate of the United

Democratic Forces (UDF) but was barred from standing against Kagame.

It is within this culture of fear that the legacy of the genocide is dealt with. Rwanda may even

be seen as a laboratory for transitional justice; it has been researched quite substantially so far

(Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 2009; Hintjens 2008; Nsengiyaremye 2005; Reinhardt 2005;

Zimmermann 2005). In addition to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal

for Rwanda it was decided to reinstate the traditional system of “village courts”: the so-called

Gacaca-Courts that apply traditional Rwandan principles of law (Buckley-Zistel 2005). The

idea to have “perpetrators” made accountable before these courts had two reasons: first, the

huge amount of cases, which is reflected in the sheer number of inmates in Rwaundan prisons.

Secondly, it was hoped that traditional law principles would facilitate the consolidation proc-

ess on the grassroots level. Eventually, the Gacaca-courts completed more than 800.000

“cases”.

Post-genocide Rwanda under President Kagame is an illustrative case for non-addressing. The

government has put laws into place which prohibit to usage the ethnic terms of “Hutu” and

“Tutsi”, in order to prevent new violence between the communities. These became the forbid-

den words. Civil servants, students and even ordinary people are indoctrinated in political re-

education camps, were they are imbued with a re-interpretation of Rwandan history along the

party political ideology of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (N.N. 2010). This repressive

way of re-education with the aim of re-interpretation of history is accompanied by selective

non-addressing because debate about historical truth is ruled out. For example, the genocice

of 1994 cannot be understood without noting the genocide of 1972 in neighboring Burundi,

when the Tutsi government eliminated half of the Hutu establishment – between 100.000 und

300.000 people were killed (N.N. 2010). The indoctrination with a new vision of history

seems to work: Even serious newspapers continue to perpetuate the myth that it was Kagame,

who invaded into Rwanda with his men and stopped the genocide. In fact, the RPF invasion in

1990 with the help of weapons and soldiers from Uganda was an illegal war in terms of inter-

national law (N.N. 2010). What is also neglected is that the genocide of 1994 was not only

preceded by pogroms against Tutsis in the 1960s; there were also many massacres against the

civilian population as part of the RPF invasion, which led more than one million people to

flee their homeland (N.N. 2010).

25

The most obvious question that is not addressed is the question of who was responsible for

shooting down the presidential plane on 6 April – the event that triggered the genocide. Still

today this question of responsibility could not be fully resolved (N.N. 2010). Worse, it is to-

tally ignored that there is reasonable suspicion that the RPF could be responsible for the shoo-

ting. This lead French attorney Jean-Louis Bruguière to charge senior Rwandan politicians

and military personnel in a court of law in November 2006 (N.N. 2010).

The Kagame establishment is not willing to deal with these aspects of Rwandan history.

Rather, the strategy of non-addressing is employed by inhibiting the accessibility (cf. Singer

& Conway 2008, cf. chapter 2.2) of certain “memory information”: Critical voices are regu-

larly condemned and accused with the spreading of “genocidal ideologies”. These accusations

are a useful tool to undermine political opposition in general (Brandstetter 2005: 141). Critics

are confronted with the general accusation of “divisionism”, i.e. perpetrating ethno-centric

division and separation (ibid.). The government tries to capture the “moral high ground” in

order to immunize its own position against any criticism (ibid.: 147). In this way, the geno-

cide has become their source of legitimacy (ibid.).

It can be argued that Kagame’s “forbidden words” do turn into an imperative to remember the

genocide: the prohibition of memory becomes an imperative for memoralization. Indeed, civil

society in Rwanda has made considerable effort to remember the genocide (cf. Brandtstetter

2005). In allusion to the old trope of the “land of the thousand hills”, Rwanda today may even

be characterized as the “land of the thousand graves” (ibid.: 140). However, as Claudine Vidal

has shown, the rulers are abusing the “orchestration” of public memory – may it be funerals,

mausoleums or memorials – to privilege their own interests and to gain political legitimacy

(ibid.: 146; Vidal 2001). In doing so, the rituals of public memory are subscribing to the logic

of victimhood nationalism: All Hutu are declared responsible and guilty for the genocide,

whereas all Tutsi are pictured as the only legitimate victims (Brandstetter 2005: 147).

Similarly to Northern Ireland (see below), it thus becomes obvious that the victim-perpetrator

formula is ineffective in coming to terms with the violent past in the Rwandan case, because it

builds on the exclusiveness of “victim status” and can only be upheld by a systematic re-

interpretation of history.

The government-led strategy on the political level does have repercussions on the societal

level. One effect could be identified in the strategy that was called “chosen amnesia” by

Buckley-Zistel (2006a). Her empirical research in Nyamata and Gikongoro on the grassroots

level has shown that memory of the causes of the genocide has largely disappeared within the

26

local communities. Buckley-Zistel’s central argument is that this “forgetting” is in fact a con-

scious coping mechanism. The local communities try to avoid antagonism. Not-addressing the

root causes of the genocide established a “degree of community cohesion”, which is indeed

necessary for the intimacy of rural life in Rwanda.

While this is presently essential for local coexistence, it prevents the emergence of a criti-cal challenge to the social cleavages that allowed the genocide to occur in the first place and impedes the social transformation necessary to render ethnicity-based violence im-possible (Buckley-Zistel 2006a).

Chosen amnesia can be translated into selective non-addressing. In conclusion, there can be

two levels of non-addressing identified in Rwanda: a elite-driven, government-led process of

re-interpretation of history – which ultimately leads to victimhood nationalism – and a strat-

egy of chosen amnesia on the grassroots level.

4.2 Namibia: amnesia remains as dominant reality

The accession to independence of Namibia in 1990 was predicated on an elite pact that in-

volved international as well as domestic dimensions. The independence of the last colony on

the African mainland continent involved an accord to at least tentatively end the Angolan civil

war, and to terminate a 75 year of South African occupation of erstwhile South West Africa.

The closing decades of this long period had involved a sustained war situation in the Northern

regions adjoining Angola, and extensive police and military repression in the central and sou-

thern regions. All of this entailed regular and severe human rights violations. Against this

backdrop, an agreement was reached not to pursue any crime perpetrated by any of the parties

in the liberation war of 1966-1989. This became known as “blanket amnesty” and was flanked

by guarantees for the current establishments in the civil service and in the army. In this way,

members of the South African army and its allied forces, including the infamous Koevoet de-

tachments, were guaranteed impunity.

During the run-up to elections, in June 1989, another dimension of blanket amnesty became

apparent, gross human rights violations committed in exile by SWAPO, the overwhelming

force within the liberation movement, Survivors of a campaign aimed by the organization to

hunt down ostensible South African spies during the 1980s, and victimizing over a thousand

members of SWAPO, presented their case in Windhoek, This turned out as the beginning of a

long and halting campaign aimed at “Breaking the Wall of Silence,” as an NGO formed by

the survivors some five years later is called. SWAPO, the ruling party, returned with an abso-

lute or over two thirds majority in five consecutive national elections, has consistently refused

to address this issue. Its public justification for this approach argues against the opening of

27

scarred wounds and points to the dangers of disruption that might be involved once the vio-

lence perpetrated during the liberation war is openly discussed on a mass scale. Still, civil so-

ciety bodies have taken up the issue repeatedly at opportune moments, such as the recurrent

discovery of mass graves in the former war zone in the North, arguing the responsibility of

SWAPO for persons under its care. In this way, the issue has been kept alive, also by the con-

sistent refusal of the ruling party to address it. Even in a situation of grossly uneven means in

terms of organizational capacity or access to the media and to the state apparatus, contingent

events have repeatedly rekindled the issue of human rights violations by both sides of the lib-

eration struggle. Besides the issue of SWAPO detainees, this concerns importantly also the

impunity enjoyed to this day by South African members of the military and secret service who

have been active in Namibia during the 1980s (see Lombard 2001; Hunter 2008, 2010; Kor-

nes 2010; Kößler 2011),

So far, Namibia, then, represents a case where a securely established and entrenched govern-

ment in a dominant party democracy, acts forcefully, if quietly most of the time, to ensure that

amnesia remains a dominant reality. Such effective amnesia can also be read as success by the

incumbent government and the ruling party to enforce their historical narrative which high-

lights above all the military dimension of the liberation war.

However, this dominant, SWAPO ordained version of the past is challenged from quite dif-

ferent quarters as well. Independence also meant that the posterity of victims of the colonial

genocide, perpetrated by the German Schutztruppe in 1904-1908 saw at last a chance to make

their voices heard and to raise claims for redress. The long and conflictual process that still

revolves around the recognition of genocide and its consequences, not least among them repa-

ration and restitution by Germany, has challenged dominant and received visions of the past

both in Namibia and in Germany (cf. Kössler 2006, 2008, 2010).

In Nambia, this challenge was directed precisely at the national narrative centred on the armed

liberation struggle that has been mentioned, This has been linked to the pervasive concern

with national unity, where the nation is almost congruent with the ruling party (cf. du Pisani

2010). From this vantage point, any action that seemingly privileges one ethnic group over

others smacks of divisive tribalism. The turn in SWAPO's policy that resulted in a nearly una-

nimous vote of the National Assembly in October 2006 in support of the demand for repara-

tions by Germany, did not relinquish government's control of the process. Ensuing develop-

ments, including the pending restitution of human remains from Namibia still housed in Ger-

man research institutions, underscore this potentially conflictive situation which is a direct

28

consequence of the territoriality principle so germane to the modern state. In this case, the ge-

nocide was addressed as a pre-history of the liberation struggle, but not as the central event of

the 20th century, which is how it is viewed by most people relating to the central and southern

regions of the country.

In Germany, an erstwhile public genocide, today controversially seen in linkages with the Ho-

locaust (cf. Zimmerer 2011), had been relegated to near oblivion after the cataclysm of Nazi

crimes, World War II and the ensuing Cold War confrontation, including unprecedented eco-

nomic expansion in West Germany. Furthermore, the atrocities of the early 20th century have

been superseded, not only by the Holocaust, but by the long and drawn-out struggle for com-

memoration that related to it. As attested not least by Adorno and his labors, this process has

by no means been marked by a smooth progress or forthcoming concern on the side of the

majority. Rather, it has been marked by halting recalcitrance to acknowledge ever more vic-

tim groups that emerged, such as Jews, Sinti and Roma, gays, etc. (overall, to the detriment of

the memory for political prisoners), and of problematics, such as forced labor or most re-

cently, pension rights of former workers from Jewish ghettos in occupied Poland.

The issue of ebding the amnesia that to a large extent still surrounds German colonialism, and

in particular the genocide perpetrated during the Namibian War (1903-1908), fits into this

overall pattern as an important piece of still unfinished, unaddressed business. A turning point

seemed to be reached when at the centennial commemoration of the decisive battle at Ohama-

kari, on 14 August, 2004, then Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development Heide-

marie Wieczorek-Zeul offered a carefully worded apology for the genocide. However, the

constructive dialogue that according to conceptions of reconciliation cited above would fol-

low from such recognition remains outstanding.

4.3 Northern Ireland: “two peace processes”

It was yet another historic moment for the Northern Irish peace process when the new gov-

ernment of Northern Ireland was formed in May 2007. For the first time in the history of

Northern Ireland the new government included the two former enemies: the Democratic Un-

ionist Party (DUP), the most radical Unionist party which strongly argues the case for the Un-

ion of Northern Ireland with Great Britain, and the Sinn Fein party, the political wing of the

Irish Republican Army (IRA). The coalition-government became possible after the so-called

“St. Andrews Agreement” which had been signed by the British and Irish governments in Oc-

tober 2006. The St. Andrews Agreement builds on the “Good Friday Agreement” which had

been signed in 1998.

29

However, the Northern Irish peace process may stay be characterized as consisting of a “cold

peace” (Moltmann 2002). There are two peace processes:

There are two peace processes. One from above, controlled by the British, who have forced everybody who’s opinion they thought to be important into negotiations. The sec-ond one is on the lowest level, between the communities (quoted in:der Freitag, No. 33, 17.8.2007).11

This statement was made by Bernadette Devlin-McAliskey, a Republican activist and former

prisoner. In her analysis, the British government has never shown any interested in the “sec-

ond peace process.” Looking at the new political dispensation and the new political elite of

Northern Ireland, it becomes very clear that the elected politicians are all too eager to ignore

or leave the past behind. Their macro-political strategy is one of “chosen amnesia,”12 because

they want to move forward with the process of political consolidation while ignoring the evi-

dent structures of division on societal level. This political strategy became apparent, for ex-

ample, when the then Minister of Culture, Edwin Poots (DUP), issued the following state-

ment:

We are now in a new era in Northern Ireland. It’s long past time that people decided they should move on and leave the past behind (quited in: The Belfast Telegraph, 9.8.2007).

The political elite wants to ignore the legacy of the past and “move on”:

We must not allow our justified loathing of the horrors and tragedies of the past to be-come a barrier to creating a better and more stable future for our children (source: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/dup/ip260307agree.htm, last accessed: 27.3.2007).

This was, once again, a quite historic statement made by Ian Paisley on 26 March 2007. On

this day he met the political representatives of Sinn Fein for the first time and agreed to form

a shared government. His statement exemplifies that the legacy of the violent past shall not

addressed for the sake of the stability of political system. “Moving on” became the new po-

litical catchphrase; but it is a word used to cover up their intentions, namely “forgetting”.

Quite a long time before the Good Friday Agreement the debate over ways and means of deal-

ing with the past had already been vivid (cf. Bloomfield 1998). Given the historical fact that

1.800 of the almost 4.000 killings of the civil war since 1969 have not been explained yet, the

community’s desire for disclosure has a particular relevance.13 If there is any consensus at all

11 See the quote in original: „Es gibt zwei Friedensprozesse. Der eine oben, gesteuert von den Briten, die alle in Verhandlungen zwangen, die ihrer Meinung nach relevant waren. Und der unten, der zwischen den Ge-meinschaften.“ 12 The term was coined by Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006a). See the chapter on Rwanda. 13 For detailed statistics see Fay & Morrisey (1999); Fay et.al. (1999).

30

regarding the issue of dealing with the past, it is that Northern Ireland is not ready for the truth

of the violent past. A positive sign might be the overarching consensus that the past cannot be

left “untouched” and that is has to be dealt with, but there is no plausible agreement on how to

do this (cf. Hamber 1999). However, “untouched” doesn’t mean “forgotten” – it does mean

“non-addressed,” because the question of the past legacy is widely and heavily debated at the

community level (“the second peace process”).

The most controversial question for the post-conflict society to be answered – which is not

addressed by the new political establishment – is the definition of a “victim”:

I was a victim, too. Please let our next generation live normal lives. Tell them about our mistakes and admit to them our regrets. I have decided to put an end to this now. I am tired. (Billy Giles)

Billy Giles was a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which was founded in 1966

and perceived itself as a ‘Protestant army’ waging a ‘war’ in defense of the Protestant com-

munity against the IRA. As part of that “war”, in November 1982 Giles killed a Catholic man,

who was his friend and workmate. Giles was charged with the murder and served 14 years of

his life sentence in prison. He was released on July 4th 1997 having completed a degree in

prison. Despite his degree, he was unable to obtain a proper job that paid a decent salary. In

the early hours of September 25th, after composing the letter of explanation cited above, Giles

hanged himself. In the TV documentary called “Loyalists” by the famous journalist Peter

Taylor, Giles describes how he has never been able to cope with what he has done. This leads

to a quite contentious question: Does Billy Giles who murdered a Catholic civilian qualify as

a victim?

In today’s Northern Irish post-conflict society, the perceptions and rationalizations of violence

are irreconcilably opposed. The past remains a vital element for the construction of identity –

not for the political elite, who wants to enforce a strategy of “forgetting”, but for the civil so-

ciety: both communities celebrate and memorialize the past on countless occassions each

year, there are many “war memorials,” acts of remembrance and other symbols of the past.

There is no mutual recognition between the two communities of the other’s community’s suf-

fering.

An example that illustrates the Protestant community’s lack of recognition for the IRA’s dis-

course on violence was represented on a symbolical level when a newly created mural was

formally inaugurated:

30 Years of Indiscriminate Slaughter by So-Called Non-Sectarian Irish Freedom Fighters.

31

Beneath the title, there are pictures portraying five large IRA bomb attacks that struck the

Protestant community of the Shankill Road area in West Belfast. For example, nine Protes-

tants lost there lives during the attack, known as the “Shankill Bombing”, when the fish store

Fizzel’s Fish Shop was bombed on October 23, 1993. The mural includes two straightforward

messages from the Protestant community directed towards the IRA and equally to the British

government:

No Military Targets — No Economic Targets — No Legitimate Targets

Where are our inquiries? Where is our truth? Where is our justice?

Source: (c) CAIN (cain.ulst.ac.uk).

Two declarations by the IRA can be seen as indirect responses to the Protestant claim, which

is epitomized by the mural, namely that their victims are “forgotten” and not recognized in the

same way as Catholic victims. First, on July 16, 2002 the IRA declared publicly as quoted in

the BBC News:

While it was not our intention to injure or kill non-combatants, the reality is that on this and on a number of other occasions, that was the consequence of our actions. […] We of-fer our sincere apologies and condolences to their.

This apology was valued as a “historical” step at the international level. Yet, as they explicitly

made that apology only with respect to ‘non-combatants’ it becomes implicitly clear that the

military targets of the IRA – institutions and symbols of the British state – were legitimate

32

targets and therefore required no apology. The second “historical” IRA statement that oc-

curred on July 28, 2005 was done in the same ideological manner: The organization an-

nounced the end of their armed campaign, but at the same time stated that the armed struggle

had been legitimate:

We are very mindful of the sacrifices of our patriotic dead, those who went to jail, volun-teers, their families and the wider republican base. We reiterate our view that the armed struggle was entirely legitimate. We are conscious that many people suffered in the con-flict. There is a compelling imperative on all sides to build a just and lasting peace (source: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira280705.htm, last accessed 29 July 2005).

The reactions of the victims, for example presented in a press release of the organization

“Families Acting for their Innocent Relatives” (FAIR) on July 16, 2002, reflect the ambiguity

and contradictions of the qualified IRA apology, since it was not received as positive by the

Protestant community as the IRA might have hoped for:

While apologies such as this are easy to formulate, where is their declaration that the war is over, that they were not justified in their use of violence and will never resort to it again – or do they continue to believe that they were justified and wish to hold the option of re-turning to murder to further their ends if the ballot box ceases to deliver.

By and large the prevailing conditions of the post-war society in Northern Ireland are those of

self-chosen, “voluntary apartheid” (Baumann 2008, 2010, 2011a, 2011b), in which there is a

strong perception of one-sided victimhood and a moral competition for primary victim status.

Northern Ireland’s “cold peace” is sustained by an elite-driven policy of non-addressing. The

societal victims’ status competition makes mutual recognition impossible. The necessary pre-

requisite to achieve any form of recognition would be to abandon the victimhood terminology

within the civil society’s discourse: There can be no hierarchy of victimhood, no one can

claim ownership of “victimhood” for himself. Rather, everyone who died as a direct or indi-

rect consequence in the conflict should be qualified and treated as a “legitimate”. There is an

eminent need for “subjective enlightenment” within Northern Ireland’s civil society.

This argument is not based on any romantic version of truism: Rather it becomes essential for

the success of conflict transformation processes in divided societies like Northern Ireland, in

which former enemies have to live together when the “war” is over, to reach a consensus on

dealing with the past that enables the conflicting communities to understand the other’s com-

munities “understanding” of violence (Baumann 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b).

33

4.4 Spain: “pacto de olvido” and the “two Spains”

The Pact of Forgetting has to be broken. All Spanish citizens – citizens of one of the most modern and most optimistically minded peoples in the European Union – have to learn to understand how this tragedy could have happened (Anthony Beevor, quoted in: “Die Zeit”, July 17, 2006, translation by the authors).

This statement by the well-known British historian Anthony Beevor was a response to an un-

expected and unprecedented event in Spanish history: the informal “pact of forgetting” (pacto

de olvido), which had been established after the civil war, was broken in 2006. In his newest

book, Beevor makes a strong case for a process of dealing with the past (Beevor 2008). The

Spanish civil war took place between 1936 and 1939. It was a war between the Catholic, reac-

tionary and anti-modernist section of Spain that was led by Franco against the liberal, secular

and pro-Western section of Spain. Thus, in the Spanish case the conflict-generating cleavages

are not based on ethnicity or race – unlike the cases of Rwanda or Namibia.

Franco’s troops won with the decisive help of their fascist friends in Germany and Italy. The

victorious “Franquists” executed many political enemies in fast-track trials after the war;

many people were buried in anonymous mass graves; many of them still count as “disap-

peared”. It is estimated that 50.000 people were killed that support the Franquists, whereas

150.000 people were killed that supported the then young Spanish republic (“Republicans”)

(cf. Capdepon 2010). Eventually, a dictatorship under Francisco Franco was established

which lasted until his death in 1975.

As Beevor argued, “two Spains” were developed by the civil war (cf. the basic literature Ber-

necker & Brinkmann 2006; Suchsland 2006; Capdepon 2010; Mühr 2010; Beatrice Schlee

2009, 2011). The “two Spains” continued to exist during the life-time of the “pacto de

olvido”; they are still the same today and are constructed alongside the old “front-lines” of the

civil war.

Since 2006, the Spanish society fights a “war of memories” (Bernecker & Brinkmann 2006);

the year 2006 was officially declared the year of remembrance. As Bernecker and Brinkmann

(2006) argued, the fact that the past has been “silenced” – not “forgotten” – for 70 years led to

an increased politically polarized way of public memoralization within the Spanish society

today. Thus, seventy years of silencing had severe consequences on the social fabric in Spain

(cf. Schlee 2009, 2011). The war of memories is fought on the basis of a very controversial

discourse of victim and perpetrator. “Both Spains” perpetrate the strategy of victimhood na-

tionalism: there is no recognition of the other “Spain’s” victim status. The victim-perpetrator-

34

formula is disputed. What is important to note, however, is that in the Spanish case there is a

clear situation of asymmetrical suffering (here the Spanish case might differ significantly

from Northern Ireland): Franco’s troops acted with much greater brutality and caused much

more mayhem and led to greater numbers of “victims” (Beevor 2008; Bernecker & Brink-

mann 2006).

Spain has always been seen as a “role model” for the strategy of forgetting as a successful

strategy of conflict resolution without dealing with the past. Indeed, it was a role model for

post-war Germany. Within the German debate until the 1960s, it was constantly referred to

the Spanish “success of forgetting.” The “pacto de olvido” was quite “successful” for seventy

years. However, the success was limited and its breakdown in 2006, almost 70 years after the

civil war, demonstrates the need for a process of dealing with the past in Spain. This process

had been “frozen” for seventy years, but the demand for memoralization never went away: the

strategy of “forgetting” could not last forever. In fact, this strategy wasn’t “forgetting”, it was

a type of chosen amnesia: a case of non-addressing.

5. Conclusions

Public amnesia turns out as predicated on many more preconditions than a simple plea to at

good last let bygones be bygones might suggest. What is at stake is a consensus about such

proceeding to deal with a difficult past. In all likelihood, such consensus will be reached, on

the basis of some kind of negotiations, or indeed it might also stem from administrative fiat.

However, a silent consensus as prevailed in Spain for some quarter century after Franco’s

death also rests on informal and implicit negotiations.

The German experience after World War II is particularly indicative for the intersecting and

intermingling of memory strategies linked to amnesia on the one hand and to remembrance on

the other. This admittedly specific experience also documents both the political nature of this

process and the power politics involved, both on a national and an international scale.

What is at stake is hegemony, most of all in the sense of according and conveying meaning,

besides selecting legitimate objects of public memory or setting priorities in memoralization.

This experience also underlines that the strategy of amnesia and non-address, while an obvi-

ous recourse even in the case of Germany, particularly during the 1950s, remains precarious

and arguably temporary in many cases where those who pursue and advocate it do not hold

overwhelming power.

35

The strategy of silencing the past runs into difficulties and needs of revision once the national

construction of the past and related identity concepts are seriously called into question.

Rather than silencing the “dire past”, non-addressing, which is complemented with “subjec-

tive enlightenment” and recognition, can be an effective strategy of dealing with the past.

Such an approach of dealing with the past wouldn’t need any ideological or even theological

basis. The victim-perpetrator formula doesn’t work in coming to terms with the violent past

because of the exclusiveness of definitions. Again, this is not always the case – see, for exam-

ple, the colonial genocide in Namibia. Within such analytical framework, the imperative of

“amnesia” would then not be a claim or desire for forgetting or forgiveness.

• Turn away from “objectivization” → a turn toward the subject and incorporate

multiple and changing or complementary perspectives.

• “Subjectivization” → subjective enlightenment

• Recognition → abandon the victimhood terminology: Who defines a victim? Rec-

ognition of complex and contradictory situations, difficulty in defining victim and

perpetrator in many, though by no means in all situations

36

References

Ackermann, Volker (1994): „Ceux qui sont pieusement morts pour la France …“, Die Iden-tität des Unbekannten Soldaten, in: Reinhart Koselleck, Michael Jeismann (eds.): Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne. München: Wilhelm Fink; pp. 281-314.

Adorno, Theodor W. (1970): Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit (1959), in: Gerd Kadelbach (ed.): Theodor W. Adorno, Erziehung zur Mündigkeit. Vorträge und Ge-spräche mit Hellmut Becker 1959-1969. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; pp. 10-29. [English translation: Adorno, Theodor W. 1998: The meaning of working through the past, in: Ibid., Critical models. Interventions and catchwords. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 89-104.]

Apitzsch, Ursula (ed.) (1999): Migration und Traditionsbildung. Opladen/Wiesbaden: West-deutscher Verlag.

Assmann, Aleida (1996): Erinnerungsorte und Gedächtnislandschaften, in: Loewy, Hanno; Moltmann, Bernhard (eds.): Erlebnis – Gedächtnis – Sinn. Authentische und kon-struierte Erinnerung. Frankfurt am Main/ New York; pp. 13-29.

–– (1999): Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses. Mün-chen: C.H. Beck.

— (2006): Trauma und Tabu. Schattierungen zwischen Täter- und Opfergedächtnis, in: Joa-chim Landkamer, Thomas Noetzel, Walther C. Zimmerli (eds.): Erinnerungsmanage-ment. Systemtransformation und Vergangenheitspolitik im internationalen Vergleich. München: Wilhelm Fink; pp. 235-255.

–– (2011): Vergessen oder Erinnern? Wege aus einer gewaltsamen Gewaltgeschichte, in: Sa-bina Ferhadbegovic, Brigitte Weiffen (eds.): Bürgerkriege erzählen: Zum Verlauf un-ziviler Konflikte. Konstanz: Konstanz University Press; pp. 303-319.

Assmann, Jan (1999): Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in den frühen Hochkulturen. München: Wilhelm Fink.

— (2000): Religion und das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Zehn Studien. München: Wilhelm Fink.

— (2005): Das kollektive Gedächtnis zwischen Körper und Schrift. Zur Gedächtnistheorie von Maurice Halbwachs, in: Hermann Krapoth, Denis Laborde (eds.): Erinnerung und Gesellschaft. Mémoire et Société. Hommage à Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945). Wiesbaden: Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte, pp. 65-81.

Barthes, Roland (1964): Rhétorique de l´image. Communications 4 (1964), pp. 40-51. [Ger-man translation: Rhetorik des Bildes, in: Schiwy, Günther 1969: Der französische Strukturalismus. Reinbek: Rowohlt, pp. 158-166].

Baumann, Marcel (2008): Zwischenwelten: Weder Krieg Noch Frieden. Über den konstrukti-ven Umgang mit Gewaltphänomenen im Prozess der Konflikttransformation. Wiesba-den: VS.

37

–– (2009a): Transforming conflict toward and away from violence: Bloody Sunday and the hunger strikes in Northern Ireland. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 2 (3), pp. 172-180.

–– (2009b): Understanding the Other’s “Understanding” of Violence: Legitimacy, Recogniti-on, and the Challenge of Dealing with the Past in Divided Societies. International

Journal of Conflict and Violence 3 (1), pp. 107-123.

–– (2010): Contested Victimhood in the Northern Irish Peace Process. Peace Review 22 (2), pp. 171 - 177.

–– (2011a): Verabschiedung von den Opfern? Die namenlose Tragik des Friedens in Nordir-land, in: Buckley-Zistel, Susanne & Kater, Thomas (eds.), Nach Krieg, Gewalt und Repression: Der schwierige Umgang mit der Vergangenheit. AFK-Friedensschriften, Band 35. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 39-57.

–– (2011b): Grenzerfahrungen in Zwischenwelten: Ethno-politische Schließung und ethno-kulturelle Separation in prekären Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaften, in: Ferhadbegovic, Sa-bina & Weiffen, Brigitte (eds.), Bürgerkriege erzählen. Zum Verlauf unziviler Kon-flikte. Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, pp. 249-269.

Bayart, Jean-François (1989): L'État en Afrique. La politique du ventre. Paris: Fayard.

Becker, Annette (1994): Der Kult der Erinnerung nach dem Großen Krieg. Kriegerdenkmäler in Frankreich, in: Reinhart Koselleck, Michael Jeismann (eds.): Der politische Toten-kult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne. München: Wilhelm Fink; pp. 315-324.

Beevor, Antony (2006): Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg. München: C. Bertelsmann.

Bernecker, Walther L.; Brinkmann, Sören (2006): Kampf der Erinnerungen. Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg in Politik und Gesellschaft 1936-2006. Nettersheim: Verlag Graswurzel-revolution.

Bickford, Louis (2004): Transitional Justice, in: The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes

Against Humanity, vol. 3, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Reference, p. 1045.

Bloomfield, Kenneth (1998): “We Will Remember Them”. Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner. Belfast.

Bobbio, Noberto (1988): Die Zukunft der Demokratie. Berlin: Rotbuch-Verlag.

Brandtstetter, Anna-Maria (2005): Erinnerung, Politik und Genozid in Ruanda. PERIPHERIE Sonderband 1. 2005, pp. 139-152.

Buckley-Zistel, Susanne; Bernhard Moltmann (2006): Versöhnung: Gratwanderung zwischen Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit, in: Reinhard Mutz, Bruno Schoch, Corinna Hauswedell, Jochen Hippler, Ulrich Ratsch (eds.): Friedensgutachten 2006. Berlin, Münster: LIT Verlag; pp. 168-176.

Buckley-Zistel, Susanne (2005): “The Truth Heals”? Gacaca Jurisdictions and the Consolida-tion of Peace in Rwanda. Die Friedens-Warte 80 (2005) 1-2, pp. 1-17.

38

–– (2006a): Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Africa 76 (2), pp. 131-150.

–– (2006b): Dividing and Uniting: The Use of Citizenship Discourses in Conflict and Recon-ciliation in Rwanda. Global Society 20(1), January, 2006, pp. 101-113.

–– (2007): Frieden entwickeln? Eine kritische Analyse der Strategien der internationalen Ge-bergemeinschaft zur Friedenskonsolidierung in Ruanda. Sicherheit und Frieden 25(2), pp. 77-85.

–– (2009): Nation, Narration, Unification. The Politics of History Teaching after the Rwandan Genocide. Special Issue on Reconciliation in Rwanda. International Journal of Geno-

cide Research 11(7), pp. 31-53.

Buckley-Zistel, Susanne; Oettler, Anika (2011): Was bedeutet: Transitional Justice? In: Buck-ley-Zistel, Susanne; Kater, Thomas (eds.): Nach Krieg, Gewalt und Repression. Vom schwierigen Umgang mit der Vergangenheit. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 21-38.

Burton, John W. (1969): Conflict and Communication. The Use of Controlled Communicati-on in International Relations. New York: Free Press.

— (1987): Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts. Lanham: University Press of America.

— (ed.) (1990): Conflict. Human Needs Theory. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

— (1995): Conflict Provention as a Political System, in: John A. Vasquez, Sanford Jaffe, Ja-mes T. Johnson, Linda Stamato (eds.): Beyond Confrontation. Learning Conflict Reso-lution in the Post-Cold War Era. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press; pp. 115-130.

— (1997): Violence explained. The sources of conflict, violence and crime and their preventi-on. Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press.

Burton, John W.; Frank Dukes (eds.) (1990): Conflict. Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Cairns, Ed; Michael D. Roe (2003): Why Memories in Conflict? in: Ead. (eds.): The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; pp. 3-8.

Capdepon, Ulrike (2010): Der öffentliche Umgang mit der Franco-Diktatur. Aus Politik und

Zeitgeschichte 36-37(2010), pp. 33-38.

Coetzee, Martin (2003): An Overview of the TRC Amnesty Process, in: Charles Villa-Vicencio, Erik Doxtader (eds.): The Provocations of Amnesty. Memory, Justice and Impunity. Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation; pp. 181-194.

Connerton, Paul (2008): Seven types of forgetting. Memory Studies Vol 1(1), pp. 59–71

Crenzel, Emilio (1997): Organisation des Vergessens: Die Konstruktion des kollektiven Ge-dächtnisses in Argentinien. Blätter des iz3w 220, pp. 19-21.

39

Crocker, David A. (2000): Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society, in: Rotberg, Robert I.; Thompson, Dennis (eds.): Truth vs. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press; pp. 99-121.

Deutsch, Karl W. (1978): Nation und Welt, in: Heinrich August Winkler (ed.): Nationalismus. Königstein: Anton Hain; pp. 49-66.

Devine-Wright, Patrick (2003): A Theoretical Overview of Memory in Conflict, in: Ed Cairns, Michael D. Roe (eds.): The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; pp. 9-33.

Diner, Dan (1996): Massenvernichtung und Gedächtnis. Zur kulturellen Strukturierung histo-rischer Ereignisse, in: Loewy, Hanno; Moltmann, Bernhard (eds.): Erlebnis – Ge-dächtnis – Sinn. Authentische und konstruierte Erinnerung. Frankfurt am Main/ New York; pp. 47-55.

Dixon, Paul (2001): Northern Ireland. The Politics of War and Peace. Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Doxtader, Erik; Charles Villa-Viciencio (eds.) (2004): To Repair the Irreparable. Reparation and Reconstruction in South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip.

Dubiel, Helmut (1999): Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte. Die nationalsozialistische Herr-schaft in den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages. München, Wien: C. Hanser.

Dülffer, Jost (2009): Im Schatten des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Der Soldatentod in deutscher und internationaler Erinnerungskultur, in: Corinna Hauswedell (ed.): Soldatentod in heuti-gen Kriegen. Herausforderungen für politische Normenbildung und Erinnerungskultur. Loccumer Protokolle 25 (08), Rehburg-Loccum; pp. 71-95.

Du Pisani, André (2010): The Discursive Limits of SWAPO’s Dominant Discourses of Anti-colonial Nationalism in Postcolonial Namibia – a First Exploration. In: du Pisani u.a., S. 1-40.

Du Pisani, André; Kössler, Reinhart; Lindeke, William A. (eds.) (2010): The Long Aftermath of War. Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia. Freiburg i. B.: Arnold Bergstraes-ser-Institut.

Fabian, Johannes (2006): Erinnerung/Gegen-Erinnerung, Sammeln/Verstreuen. Reflektionen aus einer ethnographischen Perspektive, in: Steffi Hobuß, Ulrich Lölke (eds.): Erin-nern verhandeln. Kolonialismus im kollektiven Gedächtnis Afrikas und Europas. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, pp. 13-31.

Fay, Marie-Therese; Mike Morrisey (1999): Northern Ireland's troubles. The human costs. London: Sterling.

Fay, Marie-Therese; Mike Morrisey, Marie Smyth, Tracy Wong (1999): The Cost of the Troubles Study. Report on the Northern Ireland Survey. The experience and impact of the Troubles. Londonderry, Belfast: INCORE, University of Ulster.

Fraser, Nancy; Axel Honneth (2003): Einleitung, in: Ead. (eds.): Umverteilung oder Anerken-nung? Eine politisch-philosophische Kontroverse. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp; pp. 15-128.

40

Gutmann, Amy; Thompson, Dennis (2000): The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions, in: Rotberg, Robert I.; Thompson, Dennis (eds.): Truth vs. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press; pp. 22-44.

Halbwachs, Maurice (1966): Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

— (1967): Das Kollektive Gedächtnis. Stuttgart: Enke.

Hamber, Brandon (1999): The past imperfect: Exploring Northern Ireland, South Africa and Guatemala, in: Hamber, Brandon (ed.): Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Nor-thern Ireland and Countries in Transition. Derry and Londonderry: INCORE, pp. 1-12.

–– (2002): “Ere their story die”. Truth, justice and reconciliation in South Africa. Race &

Class 44 (1), pp. 61-79.

— (2003): Transformation and Reconciliation, in: John Darby, Roger Mac Ginty (eds.): Con-temporary Peacemaking. Conflict, Violence and Peacemaking. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; pp. 224-234.

Hamber, Brandon; Richard Wilson (2003): Symbolic Closure through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in post-Conflict Societies, in: Ed Cairns, Micheal D. Roe (eds.): The Ro-le of Memory in Ethnic Conflict. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; pp. 144-168.

Hauck, Gerhard (2001): Gesellschaft und Staat in Afrika. Frankfurt am Main: Brandes und Apsel.

Hayner, Priscilla B. (1994): Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994. A Comparative Stu-dy. Human Rights Quarterly 16 (4), pp. 597-655.

— (1995): Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994. A Comparative Study, in: Kritz, Neil J. (ed.): Transitional Justice. How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Re-gimes. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace; pp. 101-104.

— (2000): Same species, different animal. How South Africa compares to truth commissions worldwide, in: Charles Villa-Vicenio, Wilhelm Verwoerd (eds.): Looking Back Rea-ching Forward. Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press; pp. 32-41.

Hettling, Manfred (2009): Politischer Totenkult im internationalen Vergleich, in: Hauswedell, Corinna (ed.): Soldatentod in heutigen Kriegen. Herausforderungen für politische Normenbildung und Erinnerungskultur. Loccumer Protokolle 25 (08). Rehburg-Loccum; pp. 171-194.

Hintjens, Helen (2008): Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda. Ethnicities 8(1), pp. 5-41.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1983): Inventing Traditions, in: Ibid., Terence O. Ranger (eds.): The In-vention of Tradition. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press; pp. 1-14.

— (1990): Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

41

Hoffmann, Stefan-Ludwig (1994): Sakraler Monumentalismus um 1900. Das Leipziger Völ-kerschlachtdenkmal, in: Reinhart Koselleck, Michael Jeismann (eds.): Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne. München: Wilhelm Fink, pp. 249-280.

Honneth, Axel (1996): The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Honneth, Axel & Fraser, Nancy (2003): Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange. London: Verso.

Hughes, Lotte (2011): “Truth be Told”: Some Problems with Historical Revisionism in Kenya. 4th European Conference on African Studies, Uppsala, 15-18 June, 2011.

Hunter, Gustine [Justine] (2008): Die Politik der Erinnerung und des Vergessens in Namibia. Umgang mit schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Ära des bewaffneten Befrei-ungskampfes 1966 bis 1989. Franfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Hunter, Justine (2010): Dealing with the Past in Namibia: Getting the Balance Right Between Justice and Sustainable Peace? In: Du Pisani, André; Kössler, Reinhart; Lindeke, William A. (eds.): The Long Aftermath of War. Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia. Freiburg i. B.: Arnold Bergstraesser-Institut, pp. 403-433.

Jarman, Neil (1997): Material Conflicts. Parades and Visual Displays in Northern Ireland. Ox-ford, New York: Berg.

Jureit, Ulrike; Christian Schneider (2010): Gefühlte Opfer: Illusionen der Vergangenheitsbe-wältigung. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Kelman, Herbert C. (1990): Interactive Problem-Solving. A Social-Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution, in: John W. Burton, Frank Dukes (eds.): Conflict. Readings in Management and Resolution. New York: St. Martin’s Press; pp. 199-215.

— (1997): Socio-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict, in: I. William Zartman, J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds.): Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods & Tech-niques. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press; pp. 191-237.

Kissel, Wolfgang Stephan; Liebert, Ulrike (eds.) (2010): Perspektiven einer europäischen Er-innerungsgemeinschaft. Nationale Narrative und transnationale Dynamiken seit 1989. Berlin, Münster: LIT Verlag.

Kornes, Godwin (2010): Whose blood waters whose freedom? Gegenerinnerungen in der na-mibischen Interniertenfrage. Mainz: Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien (Ar-beitspapiere Nr. 122) http://www.ifeas.uni-mainz.de/workingpapers/AP122.pdf (ac-cessed: 27.4.2011).

Koselleck, Reinhart (1979a): Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

–– (1979b): Kriegerdenkmale als Identitätsstiftungen der Überlebenden, in: Marquard, Odo; Stierle, Karl-Heinz (eds.): Identität. München: Fink; pp. 255-275.

–– (1994): Einleitung, in: Ibid., Michael Jeismann (eds.): Der politische Totenkult. Krieger-denkmäler in der Moderne. München: Wilhelm Fink; pp. 9-20.

42

–– (1998): Zur politischen Ikonologie des gewaltsamen Todes. Ein deutsch-französischer Vergleich. Jacob Burckhardt-Gespräche auf Castelen. Basel: Schwabe & Co AG.

Kössler, Reinhart (2006): La fin d’une amnésie? L’Allemagne et son passé colonial depuis 2004. In: Politique africaine 102, pp. 50-66.

–– (2008): Entangled history and politics: Negotiating the past between Namibia and Germa-ny. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 26 (3), pp. 313-339.

–– (2010): Genocide and Reparations: Dilemmas and Exigencies in Namibian-German Rela-tions. In: du Pisani u.a., pp. 215-241.

–– (2011): Zweierlei Amnesie und die komplexe postkoloniale Lage Namibias, Die Frie-

denswarte 86, pp. 73-99 (in press).

Kössler, Reinhart; Melber, Henning (1993): Chancen internationaler Zivilgesellschaft. Frank-furt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Leggewie, Claus; Meyer, Erik (2005): Ein Ort, an den man gerne geht. Das Holocaust-Mahnmal und die deutsche Geschichtspolitik nach 1989. München: Carl Hanser.

Lévy, Bernhard-Henri (2006): American Vertigo. Traveling America in the Footsteps of Toc-queville. New York: Random House.

Liebert, Ulrike (2010): Perspektiven einer europäischen Erinnerungsgemeinschaft, in: Ibid., Wolfgang Stephan Kissel (eds.) (2010): Perspektiven einer europäischen Erinnerungs-gemeinschaft. Nationale Narrative und transnationale Dynamiken seit 1989. Berlin, Münster: LIT Verlag; pp. 227-245.

Lim, Jie-Hyun (2010): Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourning and Global Accountability, in: Assmann, Aleida; Conrad, Sebastian (eds.): Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMil-lan, pp. 138-162.

Lombard, Christo (2001): The detainee issue: an unresolved test case for SWAPO, the chur-ches and civil society, in: Diener, Ingolf; Graefe, Olivier (eds.): Contemporary Nami-bia. The First Landmarks of a Post-Apartheid Society. Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmil-lan, pp. 161-184.

Luhmann, Niklas (1998): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. 2 vol.s. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Margalit, Avishai (1997): Gedenken, Vergessen, Vergeben, in: Margalit, Avishai; David Smith (eds.): Amnestie oder Die Politik der Erinnerung in der Demokratie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; pp. 192-205.

–– (2002): The Ethics of Memory. Cambridge et.al.: Harvard University Press.

Mbembe, Achilles (1992): Provisional Notes on the Postcolony. Africa: Journal of the Inter-

national African Institute 62(1), pp. 3-37.

McBride, Alan (2009): Hierarchy of Victims: A Question of Hierarchy, in: WAVE Newslet-ter, February 2009. Belfast: Wave Trauma Centre, p. 26.

43

Meier, Christian (1996): Erinnern – Verdrängen – Vergessen. Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschtift

für europäisches Denken, 50, pp. 937–52

–– (2010): Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns. Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit. München: Siedler Verlag.

Meyer, Erik (2009): Defizitäre Deliberation. Erinnerungskultur und „Ehrenmal“ aus der Per-spektive politischer Legitimation, in: Hauswedell, Corinna (ed.), Soldatentod in heuti-gen Kriegen. Herausforderungen für politische Normenbildung und Erinnerungskultur. Loccumer Protokolle 25 (8). Rehburg-Loccum; pp. 161-170.

Moltmann, Bernhard (2002): „Es kann der Frömmste nicht im Frieden bleiben“: Nordirland und sein kalter Frieden. HSFK Report 8, Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.

Mühr, Anja (2010): Francos langer Schatten – Aufarbeiten, Erinnern und Demokratie in Spa-nien, in: Wolfgang Stephan Kissel, Ulrike Liebert (eds.) (2010): Perspektiven einer eu-ropäischen Erinnerungsgemeinschaft. Nationale Narrative und transnationale Dynami-ken seit 1989. Berlin, Münster: LIT Verlag; pp. 127-142.

Niethammer, Lutz (2007): Wahrheitskommissionen im Vergleich, in: Christoph Marx (ed.): Bilder nach dem Sturm. Wahrheitskommissionen und historische Identitätsstiftung zwischen Staat und Zivilgesellschaft. Berlin, Münster: LIT Verlag; pp. 15-35.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (2007): On the Use and Abuse of History for Life. Sioux Falls: NuVision Publications, LLC. [German original: “Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen”, 1874]

Nippel, Wilfried (1997): Bürgerkrieg und Amnestie: Athen 411-403, in: David Smith, Avishai Margalit (eds.): Amnestie oder Die Politik der Erinnerung in der Demokratie. Frank-furt am Main: Suhrkamp; pp. 103-119.

N.N. (2010): Entwicklung versus Menschenrechte und Demokratie. Ruandas Weg in die Dik-tatur. In: Forum Weltkirche, Nr.6/2010.

Noetzel, Thomas (2006): Erinnerungsmanagement. Von der Vorgeschichte zur Geschichte, in: Joachim Landkamer, Thomas Noetzel, Walther Ch. Zimmerli (eds.): Erinnerungs-management. Systemtransformation und Vergangenheitspolitik im internationalen Vergleich. München: Wilhelm Fink; pp. 15-25.

Nora, Pierre (1989): Between Memory and History: les Lieux de Memoire. Representations 26 (1989), pp. 7-25.

Nsengiyaremye, Joel (2005): Zehn Jahre danach: Völkermord in Ruanda, in: Calließ, Jörg (ed.), Zehn Jahre danach: Völkermord in Ruanda. Rehburg-Loccum: Evang. Akad. Loccum. Loccumer Protokolle, Bd. 11/ 04, pp. 91-96.

Oettler, Annika (2008): Staatliche Initiativen zur Ahndung von Massengewalt: Perspektiven einer transnationalen Geschichte und Gegenwart. Peripherie 109 / 110, pp. 83-109.

Porter, Norman (2003): The Elusive Quest. Reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.

44

Prunier, Gérard (2008): Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ranger, Terence (2004): Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies 30 (2), pp. 215-234.

Reinhardt, Wolfgang (2005): Signs of Hope after the Genocide. Healing and Reconciliation in Rwanda Today, in: Calließ, Jörg (ed.): Zehn Jahre danach: Völkermord in Ruanda. Rehburg-Loccum: Evang. Akad. Loccum. Loccumer Protokolle, Bd. 11, pp. 187-206.

Renan, Ernest (1882): Was ist eine Nation? Rede am 11. März 1882 an der Sorbonne. Origi-nal: Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? et autres essais politiques. Ed. Joel Ronan, Paris: Press-Pochet.

Reyntjens, Filip (2006): Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising liberation and democ-ratisation. Third World Quaterly 27(6), pp. 1103-1117.

Roe, Micheal D.; Ed Cairns (2003): Memories in Conflict. Review and a Look to the Future, in: Ead. (eds.): The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict. Basingstoke, New York: Pal-grave Macmillan; pp. 171-180.

Rotberg, Robert I. (2000): Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Re-conciliation, in: Rotberg, Robert I.; Thompson, Dennis (eds.): Truth vs. Justice. The Morality of Truth Commissions. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press; pp. 3-21.

Rosenbaum, Alan S. (1996): Introduction, in: Rosenbaum, Alan S. (ed.): Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide. Boulder: Westview Press; pp. 1-9.

Rubinstein, Richard L. (1996): Religion and the Uniqueness of the Holocaust, in: Rosenbaum, Alan S. (ed.): Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide. Boul-der: Westview Press; pp. 11-18.

Schlee, Beatrice (2009): Endstation Vergangenheit? Schweigepakt und Erinnerungsgesetz am Fallbeispiel einer spanischen Kleinstadt, in: Schmidt, Siegmar; Pickel, Gert; Pickel, Susanne (eds.): Amnesie, Amnestie oder Aufarbeitung? Zum Umgang mit autoritären Vergangenheiten und Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozi-alwissenschaften, pp. 203-227.

–– (2011): Die Konsequenzen jahrzehntelanger Amnes(t)iepolitik in Spanien. Das Fallbeispiel der Kleinstadt Llanes (Asturien). Die Friedens-Warte, 86 (2011) 1-2: Transitional Justice 2.0

Siedenhans, Michael (1994): Bürgerkriegsdenkmäler in den USA. Symbole einer gespaltenen Nation, in: Reinhart Koselleck, Michael Jeismann (eds.): Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne. München: Wilhelm Fink; pp. 375-392.

Shaw, Martin (2003): War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Short, John Philipp (2004): Colonisation, War and the German Working-Class: Popular Mo-bilisation in the Reichstag Elections 1907. Paper presented at: 1904-2004 – Deconta-

45

minating the Namibian Past. A Commemorative Conference, University of Namibia, Windhoek, 17-21 August 2004.

Simon, Dieter (1997): Verordnetes Vergessen, in: David Smith, Avishai Margalit (eds.): Am-nestie oder Die Politik der Erinnerung in der Demokratie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp; pp. 21-36.

Singer, Jefferson A. & Conway, Martin A. (2008): Should we forget forgetting? Memory

Studies Vol 1(3), pp. 279–285.

Straus, Scott (2006): The Order of Genocide. Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Itha-ca & London: Cornell University Press.

Suchsland, Rüdiger (2006): Kampf der zwei Spanien. Telepolis, 29.8.2006, http://www.heise.de/tp/druck/mb/artikel/23/23273/1.html (last accessed: 13.2.2011).

Vidal, Claudine (2001): Les commémorations du génocide Rwanda. Temps modernes, 56(613), pp. 1-46.

Viebach, Julia (2010): Ruanda. In: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Dossier „Inner-staatliche Konflikte“. http://www.bpb.de/themen/3NG8CJ.html (last acessed: 1.4.2011).

Villa-Vicencio, Charles (2000a): Restorative justice. Dealing with the past differently, in: Ibid., Wilhelm Verwoerd (eds.): Looking Back Reaching Forward. Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press; pp. 68-76.

— (2000b): Getting on with life. A move towards reconciliation, in: Ibid., Wilhelm Verwoerd (eds.): Looking Back Reaching Forward. Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press; pp. 199-209.

— (2003): Restorative Justice. Ambiguities and Limitations of a Theory, in: Ibid., Erik Doxtader (eds.): The Provocations of Amnesty: Memory, Justice, and Impunity. Tren-ton, NJ: Africa World Press; pp. 30-50.

Wagner-Pacifici, Robin; Barry Schwartz (1994): Die Vietnam-Veteranen-Gedenkstätte. Das Gedenken einer problematischen Vergangenheit, in: Reinhart Koselleck, Michael Jeismann (eds.): Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne. Mün-chen: Wilhelm Fink: pp. 393-424.

Werbner, Richard (1998): Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Cri-tique of Power. London: Zed Books.

Wessel, Ineke & Moulds, Michelle L. (2008): How many types of forgetting? Comments on Connerton (2008). Memory Studies Vol 1(3), pp. 287–294.

Zimmerer, Jürgen (2011): Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Ko-lonialismus und Holocaust. Berlin: Lit

Zimmermann, Jörg (2005): Wie hat die Internationale Gemeinschaft die eigene Verstrickung in die Geschichte des Völkermordes in Ruanda aufgearbeitet? In: Calließ, Jörg (ed.):

46

Zehn Jahre danach: Völkermord in Ruanda. Rehburg-Loccum: Evang. Akad. Loccum. Loccumer Protokolle, Bd. 11, pp. 153-157.

Online Sources:

http://www.mediaculture-

online.de/fileadmin/bibliothek/weizsaecker_speech_may85/weizsaecker_speech_may85.pdf,

last accessed: 1.7.2011.

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/dup/ip260307agree.htm, last accessed: 27.3.2007.

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira280705.htm, last accessed 29 July 2005.