complete election law

8/3/2019 Complete Election Law

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1 Rangaig, Norhanna D.

ROMEO LONZANIDA,PETITIONER, VS.THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EUFEMIO MULI,RESPONDENTS.

G.R.NO.135150. JULY 28,1998

Facts:

Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly duly elected and served two consecutive terms as

municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections

Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office

and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his opponent

Juan Alvez who filed an election protest. In 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a failure of elections.

After a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots, the COMEELC declared Alvez the duly

elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and ordered petitioner to vacate the post. In the May 11, 1998

elections Lonzanida again ran for mayor. His opponent EufemioMuli filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanidafrom running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three

consecutive terms in the same post. COMELEC, Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his

proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be

counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the

Local Government Code.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales

from May 1995 to March 1998 may be constituted as service of one full term for the purpose of applying

the three-term limit for elective local government officials?

Held:

The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three term limit which is now

embodied in Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially purposed to be an absolute bar to any

elective local government official. Such disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the

accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order

to perpetuate his tenure in office. As finally voter upon, it was agreed that an elective government official

should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least

one term, he may again run for the same office.

The court sets two conditions which must concur in order to disqualify elective local officials from

serving more than three consecutive terms: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three


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consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive

terms.

In this case, the two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the

petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections. After

are application and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgement that

petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayor elections and his previous proclamation as winner was

declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a

valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. A proclamation subsequently declared void is no

proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the

proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to

the final outcome of the election protest.

Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to

March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post, he merely assumed office as presumptive

winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that

Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the

expiration of the term. He did not fully serve three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of a term

does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary

severance from office for any involuntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of

execution is sued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an

interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral

terms. The delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which

took roughly about three years cannot serve as basis to bar petitioners right to be elected. The

petitioners contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification

after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April

21, 1998 or before the May 19998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioners

proclamation. Proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for

disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue

hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.

The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which

remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward

the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the solution of the

petition until after he has been proclaimed.


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ERNESTO S.MERCADO,PETITIONER,VS. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANOAND THE COMMISSIONONELECTIONS, RESPONDENTS.

G.R.NO.135083. MAY 26,1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the

position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent Manzano was the

winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril

regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a

citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the

private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that

persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after

election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision

and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC,

the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of

the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the

vice mayor of Makati.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent Eduardo Manzanois qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD:

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the

concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered

a national by the said states. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private

respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of

such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any

disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident

or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and

bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent

has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and

anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath

of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,


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VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R.NO.1136781,OCTOBER 6,2000

FACTS:

On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneously with the

national elections. One hundred and twenty-tree parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On

June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-list representatives from twelve parties

and organizations, which had obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list

system.

Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for

their own proclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 partied. Such move filled

up the 52 seats allotted for the party-list representatives. Aggrieved, the proclaimed parties asked the

Supreme Court to annul the COMELEC action and instead to proclaim additional seats, so that each of

them would have three party-list reps.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely aceiling?

2. Whether or not the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?HELD:

Supreme Court held that 20% allocation is only a ceiling and not mandatory. Congress was

vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system. As to the

method of allocating additional seats, the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the

votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes

cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total

votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, those

garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their

total number of votes. The formula for additional seats of other qualified parties is: no. of votes of

concerned party divided by no. of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to the

first party. As for the first party, just take it at face value. (5% = 2 seats).


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BENJAMIN U.BORJA,JR.,PETITIONER VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSE T.CAPCO,JR.,

RESPONDENTS.MENDOZA,J.G.R.NO.133495. SEPTEMBER 3,1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for

a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the

death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was

again re-elected as Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of

Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a

candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already

served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve

for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared

private respondent Capco disqualified from running for re-election as mayor of Pateros but in the motion

for reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor.

HELD:

No. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,

except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall

serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time

shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he

was elected.

This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):

Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same

position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an


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interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was

elected.

A textual analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by

local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election.

The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such

official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms.

The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served

his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be

considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The

purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms anelective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is

simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully

served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars

members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas

states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term,

no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive

terms allowed.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well

as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has

served three consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to the same

position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.


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RAYMUNDO M.ADORMEO, PETITIONER,VS.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSAND RAMONY.TALAGA,JR.,RESPONDENTS.G.R.NO.147927.FEBRUARY 4,2002.

FACTS:

Adormeo and Talaga, Jr. file their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City for the 2001

elections. Talga, Jr., was then the incumbent mayor. He was elected mayor in 1992 and was again re-

elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost, however, in the recall election of May 2000; he

won and served the unexpired term.

Adormeo filed a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga, Jr.,

on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms. Talaga,

Jr., responded that he was defeated in the 1998 election, interrupting the consecutiveness of his years as

mayor. COMELEC First Division found Talaga, Jr., disqualified for the position of city mayor. He filed a

motion for reconsideration and COMELEC en banc ruled in his favour and held that 1) respondent was not

elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the 1998 elections; 2) that he was

installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall election; 3) that his victory in the recall

elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 2-term disqualification rule, and

4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the 1998 elections is

considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. After canvassing,

Talaga, Jr., was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Talaga, Jr. was disqualified to run for mayor in the elections.

Held:

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well

as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has served three

consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to the same position for the

same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

The two conditions for the applications of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official

concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and b) that

he has fully served three consecutive terms. COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for

three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his

defeat in the 1998 elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be


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considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.

Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three

term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term

provided by law amount to an interruption of continuity of service.


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ANTONIO BENGSON III, PETITIONER, VS.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND TEODORO C.CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.

G.R.NO.142840.MAY 7,2001

FACTS:

Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San

Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the

1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine

Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United

States.

As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section

1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting

commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17,

1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.

2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May

11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the

constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is

a natural-born citizen.

HELD:

Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process

of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned

resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to

his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born

citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born

Filipino.


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BIENVENIDO O.MARQUEZ,JR.,PETITIONER, VS.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

EDUARDO T.RODREQUEZ,RESPONDENTS.G.R.NO.112889.APRIL 18,1995.

FACTS:

Rodriguez and Marquez both ran for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the 1992

elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez'

victory Marquez alleged that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his

disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code(R.A. 7160). COMELEC

dismissed Marquezs petition.

In the 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of

governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the

COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice."This time

the COMELEC sustained Marquez. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in

which prompted Marquez to file urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the COMELEC

granted. Nonetheless the Provincial Board of Canvassers still proceeded with the proclamation.

The Court ordered COMELEC to designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of the COMELEC

to receive and evaluate such legally admissible evidence as Rodriguez may be minded to present to

establish petitioners contention that he does not fall within the legal concept of a "fugitive from justice.

In its report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'SEVALUATION" it declared that

Rodriguez NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, thus

making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new

conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision

definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that

Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the

Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive

from justice as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.

HELD:


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No. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates

one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be intent to evade prosecution or

punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a

promulgated judgment of conviction. Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute

that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureauof Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, 4 preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the

Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the

same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known

about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no

complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. The very essence of

being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition is just nowhere to be found in the

circumstances of Rodriguez.


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JUAN DOMINO, PETITIONER,VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,NARCISO RA.GRAFILO,JR.,EDDY B.JAVA,JUAN P.BAYONITO,JR.,ROSARIO SAMSON AND DIONISIO P.LIM,SR., RESPONDENTS.

G.R.NO.134015.JULY 19,1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone

legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where

he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the

certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of

candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he

seeks election.

Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as

candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for

lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of

candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St.,

Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately

preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.

HELD:

The term residence, as used in the law prescribing thequalifications for suffrage and for

elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a

fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or

some other reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in

1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for

the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is

now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new

domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.


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A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until

a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of

residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not

adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to

reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of

ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how

long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the

date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other

circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of

intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in

Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of

residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.


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MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,PETITIONER VS.RAMOS,RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

In her motion of 16 August 1995, Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Protestant) prayed that the revision of

ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot

areas be deemed completed.

Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) deferred action on that motion and required the Santiago and

Fidel V. Ramos (Protestee) to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether this case had

been rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her

assumption of office.

The Protestant asserts that an election contest involves not only an adjudication and settlement of

the private interests of the rival candidates, but more importantly, the paramount need to dispel, onceand for all, the uncertainty that beclouds the true choice of the electorate. Hence, it is imbued with,

public interest and should be pursued to its final conclusion to determine the bona fide winner.

For his part, the Protestee submits that there is strong legal basis for this Tribunal to rule that the

Protestant is deemed to have abandoned the instant protest,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the protest be rendered moot and academic by the election of the Protestant as

Senator and her subsequent assumption of office.

RULING:

In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this

protest, or at the very least, her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the

matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render

moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would

dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the

all-to crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. It must also be

stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily

dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following

grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the

periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for

in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first P 100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after

the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the


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Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules

of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the

answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In

sum, if an election be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if

it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.


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ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.R.NO.119976.SEPTEMBER 18,1995.

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position ofRepresentative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the

same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that

petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that

petitioner lacked the Constitutions one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of

Representatives.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6of the Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. COMELEC Resolution is SET ASIDE. Residence means domicile inelection laws. It would be

plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of

candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. Mrs. Marcos merely committed an honest

mistake in her certificate of candidacy. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a

given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to

study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of

residence. The facts clearly established that Mrs. Marcos never abandoned her domicile.


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ELEAZAR P.QUINTO AND GERINOA.TOLENTINO,JR.PETITIONERS,VS.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,RESPONDENTS.

G.R.NO.189698.DECEMBER 1,2009

FACTS:

In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution

No. 8678 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official

Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local

Elections. Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 8678 provides that Any person holding a public appointive office or

position x xx shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of

candidacy (automatic resignation) however it exempts those elected officials saying that Any person

holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of

candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Sec.13(par. 3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369 provides: x xx any person holding a public

appointive office or position x xx shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office x xx.

Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, reads: x xxAny person holding a public

appointive office or position x xx shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of

his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners were appointive officers of the government who were planning to run in the 2010

elections sought the nullification of Sec. 4(a) on the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and

violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Elections resolution is constitutional.

HELD:

No. Sec. 4(a) of the COMELEC Resolution is null and void for being violative of the equal

protection clause and for being overbroad. Sec. 13(par. 3) of R.A. 9369 & Sec. 66 of the Omnibus

Election Code were also declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881 & RA 8436 relating to the automatic resignation of elective officials upon

the filing of their CoCs was repealed by R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act). There was, thus, created a

situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from

their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not.According to the Supreme


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Court, the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding

elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position

to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. And

discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be

motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified

by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in

neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign

rather than to their office work.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon

the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective

ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial

distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not

justify such differential treatment. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be

germane to the purposes of the law.


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CIRILO R.VALLES,PETITIONER,VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSAND ROSALINDYBASCO LOPEZ,RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.

FACTS:

Respondent was born in Australia on May 16, 1934 to a Filipino father and an Australian mother.

She ran for governor. Petitioner, her opponent, filed a case for disqualification on the ground that she is

not a Filipino citizen since she was issued an alien certificate of registration; there was an application for

an immigrant certificate of residence and she was a holder of an Australian passport.

HELD:

The respondent is a Filipino citizen since her father is a Filipino. Holding of an Australian

passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship

and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. At most, she has dual citizenship.


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Victorino X. Fornier V. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, AlsoKnown as Fernando Poe, Jr.

G.R. No. 161824, 04 March 2004

FACTS:

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny duecourse or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a materialmisrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when intruth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmittedhis Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based theallegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a priormarriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no suchprior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Fernando Poe Jr., is a natural born Filipino citizen.

HELD:

It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,

which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself

been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent

prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino

citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84

years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was underSpanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the

absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that

Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected

in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,

father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light,

confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children

are legitimate or i llegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough

to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of

candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.


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MERCADO VS. MANZANO307 SCRA 630

Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for

the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner

of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding

the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the

Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private

respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons

who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a

motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in

the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified torun for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private

respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to

declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held:

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent

application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national

by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a

state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus

soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born

in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is

concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of

our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual

citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the

principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws

of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the

laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are

deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the


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situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.

While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent

elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such

certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing anydisqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a

permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of

the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,

private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his

American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand,

private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent

his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in

past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.


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MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.RNO.127325.MARCH 19,1997

FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for PeoplesInitiative, filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective

Officials, by Peoples Initiative citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition,

the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the

hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the

oppositors to file their memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days.

On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel

Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among

others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling lawpassed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice

as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoplesinitiative.

b) Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to theConstitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

c) Whether or not COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendmentsto the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the

conduct of such initiative.

d) Whether or not the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed inthe draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

e) Whether or not the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.f) Whether or not it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when

there is a pending case before the COMELEC.

HELD:

NO, R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are

not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the

Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or


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resolutions. The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended

or repealed denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local

Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the

main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were

intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it

could have provided for a subtitle therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of

interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the

Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on

national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the

Constitution. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to

forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition. TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.


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ATTY. VENANCIO Q. RIVERA III and ATTY. NORMANDICK DE GUZMAN v.COMELEC and MARINO BOKING MORALES

G.R. No. 167591

FACTS:

In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, Marino Boking Morales ran as

candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30,

2007.Prior thereto or on January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. On January 10, 2004,

Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman filed a petition to cancel Morales Certificate of

Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor

of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section

43 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code.

In his answer Morales admitted that he was elected mayor for the term commencing July 1, 1995

to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the (second

term) from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto officer

On May 6, 2004, the COMELEC rendered Morales disqualified to run on the ground that he had

already served three (3) consecutive terms. But on Morales motion the resolution was set aside. The

COMELEC En Banc held that since the Decision of the RTC declared respondent Morales proclamation

void, his discharge of the duties in the Office of the Mayor in Mabalacat is that of a de facto officer or a

de facto mayor. Therefore, his continuous service for three consecutive terms has been severed. Hence,

this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales assumptions of office as mayor on July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007

constitute his fourth term.

RULING:

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or

requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive

terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001.He assumed the position and served as

mayor until June 30, 2001.He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in

the electoral protest case filed by Dee ousting him as mayor. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can

not be more clear and explicit, the term of the office of elected local officials, shall be three years and no

such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.


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Upon the other hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly

provides No local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.

Morales is now serving his fourth term and has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without

any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of

Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. He maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001)

only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated

and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms.

Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the

office which enables him to stay on indefinitely. He should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor

of Mabalacat.

Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30,

2003 should be cancelled. The effect of the cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy is provided under

Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, thus under :

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes

cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared

by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and

receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission

shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,

upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency

thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever

the evidence of guilt is strong and

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of

Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny

due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

In relation to Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:

SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot

shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of

election inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to

obtain the expression of the voters will:


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Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor of a

candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall

not invalidate the whole ballot.

In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May

2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be

considered stray votes.


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ANTHONY D. DEE v.COMELEC and MARIANO BOKING MORALES

G.R. No. 170577

Facts:

On May 24, 2004, after respondent Morales was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat

for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, Anthony Dee, also a candidate for mayor, filed

with the RTC, a petition for quo warranto against Morales alleging that having served as mayor for three

consecutive terms, is ineligible to run for another term or fourth term. Dee interposed an appeal to the

COMELEC were in it was also dismissed. It held that respondent Morales cannot be deemed to have

served as mayor of Mabalacat during the term 1998 to 2001 because his proclamation was declared void

by the RTC. He only served as a caretaker, thus, his service during that term should not be

counted. Hence, petitioner Dees instant petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining portion of

the 2004 to 2007 term.

RULING:

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or

requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive

terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001.He assumed the position and served as

mayor until June 30, 2001.He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC inthe electoral protest case filed by Dee ousting him as mayor. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can

not be more clear and explicit, the term of the office of elected local officials, shall be three years and no

such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.

Upon the other hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly

provides No local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.

Morales is now serving his fourth term and has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without

any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of

Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. He maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001)

only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated

and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms.

Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the

office which enables him to stay on indefinitely. He should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor

of Mabalacat.


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Since Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant

petition for quo warranto has become moot.

Going back to G.R. No. 167591, the question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or Dee who

shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec it has ruled that a

second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, the rule is, the ineligibility of a

candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest

number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to

the office as this would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. As a

consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This

should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to

wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-

Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or

the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.


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JOSE B. AZNAR, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

FACTS:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his

cert if icate of candi dacy wi th the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province

in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent

Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private

respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the

United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by

the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying

that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration

and Immigrant Certificate of Residence, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,

respectively.

During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a

Fi li pino ci tizen, al leging, tha t he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of

the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr:,that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine

Passport issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines

since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a

registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification

for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is

not a Fil ipi no cit izen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiringdual-citizenship.

HELD:

SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELECs decision. The petitioner

failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by


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any of t he modes prov ided for under C.A. No. 63. these are (1) by naturalization in a foreign

country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to

support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that

private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three

mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In the instantcase, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the

United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously

participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter

and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine

citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a

Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American

does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that

he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both

nationalities and citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine

citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When

we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express",

it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is

no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".


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VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, , petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et.al. respondents.

[G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002]

FACTS:

On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto

Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) at the Gymnasium

of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall[2] of

Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (Socrates for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesas mayor on

June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the

Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.

On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution for brevity) which

declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to

schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.

On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to

nullify and deny due course to the Recall Resolution.

Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M.

No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on

September 7, 2002.

Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall

Resolution. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the

PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the

meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3)

the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective

constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the

PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the publics constitutional right to

information.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall

Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.

HELD:


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Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity

of the Recall Resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on

September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in

the recall election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.


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ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES, andORLANDO R. BALBON, JR.,

G.R. No. 191938

Facts:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the

incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other

territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a

domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately

before the elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa

City was reclassified as a highly urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component city of the Provinceof Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City

residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for

the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto

Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He

subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents)filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC. They essentially argued that Mitra

remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is

therefore not qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has

successfully abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his domicile of origin, and has established a new domicile

in Aborlan since 2008.

Issue:

Whether or not ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA abandoned Puerto Princesa as his Domicile origin

Ruling:

The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws for the candidates residency

in the political unit they seek to represent has never been intended to be an empty formalistic condition;


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it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the

conditions and needs of a community from seeking elective offices in that community.

The requirement is rooted in the recognition that officials of districts or localities should not only

be acquainted with the metes and bounds of their constituencies; more importantly, they should know

their constituencies and the unique circumstances of their constituents their needs, difficulties,

aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare.

Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar, with these circumstances can only come with residency in

the constituency to be represented.

The purpose of the residency requirement is best met by individuals who have either had actual

residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or

by choice. At the same time, the constituents themselves can best know and evaluate the candidates

qualifications and fitness for office if these candidates have lived among them.

Read and understood in this manner, residency can readily be appreciated as a requirement that

goes into the heart of our democratic system; it directly supports the purpose of representation electing

those who can best serve the community because of their knowledge and sensitivity to its needs. It

likewise adds meaning and substance to the voters freedom of choice in the electoral exercise that

characterizes every democracy.

In the present case, the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate

of candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a

resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of Governor.

Mitra came to this Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation.

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