G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party,an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.

Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"),rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

CASE DIGEST AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703)

Facts:Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor ofCebuin the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of theUnited States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmea maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that he was continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and (4) that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.

Issue:Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship.

Held:YES. Osmena is still a Filipino.The court held that Aznars contention was not meritorious. Aznars argument that Osmea is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof that Osmea has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for underC.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship in any of the modes provided.

By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmea is a Filipino remains. In this case, Osmea denies having taken the oath of allegiance of theUnited States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963.

The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmea obtained certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water. The court in this case held that Osmea is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a dual citizen.

Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

NO.

In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 :"For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.BORJA versus COMELEC

Facts:Private respondent Jose T. Carpo, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.On March 27, 1998, private respondent Carpo filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Carpos disqualification on the theorythat the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo saying that In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Carpo won the election case against Borja. Hence, this petition.Issue:Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served the term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution.

Held:NO. The court held that when Carpo occupied the post of the Mayor upon the incumbents death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of Mayor, he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other.

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum:One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate,Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,vs.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGOversus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the 16thday of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29thof August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.

The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue:Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30thof June in the year 1995.

Held:YES. The Court held that the election protest filed bySantiagohas been abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.

The protestant abandoned her determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.

Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

MERCADO versus MANZANO (307 SCRA 630)

Facts:Respondent Eduardo Manzano won as vice mayor ofMakatiCityin the May 1998 elections.

However, upon petition of a certain Ernesto Mamaril, the COC of Manzano was cancelled by COMELEC on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Issue:Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held:YES. Private respondent Manzano was qualified to run for the position of vice mayor ofMakati. The COMELEC en banc held that Manzano acquiredUScitizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle ofjus soli. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship since he did not take an oath of allegiance to theUnited States. It is an undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,which effectively renounced hisUScitizenship under American law.

According toArticle IV Section 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship is not dual allegiance; as such dual allegiance and not dual citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.

MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

Facts:Marquez, a candidate for an elective position inQuezonProvinceduring the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.) Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in theUnited Statesand that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquezs Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issue:Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice.

Held:NO. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the termfugitive from justiceincludes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 136781)

Facts:COMELEC proclaimed 14 party list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast as member of the House of Rep. Upon petition by other party-list organization, it proclaimed another 38 additional party representatives although they received less than 2% of the votes on the ground that under the Constitution it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of House of Representatives must come from the party list representatives.

Issue:Whether or not Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory where at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives must come from the said party list system or representatives.

Held:NO. It merely provides a ceiling for party list seats in the House of Representatives. The Congress is vested with power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. In the exercise of their Constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary that parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast to be entitled to a party-list seat. This is to ensure that only parties with sufficient number of constituents are actually represented in Congress.

ADORMEO versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927)

Facts:Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor for three consecutive terms.

Issue:Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms.

Held:NO.In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no recall election for members of Congress.

Neither can Talagas victory in the said recall election can be deemed as a voluntary renunciation under the Constitution. It was only by virtue of the recall that he served Tagaraos unexpired term. This did not amount to a third full term.

VALLES versus COMELEC (337 SCRA 543)

Facts:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez on citizenship grounds, in May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Respondent was born on May 16, 1934 inAustraliato a Filipino father and an Australian mother, who ran for governor of Davao Oriental. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.Issues:1. Whether or not respondent is a Filipino.2. Whether or not, if proven that she is a Filipino, did she, in anyway renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.

Held:YES. Respondent is a Filipino since her father is a Filipino.

In 1934, the controlling laws of thePhilippineswere the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of thePhilippineswho were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondents father was therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her.

As for issue number two, respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Holding of an Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. At most, she has dual citizenship.

MARCOS versus COMELEC (208 SCRA 300)

Facts:Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitutions one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.Issue:Whether or not the statement in the COC determines whether an individual satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement, to warrant herein petitioners disqualification.

Ruling:NO. Havingdetermined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

LONZANIDA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 135150)

Facts:Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor ofSan Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8 1995 elections where he ran for the mayoralty position ofSan Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed the winner. He then assumed office and discharged said duties therof. His proclamation in the year 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who later on filed an election protest.

In the year 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a failure of elections. After a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballot, COMELEC declared Alvarez the duly elected mayor ofSan Antonio, Zambales and ordered petitioner to vacate the post.

On the 11thof May in the year 1998 elections again, Lonzanida ran for mayor wherein his contender Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify the former from running for mayor ofSan Antonioin the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.

Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

Issue:Whether or not tit may be considered that the petitioner had served three consecutive terms, granting that he did not finish his term in 1995.

Held:NO. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve the 1995 to 1998 mayoral term and became a private citizen. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The court set two conditions which must concur in order to disqualify an elective local official from serving more than three consecutive terms such as that 1.) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and that 2.) he has fully served three consecutive terms.

AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703)

Facts:Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor ofCebuin the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of theUnited States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmea maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that he was continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and (4) that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.

Issue:Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship.

Held:YES. Osmena is still a Filipino.The court held that Aznars contention was not meritorious. Aznars argument that Osmea is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof that Osmea has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for underC.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship in any of the modes provided.

By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmea is a Filipino remains. In this case, Osmea denies having taken the oath of allegiance of theUnited States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963.

The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmea obtained certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water. The court in this case held that Osmea is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a dual citizen.

RIVERA III versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 167591)

Facts:A petition for cancellation of the COC of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms in the office that he seeks to run for.

However, Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995 1998 in his first term and 2004 2007 for his third term, he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in the year 1998 2001 for his said to be second term that is because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest.

COMELEC ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory on May 14, 2004.

Issue:Whether or not Morales had already served his three consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position.

Held:For the three term limit for elective government officials to apply, two conditions must concur to wit: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

As the issue whether a caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him to stay on indefinitely.

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.versusJOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS THE VOTES FOR PRESIDENT & VICE PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10 2004 ELECTIONS

Facts:By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in the May 10 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress on June 11 2004.

The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.

Issue:Whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress supports Pimentels arguments against the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress after the adjournment of Congress.

Held:NO. Pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member.

Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned on 25 May 1992. Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the Eight Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice President, respectively.

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, theMunicipalityofAborlanandPuertoPrincesaCity. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary ofPuertoPrincesaCity, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative),PuertoPrincesaCitywas reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of theProvinceofPalawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility ofPuertoPrincesaCityresidents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 ofBrgy. Sta. Monica,PuertoPrincesaCity, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub,MunicipalityofAborlan,ProvinceofPalawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.Issue:Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held:YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan.The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.

The election ofAbraham Kahlil Mitra as governor ofPalawanin the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3.The respondentswere not able to presenta convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC. Likewise,the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."

SOCRATES versus COMELEC

Facts:Edward Hagedorn has already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office.

On August 23 of the same year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4thconsecutive term.

Issue:Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election.

Held:YES. The court ruled that the rationale behind the three term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election.

FORNIER versus COMELEC

Facts:Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of the respondent.

Issue:Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held:It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.