CAVOUR AND GARIBALDIi860

Syracuse

ITALY IN THESUMMER OF 1860

CAVOUR ANDGARIBALDI

I860A STUDY IN

POLITICAL CONFLICT

BY

D. MACK SMITHSENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,

ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFORD

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Copyright Cambridge University Press 1954

First published 1954Reissued with a new preface 1985

Reprinted 1986

Printed in Great Britain by theUniversity Press, Cambridge

Library of Congress catalogue card number: 84-46028

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Mack Smith, DenisCavour and Garibaldi, i860: a study in

political conflict.1. Cavour, Camillo Benso, Conte di

2. Garibaldi, Giuseppe 3. Italy—History—War of 1860-1861 4. Italy—Politics and

government—1849-1870I. Title

945/.o8/O922 DG552.8.C3

ISBN 0521303567 hard coversISBN 0521 3163 75 paperback

UP

ToG. M. and JANET TREVELYAN

CONTENTS

Preface page ix

Abbreviations xvii

Introduction I

Chapter I Political opinions in Sicily: April-June i860 7

II Cavour and the diplomats: April-June 22

III La Farina and Crispi: June 37

IV Arguments for and against annexation 47

V Arguments over ways and means 57

VI Crispi loses the first round: June 71

VII Cavour loses the second round: July 85

VIII Cavour adjusts his policy: July 100

IX Depretis begins his prodictatorship: July 117

X Cavour plans a revolt at Naples: July 129

XI Cavour fails at Naples: August 144

XII Political differences in Sicily: August 162

XIII Cavour forces Depretis to a choice: 1-8 September 176

XIV Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 September 193

XV Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September 204

XVI Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 222

XVII The radicals at bay: September 240

viii ContentsChapter XVIII Mordini the new prodictator:

17-25 September page 261

XIX Further controversy over annexation:

September-October 277

XX Mordini summons an assembly: 5 October 293

XXI Pallavicino fights for a plebiscite: 8 October 307

XXII Parliament supports Cavour: October 320

XXIII Mordini changes his mind: 9-13 October 340

XXIV Garibaldi makes his decision: 9-13 October 356

XXV The plebiscite in Sicily: October 376

XXVI The doubtful significance of the vote:October-November 3 92

XXVII Cavour's government in the south:November-December 411

XXVIII Conclusion 434

Index 445

MAP

ITALY IN THE SUMMER OF i860 frontispiece

IX

PREFACE

An author who returns after a gap of thirty years to re-read his firstbook may be in for some surprises and may even find the experiencesomewhat chastening. Perhaps he will think that the subject shouldhave been more precisely defined, or the general design could havebeen more persuasively arranged. Almost certainly there will be tricksof style that look awkward and some incidental judgements that mightbe better softened or strengthened. But this study in revolutionarypolitics has at least passed one test, because its Italian translation hasremained in print and still evokes a positive reaction of both approvaland protest. Its theme is the conflict between Cavour and Garibaldi,that is to say between moderate and radical Italian patriots. Everyonenow accepts that this conflict was of crucial importance in the processwhich led to Italian unification, and indeed it helped to determine thekind of nation that emerged. The year i860 saw the birth of a unitedItaly as the product of a clash between quite different ideas about endsand means. During six months of this year there existed two conflictingcentres of policy-making in what was still a disunited country, one ofthem being at Turin where Cavour was Prime Minister of Piedmont,the other at Palermo and Naples where Garibaldi ruled as a revolutionarydictator. Cavour was eventually able to impose his own solution,but he succeeded only because his radical opponents first broke freefrom his leadership and then forced him into actions that he had neitherintended nor even foreseen.

One reason why this division inside the national movement hadpreviously been studied insufficiently was that much of the relevantdocumentation was barred to scholars, or else had been doctored forpolitical reasons. Such falsification of history was excusable in the earlyyears after i860 when there was an urgent need to consolidate the notvery vigorous sense of national unity and so conceal the strength ofinternal divisions. But the excuse of political emergency became lessvalid in course of time. Early in the twentieth century, when theargument was advanced that such concealment had become harmfuland even dangerous by obscuring any truthful understanding of some

x Prefacefundamental national problems, another Prime Minister, GiovanniGiolitti, made the discouragingly negative reply that ' it would not beright to let beautiful legends be discredited by historical criticism'.Giolitti was ready to allow a special Royal Commission to be set upin 1913 to supervise the publication of Cavour's letters: neverthelessthe impression remained that this was done so as to preserve someofficial control over the divulgation of history, and no free access tothe archives was permitted except for the period before Cavour becamea minister. In the 1960s, a century after his death, historians were stillcomplaining of being refused permission to see the private papers ofthis greatest Italian of modern times. And even today, seventy yearsafter the Commission began its task, although the State archives areopen to everyone, the project to publish his letters is only at the half-waystage.

This preference for officially sanctioned mythology was the reasonwhy, when in 1946 I visited Italy to study Cavour's political practice,I came up against a courteous but firm opposition from the authoritieson the grounds that the material was still' too delicate' to be consulted.I had been at first encouraged by the great Cavourian scholar, AdolfoOmodeo, who had himself been denied access to this material and whowas hoping that an expression of foreign interest might help toprovoke a relaxation in official policy. But I was reluctantly forced toswitch to another subject and chose the revolution that during i860took place under Garibaldi's direction in southern Italy. Only after thisresearch was completed did the Commission agree to publish most ofthe documents in its possession that dealt with the events of i860. Atthat point it became possible to consider writing a book that tried tobring the antagonistic policies of Cavour and Garibaldi into a singlefocus.

Perhaps this may seem to have been over-ambitious, because thepolitics of any revolution are almost infinitely complex, and only withmuch difficulty could the complexities of this greatest revolution inmodern Italian history be brought into a coherent and intelligiblepicture. Among the more intractable subjects of historical study arethose that deal with a rapidly changing political situation when anumber of opposing groups are manoeuvring for position, sometimesconcealing their real motives and objectives, often quite misunder-

Preface xistanding each other and reacting to the quick succession of events on thebasis of incomplete or inaccurate information. But my hope was that,since this was one of the earliest moments when telegraphic messagespermitted a day-to-day or hour-by-hour chronology of what washappening, a more exact analysis of revolutionary action would bepossible than for any previous period of history—and perhaps than forlater periods when the documentation becomes too abundant. Itseemed likely that such a detailed study of a single year would makepossible a deeper understanding of the historical process and test someof the familiar generalizations made about the Italian risorgimento.

Though the book was written with only an English-speakingreadership in mind, its biggest impact was in Italy. This was partiallydue to the fact that it was published at a time when quite extraneouscontroversies were raging in which it was given a part to play—unintentionally on my part. Some of these polemics were pseudo-historical, for instance over whether the risorgimento had in some sense' failed' in its objectives and whether or not the course of nationalunification ought to have taken a different direction. Often the debatebecame frankly political, for example over whether there was causefor regret that the victors in the risorgimento had been a small minorityof conservative liberals who were monarchists and anticlericals. Thiscontroversy was part of the political conflict between liberals andradicals that reappeared strongly after the defeat of fascism, though ina very different context from that of i860. The question of Sicilianautonomy and whether Italy would have been more healthy as afederal state were other problems that aroused fierce argument in thenational Constituent Assembly of 1946. Some northern Italianscontinued to speak as though their union with the south in i860 hadbeen a false step; other southerners thought that Cavour's hurriedimposition of northern laws and institutions had been a major factorin keeping the southern regions backward and impoverished.

In part the interest generated by this book was due to the inaccuratebelief that I was involving myself in these controversies and writinga political tract. In part it was helped by a sense of indignation in somequarters at the equally false assumption that it was an attempt to belittlethe risorgimento and its heroes, or even that a secret motive was todenigrate Italians in general. Others on the contrary thought that its

xii Prefacejudgements were too indulgent to either Cavour or Garibaldi. Ingeneral there was some agreeable surprise that an outsider should havechosen such a subject for detailed study, and further curiosity wasaroused by the fact that the author did not seem to fit into any of theestablished categories of Italian historiography, being neither a Catholic,nor a socialist, nor a follower of Benedetto Croce's liberal idealism.The kind of history labelled as anglo-saxon empiricism had at least theattraction of novelty for a generation that had grown up during theself-contained 'intellectual autarky' imposed by Mussolini. MostItalian reviewers were in fact complimentary, sometimes perhapsexcessively so. In particular there was a welcome for the use of sourcesthat no one else had hitherto thought to tap and for the attempt touse these sources to piece together what could be seen as one of themost important chapters of national history.

There was of course some criticism of a general thesis that took issuewith many current readings of history, and though I find thesecriticisms unacceptable or even sometimes unintelligible, it is right thatthey should be kept in mind. At one extreme, Professor Romeo wrotethat he would not waste time challenging individual facts or judgementsin this book, because any connection between them and historical truthwas in his view 'merely coincidental'. Professor d'Entreves was moreappreciative and did not make the charge of factual inaccuracy, butthought that I twisted the evidence in favour of conclusions that weresometimes far-fetched. Professor Maturi, as well as finding much topraise, accused me of 'an austere English puritanism' which led tomaking judgements that were moral rather than historical.

Since other reviewers copied Maturi in making this same point, Ishould explain that Cavour was often accused by his contemporariesof unethical behaviour and himself admitted that deceit and mendacitywere perfectly legitimate weapons in a politician's armoury; but myreference to these contemporary criticisms is a statement of historicalfact and not a moral judgement. In my own view it is also a highlyrelevant historical point in so far as it helps to explain why Cavourwas so much more successful than other politicians of the time. Noram I being moralistic when I quote those of his close colleagues whothought that disingenuousness sometimes took him too far and madehis task harder by leading others (not only Garibaldi) to regard himas someone who could not be trusted.

Preface xiiiSince the chief criticism made of this book was that it was

unfavourable to Cavour, I should state in advance my own opinionthat the contribution made by Garibaldi to the successes of i860 hasif anything been underrated, but that to redress the balance betweenthese two men does not in any way diminish Cavour's claim to beregarded as the most outstandingly successful European politician ofthe century. It should be remembered that the year i860 was the mostdifficult of his life, when the initiative had fallen into the hands of hispolitical enemies, which meant that there was little chance for him toachieve a complete and unqualified success. I also believe that hisgreatness as a politician lay not so much in high moral and patrioticqualities, but rather was to be found at its most impressive in apragmatic realism that allowed him to contend with enormousproblems while supported by only limited resources. What hesucceeded in doing was to make the best of circumstances that werelargely against him. Cavour's main contribution to Italian unificationwas in any case as a diplomat, because he better than anyoneunderstood the mechanisms of the balance of power and how to exploitthe rivalries between other countries in Europe. The subject of thisbook, however, is not diplomacy but his relations with Garibaldi andthe radicals, that is to say people he did not understand well and againstwhom, partly for that reason, his ultimate victory was won only withthe greatest difficulty.

In reply to one criticism I should make clear that my concern is notso much with whether he should at any moment have acted differently,nor whether he judged well or badly, but rather in showing the resultsthat flowed from the way he behaved and perhaps had to behave. Ifhe himself admitted to making mistakes, or if some contemporariesthought that other more profitable lines of conduct were open to him,these are straightforward facts of history, and as such deserve mentionwithout any overtones of blame or reproach. Consideration of all theevidence will, I think, show that he was if anything more subtle,adaptable, clever, but also more ruthless than has sometimes beenthought, and less in charge of events. It is in no sense discreditable tosuggest that he spent much of his time feeling his way, trying to keephis head above water, sometimes following contradictory policiessimultaneously until the time came when he could choose betweenthem and make a decisive move. The experience of this year shows

xiv Prefacehow hard was the ultimate solution, how unforeseen and empirical itwas, but also how remarkable.

Like all good politicians, Cavour rarely showed all the cards in hishand and often said quite different things at the same time to differentpeople; hence it is not easy to be sure what were his true opinions atany one moment. But some of his basic beliefs are fairly clear.Undoubtedly he was moved by a strong distrust and fear of revolution,partly because the radical political opinions of his youth had changedafter the disillusionment caused by the events of 1830 and 1848, partlybecause any truly popular movement was likely to alienate the oneper cent of the population who exercised the vote in Piedmont.Without the support of this small minority he could have achievedlittle, and their interests reinforced his own determination to distancehimself from the radical policies and social reforms associated with thenames of Mazzini, Garibaldi and Cattaneo. In Cavour's opinion, as amatter of shrewd calculation, the risorgimento had to be divorced frompopular initiative and so far as possible imposed and controlled fromabove; otherwise he believed it would fail or, perhaps worse, wouldbe captured by his political enemies.

Certainly he was an Italian patriot, even if less markedly andobviously so than some others. His native language was French notItalian, and to the end of his life he knew far more about the politicsand culture of France and England than about the rest of Italy. Untili860 he had been unenthusiastic about the idea of a united Italy becausehe thought it a Utopian idea, and utopianism was something that hecondemned as the worst of all sins for a politician. He also knewunification to be the favourite objective of Mazzini's revolutionaryrepublicans. His own early preference was for an enlarged Piedmontbecoming the nucleus of a kingdom of northern Italy, which wouldleave the south as a problem for later generations to solve. At a laterstage he envisaged and even welcomed the possibility of an Italianconfederation in which Pius IX would remain sovereign in the PapalStates, while the Bourbon dynasty would stay in Naples and Sicily,and the Grand Duke Leopold would still rule in Tuscany; because therewas reason to hope that general policy in such a confederation mightbe dictated from Turin. Only in i860 did he move further towardsthe realization that a united Italian state under Piedmontese and

Preface xvconservative direction might be practical politics, and it was the urgentneed to defeat Garibaldi that finally made this a necessary solution.

There was thus a deep division between the two wings of thepatriotic movement even though both were necessary for its ultimatesuccess. Mazzini was prepared, albeit with no great enthusiasm, toaccept the Piedmontese monarchy if such an acceptance turned out tobe the most effective method of unifying the nation. Cavour, on thecontrary, regarded the great patriot Mazzini as a more fearful enemythan the Austrians, indeed as 'the greatest enemy of Italy', and morethan once said that he was ready to fight a civil war if that were theonly way to prevent a united nation being formed under Mazzini'sor Garibaldi's auspices. Moreover Cavour relied above all on analliance with the Emperor Napoleon III, because experience taught himto be deeply pessimistic about Italians being able to act effectively ontheir own, and this alliance with imperial France was an added reasonwhy he had to take so rigid a stance against any open collusion withthe radicals.

Garibaldi's idea was very different. He, like Mazzini, thought thatItalians must themselves undertake their own liberation if they wereto be considered worthy of nationhood. Hence he concluded thatCavour's reliance on France was not only undignified, but wouldmerely make Italy into a submissive client of Paris instead of Vienna,a fact which incidentally would alienate England and other countries.Garibaldi believed, perhaps excessively, in the virtue and effectivenessof popular initiative, but sensibly set out to appeal to a wider publicopinion in Europe by demonstrating that Italians could act on theirown without French help. Many foreign statesmen had been antagon-ized as they watched Cavour trying to stir up a major European warfor what appeared to be reasons of dynastic egoism, whereas Garibaldineutralized much of this antagonism by insisting that the risorgimentowas a movement for self-determination and not territorial aggrandize-ment. He more than anyone proved that Italians were ready to fightand die for their own patriotic cause without having to rely on thebelligerent ambitions of imperial France.

This was of great importance in winning wide acceptance abroadfor the new Italian state and in making a united nation seem more thanmerely an artificial creation of diplomacy. And equally important was

xvi Prefaceanother contribution by Garibaldi in that he attracted popular supportinside Italy to what was bound to seem the handiwork of a smallminority. Italian nationality meant little or nothing to most Italians,to whom the very word 'Italy' must have been unknown. ButGaribaldi caught the imagination of ordinary people and exploited hisown reputation among a conservative peasantry in order to neutralizetheir opposition to what was happening. Where the liberal politiciansfeared the possibility of a social revolution, his own fear was ratherthat, without some involvement of the masses, the patriotic movementwould be perverted or might fail altogether. In i860 he proved thata popular revolution, however dangerous it seemed in the eyes ofconservatives, was in practice an indispensable ingredient of success.

When Garibaldi sailed from Quarto with his' Thousand' to attemptthe conquest of Sicily, Cavour condemned it as a 'mad enterprise' thatwas almost bound to fail; apart from which it challenged his leadershipin Italy and threatened to ruin his carefully-laid diplomatic plans. Oneconclusion of this book, however, is that Garibaldi was more realistic,more moderate and ready to compromise than the liberals tried tomake out, and certainly was far more successful than they had everthought possible. Cavour on the other hand, notwithstanding hisbrilliant political skills, was more uncertain, more devious, less willingto compromise, sometimes even less realistic, and more actively hostileto Garibaldi's expedition than has usually been allowed. Nor is thisa matter for condemnation, because both men had good reasons foracting as they did. The chief interest lies in observing how their conflictturned out to be an important factor in the making of Italy.

XV11

ABBREVIATIONS

For convenience of printing, some abbreviations have been used infootnotes:

ASR Archivio di Stato, Rome.AME Archivio del Ministero degli Esteri, Rome.MRR Museo del Risorgimento, Rome.MRM Museo del Risorgimento, Milan.

ACM Archivio Curatulo.ABCM Archivio Bertani-Crispi.ABM Archivio Bertani.

AMB Archivio Mordini, Barga.ASF Archivio di Stato, Florence.

BR Carte Bianchi-Ricasoli.CF Carte Farini, Biblioteca Classense, Ravenna.ASP Archivio di Stato, Palermo.

ACP Archivio Crispi.FT Biblioteca Fardelliana, Trapani.PRO Public Record Office, London.

F.O. Foreign Office papers.RP Russell papers.

CC Carteggi di Camillo Cavour (published).Lib. del Mezz, ha liherazione del Mezzogiorno.Cavour-Nigra II carteggio Cavour-Nigra.Ing. Cavour e V Inghilterra.

INTRODUCTION

The year i860 was the annus mirabilis of the Italian risorgimento. In thespace of a few months, Piedmont-Sardinia more than doubled its size,and combined most of central and all of southern Italy. The formerlyindependent states of Tuscany, Modena and Parma, with the Papalprovinces of the Romagna, Umbria and the Marches, and the far largerarea covered by the Two Sicilies, all these invoked the sovereignty ofthe House of Savoy; and early in 1861 the existence of a new kingdomof Italy was officially proclaimed. Few people were more surprised atthe success and speed of this achievement than Cavour, its chief architect;and few more disappointed than Mazzini and Garibaldi, the two menwho had looked forward to this moment most keenly and who hadsacrificed most for its attainment. Here is a paradox which will serveto indicate at the outset that this was a complicated and controversialpassage of history.

The complications and controversies are worth examining for theirown sake. They are also important for their influence on the type ofstate Italy became after 1861, and for the fact that they make a small butinteresting chapter in the larger history of nationalism. The subject ismore accurately studied in particular than in general. In recent yearsthere have been a number of broad surveys written about the nationalmovement in Italy; the need now is not so much for outline histories,as for detailed monographs to test the generally accepted canons ofinterpretation. There are still too many gaps in our knowledge of whatwent on underneath the main episodes of this national revolution. Evenfor the critical conquest of the south in i860, much is unknown orknown only in part. On the straightforward narrative of Garibaldi'svictories in Sicily there may be very little to add to what G. M.Trevelyan wrote half a century ago. On the other hand, the internalpolitics of this civil war in southern Italy have not received nearly asmuch attention as their interest and importance would warrant.

The following chapters are designed as a study in revolutionarypolitics during a civil war. They are not concerned with military or

2 Introductiondiplomatic history except by the way. They leave out of considerationthe Bourbons of Naples who lost, and deal only with the nationalistswho won. They do not even try to give any detailed chronology of thesequence of events, except where this may seem necessary to explainparticular states of mind. The intention is to discover more about someof the main impulses which helped to make events take the course theydid; in particular to distinguish the aims of the several revolutionaryparties, and the contribution which each made to success. Withoutinterruption during this period there was serious internal conflict amongthe patriots, and that conflict was even at some periods in the year anecessary constituent in the making of Italy. On occasion, only clashesinside the nationalist camp (principally between the * party of order'and the * party of action') can explain thecourse taken by the revolution.The chief interest therefore reposes, not just in the conscious policy ofthe various liberal and radical groups, but in the struggle which grewup between them; not that is to say only in pure, but also in appliedpolitics.

The simplest thread running through the political tangle attachesitself to the guerrilla leader Giuseppe Garibaldi. A second thread, farmore difficult to follow, will be found in the policy of Count Camillodi Cavour, the Piedmontese prime minister at Turin. These two menrepresent the two poles of opinion inside the nationalist party. BehindCavour there was the miscellaneous variety of liberal politicians inPiedmont; behind Garibaldi, the radical democrats who enthusiasticallyfollowed him to Palermo and Naples. These radicals must not beconfused with the relatively insignificant extreme Left of republicansand socialists; just as Cavour's following of liberal-conservatives mustlikewise be distinguished from the equally inconsiderable extreme Rightof reactionary conservatives and clericals. Neither Cavour nor Gari-baldi was, strictly speaking, an extremist, although both could berelentlessly uncompromising or wildly unrealistic on occasion. As abackground to the struggle between them, there is the indigenouspopulation of Sicily. This was the raw material on which Cavour andGaribaldi had to work in the decisive phase of this revolution. Sicilianpublic opinion never spoke with a single voice. Nor, it must beremembered, did either of those two main sections of the patrioticparty which, for convenience, are called radical and liberal. Generally,

Introduction 3however, the broader trends of opinion can be identified, and theirinteraction upon each other observed.

To concentrate on Sicily and Naples alone, during the short periodfrom April to December i860, and even then with only a restrictedfield of vision, might be thought unnecessarily finical. But such alimitation of time and place is designed to make these political conflicts acoherent subject of study. By observing these conflicts as they developedday by day, and going for this purpose to the most detailed sources ofevidence, it may be possible to throw some light upon the whole move-ment for national unification. The invasion of Sicily was Garibaldi'sfinest and most typical achievement, as that of Umbria was probablyCavour's. This period is thus the most interesting of all for such a study,and the wealth of documentary evidence makes it also the most feasible.

One special interest of these particular months in the south is that, foralmost the only time in these formative years, men of distinctly un-orthodox political principles held great authority and power. For ashort while the radical 'party of action' controlled a dictatorial govern-ment, possessed a large army, and enjoyed the prestige of having con-quered half the peninsula. This was probably the time when Cavour'sgenius was most severely taxed; for though foreign politics were lessexacting than he had known them before, inside Italy the liberalsand radicals were openly attacking each other. Very little has beenwritten about the opposition groups to the Left of Cavour, for there isa tendency to justify the victors and forget the defeated. The radicalsthemselves were too busy making history to write it; and if they didwrite, were either too bitter for sound judgement, or else too illiterateto write convincingly and for posterity. This makes it the moreinstructive to be able to follow some of Cavour's opponents in detail,especially as this was one of the few periods when they were strong, andwhen there was play for rival theories about the conduct of Italianaffairs. One conclusion which emerges upon close examination is thatthe radical opposition was more moderate, more realistic, and moreintelligent than the liberal politicians and historians used to allow.

A further interest is added by the fact that at no other single momentduring the risorgimento were so many national leaders of every type andhue personally involved in what was happening. Quite apart fromCavour and d'Azeglio, there were as many as ten future prime

4 Introductionministers of Italy who had some part to play in this particular revolu-tion. Seven of them were in southern Italy for some of the time:Crispi and Cairoli in Garibaldi's retinue; Farini, Lanza and Zanardelliin that of Cavour; Depretis and Di Rudini contriving, or ratherattempting with indifferent success, to serve both masters at once. Inaddition to these, there were Ricasoli and Minghetti who had animportant share in the shaping of Cavour's pohcy as ministers in thenorth. Finally, there was Rattazzi, a dim figure spinning a tenuous webof conspiracy, who tried to form an alliance between the revolutionaryradicals, the 'parliamentary Left' and the court party, to accomplish thedefeat of Cavour. The leaders of the various radical groups of coursetravelled south to be at the scene of action. There was Mazzini himself,with Bertani, Nicotera and Mario who were not far removed fromhim in their political ideas. There were Cattaneo and Ferrari, the twoleading Italian federalists; and Sineo, Asproni and Pallavicino whobelonged rather to the 'constitutional opposition'. Other distinguishedfuture ministers of Italy who were more or less actively engaged, eitherin Palermo or Naples, included Amari, Cordova, Ferrara, De Sanctis,Visconti-Venosta, Mancini, Scialoia and Spaventa. These names bythemselves tell in part why the duel between the two principals, Cavourand Garibaldi, was fought on such an elevated plane.

Very briefly, the central theme is as follows. In April i860 a revoltbroke out among Sicilians against the Bourbon government at Naples.This was in the main a local movement against administrative oppres-sion; but incidentally it became tinged with politics, for it had beenactively encouraged by the radicals, and was accepted only with somereluctance by the moderate liberals. Then in May the arrival of Gari-baldi with his Thousand from the north confirmed and continued thisradical inspiration of the revolt. The name of Garibaldi was a guaranteethat the battle would be fought for Italy and not just for the local needsof Sicily, but it also represented political ideals very different from thoseof Cavour. Garibaldi was a great soldier, and the revolution developedwith unexpected success beneath his protection and encouragement.In July he marched through to the eastern seaboard of Sicily. In Augusthe crossed over to Calabria. On 7 September he entered Naples, andsoon the whole of southern Italy up to the River Volturno was under hisradical dictatorship. Later in September he felt strong enough to begin

Introduction 5his march on Rome, and even to ask that Cavour be dismissed from thepost of prime minister. But then, suddenly, the political direction ofthe movement changed, and Garibaldi was manoeuvred into a positionwhere he had to surrender. Cavour's troops invaded Naples before therevolt could spread to Rome. On 21 October, Sicily and Naples electedby plebiscite for the merger of all the south into the kingdom governedfrom Turin by Victor Emanuel. This vote brought the revolution toa close. It represented a notable victory for Cavour, who haddramatically captured the political and military initiative.

As a result the radicals had to wait many years for the partial attain-ment of their various desires: until 1870 for the realization of Garibaldi'sdesigns on Rome; until 1876 for the victory of Depretis and the Left inparliament; until the turn of the century for recognition of the specialeconomic and social needs of the south; and until after 1946 for theachievement of Mazzini's republican dream and Cattaneo's cherishedideal of regional autonomy. And yet a false picture will be given if it isassumed in advance that, in the year i860, a monarchic and unitarystate was the only conclusion which had any chance of emerging fromthe revolution. For in fact, although the method of a plebiscite seemedto lead easily enough to the creation of a united kingdom, many peoplehad feared until the last moment that a constituent assembly mightmeet instead, and that a federalist or a republican solution would beconsidered.

This alternative of plebiscite or constituent assembly became the issueround which the various political programmes took shape in southernItaly. The victory of the plebiscite marked the success of one set of ideasand one set of men over another. The limitations and incompleteness ofthis victory, as well as the manner of its achievement, were to be ofgreat importance for the future history of Italy. Not only did they beardirectly on the emergence of a 'southern question' in Italian politics, butneither the radicals nor the regionalists were ever quite reconciled tofinding the fruit of their labours plucked by other people. The tensionsset up between the various regions and political parties were never to beproperly resolved. Some of the ablest of Italian politicians were keptfor decades in unproductive opposition, and, when at last they wereaccepted into the ruling elite, were too old to learn the delicate art ofresponsible government. The southern provinces were also taught by

6 Introductionthis victory and its aftermath to resent the domination of the 'Pied-montese'—as their new governors from the north were genericallytermed. Political opposition thus became identified in part with regionalopposition, and this in turn with social and religious opposition; forlittle effort was made to reconcile either the southern peasants or theChurch to this sudden triumph of a secular, middle-class state.

Cavour has his place secure among the greatest statesmen and thegreatest liberals of any nation. Few historical characters have had sucha consistently 'good press' since their death. And yet, as with allhistorical figures, his true stature will be understood only if he is lookedat with a critical eye. Wherever historians can spend longer studying astatesman's reaction to a problem than that statesman once spent on theproblem itself, it often occurs that events appear to have happenedmore unpredictably and with less conscious purpose behind them thanhad formerly been thought. It also becomes possible to question someof the legends left behind by historical recollection. It will be seen thatCavour was by no means infallible; and his chosen colleagues often fellfar short of what the moment required. The kingdom of Italy, whichthey did so much to create, was one of the most notable achievementsof the age, and this gives to these critical months of its formation aparticular interest. Nevertheless, in some important respects it was toprove highly unstable; and many Italians agreed that this was due toflaws in its original creation.

For these various reasons it is specially interesting to observeCavour's political theory and method in response to—and as aninitiating force upon—the development of Garibaldi's revolution.And Sicily, which was the centre of that revolution and where theradicals were strongest and most successful, inevitably becomes thecentre of attention. It was to public opinion in Sicily that bothCavour and Garibaldi appealed, and a detailed study of this onearea may help incidentally to clarify that elusive concept, publicopinion, upon which liberals and nationalists so freely (and oftenillegitimately) relied. In following the course of events in Sicily oneis never far from the larger problem of how and why Italy becamea united nation.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL OPINIONS IN SICILY:APRIL-JUNE 1860

The most convenient point to begin a study of the Sicilian revolutionis the Palermo rising of 4 April i860; and the first question whichpresents itself is, what was in the mind of those Sicilians who then roseand for a full month kept alive a flickering rebellion on their own.

It may be assumed from the start that most thinking people in theisland were at one in their dislike of being ruled by the NeapolitanBourbons. Foreign observers in Palermo were generally agreed thatthe revolution 'had not its origin in any sudden fit of anger or disappoint-ment, but in a long and deep-rooted animosity on the part of the entirepeople of Sicily'.1 Such a situation gave plenty of scope to the activerevolutionaries. Any organization there was behind the movementhad largely been the work of Mazzini's disciples. For some years now,Giuseppe Mazzini had been looking towards southern Italy as theprobable scene of his next revolution, since his influence in the northhad been growing ever smaller since Cavour's rival and more moderateprogramme had won its first great success in 1856. In March i860Mazzini's friends, Pilo and Corrao, had therefore set out from Genoato stir up an insurrection in Sicily. Here they found an excellent fieldfor their activity. The Bourbon government had already had cause tonote with dismay how all classes there were becoming familiar with'popular sovereignty, universal suffrage and other extravagant notions'.2

Even some of the more conservative Sicilians had lately been askingCavour how much he would concede to their desire for local autonomyif they managed to revolt and invoke Piedmontese sovereignty; butCavour gave them little encouragement, and the conservatives provedto be by nature too timid to make good revolutionaries. In general,

1 11 May, a note from five British commercial firms addressed to consul Goodwinin Palermo (F.O. 165/134).

2 8 March, Castelcicala the governor of Sicily to the minister for Sicilian affairsat Naples (ACP, fasc. 138).

8 Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860motives were very mixed, and those few people who really knew theirminds wanted very different things. One British witness of what washappening remarked on the 'amazing development which the notionof annexation and a single Italian kingdom has acquired within the lastsix months both in Naples and Sicily'.1 Another, describing what hehad himself seen of the Palermo revolt, wrote as follows:the letter of the Times Correspondent of April ioth contains some errors.No cries were heard in Palermo of 'long live Victoria and Annexation toEngland'. The cries were 'Victor Emanuel and annexation to Piedmont'everywhere

The movement was indeed premature and urged on by the police, whilethe best friends of the country tried to keep it down... from the convictionit would fail.... The outbreak was not known to the Liberals until 24 hoursbefore it took place.... Not one of the Liberals had anything to do with it.Riso [its leader] belongs to the Mazzinians.2

Apparently most Sicilians, whether liberals, conservatives, auto-nomists, or without positive views on politics, were sufficiently agreedin their dislike of the Bourbons to accept in principle the extrememeans of revolution; but it is equally obvious that the lack of organiza-tion, the fear and suspicion among different groups of people, and theunwillingness of the 'liberals' to design and lead an actual insurrection,all contributed to inhibit action and leave the field open to the extremists.In the eyes of most Sicilians the rising in Palermo came prematurely,and respectable people looked askance at it. But the radicals, bothinside Sicily and outside, were prepared to exploit whatever happenedfor political ends of their own.

If the initiative chiefly lay with a few Mazzinian intellectuals, whowanted unification of Italy and if possible a republic, the immediatedriving force behind the movement came from the uneducated peopleto whom 'United Italy' must have been a meaningless phrase. This isone of those moments when we catch a glimpse of the bassa gente, theplebaglia, the masses as distinct from the classes. Sicilians at this levelwere always verging on starvation, and had little to lose if they tookany chance to rebel for a better means of livelihood. They knew nothingof Italy or of republicanism, but they disliked all government on

1 30 April, Elliot the British minister in Naples to Lord John Russell (F.O.70/315/153). 2 2 May, Goodwin to Elliot (F.O. 165/134).

Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860 9principle, and had an especial hatred for government by Neapolitanfunctionaries who were at once inefficient, cruel, unjust and extortionate.This was why a few political leaders could rouse the common citizensof Palermo in another Sicilian Vespers, and so begin an upsurge whichsoon became unexpectedly large and complicated. The national move-ment was not strong, but for a brief while it coincided with a socialmovement of great strength. As the government was paralysed by thenon-cooperation of the leading families in each village, politicalrebellion joined hands with social revolution and spread from Palermointo the countryside. This in turn brought about the collapse of localauthorities all through the island; the police fled for their lives; familyfeuds and social grievances came out into the open, and society was soonin a state of more or less complete dissolution.

One incidental result of this was to confirm the middle and upperclasses in their initial doubts about the desirability of this prematurerevolution. However much they too had political grievances againstthe Bourbons, their primary, instinct was to restore social order and endthe contagious epidemic of land-occupation. Even many of those whocalled themselves hberals, when faced by a peasants' revolt acted todamp it down rather than fan it further into flame.1 They also hadclearly in their minds the menace of a Bourbon counter-revolution.Several times earlier in the century a popular insurrection had reachedthis point, but each time the dynasty had won back the ground lost;and this had invariably meant not only political proscription of theliberals, but a 'white terror* against men of property, as the lazzaroniand contadini were incited by both Church and State to take a bloodyrevenge. Mindful of what had happened to their ancestors, some evenamong the more enlightened in i860 were unwilling to commit them-selves until the upshot was clear, until the peasants' revolt had beentamed and the threatening counter-revolution defeated. At the end ofApril this irresolute attitude aided the Bourbons, just as earlier in themonth it had aided the outbreak of insurrection. Passively, and oftenactively as members of the national guard, many of the Hberals assistedthe gradual restoration of law and order.

At the beginning of May, when the revolt in Sicily was on the point1 D. Mack Smith, 'The Peasants' Revolt of Sicily in i860', Studi in onore di Gino

Luzzatto, vol. m, 1950, pp. 208-15.

io Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860of being brought under control by the authorities, Garibaldi and hisThousand set out from a point near Genoa on their quixotic journeyto aid the rebels. They landed in Sicily on 11 May. Occasionally theymet an understandable perplexity on the part of the local peasants, butGaribaldi was able to report on the second day that 'the people havewelcomed us with enthusiasm and are joining up in crowds.. .1 hopewe shall become an avalanche... I have found the people better eventhan you said they would be'.1 On the 'invitation' of one village afteranother, he proclaimed himself dictator, and then handed over toFrancesco Crispi the task of organizing government and countersigningdictatorial decrees. Whenever the country districts had fallen back intoa state of apathy and resignation, the news of his coming sufficed almostby itself to rouse them once more.2 Only in three or four of the biggertowns did people deliberately wait until the volunteers first encountereda regular army in pitched battle.3 On 27 May Garibaldi convinced mostof the waverers when he successfully attacked Palermo. By the endof the month, after astonishing adventures, he thus found himselfnominally ruler of all Sicily except the eastern seaboard. By this timeCrispi had already appointed governors to all the twenty-four districtsof the island; and out of many spontaneously formed local committeesand private armies, an improvised system of centralized administrationhad begun to grow.

Such an extraordinary success with the slenderest of resources is aclear indication that public opinion had little sympathy with the oldregime. No doubt many proprietors would have continued to supportthe Neapolitan government if by so doing they could have beencertain of avoiding the devastation brought by social and civil war; butonce there was no further possibility of restraining the revolt, Garibaldibecame their best hope of law and order. The consensus of feelingagainst the Bourbons in all social classes and political camps gave to hisadvance a powerful momentum. Some of the volunteers wrote homethat the city of Palermo had given no help to the attackers;4 but this

1 13 May, Garibaldi to Bertani (ABM).2 27 May, the intendant of Messina to the minister for Sicilian affairs (ASP, Affari

Esteri, busta 1239). 3 19 June, Gazzetta di Catania.4 29 May, S. Calvino to A. Bargoni (Memorie di Angelo Bargoni i82g-igoi, ed.

Attilio Bargoni, 1911, p. 101).

Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860 11kind of lament is common among invading armies, and Garibaldi'ssuccess is only explicable on the assumption that, in countless un-spectacular ways, his advance against the Neapolitans was generallyfavoured.

People were far less certain when it came to positive wishes for thefuture. So deep-rooted were the ancient traditions of insular inde-pendence that no one dared to advocate publicly a resumption ofBourbon absolutism. What still found some encouragement was theproposal for a mitigation of Bourbon rule through something like adual monarchy of Naples and Sicily, or an independent Sicily ruled bya Bourbon cadet. But for this to become practicable, King Francescowould probably have had to offer Sicilians their old 1812 constitutionat once, and he was not intelligent enough to consider such an escapewhile there was yet time. 'The people seem to be divided into twoprimary parties', said a British naval officer in Sicily, 'the larger onehaving the annexation to Piedmont in view, the smaller and moreenlightened party desiring the constitution of 1812 under the presentruler. Since the appearance of Garibaldi on the scene, the hopes of thelatter party have evidently diminished.'1 There were some Sicilians,especially among the aristocracy, who were never very happy at thethought that this dictator from the north, by right of conquest, mightclaim to impose on them a system alien to their native traditions. Butfor the moment Garibaldi's provisional government was one 'whichthe people all acknowledge and obey with pleasure'.2 It was long sinceanyone had been able to say so much of any government in Sicily.

United against Naples and temporarily in favour of Garibaldi,Sicilians found it a little harder to agree over a long-term alternative toNeapolitan rule. One can affirm at once—and this is important in viewof the accusations upon which Cavour later built his policy—that therewas hardly the least glimmer of a republican party in the south:3

even that arch-republican Mazzini was now working alongside themonarchists towards the common goal of a national state, and had

1 18 May, Captain Cochran to Admiral Fanshawe (F.O. 70/325).2 21 May, Commander Marryat to Admiral Mundy (F.O. 70/326).3 8 August, M. Amari to G. P. Vieusseux: *I have not been able to discover any

republican party, even searching for it with a microscope' (Carteggio di Michele Amari,cd. A. d'Ancona, vol. in, 1907, p. 205).

12 Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860declared himself ready to accept the popular wish for a king so long asthat king believed in a united nation. There still could be found someSicilian separatists, but usually their object was only to find a practicalmethod of splitting off from Naples, and most of them were tochampion union with Piedmont as soon as Garibaldi's unexpectedsuccess made this a more feasible means to their end. If divorce fromNaples could be bought only at the price of marriage with Piedmont,some people who would have preferred complete independence wereyet prepared to pay that price.1 The names of the duke of Genoa, theduke of Parma, the count of Syracuse and even of Prince Napoleonwere discussed as possible kings of Sicily. But this was idle speculationfor Sicily would hardly have been viable as an independent state. Nordid any European state except Piedmont have designs upon her. Re-putable Italian scholars still repeat that Great Britain had ambitions toinclude Sicily in her Empire, but they are careful not to indicate whensuch an idea entered the head of any British statesman as a practicalproposition.

All the obvious facts pointed to Sicily forming some sort of unionwith Piedmont-Sardinia. Such a union had already existed for a shortwhile after 1713, and had again been canvassed in 1848. If in i860 itseemed still more of a possibility, this was partly because the northernkingdom in the interim had become more Italian and less French,especially by her recent exchange of Nice and Savoy for Lombardyand Tuscany. Many schemes were now propounded for incorporatingSicily in the old kingdom of Sardinia, and they were to cover every-thing from unqualified annexation to the grant of more or less completehome rule. Round the alternative of'annexation' or 'autonomy' therewas to grow up an important controversy among those who favouredthis Piedmontese connexion.

Cavour's aim soon became that of getting as near to outright annexa-tion of Sicily as he could. At first he had not hoped for anything at all,and he was surprised when Garibaldi's victories suggested that anothermove towards national unification might at last be practical politics;but he gradually allowed himself to be converted, and ended with theperemptory demand for unqualified surrender by the south. Giuseppe

1 E.g. Count Amari, cousin of Michele Amari the historian. See his letter of13 February to Marchese di Torrearsa (FT, Trapani).

Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860 13La Farina, a Sicilian long exiled at Turin, had encouraged Cavour tobelieve that Mazzini's concept of national unity was not so Utopian ashad been thought: the idea only needed to be taken over from itsprophet, detached from his republicanism, watered down from hisnotion of catastrophic creation, and changed into the conception ofa gradual absorption of successive provinces by Piedmont. This wasthe attitude of the so-called 'annexationists', who wanted the gradualannexation of Italy region by region. Cavour soon found a strongparty in Sicily which for various reasons agreed with him on this.

Quite distinct were the views of the unqualified champions of unity,whose most notable representative was Francesco Crispi. Crispi stoodin,something of the same relation to Garibaldi as did his enemy LaFarina to Cavour. He was a leader of the quasi-Mazzinian opposition,in revolt against those whom he thought wanted the mere aggrandize-ment of Piedmont. While quite ready to accept the dynasty of Savoy,his first object was to unify the whole nation, and this could best beachieved not by piecemeal annexation, but by letting Garibaldi'srevolutionary forces sweep up in one move to Rome. The acquisitionof Rome would make Italy an altogether new kingdom with a newcharacter and emphasis, and would prevent the nation becoming merelythat enlargement of Piedmont which was as anathema to all radicaldemocrats as it was dear to the court aristocracy of Turin. To reachRome would also be a victory for the democratic 'party of action',such as would place the radicals in a very strong political position. Bestof all from Crispi's point of view, it would involve the conquest of thePapal States, and so would mean the final consummation of thenational movement. For such a purpose it was important to keepGaribaldi's army alive and its enthusiasm hot; whereas annexation toPiedmont would cut short the revolution, and would mean breakingup the volunteer army and halting the process of unification half-way.

The division of patriotic Italians into liberal and radical thus more orless corresponded with a further division into what with some over-simplification can be called 'annexationist' and 'Unitarian'. In this yeari860 they were to fight out their differences in Sicily. The decisioneventually went against Crispi and in favour of La Farina and Cavour.One result was to be that Rome remained for ten years outside the newstate; another that the south was in the long run goaded into rebellion

14 Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860against these northern 'conquerors' with their centralized governmenton a French or Piedmontese pattern. It was in apprehension of thisprosaic and disappointing conclusion to the revolution that many of theintellectuals and politically-minded Sicilians in i860 took up a positiondistinct from that of both La Farina and Crispi: they would gladly joina united kingdom of Italy, but only if union were mitigated by ameasure of local autonomy. In the opinion of these autonomists,Sicily was a nation, or at least it was as much an indefeasible unit as wasItaly itself. For some of them, indeed, conditional annexation to Pied-mont was a sacrifice they would make merely to find a safe harbouragainst a resumption of Neapolitan tyranny.

It is impossible to discover with any precision the degree of popularsupport behind these various opinions at any one time. After the firstoutburst of spontaneous rebellion, popular opinion became less ascer-tainable than that of particular groups or individuals. Although everyparty claimed to stand for the people, vox populi was never clearlyheard: indeed, it was to be heard but imperfectly even in the plebiscite of21 October. Goodwin, the British consul at Palermo, although he livedtoo much in the past to make completely reliable political judgements,thought that intelligent Sicilians would have preferred just a reconces-sion of the 1812 constitution under the Bourbons,1 and that theinvocation of Piedmont was rather a pretext than a positive desire.2A study of contemporary newspapers in Palermo confirms what onemight have expected, that opinions were too complicated and variedfor useful analysis. Most people do seem to have been conscious ofSicily's peculiar interests, and of her need for special regional concessionswhatever king might reign. The annexationist school was spht betweenthose who wanted administrative centralization on the French model,and those who took at more than their face value Cavour's deceptivehints on the future development of Sicily as an autonomous region.A similar division existed among the radicals, separating the uncondi-tional supporters of unity from those desirous of administrative or even

1 15 May, Goodwin to Elliot: 'this morning a leading liberal has told me that theparty for Annexation is the most numerous, but the party for the Constitutionembraces all men of weight and intelligence* (F.O. 70/316).

2 These were his words as reported by the Bourbonist General Lanza on 25 Mayto the minister for Sicilian affairs (ASP, Affari Siciliani, polizia, b. 1239).

Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860 15political self-government in Sicily. But in general the autonomistsappear to have been more vocal, if not also more numerous. A numberof pamphlets pointed out how badly placed in the world were outlyingdependencies like India, the island of Sardinia, Malta and especiallyIreland; and then tried to contrast with this the benefits which theythought Scotland had secured from a union limited by enlightenedlegal and fiscal exemptions. An audible party stood for autonomyinside an Italian federation, but would have preferred complete inde-pendence if the alternative were not a federal but a unitary state. Thefollowing letter written from Catania in June may be quoted to showthe strength of insular traditions and housepride:

is it not enough for our poor Sicily to have had forty years of Neapolitantyranny to endure that we must now listen to the voice of another masterfrom Turin ? Must we be slaves to one still further away ?... Not evenGaribaldi can venerate Victor Emanuel as I do, and yet I think Sicily willbe deserted if chained to his chariot....

Be sure of one thing: that the desire for annexation has arisen out of thedesperation of slaves in a moment of enthusiasm, and will only implant theseeds of civil war to come.... It is a disservice to our country to wish it aprovince of Turin. If such a disaster is by now inescapable, let the devil'swill be done, and let us prepare to fight and free ourselves from our newmasters....

Our real wishes are two: first the unification of Italy, and secondly theretention of our autonomy. The most conciliatory course would just be toform a defensive and offensive league between the Italian regions. But ifyou persist in your present plan you will open the way for a return of theBourbons.1

This letter is the more convincing for being written by a man ofmoderate views, who believed both in a united Italy and in the northerndynasty of Savoy.

Whatever were the merits or popularity of these ideas, one mustacknowledge that Garibaldi acquired a completely deciding voice inSicilian politics whenever he could spare the time to make up his mindand interfere. During his six months' dictatorship, whenever he over-came his natural hesitancy and decided firmly upon any line of policy,his will was law almost automatically, and this because of the amazing

1 5 June, Vigo to Crispi (ACP, f. 135).

16 Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860trust and almost worship with which people regarded him. Whateverhis enemies might say, there was little of the police state about his rule.It was spontaneous affection and confidence, not terror, which led eventhe newspaper-reading public to accept statements such as that, 'everyaction of the great man cannot but be just and magnanimous, and wemust blindly obey'.1 For all that he could be vulgar, irreverent, head-strong and blustering, he was a great man in his own way, and instinc-tively recognized to be such by the common people. In courage andcapacity for energetic action he was second to none; but he combinedwith this an earnestness of purpose, a disinterested love of his country,a zeal for social reform, and a simplicity of character and absence ofostentation or personal ambition, all of which endeared him to themultitude. It is therefore the more important to note that, in thevarious political crises which preceded the final plebiscite, his wisheswere sometimes not known; and this rendered ineffective that decisivebody of people who took their views from what he was supposed towant. For most of the time his thoughts were concentrated on winningthe war, and his political views, whenever they were translated intopractical statements of policy, often seemed second-hand, vague andchangeable. Only dimly could people trace any linear development inhis opinions, and his frequent changes of tack were evidently dictatedless by mind than by instinct or emotion. What was even more con-fusing, he allowed his subordinates to make the most contradictorypronouncements in his name.

Garibaldi was no thinker, and indeed could not be called veryintelligent; but still he was a man of principle, and instinctively heldfast to certain general criteria of action which had their importance forthe history of Sicily in i860. A man who had seen a good deal of himthe previous year wrote that 'his views though broad and honest hardlyever rise above the level of trite and popular generalities'; adding,however, that 'for this very reason perhaps he exercises an influence onhis hearers which a more cultivated intelligence might fail to produce'.2

He was seen to possess almost childish illusions about human nature, andhe believed excessively in the good sense and resilience of the commonpeople; but even illusions can sometimes be a powerful stimulus to right

1 22 August, La Cicala Italiana (Palermo).2 31 October 1859, Colonel Cadogan to Russell (RP G.D. 22/73).

Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860 17conduct and effective action. He had learnt from Mazzini to set hisheart on the unification of Italy, and accordingly had no truck with theSicilian separatists. It was his intention to carry through his campaignif possible to the walls of Rome, there on the Capitoline hill to proclaimVictor Emanuel as king of Italy. He was and remained, that is to say,a loyal and enthusiastic monarchist, and indeed he had broken withMazzini on this precise point. Ever since 1856 he had been advocatingthat all Italian patriots should override their private convictions andrally to the strongest force existing inside the country, namely to theliberal-conservative kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. Garibaldi thusstood some way between the two main factions of the nationalist party.Nevertheless, he leant well towards the Left in most matters of internalpolitics. He was generally on amicable terms with Mazzini, and con-tinued to revere him as the prophet and standard-bearer of the Italianmovement. Like Mazzini, and unlike the liberal-conservatives wholooked for their inspiration to Cavour, he believed that Italians shouldat all costs redeem themselves by their own initiative, and should nothave to rely on French soldiers and diplomatic bargaining to win theirbattles for them. One aspect of this same belief was his fervent con-fidence in the effectiveness of a volunteer force; and he rejoiced to showoff the mettle of his irregulars, especially in front of those Piedmontesegenerals who had purposely and contemptuously given him so smalla part to play in earlier wars.

Garibaldi was always possessed by a basic distrust of Cavour, and thisdistrust was never sharper than in the summer months of i860, just afterCavour had bartered away to France Garibaldi's homeland of Nice. Thegovernment of Turin had been trying hard to make nationalism respec-table by transferring it from the field of revolution to that of diplomacy,and this had led to the formation of an alliance with Louis Napoleon,and so to the subsequent bargaining of Nice for Tuscany. Such a processwas taken to illustrate the point that, instead of accepting nationalunification as an axiom, Cavour seemed to prefer the less immediatelyattractive but apparently more realistic idea of a gradually expandingPiedmont—if necessary, sacrificing 'national territory' in the process.Garibaldi resented this. He knew as well that in Farini and Fanti thecabinet at Turin contained two of his bitter enemies, the two men withwhom he had clashed in 1859 when on a former occasion he had tried

18 Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860to march on Rome. He also knew how hard this same cabinet had triedin May i860 to stop him setting out for Sicily. Much of Cavour'sconduct gave good grounds for supposing that at Turin they stillwanted to divide Italy in half, merely allying with Bourbon Naples inorder to conquer Venice from Austria, and then perhaps returningSicily to Francesco II as compensation. Even when Cavour in Junebegan a campaign for annexing Sicily to Piedmont, his motives werestill suspect. In the first place, possession of Sicily might have been inhis eyes just a bargaining counter to obtain this Neapolitan alliance; andin the second place, annexation might well have been designed simplyto prevent Garibaldi leading another expedition from Sicily to winNaples and Rome. This was why Cavour's proposal to hold a plebiscitein the island was so fiercely contested. No stroke of Machiavellismwas now thought to be beyond him. Quite apart from these considera-tions, Garibaldi felt that to allow a plebiscite in Sicily would amount togiving tacit sanction to the loss of Nice, since this had also been cededby means of a similar vote. His intention was therefore to postponeany popular vote, and to defer surrendering his conquest at least untilthe revolution was well established; and postponement began to appearall the more desirable when he discovered Cavour secretly working toend the revolution and force his surrender in a way that profoundlyexacerbated his instinctive distrust. He by no means excluded helpingthe Piedmontese, but he insisted on having evidence that they meant tomake Italy a nation, and were not just out to push the selfish interests oftheir province. He firmly believed in Sicily submitting to the dynastyof Savoy; but only when this would be a contribution and not anobstacle to national unity.

That Garibaldi held these general opinions will give some idea of thepolitical significance of his success in Sicily. He had saved the revolutionfrom petering out, but he had also captured it for a political programme.In practice we shall see that his views and his actions were more moderateand even more statesmanlike than is often said; and yet they werebound to give Cavour as well as the Bourbons some cause for worry.This was almost the only time during the whole risorgimento that theradical democrats had a pied a terre, and not only that but also an army,a momentum, and something of a practical programme. There was thefurther possibility to be feared that they might receive some support in

Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860 19parliament. Rattazzi, Brofferio and the opposition deputies did indeedmake some attempt to keep in touch with Garibaldi in Sicily and usehim to overturn Cavour. Brofferio, for instance, wrote in June toexpress the wish that his southern army 'would liberate Italy not onlyfrom Palermo to Rome, but from Rome to Turin', and upset 'ouranti-national parliament'.1 But the dictator had other things to thinkabout, and apparently did not answer their letters. He had as littleconfidence in Cavour as they had, but he was more of a patriot thanthey ever were, and for him the making of Italy came first, with orwithout his political opponents. In this respect Garibaldi differedstrikingly from both of the main parliamentary groups.

Mazzini was present at Palermo only in spirit. He had long beenexcommunicated from the company of almost all the deputies inparliament whether of the Left or Right, and had been living exiled inEngland under sentence of death from the government of Piedmont.But the news from southern Italy had been too exciting: it seemed toprove at long last the correctness of his political analysis and of histechnique of revolution. As he wrote, 'the Sicilians, God bless themfor always, have for the second time given a glorious example ofpopular initiative. If only our country knows how to profit from this,they will have saved Italy.'2 Although the London police thought theystill had him under observation, on 8 May Mazzini was back at Genoa inhiding. Since the Thousand had already sailed, his first plan was tobuild up another expedition which he could launch in June through thePapal States to link up with Garibaldi in the south.3 In this he wasprevented, because most people preferred to concentrate all availableresources upon Sicily. He therefore had to rest content with advisingfrom a distance, trying to encourage Garibaldi to stand fast upon theradical-democratic programme, and to resist the machinations of theCavourians and the Sicilian 'independentists'. He was delighted to find

1 25 June, Angelo BrofFerio to Agostino Bertani (ABM). The letter added that hehad just written * again* to Garibaldi. Altogether in this collection there are eleven lettersaddressed to Bertani by BrofFerio between June and December i860.

2 9 June, Mazzini to Crispi (Epistolario di Giuseppe Mazzini, ed. naz., vol. XL, 1934,PP. 30-3).

3 May, letter from Mazzini to Libertini (quoted by Emilia Morelli, * Mazzini e lapolizia Napoletana', Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, Anno xxvm, 1941, p. 504).

20 Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860that, after all his years of persecution, public opinion in Italy wasenthusiastic for the radical-democratic programme; and he was equallydelighted that Cavour had put himself in the wrong, both over thequestion of Nice, and over the government's initial distrust of theSicilian revolution. Accordingly he counselled Garibaldi to use hisstrong position to wean the king from reliance on Cavour, as this wouldbe the simplest and most effective way to make political follow militaryvictory.1 Bertani now wrote to Crispi: 'be careful the General is notprevailed upon to leave Sicily and resign his command before havingfirmly established our political future there'. * Thank God the power isin your hands—hold on to i t ! . . . Between us we will turn Italy upsidedown.'2 For Mazzini this was a moment of great elation, a moment forwhich he had toiled thirty years in poverty and exile. 'My Italians willastonish the world', he said; and he prayed that the revolutionarymomentum would not slacken until Cavour and the other respectableconservatives were either dragged into it, or else were forced to makeway for his own more radical solution to the Italian question.

Mazzini, however, was far from the scene of action, and the newdictator of Sicily, although his friend, was a radical with a difference.Garibaldi was justifiably suspicious of Cavour, and yet combined thissuspicion with a sensible and realistic appreciation that Piedmont andthe liberal-conservatives were necessary for success. At no momentduring successive triumph and defeat did he waver in his adherence tothe monarchy and the programme of ultimate union with Piedmont.Before landing at Marsala he announced his programme as 'Italy andVictor Emanuel'. He then declared the flag of Sicily to be that of the'kingdom of Italy'. The Sicilian army was to be organized on Pied-montese lines, with the same rations and payments as in the north, andits navy was to have Piedmontese laws and uniforms. Customs barrierswere removed between Sicily and the other provinces of northernItaly, even though Victor Emanuel could offer no formal reciprocity.3

Garibaldi also showed his good intentions by appointing moderate1 28 June, Mazzini to Garibaldi (Epistolario, vol. XL, p. no) .2 9 and 16 June, Bertani to Crispi (The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, ed. Palamenghi-

Crispi, vol. I, 1912, pp. 260-1).3 Decrees dated 13, 16 June and 5 July, Raccolta degli atti del governo dittatoriale e

prodittatoriale in Sicilia (Palermo, 1861).

Political Opinions in Sicily: April-June i860 21conservatives to ministerial position in Palermo, just as he did lateragain at Naples. Although the radical Crispi remained the chiefminister except for two three-week intervals, the government was tobe a coalition, in which the radicals were and always remained aminority. Garibaldi wanted to postpone any vote or act of union untilhe was certain that it would not bring his movement to a prematurehalt, because he meant to continue as far as Naples, and then to Romeif fortune should permit. Apart from this, however, he had no dubiouspolitical objective, and Cavour was certainly wrong to think he tookadvice from Mazzini. True enough, even though an elected deputy,Garibaldi was no conventional parliamentary democrat; but neitherhad he the ambition or wit to play the Cromwell or the Napoleon. Theacquisition of maximum liberty for the greatest number was a basicdogma in his political system, and if he turned naturally to dictatorship,this was so that he might fight tyranny the more effectively and thenforce people to be free. In everything he proved to be honest, simpleand single-minded. He lived as a warrior, yet he probably spoke atleast a half-truth when he said that he did not like war.1 UnlikeMazzini, he had no subtle mental reservations; and unlike Cavour, healways meant what he said. Hence it was that the people of the southloved him as perhaps they have loved no previous or subsequent ruler.Commander Forbes was deeply impressed to find that 'there is a sortof intimate communion of mind between Garibaldi and the masseswhich is perfectly electrifying'.2 The political events of these months inSicily were inevitably coloured by this fact.

1 4 March 1861, Garibaldi to Lord John Russell (RP G.D. 22/68).2 28 July, Commander C. S. Forbes, The Campaign of Garibaldi in the Two Sicilies,

1861, p. 118. * Garibaldianism is with them as completely a religion as was Moham-medanism with the fanatical followers of the prophet', pp. 340-1.

22

CHAPTER II

CAVOUR AND THE DIPLOMATS:APRIL-JUNE

The outbreak of revolution in the south found Cavour unusually con-fused and uncertain in his movements. His political life in ten years ofoffice had mainly been devoted to the development of constitutionalgovernment and economic prosperity in the small subalpine state whichcomprised the provinces of Savoy, Piedmont, Liguria and Sardinia.Latterly he had turned his attention to other regions in the northernhalf of the peninsula, and in 1859-60 with French help he had partiallydisplaced Austria and obtained for his king the additional provinces ofLombardy and the duchies. He still did not concern himself very muchwith the centre and south. Unquestionably he wanted to establish theindependence of Italy from Austrian influence, but he had no idea hownear this was to achievement. He had privately expressed the hope thatNaples and Sicily would remain quiet for several years, and it was inkeeping with this thought that his official representative at the Bourboi.court was a man whom he himself recognized as second rate. In hisplans for Italy he leant rather to an alliance or a confederation of statesthan to centralized unity. The idea of national independence by nomeans implied for him a united nation.1 He had shown signs of restingcontent with Victor Emanuel as king of the north, and the BourbonFrancesco as king of the south. He himself knew no other part of Italyexcept the north-western corner, and he continued to look on Rome as amysterious and not altogether pleasant city. Unification as a doctrine, sofar as he was concerned, carried some of the taint of Mazzini about it. Therewas always the suspicion that in practice it might mean a republic; and theconversion of Italy into a republic was something he would not have atany price. What he hoped at this stage was to keep Italy out of troublefor a few years while he consolidated his regime in the north. It mightthen be possible to see more clearly if the balance of power in Europewould permit any further expansion against Venice or the Papal States.

1 Cf. Salmour's comment (CC Carteggxo Cavour-Salmour, 1936, p. 99).

Cavour and the Diplomats: April-June 23In the spring of i860 Cavour was in a particularly weak situation.

He had just been forced into the surrender of Nice and Savoy to Francedespite strong opposition at home and abroad. It was not only thatin this he had broken his promise, nor merely that he had proceeded'unconstitutionally'; but the act also made Turin into a frontier city,militarily untenable, and his alienation of national territory was some-thing which the italianissimi could by no means forgive him. The chiefopposition paper at Turin, II Diritto, commented that 'the treaty of24 March mutilated and decapitated the nation, and ceded one of thechoicest regions of Italy to a foreign government'.1 On 12 AprilGaribaldi himself had arrived in parliament to denounce this ignobletraffic in peoples, and to protest that the conduct of the plebiscite in hishome town of Nice had been farcically improper. Before long it wasan issue on which even members of Cavour's own cabinet threatenedto resign, and the unexpected force of public opinion made him un-certain until the last minute whether his government could survive.

The sudden revolt in Sicily thus came as a further unwelcomeintrusion at a time when matters were already difficult enough. Someprominent Sicilians had consulted him on several occasions betweenJanuary and March to hear his views on the south, but he had tem-porized; and though he privately attempted to find whether there wereany means of helping them, he had ended up without offering anyuseful advice.2 Then, during April and May, he was confronted withoutwarning by a very complicated problem, so complicated that he couldnot bring himself to follow any consistent policy, but rather abandonedattempts at control and drifted before the current of events. Over hisaction, or lack of action at this point, there began to grow up a legendwhich eventually was to portray him as all-wise and all-successful in hisconduct throughout the year. La Farina and Admiral Persano later triedto show that Cavour had aided Garibaldi's expedition 'with everypossible means'.3 In fact this was an attempt to justify their own part

1 23 May, II Diritto.2 L. La Bella, 'V. Fardella, Marchese di Torrearsa', Archivio Storico per la Sicilia

Orientate, 1932, p. 473.3 La Farina in parliament, 18 June 1863, Atti Parlamentari; C. di Persano, Diario

privato-politico-militare.. .nella campagna navale degli anni i860 e 1861, part 1, 1869,pp. 14-17.

24 Cavour and the Diplomats: April-Junein the revolution. Subsequent historians have usually accepted theiraccount, and have rationalized what appear to be contradictory facts bysaying that he positively helped the expedition while cleverly seemingnot to. But this should rather be put the other way round, for in facthe gave no help, while skilfully letting the patriots think that he mightdo so at any moment.1 He was in a position where the appearance ofpatriotism was more important to him than being a patriot in deed.Since his faith was in the methods of diplomacy, his first and essentialobject was to remain friendly with the cabinets of Europe, and it wason this very point that Garibaldi's venture threatened to ruin his wholepolicy of cautious gradualism.

The expedition of the Thousand had taken place against Cavour'sexpress advice, and was apparently inspired by his political opponents.To him it was Mazzinian in origin, inexpedient in manner and timing,and extremely dangerous from the point of view of its possible effects.As to its composition, while there were undoubtedly one or tworepublicans, it had no strong political stamp; but there was a distinctregional preponderance of Lombards and Venetians in this expedi-tionary force, and there were hardly any Piedmontese at all. Cavourhad no confidence in its leaders, and saw that so long as they held theinitiative, his own hand would continually be forced by events outsidehis control. There was an acute risk that something might go wrong:it might be that, without Piedmontese help, a Bourbon counter-revolution would prevail just as in 1849; alternatively Mazzini mightcapture the rebellion and direct it for his own sinister purposes; perhapsthe Sicilian autonomists would use the interregnum to carry their viewsand make Sicily a separate state. Garibaldi was clearly in the hands ofhot-headed, inexperienced men, people with a grievance like Crispi.If they reached Rome they might try to impose conditions on the north;that is to say they might challenge the Piedmontese hegemony in Italy.They might even summon a constituent assembly and call in questionfundamental principles of the constitution, or might ask the king to

1 The evidence for this is discussed in D. Mack Smith, * Cavour's attitude toGaribaldi's expedition to Sicily', The Cambridge Historical Journal, vol. ix, 1949,pp. 359-70. The contrary view is stated by W. R. Thayer, The life and times of Cavour yvol. 11, 1911, pp. 268-9; ?• Matter, Cavour et V unite Italienne, vol. m, 1927, pp. 343—6;A. J. Whyte, The evolution of modern Italy, 1944, p. 134.

Cavour and the Diplomats: April-June 25dismiss Cavour himself. Cavour of late had not been on good termswith the king, and indeed Victor Emanuel was rash and self-willedenough to have dismissed him and supported a victorious Garibaldi.It was suspected on good evidence that both Ricasoli and Rattazzi werebeing actively considered as alternative candidates for the premiership.This weakened Cavour considerably, and made it unwise for him atthis moment to take any strong action for or against Garibaldi. If hehad been ready to allow discussion of fundamentals, he might have wonover the radicals by himself proposing a constituent assembly; but afterthe loss of Savoy it was more important for him to make concessions tothe Right than to the Left. He also could not help but go on lookingat the problem as a diplomatist, with the international complicationsuppermost in his mind. Since all his hopes centred on French support,and as Rome had a French garrison, he was understandably terrified thatthe democrats' policy of advancing on Rome would bring about a clashwith his patron in Paris. His own preference—and it was a reasonableone—was to negotiate with Louis Napoleon for the withdrawal of thatgarrison in Rome. Another revolution in Italy was of all things mostlikely to make such negotiations fail.

Cavour therefore did all he could, short of using force, to preventGaribaldi setting out for Sicily. When at the last minute it appeared thatthe radical leader would not listen to advice, he even ordered his navyto arrest the expedition ' at all costs9 (the words of his original order wereunderlined). But he had not dared to be so bold until the volunteershad openly and unexpectedly put themselves in the wrong by leavingport, and fortunate circumstances then took them on a circuitous routesafely to their destination. Public opinion in the north had apparentlyabandoned Cavour for Garibaldi, and public opinion, if not the kinghimself, might well have unseated the prime minister if he had gonedirectly against the current. At this moment the parliamentary electionswere taking place, and the administrative officers of the crown werefully occupied in trying to return a government majority. There wasin any case a serious ministerial crisis, made all the more difficult by theprospect of a difficult debate over Nice. Cavour therefore held hishand. He could not afford to use force until Garibaldi had openlydefied him, and even then there were all these other reasons why heshould lie low and hope for the best. Once the expedition had escaped

26 Cavour and the Diplomats: April-Juneinterception by his navy, there was little he could do but wait to seewhether it would have to be disowned or exploited. He naturallydid not wish to compromise himself unnecessarily until one side hademerged victorious. He did not know the extent of his own successin the elections until 10-12 May, by which time Garibaldi had safelylanded. After that, as the Turin newspapers show, the imminent debateover Savoy and Nice made any serious consideration of Sicilian affairsimpossible. Only on 29 May did Cavour know he had a firm majorityin parliament; only on the 31st did he hear of the capture of Palermo.These two pieces of information at last made it possible for the govern-ment to assert itself, and also indicated how the expedition might beuseful after all. What Cavour then had to do was to bring this privatearmy under a moderating influence. As soon as Palermo had fallen,active but still unofficial aid was therefore given by the king's govern-ment in forming a second expedition of reinforcements. After theseweeks of delay, however, it was not quite so easy to make up for losttime and exploit Garibaldi's unexpected success. The Thousand, withtheir rusty converted flintlocks, might well have perished on their own,and Garibaldi in the meantime had only been confirmed in his beliefthat Cavour could not have the interests of Italy at heart.

It would be wrong to tax Cavour with deficiency of confidence andidealism over this, for it was hardly possible to guess in early May thatthe revolution would be so successful, or indeed to be sure that Franceand Austria would omit to veto what was happening. In the generaluncertainty, his safest plan was to suspect the worst of Garibaldi, and toplace his entire trust in Louis Napoleon. He was seriously worried thatFrance might withdraw her benevolent support from Piedmont,especially as Dr Bertani, Garibaldi's chief organizer in Genoa, hadorders to carry out Mazzini's plan for another insurrection in the PapalStates.1 If any of the bigger volunteer expeditions had gone to thePapal States instead of Sicily, it might have brought about the end ofdiplomatic non-intervention. In order to show that he would by no

1 13 May, Garibaldi to Bertani, giving orders that Medici should concentrate withhis second expedition of volunteers on the Papal States; and 25 May, Bertani toGaribaldi, explaining that Medici had let himself be diverted from this plan (ACM).On 16 June, Bertani asked Garibaldi to instruct Cosenz to attack the Papal Stateswith the third expedition (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 277-8).

Cavour and the Diplomats: April-June 27means countenance such an occurrence, Cavour had to arrest one ofGaribaldi's senior officers, Colonel Zambianchi, whom he then illegallykept in prison without trial for almost a year. When Cavour sub-sequently gave secret help to the two relief expeditions of Medici inJune and Cosenz in July, he was in part moved by this same necessityof canalizing the volunteers towards Sicily and diverting them fromRome. His motive, that is to say, was shrewd common sense as wellas patriotic enthusiasm; perhaps it was less eagerness to unify thewhole of Italy, than fear that France might upset that degree ofunification already achieved. Cavour made another serious effort toappease Napoleon III by ordering Mazzini's arrest, though his policefailed to locate the culprit. Many people in Paris and Turin continuedto believe—although on the very slenderest evidence—that the Sicilianexpedition might end in a victory for the republicans. Garibaldi wasnot in fact a republican, but he was a sworn enemy to the presentgovernment. If there were some in northern Italy who could evenrejoice when the brave and selfless radical leader, Rosolino Pilo, waskilled with the volunteers in Sicily, one can understand how manymore feared the influence which a victorious Garibaldi might wieldin parliament on his return.1

Cavour was not a man who normally lacked courage or vision.Nevertheless it must be admitted that other Italians were bolder, andsome among his fellow diplomats more far-sighted. For instance, theUnited States minister at Turin wrote home with a remarkably clearappreciation of the possibilities of the moment:

before this year is ended, it is quite possible that the entire Italian peninsulawith the exception of Venice and perhaps the city of Rome intra muros willbe united under the sceptre of Victor Emanuel. Only one thing can preventit—a great effort and an actively conducted war by the Austrian Empire.It is said that the King of Naples has already demanded the armed inter-vention of that power in his affairs. It is quite improbable that he willreceive it. The battles of last summer have prostrated Austria. All the prideand spirit was then taken from her. She rests an inert mass on the bank,while the river of Italian revolution runs a straight, and now an unresisted,course.2

1 This is described in a letter of 4 June, from Cordova to Torrearsa (FT).2 4 June, Daniel to secretary of state Cass (copy in MRR).

28 Cavour and the Diplomats: April-JuneTo take another example, Bettino Ricasoli, the governor of Tuscany,did not cease to blame the government for abandoning the direction ofthe Italian movement to Garibaldi. It was pointed out that the worldwas bound to put responsibility upon Turin for events in Sicily,especially as the revolutionary government at Palermo headed all itsenactments with the name of Victor Emanuel. Cavour had been forcedinto a position where his own cause was bound up with that of therevolution, and where he could hardly stop short of active participationwithout being ruined; whether the Bourbons won, or whether Gari-baldi won without Piedmontese help, the cause of Italy would alike beimperilled. Ricasoli put it to him that the revolutionaries were out-pacing the liberal-conservatives. Therefore, to save the prestige of theking, he should not hesitate to invade the Papal States himself; for, asthis pious Catholic concluded, 'we must destroy the temporal powersoon, completely and for always'.1 Much the same advice came fromValerio, the prefect of Como, who wrote to urge that Cavour musteither outdo Mazzini or yield: to retain his position he had to make upwhat he had lost in prestige over the surrender of Nice; otherwiseMurat, or Napoleon, or the * reds' would have an open field for theirown private schemes.2

So far the opposition had had free rein for its criticism of Cavour'sactions and omissions during May. He was charged with 'having doneall he could to prevent the expedition, only stopping short before thedanger of civil war';3 and the accusation was made that he had thenwaited to see if Garibaldi won or lost before making any furtherdecision, 'although in a thousand ways the government could havegiven help without anyone knowing'.4 Once the volunteers hadbegun to win, it was a different story. Cavour had spent too much timeduring May in telling the world how little he approved of Garibaldi'sfoolhardy venture, so that it was a difficult task to adjust himself in Juneto the revolutionary victories. Nevertheless, it was essential to changeround to try and win Garibaldi's confidence. One thing he could dowithout prejudice was to hold the ring for a fair fight, and on i June hepublished a statement invoking and restating the doctrine of non-

1 i i , 16 and 28 June, Ricasoli to Cavour (Lettere e Documenti del Barone BettinoRicasoli, ed. A. Gotti and M. Tabarrini, vol. v, 1890, pp. 119, 126, 145).

2 16 June, Valerio to Castelli (Carteggio politico di Michelangelo Castelli, ed. LuigiChiala, vol. 1, 1890, pp. 307-8). 3 15 May, II Diritto (Turin). 4 14 June, ibid.

Cavour and the Diplomats: April-June 29intervention—a protest in advance against armed intervention by anythird party in the south. Even this step he did not take until the news ofthe fall of Palermo had suggested how the government might be ableto profit from what was happening. There subsequently arrived fromParis another highly welcome message, to say that France could nothelp but accept any free vote by Sicilians in favour of union withPiedmont. He therefore allowed that the government might interveneactively but secretly in sending arms to the volunteer army. While stillpreserving the public fiction of disapproval and non-intervention, hesent out unofficially his friend La Farina to examine the possibility ofsetting up a regular Sicilian government.

This was a distinct change of attitude.1 Cavour had been franklydelighted, but no less delighted than astonished, to find that 'theexpedition of Garibaldi has turned out to be the most poetic fact of thecentury, and is praised by almost the whole of Europe'.2 It had comeas a real surprise that Garibaldi, far from having fallen for a completelyMazzinian programme, had mitigated his animosity of a month earlierand confirmed his acceptance of Manin's formula 'Italy and VictorEmanuel'.3 The Thousand had landed in Sicily, and not in the PapalStates as had been feared. The king was for the moment more friendly.4There was also the consideration that the recent elections had givenCavour a more comfortable parliamentary majority than many peoplehad expected, and he now felt that this afforded him the support herequired for the difficult task of moderating the revolution.5 While hewaited for La Farina's letters to give him some idea of the state ofaffairs in Sicily, he helped to equip Medici's expedition which sailed on10 June, and sent back to Palermo certain other Sicilian exiles whose

1 The National Edition confuses this fact, inadvertently printing the same lettertwice with two different dates (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. m, 1928, p. 289; vol. iv,1929, p. 19). Cavour's change of mind is thus wrongly ascribed to early May.

2 6 June, Cavour to G. Durando (Una silloge di lettere del Risorgimento, 1839-73,ed. C. Bollea, 1919, p. 260).

3 2 June, note by G. Pallavicino Trivulzio (Memoriepubblicatedallajiglia, 1883, vol. in,p. 582); 9 June, Farini to Ricasoli (Lettere di Ricasoli, ed. Tabarrini, vol. v, p. 113).

4 17 May, Cavour to Cugia (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, 1949, p. 108).5 11 June, Brofferio to Bertani, where he admits that Cavour had been cleverer

than the opposition in the elections (ABM); 15 June, Cavour to E. d'Azeglio (CC Ing.vol. n, part 11, 1933, p. 81).

30 Cavour and the Diplomats: April-Juneintelligence and social standing he calculated would have the right effecton the leading citizens of the island. La Farina's correspondence showsthat this help was given on the assumption that Sicily would soon bewithdrawn from Garibaldi's purview and annexed to Piedmont. Thechange in Cavour's attitude, from unhelpfulness to encouragement,was thus described by his friend Hudson, the British minister:at the outset nobody believed in the possibility of Garibaldi's success, andCavour, and tutti quanti, thought the country well rid of him and of theunquiet spirits who went with him. The argument was—if he fails we arerid of a troublesome fellow, and if he succeeds Italy will derive some profitfrom his success. It succeeded so quickly that Cavour was forced to lookthe Sicilian question fairly in the face: and he found the general opinion inupper Italy to be for uniting all Italy under Victor Emanuel.1

Such a change of mind came none too soon. Five weeks had passedafter Garibaldi's departure before Medici left to follow him with thesereinforcements.

As always, Cavour showed himself second to none in his readiness tofollow public opinion; and, as on at least one major occasion before, itis likely that he was also swayed against his own first intentions by theimpetuosity of the king, who was now an enthusiastic Garibaldian.* Inthe middle of June Cavour even tried to negotiate with Bertani andadopt something of the radical policy of action, ' either in order toregain part of the popularity lost over the cession of Nice, or because ofrecognition of the irresistible force of events', as one of his opponentsput it.3 The problem was already presenting itself of how he could takeaway from Garibaldi the active control of affairs, above all how to doso without falling out of step with public opinion.4 It was his hope thatLa Farina would eventually find some way to recapture the initiativein Sicily. For the moment, however, Cavour instructed the Sicilianliberals to play second fiddle, and to try and win the dictator's goodopinion. They still needed Garibaldi for military victory. In any case

1 28 June, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).2 1 July, La Varenne to Crispi, 'the king is with you body and soul; he has full

confidence in Garibaldi' (quoted in A. Comandini, L'Italia nei cento anni del secolo XIX*vol. in, 1918, p. 1496).

3 16 June, Bargoni to Bertani (Memorie di Bargoni, pp. 106-7).4 18 June, Cavour to Prince Eugenio (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 217).

Cavour and the Diplomats: April-June 31it was likely that the radicals would soon wear out their own reputationby the mere process of trying to govern such a country at such a time.Far better, too, that Garibaldi should be persuaded to carry out theannexation of Sicily to Piedmont of his own accord.

Cavour's general aim thenceforward remained constant, to annexSicily as soon as might be; and the chosen method was to be that of apopular vote, either a direct vote through a plebiscite, or an indirectvote through a popularly elected Sicilian parliament. In principle hewas opposed to universal suffrage, which he once said was incompatiblewith constitutional monarchy; but the experience of this year taughthim that there might be extraordinary circumstances when its use washighly convenient. For a time he thought of trying to recall theSicilian parliament of 1848. But he was warned that such an assemblywould give free rein to the Sicilian autonomists. He was too perceptivea politician not to recognize how successful had been the plebiscitariansystem in France, and he also hoped that the patronage of Napoleon IIImight be won by judicious emulation of his example. Earlier in thisyear he had agreed to use the method of a plebiscite in Nice and Savoy,both to justify in the eyes of parliament his prearranged cession of theseprovinces, and also to compromise Napoleon into supporting anyextension of this same system to other parts of Italy. France would inall appearance have a great deal to lose from the achievement of Italianunity; nevertheless, Napoleon would have fewer grounds for objectionif Sicily voted for union by the same method which French constitutionallaw had already declared sacrosanct. There was also the point thatPiedmontese annexation of Sicily would be in French eyes a concealedand welcome blow against the supposed ambitions of England. Earlyin June, therefore, Cavour was able to extract from the Emperor of theFrench a verbal agreement to respect a vote by Sicilians, and he soonbegan to intrigue actively through La Farina for a plebiscite, as some-thing that would at once satisfy Napoleon and effectively tame therevolution. Paris was a very sensitive spot for his policy, so he lavishedmoney in subsidies to the French press.1 It was a safe assumption that,if the making of Italy could be no longer postponed, France wouldwant the new nation to be her friend rather than her enemy.

1 31 May, Farini (minister of the interior) to Nigra, complains that the subsidiesto French papers have already exhausted his Estimates (CF Ravenna).

32 Cavour and the Diplomats: April-JuneFortunately, France and Britain were more afraid of each other than

they were of Italian unification. Without the encouragement or atleast the toleration of the Great Powers—a toleration broken only byshocked asides and an occasional obedience to the conventions by with-drawal of diplomatic representation—Italy might have been as un-fortunate as Poland in her national aspirations. British policy duringi860 was a good deal less ambivalent than French, and surely no lessimportant for Italy, though it is still sometimes misunderstood. Inpractice that policy was built up on one simple proposition, that 'HerMajesty's government have always been of opinion that the Italiansshould be left to settle their own affairs'.1 This implied a virtualguarantee against intervention by any other Power, and so gave powerfulsupport to the cause of unification. The only conditions attached werethat Cavour should not bargain away any more provinces to France,and that he should not try to seize Venice from the Austrian Emperorwith whom Britain was in friendly relations. Cavour depended uponthis tacit understanding. He wrote in May that, 'comme j'ai peud'espoir que la France nous aide a Naples et en Sidle, je voudraisengager l'Angleterre a faire au midi de l'ltalie ce que la France a fait auNord. L'Angleterre le pourrait a peu de frais et sans se departir de sonegoi'sme habituel.'2

This trust in England is one of the keys to Cavour's policy in i860.The private convictions of Palmerston and the new Whig governmentwere for him. Gladstone, for instance, had written in 1859: 'I have notviewed the aggrandizement of Piedmont as an object in itself desirable.When it has reached a certain point, a new set of dangers may springfrom it. But as matters now stand it seems to be the most likely coursefor averting far worse and more pressing evils.'3 Lord John Russell,the British foreign minister, also had some shrewd comments to makeon the situation. He thought thata Kingdom of Northern Italy, strong and compact, including Florence andModena, would I believe be an excellent thing for that mechanical con-trivance the balance of power. At all events it is enough that the Tuscanpeople wish it I dare say the dreamers wish to unite Naples and Sicily and

1 9 July, Russell to Elliot (F.O. 70/312).2 18 May, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. in, 1928, pp. 303-4).3 22 August 1859, Gladstone to Russell (RP G.D. 22/19).

Cavour and the Diplomats: April-June 33make a Kingdom of the whole of Italy. But that is wild and foolish. It wouldmake a despotism instead of a free government, an unwieldy power instead ofa compact one, and it would increase tenfold the European difficulties.1

Russell had already told the Sardinian ambassador that he feared thereturn of republicanism, as in 1848, and he therefore hoped that VictorEmanuel would take over all those provinces of Italy which mightdeclare for unification. He was deeply distressed at Neapolitan mis-government, and even regarded this as a breach of treaty obligationswith Great Britain.2 While he wished Sicily still attached to Naples,and while he would certainly give no assistance to rebellion, he alsorefused to guarantee the Bourbon government even if there should bea reconcession of the 1812 constitution; and the criticisms of Bourbontyranny made in public by him and his colleagues 'undoubtedly en-couraged the revolutionary spirit'.3 Working in the same directionthere was Protestant anti-papalism. Russell stated that he was on theGhibelline side in the war against the neo-Guelphs; and his nephew,the British minister in Rome, wrote home: 'I cannot conceal my deepconviction that the sooner the Pope's temporal Power is abolished, thebetter for Italy and Humanity in general.'4

Cavour was thus able to rely on the support of Protestant andhumanitarian sentiment in Britain, and this regained for Piedmont someof the sympathy which had been lost there by his bare-faced deceit overthe cession of Savoy. Opinion in London was also conditioned infavour of Italy through the great enthusiasm aroused by Garibaldi. Thisheroic and picturesque figure had already captivated English publicopinion before his descent on Sicily. As one small indication of this,there exists a letter from Thackeray to Garibaldi early in 1860; Thackeraywas hoping to obtain an autobiographical article for the CornhilL* The

1 25 August 1859, Russell to Corbett (RP G.D. 22/109).2 11 August 1859, Russell to Elliot (RP G.D. 22/111).3 15 April i860, U.S. minister Chandler at Naples to secretary of state Cass (copy

in MRR); 10 May, Daniel at Turin to Cass, 'the Nation which has hardly finished inIndia the bloodiest series of executions and massacres that the world has heard ofsince the 14th Century [Great Britain] is horrorstruck to know that the King ofNaples imprisons his subjects for political offences' (MRR).

4 29 June, Odo Russell to Lord John (RP G.D. 22/75).5 2 February, Thackeray to Garibaldi (Archivio Garibaldi MRR).

34 Cavour and the Diplomats: April-JuneSardinian ambassador in London, when writing to confirm that Britainwould oppose Austrian intervention in southern Italy, added that 'lesMinistres... s'ils ne sont pas tres Cavouriens, ils sont Garibaldiens plusqu'on ne saurait l'imaginer'; and Cavour replied to him with anexhortation to make the most of this.1 Still more in Italy's favour wasthe traditional British fear and suspicion of France. The Whig govern-ment was afraid that Cavour, by his sacrifice of Savoy, had placed hiscountry in the hands of France. Russell therefore had to satisfy himselffirst that a movement in Italy would not leave France the gainer by anyfurther alienation of Genoa or Sardinia as the price of services rendered.2Once this was certain, he had no further doubts. His ambassador atTurin, Sir James Hudson, was an enthusiastic Italophile, who yetclaimed to study the Italian question in the light of'British interests'.Hudson did not cease to send back unsolicited advice to the cabinet.'For my part I am all for making a strong Italy and for doubling ournaval strength in the Mediterranean: we shall want Italy when we speakwith L. Nap. on the Eastern question.' 'Either Italy must be Italian, orshe will again be either Austrian or French.'3 Cavour had cause to bevery grateful to Hudson and the Whigs—it was his earnest prayer notto have a Tory ministry in Great Britain until the national revolutionwas complete—yet even the conservative Malmesbury later confessedthat his 'private sympathies were with Italian regeneration'.4 QueenVictoria continued throughout the year to protest strongly against this'partnership with the Italian Revolution', pointing out that VictorEmanuel had no 'rights' at all in the rest of the peninsula, whereas theAustrian Emperor had at least a reversionary claim upon Tuscany; butRussell enjoyed himself reminding her of the precedents furnished againstthe divine right of kings by William III and by Leopold of Belgium.5

When Garibaldi landed in Sicily, therefore, the British government,1 6 June, E. d'Azeglio to Cavour (CC Ing. vol. n, part n, p. 77); and Cavour's

replies of 18 and 21 June {ibid. pp. 81, 85).2 E.g. 10 July, Elliot to Russell, 'except Hudson there are few people in their senses

who believe that France would consent to an united Italy without exacting at leastan equivalent' (RP G.D. 22/85).

3 25 March, 28 June, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).4 14 December 1873, Malmesbury to Massari (Archivio Massari MRR).5 11 January, Queen Victoria to Russell; 12 January, Russell to the Queen (RP G.D.

22/14).

Cavour and the Diplomats: April-June 3 5much to the queen's annoyance, proclaimed itself'entirely neutral'. Inprivate, like most of his countrymen, Russell rejoiced at Garibaldi'ssuccess, and from the start considered annexation to Piedmont asvirtually an accomplished fact.1 He told Palmerston on 18 May that hecould not stomach defending Bourbons: there were good reasons ofnational interest why 'we ought as much as possible to have the feelingof Italian independence in our favour. One must expect that Umbriaand the Marches as well as Naples will fall and proclaim VictorEmanuel.' But he added the warning that, 'unless Venice remains withAustria, all Germany will stir. And Venice, though Italian, may becomeas much German as Alsace is French.'2 To the queen he explained him-self in more simple terms: ' the counterpoise for Great Britain and forEurope is the independence of Italy, and this counterpoise is far morevaluable than Savoy or Nice. Another Prussia has arisen in the Southof Europe which will in all probability be a new guarantee for theBalance of Power. The present subjection of Count Cavour to Franceis not likely to last long, and if it did, would the Italians long submit tobe dependent?'3

On second thoughts, and to a less critical audience, Russell expressedsome doubts about Cavour's good intentions with regard to France.He did not properly understand what was occurring, and was honestlypuzzled that Piedmont, like Germany in 1848, was less interested in herown internal liberties than in the conquest of other provinces. WhenCavour denied all intention of yielding Genoa and Sardinia to France,this seemed an exact parallel to the mock denials which had been madeover Savoy and Nice a few months before: ' I fear Cavour is little morethan a Prefect of the Department of the Po. It is a great pity, as he is soable and has rendered such service to his country.... If he would butrun straight all might be well.'4 On 25 July, at the Prince Consort'sbehest, he took Hudson mildly to task: 'you should be very careful tokeep the interests of Great Britain always in sight and not to be led too

1 22 May, Russell to Corbett, 'Garibaldi seems to be successful, and no one willbe sorry for it. I should be glad if he would put up the King of Sardinia's secondson, instead of the King himself (RP G.D. 22/109).

2 18 May, Russell to Palmerston (RP G.D. 22/30).3 26 May, Russell to the queen (RP G.D. 22/14).4 26 and 28 May, and 25 June, Russell to Hudson (RP G.D. 22/109).

3-2

36 Cavour and the Diplomats: April-Junefar by your Italian sympathies'; adding as a postscript, 'but EvvivaVItalia nevertheless'. Garibaldi's next series of victories then happilyobviated the trouble of any further discussion about the relative meritsof Unity or Dualism.1 The salvation of Italy was coming not fromGreat Britain, nor from France, nor even from Cavour; it was in thehands of Garibaldi and the revolutionaries.

1 25 July, 6 August, Russell to Hudson (RP G.D. 22/109).

37

CHAPTER m

LA FARINA AND CRISPI: JUNEIn the first week of June, Cavour's first envoy to Sicily, Giuseppe LaFarina, landed at Palermo, and began actively to work for annexation.La Farina had long since abandoned his early sympathy for the radicalUnitarians. He had been converted to the 'artichoke' policy, that is tosay to Cavour's programme of peeling off the unredeemed provincesslowly and singly, instead of courting disaster by staking the wholeprocess of unification on a single throw. From La Farina's point ofview,

what distinguishes Mazzinianism is the mad policy of all or nothing, thepolicy which imagines you can achieve your end without thinking outconvenient means, which ignores the necessity of alliances, which does notproportion forces to their object, and thinks enthusiasm enough for victory,which is perpetually deluded as to the efficacy of its own initiative, and wouldlike to substitute its own adepts for the elected representatives of the nation.1

It was on the whole a fair criticism; but in practice this ex-Mazzinian,like so many converts, had become surprisingly bitter against his latecomrades. These differences of view were now a fundamental questionin dispute between patriotic Italians. What was needed was someone toreconcile, not to aggravate, their disagreements.

Between 1857 and 1859 La Farina had effectively co-operated withCavour in planning the consolidation of northern Italy, but his influencein Sicily during i860 was less happy. This was the year of the 'party ofaction', from which La Farina was estranged. Garibaldi regarded as apositive hindrance people who believed that independence and unitywere a Utopian condition which Italy could move towards but hardlyhope to attain in the foreseeable future.2 The two had already had morethan one quarrel, and Garibaldi held La Farina partly responsible for theinvaders of Sicily being supplied with few and defective fire-arms. This

1 July. G. La Farina, Scritti Politicly vol. 11, 1870, p. 315.2 As La Farina had said in Sicilia e Piemonte: Lettera ad un amxco in Sicilia, published

12 December 1857.

38 La Farina and Crispi: Junepast history, as well as the unstable judgement and passionate nature ofLa Farina, should have marked him as quite the wrong person to sendout to supervise the revolution.

He was selected for this task because, apart from being a friend ofCavour, he was director of the Societa Nazionale which had done somuch by way of propaganda and material preparation for the work ofnational regeneration. Moreover, he was the only Sicilian by birth whowas in the inner councils of the government, and he had what wasthought to be the added advantage of having become by adoption aPiedmontese. It was a pity that Cavour preferred his candidature to thatof Depretis, who one month later had to be sent out urgently to remedythe damage which had then been done. The remarkable thing is thatone can find nobody else who agreed with his selection of the tactlessand ambitious La Farina. Among Cavour's advisers, Ricasoli specificallydisapproved.1 Valerio had just sent to warn Cavour against this verystep. 'Let us hope that the government is not thinking of sendingLa Farina to Sicily', wrote Valerio. 'He is loathed by Garibaldi and hisfriends, and a breach between them might be very dangerous. Besides,his past history in '48 and '49 is not in his favour.'2 The king did notlike him. Hudson, too, came out strongly against this 'busybody', andmade the significant criticism that ' Cavour has not the gift of puttinground men into round holes... .La Farina is a round man in a squarehole in Sicily.'3 The Marquis di Torrearsa, one of the most generallyrespected Sicilians, prophesied to Hudson that the choice would leadto a complete fiasco.

If Cavour had been in touch with any wide range of Sicilian exileshe might perhaps have considered that Torrearsa was preferable forsuch a delicate mission. Torrearsa and Depretis were two men who lateron were left to salvage what remained of Cavour's policy after thedamage done by La Farina. The bad choice of subordinates, and theignorance of every other province but his own, were among Cavour's

1 13 June, Ricasoli to Cavour (Lettere di Ricasoli, ed. Tabarrini, vol. v, p. 121).2 3 June, Valerio to Castelli (Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1, p. 305).3 28 June, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66); and see King Victor EmanuePs

criticism of Cavour's * confiance illimitee qu'il accorde parfois a des gens qui ne lameritent pas', in his letter of 14 April 1859 to Prince Napoleon, published by Luzioin the Cornere della Sera of 17 March 1931.

La Farina and Crispi: June 39chief weaknesses for his task as a national leader. The history of this yearshows as much. On the present occasion his problem had been to findsomeone who could first persuade Garibaldi to surrender his civil powers,and who could then set up a government in Sicily just as Farini andRicasoli had done in the central provinces during the emergency of1859-60. But of all people he had to choose the personal and politicalenemy of both Garibaldi and Crispi, of the two people, that is to say,whom it was most necessary to conciliate. The inevitable result was thatthe strife between liberals and radicals, which had flared up over thecession of Nice and Cavour's initial coolness towards the Thousand, wasnow extended and intensified. The radicals reacted just as might havebeen expected. Mordini wrote that 'La Farina's presence in Sicily ispreordained to raise up a party against Garibaldi. Cavour has com-mitted a grave error.'1 Il Diritto was amazed that Cavour's choiceshould have fallen on a man who was generally known to have arousedthe 'inextinguishable hatred' of part of the liberal party, and com-mented that, with such a man, the Turin government could neveracquire in Sicily the influence which it ought to possess as the representa-tive of the nation.2 In part this appointment was due to carelessness, inpart to Cavour's underestimation of the possibilities of success forItalian independence. In particular it arose from his disbelief in theability of the volunteers to succeed in their foolhardy venture withoutcoming to beg help of him on his own terms. This can be the onlyexplanation for his sending anyone, let alone this particular person, toask Garibaldi to hand Mazzini over to justice.3 The request for Mazzini'sarrest was accompanied by an ultimatum that failure to comply wouldmake Piedmont break off relations and withdraw all aid from therevolution. Fortunately Mazzini was not in Sicily at all, so the brusque-ness of this unnecessary challenge could be overlooked. It is to Cavour'scredit that he soon realized his mistake in this, as he also realized his yetgreater mistake of choosing such an agent as La Farina; but the initial

1 5 June, Mordini to Cironi (ASF Dono Ricasoli, busta T, fascicolo iv).2 14 and 21 June, II Diritto.3 12 June, Cavour to Persano via Mathieu (Lettere di Camillo Cavour, ed. Luigi

Chiala, vol. in, 1884, p. 263). For some reason this telegram has been overlooked inthe recent national edition of Cavour's letters; Persano says that he received it onthe 13 th.

40 La Farina and Crispi: Juneblunder was his own responsibility. It prevented the establishment ofgood relations with Garibaldi at a time when there was goodwill onboth sides, barely a fortnight after the capture of Palermo; and fromthis derived the other misfortunes of the year.

La Farina arrived at Palermo on 6 June. His landing from a Sardinianman-of-war hardly confirmed the announcement that 'he has gone onhis own initiative without any mission whether official or semi-official'.1

Cavour had privately instructed Admiral Persano to convoy him, butto divulge neither the purpose of his journey nor even his name, addingthat' Sig. La Farina enjoys my entire confidence, knows my plans, andso you can heed his words'.2 The mission mentioned in this letter wasthat of concocting some scheme to undermine the allegiance of theBourbon fleet, and Persano was instructed to help in this, even thoughPiedmont was officially on friendly relations with Francesco II atNaples. But La Farina's more important task, so Cavour wrote toRicasoli on 3 June, was' to see to the ordering of a regular government' ,3despite the fact that Garibaldi had so far invited no such intrusion intothe affairs of the revolution. Letters warning Garibaldi against the manwould have arrived on the same ship as La Farina himself, and perhapsthis very same ship brought the news of the final decision of parliamentto sacrifice Nice to France. Yet Garibaldi received him courteously; somuch so that Cavour's semi-official newspaper incorrectly announcedthat he had been given the most important post in the revolutionarygovernment. It was not Garibaldi's treatment of him, but La Farina'sown subsequent activities, which made his position impossible andendangered the prospects of union between southern and northernItaly.

There was much in his favour at the outset. He arrived well suppliedwith money, with a titled aide to help win over the Sicilian aristocracy,with annexationist leaflets for his propaganda, and with the speciallychartered support of the Sardinian naval and consular authorities. Hehad all the prestige of being known for Cavour's agent and money-bearer, and probably the dispenser of future patronage and promotion.He was supported by his own reputation as a Sicilian patriot returning

1 14 June, L'Opinione (Turin).2 1 June, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 160).3 3 June, Cavour to Ricasoli {ibid. p. 163).

La Farina and Crispi: June 41from exile, and by the fact that some of his friends were already wellplaced in the revolutionary government at Palermo. Garibaldi so farhad done nothing to provoke political discord, but had instinctivelygone out of his way to conciliate all parties in a united front. Althoughthe radical Crispi had been responsible for organizing the government,the other ministers were mostly moderate liberals: Baron Pisani, forinstance, the foreign minister, was a man who had been expressly sentback to Sicily by Cavour, and so was Piola the minister of marine.1 Thisis convincing testimony to Garibaldi's good sense and moderation. Theywere all good appointments, said the British consul about this firstministry of 2-27 June;2 and Goodwin was certainly no radical.

Without more ado, La Farina set to work. A newspaper was foundedwith the title of L'Annessione, and the town was soon plastered withprinted notices saying ' we want annexation to the kingdom of VictorEmanuel'.3 His activity during the next fortnight was thus describedby a partisan critic, Crispi:

at first he tried to persuade me through his friends, of the necessity of takinghim into the government. Then he began organising hostile demonstrations,which did not succeed, spreading damaging insinuations that failed to affectus, and his last move was an attempt to bring about a ministerial crisis, whichresulted in the resignation of three of my colleagues—Torrearsa, Pisani andGuarneri. His lightest accusation is that I am a republican and am endangeringthe success of the Sicilian revolution....

In this country of ours, with its hot-headed inhabitants, we may lookforward to serious danger, if his intriguing is not checked. It is indeed painfulto think that, after so many sacrifices, after the spilling of so much blood,they should seek to deprive us of the joy of gathering the fruit of so manyyears of study and suffering!!4

One must suppose that La Farina was here exceeding his instructions,or else that Cavour had left not only the execution but the actualformulation of policy to a subordinate. Their obvious interest should

1 21 May, Mathieu to Cavour [ibid. p. 121); 23 June, Cavour to Persano (ibid.p 234).

2 5 June (Goodwin's Political Journal no. 5, F.O. 165/134).3 14 June, Admiral Mundy, H.M.S. Hannibal at Palermo and Naples 1859-61, 1863,

p. 175; 11 June, // Garibaldi (Palermo); 22 June, Gazzetta di Catania.4 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 255-6.

42 La Farina and Crispi:Junehave been to maintain friendly relations with Garibaldi. That friendli-ness was still possible is proved by Garibaldi's amicable conversationswith the Piedmontese Admiral Persano. But La Farina's conduct putCavour into direct conflict with the dictator. The returned exile, backamong the political and family vendettas of his native island, must havelost his sense of proportion. Certainly he must have been insufficientlybriefed for his mission; and it seems that, intentionally or unintentionally,Cavour had given him no instructions to be tactful or compromising.

His opposite number in this miniature struggle for power was Crispi,the leading Sicilian among the Italian radicals, and second only toGaribaldi in his influence over the fortunes of Sicily in this year.Garibaldi later called him the man who was 'first in intelligence amongour expeditionary force, and the real organiser and ruler in the heroicgovernment of Sicily in i860'.1 Crispi was to have a striking future inItalian politics, as one of the architects of the Triple Alliance and thenew Italian empire, and as the 'reactionary' prime minister whocrushed a Sicilian socialist movement in the nineties. As a young manhe had become a lawyer and a journalist of Mazzini's school. Exiled inturn from Sicily, Piedmont, Malta, and France, he always retained someof the venom and irreconcilable temper of the hardened exile. In thisrespect he was a good match for his one-time colleague and now enemy,La Farina. Both these two shared a strong wish for the creation of apowerful Italy—as prime minister Crispi was later to have the reputa-tion of sternly repressing any move for Sicilian autonomy. They like-wise shared a consummate ambition, an authoritarian temperament,and an extreme arrogance and dogmatism in their private and publicbehaviour. But Crispi, who retained longer than the other a distincttinge of the Jacobin, was his rival on personal grounds, as well as beingstrongly opposed to the conservative policy of piecemeal annexation.It was wrong but perhaps excusable in Cavour to think that this youngradical was first too contemptible, and then too dangerous a man tobe wooed by his ambition into a coalition with orthodoxy. Crispimade unmistakable overtures for an understanding with the liberal-conservatives during i860, but this necessary task of conversion wasleft to be carried through by later politicians.

1 24 November 1869, Garibaldi to Crispi (printed in the Giornale d' Italia, 18 July1909).

La Farina and Crispi: June 43The revolution of i860 gave Crispi his first experience of power since

1849. To him almost as much as to Garibaldi, and more than to anyother, was due the setting out from Genoa of the Milk. In 1859, whileCavour and La Farina had been counselling Sicilians to keep quiet so asnot to complicate Piedmontese activity in the north, Crispi had left hisEnglish exile, and with forged British and American passports had twicevisited Sicily in disguise. There he had secretly organized groups ofpolitical revolutionaries, showing them how to make home-madebombs, and in general preparing them for the day of deliverance. AtTurin he had then tried to bespeak the active interest in his scheme ofRattazzi, who had temporarily succeeded Cavour as the leading figurein the government. When this failed, it was Crispi, together with Bixioand Bertani, who persuaded Garibaldi to lead his piratical expedition.1

Once arrived in Sicily, Crispi stepped automatically into the position oflegislator and statesman of the revolution, organizing the administrationin Palermo, and generally acting as Garibaldi's right-hand man.

What were Crispi's politics? When Petruccelli asked him whetherhe was a Garibaldian or Mazzinian, he replied—neither: 'io sonoCrispi'.2 And indeed he was always too self-confident to take orders oropinions readily from other people. His views were certainly radical,but we shall see that they were not to be completely identified withthose of Garibaldi. As to his relations with Mazzini, like so many otherItalians of all political shades he had learnt from Mazzini to be a patriot,and to the end of his life he retained a warmer regard for his master'smemory than did many others among the former republicans. In 1859he had stood by Mazzini in opposition to Cavour's war against Austria—a war, incidentally, which Garibaldi supported—and throughouti860 he remained at least in correspondence with him. But whereasMazzini had accepted monarchical government contingently andtemporarily, Crispi had now done so finally, and there is no evidencethat he wavered in his loyalty to the throne. In so far as there was inthis year still any rift between Garibaldi and Mazzini, Crispi rangedhimself alongside Garibaldi. Although the fact was never quiteappreciated or believed at Turin, the real diehard republicans hadabandoned the Mille in the first fortnight of May, and Crispi had not

1 Risposta del Generate Turr all* opuscolo Bertani, 1869, p. 6.3 F. Petruccelli della Gattina, I Moribondi del Palazzo Carignano, 1862, p. 170.

44 La Farina and Crispi: Junebeen among them. As he wrote to Bertani in June: ' our friends amongthe republicans accuse us of forsaking the banner; Cavour's followerssay we want a republic! What we really want is Italy, and we willhave her !'*

The making of Italy was Crispi's objective, and the redemption ofSicily but one step towards that end. In this and other respects he wasa good deal nearer to the policy of Turin than La Farina allowed Cavourto know. To judge from Crispi's Palermo paper, the Precursore, he beganby being almost surprisingly moderate in his political views. He stoodup for Mazzini personally, while repudiating the more extravagantaspects of his policy, and asserted that frank acceptance of the monarchywas an essential preliminary if it was wished to unite the nation.Cavour and his friends were misinformed or credulous if they thoughtthat Crispi was working to proclaim a republic from Rome.2 Equallyfalse was the accusation that he was acting on behalf of Sicilian separatismagainst any form of union with Naples. For in fact, as a convincedUnitarian, he was one of the few Sicilians whose hatred of the Bourbonsremained unadulterated by dislike of Neapolitans in general.3

If these dangerous suspicions gained currency in the north, this wasdue to La Farina's reports, which were unfortunately the basis on whichCavour built his policy. These put all the disorganization in Palermodown to Crispi's mismanagement, and ignored the fact that five daysof street battle, followed by the complete breakdown of Bourbonadministration and the improvization of a new government, werebound to leave disorganization behind. Deceptive accounts were alsosent back of how Garibaldi's regime was becoming highly unpopularand could hardly last much longer.4 From these reports, governmentcircles in Turin acquired a hostility not only to the administration ofGaribaldi, but even to Sicilians in general.5 Later historians, too, weremostly to take La Farina's word for what was happening at this time in

1 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. i, p. 266.2 31 August, Crispi to Correnti, asking him 'to present my humble compliments

to His Majesty our champion' (ACP, b. 152). It was Crispi who had proclaimedGaribaldi to be dictator 'in the name of Victor Emanuel'.

3 26 January, Crispi to Fabrizi (Crispi: lettere dalV esilio, ed. T. Palamenghi-Crispi,1918, p. 201).

4 20 June, V Opinione (Turin), reports from Palermo dated 12 and 14 June.5 L. Natoli, Rivendicazioni attraverso le rivoluzioni siciliane del 1848-60, 1927, p. 194.

La Farina and Crispi: June 45the south, not making allowances for his character and the fact that hehad an axe to grind. It is probable that he was not above exaggeratingdifficulties so as to appear the cleverer in correcting them, and hiscriticism of Crispi was coupled to equally exaggerated and tendentiousstatements about his own popularity.

There is evidence to suggest that, as early as 16 June, Cavour realizedhe had made a mistake in sending out this particular man.1 Quite apartfrom the unfortunate influence La Farina was having in Sicily, therewas the important point that his absence from Turin left the NationalSociety leaderless and disintegrating. Nevertheless, instead of recallinghim, Cavour just gave belated instructions not to force a breach withGaribaldi,2 and hurriedly dispatched Cordova and others of his Sicilianacquaintance after him in the hope that they might prevent an opencleavage and perhaps discover a better policy. Cavour's semi-officialnewspaper at Turin referred on the 22nd to the deviation of viewbetween the government and its agent, and also mentioned the unani-mous feeling among Sicilians that La Farina's failure in the Sicilianrevolution of 1848-9 made him unacceptable as a leader in i860. Inview of La Farina's later expulsion, and the criticism of Garibaldi whichthen ensued, this confession is worthy of note. The king at least, if notCavour as well, was becoming aware of the necessity of recalling him,and did not hesitate to express indignation.3 But still nothing was done.

The peak of La Farina's campaign was reached when the civiccouncil of Palermo was persuaded to register an official motion to thedictator in favour of annexation. To this motion, Garibaldi on the 22ndreplied in a pronouncement of what henceforward had to be acceptedas orthodoxy. 'It was I who gave you the cry of "Italy and VictorEmanuel"... .It is now equally in my power by dictatorial act toproclaim annexation.... But let us have this quite clear, I came here tofight for the cause of Italy, not just for that of Sicily: and if we do notliberate and unite the whole of Italy, we shall never succeed properlyin any of her individual provinces.'4 This was one of the simplest and

1 16 June, Bargoni to Bertani, saying that Cavour was now desirous of replacingLa Farina (ABCM and CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. i, pp. 208, 229).

2 23 June, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 234).3 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. i, p. 322; Comandini, L9 Italia nei cento anni, vol. m, p. 1490;

22 June, L' Opinione. 4 26 June, L' Annessione (Palermo).

46 La Farina and Crispi: Juneclearest statements of Garibaldi's point of view, and the argumentbehind it had some plausibility and was sincerely believed. It seems tohave satisfied the civic council,1 and so to have ended the attempt toundermine Garibaldi's position through the mayor and corporation.2

But in one point La Farina had succeeded: by precipitating andpublicizing the issue of annexation to Piedmont, he had rallied for thispolicy enough support to shake Crispi's position in the government.The effects of his campaign were beginning to be felt in Palermo as wellas Turin.

1 27 June, Gazzetta di Catania, report from Palermo dated 22 June.2 La Farina's Gazzetta del Consiglio Civico di Palermo came to an end after producing

its first and only number on 23 June.

47

CHAPTER IV

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINSTANNEXATION

The political conflict in Sicily between June and October took shaperound one central problem, how soon and by what method the islandwould join up with the existing kingdom in northern Italy. It will helpto explain this conflict if a general preview is given of the various argu-ments brought up by one side or the other. Historians generally usedto conclude that 'immediate annexation to Piedmont was the wisepolicy for Sicily'. Crispi and his friends, in opposing 'the almostuniversal eagerness of the Sicilians to be annexed', were said by BoltonKing to have had 'no excuse'; and they were not even allowed anymotive except 'to leave a thorn in the side of the government', andperhaps to upset the monarchy.1 Such an interpretation, however, ismore than just oversimplified, it is inaccurate.

Some of the reasons urged for quick annexation were spurious in theextreme: for instance, that it would stop England from acquiring hercoveted foothold in Sicily,2 or that it would prevent Garibaldi'scamarilla from taking all the perquisites and pickings of office;3 or elsethat, by making impossible any further expeditions to Rome, it wouldend the hated novelty of conscription which Garibaldi was trying hardto introduce.4 Much more weighty than these was the argument thatannexation would restore law and order to the country, and compelnorthern Italy to underwrite the revolution against a Bourbon restora-

1 Bolton King, A History of Italian Unity, vol. n, 1899, pp. 148-9.2 14 June, V Unione (Milan).3 12 July, G. Fiorenza from Palermo to Ricasoli, to be published in the new Carteggi

di Bettino Ricasoli in course of preparation by M. Nobili and S. Camerani.4 19 August, Major Cadolini from Messina to Bargoni: 'the Sicilians have no wish

to become soldiers, and still less to come with us on to Naples. They shout "vivaT Italia", but really have no thoughts except for themselves. They could not put upa worse showing if they tried. The Sicilian government makes no effort to carry outconscription. And the army which is now called "southern" is composed for nine-tenths of northerners' (MRR).

48 Arguments For and Against Annexationtion. In many parts of Sicily the pent-up communist rebelliousness ofthe peasants had been released by the war, and Garibaldi's governmentfound itself with no effective police force to keep the peace. The rulingclass was predominantly one of landowners, who were particularlyanxious for a return to peace and an end of social war. Merchantswanted a conclusion to the war emergency, and most of them feltcertain that a close Piedmontese connexion would favour their trade.The important class of lawyers was to be unemployed continuously forfive months, and during this time grew increasingly impatient withmilitary rule. For them and the professional classes generally, annexa-tion held out the attraction of more jobs, higher salaries, and a wideraudience or clientele.

The convergence of these various motives would suggest that, ifCavour had played his hand well, annexation might have followedalmost automatically. After all, Garibaldi on landing had at onceproclaimed Victor Emanuel as king, and all his dictatorial edicts wereheaded with the sovereign's name. Moreover 'spontaneous' adhesionto this procedure and programme had been received from each succes-sive city in the island as it was conquered. On 14 June Garibaldi'sforeign minister officially declared to the governments of Europe thatSicily had in this way already 'voted' through its municipal councils;and that, although a plebiscite would probably follow at some time, itwould be merely a formality to confirm this manifest intention to jointhe rest of Italy. On 2 July he even published a statement to say that'the island regards itself as already part of the kingdom of Italy'. Suchwas the design of the revolutionary government. But over the applica-tion of this design Palermo and Turin were out of step from the start.Being too far away to judge the situation correctly, Cavour was unableto specify or control properly the detailed political tactics of his agentson the spot. La Farina at first thought that he had official approval forrefusing to concede any point to the Garibaldian party. Cavour'scorrespondence shows how many other things had to compete withSicily for precedence in his mind. In any case, administration was alwaysless interesting to him than diplomacy, and gave less scope for his ownpeculiar expertise. Hence his failure to take advantage of this generalagreement over essentials in Sicily. Garibaldi's moderate appointments,and the foreign minister's proclamation, went unheeded.

Arguments For and Against Annexation 49Instead, goodwill and agreement were dissipated by bad tactics, by

trying to set up an organized opposition to the dictator, and by tryingto force a precipitate vote in a way which aroused all his native suspicion.Some of those who later in the year changed their minds, were at thisstage convinced that Cavour's campaign for annexation was premature.Others who now supported it, later confessed that they had been wrongto do so, and even VAnnessione was grudgingly to admit the wisdomof Garibaldi's repudiation of its own earlier policy on this point.1 TheMilanese Perseveranza, which was another conservative journal, didlikewise. For it had to be granted that no free vote could be held whileBourbon troops still controlled an important part of Sicily; and equallyit was true that Garibaldi's dictatorial powers were still needed for thedirection of emergency government and completion of the enemy'sdefeat. More important still, annexation at this moment wouldpositively have embarrassed Turin, since France and Austria could thenhave pinned a definite responsibility on pavour for Sicilian affairs,whereas at present Garibaldi was happily responsible to no one.2

Europe could have penalized Cavour, where it could not easily penalizeGaribaldi. Moreover, Napoleon's subsequent attempt to stop thevolunteer army from crossing the Straits might have been irresistiblehad the island already been formally annexed.3

The first argument against prompt annexation was that, if a vote byuniversal suffrage was necessary to pacify Napoleon, no even remotelyplausible vote on this scale could yet be taken. Until the end of July,Garibaldi could not call himself master of the north-eastern sector of theisland, and isolated Bourbon garrisons continued to exist in Sicily fora long time after that. Secondly, Garibaldi did not wish to be botheredwith elections in the middle of a precarious military campaign. Hisdislike of La Farina therefore came vividly to life when a group ofcivilians began this attempt to distract people's energies from the warand to frivol at piazza politics. It seemed to him that preparations fora plebiscite would only divert much enthusiasm and organization awayfrom the front line, and this would be merely for something which heand Sicily had already accepted in principle. By stooping to these

1 11 September, V Annessione.2 17 September, La Perseveranza (Milan).3 1 July, De Sanctis to De Meis (Lettere dall* esilio, 1938, ed. Croce, p. 343).

50 Arguments For and Against Annexationintrigues, La Farina was only damaging his own cause; for the radicalsnaturally made capital out of this fact when they wanted to convinceGaribaldi that there were strong political objections to such suspicioushaste.

Of these political objections to an immediate vote, one was thatannexation would mean taking away Piedmontese troops from thevulnerable northern frontier; and this in turn might have emboldenedthe Austrians to abandon their highly precarious attitude of non-intervention. A yet stronger objection was that it threatened to spoilany hope of quick annexation for the rest of the peninsula.1 Piedmontwas technically on friendly terms with Naples, and Cavour therefore,once he was established as ruler of Sicily, would have been muchembarrassed if Garibaldi sailed thence on another piratical expeditionto the mainland. By annexation of Sicily, the revolutionary initiativemight thus be brought to a stop while Rome and Venice still laysubjugated to the foreigner. The radicals were able to point out thatsomething similar had happened in 1859, when Farini and Fanti hadheld up Garibaldi's march on Rome: once Emilia had been annexed,little interest had been shown by that province in the rest of Italy, andso a chance of advancing further into Umbria and the Marches had beenlost. On this analogy, the annexation of Sicily would only clipGaribaldi's .wings, and the island would then become, like Emilia, anoutlying dependency of Turin instead of a constituent province of a newkingdom of Italy.2 On 3 August Crispi's paper carried an article withthis interpretation:

it is told of a certain prince of Savoy how he once spoke of Italy to one ofhis courtiers in these terms, 'we shall eat it leaf by leaf like this artichoke'.Such an attitude typifies the narrow national spirit of the Piedmontese: theyhave never wanted Piedmont for Italy, but always Italy for Piedmont...;except on one occasion when at long last a great prince managed to changetheir attitude—this prince was Victor Emanuel, and the time was the cam-paign of'59....

1 19 July, II Precursore: * you who cry out for annexation do not want Italy to becomeone nation, but just desire liberty for Sicily at the expense of more slavery for Naples,Rome and Venice If we should isolate Sicily from mother Italy in order to annexourselves separately to Piedmont, this would retard the coming of full unification.'

2 11 August, La Forbice (Palermo).

Arguments For and Against Annexation 51As far as Cavour is concerned, however, there has been no radical change.

If he were to obtain his wish and Garibaldi were forced to put up his sword,then Sicily would become a province of Piedmont; perhaps the diplomatsof Europe would allot us a new master, and instead of Austria we shouldhave the French. Does not Bonaparte's policy make you suspect this ? Wouldnot annexation lead us probably to federation instead of unification ? *

Many educated Sicilians seem to have wanted some degree of homerule, but La Farina's programme rather opened up a prospect ofcentralization under the government of Turin.2 Unconditional annexa-tion could therefore be depicted as implying the same mixture ofexploitation, neglect and bureaucratic misrule which was causing theisland of Sardinia to wither under Torinese administration.3 Theexample of Tuscany was yet further evidence that Piedmontese rule didnot automatically bring the ordered government that its champions hadexpected. Observers more perceptive than La Farina might have realizedthat disorder in Sicily did not come only from Garibaldi's waywardnessor inefficiency, but rather from deep social causes which even the skilledbureaucrats of Piedmont were not going to remove. On the otherhand, government from the north was bound to bring with it all mannerof novel customs and institutions which would offend local traditionand cause difficulties of assimilation.4 Some of the more far-sighted

1 3 August, // Precursore.2 La Farina, Credo, originally published in February 1858; but at least two editions

appeared in Sicily during i860.3 17 August, La Varenne to Crispi: 'ne pas vous livrer sans conditions a Turin, tant

que M. de Cav. sera la, car vous en verrez de belles et le pays aussi si on tombait dansson arbitraire. Regardez la Sardaigne a deux pas de vous' (ACP, f. 149).

4 Those in Cavour's party who put down all the troubles of Sicily to Garibaldi'sinefficiency might have learnt something from a letter written to Ricasoli by hissecretary in September, which showed that there were plentiful disorders in Tuscanystill, long after * annexation': 'the moral unrest in the country is in part due to theineffective protection given to property and to the liberty of citizens. Outside thecities people may thieve with impunity right and left, and certain people in the guiseof liberals tyrannize over the small villages, not allowing even the freedom to think.'Tabarrini added (what in Sicily was to be discovered too late), that a contributorycause of unrest was the great speed of assimilation by Piedmont which was sodamaging to morale; and he concluded, * until Italian affairs have settled down, wemust try hard to hold on to our old Tuscan institutions as long as we can' (Carteggidi Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani).

4-2

52 Arguments For and Against AnnexationSicilians might also have envisaged the likelihood that annexationwould bring with it far higher taxes, and they would have to carrytheir share of the heavy debts already contracted by Piedmont in thewars against Austria. Almost certainly it would lead to the introductionof an efficient and permanent system of conscription, and would soonput an end to fiscal protection for local products in the national market.

There was an alternative line of reasoning which led to a differentbut even less welcome conclusion. For, as Cavour's negotiationsproceeded through July and into August with the Neapolitan envoyswho were seeking his alliance against Garibaldi, Sicilians had someinducement to believe that Cavour might prefer to win Neapolitansupport against Austria by a sacrifice of Sicily. Surrender to Cavour inthat case might mean a return to the hated Bourbon allegiance and todependence on remote Naples.1 Alternatively it might mean a furthersacrifice of Italian territory to France. Garibaldi was always firmlyconvinced that there existed in France a well-considered plan for nationalaggrandizement at Italy's expense, just as he was also sure that Cavourwas a lackey of Napoleon: if this was right, the acquisition of still moreterritory in the south might demand the alienation of yet anotherItalian province in compensation, just as Cavour had paid for Frenchapproval several months earlier by the sacrifice to France of Nice.2 Thiswas no wildly improbable hypothesis, and it was quite generally heldin British government circles. The Italian radicals were convinced of it.As Cattaneo wrote in June: 'if you let Cavour have Sicily, France willtake Spezia just as surely as if Garibaldi were handing it over with hisown hands.... To avoid all such claims by France it is imperative thatSicily at all costs should remain free as long as possible.... We mustmake it the barracks and the arsenal for all that still remains to be done.'3However unjust this innuendo, precedent made it plausible whenviewed alongside the other causes of growing suspicion.

Carlo Cattaneo was here speaking for one section of the radical'party of action'. Unlike Cavour's disciplined supporters, who wereusually united over ends and means as soon as their leader made up hismind on a point, the radicals were almost always divided, and never

1 12 October, V Assembled (Palermo).2 19 July, II Precursore.3 9 June, Cattaneo to the Marios (Archivio J. W. Mario MRR).

Arguments For and Against Annexation 53formed a cohesive party in more than name. This was one of thestrongest points in Cavour's favour. An important division inside thegroup of radicals was that Cattaneo called himself a federalist, puttingthe emphasis on individual liberty within the state, while Mazzini wasbefore everything else a Unitarian, with the emphasis on nationhood assomething sacred and indivisible. Cattaneo would have found generalsupport from the others for allowing Sicily some regional self-govern-ment, but only if this were in a general plan of moderate devolution forall the regions of Italy, and only if it would not cause any diminution innational strength and national consciousness.1 Most of the radicals werestrongly nationalistic, and ranged themselves with those who agreedthat 'federation would restrict us to the place of a second-rate power'.2

And on this point Cattaneo and Giuseppe Ferrari were bitterly opposedto the majority.

Compared to Cavour with his 'artichoke* policy, Mazzini was atonce more of a political Unitarian and less of an administrative centralist.The Mazzinians wanted annexation pure and simple,3 but they alsowanted to postpone the act of union till it might mean something morethan mere surrender to Cavour and the conservatives. This policy ofpostponement arose directly out of their political radicalism, but wasalso inspired by their desire for national unity. At last they had somepower and political status again, and Mazzini sincerely hoped that thismight prove to be the salvation of Italy against the defeatist attitude andmerely partial ambitions of both Cavour and the local autonomists. Hetold Crispi to 'support the independence of the revolution as long asever you can.. . but if the autonomists agitate then you must precipitateannexation'. We can see from this that he hoped to establish a strongand independent base for future action, and to win the right if necessaryto dictate political conditions to Cavour; yet he was quite as anxious asCavour not to give the Sicilian autonomists any chance to air theirviews and perhaps capture the revolutionary movement.4 At thisparticular moment he was hiding from Cavour's police in Genoa,knowing that he lay under double sentence of death from his owncountrymen. As matters turned out, those of his friends who were in

1 4 September, L'Unith Italiana (Palermo).2 27 August, ibid. 3 23 August, ibid.4 22 June, Mazzini to Crispi (Epistolario, vol. XL, p. 96).

54 Arguments For and Against AnnexationSicily, for example Crispi and Mordini, often ignored his advice, anddid not take such a rigid line against the autonomists. This fact was tohave considerable importance for the course of the revolution.

One may say in general that the adherents of Cavour and Mazzini,though they differed on points of principle, had much in common whenboth are set against this third group of Sicilian autonomists. It was notover the general aim of unity or the method of revolution that the mainsplit developed between the 'party of order' and the 'party of action',because each side contained both convinced Unitarians and practisingrevolutionaries. Nor did the split occur over the propriety of annexingSicily to the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. It developed rather overwhether annexation should come sooner or later. Unlike those whowanted special privileges for Sicily, Crispi did not oppose annexation,he just hoped to postpone it. He had no intention of imposing anyconditions on Piedmont, except that he wanted to delay until annexa-tion could no longer endanger the achievement of a unity whichincluded also Naples, Rome and Venice. In this straightforward policyof delay he was no doubt moved in part by other reasons as well. Forinstance, there was the determination to prolong his enjoyment of power;and this was by no means an altogether unworthy motive, for only bysuch a prolongation could the plans he had taken so long to mature becarried out, and it was a reasonable assumption on his part that only theradicals had much chance or even much intention of capturing Rome.No doubt, too, it would have been his instinct to resist immediateannexation just because this was the means by which La Farina washoping to replace him and become Royal Commissioner for Sicily.Nevertheless, it remains that Crispi's primary motive in delay wasmilitary and strategic. He assured Mazzini that 'annexation.. .will beestablished by vote as soon as this can be done without interfering withour operations on the Continent'.1 The idea of postponement was allbased on his magnificent optimism that Rome would be captured, andthat this alone mattered. Nor can one ridicule this optimism, sinceCrispi had been proved correct against the wiseacres in thinking possiblethe original conquest of Sicily by a few irregulars. It was a fair supposi-tion that Cavour's cold touch might devitalize this second expeditionon to Rome, as it had only just failed to do with their first expedition to

1 31 July (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 363).

Arguments For and Against Annexation 5 5Sicily: for Cavour had not been converted to a delight in revolutionaryenterprises, and he still feared that France might fight to save Rome forthe Papacy.

From these opinions we may derive something like a general pictureof radical policy in Sicily. One of its practitioners put it like this.

Sicily has become the centre of operations Once master of the Nea-politan arsenals and the immense resources of that country, our march ofliberation will be all the quicker.... And when we have Rome we shall haveItaly.... We must make a really big military effort.... Till now Palermo hasnot been pulling its weight.... For it is in Sicily that we must discipline thearmed forces of Italy, since Italian youth has no other secure and independentstronghold for such action.1

The function of Sicily in this radical programme was therefore to act asthe springboard and the armoury for a war of final liberation.2 Petruc-celli wrote in June from London to Garibaldi:

whatever you do, avoid becoming the King Lear of Democracy. Hold onto the Two Sicilies for our party... as something to bargain with against theEuropean diplomats. Remember that one day you may have to say toEurope,' either allow us to unify Italy under Victor Emanuel, or else we turnsouthern Italy into a republic'... .And if you find this responsibility tooheavy, associate yourself with a Convention, not one like the French Con-vention of'92, but a real 'Long Parliament' like that of Cromwell.3

Subsequent events were to suggest that much of this radical programmewas Utopian: but that is not to say it was mistakenly held at the time.The great practical function of the 'party of action' during the risorgi-tnento was to be a.prod for use against the liberals, who were thus forcedto take over the radical achievements and give them the stamp oforthodoxy and finality. These radicals reasoned that Cavour looked onthem as the chief enemy, and on France as the chief friend, of his ownhoped-for Italy. La Farina's embassy had done nothing to disillusionthem on this point, and for some reason Cavour on this occasion hadmade no attempt to deceive them into thinking him their friend. Thesubsequent messengers whom Cavour sent to Garibaldi were thinking

1 21 August, // Precursore.2 19 September, Asproni from Naples to Fabrizi (Archivio Fabrizi ASR).3 14 June, V Unione (Milan).

56 Arguments For and Against Annexationeven as early as July of bringing 'large Piedmontese forces' to fightand destroy the radical nest in Sicily.1 So there was some excuse forthose radicals to cling to their foothold in southern Italy as the only basisin the future for their own political existence. To them it must haveseemed that, Cavour once master, they would then be again sent intoexile, outlawed from active political expression in Italy, and theirprinciples defeated perhaps for ever. Their self-interest, their desire forresponsibility and activity and power, were all at stake.

It may perhaps be thought in retrospect that Cavour was not so wellserved that he could afford lightly to reject the help of so many futureministers of Italy. But so far as he could see, they were but a few reck-less hotheads; and since the government majority in parliament wascompletely safe, there was no need to stretch his gifts for compromiseas he had done so cleverly with Rattazzi and the parliamentary Lefteight years before. The issue of immediate annexation was one uponwhich he was ready to do battle.

1 D. Guerrini, 'La Missione del Conte Litta Modignani in Sicilia i860', II Risorgi-mento Italiano, February 1909, pp. 23-4.

57

CHAPTER V

ARGUMENTS OVER WAYS ANDMEANS

These differences of opinion were reflected from the start in practicalpolitics. We have already watched the commencement of La Farina'scampaign. But the political scene in Palermo still remained agitatedafter Garibaldi's rebuff on 22 June to the champions of immediateannexation. On the 23 rd, Crispi's government was weakened by theresignation of two leading members of the Sicilian aristocracy, theMarquis di Torrearsa and Baron Pisani. Later in the same day, perhapsas a partial concession, a decree was issued to say that local authoritiesshould draw up electoral registers and have all ready for voting by20 July.1 This marks a small but definite retreat by Crispi from thepolicy of'nothing at all till Rome' which Garibaldi had proclaimed theday before in his speech to the civic council.2 It was a new development,which shows that the situation was now becoming more complicated.

In trying to explain this modification of view, it first of all is clearthat Crispi's political ascendancy had been shaken by the insinuations ofLa Farina, and he was therefore in a compromising mood. We knowthat he was trying to make contact with Cavour at this time, perhapshoping to displace his rival in Sicily, and to reconcile all parties thereby some striking and meritorious act of statesmanship. He had foundthat he could not ride the radical programme rough-shod over Palermoopinion. Sicilian susceptibilities had been touched by his innovation ofconscription, and war conditions were adversely affecting many vestedinterests in the island. La Farina had an easy task in suggesting thatremedial measures could be expected from Cavour as soon as annexa-tion had been accomplished; and public opinion adjusted itselfaccordingly. There were also other tactical reasons which induced

1 23 June, Raccolta degli atti del governo dittatoriale.2 It was Crispi who proposed this decree and who circularized provincial governors

to execute it with especial care; 25 and 28 June, Giornale Officiate di Sicilia; 3 July,V Annessione.

58 Arguments over Ways and MeansCrispi to yield a point. He had if possible to forestall, or compete with,any grant of a constitution by the Bourbons. In fact King Francesco atNaples had already half-decided to concede Sicily her constitution of1812,1 so that there was good reason to fear lest he might recapture somepopular support before being driven from his last foothold on the island.It was therefore advisable to put up quickly some plausible alternativeand one which offered good long-term prospects of stable and en-lightened government. The argument was also being advanced bysome of the radicals that, while a vote of annexation would always bindPiedmont to help them, any actual execution of what had been votedcould perhaps be delayed until the revolution had reached the nationalcapital.2

Such were the thoughts which helped to inspire Crispi's decree of23 June. One detail we can pause to note is that newspapers nearest toMazzini deplored his decision.3 Here we have more proof of anothersignificant division among the radicals, and it was a division whichCavour might well have recognized and widened if he had not deter-mined to look on Crispi as an incorrigible enemy. Notwithstanding allthe tirades of La Farina, there were no republicans among Garibaldi'sministers, and most of those ministers were still nearer to Cavour thanto Mazzini. But this fact was to be ignored at Turin. Instead, errors ofpolicy by Cavour and his subordinates were to compel the radicals intoa common front, and so his programme of annexation became the moredifficult to carry out. He did not appreciate that, as soon as publicopinion revealed itself, Garibaldi's government was ready to makeconcessions in the interests of common agreement.

Crispi's election decree was intended as a concession, but in fact it hadlittle immediate effect. La Farina's campaign for a vote had not takeninto account the difficulties of employing universal suffrage in a regionso socially backward, especially when that region was torn by civil warand communistic jacqueries. A vote of any sort would have been

1 20 June, Elliot telegram to Russell (F.O. 70/317).2 1 July, La Varenne from Turin to Crispi: 'meme apres le vote, vous avez cent

moyens de retarder la chose, tout en vous conservant de Tappui (alors force) duPiemont. Le temps est tout, et soyez convaincu que M. de C. ne saurait durer beau-coup' (in the Italian edition of Crispi's memoirs, I Mille, vol. 1, p. 241).

3 1 July, VUnita Italiana (Genoa).

Arguments over Ways and Means 59impossible at the moment. Most of the new politicians and civil servantswere inexperienced; there was almost nothing left of a police force orlocal government, and most of the capable clerks and administratorshad fled or been liquidated. Although the text of Crispi's decreementioned 20 July as the date by which preparations were to be readyfor the vote, this was soon seen to allow far too short an interval tomake up for these administrative deficiencies. On 14 and 22 July, andagain on 2 and 25 August, the date for completion of the registers hadto be pushed further and further away. It is true that many of thecommon people in the towns inscribed themselves at once on theelectoral lists, perhaps attracted by the novelty and the apparent senseof responsibility thus conferred. But the middle and upper classes weretoo lazy and too uninterested in this incomprehensible device to go tothe appointed churches for registration; or else they went, and thencould not be bothered to wait a quarter of an hour in the queue withtheir inferiors.1 As for the peasants, the following report of how theprospect of universal suffrage was received in the country-side may notbe untypical—a local official is writing to Crispi:

despite all my efforts, out of nine thousand people I cannot make more thansix hundred inscribe themselves. The reason for this unfortunate fact is therumour that those who inscribe as electors will be those chosen for con-scription. Because of this current impression I summoned the clergy, andarranged that they should give a sermon on the importance of votingWhat was my surprise when Mass began and still the priest made no attemptto mount the pulpit as he had promised. Seeing this, and still hoping forsome result, one of the electoral commission stood up and began to speak.But his first words were taken wrongly, and people took fright. Everyonein the church fled into the fields, and most of them heard no Mass that day.2

It is obvious that Sicily was not ready for self-government, nor evenperhaps for a plebiscite by universal suffrage to decide its own future.

The final decision did not, of course, lie with the common people.Even under 'universal suffrage' it would be the so-called ruling classeswho determined the issue; and among these it was not any conventional

1 29 June, La Forbice (Palermo); 4 August, L' Unita Italiana (Florence); 29 July,La Nazione (Florence); 26 July, 22 September, V Annessione.

2 14 August, Sansa from Floridia to Crispi (ACP, b. 155).

60 Arguments over Ways and Meansradicalism or liberalism which prevailed. The issues which dividedCavour from Garibaldi, and La Farina from Crispi, were not alwaysthose which were felt most keenly in Sicily. Again one comes back tothat variegated section of municipalists or autonomists, whose viewspervaded public opinion, and whose vote in the end would decide thewhole controversy. Any generalization about these people can be trueonly in part, for they differed widely amongst themselves and neverformed a compact political party with common beliefs. We only knowthat numbered among them were many of the leading names ofSicily: many of the lawyers, trained to use Sicilian law, and fearing theintroduction of new codes and an appeal court in Turin; aristocrats whowere immersed in local history and traditions of Sicilian parliamen-tarism; the clergy, fearing for the great possessions of the Church at thehands of secularized Piedmont, and jealous for the ancient insularprivilege of apostolic legateship; agriculturalists with special interestsneeding protection in a national market; and those numerous peoplewho feared that a northern government would nationalize the basic saltand sulphur industries to bring these into line with northern practice,or would spread out over the whole peninsula the high taxes andcolossal national debt of Piedmont. So far as one can see, the most vocaland powerful elements in Sicilian society wanted at least some measureof local autonomy. That is to say, public opinion in the island should bedifferentiated on the one hand from Mazzinian Unitarians, and on theother hand from those who wanted a speedy and complete fusion withPiedmont. We shall see that many of the more moderate among theseautonomists could still want an immediate, and sometimes an un-conditional, vote of union with the northern kingdom; but politicalunion in their minds by no means implied administrative or financialfusion. The simple alternative between nationalism and 'annexation'was not one which was either immediately apparent or inherentlyattractive to them.

Some few might even now have been content with self-governmentunder the Bourbons, so long as Sicilian administration was made quiteseparate from that of Naples. A very few at the other extreme mighthave fancied a completely separate existence, and no connexion witheither Piedmont or Naples. But the more realistic eventually had torecognize in Piedmontese protection their only guarantee against a

Arguments over Ways and Means 61resumption of Neapolitan rule. Furthermore, they had to acknowledgethat this was bound to mean something more than a mere union ofcrowns with Piedmont, however much such a loose connexion mightbe 'what every Sicilian would dearly love, only none dare ask for'.1

A favourite system canvassed was the Scots solution of a commonparliament but a separate legal system; for the lawyers were obviouslyattracted by this sort of autonomy. Discussion in pamphlets and news-papers also took into consideration the Swiss and Norwegian constitu-tions, as well as the American system of a unitary but federal state. Onedistinct attitude was based on the assumption that Sicily had its owninsular nationality, so that, while it might possibly join an Italian federa-tion, it never should form part of a united kingdom.2 Almost directlyopposed to this was the view put forward by Mariano Stabile in a letterto Lady Russell: that if Italy were to emerge as a unitary state well andgood; but if, as seemed the more likely possibility early in i860, Italywere to become a federation, then Sicily would prefer independence tothe risk of ending up a mere appendage of Naples.3

What is important to grasp is not so much the points of contact anddeviation between the different varieties of autonomist, but the fact thatthey together formed an important background of opinion to the openconflict between the two active and extraneous parties led by Crispi andLa Farina. The bulk of them do not seem to have been attached to eitherof these parties, but sometimes acted as though the only hope of makingtheir own views prevail consisted in a deliberate attempt to widen thebreach between the two. This fact lies under the surface of active politicsall through these months, and while it is impossible to assay its preciseinfluence at any one moment, yet the knowledge of its existence willoften help to unravel the political complications in Palermo.

We may see for instance during June some indication of a change ofview by this third and rather amorphous political group. So far, it hadbeen possible to think from Garibaldi's pronouncements that he hadbeen trying to impose annexation on Sicily, and that he had failedin this just because the autonomists wanted only a loose bond with

1 Cenni sulgiusto tnodo d* intendere V annessione della Sicilia, i860, p. 3 (Biblioteca diStoria Moderna, Rome).

2 Appendice all' opuscolo sulV annessione ed autonomia, 14 August i860, pp. 20, 29.3 12 January, Stabile to Lady Russell (RP G.D. 22/73).

62 Arguments over Ways and MeansPiedmont.1 With new circumstances this situation was almost reversed,and it now appeared that Garibaldi wished for delay, while many ofthe autonomists paradoxically wanted annexation. The explanation ispartly that, although La Farina's party tactlessly went on tilting againstthe 'imbecile' autonomists,2 Cavour repaired this by cleverly hinting tothese same people that unconditional annexation might be rewardedlater by an ample dose of self-government. Cavour had thus beengradually winning over some of their leaders ever since his informaltalks with Torrearsa and Cordova earlier in the year. Hence, by Juneand July, many of them were ready to prefer immediate annexation,trusting that the national parliament would afterwards make a voluntaryconcession of regional autonomy.

What Cavour gained in this process, Garibaldi lost. Admiration wasunbounded for the person of the dictator, but not for his policy ofcontinuing the war. Once Sicily was liberated, the sustaining impulsebehind the revolution thus declined. People there were beginning tosuspect that Garibaldi was exploiting them in an attempt to link upSicily and Naples in a common liberation. The hateful province on thecontinent was to many of them not worth their sacrifice, and theyfound abhorrent the very thought that Garibaldi might then set up ajoint dictatorship over both Sicily and Naples. Before very long, it wasthe radical party which was referring to these autonomists as' imbeciles ',3

and Crispi disliked Cavour the more for playing up to their unworthyselfishness. This third party did not consider annexation to be just onestep towards a united Italy, as did Garibaldi or Crispi; annexation wasrather the only apparent hope of deliverance from Naples the hereditaryenemy. They would have felt humiliated to follow behind Naples inyielding to Piedmont, just as they did not want even to find themselvesassociated with Naples in an act of joint submission. 'The municipalistparty in Sicily', wrote Calvino, 'now wants annexation immediatelyso as to be able to carry this out before Naples has time to do likewise.'4In this sense, the movement for immediate annexation to Piedmont wasfed by sentiments which were not exactly Italophile, and which even

1 20 June, Conte Siracusa to G. Fiorelli (Museo di San Martino, Naples).2 6 July, La Farina to Cavour (CF).5 29 July, II Precursore.4 9 July, Calvino to Bargoni (Memorie di Bargoni, p. 133).

Arguments over Ways and Means 63could be positively anti-Italian. This helps to explain why the radicalUnitarians sometimes looked upon that movement with such suspicion.

These, very roughly, were the current political opinions in June,when several of the more moderate and intelligent Sicilians resignedfrom the government in protest against Crispi's evident wish to post-pone annexation indefinitely. But people of the same political tendencieswere to side again with the radicals as soon as it became a question, notof the time, but of the method of annexation.1 The conservative Cavourwas obliged to favour the revolutionary method of a plebiscite, whereasthe radicals wanted to supplement this with that highly traditionalSicilian institution, an assembly of elected representatives. On this pointthe autonomists tended to side with the radicals and tradition. Anassembly would be able to debate all the various possible schemes ofunion, and to bring the free discussion of enlightened minds to bear onthe problem. On the other hand, to force upon the illiterate mob afalsely simplified yes or no vote would leave Sicilians but little say intheir own future, and the true significance of their eventual choice wouldremain unclarified. A simple plebiscite was wanted only by those whoadvocated quick and unconditional annexation; but many of theautonomists would have liked to attach certain conditions to the act ofunion, and for this a plebiscite was no use.2 An elected assembly was

1 E.g. 20 October, Lf Annessione, A. Guarneri's letter to the editor.2 15 August, Elliot to Russell encloses this statement from a Sicilian, dated 10 August:

'we are all quiet here but do not like the proceedings of the Sardinian GovernmentThe Sicilians do not like the annexation without a concerted plan for the terms ofa separate local government: they would not send Members of Parliament to eitherTurin or Rome' (F.O. 165/133). The British had an interest in regional autonomywhich was sentimental and something more. Goodwin noted on 1 August,' a simpleor absolute annexation implies the surrender of the national rights, an act of boundlessconfidence too great to be prudently risked. A conditional annexation is thereforethe wiser course. The conditions to be required are five in number, namely CivilLiberty, Municipal Freedom, National Defence, Free Press and Better EducationThe mode of voting the annexation, whether by direct or indirect suffrage, and theestablishment of a constitution, whether the Sicilian or Sardinian, are subjects forfuture consideration' (Political Journal no. 16, F.O. 165/134). Another British pointof view was the criticism made about Garibaldi in the Westminster Review, April 1861,vol. xix, pp. 344-5: * we are rather inclined to regard as an illegal stretch of power thedecree of October by which he finally ordered the vote of annexation to be taken byuniversal suffrage.... As soon as the island was free, it was his duty to summon the

64 Arguments over Ways and Meansthe only method by which they could lay down conditions of annexa-tion and give publicity to the existence of purely Sicilian interests. Therewas also the point that Tuscany and the central duchies had lately beensummoned to vote on this same question by means of elected assemblies,and it would seem doubly offensive if Sicily were singled out for adifferent procedure, despite her far older and still living traditions ofrepresentative government.1

If these were the arguments advanced by the autonomists, therewere other reasons why, in the next few weeks, many of the radicalsshould come to share with them this preference for a representativeassembly. It is true that Crispi and his friends always tended to lookaskance on conditional annexation as derogating from their ideal conceptof United Italy; but they were also set against the policy of administra-tive centralism with which the parliament at Turin had becomeassociated, and were ready to agree that the best means to their endmight be to reconcile unity with the existence of special economic needsand historic rights in each region. Moreover, the word 'assembly'almost carried the same significance as their cherished 'constituent*.Such a body might be induced to make annexation depend on Cavour'sacquisition of Rome. It might also prevent him imposing Piedmonteselaws and institutions on the south, and might insist on the creation ofsomething quite new, as befitted a newly-constituted kingdom of Italy.2It would provide a public platform for the airing of radical opinions.Incidentally it would prolong the process of annexation until Garibaldihad had time to carry the revolution over to the mainland and perhapson to Rome. By its very existence it would provide a useful bargainingcounter, if ever a pact could be struck with the conservatives. The radicalsknew, furthermore, that any support for their views was to be foundrather among those educated classes who would predominate among

Sicilian Parliament, conformably to the constitution.... That assembly, one of themost venerable in Europe, not only theoretically possessed the right of disposing ofthe crown, but had actually exercised it, not only in the Middle Ages, by conferringSicily successively on the Houses of Suabia and Aragon, but as recently as 1848, byelecting the Duke of Genoa as King; and the tyranny of the Neapolitans duringeleven years assuredly did not suffice legally to abrogate the ancient laws.'

1 Assembled 0 plebiscito: memoria, i860, pp. 7, 14.2 11 August, La Forbice (Palermo).

Arguments over Ways and Means 65the deputies to an assembly: whereas on the other hand they feared theignorance of the common people; and there was always the possibilitythat a snap plebiscite vote might be manipulated to crush the last hopeof carrying through their anti-Cavourian idea of the risorgimento.1A mass vote by all the people would surely tend to become a vote forsafety first and a quiet life, or for giving absolute priority to the interestsof Sicily; while the real need was for courage and action, and for anabsolute priority to be given to the interests of Italy as a whole.

In this conflict of ideas the scales were heavily weighted in favour ofCavour, for the radicals were too individualistic to agree on the samepoint at any one moment. If they came near to common agreementover wanting an assembly, this was not altogether of their own freewill, but was forced on them by events which they disliked. Theimpetus towards national unification was always their first considera-tion, and some of them feared that an assembly might lead towardsSicilian separation or a federal Italy.2 It was a risk, that is to say; but stillit was a risk which had to be run. Eventually the political and militaryobstacles which held up their march on Rome were to make a postpone-ment more desirable from their point of view, and an assembly that muchmore welcome. This gradual approximation of view between radicalsand autonomists is reflected in the following statement by a Sicilian—itis taken from a pamphlet written in August:

I would prefer a plebiscite if only it were laid down by law that conditionscould be arranged later in a constituent assembly held at Rome, and also ifwe could agree that interim authority should meanwhile rest with dictatoror King only in so far as such authority is necessary for the war or for themaintenance of public order.

If agreement on these lines is impossible, I think we ought to vote bymeans of an assembly, in which we could discuss the pact of union and howto carry it out. So doing, we should avoid binding ourselves hand and footby the simple monosyllable 'yes'.

The unification of Italy on the doctrinaire French system would be tanta-mount to preparing civil war.... Annexation must be either preceded orfollowed by the imposition of conditions.3

1 24 and 25 October, II Precursore, article by F. Lo Presti.2 14 July, Fragala from Catania to Crispi (ACP, f. 138).3 L. Vigo, Sicilia nelV agosto i860, i860, pp. 8-9.

66 Arguments over Ways and MeansThe radicals inevitably took some time to clarify their attitude to this

alternative of assembly or plebiscite, and even as late as October someof them were to be uncertain about it at a decisive moment for thefortunes of their party. Only unobtrusively did it emerge as the focalpoint of political differences. Even Cavour was for a few days unawarethat there existed such an alternative, although he was one of the firstto see that this particular issue underlay everything else. Once it becameclear, he, no less than the radicals, changed his views, in the oppositedirection from them. But to start with, he had thought that it might beadvisable to call a special Sicilian parliament. Michele Amari thus tellsthat, when the fall of Palermo convinced Cavour of the viability ofGaribaldi's expedition and of the need to canalize such an explosiverevolutionary force, a meeting of Sicilian exiles was called in Turin,and Cavour put before it a plan to recall the Sicilian parliament as in1812 and 1848. This solution no doubt had a prima facie appeal for theTurin government, in that it seemed to emphasize the traditional andhistoric at the expense of the revolutionary. A parliamentary assemblywould flatter Sicilian regional sentiment. At the same time it would alsoinvite British support, because it would mean a revival of that 1812constitution which had been inspired by Lord Bentinck and built ona British model. La Farina had had this in mind when he originallybrought Cavour's mandate for Sicily to follow the Tuscan example andcall an assembly 'to vote annexation and regulate the decision of thepeople'. As late as 28 June La Farina's journal, VAnnessione, spoke of anassembly as indispensable, and of a plebiscite as just a possible sequenceto it. A month later still, Count Litta, an ambassador from the king toGaribaldi, was still talking in terms of an assembly not of a plebiscite.1And for some time after this there was still no very clear appreciationin the north of what was involved.2

In Sicily, however, the different political implications of these twomethods of voting had become an open dispute by the beginning ofJuly.3 When Crispi issued his decree of 23 June he was yielding a pointover the timing of the vote, faced as he was by the alliance of La Farinians

1 30 July, diary of Count Litta, II Risorgimento Italiano, February 1909, p. 24.2 20 August, Ricasoli to Cavour (Lettere di Kicasoli, ed. Tabarrini, vol. v, pp.

201-2).3 10 July, Gazzetta di Catania.

Arguments over Ways and Means 67and others in favour of a quick decision. But in the process of yieldinghe transferred his delaying tactics from the question of time to that ofmethod. As an attempt to weaken the opposition alliance he inserted inhis decree a proviso, namely that the issue might still be decided byeither direct or indirect suffrage, and that meanwhile everything shouldbe prepared as if for the second method, that is to say for election ofdeputies to a parliamentary assembly. From this moment, all those whobelieved in autonomy or conditional annexation tended to back Crispiin choosing this latter course; and, now that the radicals had shown theirhand, Cavour's party changed their minds and opted less equivocallyfor the alternative method of direct suffrage by plebiscite.

As soon as the terms of the dispute had begun to crystallize, Cavouradjusted his plans. At the beginning of June he had 'thought it morehonest and convenient to convene the Sicilian parliament', as being themost legal and traditional way of sampling Sicilian opinion.1 Amari hadthen warned him that such a body would voice only the desires ofSicilian regionalists, and any talk of italianita would be swamped.2 Theassumption upon which Amari based his advice—and he had goodreasons for knowing—was that the weight of Sicilian opinion wantedlocal self-government before it wanted national unity. But Cavourneeded a quick popular vote in favour of unconditional annexation toPiedmont. The right of self-determination therefore had to be invoked,but only within these narrow limits. Cavour needed to confrontEurope and Napoleon with 'proof that annexation represented thewill of the people; but he did not wish the will of the people to gofurther and tie his hands by forcing conditions on him. Nor in hisembarrassed diplomatic position could he relish the prospect of inter-minable debates in a representative assembly, especially as it had beenshown at Nice how quickly a plebiscite might act and how surely itcould be manipulated to give the desired result. An unqualified vote for'annexation'—he always used this word—would leave him quite freeto take any action which later circumstances might make appearto be desirable.

In order to obtain this result, Cavour moulded his policy so as towin the support of the middle-of-the-road, local-autonomy school of

1 Ed. d'Ancona, Carteggio di Amari, vol. in, p. 231.2 Ibid. vol. 11, 1896, p. 389.

5-2

68 Arguments over Ways and Meansthought. He consequently let it be known, without detailed promiseswhich might later compromise him, that if annexation were quicklyvoted by plebiscite, some local government would in all likelihood beconceded afterwards ex gratia by parliament. At Palermo the news-papers of his party proclaimed the necessity of decentralization.1 InTurin his minister for internal affairs, Farini, was deputed to work outan official statement to advocate the devolution of power on to thehistoric regions of the peninsula. This statement was to be given muchpublicity by Cavour's friends in Sicily. It carried with it the confidentexpectation that Sicily would be rewarded with regional autonomy andbe spared the system of centralization as practised in northern Italy.Cavour may or may not have been very serious in these hints ofdevolution. In the end they came to nothing, and he did not showmuch regret over the fact. On the evidence before him in the summerof i860, however, their publication broadcast was calculated to givehim the best hope of an easy and painless annexation of the south.

An interesting memorandum was sent to Cavour early in July by theforemost living Italian economist, Francesco Ferrara, a former colleagueof his journalistic days. Ferrara was a man of autonomist sentiments,who would have liked Italy to copy the United States' system of federalgovernment. His memorandum on this theme is too long to quote infull, but the following excerpts will give the substance of his advice andhis analysis of the situation.

The fact is that the Sicilian revolution springs solely from the irresistibledesire to break free from Naples. The cries raised, the principles invoked,are simple phrases to which recourse is had purely from reasons of politicalnecessity, and which could be altered from one hour to another with anychange in circumstances: the words 'nationality' and 'unity' therefore repre-sent means and not ends

It is important that we should prevent Sicily becoming the running soreof the kingdom of Italy as she has also been of the Bourbon state.... Theprinciple of fusion with the north now being preached is the very negationof liberty, concealed under the invocation of liberty itself: it is even a formof political socialism. It would be a fatal error if Italians showed that theycould not emerge from the excesses of municipalism without throwingthemselves into the other extreme where unity is confused with absorption.

1 28 June, L9 Annessione.

Arguments over Ways and Means 69Complete fusion would in any case be quite impossible to carry out in

Sicily, simply because of the profound revolution it would involve for thecustoms of the island... .The public debt would be increased fourfold at onestroke in a country which would not have the resources for it. The system oftaxation would have to be completely changed.... Apart from the difficultyof introducing military conscription, many unfortunate changes would bemade in the system of administration, in money, weights, even in language;and the supreme court of appeal would also have to be abolished. Furtherdifficulties would arise through the sheer distance away of the new capital,and through the presence in Sicily of non-Sicilian officials All theseinnovations would be found impossible to apply in practice, however simplethey may seem in the abstract....

Sicily has never in its history known such a fusion as this except withNaples between 1838 and 1848; and on that occasion it was such a fusion asforced the island into revolution.... Fusion would turn Sicily into the Irelandof Italy, and hence, instead of making our nationality more compact andsecure, would be a real and perennial source of weakness from which anenemy could profit Whoever knows the country well must be convincedthat annexation, on conditions which Sicilians might later regret, would soongenerate sentiments not wholly Italian, which interested parties would notomit to nourish

Ideas of rigid centralization are not native to Italy... and no other part ofItaly is so distinctive as Sicily. The government could profitably carry outan experiment there, which could do no harm, and might be a source ofprecious information for the future.... The American system would con-ciliate all Sicilians.1

Cavour made no direct acknowledgement at all to his former friendfor this long and carefully-planned memorandum. Instead of beinggrateful for well-intentioned advice, he sent a churlish rejoinder througha third party: 'if the Italian idea has no influence in Sicily, if the idea ofbuilding a strong and grand nation is not appreciated there, Sicilianswould do well to accept the concessions offered by the king of Naples,and not unite themselves to people who could have no sympathy oresteem for them'.2 This was unkind and unwarranted; and, probablyowing to an over-hasty perusal, it quite missed the point. It only addedto the internal divergence among the patriots, and deprived Cavour of

1 8 (?) July, F. Ferrara to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, pp. 296-305).2 7 July [ibid. p . 305).

70 Arguments over Ways and Meansthe counsel of one of the few men who could have offset the dangerousnonsense talked by La Farina. Henceforward, Ferrara gave his adviceonly to the other side.

Yet Cavour had reason for being confident at this moment, andcould hardly appreciate how many difficulties lay ahead. All he sawwas that Garibaldi had not given way to the republicans, and had stillreceived no military check; the Great Powers of Europe had made noserious effort to intervene; and now Crispi's government in Sicilyappeared to be giving ground under pressure from La Farina. Cavourcould surely imagine that he was more than likely to inherit Garibaldi'sconquests, if only he proceeded with firmness and patience. In themeantime he had no wish to hear advice from people like Ferrara andBertani, who made the situation look more complicated than he thoughtit was. After certain initial waverings, he now knew his own mind.What he wanted was to absorb Sicily at once, without conditions; anda plebiscite by universal suffrage was the obvious means for this. Hisrepresentatives in the south were therefore instructed accordingly.

CHAPTER VI

CRISPI LOSES THE FIRST ROUND:JUNE

La Farina had certain distinct advantages in his conflict with Crispi.Being in opposition it was easy to criticize. Cavour could be held upto Sicilians as bearing the promise of peace and gradualism, whileCrispi could be associated with revolution, with the continuance ofwar, and hence apparently with the need for more taxes, more levies ofmen and material, and continuing disorder. People were told that thepolicy of holding an assembly was linked with that of continuing thewar into the Papal States, and so with a prolonged emergency, withcontinued sacrifices, and even the risk of open war with the Frenchgarrison at Rome. To a conservative eye, this was to endanger the wholefuture of united Italy, by attempting too much too soon. Anotherpoint was that, as a result of Cavour's alliance with plebiscitary Bona-partism, direct suffrage could now be called 'the only method held tobe legal by the public law of Europe'.1 A plebiscite might therefore bethe only means of securing French permission for the annexation of yetanother province by Victor Emanuel. Whereas while an assemblydebated, all manner of disasters might happen. Perhaps a European warwould break out, or else a diplomatic veto might be imposed on Italianunity. In either event—and this was the decisive point—Sicily wouldbe left at the mercy of Naples. As the Marquis di Rudini was to put it,

some people seem to wish that five hundred deputies for the island of Sicilyshould sit and chatter, and all for the sole purpose of asking from theExecutive, that is to say from a power unable to grant any such request,conditions which would reduce annexation to a contract in which all thegains would be with Sicily and all the disadvantages with the other con-tracting party.... At any moment now Europe may be thrown into a generalwar, and then unforeseen events may easily forbid the unification of Italy.In that case, what would become of us in Sicily, isolated and without stronggovernment?2

1 14 August, L' Annessione. 2 16 October, II Plebiscite.

72 Crisp Loses the First Round: JuneA quick vote for annexation would at least make more certain on thisscore.

Another convincing reason was contributed by the big battalions.People soon knew that Piedmontese moral and material forces werebehind the plebiscite, consequently making that a more feasible methodby which to end the revolution; and this argument by itself more thanmade up for the fact that the plebiscite on its own merits might havecommanded only minority support.1 Time also was on its side. Thelonger that civil war and rule by amateurs was allowed to continue, themore were people ready to sacrifice full liberty of choice in return forthe promise of strong and stable government. A quick decision—it wasmistakenly thought—would end the internal uncertainty and disorderattendant on an interregnum. Against the convocation of a Sicilianparliament it was feared that, just as twelve years before, such anassembly would mean all talk and no action, and so would leave thecountry open to a Bourbon counter-attack. This unhappiness about thememories of 1848-9 was widespread, and proved a powerful influenceamong the waverers. It was also argued that any attempt to imposeconditions on Piedmont would set an example which other provincesmight follow, and this would imperil the whole structure of a unitarystate. What in any case would happen if Piedmont chose not to acceptannexation on conditions ?

It would be quite wrong [wrote L' Annessione] to demand a pact orguarantees from Piedmont, for that province now represents but a tinyfraction of our great family Only the full nation represented in parlia-ment can settle the organization of Italy for the future; and there must beone uniform law, not many local privileges... .Otherwise we should justifythe calumny which holds that we Italians cannot free ourselves from theinveterate traditions of localism which for so long have kept us divided andin bondage.2

The cumulative effect on the autonomists of such reasoning may beseen in the personal history of two great Sicilians who have alreadybeen noticed as leaders in the revolution, Professor Michele Amarithe historian, and the Marquis di Torrearsa. As with other former

1 Natoli, Rivendicazioni, p. 197. a 6 September, V Annessione.

Crispi Loses the First Round: June 73separatists, long exile in the north had convinced these two that onlyby taking orders from Turin had they much chance of promotingSicilian welfare.

Amari was one of those bred in the full tradition of Sicilian indepen-dence and autonomy, and he had for long championed that traditionagainst both Crispi and La Farina.1 His widely-read history of medievalSicily, first published in 1842, had been full of insular animosity againstNaples. Subsequently the afflictions of exile had changed him, and byway of republicanism and federalism he had finally come round toacceptance of some sort of unitary kingdom under Victor Emanuel.As Garibaldi's foreign secretary in i860, he appeared to favour Cavour'spolicy rather than Garibaldi's. It was his view that it should be left toa future Italian parliament to decide what measure of autonomy beallowed in Sicily, and in the meantime annexation should be approvedunconditionally. This did not prevent him from desiring autonomy,nor from still wanting an assembly as well as a plebiscite. As he wrotein August: 'we must not lay down conditions, but we can still determinethe general lines of annexation. After our forty-five years' struggle withNaples, it cannot be that Piedmont should wish to take from us thatadministrative autonomy which we used to enjoy under the Bourbonyoke... .Everyone now sees that Italy wants unity, but not with theFrench system of centralization'.2 On the question of timing, Amariopposed La Farina's plan for immediate annexation, and wanted thevote to be held only when Garibaldi should have crossed the straits toNaples. Once this crossing had taken place, however, there would beno more excuse for delay. In the reasons which he then put forwardwe can trace an echo of his former separatism: annexation was needed'in order to combat the pretensions of the Neapolitans, who are nowtaking advantage of Garibaldi's being in the shoes of Francesco II torevive their old metropolitan rights over Sicily'.3 Amari was clearlysome way removed from either of the two extremes, and he claimedto have taken office just in order to help avoid the clash between

1 B. Marcolongo, 'Le idee politiche di M. Amari', Archivio Storico Sidliano, 1911,pp. 191-216.

2 28 August, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,vol. 11, p. 129).

3 11 September (ibid. p. 132).

74 Crispi Loses the First Round: June'annexationists' and 'postponed annexationists'.1 Yet his faith inCavour's word, and his consequent reluctance to attach any conditionsto annexation, made him increasingly firm in favour of submission toVictor Emanuel.

The Marquis di Torrearsa was the leading figure among the aristo-cracy, the one Sicilian whom Cavour was later to admit had not losthis reputation in these political broils of i860. In exile he, too, had stoodfor autonomy against nationalists of both La Farinian and Mazzinianschools.2 Indeed, he never quite threw off the reputation that he wasa separatist at heart, whose chief aim was to break free of Naples.3 ByMay i860, however, he had so far developed his views as to offer thesupport of his group to Cavour, fearing that Sicily might otherwise fallbefore the greater evils of republicanism or socialism; and in return,according to his biographer, he was assured by Cavour that thearistocratic element would be allowed to control the revolution.4 ByJune he was one of those who wanted quick annexation, but the methodshould be that of an assembly, and the union was to be hedged withconditions.5 On 17 June Garibaldi appointed him President of theCouncil, to act as deputy whenever the dictator was absent; but fromthis post he resigned after a week, presumably because Garibaldi wouldnot summon a constituent assembly to decide forthwith the island'sfuture.6 This policy of quick annexation by means of an assembly wasnot that of either Cavour or Garibaldi; but it represented the view ofa real body of interests which was by no means negligible. AndreaGuarneri, who also resigned at the same time from his post as minister

1 13 July, Amari to W. C. Cartwright (ibid. p. 106). On p. 116 he refers to Pisaniand Torrearsa as among those who wanted immediate annexation, and says that'in pure logic they are right; but not so when judged by the logic of politics andrevolution*.

2 U. di Maria, 'Episodi del risorgimento nella corrispondenza del Marchese diTorrearsa', Archivio Storico Siciliano, 1915, p. 166.

3 9 July, Calvino to Bargoni (Memorie, ed. Bargoni, p. 133); 31 July, Cordova toCavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 425).

4 F. de Stefano, 'I Fardella di Torrearsa', Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, 1934,pp. 1310-12.

5 7 July, L9 Unita Italiana (Genoa), report from its Palermo correspondent dated30 June.

6 R. di Castel-Maurigi, Vincenzo Fardella, Marchese di Torrearsa, 1862, pp. 43-4.

Crispi Loses the First Round: June 75of justice, explained that he had been impelled to this step by his desirefor quick annexation; yet, on the actual method to be adopted, he toothought that Sicily should choose for herself, and not have a plebisciteimposed on her by Piedmont.1

In theory this was a distinct point of view, but in practice it was morefavourable to Cavour than to his radical opponents. For the historicimportance of these men lay less in their desire for an assembly, than intheir conviction that annexation should not be unduly delayed. Thearistocrats at Palermo were not as much favoured by Garibaldi as theywould have liked, or as they might have been by Cavour. Their habitsand outlook may have differed from those of the northern conservatives,but they far and away preferred Count Cavour to avvocato Crispi. Itwas true of them in general what a conservative newspaper wrote, that'the people who call out for annexation are the quietists, and thereturned emigres, who now find themselves neglected by the newregime'.2 Another reporter amplified this same idea when he statedthat the annexationist party included 'those whose interest was peaceand quiet, those who wanted to end the state of war as soon as possible,and so be able to secure tranquillity and to cease their efforts and theirsacrifices \ 3 For these reasons in particular, some among the landowningclass desired to bring Garibaldi's provisional regime to an immediateend, even before the conquest of Naples—the salvation of Naples heldlittle interest for the majority of Sicilians. La Farina and his friendstherefore had a simple task when they tried to poison upper-classsociety in Palermo with suspicions of Garibaldi's government. Hencethe success of their alarmist rumour about 'Mazzinianism' and 'civilwar'. Hence the exaggerated reports to Cavour, in which theymagnified the inevitable bandits and pick-pockets into an active organi-zation of either counter-revolutionaries or republicans (they were neversure which). Unfortunately, La Farina was allowed to get away withthese exaggerations, and soon the issue was so clouded with emotionthat rational discussion proved impossible. If only wiser and moremoderate men like Torrearsa had not subsequently taken political

1 20 October, V Annessione.2 27 July, II Movimento (Genoa), report from its Palermo correspondent dated

24 July.3 20 July, La Nazione (Florence).

j6 Crisp Loses the First Round: Junequietism to the point of virtual abstention from politics, if they hadonly allowed their criticisms of both Garibaldi and Cavour to takepolitical form, perhaps with their great influence in the island theycould have made calmer and more sensible counsels prevail. If thisdifference of opinion could have been debated in a mood of greatercompromise, then the later history of Sicily might have proved happier.

By 23 June, when Torrearsa and Guarneri resigned, the chance offinding any compromise agreement between these three groups ofopinion was rapidly dwindling. By this time, some people werejust beginning to see how much depended on whether there was aplebiscite or an assembly, and on whether annexation was to comesooner or later. Behind these questions there were matters of principleat stake. Some of the background to this first ministerial crisis of thedictatorship is made clearer for us by the views of other members of thecabinet. Baron Pisani, for example, though he was one of those formerexiles whom Cavour had sent back to Sicily, had been appointed byGaribaldi to cabinet rank. He was another who resigned on thisoccasion, and his letter notifying the dictator of the fact refers deferen-tially but openly to a disagreement on policy.

You with your great heart and lofty mind, brushing aside all difficultiesin your path, wish to run directly to our sublime goal; while I in my littleness,and fearful at the sight of difficulties, think that we should go step by step,completing each single success in turn, and only then proceeding to newenterprises—in fact that we should enlarge our nation little by little.

Once I have made this declaration, nothing remains for me but to recom-mend warmly to you my beloved and battered Sicily. I beseech you to letits future status rest in doubt no longer, and not to leave it a prey to anyfactions that may arise I beg you to consider that, if you go on recklesslyinto Naples, you may perhaps be aiding that person [Mazzini] whom youleast expect to help; and he will know how to profit from your work withouteven being grateful to you for it... .Let Sicily be your fatherland; for it isa country not unworthy of so illustrious a son.1

Here is an example of how the desire for quick annexation was some-times intimately connected with an unwillingness to bother aboutNaples; and also of how it was involved with the fear that governmentand property might be jeopardized when the military power of

1 28 June, V Annessione, letter dated 24 June.

Crispi Loses the First Round: June 77Garibaldi was no longer available in Sicily. It was this strange combina-tion of interests which told so heavily in Cavour's favour.

Another member of the cabinet, Dr Raffaele, gave his reasons for notresigning with the others. He disagreed both with those who wantedan assembly at once, and with those who wanted to postpone annexa-tion until the whole of Italy was free. He censured the civic council ofPalermo for its petition on behalf of annexation, using the argumentthat an administrative body should not try to take on political functions.Against La Farina he pointed out how impossible it was in presentcircumstances for Sicilian government to be in any sense normal. Heagreed with Crispi that the simple publication of a preparatory decreewas as far perhaps as one could yet go towards the future elections.Under a dictatorship, moreover, the will of one man must prevail, andcriticism should not go beyond a certain point. 'The Sicilian revolutionis personified in General Garibaldi. He is the one man necessary for itsconsolidation. Even when he has ideas conflicting with our own, is itnot a duty for all good citizens to stand firmly with him, even to comecloser to him, so as to convince him of the reasonableness of theirviews?'1

It is evident that Crispi's government must have been losing publicsupport if it had to be defended, not on grounds of justice, but on thoseof dictatorial will. Quite likely there was more than merely the annexa-tion controversy behind this loss of esteem, because the opposition seemsto have grown after Crispi's decree of 23 June making provision for apopular vote. Probably it was due to a combination of various dis-contents : over the necessary requisitioning and conscription arising outof the war, over inflation, and in general over the failure to restore orderand prosperity after the revolution had triumphed with such largepromises and anticipations of Utopia. All this discontent in Palermowas exploited by La Farina, whose personal and political quarrel withCrispi was for the next ten days the dominant factor in Sicilian politics.A reliable observer like Amari easily penetrated behind the facade ofpolitical opposition, and noticed that the fundamental disagreementswere personal.2 Foiled successively in his attempts to control both

1 3 July, V Annessione, letter dated 1 July.2 3 July, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,

voL n, p. 97).

78 Crispi Loses the First Round: Junegovernment and municipality, La Farina" then found a new and moreefficacious weapon in the piazza mob, and on the 27th he instigatedsome of the common people to demonstrate against the ministry. Thedictator's first reaction to this was a sharp threat that he would movehis government out of Palermo and away from this danger of populardictation.1 But on second thoughts he resolved to accept Crispi'sproffered resignation, and to replace him with someone of morenondescript political colour. He meant to see if the critics of Crispiwere justified in their complaints, and whether they could do anybetter themselves. If only Cavour had allowed himself to be betteradvised, he could have had no better evidence than this of Garibaldi'smoderation and good common sense.

Barely a month after the capture of Palermo, it thus seemed that thepatriotic party which had emerged victorious from the revolution wasbeginning to split up into warring factions. The almost inevitable clashof interests over reconstruction was coming to focus on certain con-stitutional points, and political parties were already growing up aroundrival policies and rival personal antagonisms. La Farina had found iteasy to sow discord in a broadly-based ministry which contained menof such different political tendencies; and after securing the resignationof several leading ministers on the 23 rd, he had now obtained theexclusion of Crispi and the rest. The only pity from his point of viewwas that he had been forced to use mob demonstrations, an expedientwhich was as easily copied by his adversaries, and which was to be anelement as unfortunate as it was incalculable in Sicilian politics. He hadalso been obliged to draw closer to 'the aristocratic party, which notonly does not want an Italian union, but desires annexation on specialterms of autonomy for Sicily'.2 In order to halt the revolution, LaFarina had been compelled to try and dissuade Sicilians from assistingin the redemption of other Italian provinces, and in particular he hadplayed on the animosity between them and the Neapolitans.3 Annexa-tion was presented to people as the easiest and surest method of dis-sociating from Naples; or as II Diritto contemptuously said, 'so that

1 27 June (Goodwin's Political Journal, F.O. 165/134).2 6 July, II Movimento (Genoa), report from Palermo dated 1 July. This paper called

itself 'independent liberal'.3 27 June, ibid., report from Palermo dated 23 June.

Crispi Loses the First Round: June 79Sicilians could sleep in peace without having to bother about otherItalian provinces which are still enslaved'.1 His alliance with theautonomists was something of a volte face; but it was effective enough,and as such was to be copied by some of the radicals before many moreweeks went by.

One side of this story appears from what Crispi had to tell at thismoment. Crispi described how La Farina, after being refused a post inthe ministry, hadresorted to intrigue and disloyal machinations, which, thanks to GeneralGaribaldi's forbearance, I was obliged to tolerate At last, on the 27th,with the help of the police, whose chiefs I have been forced to remove owingto their utter faithlessness, La Farina sent a deputation to wait on Garibaldiand demand our withdrawal.... The cabinet of June 2 fell, and another tookits place, composed of separatists and La Farinian elements.

What will come of all this ?... On that day the individual policy gave wayto the policy of the streets, and it was the conservatives who brought thisabout. Those demonstrations will probably be followed by others, and notonly will the government fail to obtain a firm footing, but will be ever atthe mercy of the first comer. I know that matters have been purposelybrought to this pass in order to reduce the country to such a state of weaknessand exasperation that she will beg Cavour, as a favour, to annex her toPiedmont.

Farewell, my dear friend. It is painful to reflect that it has been our lot tomake all the sacrifices, to risk our lives even, only to see our enemies usurpthe power, and ruin the country.2

Two other letters from Crispi at this moment show how he had beenhoping to win the confidence of the Turin government. They suggestthat, had Cavour been ready to withdraw La Farina, he might possiblyhave neutralized if not actually won over the radical opposition, in thesame way that another of his brilliant strokes of opportunism hadformerly won over Rattazzi and the 'constitutional Left'. Both letterswere addressed to Cesare Correnti, editor of the conservative Perse-

1 16 July, II Diritto (Turin); 1 July, ibid., letter from Palermo dated 24 June: 'hereparties are becoming agitated. The government is being fought by the Lafariniansand the municipalists who are trying to win power, and I cannot see how we shallfind a compromise The municipalists would like immediate annexation, notcaring about anything else.'

2 3 July, Crispi to Asproni (Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 302-3).

80 Crispi Loses the First Round: Juneveranza to which Crispi sometimes used to contribute, and himselfCrispi's chief contact with the Cavourians. On 25 June, at the peak ofLa Farina's campaign, Crispi had written:

La Varenne [the bearer of this letter] will tell you of the base intrigues ofCavour's agents to get the power out of our hands Matters being in sucha pass, would you let me ask you to be my intermediary with the king, toshow him that we are not lacking in loyalty to the cause of Italy which ispersonified today in the glorious House of Savoy.... Our party since itsorigins in 1831 has been unitarian before everything. On many diverseoccasions we have said that we are for the king if he will be for Italy. Nowno one in the world can be so blind that he cannot see how today there canbe no safety for our country unless under the protection of the cross ofSavoy. Do they do us such an injustice as to think that we lack the intelligenceto see the signs of the times ? Is not Garibaldi's presence at the head of ourgovernment a guarantee? Are not the laws we have so far made a sufficientproof?1

There is a hint here of what shortly became a major point of differencebetween conservatives and radicals; for it soon emerged that the radicals,far from being the dangerous republicans which Cavour sometimesdepicted them for political reasons, might be believers in almostprecisely the opposite, an excess of monarchism. On at least one pointGaribaldi agreed with Ricasoli, in advocating that the final making ofItaly needed a king vested with fully dictatorial powers, if for no otherreason than just because the Re Galantuomo would be less prone tohesitate and count the cost than was the quasi-dictatorial primeminister Cavour. One liberal-radical paper was clever enough tonotice as much even in June when it wrote: 'this is the real differencebetween us and La Farina. It is not a question of a republic, but ofgalantomismo.'2 It was apparent that, in an attempt to counteract thistendency, 'like a clever minister, Cavour tries to make the king thinkthat Garibaldi is using the royal name for a purpose which has nothingwhatever to do with monarchy'.3 But the king was scarcely likelyto be deceived for long. Cavour's real cause for opposition to theradicals was not that they rejected the king, for they did no such thing;it was because they were against the ministry in power, and were

1 25 June, Crispi to Correnti (ACP, b. 152). 2 16 June, II Movimento.3 17 June, V Unita Italiana (Florence).

Crispi Loses the First Round: June 81hoping to use the king to help upset that ministry. Victor Emanuel forhis part was quite content to have a foot in either camp and await whathappened. As for the radicals, the more they failed to make contact withCavour, the more they pinned their faith on the monarch.

The second of Crispi's letters to Correnti bears the date of 5 July,a week after his resignation.

Why is Cavour still against me? . . . Shall we ever make Italy if his attitudecontinues like this ? Listen to me. Here in Sicily there are no Unitarians onprinciple except myself and the nucleus of young men who follow me. Themass of the country is indifferent. People hate the Bourbons only becausethey have been tormented by them.. . . Among those who in 1848 ruined theSicilian revolution there is not one who is for national unity. They pretendto wish for union with the other emancipated provinces of Italy, but in theirhearts they are searching out every possible manner in which to change theircoats and bring back a Sicilian king.

This party suddenly found itself confronted with the prodigious successof Garibaldi and the rapid way in which I organized the country. Then cameLa Farina, and with him discord entered this poor land. He found no supporthere, for all distrusted him; and yet he and his friends are now trying to fightus by force and with the vile accusation of republicanism. In this distrustfuland suspicious country, every accusation makes an impression; and if tillnow people loved and respected me for the sacrifices I had made and mylove for the country, now they are beginning to doubt my intentions....

I love Italy above everything, and since Italy must be made with the houseof Savoy, I accept the king without arriere pensee. It was I who first gaveVictor Emanuel the title of king of Italy.... It is I who can save Italy inSicily.... I assure you that among politicians you will find none like me.Among the petty celebrities of the island I alone can win Sicily for Italy.Do not oppose me in this. But do help me by withdrawing La Farina whomI have twice saved from death and have not arrested or expelled. Talk toFarini [Cavour's minister of the interior] and let me know at once.1

Two particular points emerge from this letter: one, that there wasnot much to choose between Crispi and La Farina in the matter of

1 5 July, Crispi to Correnti (ACP, f. 138). On 24 June, Calvino wrote to Bargonithat 'the Lafarinians pretend not to know that the "republicans" fought well enoughfor Victor Emanuel and Italian unity in the past campaign of 1859, and that they cameto Sicily to do so again. But you know how people of that type will make use ofany means to their end/ Memorie di Bargoni, p. 121.

82 Crispi Loses the First Round: Junearrogance and self-importance; and the other, that La Farina's newpolicy of pandering to the autonomists did not as yet present itself tohis rival as a matter for emulation. On both these counts Crispi hadobviously been becoming unpopular; though it is hard to apportion theresponsibility for this between his political programme in itself, and thearrogant, aggressive manner with which he pushed it. As a strongpersonality, he aroused the most varied feelings in people. To quoteBixio, a sensible Garibaldian officer who cannot be accused of holdingany strong political beliefs:' I am sorry Crispi has fallen from power andso unjustly.... Garibaldi did not want him to go, but in view of thedeveloping crisis Crispi chose to resign, although I am told he will notbe out of office for long.'1 Bixio went on: 'One of the leaders of thisintrigue is certainly La Farina, who would like to become a minister andgovern Garibaldi; but I do not think he will succeed.' Persano, thePiedmontese admiral who had several ships in Palermo harbour, madean interesting entry in his diary for 30 June. He recorded his impressionthat Crispi, 'besides ability, possesses really elevated qualities'—anappreciation which, incidentally, the admiral did not pass on with hisother information to Cavour. But he added that Crispi would have tobe opposed for sharing the rash views of Mazzini, ' and these would bethe ruin of Italy if ever they were seized on by the masses'.2 This wasa significant, if not very convincing, line of thought among the con-servatives. Another witness of these events similarly recalled, in laterdays, the horror in Palermo society over Crispi's 'semi-republicanism';and it is important to remember that republicanism usually meant 'redrepublicanism', and was connected in people's imagination with socialrevolution on the model of 1848. This same observer added that it wasnot Crispi's principles, but rather his rough methods of government,which ultimately drove people into protest. He also explained that theopposition had found in popular demonstrations the sole outlet fortheir feelings which was at once tolerated, effective, and intelligible tothe masses. As an example of Crispi's tactlessness he mentioned that,instead of playing up to local feeling, Crispi had offensively suggestedthat Sicily had been 'conquered' by an invasion of the Thousand from

1 2 July, Bixio to Parodi (Epistolario di Nino Bixio, ed. Morelli, 1939, vol. 1, pp.359-60).

2 Persano, Diario 1860-1, 1869, part 1, p. 52.

Crispi Loses the First Round: June 83Genoa.1 There had also been against Crispi the understandable animustowards a returned exile; both because an exile must have had morecourage than the rest of his class in choosing this fate rather than com-promise with his beliefs, and also because he was now coming back witha wider culture and the condescending air of one who was lecturingthem on their political backwardness. All this must be kept in mindwhen trying to explain the temporary resignation of Garibaldi's firstgovernment on 27 June. Other things being equal, the Palermoaristocracy would as naturally turn towards Cavour and the monarchyas it would dislike a mere provincial lawyer from Girgenti.

The temporary disappearance of Crispi from active participation inthe government of Sicily only reinforced Cavour in the justifiableoptimism which took hold of him at the end of June. The radicals werestill a force to be reckoned with at Palermo, but they had failed toestablish themselves against the liberals. The dictator was clearly goingto do nothing against the king he so much admired. Far from abusinghis dictatorial power, he had voluntarily dismissed his chief adviser andappointed a new cabinet of moderates which even included the editorof the liberal-conservative L' Annessione. The arrival in Sicily ofmoderate liberals like Cordova and Amari at the end of June was adistinct help in making a restraining influence felt at his headquarters.As it was, the chief radical leaders like Mazzini and Bertani had not leftfor Sicily, and were proving unable at Genoa to collect enough men toinvade the Papal States as they had planned. So confident was Cavour,that he at last felt strong enough to threaten Garibaldi, putting fairwords aside. A message was sent to say that no more help would begiven from Turin unless Bertani was deprived of all influence in theirdespatch.* But the dictator sensibly chose to ignore this challenge. Hewas not going to be deterred from his task of winning the war, and itwas to need further provocation than this by the 'moderates' before hehimself turned back to take sides in the political turmoil which LaFarina was stirring up at Palermo.

1 R. Salvo di Pietraganzili, // Piemonte e la Sicilia 1850-60, 1903, vol. 11,p. 348.

2 28 June, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 257). Amari and Cordovaarrived in Sicily with this message on the 30th, and Persano describes Garibaldi'sreaction on p. 278.

6-2

84 Crispi Loses the First Round: JuneThe more Cavour studied the situation, the more he felt encouraged.

With those of his correspondents to whom he liked to give the impres-sion of enterprise and audacity, he even began to prospect not only theannexation of Sicily, but the fall of Naples, and even that of Rome andVenice in the fullness of time.1 Hitherto Cavour's letters had containedfar more references to Garibaldi as an embarrassing nuisance than as anational hero, but now he could afford to let himself be carried awayby public opinion and confess privately that he was coming round tothe doctrine of united Italy. On 4 July he wrote to Nigra in Paris: 'lesucces fabuleux de Garibaldi d'un cote, la cruaute, la lachete, l'ineptiedu Roi de Naples de l'autre, ont donne au sentiment unitaire un pouvoirirresistible. Les hommes les plus calmes, les plus moderes, les plusconservateurs sont devenus unitaires. Le Prince de Carignan, moncollegue Cassinis, le Baron Ricasoli n'admettent plus d'autre solution.'He candidly admitted in private that it was these successes in Sicilywhich compelled him to adopt a forward policy. If he held back now,public opinion throughout the north of Italy threatened to overturnhim in favour of the revolution. At the same time Cavour believedhe had one trump card himself. For Garibaldi could not change hismoderate programme of'Italy and Victor Emanuel' without alienatingmany of the volunteers, and in that case a few battalions of bersaglieriwould easily be able to overcome those who remained.2 The very fact,however, that this thought entered his head, shows how little he under-stood of his political opponents. Seldom did he come near to appreciatingthat Garibaldi would sooner cut offhis hand than betray the monarchy.

Cavour was, indeed, in a strong position. But he had left out ofaccount the headstrong and unyielding La Farina, who was even moreunrestrained after the eclipse of Crispi. Instead of trying to bridge thegap between Cavour and Garibaldi, La Farina was purposely doing hisbest to widen it and render it unbridgeable. In Turin he was spreadingstories that Sicily was lapsing into anarchy, and that Garibaldi might atany moment apostatize to republicanism. In Sicily he was so far hinderingthe conduct of the war and the maintenance of Garibaldi's govern-ment, that the dictator was finally compelled to abandon his policy ofmoderation.

1 27 June, Cavour to Ricasoli (ibid. p. 252); 8 July, Cavour to Ricasoli (ibid. p. 309).2 4 July, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, pp. 54-5).

CHAPTER VII

CAVOUR LOSES THE SECONDROUND: JULY

Crispi was out of office for three weeks after his resignation on 27 June;but although this made it appear as though La Farina had won, theappearance was illusory. La Farina wrote a letter to Cavour early inJuly which was not published in his Epistolario: it is particularlyinteresting, in that pencil markings round the more fantastic portionssuggest that Cavour by now had probably weighed up the character ofthe man whom he had sent to restore order in Sicily.1 La Farina reprovedCavour in this letter for still thinking that there might be some good inGaribaldi.

Perhaps, owing to some scruples of delicacy, I have not insisted enoughon Garibaldi's attitude to you... .My greatest fault in his eyes is just that ofcalling myself your friend. Indeed, some people have advised me to feignother sentiments in order to obtain the General's good opinion.... If, there-fore, you and your friends think you can win what I have not been able towin, you are quite wrong [pencil mark]. Putting aside my modesty in theinterests of the public weal, I tell you that outsiders would lack all mypersonal relations and knowledge of people and customs here, and also, I maysay, that popularity which makes me (excuse the arrogance) a power withwhom Garibaldi himself has to count [pencil mark]. And do not think I saythis out of personal ambition. You must know me well enough now notto harbour any suspicion of that.

La Farina must have heard that Cavour was planning to replace him,and the letter concluded with a plea against any other official represen-tatives being sent to take over in Sicily, because that would be read asa personal reflexion upon himself. This last point was also underscoredin pencil when Cavour passed the letter over to Farini, either to signifyappreciation of its truth or its absurdity. What cannot be denied is thatLa Farina seems to have been more interested in his own reputation than

1 5 July, G. La Farina to Cavour (CF).

86 Cavour Loses the Second Round: Julyin the possibility (which still existed, as Depretis and Persano were toshow) of Cavour and Garibaldi working together without an open split.

It was already becoming common knowledge throughout Palermothat La Farina was in 'violent opposition' to the government. In publicand private he was saying that ' the cause of the revolution was betrayedby Garibaldi'.1 Giuseppe Abba, the most notable chronicler of therevolution, described a scene which must have taken place about26-7 June, andthe grave danger in which La Farina put the fortunes of the dictatorship.I recall clearly the demonstration he organized, with a torrent of peopleshouting outside the palace for annexation..., and * death to Crispi' wastheir cry I said to a friend that a new Sicilian Vespers must have begunCrispi came down to the piazza, having been refused a hearing from thebalcony. In complete silence he spoke just these few words: 'If you wantto make a united nation, then leave it to the dictator; but if all you want isyour own liberation, we can go away and leave Sicily for good.' It was amiracle of courage! The tempest suddenly changed, and you could hearcries of'viva Crispi'.2

Another witness, Salvatore Calvino, wrote on 9 July:Crispi ought to have given La Farina his passport a month earlier. If he

did not do so it was from generosity, and so as not to be accused of privatevengeance. But it was a fatal mistake; for when your country's welfare isat stake, generosity is wrong.. . . La Farina recently held meetings at whicheven senior military officers attended. He tried to set up a network of sup-porters among government officials, even aided by some of the ministers,and he once wrote in the Giornale that our first expedition was fitted out at theexpense of his National Society. The whole country is indignant against him.3

La Farina's more open enemies, Raffaele for instance, ascribed hisconduct to mere annoyance at the fact that Torrearsa had been madePresident of the Council rather than himself. Purely out of spite at thishe was associating with the dregs of Palermo, and purposely trying tocoerce the government by organized piazza demonstrations.

In conditions so grave as those of a country in revolution, the governmentneither could nor should have remained indifferent. And yet La Farina was

1 9 July (Goodwin's Political Journal no. 13, F.O. 165/134).2 Letter printed in the Como review, Garibaldi e i Garibaldini, 15 November 1910.3 9 July, Calvino to Bargoni (Memorie di Bargoni, pp. 133-4).

Cavour Loses the Second Round: July 87warned to desist or go away—a warning that was repeated at least twice.We even wrote to one of the ministers at Turin begging him to recallLa Farina, since his presence at Palermo, far from helping, was actuallyhindering Cavour's plan.... This had no effect.... Meanwhile La Farinafound that he was in no better position after the fall of Crispi's ministry,since Garibaldi was still an insurmountable barrier to prompt annexation,and thus also a barrier in La Farina's only path towards becoming commissarioregio.1

Garibaldi not unnaturally read into La Farina's conduct a deliberateintention by Cavour to upset the revolutionary government. Whilecertain of the dictator's friends had advised trying to join forces withCavour, others, even including some among the more moderate, hadrecently confirmed his own impression, namely that Cavour had losthis liberty of action by submission to France. It could always beplausibly contended that France wanted a divided Italy or at the mosta weak federation which she could dominate;2 and the actions of LaFarina could easily be interpreted to fit in with this. It was hard to denythat Cavour's party was deliberately spreading alarm and despondency,and so hindering the war effort. Through one of Garibaldi's owncabinet, moreover, a plot was afoot to place treacherous officers in hisships, with the intention of capturing his tiny fleet as soon as, or if ever,it became necessary.3 Garibaldi did not know this; but twice in thecourse of June Cavour had sent direct ultimatums to the government ofPalermo, threatening to break off relations with Garibaldi unlessMazzini was arrested and Bertani repudiated. Evidently at Turin theywere as much concerned with party politics as with national politics,and more with counter-revolution than revolution.

Until the beginning of July Garibaldi continued to show himselfamenable. The king's government was being unduly provocative inresponse to his moderation, but still its financial help was desirable oreven essential if he was to receive adequate military supplies. Thenoccurred an unfortunate incident. By some slip in Cavour's informationservices, the Piedmontese admiral tried to ingratiate himself withGaribaldi by reporting two men, Griscelli and Totti, whom he supposed

1 11 July, II Precursore.2 19 June, Pallavicino from Turin to Garibaldi (ACM, no. 1169).3 13 July, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 322).

88 Cavour Loses the Second Round: Julyto be assassins in Bourbon hire. They were thereupon arrested. It waseasijy established that they were Bourbon spies, and it also transpiredthat they had been in the employ of Louis Napoleon and the Pope; butremarkably enough these same two men were simultaneously on amission from Cavour, for which a substantial payment had already beenmade, and they had also attracted the notice of Garibaldi's police byoffering their services to the revolutionary government as well.1 Thepolice, in their subsequent report, concluded that these two highlydoubtful characters were being used by Cavour and perhaps by others forsome sinister purpose. When Admiral Persano realized his mistake he wascovered with confusion, and had to ask Garibaldi for their release,explaining that they were secret agents of Cavour who in reality weretrying to compromise the Bourbon government;2 but it was animplausible story, and the damage done was by then irremediable.

Coming on top of La Farina's irritating manoeuvres, this incidentproved the last straw. Crispi and his friends seized upon it to show thedictator that he was gaining nothing in return for his political neutrality,nothing at least except suspicion and treachery. On 7 July, therefore,Garibaldi sent an order for the questura to arrest La Farina and send himback to the north.3 What made this summary treatment particularlywounding was the statement which appeared in the Giornale Officiate.'By special order of the dictator', it ran, 'there have been expelled fromSicily signori La Farina, Griscelli and Totti. Signori Griscelli and Tottiare of that type who find some way of enrolling among the secret policeof every country. The government, which has to see that the publictranquillity is rigidly maintained, could not tolerate any longer amongus the presence of these individuals with their wicked intentions.' Theannouncement went on to belabour the Societa Nazionale, of whichLa Farina had been the president, and even to say that the society,

1 Griscelli's signed but undated confession (in Fondo Nelson Gay MRR) is con-firmed by other evidence: 14 July, Cavour to La Farina (T ettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala,vol. m, p. 290); Memoires de Griscelli, 1867 (Bruxelles); police report to Crispi (ACP,£ 138, nos. 4661 and 4662); the Carte Farini at Ravenna and the Carte Bianchi-Ricasoli at ASF Florence also show that he was in touch with the minister of theinterior at Turin and the governor of Tuscany; 31 May, Teccio to Cavour referringto payments made by Cavour to Griscelli (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 149).

2 7 July, Persano to Garibaldi (ACM, no. 1214).3 Library of the Societa di Storia Patria, Palermo, b. 27.

Cavour Loses the Second Round: July 89'reduced in means after Garibaldi had resigned its presidency, wasrather a hindrance than a help to the cause for which we fought atCalatafimi and Palermo'.1 This statement was as uncharitable as themanner of the expulsion was abrupt, but tempers by this time wereboiling, and some violent break in the tension was bound to comesooner or later. La Farina, having staked everything on shakingGaribaldi's position, now had to pay the price of failure. He returnedhome as he had come, on a Piedmontese warship.

We know that, even before hearing of the expulsion, Cavour wasassured that La Farina had failed in his allotted task. Without beingquite resolute enough to recall him, Cavour was already casting aboutto find a successor, and by now had written to tell him that this wouldprobably be Depretis.2 The king had even tried to insist on his recall asa known trouble-maker, being of opinion that 'if only he comes homethe annexation of Sicily will follow automatically'.3 It is just con-ceivable that Cavour, not liking to confess and atone for his originalmistake, had wanted Garibaldi to bear the onus of responsibility forany open breach, so as to terrify the Sicilian nobility into acceptingPiedmontese rule as the only practicable alternative to irresponsibledictatorship and red republic.4 But probably the delay is one moreexample of Cavour's indecision and procrastination. Persano told himthat expulsion was the best thing that could have happened to hisenvoy. The immediate and deliberate cause of the divergence betweenliberals and radicals had been La Farina himself. Crispi on one side andVictor Emanuel on the other had good reason to think that, withoutthe presence of this man at Palermo, things would have gone moresmoothly. As it was, all the work of people on both sides to secureannexation by agreement was ruined. He had succeeded in creating theimpression that he had been sent by Cavour to oppose Garibaldi'spolicy, and that Cavour was just out for Piedmontese aggrandizement

1 9 July, Giornale Officiate di Sicilia.2 8 July, Cavour to La Farina (// Risorgimento Italiano, vol. for 1916, p. 274).

Neither was this letter published in La Farina's Epistolario.3 N.d., Victor Emanuel to Farini (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. v).4 GortchakofF' feared that the Sicilian nobility would throw themselves into the

arms of Piedmont in order to escape both republicanism and dictatorship', quotedby Alfredo Zazo, La politica estera del regno delle Due Sicilie nel 1839-60, 1940,p. 369.

90 Cavour Loses the Second Round: Julyand no more.1 This being so, Garibaldi had no choice but to accept thechallenge and send him packing. The dictator so far had shown signs ofnothing but friendliness towards the liberals, but this gave him theimpression that they could not be trusted. While Bourbon soldiers werestill on Sicilian soil he could not allow this sort of factious opposition.Even the conservative Perseveranza realized that La Farina had beenplaying with fire when, in such a delicate situation, he had stirred upthe fickle piazza mob of Palermo against the government.2

The same newspaper made another point when commenting uponCavour's more than friendly attitude at this time towards Naples. Forthe prime minister gave the impression of being about to discusspreliminaries of an alliance with the very people against whomGaribaldi was engaged in mortal combat.3 If Cavour was bluffing inthis, at least he did not help the dictator to see through his bluff. All theappearances suggested that France was compelling Piedmont to turnagainst the revolution. Such behaviour seemed to illustrate exactlyMazzini's belief that Cavour would be forced into an unhelpful andun-Italian policy by pressure from Louis Napoleon. And the Gari-baldians took note of the probability that, if Sicily were once annexedto Piedmont, diplomatic necessities might a fortiori constrain Cavourto stop the further progress of the Italian revolution before the conquestof Naples. The policy of annexation thus came under strong suspicion.It was certainly not reassuring to find the semi-official L' Opinione atTurin carrying bitter articles against Garibaldi's government, at a timewhen the Neapolitan army still controlled part of Sicily.

Even on a more favourable view of Cavour's policy, there was stillgood reason for the radicals not to give in to his request for immediateannexation. Even had Garibaldi thought more highly of Cavour thanhe did—if he had believed, for instance, that the northern governmentwas ready to use revolutionary methods and not merely diplomaticbargaining for the achievement of unity—he could still imagine that,in that case, Cavour's campaign for immediate annexation might bebut a stratagem to confuse the diplomats until the volunteers had wonall southern Italy. It is important to bear in mind that Cavour, craftypolitician that he was, had become accustomed to telling untruths. He

1 G. La Cecilia, Storia delV insurrezione Sicilians 1861, vol. 1, p. 169.2 17 July, La Perseveranza (Milan). 3 14 July, ibid.

Cavour Loses the Second Round: July 91had informed the world that he was opposed to Garibaldi's expedition;but later, after that expedition had succeeded, he told Italians that thishad been but a ruse. Subsequently he was to ask the revolutionaries thatthey should not cross over to the continent; but this too, after Garibaldihad disobeyed, was later said to have been a ruse. It was not so easy,then, seriously to complain when Garibaldi treated the whole annexa-tion campaign with disrespect. Either that campaign was genuinelymeant, in which case it had to be opposed as cowardly and un-Italian;or else it was bogus, designed simply to delude the diplomats of Europe,and in that case it was to be resisted as a practical joke. This was the pricepaid for Cavour's deeply subtle methods. People could never knowwhether to take his words at their face value. Not only the disreputableGaribaldi, but also the highly respectable Lord Palmerston and LordJohn Russell said that they never would believe him again after his liesover Nice and Savoy. Even when he spoke the truth, people suspecteddouble motives and a double meaning; and Garibaldi had this excusefor treating his public demands with such scant attention.

Over his original attitude to the expedition of the Thousand, Cavourhad in fact been deceitful to no purpose; for people had not believedhis disclaimer of responsibility, and he had just compromised himselfwithout benefiting either himself or Garibaldi. The facts suggest thatneither then, nor throughout June, had he properly made up his mindwhat to do. It was Cavour's habit to keep many different policiesready for instant adoption. In southern Italy one can watch his tech-nique of employing many agents at once on the same job, sometimesunknown to each other. No one of them was allowed into all hissecrets, but each was encouraged to fend for himself, to push at opendoors until one or other hit upon what looked like the best policy in thecircumstances; Cavour would then adopt that policy with vigour. Such'tact des choses possibles' was one important explanation of his greatsuccess; but it did have the disadvantage that any single subordinatemight compromise his master by overreaching himself. La Farina hadbeen sent to Sicily before it was possible to frame any policy in detail,and had meanwhile been allowed to think that he could act on his ownauthority. The result was that Cavour was committed to a certain lineof conduct before he himself quite knew what was happening. Histemporizing with the Neapolitan envoys was likewise a method of

92 Cap our Loses the Second Round: Julyplaying for time, of waiting for the complete context of circumstancesto materialize before he framed the plan of action most suitable to it.But in the meantime his co-revolutionary Garibaldi, left in doubt abouthis real intentions, was compromising him quite as much as had LaFarina, and at the same time was putting the worst possible constructionon both his words and deeds. Not only were the two great nationalforces of Italy out of step, but mention was being made of civil warbetween them.

Cavour's negotiations with Naples in July illustrate the ambivalenceand disingenuousness of his policy. So energetically had he protestedabout Garibaldi being an irresponsible pirate, that the Bourbon govern-ment asked and received his permission to send a special embassy todiscuss terms of alliance against the revolution. This put the Pied-montese in a false situation: 'trying to keep in both with the Unitariansand with diplomacy, Cavour is falling out with both of them', said onenewspaper.1 These negotiations did him more harm than good. Theynever quite convinced Naples or France of his good intentions, andthey damaged both his reputation for sincerity and the esteem in whichhe was held by Garibaldi and the patriots. The ambiguity of his positionover this is one more illustration of the fact that the diplomatic methodwas attended with serious drawbacks. His readiness to negotiate wasyet another result of his dependence on France, like the cession of Niceand the attempt to stop Garibaldi crossing the Straits. But it was alsomore than this, for, as the opposition papers pointed out, he could easilyhave temporized and put off negotiation, making the plea that he mustwait until the new Neapolitan constitution had proved itself by working.2

When he deliberately entered upon these discussions he must haveknown that this would retard the development of any crisis at Naples,in other words that he would be giving positive aid to the Bourbons aswell as alienating the revolutionaries. Whether or not he was alsodeceiving Francesco (as he was certainly deceiving Garibaldi), the factremains that his action convinced the italianissimi that he was stillthinking in terms of a Neapolitan alliance and not of Italian unity. Theresult was to confuse Italian patriots, and to make the radicals yet moredistrustful and uncompromising. Moreover, he must have been fully

1 30 July, A. Bianchi-Giovini in H Unione (Milan).2 13 August, II Diritto.

Cavour Loses the Second Round: July 93aware that his policy would give this impression; and he could haveguessed that the NeapoHtans would publicize his complaisant attitudein order to divide Garibaldi from the moderates.

The fact that his friendliness to the Bourbons was bound to antagonizeGaribaldi constitutes the chief difficulty in explaining his conduct.Cavour's apologists maintain that he had already made up his mind toreject the proffered alliance before the Neapolitan plenipotentiaries,Manna and Winspeare, arrived in Turin on 16 July. But it is unlikelythat he would have gratuitously provoked Garibaldi by negotiating ifhe had made up his mind in advance that there was nothing to gain froman alliance. One would surely expect to find Cavour's duplicity ofa subtler order than this. We know that he had to contend with arapidly changing situation, at a time when the true state of publicopinion in the south was unknown to him. Until he could learn whatwas likely to happen in Naples and Sicily, it might have seemed thathis best plan was to play for time. Garibaldi's success had already forcedFrancesco to grant a liberal constitution at Naples on 25 June. A seriouspossibility existed thereafter that liberal as well as conservative Nea-politans, in their resentment over the Sicilian rebellion, might rally tothe Bourbon throne and agree to work the new constitution; and inthat case, if public opinion at Naples preferred the constitution toGaribaldi, Cavour felt that he would have to opt for the liberal Nea-poHtans against the revolutionary Sicilians. On certain terms, that is tosay, he does seem to have been ready to follow French advice and makean alHance with Naples. The NeapoHtan government would first haveto show that it had some popular backing; it would also have to joina common front with Piedmont to keep Austrian influence out of thepeninsula; and it would have to let Sicilians become independent or atleast decide their own fate by a vote.1 An alHance on these terms wouldfit Cavour's scheme to maintain relations with France; it would alsoact as an insurance against Garibaldi's possible defeat;2 it would,furthermore, insure against Francesco trying to make terms with the

1 27 June, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 43).2 Ed. G. Romano, Memorie politiche di Liborio Romano, 1873, p. 34. Romano also

confirmed how Cavour told the Neapolitan envoys 'not to wait for Garibaldito attack you always, but go out and beat him, capture and execute him*. Ibid.p. 33.

94 Cavour Loses the Second Round: Julyitalianissimi and set up in Italy as a rival to Victor Emanuel;1 it wouldmake possible the concentration of national resources upon the conquestof Venetia, so as to build up a strong northern Italy as Cavour preferred;it would also halt the revolution and prevent complications arisingout of Garibaldi's further advance in the south; above all, it wouldgain time for Cavour to observe the portents and make up his mindhow far he could safely allow the Italian movement to progress.One would suspect that these arguments must have been cumulativelypersuasive.

At all events, we know that in the middle weeks of July politiciansin the north were considering that alliance with Naples, at least on someconditions, might be more in their own interests than was alliance withGaribaldi.2 Now that La Farina had been banished, the success of theSicilian revolution looked much less attractive than before. Cavourhad to be prepared for anything, for victory either by the revolutionor by the counter-revolution. So far as he could see at the moment, itwas likely that the Bourbon army would stand firm in eastern Sicily;but still he had to be ready in case it collapsed. If Great Britain supportedFrance in demanding that he should conclude an alliance with Naples,then he would almost certainly have to play for safety and to concurin measures to check Garibaldi's advance. Yet it would be foolish tocommit himself against the revolution until either Britain declaredherself, or else he himself was quite certain that it could not succeed.As early as 6 July he was preparing to send secret agents to Naples incase the revolution could not be checked on the Straits of Messina.3At the same time, it would not be wise to close the door on the pos-sibility of a Neapolitan alliance. No doubt he expected or hoped thatan alliance would prove to be not necessary, or else would be renderedimpossible by his conditions. He argued that, if Francesco agreed to

1 29 June, Cavour to Villamarina (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. m, p. 277).z Another example is Minghetti, who, in an undated draft, mentions that they

were debating the-alternative policy of either 'annexation or alliance' for Naples(Carteggio Minghetti, Biblioteca communale, Bologna). Cavour agreed to accept theenvoys on 7 July, N . Bianchi, Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in ItaliadalV anno 1814 all* anno 1861, vol. vm, 1872, p. 666.

3 6 July, A. Ronchei from Genoa to Calvino (F. De Stefano, Salvatore Calvino,1942, p. 189).

Cavour Loses the Second Round: July 95his stipulation for Sicily to be first given the right of self-determination,the Bourbons would then lose face at Naples, since 'les Napolitainsliberaux s'ils doivent renoncer a leur domination sur la Sicile, devien-dront tous unitaires: c'est certain'.1 This was a clever calculation, basedon the regional self-esteem of the Neapolitan liberals; and Britishsupport for his prior condition about Sicilian self-determinationenabled him to adhere firmly to his point.2 Nevertheless, so long as theliberals showed any signs of supporting a new constitutional regime atNaples, Cavour was obliged to hold the door open, in case he wasforced to make a bargain at Garibaldi's expense. This was his view on12 July;3 and long after that, Garibaldi's friends were able to go onassuming that the Piedmontese were ready to betray them at the firstopportunity.

However mistaken this assumption may have been—probably notvery much—it was the impression and not the reality which mattered.Cavour had conversations with Manna and Winspeare on at leasttwelve occasions between 16 and 31 July. When the minister for internalaffairs, Farini, had a talk with these Neapolitan envoys at Turin on the20th, he told them frankly that a Bourbon victory over Garibaldiwould be 'the salvation of Italy'; and with doubtful taste he tauntedthem to their faces, saying, 'if only I had twenty thousand of ourtroops, I should have courage enough to throw Garibaldi and his armyinto the sea'.4 All this was at once reported back to Naples, and thencewas published abroad. Towards the end of the month, after the news of

1 4 July, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 55).2 7 July, Cavour telegram to Villamarina (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. in,

p. 281).3 12 July, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 72). On 14 July Cavour's

semi-official Opinione publicly explained that he had to wait until the Neapolitanparliament met and accepted the new Bourbon constitution before he knew whetherhe would have to conclude an alliance. On 20 August the same paper remarked that,'if the government of King Francesco had been solidly supported by the sincere wishesof the people.. . , Piedmont would have been able to form an alliance with Napleswhich would have proved useful to Italy*.

4 23 July, Winspeare to De Martino (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. v); also 20 July, diaryof Manna and Winspeare on their mission (ibid.). Of these two, Manna at least wasa completely reliable witness. In any case they probably would have lacked thecourage and the motive (as well as the deceitfulness) to make such a story up.

96 Cavour Loses the Second Round: JulyGaribaldi's victory at Milazzo had reduced or abolished all chance ofcompleting the alliance, Manna noticed that Cavour's attitude becameless friendly and expansive. But again legend was bound to outlivereality. On 25 July a correspondent at Turin wrote: 'Cavour isperhaps not averse to contracting the alliance (of course with theintention of breaking it at a more propitious season) in order to put upa temporary barrier against the march of democracy.... The signorCount remains a Count despite his liberal mask.'* This was a not alto-gether unfair supposition in the circumstances, and it played a consider-able part in the loss of mutual confidence which became so much morenoticeable in July. Once having begun negotiations, Cavour had tokeep up pretences even when all serious intention of an alliance hadleft him. As late as 5 September Victor Emanuel apparently advised theBourbons to attack Garibaldi boldly, adding that he hoped they wouldwin and capture and hang the rebellious general.2 This sort of ruse canhave gained absolutely nothing, and it certainly lost something inhonesty. It can only have encouraged the king's enemies, just as therumours which it engendered must have divided his friends.

La Farina's banishment, in its own turn, made Cavour yet moreunwilling to meet Garibaldi half-way, and so caused the growth ofeven more mistrust. When the unfortunate exile arrived back at Genoaon 11 July, there was no one to contradict his statements, and he easilypersuaded Cavour to approve what he had done in Sicily.3 He purposelyexaggerated the political implications of differences which were largelypersonal, knowing that otherwise his own behaviour would be calledin question. He thus frightened people with the spectre of red republi-canism in Sicily; although a fortnight earlier, when he had rather beenboasting of his own power and popularity in the island, he had repeatedmore than once that no vestige of republicanism could be found in thesouth. Again, he blamed upon Crispi all the lack of ordered governancein Palermo; though the day before his expulsion—when his motiveshad been different—he had written to give Cavour other reasons which

1 26 July, V Unita Italiana (Genoa), report from a correspondent at Turin dated25 July.

2 5 September, Winspeare telegram to the foreign minister at Naples on hisinterview of that date with the king {CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. v).

3 13 July, Cavour to Persano {ibid. vol. 1, p. 323).

Cavour Loses the Second Round: July 97were perfectly adequate to explain this.1 In immoderate language bornof wounded vanity he informed northerners that

the camarilla round Garibaldi which has the reality of power is a hotch-potchof incorrigible Mazzinians and vituperative Bourbonists—a horde of savagedrunkards.2

As for me, it is hardly necessary to add that I do not blench, no not evenat the prospect of civil war if it is thought necessary to save the country...convinced as I am that a brigade of Piedmontese will suffice in the last resortto snatch Sicily from the hands of all the Mazzinians of Italy together, evenif Garibaldi is at their head.3

His ambition was just to stir up trouble between Garibaldi and Cavour.He had a plentiful armoury for abusiveness in the gossip he broughtfrom Palermo, and besides circulating rumours of a reign of terror, hespread it abroad that Garibaldi was also meditating an expedition torecapture Nice from France.4 The implication from this was that thegovernment in Sicily was not only a nuisance, but even hostile anddangerous.

Cavour's reaction to the news of La Farina's expulsion was prompt.This particular agent would in any case have been recalled; but herewas an affront to the dignity of the government, and a public criticismof its policy such as could not go unnoticed. On 10 July Cavour there-fore sent a peremptory order to Genoa that no more volunteer expedi-tions were to be allowed to sail. The motive given for this was thatGaribaldi had refused to recognize Cavour's good will and wassurrounding himself with Mazzinians.5 Admiral Persano at Palermo

1 6 July, La Farina to Cavour: ' Sicily is not like central Italy. Here, so long as thereare not a thousand carabinieri and four regiments of Piedmontese troops, no one willbe able to govern except with their own faction of partisans: every other type ofgovernment will be impotent and despised' (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. i, p. 292). Whenthe time came for La Farina to form his own government in Sicily at the end of theyear, he asked for as many as sixteen thousand armed men (ibid. vol. in, p. 245).

2 17 July, La Farina to A. Franchi (Epistolario di Giuseppe La Farina, ed. AusonioFranchi, vol. 11, 1869, p. 360).

3 19 July, La Farina to G. Clementi (ibid. p. 370).4 13 July, Ronchei to Calvino (ACM, no. 3061).5 10 July, Cavour telegram to Magenta, Vice-Governor of Genoa (Lettere di Cavour,

ed. Chiala, vol. vi, p. 569); 18 July, Cavour to Magenta (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1,P- 349).

98 Cavour Loses the Second Round: Julymeanwhile prepared to arrest Crispi, Mario and Ferrara as soon asGaribaldi was out of the way.1 To his ambassador at London, Cavourwrote: ' Garibaldi se laisse entrainer par l'enivrement du succes. Au lieude faire, ou de laisser faire l'annexion, il songe a conquerir Naples et adelivrer l'ltalie.. ..L'annexion nous tirerait d'embarras, car elle feraitrentrer Garibaldi dans une position normale.'2 The radical 'dream' ofconquering Naples was thus an 'embarrassment' to Turin. WhileCavour would no doubt have liked to bring about the collapse of theBourbon regime, he was inclined to think that the time was not ripe,and he was certainly not prepared to work for it if the result would bea radical victory, nor unless he had a convincing display of support fromopinion in both the south and the north. Only after Garibaldi's victoryat Milazzo was Cavour properly convinced that his radical opponentswere not the dreamers he had supposed; and of course this same battlewas to make them even more of an embarrassment and a menace tohim. Above all he did not wish the radicals to have any share in thedeliverance of Naples; for once master of that city, Garibaldi mightprove irresistible as well as incorrigible.3

Cavour's mistaken analysis and maladroit conduct did not pass with-out criticism, even among the moderates. That conservative southernlandowner, Lacaita, wrote from London that 'here people in generalapprove La Farina's expulsion, and it is thought that annexation at themoment would arrest Garibaldi in Sicily, and so preserve Bourbon ruleat Naples. There is strong disapproval of La Farina's plotting againstGaribaldi/4 The moderate and respectable General Tiirr, from what hehad seen himself in Sicily, published a different story from the tittle-tattle which had reached the ears of Cavour.

I can guarantee that every dictatorial order was invariably favourable tothe Piedmontese government. If some people privately expressed opinionsagainst one or other minister in the Piedmontese government, that wassomething which happens at Turin as well as Palermo. And as for dis-

1 17 July, Persano to Cavour (ibid. p. 342).2 12 July, Cavour to E. d'Azeglio (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, pp. 93-4).3 12 July, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 71).4 23 July, Sir James Lacaita to Massari (Archivio Massari MRR); 10 August,

Michele Amari to W. C. Cartwright (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona, vol. 11,pp. 119-20).

Cavour Loses the Second Round: July 99crediting the Piedmontese ministers, I believe that La Farina has contributedmore than anyone to this I am fully persuaded that, both for La Farina'sreputation and for the national cause, it would have been better had he nevercome to Sicily. For in Sicily, until his arrival, there had reigned a perfectaccord among all parties, and this accord did not return until his departure.*

The republicans were not a danger. If Cavour had only known,Mazzini was bitterly lamenting his impotence and the fact that Garibaldiwould accept advice from the moderates alone/ Garibaldi's recruitingofficers Cosenz and Sacchi, when they sailed with their volunteers toSicily, obediently followed Cavour's instructions to keep clear of thePapal States. Cavour himself soon had to recognize these evident facts,and probably for this reason he did not enforce his hasty veto onfurther expeditions. Conceivably he had known all along how littlea danger Mazzini was, and was simply using this particular red rag asa means to frighten Napoleon into backing a Piedmontese Italy as alesser evil. If he was waiting for an excuse to sever relations, he probablyrealized on second thoughts that Garibaldi had not yet put himself in thewrong, and had not been deserted by public opinion. Alternatively,perhaps Cavour had just been caught off balance by one of his habitualfureurs momentanees brought on by the humiliating expulsion of hisrepresentative and the public exposure of a casual but importantmistake. Whatever the explanation, his optimism received a temporarycheck now that he saw that Garibaldi had a mind of his own andwas the real master in Sicily. It was easy to conclude that the enviousand excitable La Farina should never have been sent with full powersto intrigue against men he so much disliked. But it was not so easyto see how the damage could now be repaired.

1 24 July, // Diritto, letter of 20 July by Tiirr written from Aix to the editor.2 25 June, Mazzini to Caroline Stansfeld (Epistolario, vol. XL, p. 101); 6 July,

Mazzini to Emilie Venturi: 'Dear, Garib. has spoken delay. Bert, yields. It is bothindividually and collectively, ruin. I never felt more the bitterness, the scoramento offinding myself in another man's hand' (ibid. p. 142); 9 July, Mazzini to CarolineStansfeld, that Garibaldi had 'a feeling of jealousy of me which is really unintelligible'(ibid. p. 160).

7-2

100

CHAPTER VIII

CAVOUR ADJUSTS HISPOLICY: JULY

Up to the beginning of July Cavour had rather drifted before events;but La Farina's banishment from Sicily was a warning that those eventsmight run away with him if he did not assert himself. The bolder spiritsin his party were advising him to launch an expedition against Naples,so as simultaneously to reap the harvest sown by the radicals and toprevent them extending their influence on to the continent.1 ButCavour was too much dependent on Napoleon III to be able to pushmatters so fast, and feared the diplomatic difficulties if Naples wasbrought in as an additional complication. He had made the Emperorof the French his accomplice so far as Sicily was concerned, but therewas a strong Napoleonic interest in Naples, just as there continued tobe a strong French interest in seeing that Italian unification did not gobeyond a certain point. Sicily was ripe for the harvest, Naples not:'les macaronis ne sont pas encore cuits, mais quant aux oranges qui sontdeja sur notre table, nous sommes bien decides a les manger'.2 This wasthe position during June and most of July, while Cavour cast about fora way to annex Sicily. He would never stoop to become an activerevolutionary he said, and would on no account foster insurrection atNaples, though in legitimate warfare he was ready to fight the wholeworld.3 Only later, when Garibaldi was revealed to be yet more ofa menace, did Cavour lower his standards and demean himself to thepoint of becoming a vulgar revolutionary. For the present he still spokeas an orthodox liberal, who would have liked a united Italy, but onlywhen Italy was ready to unite itself: ' vous savez que l'opinion publiqueest ma boussole; mon programme est de ne pas imposer l'annexion,mais de braver tous les dangers pour la faire, si les populations lareclament. L'ltalie n'aura peut-etre jamais une occasion plus belle de

1 N.cL, Prince Eugenio Carignano to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. i, p. 262).2 25 June, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 39).3 18 July, Cavour to Ricasoli (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 350).

Cavour Adjusts his Policy: July 101constituer son unite et son independance reelle; mais il faut que lesNapolitains le veuillent serieusement, et nous aident un peu de leur cote.'*

In a number of letters Cavour admitted that the time would probablycome when he must break openly with Garibaldi; but for the momenthe had to be content with less strident measures, surreptitiously tryingto cut off the general's reinforcements and to compel his surrender ofSicily.2 At the same time Garibaldi's better nature was appealed to ina personal letter from the king, which asked in the first place forannexation as soon as possible, and in the second for avoidance of anyattack on the coast of Naples. An attempt was also made to persuadethe dictator that the king at least, if not the Piedmontese governmentitself, was but play-acting in its negotiations with Naples.3 The objectivehowever, remained the same. The hypothesis of a Neapolitan alliancewas not yet abandoned, just as the hypothesis of a united Italy was notyet finally accepted. Both were retained until the forces of nationalismcould be more accurately measured. In the meantime Cavour was sureof only one thing, that Garibaldi and not Francesco represented themost immediate danger to his system. 'L'annexion de la Sicile', hesaid, 'est un moyen d'annuller Garibaldi, ou tout au moins d'amoindrirson influence de fa^on a ce qu'elle ne fut plus dangereuse.'4 Some weeksearlier Cavour had been ready to allow Garibaldi to cross over to thecontinent; but by the middle of July he was hoping that this could beprevented. The man was now too dangerous to be given a free hand.He had been too much antagonized by La Farina to be made a friendmerely by more fair words, and at the moment fair words were theonly commodity which Cavour had to offer him.

Cavour's main strength and weakness lay in the diplomatic situationof Europe. One of his constant preoccupations was to know how far

1 7 July, Cavour to Villamarina (N. Bianchi, Storia documentata della diplomaziaeuropea in Italia, vol. VIII, 1872, pp. 691-2).

2 13 July, Cavour to Persano {CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 322); 18 July, Cavour toMagenta {ibid. p. 349).

3 8 July, Victor Emanuel to Garibaldi via M. Amari (Comandini, L' Italia neicento anni, vol. in, p. 1502).

4 12 July, Cavour to Nigra {CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 71); 14 July, Nigra toCavour: 'ne craignez pas l'influence de cet homme [Garibaldi]. Ils'useradansraccom-plissement de sa tache, et ce n'est certes pas lui qui est destine a recueillir le fruit deses ocuvres. Garibaldi n'est bon qu'a detruire... ' {ibid. p. 80).

102 Cavour Adjusts his Policy: Julyhe could go without alienating France, and as he believed that a generalEuropean war was not far off, it was all the more necessary to keep hisdemands within what Napoleon would allow him.1 Yet he knew thatBritish support would be forthcoming only in so far as he appeared toweaken in his allegiance to Paris. It was fortunate that Napoleon hadlost the confidence of Britain as of most other countries, and was there-fore having to rely to a considerable degree 'on the popular and revolu-tionary element' in Europe.2 With a little cleverness, France as well asBritain might thus be induced to accept the yet further expansion ofPiedmont, provided at least that the impulse did not come from anyother European power, but appeared to derive from the Italian peoplethemselves. At the end of July Napoleon wrote: 'je desire que Tltaliese pacifie, n'importe comment, mais sans intervention etrangere'.3

Evidently the Emperor was ready to accept Piedmontese dominationof the peninsula if the alternative was Austrian domination in the north,or if either British or Garibaldian influence threatened to prevail in thesouth. It was the direct opposite with Great Britain. Lord John Russellstill feared that Cavour might be forced to make a bargain with Francefor the purchase of Sicily and Naples at the price of yielding Sardiniaand Liguria,4 even though on this point his ambassador assured him thatCavour had promised to 'run straight'.5 But this also had compensatingadvantages as far as Piedmont was concerned. In order to prevent Italyemerging as a client of France, Russell was ready to vie with Napoleonfor Cavour's favour and gratitude. The mutual distrust betweenBritain and France was an invaluable fact, easily exploited in emergencies,and one more indication that fate was on Italy's side.

Cavour was gradually feeling his way towards a more active policy,as he adjusted himself to what had happened since May. In the process

1 8 July, Cavour to Ricasoli (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. i, p. 308).2 12 August, Nigra to Cavour (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, pp. 152-3).3 25 July, Napoleon III to Persigny (Paul Matter, Cavour et Vunite Italienne, vol. m,

1927, p. 366).4 31 July, Russell to Farini: ' we know that Count Cavour thought himself com-

pelled to yield contrary to his declarations on the subject of Savoy and Nice, sothat many say what has happened once may happen again. Too great a desire topossess Naples may lead to an equal desire to possess Venice and Dalmatia' (RP G.D.22/73)-

5 16 July, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).

Cavour Adjusts his Policy: July 103he let himself be converted by Garibaldi's extraordinary success toconceive that Mazzini's Unitarian Utopia might not be so distant afterall. Italian unity had always remotely been a hypothesis for him,1 butwas hardly a working hypothesis even in the first half of i860, and untillately he had dismissed the idea as 'nonsense'.2 Now he found, to hissurprise and ultimately to his great pleasure, that the general feelingboth in Italy and Europe was ahead of him in this. * Since the affair ofSavoy and Nice', said the United States minister, 'public opinion is nolonger with Cavour, but it is with Garibaldi. Cavour cannot opposehim.'3 Hence the government had reluctantly been compelled to allowthe Thousand to set out in May; and hence in July, as Garibaldi threatenedto become an ever more actual and no longer just a potential danger,Cavour had to catch up quickly with public opinion if he wanted togive a moderate, monarchical, Piedmontese direction to what washappening. It was a case of yielding to the inevitable. Somehow hehad to find a way of discreetly accepting and enveloping the revolu-tionary movement which so far he had openly repudiated. This wouldfor preference have to be done with Garibaldi's good will, becausepublic opinion, which he proudly acknowledged to be his boussole orcompass, would not at this moment have permitted an open breachwith the glamorous and successful Duce in Sicily. The only alternativewas that he should go one better than the revolutionaries and outbidthem in public estimation at their own game. These various considera-tions now gave Cavour his leading principles of action. While secretlypreparing to stop Garibaldi's further progress, he simultaneously hadto devise how, if necessary, he might outdistance the dictator in revolu-tionary zeal. Yet he also had to keep up an appearance of giving cordialassistance to the very man whom he was preparing to defeat; for thatman had not only won the admiration of Europe, but had convinced

1 2 October 1832, Cavour to Marchesa di Barolo (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala,vol. 1, 1884, p. 280).

2 12 April 1856, Cavour to Rattazzi, saying that Manin 'vuole Y unita d* Italia edaltre corbellerie' (CC Ing. vol. 1, 1933, p. 463); Chiala typically omits this part ofthe letter, without even saying that he has made any omission (Lettere di Cavour,vol. 11, 1883, p. 220).

3 24 July, Daniel to Secretary Cass (copy in MRR); and Commander Forbes on15 July at Genoa wrote 'it is not in the power of the Government to check themovement' (The Campaign of Garibaldi in the Two Sicilies, 1861, p. 5).

104 Cavour Adjusts his Policy: JulyCavour himself and many of his countrymen that a kingdom of Italymight almost be a practical possibility.

An ordinary politician might have been baffled by the incongruous-ness and irreconcilability of this multiple policy. Not so Cavour. Butit was these internal inconsistencies which make it so hard for a historianto follow his tracks. From his private letters, however, one does derivethe general impression that, if he had one principal aim throughoutJuly, it was not so much to proceed with the unification of Italy, as tostop Garibaldi's progress altogether, leaving any question of acquiringfurther provinces plenty of time to mature. His difficulty in pursuingthis particular aim was simply that he had always to keep up appearancesof quite a different sort. This was necessary even inside the liberal-conservative party, for d'Azeglio had to be reassured that Cavour hadno territorial ambitions in the south, while Ricasoli had to think thevery reverse; politicians at Naples had to be persuaded that he wantedan alliance with the Bourbons, at the same time as Garibaldi and publicopinion in liberated Italy had to believe that he was in league with therevolution; the Piedmontese had to be lured by the vision that theywere conquering Italy, at the same time as the rest of Italy had to beassured that it was liberating itself, and merely associating voluntarilywith Piedmont to create a wholly new kingdom of Italy; the Frenchhad to be convinced that Cavour was Napoleon's humble servant, theBritish that he was no such thing; Louis Napoleon, too, had to bepersuaded that he must support Cavour as his only hope of saving Italyfrom the anti-clericals and the anti-French, while Russell had to beinduced to help Cavour in his reputed desire to free himself fromFrench influence and to destroy the temporal power of the Pope; theAustrians also had to think that Cavour had no immediate ambitionsin northern Italy, although Kossuth and the Hungarian nationalists weretold that he was eager for battle. It was, indeed, a sign of Cavour's skilland courage that he contrived more or less to keep up these contradictoryappearances by artful deceit, at the same time as he gradually edgedhimself into a position where he could once more command and beobeyed. Even if people had now learnt to disbelieve him and distrusthis motives, they were still likely to be confused and confounded bya smoke screen on this scale, and behind such a screen he could deployhis forces until he was strong enough to attack.

Cavour Adjusts his Policy: July 105One essential task in July was to establish contact again with Garibaldi,

in order to preserve one more illusion a little longer, and in case it wasstill possible to repair the damage done by La Farina. The question was,whom to send. Admiral Persano was still in Garibaldi's good books, buthe was a serving officer who might be required elsewhere, and his pasthistory did not suggest that he was above average as a politician anymore than he was above average as a naval officer. The need was forsomeone less official, who was an experienced diplomat and adminis-trator, and who in some degree possessed the confidence of both sides.The answer was found in Agostino Depretis, like Crispi to become laterone of the most famous prime ministers of Italy after Cavour's death.This year i860 was to give both these men their first real experience ofgovernment. On close study one can already discern in Depretis thequalities which much later became so notorious in the prime minister,the same hesitation and yieldingness, the same tact, moderation andlack of strong conviction, the same administrative ability, diplomaticsavoirfaire, and skill in smoothing over rival people and ideas. Petruc-celli summed him up as 'a capable administrator, but completelylacking in political courage'.1 On both these counts, because of hiscapability and his meekness, he had good claims to Cavour's considera-tion. By temperament and ability he was incomparably more suitedthan La Farina to a job which required someone genial and serene bynature, a natural sceptic who could tack and temporize.

His political history also marked him out as peculiarly suited to thenew post. Depretis was in some sort of contact with Cavour andGaribaldi, the king and Mazzini, La Farina and Dr Bertani.2 Fromdifferent points of view, both the Movimento and the Cornere Mercantileat Genoa welcomed his appointment. At Palermo, L' Annessionegreeted him favourably as a man who was by birth a Piedmontese, andwho in politics was a good democrat without being of the radicallevelling variety. He belonged to the same political group as Rattazzi,and had some claims to be considered a leader of the parliamentary

1 F. PetrucceUi della Gattina, I moribondi del Palazzo Carignano, 1862, p. 107.Hudson rather unfairly called Depretis a 'clever unscrupulous man, and I should saynot to be trusted', 16 July, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).

2 E. Librino, 'Agostino Depretis prodittatore in Sicilia', Nuova Antologia, December1930, pp. 462 et seq.

106 Cavour Adjusts his Policy: JulyLeft at Turin. That he was not too radical had been shown by hisopposition to Garibaldi over the question of the Nazione Armata inJanuary, and also by his serving under Cavour's administration asgovernor of the province of Brescia. This latter experience of rule overa large area under emergency conditions left him much better equippedthan La Farina for his work in Sicily. The extreme radicals, while theysaw in him a true patriot and democrat, called him ambitious, cunningand underhand, and continued to be on their guard.1 Both sides con-tinued to be slightly suspicious of him, yet he skilfully induced bothsides to hope that he shared their way of thought. While still governorof Brescia, he actively abetted the revolution by collecting money andarms for the Sicilian expedition;2 and having resigned from Brescia,he was one of those who had criticized Cavour's cession of Nice, thusingratiating himself further with Garibaldi.

Bertani, the extreme radical, could never really understand whyGaribaldi was so moderate and unrevolutionary as to want a Sardiniancommissioner to whom he could hand over the civil government inSicily. Nor did Cavour understand or appreciate Garibaldi's initialdesire to establish this contact with Turin, or else presumably he wouldhave consulted the dictator's wishes before sending out such a man asLa Farina. It was not the least of Cavour's tactical errors that heidentified Garibaldi with the extreme revolutionaries, and this attitudeonly drove the dictator more solidly into their ranks. Neither side isfree from criticism in the development of this split, but in fairness tothe radicals it must be stated that they had asked for Depretis a monthbefore Cavour agreed to let him go. Half-way through June, when thename of Depretis was first mentioned, the chances of co-operation hadbeen at their greatest, because both sides then realized that La Farinawas causing discord and making agreement between Palermo andTurin less easy. The initiative in reconciliation at that moment had comefrom Bargoni, one of the less extreme members of the radical partitod'azione. What Bargoni asked was that a man should be sent to Sicilywho was not an extreme partisan, but who could interpret one side to

1 9 July, Asproni to Crispi (Crispi's Memoirs, vol. i, p. 318).2 27 April, Depretis to Garibaldi (G. E. Curatulo, Garibaldi, Vittorio Emanuele,

Cavour nei fasti delta patria, 1911, p. 194); and 24 March, Depretis to Garibaldi(ABM).

Cavour Adjusts his Policy: July 107the other. By that time Cavour had reached the stage of giving secrethelp to the volunteer committees which were organizing reinforcementsfor Sicily; for he had convinced himself that the annexation of thisprovince was feasible, and he wanted to keep the Sicilian revolutionalive until the island was free, or until the diplomatic and militarysituation allowed him to fight his own battles himself. Accordingly hereplied to Bargoni that he was now willing to help Garibaldi; but that,since he believed Mazzini to be in Sicily (in this he was mistaken), someguarantee of reliability and good faith was needed. What he proposedwas that a man should be sent by the government with full powers, tobe on the spot in case of need, and he suggested that Garibaldi shouldchoose this man from a list drawn up in Turin. When notified of thisproposal, Bertani's reaction was that he could agree to no name butthat of Depretis. Garibaldi welcomed this mention of Depretis, andCavour also agreed when on 19 June Ribotti was sent to ask his consent.1

Bargoni's scheme, as it then stood, was that Garibaldi should shortlyhand over his powers of civil government to Depretis, and so put anend to the growing schism.

At this point there seemed good reason to hope for a settlement. But,though the choice of Depretis had been virtually agreed by 19 June, hewas not allowed to set out from Genoa until four weeks later on 16 July,by which time La Farina's uniquely foolish methods of conspiracy andmob agitation against Garibaldi's plans had made an agreed compromisealmost impossible. Cavour was strangely reluctant to recall La Farina.He was inevitably out of touch with Sicily, and perhaps had little choicebut to believe the reports of this his semi-official representative. Thesereports had thus spoken at length of La Farina's personal success, andhad stressed the inadvisability of sending out a new royal commissionerinstead of promoting to that office La Farina himself. Even when doubthad been thrown on the value of this information, some more dayswent by in second thoughts over who was the right man to be hissuccessor. Cavour gave orders on 7 July that if Garibaldi insisted onDepretis he should have him, but efforts were still to be made to secureacceptance of the more politically reliable Valerio. For some reason orother, Cavour was fond enough to think that Depretis of the 'constitu-

1 20 June, Bargoni from Turin to Bertani; 21 June, Bargoni to Calvino (Memoriedi Bargoni, pp. 106-19, 128).

108 Cavour Adjusts his Policy: Julytional Left' would be tolerated neither by the country nor by Europe.1

This was a narrow liberalism thus to arrogate to itself a monopoly ofrespectability and worth. It was also said that Depretis had once beena Mazzinian and still refused to renounce Mazzini explicitly in public.With rather more perception, Cavour added, 'what is more, Depretis,under an austere exterior, and despite manners which would seem toreveal a resolute character, conceals an irresolute and undecided naturethat will with difficulty resist unpopularity. He has ability, but lacksthat study of politics which makes it possible to judge the opportunenessof acts affecting international policy. '2 There was some truth in this, butnot a great deal; and such truth as there was did not tell altogetheragainst Depretis as a candidate for this particular post.

This was the moment when La Farina's expulsion upset Cavour'snice balance of policy. The prime minister's first reaction, as we haveseen, was to stop further supplies going to help the revolution. But onsecond thoughts he saw that this could gain him nothing. Accordingly,on 14 July, he at last asked Depretis to come to Turin and be coachedfor his new office. The radicals for a moment took this as their victory.Probably it was Bertani who had been responsible for the repudiationof Valerio, by describing the latter to Garibaldi as 'molto manipolabile'and 'seen to be day and night with Cavour'.3 The choice of Depretishad certainly lain primarily with the radicals, and on this very 14 Julythey also sent a separate letter to Depretis with Garibaldi's instructionsto leave at once for Sicily.4 Cavour, however, had correctly readDepretis's character, and knew that he would do nothing very readilythat was unpopular or against his own interests and career. To PersanoCavour therefore wrote that, since Depretis was 'a weak characterwho will allow himself to be easily coaxed', he might be made theinstrument for Piedmontese policy—adding that, nevertheless, heshould not be trusted too far.5 The king was then brought in to makeDepretis a royal commissioner, although this title was to be kept secretuntil it was clear that no difficulties would thereby be created with

1 12 July, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 71).2 7 July, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 295).3 2 July, Bertani to Crispi (ABCM).4 14 July, Macchi to Depretis (Archivio Depretis ASR).5 14 July, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 328).

Cavour Adjusts his Policy: July 109Garibaldi or with Europe. Thus equipped, on the 16th Depretis at lastset out.

Some of the radicals soon began to suspect that after all he might beout to betray the revolution.1 There is little doubt that he gave Cavourto understand that he would work in the interests of Turin, and he wasgiven a special cipher of the Ministry of the Interior in which to makereports.2 Almost certainly he agreed to engineer annexation as soon aspossible. La Farina wrote on 22 July that 'here everyone is anxiouslyawaiting the outcome of Depretis's mission.... If he cannot achieveanything, this would then be in all probability the signal for breakingoff relations between the king's government and Garibaldi.'3 One ofCavour's most intimate friends, Castelli, reflected the current viewwhen he wrote that 'I hope Depretis will act like a good Piedmontese,which for me is the highest praise there could possibly be'.4 Castelli'scorrespondent here was Lanza, the President of the Chamber ofDeputies at Turin, Depretis being one of its vice-presidents. We shallsee that Depretis, as a Piedmontese by birth himself, and having goodreason to ingratiate himself with Cavour, was in fact to represent Cavourin Sicily almost as accurately as La Farina himself. Yet he also had enoughsense to see that, though the best hope for Sicily lay in annexation toPiedmont, this should be carried out only in Garibaldi's good time.5

With his lifelong reluctance to hold strong views of any sort, and hisconsiderable ability in reconciliation and compromise, he should havesucceeded in this task if any man could; and if he finally failed in hisattempt to serve two masters, this was not due only to the ambiguity ofhis position and that of Cavour, but also to the fact that La Farina'sconduct had left people too much embittered for a reconciliation.

1 20 July, L1 Unita Italiana (Genoa).2 6 October, letter from the Ministry to Depretis, asking him to return at once the

chiffrant given him for his mission in Sicily (Archivio Depretis ASR).3 22 July (wrongly printed as June), La Farina to G. Giunti (Epistolario di La Farina,

ed. Franchi, p. 378). Montecchi, who was in the Ministry of the Interior, wrote on19 July to Fiorenzi of these secret undertakings, saying that 'in a few days we shallsee the result of the mission he has gone to perform' (E. Montecchi, M. Montecchi netrisorgimento Italiano, 1932, p. 153).

4 23 July, Castelli to Lanza (A. Arzano, 'II dissidio fra Garibaldi e Depretis',Memorie Storiche Militari, 1913, p. 10).

5 11 October, speech by Depretis, Atti Parlamentari.

i io Cavour Adjusts his Policy: JulyIn allowing Depretis to leave on this mission, Cavour was going part

of the way to become himself an unconcealed revolutionary. He didnot like it, but he saw no option. As he wrote to Nigra on 25 July: 'jeferai tous mes efforts pour empecher que le mouvement italien cessed'etre national pour devenir revolutionnaire. Je suis pret a tout pourobtenir ce resultat. Mais pour conserver quelque chance de succes, jene puis me mettre en lutte avec la veritable opinion publique.'1Perhaps it was some consolation that, choosing Depretis, he weakenedthe leadership of Rattazzi's group. In the same way, by absorbing asmall part of the radical programme, he could vindicate himself withpublic opinion, and also hope to weaken the parliamentary oppositionstill further. A private letter of 23 July suggests that to divide theopposition may have been specially useful to him at this moment.'Here there is a ministerial crisis', wrote De Meis the philosopher fromTurin. 'People are talking of Rattazzi; and, for my part, after themistakes made over Nice, I should see Cavour go to the devil withoutdispleasure; the necessary men in Italy now are Victor Emanuel andGaribaldi, perhaps Farini too, but no one else.'2 Rattazzi had continuedto keep up correspondence with Crispi and the Garibaldians, as they werea possible political ally for the future;3 but he was perceptive enough tosee that Cavour's instinct would sooner or later bring the governmentinto line with the great majority,4 and this took away from the oppositionany opportunity to do other than await further developments.

Rattazzi was in any case powerless, so long as parliament remainedclosed and Cavour treated the king with circumspection. Althoughrepresentations were made that at this time of all times the Chambershould be open, so that the collective wisdom and force of the nationmight be concentrated behind the government, Cavour did not wanthis hands tied. Hence 'the ministers were able to carry on as thoughthey were servants of an absolute monarch'.5 During these six months

1 25 July, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. rv, p. 107).2 23 July, De Meis to Bertrando Spaventa (Silvio Spaventa, Dal 1848 at 1861,

ed. Croce, 1923, p. 347)-3 4 July, Rattazzi to Crispi (catalogued but missing from b. 142 of Archivio Crispi

ASP).4 17 July, Rattazzi to Castelli (Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1, pp. 309-10).5 14 August, II Diritto.

Cavour Adjusts his Policy: July i nRattazzi returned to his legal practice, and the rest of his group had littleoutlet for their criticisms' but the columns of II Diritto. This Turinnewspaper repeatedly tried to throw blame on Cavour for having doneall he could or dared to oppose Garibaldi's initial expedition to Sicily,and so for flouting the will of the people. Even after the capture ofPalermo he had played an ambiguous and ineffective part in events.

In our view it should have been a question of saving appearances, but atthe same time of giving real help; whereas the government did precisely theopposite. Cavour boasted about the assistance given, and indeed was soostentatious about this that he was compromised a thousand times in theeyes of diplomacy; but he never gave as much practical help as a trulynational government ought.1

La Farina was sent to Sicily, although authoritative people advised againstthis, with the aim of opposing rather than helping Garibaldi, of sowingdoubt and discord... .But despite the continuous representations of theindependent press, the government never recalled him....

Cavour and Garibaldi may be agreed over their general aims, but thereis a wide gulf between them on the means to be used.... and it is Garibaldirather than the prime minister who at this moment represents the nation....

We do not wish to provoke a ministerial crisis. But we do want thegovernment to proceed with more spirit and more frankness; it shouldassociate itself loyally and courageously with Garibaldi (which it could dowithout any serious danger); it should show itself more independent ofFrench influence, and should have faith in the nation.2

On 24 July the Diritto came out with a leading article which surelymust have been written by Rattazzi himself, and which gives a goodsummary of the standpoint of the 'constitutional opposition*. Cavour,it was there stated, distrusted the nation, and had repeatedly violatedthe 'Italian principle', for instance by entering the Crimean War andby his cession of Nice. He was 'entirely and blindly bound to theFrench alliance', that connubiofatale, and so had become 'but an instru-ment of the Emperor's policy in Italy'. Garibaldi on the other handrepresented the national idea and believed in popular initiative. Thearticle gave a partisan but interesting portrait of Cavour.

His political education took place outside Italy. His mind is subtle, lucid,but too clever to be strong, and is lacking in that warmth which comes fromthe heart....

1 27 August, ibid. * 27 July, ibid.

112 Cap our Adjusts his Po licy: Ju lyIt is true that he possesses in a high degree the art of managing assemblies,

of catching men in the snare of political passions and individual interests;it is true that he knows how to use alternately insolence, invective, or skilfulriposte according to his particular adversary of the moment; it is also truethat he has a particular tact in handling parties, purchasing the interest of thepress, and winning elections. But all this builds up to the fact that he hasdeprived parliament of its authority. By inconsiderately abusing his majority,and by further abuse of government influence in elections, he has completelyundermined the constitution and upset the equilibrium of power.

The day that war began [in 1859] he closed parliament, having been givenabsolute powers instead of just the special authority strictly needed for thepurposes of war. After that he bartered away two provinces as if they weremerchandise, openly violating the constitution in doing so; and parliamentjust cried him hosanna.

The result is that, if you ask people what parliament is, they will reply,'an assembly of talkers which is a useful ladder for titles and jobs'; andPiedmont, which possesses in her parliament the most precious pledge forthe future of Italy, now sees it without authority, without influence amongpeople, without influence on the ministers

Cavour is highly skilled at capturing individuals, but has not the art ofbefriending the multitude, because he is despotic in his way of government,and careless of public opinion whenever it is against him.

Cavour did not have much to fear from these parliamentary deputies,for the gifts attributed to him in this article had been used to good effectin weakening their strength and composition. True enough, he was toset a fashion in 'parliamentary dictatorship' which later became a normof government in Italy; but though he himself was often dictatorial inmethod, in substance he always remained more liberal than his opponents,and they were quite wrong to think that he lightly disregarded publicopinion. On the contrary, a more apt accusation might be that, when-ever Rattazzi discovered an alternative line of policy or a point ofcriticism which found some public favour, Cavour used to incorporateit at once in his own system; so that there was seldom a strong inde-pendent opposition with a distinct programme of its own, and thereforeseldom sufficient chance of obtaining adequate publicity and debate formajor differences of principle. Even the Diritto had to agree withCavour over the value of the French alliance,1 and could find little good

1 27 May, 6 June, 18 August, ibid.

Cavour Adjusts his Policy: July 113to say of Mazzini's politics.1 A dexterous treatment since 1852 hadeffectively cut off Rattazzi and Brofferio from the radicals roundGaribaldi who still acknowledged the old democratic programme.2

Mazzini might possibly have been more of a danger to the govern-ment than was Rattazzi; but Mazzini had deliberately drawn his ownrepublican fangs, and now hoped for little more startling than thatCavour might be obliged to yield his place to that revolutionary con-servative the Baron Ricasoli.3 It was still Mazzini's intention toorganize a volunteer attack on the Papal States, and so to exposeCavour's false position between conservatives and revolutionaries, orat least to force him off the fence. But this never became much morethan an intention, and in practice the movement which Mazzini hadbegun and kept alive in the dark days was slipping ever further out ofhis control. The 'party of action' was entrenched in Palermo, but it wasdivided in itself, and had no one leader with the ability and experienceto stand up to Cavour. Once they had forced Piedmont to come half-way to meet the revolution, the chief political task of the extremeradicals was almost done.

By emulating the revolutionaries, Cavour was stooping to conquer:there was no alternative. The Neapolitan alliance, if it had ever beenmuch more than an insurance policy, was fading away in front ofGaribaldi's victories and the general reaction to them. 'What can wedo?', he demanded of Nigra in a letter of 22 July, knowing that thisexcuse would then reach Napoleon.

An alliance with Naples would now lower our king in the estimation ofItalians. From Florence and Milan people are writing to tell me that, if itis signed, serious troubles will break out in those towns If the king ofNaples had only placed himself at the head of his troops and fought boldly,we could have made some rapprochement with him, even if he had after allbeen defeated. But what can you do with a prince who inspires neitherconfidence nor esteem?4

There was nothing else that Cavour could do but accept the revolutionin part, so as to defeat the whole. His letters suggest that his main

1 28 August, ibid. 2 7 July, V Unith Italiana (Genoa).3 July, Mazzini, Epistolario, vol. XL, pp. 216-17, 2 25-4 22 July, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 93).

H4 Cap our Adjusts his Policy: Julyobject continued to be the defeat of the whole; and although in retro-spect he was glad enough incidentally to have accepted the part, at thetime he was fearful of what might befall from this, and acted withreluctance. It is true that, when writing to people in contact withGaribaldi, he dropped convenient hints of his own readiness to resignif this would help co-operation between government and revolution,1

but it is not easy to believe that any such thought seriously crossed hismind, or that he was making more than a tactful gesture. Cavour andhis party never looked kindly on the idea of compromise with therevolution, and if he yielded at all it was only so that he might conquerin the end.

Ricasoli went further, and did not cease urging on Cavour to havedone alike with Garibaldi in Sicily, with the Pope at Rome, and withthe Bourbons in Naples. Ricasoli was convinced that, although VictorEmanuel had had to accept Lombardy as the gift of Napoleon in 1859,it would be too humiliating for the monarch to accept Sicily as the giftof a mere subject.2 Here was the material for another investiture contest,over whether the king could allow himself to accept investiture for hisnew kingdom at the hands of Garibaldi. Victor Emanuel himself didnot worry much about this, for he was proud to own Garibaldi'saffection and loyalty. But many other people in the north dislikedwhat they read as a challenge to the king's prestige, and disliked it morethan they liked what the volunteers were doing for Italy—in otherwords, many, perhaps most, of the liberals put monarchy beforenational unity in their scale of political values. Some of them, indeed,in the end accepted unification only because it was a method ofrecovering royal prestige and defending the principles of socialconservation.

Cavour had not been able to frame a detailed plan of action until hecould feel the pulse of popular opinion, until he could obtain somegeneral idea of the relative strength and potential danger of the forcesat play in the revolution. By the middle of July he had some of theinformation he required, and it was becoming more clear that he couldnot afford to wait much longer for the rest. Ricasoli's threats on the one

1 23 July, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 363).2 15 July, Ricasoli to Cavour (Lettere di Ricasoli, ed. Tabarrini, vol. v, pp. 161-2);

15 July, Ricasoli to Fabrizi (ibid. pp. 159-60).

Cavour Adjusts his Policy: July 115hand were matched by threats from the radicals on the other. One ofGaribaldi's friends had seen Cavour on 19 July and put to him the directalternative, either to become liimself a revolutionary, or else to let theradical democrats carry out the revolution on their own lines.1 Thiswas clumsily stated, but there was just enough substance in the threat tofrighten all good liberals. Though the danger was an illusion, it was aneffective illusion. The few real republican leaders, Quadrio, Saffi andCampanella, were grouped near Mazzini at Genoa. Bertani was nowworking more closely with Mazzini, and was preparing an attackagainst the Papal States based on Tuscany.2 Others of the near-republicans and federalists were congregating in Sicily, where Garibaldiwas dangerously uncontrollable. The longer they were left alone withoutany competition from a liberal policy of action, the more likely theywould be to retain the favour of public opinion.

Cavour's slender hold on Garibaldi so far had mainly depended onthe latter's known loyalty to the king; but unfortunately this bondbetween sovereign and subject could only be kept in repair at a certainprice, by unintentionally confirming the revolutionaries in their beliefthat Victor Emanuel might be at heart on their side. This belief hademboldened them to think that, despite the policy of his government,the king personally wished them to advance on Rome. Judging by whatevidence we have, the king did want them to continue their advance,and apparently his aide-de-camp Marquis Trecchi took them privatemessages of encouragement. If this was not his plan, he would surelyhave given Garibaldi a specific order not to raise the Roman question,or at least not to raise it until France was appeased; and there can belittle doubt that such an order would have been obeyed, howeverreluctantly. That Cavour apparently did not ask the king to do so,probably indicates once again that he was not certain of his master, andalso that Victor Emanuel would not commit himself to his ministers'policy about Rome until he was quite sure Garibaldi could not succeed.Cavour cannot be blamed for this ambiguity in his government'spolicy; but historians must also be chary of blaming Garibaldi if,

1 21 July, La Masa from Turin to Garibaldi (G. La Masa, Alcuni fatti e documentidelta rivoluzione dell* Italia meridionale, 1861, p. 196).

2 23 July, Farini to Ricasoli (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani; volumeto be published).

8-2

116 Cavour Adjusts his Policy: Julybecause of that ambiguity, he continued to increase the pressure stillfurther.

By the time of the battle of Milazzo on 20 July Garibaldi was burstingwith confidence, and this victory then opened up to him the vision ofa completely united Italy, with himself offering the king his new crownin the city of Rome itself. The result was that he now appeared toCavour as being far from just a quaint adventurer whose deeds mightbe exploited profitably at a suitable moment; he was a positive andimmediate danger to the whole idea of solving the Italian question bydiplomatic means and the French alliance. The threat of republicanismmay have been deliberately exaggerated, but the liberal leader certainlysaw embodied in Garibaldi what Omodeo has called ' the dissolution ofhis own conception of the State'.1 Hence Cavour's eagerness to halt thevolunteers in Sicily and sweep Garibaldianism from the south. Hencehis and Farini's apparent annoyance when the Bourbon army provedunable to defeat Garibaldi or keep him out of Messina. During at leastone stage in his conversion to revolutionism, Cavour almost seemed tobe on the wrong side of the civil war.

1 A. Omodeo, * Cavour e Y impresa Garibaldina', Leonardo, May 1929, p. 126.

117

CHAPTER IX

DEPRETIS BEGINS HISPRODICTATORSHIP: JULY

The expulsion of La Farina had come as a sharp shock to Cavour inTurin. It had also of course upset the party in Sicily which had beenorganized to campaign for immediate annexation. Many of themoderates, including people who knew La Farina to be unpopular andthought he should have returned home earlier on his own or on Cavour'sinitiative, still regretted the arrest and ignominious banishment of aSicilian patriot.1 Nevertheless, even among those who disliked whathad happened, the matter was passed over in silence, and there wasapparently no disturbance to public quiet or to Garibaldi's prestige.2Most people in Sicily were probably content to believe that thedictator had good reasons for what he had done, and were glad that thenational party in Sicily would no longer be so publicly riven in twofactions.3 Some days afterwards Garibaldi changed the composition ofhis ministry, but the inclusion of moderate 'Cavourians' like ProfessorAmari testified to the continuity and essential moderation of the dictator'spolicy.

Evidently La Farina had exaggerated in report as well as exacerbatedin person the political divisions which he had found in Palermo. On hisreturn to the north he published a statement to the effect that threehundred townships in Sicily had sent in petitions for prompt annexation;yet only a handful of these petitions have so far been traced.4 Annoyedthough Garibaldi must have been by the evidence of La Farina'sintrigues, he did not let this annoyance deflect him from the moderate

1 12 July, G. Fiorenza from Palermo to Ricasoli (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobiliand Camerani).

2 29 July, La Nazione (Florence), report from Palermo dated 24 July.3 12 July, La Forbice (Palermo).4 F. Guardione found only three in the Archivio di Stato at Palermo, La Sicilia

nella rigenerazione politica d' Italia iyg8-i86o, 1912, p. 600, commenting on La Farina'sstatement in II Piccolo Corriere d* Italia for 22 July.

118 Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: Julyprogramme which Crispi had outlined in May and June. On 14 Julyprovincial governors were informed that 'the programme of thedictator's government is this: slow, gradual annexation, according asthe opportunities become more or less easy; and in the meantime a defacto assimilation of Sicilian administration to the governmental systemof Piedmont'.1 Notwithstanding anything La Farina told Cavour, thiswas no new policy, but something quite explicit in Garibaldi's adminis-trative actions from the very first, and the arrival of neither La Farinanor Depretis was to make any difference in this respect. From first tolast Garibaldi stood for assimilation of the south by the north, and theonly difference made upon him by La Farina's plotting was that he wasnow forewarned and forearmed against Cavour's duplicity. Garibaldi'spolicy is often accused of being immoderate and irresponsibly whimsical,and it is therefore the more important to note that it remained moderateand constant despite all this subversive conspiracy. It was Cavour'spolicy, not Garibaldi's, which was suddenly changed into somethingintemperate and uncompromising by La Farina's conduct.

Depretis arrived in Sicily on 21 July. The common opinion, said theBritish consul, was that he came as ' a Piedmontese who will representthe Sardinian Government';2 but his arrival by mail boat, and not bywarship like La Farina, was typical of his lesser degree of ostentation,and his determination that unlike his predecessor he would representand reconcile both sides of the political conflict. The chief 'annexa-tionist' paper greeted him on the day he landed with a frank approvalof the dictator's policy of delay. Garibaldi, so this journal now asserted,should for the time being keep Sicily clear from association with theTurin government, for in this way he would remain free from anydiplomatic pressure which could be brought to bear on Sicily throughPiedmont. The annexation of the island would also make the invasionof Naples more difficult; for it was important that Naples should seemto fall before a popular revolution by the irresponsible volunteers, andnot before a 'conquest' by Piedmont which could be resented by therest of Europe as an imposition from without.3 The general feeling in

1 14 July, La Porta the minister of public security to the governor of Messina atBarcelona, on note-paper headed 'Gabinetto Segreto', in the file registered as 'Attivari sulla rivoluzione del 1860' (Archivio di Stato Messina).

2 18 July (Goodwin's Political Journal, F.O. 165/134). 3 21 July, L' Annessione.

Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: July 119Palermo was against any further agitation of the people for politicalends. It was confidently expected that the various parties would cometogether again in common agreement, and that Depretis would quietlycarry through the annexation by plebiscite as soon as Garibaldi crossedover to the continent. Meanwhile, the weapon of mob demonstrationswas held in reserve, if need be 'for use at a more opportune moment'.1

Depretis's presence was a sedative and a reassurance to people. Hearrived as the official bearer of'instructions' from the king to Garibaldi.2

Going up at once to the front line, he scored an early success by beinggiven the official title of'prodictator' and the concession of'absolutepowers'. This confirmed his joint allegiance and responsibility to bothGaribaldi and Cavour, and seemed to bring with it the promise of moreharmonious relations. Admiral Persano rejoiced at this formal appoint-ment, for he feared that there had been a move among the radicals toclip Depretis's wings, and Garibaldi was thus giving one more indica-tion that concord and impartiality took precedence in his mind overa radical policy.3 The Piedmontese consul also reported back approvinglyon the new prodictator's reception and his conduct.4 On 27 JulyPersano wrote to Cavour:

Depretis has shown himself at once firm and gentle; he is certainly mostable; he works calmly and yet with perfect determination; he will shortlybe promulgating many of our Piedmontese laws; he is both honest and loyal,and hence it was not hard for me to make him devoted to you; he tells mehe has admired you for a long time. I had hardly met Depretis before, butI am coming to admire him more every day.5

Not only among the moderates, but among the radicals too there wasscarcely yet a dissenting voice on the merits of the prodictator. 'Letthem do their worst, these La Farinians and separatists and Bourbonists,'

1 17 July, Fiorenza to Ricasoli (BR ASF, busta N, fascicolo E).2 16 July, Cavour telegram to Persano (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. in,

p. 292).3 22 July, Persano, Diario 1860-1, part 1, p. 82.4 24 July, consular report to Turin, quoted in Michele Rosi, II risorgimento italiano

e V azione df un patriota, 1906, p. 199.5 27 July, Persano to Cavour (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. m, p. 304); but in

the national edition of Cavour's letters this passage is not included, and perhaps it isone of Persano's (not altogether disinterested) later fabrications.

120 Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: Julywrote Calvino, 'for Depretis is the man to put them in their place onceand for all.'1 More to the centre of Sicilian politics, Amari, now aminister, wrote to his cousin on 26 July:

Depretis will succeed to perfection in tranquillizing people about thepolitical direction to be followed, and will do a great deal to reconstitute thepublic administration after its complete disorganization. I like him verymuch. On the few occasions we have met so far in council meetings he hasshown not less skill than firmness, as well as knowledge of administrativepractice and political penetration He is the best of guarantees that thingswill now go well.2

Depretis's treatment of the radicals was especially tactful. One of hisfirst actions was to ask Mordini to write and ask Bargoni to come ashis personal secretary.3 Bargoni was one of those working with thatcommittee for aid to Sicily which Bertani had set up to supply thedeficiencies of La Farina's Societa Nazionale; but he was a moderate man,and it had first been his idea to negotiate with Cavour for sending outthe new prodictator to Sicily as a man respected and trusted by bothsides. Even more than by this appointment, the radicals were con-vinced of the good intentions of Depretis by his confirmation of Crispias a minister once more. For Depretis saw in Crispi an expert onSicilian affairs, who was the friend of Garibaldi and the man who hadbuilt up the revolutionary government. Crispi for his part had at thisstage little suspicion that Depretis might in the end turn out to be moreof a partisan than a moderator. Both were at one for the moment,wanting annexation, but only when this would not be a tie on Garibaldi.Amari, it is true, believed that Crispi must have been put on the pro-dictator as a sort of watchman or supervisor, and was bewildered tofind no hint that Depretis might be only feigning confidence in him.It seems, nevertheless, that there existed complete confidence betweenthe two. After the first week Crispi even took this confidence to thepoint of addressing to Garibaldi a request that he might be allowedto rejoin the army, explaining that Depretis was by that time quite

1 31 July, Calvino to Bargoni (Rosi, L* azione <T un patriota, p. 199).2 26 July, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,

vol. 11, pp. 107-8).3 25 July, Mordini to Bargoni (MRR 221/6/2).

Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: July 121familiar with his duties and did not need him further.1 The request wasnot granted, for Crispi was still required at Palermo.

It is likely that Crispi had returned somewhat to public favour, andthat, however much La Farina's friends continued to dislike him, thethree weeks of his absence from the government had impressed peoplewith the value of his energy and single-mindedness. On his return tothe Home Office, an immediate improvement was noticed in thepreservation of law and order, at least by radical sympathizers.2 Thesensible and moderate Amari was suspicious of Crispi as a colleague,but remained personally on good terms with him, and made the shrewdcomment that 'he shows intelligence and integrity in business when-ever it has nothing to do with either his friends or his enemies'.3Calvino, who until lately had always cut Crispi even if they met in thehouse of a common friend, was now reconciled to him owing to his'great services, and the abnegation with which he has served the causeof Italian unity'.4 Another person to speak well of Crispi, despite astrong personal dislike, was Count Litta, when he came to Sicily ona mission from the king. Litta entered in his diary for 31 July thatDepretis, 'when asked about Crispi, answered me plainly that he wasquite satisfactory, adding that he would even follow out our ideas aboutimmediate annexation...; and also that we ought to use him becauseof his large following in Sicily, and because he had distinguished him-self on every occasion and shown himself a valiant soldier in the battlesof Calatafimi and Palermo'.5 It was hardly likely that a man likeFrancesco Crispi, with such a temperament, and such a desire to com-mand, after having waited twelve years for this moment, would longremain idle and out of office.

When Depretis arrived in Sicily, Garibaldi had just won his decisivebattle at Milazzo on 20 July. This brought the volunteers right up to the

1 26 July, Crispi to Garibaldi {Memoirs, vol. i, p. 346).2 15 August, II Diritto, report dated Palermo 10 August.3 3 August, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,

vol. n, p. 114).4 9 July, Calvino to Bargoni (Memorie di Bargoni, pp. 130-1); also 25 June, V. Cor-

dova to Crispi: 'for my part I am convinced that the revolution must be com-pleted by none other than yourself who initiated it' (ACP, f. 138).

531 July, Guerrini, 'La missione del conte Litta', II Risorgimento Italiano, February1909, p. 26.

122 Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: JulyStraits of Messina, and so raised the question of how soon they wouldbe able to cross to the mainland. The dictator was at his most hopeful.So many apparently insuperable difficulties had already been overcomethat he refused to flinch before all the political and diplomatic complica-tions which threatened. His mind was as usual preoccupied by militarymatters, and with some justification he reduced these complications toa mere question of power. If his forces proved sufficient, then advancewould be easy; if not, not. It was as simple as that. Not even La Farina'sexposure had completely destroyed his faith that co-operation withTurin would prove possible, for he believed he would succeed and thatsuccess would have to be condoned and exploited by the king's govern-ment. He had written on the 13 th to Victor Emanuel, promising to tellhim in advance when he felt able to cross the Straits. He franklyacknowledged in this letter that he appreciated the difficulty aboutRome, protected as it was by the French; and he explained to the kingthat, while still preparing a movement in the Papal States, he wasrecommending no precipitate action there. He further requested VictorEmanuel to look into rumours that the Piedmontese government wasstarting a separate movement in Naples, because he was not ready for it.Such a movement might well be used to spoil the radical plan of action,and he feared that he would be forced to launch a hurried invasion atthe first sign of any insurrection on the mainland.1 This indicates that hewas by no means unaware even at this early date of Cavour's tentativecounter scheme to forestall him at Naples. Several days later he wroteto Persano with a demarche towards Cavour, for whose eyes it wasintended: 'we are all working together to make Italy under our ReGalantuomo. As we have the same aim, I hope we shall easily under-stand one another.'2 Coming only a week after La Farina's expulsion,this was magnanimous, and also optimistic. Garibaldi seems to havebeen genuinely convinced at this point that Cavour as well as the kingmight come in with him, and one may guess that Persano's play-actingwas chiefly responsible for this. The admiral's most notable qualities ina long and inglorious career seem to have been a skill in flattery, anda penchant for taking imaginative liberties with the truth; and atPalermo he used both assiduously to allay Garibaldi's suspicions. This

1 13 July, Garibaldi to Victor Emanuel (Bollea, Una silloge di letterey p. 282).2 16 July, Garibaldi to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 344).

Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: July 123helped to keep the dictator in a good temper, but there is little doubtthat it also helped, against all Cavour's wishes, to confirm the radicalsin their intention to march on Rome.

It was now becoming an important question whether Garibaldi'sadvance could be stopped in Sicily. A month earlier, before Cavourhad properly thought out his policy, he had been hoping that therevolutionary army would cross the Straits. At least he said as much,and perhaps he genuinely supposed that the volunteers would wear outtheir strength and reputation in Naples and let Sicily be quietly annexedbehind them.1 Before the middle of July he was of a different mind, forthe revolution was proving more dangerous and uncontrollable thanhe had thought. Persano now received a change in orders: 'our policymust be to prevent Garibaldi at all costs from passing over to thecontinent, and at the same time we must work up a movement inNaples ourselves'.2 Cavour was here aiming to do precisely the twothings which Garibaldi most feared. Despite outward protestations,a first attempt was now made from Turin to stop further reinforcementsbeing recruited to join the volunteers in Sicily. Persano was privatelycommanded to encourage Piedmontese naval officers to desert semi-officially to Garibaldi's fleet, so that they would be at hand to mutinyif and when Cavour decided he was strong enough to bring his rivalpolicy out into the open. The admiral was also instructed not to giveeven indirect assistance to Garibaldi, but to keep his ships well awayfrom any fighting.3 Once the volunteers had cleared the last Bourbongarrisons out of Sicily, their usefulness would cease as far as Cavour couldsee. Much better that they should not go on towards Naples at all,because their further success might be more disastrous even than theirdefeat. 'La position est bien compliquee', Cavour told his minister atNaples, Villamarina. 'Nous ne pouvons guere desirer que Garibaldipasse a Naples, car il est si mal entoure, tellement enivre de ses succes,qu'il porterait avec lui le desordre et l'anarchie. Une fois a Naples ilvoudrait aller a Rome malgre les Fran^ais, ce qui serait la ruine de notre

1 19 June, Cavour to La Farina (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. in, p. 266);Farini, the minister of the interior, thought likewise, see L. Rava, in Nuova Antologia,f. 939, 1 February 1911, p. 554.

2 14 July, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 329).3 23 July, Cavour to Persano (ibid. p. 363).

124 Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: Julycause.' It was explained that the new liberal constitution published bythe Bourbons at Naples had changed everything: for, with even avaguely liberal government at Naples, either a Garibaldian or aCavourian putsch there would seem morally wrong, and unless welldisguised would have a very bad effect on liberal opinion in Europe.1

Cavour was already beginning preparations in case he might have toattempt a putsch of his own against the Bourbon government; but thiswas under duress, as a last defence against Garibaldi setting off a train ofexplosions on the mainland. His motives were not strictly those of anunalterably convinced 'Unitarian', but rather those of a liberal con-servative who still would prefer the Bourbons at Naples if Garibaldi wasthe alternative.

The dictator and his friends were not to know that Cavour waswriting in this sense, but the less charitable among them might haveguessed it, and the entertainment of the Neapolitan plenipotentiaries atTurin cannot have inspired them with much confidence. Private letterswere arriving in Sicily from Turin which conveyed the impression thatin actual alliance with Naples was about to be signed at any moment,and the danger that such a pact might be made must surely have weighedwith the dictator as he planned his future policy.2 Again there wereother rumours that Cavour was himself thinking about plans for acounter-revolution at Naples, directed as much against Garibaldi asagainst Francesco. Probably Cavour was for some time undecidedwhich of these alternative policies would better fit the situation, butboth of them were directed against Garibaldi.

On 22 July news reached Turin about the battle of Milazzo. Cavourwas warned that the last Bourbon garrison in Sicily might have to

1 20 July, Cavour to Villamarina (ibid. p. 354); 24 July, Cavour to Villamarina:'permettez moi de croire que de Turin on juge plus sainement la position que deNaples. Il est hautement a. desirer que la delivrance de Naples ne soit pas due aGaribaldi, car si cela arrive le systeme revolutionnaire prendra la place du partinationale monarchique' (ibid. pp. 383-4); 23 July, Lord John Russell to Elliot, withorders to tell Garibaldi that 'he ought to be content with the whole of Sicily and notstir any further the fire of Italian insurrection* (RP G.D. 22/111).

2 18 July, G. La Cecilia from Turin to Garibaldi (ACM, no. 1048); 27 July, Frapollifrom Turin to Depretis, saying that though the government now seemed to be infavour of national unification, it was slow and inefficient in action, always unprepared,and was more than ever the slave of Napoleon (Archivio Depretis ASR).

Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: July 125surrender, and that insurrections were already breaking out on themainland. He now had to confess that a Neapolitan alliance was quiteunrealistic. When the French proposed to him that they should makea joint guarantee for a six months' truce in Sicily, he had to reply that,however good the idea in theory, there seemed little possibility of nowbeing able to control the volunteers.1 Public opinion would not havestood for Cavour joining a foreign power to use force against them.He would have to try other methods, even though with small hope ofsuccess. So, later on the 22nd, the cabinet officially requested the kingto write a direct letter to try and dissuade Garibaldi from crossing theStraits, provided at any rate that Francesco recognized the right ofSicily to determine its own future.2 At the very best this might havethe double result of winning Sicily for Piedmont, as well as haltingGaribaldi short of Naples. Cavour suspected that such a letter wouldarrive too late to have much effect on the dictator, but at the very leastit would act as a formal satisfaction to diplomatic convention, and asa reassurance to those who suspected Piedmont of fishing in troubledwaters.3 The king's letter, written on advice from the cabinet, was dulycarried to Sicily by his orderly, Count Litta, who sailed on the 23 rd andeventually encountered Garibaldi on the 27th.

There is some obscurity about this mission of Litta and the exactmessages he took with him. Several versions exist of the king's officialletter, and five different versions of Garibaldi's reply, though Curatulocould find no signed original of either. The generally accepted text ofVictor Emanuel's letter mentioned his disapproval of Garibaldi'soriginal expedition, and advised that this civil war between Naples andSicily should now stop.4 But a second and more informal letter in theking's own handwriting came to light many years later in 1909, longafter Garibaldi and other witnesses who could have confirmed it weredead. This second letter purported to contradict the first, and to giveGaribaldi the king's permission to disobey his official communication.

1 23 July, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 100); 24 July, Cavourto Talleyrand (ibid. p. 103).

2 22 July,' Verbali del Consiglio dei Ministri', E. Artom, L' opera politica del SenatoreI. Artom nel risorgimento italiano, 1906, p. 277.

3 22 July, Cavour to E. d'Azeglio (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, p. 102).4 22 July, Victor Emanuel to Garibaldi (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 98).

126 Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: JulyIf genuine it was entirely contrary to the cabinet's positive decision andadvice—and surely there would have been no reason for falsification ina secret cabinet minute. It is not printed with the king's first messagein the national edition of Cavour's letters. Neither Garibaldi norCavour ever made mention of having seen or heard of a second message,and Garibaldi on the contrary often repeated that the Turin governmenthad tried to stop him crossing to Naples.1 Omodeo thinks Cavour can-not have known of it. The king did not say a word to Ricasoli whenthey met at the end of July, though Ricasoli was loud in his protests atthe king's public behaviour, and it would have been easy and effectivefor the king to have dropped him a hint. None of the friends whosurrounded either dictator or king ever referred to its existence. No onehas yet explained these extraordinary facts. Nor has it been explainedwhy this mysterious letter should not have been published after i860as a reply to Garibaldi's accusations of governmental obstruction; norwhy its advice, if genuinely intended, could not have been morejudiciously given by word of mouth; nor, indeed, why it should havebeen found among Litta's papers rather than Garibaldi's or the king's,and with its seal unbroken.2 It has been suggested that it may representthe private policy of the king which he tried to undertake without theknowledge of the cabinet.3 The king certainly wrote this second letterand gave it to Litta at some stage, but the evidence suggests it was notdelivered. One explanation which fits many of the facts is probablytoo far-fetched to be credible, that it was written for the purpose oflater justification, but then buried as too compromising. Its content wassensible enough. Possibly the king had instructed his private orderly tosound Garibaldi first, giving him the official letter as the cabinet hadasked, but if he found the dictator bent on further conquest he was tohint that success would be condoned. It would have been absurd toprotest at something which could not be helped, and dangerous to

1 E.g. 28 August 1869, II Movimento (Genoa), letter of Garibaldi to Barrili dated24 August 1869.

2 D. Guerrini, 'La missione del conte Litta', II Risorgimento Italiano, February 1909,p. 24; Curatulo's reply, ibid. August 1909, pp. 652-9; Curatulo, Garibaldi, VittorioEmanueky Cavour, pp. 150-4.

3 G. Manacorda, in Nuova Antologia, 1 June 1910, p. 408; A. Omodeo, 'Cavoure T impresa Garibaldina', Leonardo, May 1929, p. 126.

Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: July 127announce publicly a breach with Garibaldi until either public opinionwould sanction such a move, or at the very least until there was some-thing to be gained by it and his further progress could thereby bestopped.

As for Cavour, despite all the legends conveniently built up roundthis second letter, we know that he did not want Garibaldi to cross theStraits, but hoped that the moderate liberals could if necessary takecharge of anything that was to happen in Naples. The difficulty of hisposition was that Garibaldi could hardly be induced to desist unless theking gave him a formal and definite order to halt, or unless there wereevidence that the liberals would actively take over and carry forwardthe revolution. For the present moment, therefore, nothing muchcould be done without danger, and so governmental policy still had tobe one of watchful waiting. In the meantime the king's official andpublished letter could at least be used to show Europe that the respon-sibility for any invasion of Naples lay solely with Garibaldi: it wouldthus act as an insurance, either in case Garibaldi were defeated, or incase Piedmont had finally to intervene against him in the interests ofEuropean peace and Napoleon's commitments to the Pope. As forCavour's attitude to the problematic second letter, we must be readyto accept a number of interpretations. Perhaps the letter was notsent at all; perhaps it represents the private policy of the kingunknown to his ministers; perhaps, as on other occasions, Cavourknew about what the king was doing but pretended not to know. Onthe most favourable interpretation it was Cavour's project all along;but if so, it was designed only to 'legalize', and to claim some creditfor, an action which he regretted but was powerless to stop. Thosehistorians can hardly be correct who say that Cavour was secretlyurging Garibaldi to advance,1 for there is too much other evidence tothe contrary.

Cavour was reluctant to take direct responsibility when matters werein so much doubt, and when several lines of retreat could more profitablybe left open in each direction. Faced by a difficult choice, he was oncemore obliged to let Garibaldi take the initiative, confining himself toan attitude of discouragement, but being as far as possible ready and

1 G. M. Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, 1911, p. 101; I. Nazari-Micheli, Cavour e Garibaldi nel i860, 1911, pp. 145—7.

128 Depretis Begins his Prodictatorship: Julyfree to act in whatever way circumstances might dictate. It was aperfectly justifiable policy in the circumstances, to let Garibaldi take thekicks, but to try and make him hand over any halfpence that mightaccrue. Meanwhile, Depretis could be relied upon in Sicily to try andkeep up for a little longer the appearance that all the patriots, of what-ever political colour, were working together in amity.

129

CHAPTER X

CAVOUR PLANS A REVOLTAT NAPLES: JULY

Cavour was never again to be so passive as he had been when theThousand first set out. Thereafter, however much he may have been onoccasion playing second fiddle to Garibaldi, he always had, if not apositive policy, at least some hypotheses for a policy. The chief difficultyis to disentangle these various hypotheses; for Cavour instinctively triedto keep his freedom of manoeuvre so as to be prepared for any even-tuality. He had to be ready to accept Garibaldi's success, but also todisown his failure; to accept annexation of the south, but also to scoreany point against what were called—still with a pejorative connotation—the italianissimi.

Throughout June and July his main object was to see that the Sicilianrevolution avoided the two extremes of failure or overmuch success;and on occasion he was able to contribute materially towards preservingthis nice balance. But it was a delicate and dangerous task. Garibaldi'sfailure would not have been an unmitigated disaster, for it would havearrested the revolution, and given Cavour the several years he soughtto consolidate the existing kingdom of northern Italy. Yet publicopinion in Italy would not lightly have forgiven Cavour for allowingits hero to perish, and he would have hopelessly alienated the radicalelement in Italian politics which he relied on being alternately hisstalking-horse, his scapegoat, and the combustible tinder and ignitionspark needed for the next insurrection. On the other hand, Garibaldi'ssuccess beyond a certain point would have meant handing over theItalian movement to the hotheads, and perhaps thereby causing itscollapse; the European Powers would possibly have intervened againstit, and Cavour might have been swept out of power before he had beenable to shore up some defence against internal and external onslaught.

It was not the danger of Garibaldi's defeat, but the danger that hemight win too fast and too completely, which forced Cavour to intervenemore directly at the end of July. All over the country people were

130 Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: Julylooking to the king's government for some bold decision, especially asthe winding up of the Sicilian campaign brought on as an urgent matterthe question of Naples. Some of the liberal-conservatives at Naples hadbeen astonished at the cowardly or underhand appearance so far givenby Piedmontese policy. 'I wish Victor Emanuel would throw off themask like a man and go to war honestly,' wrote the British minister,'instead of putting on an innocent look and sitting like a receiver ofstolen goods opening his pockets to any plunder his children may bringto him.'1 Correspondents in Naples and Rome had begun to warnCavour that he was being dwarfed by the revolution, and were begginghim to do something about it.2 Ricasoli at Florence expressed himselfdeeply humiliated over the king's official letter advising Garibaldi tostay in Sicily, for the king thereby put himself in the wrong withnational sentiment at the same time as he knew his advice would beflouted, and this could only have the effect of bringing the monarchyinto ridicule and public contempt. Ricasoli threatened to resign if theking did not resume command of the national movement, and heconjured Cavour to 'expose us if you like to war with one or eventhree powers, but save us from Garibaldian anarchy'.3 Another govern-ment official, Lorenzo Valerio, wrote from Lombardy in a similar vein:' Cavour and Farini have allowed themselves to be overwhelmed, andit is no longer they who govern. This has inflicted a severe wound onour constitutional regime. God help us.'4 In Piedmont, the'Speaker*of the Chamber of Deputies could not understand this lack of courage,and thought that the government could at least have made up its mindeither to oppose or to help Garibaldi, instead of wavering in the middle.'The direction of the Italian movement is no longer in the hands of the

1 25 June, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66); 10 July: 'an underhand intrigue farsurpassing anything that could be alleged against the Austrians' (G.D. 22/85).

2 E.g. 24 July, Pantaleoni from Rome to Cavour (CC La Qnestione Romana neglianni 1860-1861, 1929, p. 31); cf. Marc Monnier at Naples on 24 July: 'la diplomatic,M. de Cavour, Vittorio Emanuele, n'ont pas Fair de s'entendre et agissent separement.Il n'y a dans tout ceci qu'un homme logique, immuable, inflexible, qui marche droitdevant lui—c'est Garibaldi qui prendra Naples'. Garibaldi, histoire de la conquete desdeux Sidles, 1861, p. 195.

3 2 and 3 August, Ricasoli to Cavour (Lettere di Ricasoli, ed. Tabarrini, vol. v,pp. 176, 180).

4 29 July, Valerio to Castelli (Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1, p. 310).

Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: July 131government', he bewailed, 'but has passed into the hands of therepublicans; and if the government cannot reassert itself they will dragus along behind them.'1 Another of Cavour's friends, Sir James Hudsonat Turin, feared that, if Cavour did not yield to the radical pressure andfight against Naples, then 'half the king of Sardinia's army will desertin order to join Garibaldi'.2 Instead of having been secretly maturingsome fine coup de theatre, Cavour in appearance was just letting mattersslide. 'My belief is that he has no plan. He is a waiter upon Providenceand the chapter of accidents.' Hudson also envisaged, however, that asGaribaldi threatened to take the revolution into Naples, Cavour wouldin the end be forced despite himself to outdo Mazzini and 'seek theannexation of the rotten body of Naples to the vigorous North Italy'.3

The disease would thus bring about its own remedy.Cavour was never very far behind such a widespread display of

opinion, and from a letter written to his London ambassador on 25 Julywe can tell that by that time he had reached certain interim conclusionsabout the new situation in the south. In the first place, it was no longerlikely that he could ever sign any alliance with the Naples government,for he was now assured that public opinion would in that event turnhim out of office. In the second place, the cowardly surrender ofMessina finally proved that the Bourbons had lost all dignity and powerof resistance, so much so that it was hardly possible for the govern-ments of either Naples or Piedmont to stop Garibaldi's advance intoCalabria. Cavour had been informed by his minister at Naples that theBourbon regime was disintegrating. As a result, he now concluded thatthe best hope of controlling and profiting from the revolution was him-self to adopt and exploit the concept of Italian unity which peopleapparently found so fascinating.4

This left Cavour the problem of how he could remain friendly withthe Bourbons at the same time as he planned their destruction, and alsothe problem of how he could retain the semblance of friendship forGaribaldi while he proceeded to steal the revolutionary thunder.

1 1 August, Lanza to Cadorna (Le carte di Giovanni Lanza, ed. De Vecchi di ValCismon, vol. 11, 1936, p. 169).

2 31 July, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).3 27 July, Hudson to Russell (ibid.).4 25 July, Cavour to E. d'Azeglio (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, pp. 108-9).

9-2

132 Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: JulyInevitably he had to continue to try and maintain for as long as possiblehis many-faced attitude to events in the south. Thus to Persano, who wasa link with Garibaldi and had retained some of the dictator's confidence,he wrote that the volunteers must be congratulated on their 'splendidvictory', and that the national movement could no longer be haltedhalf-way, but that the Piedmontese forces must themselves carry it oninto Venice. On the very same day, 28 July, he wrote in a differentvein to his minister at Naples. Villamarina was told that the prospectof Garibaldi's further success was 'facheux, tres facheux; mais il fautsavoir se resigner a ce qui est inevitable. Garibaldi a Naples est maitrede la situation. Il ne trahira pas le Roi, mais il lui imposera sa politique,et sa politique n'admet pas de transaction. Il faut par consequent sepreparer a la guerre avec l'Autriche dans un avenir peu eloigne. Pourma part, j 'y suis tout resigne.' The volunteers were a nuisance, but afterMilazzo there was no stopping them, and there was one great compen-sation: 'le courage deploye par les volontaires est d'un effet moralexcellent, il prouve a l'Europe que les Italiens se battent et se battentbien'.1 To a third correspondent, his minister at Paris who usuallyreceived the largest share of his confidence, Cavour wrote stressingthose aspects of the situation which were calculated to carry most weightwith Louis Napoleon:

Si Garibaldi passe sur le continent et s'empare du Royaume de Naples...il devient maitre absolu de la situation. Le Roi Victor Emanuel perd a peupres tout son prestige; il n'est plus aux yeux de la grande majorite des Italiensque l'ami de Garibaldi. Il conservera probablement sa couronne, mais cettecouronne ne brillera plus que par le reflet de la lumiere qu'un aventurierheroi'que jugera bon de jeter sur elle....

Garibaldi..., disposant des ressources d'un royaume de 9,000,000 d'habi-tants, entoure d'un prestige populaire irresistible, nous ne pourrons paslutter avec lui. Il sera plus fort que nous.... Le Roi ne peut tenir la couronned'ltalie des mains de Garibaldi: elle chancellerait trop sur sa tete. Pourraffermir son trone il devrait monter a cheval et chercher a faire oublier aucentre du fameux quadrilatere les aventures de la Sicile. La prise de Veroneet de Venise feront oublier Palerme et Milazzo....

Elle est inevitable si Ton veut sauver le principe monarchique. Pour unPrince de la Maison de Savoie mieux vaut perir par la guerre, que par la

1 28 July, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, pp. 400-1); 28 July,Cavour to Persano {ibid. p. 401).

Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: July 133revolution. Une dynastie peut se relever si elle tombe sur un champ debataille, son sort est scelle a jamais si on la traine dans un ruisseau.1

If Cavour's opponents had known what he was writing here, theywould have called this just one more proof that, though he was anationalist after a sort, he yet put the interests of the dynasty beforethose of the nation.

Cavour was no better informed about affairs in Naples than he hadbeen about Sicily, and until the second half of July he had to rely on thereports of his not very competent minister there, bolstered up by thecurrent gossip among the Neapolitan exiles at Turin. It is instructiveto note that L' Opinione, the newspaper which carried his officiallyinspired pronouncements, had no regular correspondence at all fromsouthern Italy, but concentrated its news services on Paris and theAustrian frontier where Cavour's chief interest lay. This helps to explainwhy he had to formulate his Neapolitan policy on evidence which wasinsufficient in quality and quantity. From the information at hisdisposal, he had at first hoped that terror of Garibaldi would bring theBourbons into an alliance with Piedmont against Austria and the Pope;for though Louis Napoleon had not put up much opposition againstPiedmont's having Sicily, there were political, dynastic and religiousreasons why France should want to preserve an independent Naples.Cavour's negotiations for an alliance with Naples in the middle of Julyhave already been described. But Garibaldi's victories and Italian publicopinion very soon ruled out the possibility of any such alliance, and bythat time Cavour was ready with an alternative and far bolder policy.The Marquis de Villamarina had sent more than one report to say thatNeapolitans had no other wish than for annexation to Piedmont. Solimited was Villamarina in his sources of information and knowledge ofhuman nature, that he had even expected a rebellion with this object tobreak out in Naples by the end of July.2 In consequence, Cavour cameto imagine that his best policy now might be to anticipate Garibaldi bya liberal rising on the mainland.

Since Villamarina continued to be so confident about the generalfeeling for annexation at Naples, Cavour, who had no personal know-ledge at all of Naples and little enough of Neapolitans, had to believe

1 1 August, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, pp. 122-3).3 9 July, Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 311).

134 Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: Julyhim. Massimo d' Azeglio knew better from personal experience. It wasnonsense, said d'Azeglio, to think that more than one in twentyNeapolitans really wanted annexation, and this being so it would be alabour of Hercules for Piedmont to try and clean out that particularstable.1 There were others who agreed with this former prime ministerthat the rest of Italy was not ripe for such a union. 'Naples', wroteCasalis, 'is considered a country which, because of the number of itsinhabitants, their corruption, ignorance and lack of national spirit,especially among the masses, will present great and almost insuperabledifficulties for the country which tries to absorb it.'2 This was themisfortune of Naples, to be regarded either with thoughtless contemptor thoughtless over-confidence; and, as a result of this mistake, thepolicy of northerners towards the south was put on a wrong footingfrom the start.

If Villamarina had looked further into people's motives, he mighthave perceived that with many Neapolitans the desire for annexationwas more apparent than real. All too often it was a projection of thefear that Garibaldi would arrive first and instigate a civil and social warfrom which they were bound to suffer. A simple annexation to Pied-mont, they imagined, would avoid or mitigate this disaster andguarantee the continuance of conservative government. For the commonpeople were becoming increasingly restive as the Bourbon administra-tion began to crumble. The British consul had a report from Tarantoon 6 July to say that the lower classes were on the brink of revolution,not out of liberal sentiments, since they were quite indifferent to mereforms of government, but as an excuse to pillage the property of theirbetters; and it was stated that 'moderate citizens' therefore feared lestGaribaldi should come to 'spread intestine disorder in these districts,which will become a prey to blood and the devastation of civil war'.3

At Salerno the common people had already taken the occasion of the1 2 July, M. d'Azeglio to Castelli (Raccolta Azegliana MRR).2 29 July, Casalis from Parma to Depretis (ASR).3 6 July, Vice-consul Randone from Taranto to Consul Bonham at Naples: * the

labouring class, numerous and often wanting daily bread,... if now in some measureleagued with the party in favour of unity, is nevertheless always ready to takeadvantage of the smallest disturbance to pillage and lay hands on other people'sproperty: it breathes only anarchy and disorder, and is indifferent to the form ofGovernment' (F.O. 165/134).

Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: July 135Bourbon grant of a constitution to rise and demand a division of theland.1 The police records at Naples are full of similar accounts fromother provinces. At Avellino, according to reports of 3 and 28 July,there had been local risings against the constitution, against the galan-tuomini and the national guard, and significantly their cry was Viva il Re,by which was meant Francesco and not Victor Emanuel. On 19 Julythe sub-intendant of Vasto told of hundreds of peasants, armed withscythes and bill-hooks, advancing to claim their old rights to enclosedland. The mayor of Venafro on the 24th sent in an account of how thecountry folk had been attacking ' honest citizens' and the national guard;and at Chieti on the 29th they had managed to burn the prison registers.2

Just as in Sicily, that is to say, the common people were taking advantageof the evident collapse of civil government. Fear of this submergedrevolt is an important reason why so many of the honest citizens inNaples were busy whispering their desire for annexation to Piedmont.On precisely the same grounds, however, the very same people wereanxious not to stir a finger to hasten the revolution, until they knew thata Piedmontese army was approaching the frontier to come and restoreorder if necessary. The same reasons why in theory they supportedCavour, in practice made them unwillingly but decisively aid Garibaldi.

Villamarina did not understand the social malaise of the Napoletano,and so could not explain it to his government. Cavour was thus per-suaded into a new policy by facts which, had they been correctlyinterpreted, might have suggested a very different reaction. He wasalso put at cross purposes with the Neapolitan liberals; for while theywanted the Piedmontese to arrive and give them the excuse forrebellion, he was not going to intervene unless they first rose and gavehim the excuse to put his armies in motion. Officially, in the eyes ofEurope, he was still not a recognized participant in the revolution thatwas afoot; indeed he was excluded from it by the doctrine of non-intervention; and if ever he was to violate this doctrine he would needsome popular call to make his intervention something other thanshameless aggression. So, while he still did not break off his pourparlers

1 26 June, G. Mottola's diary (Archivio Storico delta Provincia di Salerno, June1924); also 14 June, the Intendant of Salerno (in Archivio di Stato, Salerno, AfFariPolitici, b. 9).

2 Documents in Archivio di Stato, Naples, Dicastero Polizia.

136 Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: Julyfor an alliance with the Bourbons, he also laid plans in case the exactopposite policy became more possible or advisable. From Villamarina'sreports he received the impression that, with a little mild encourage-ment, the south might rise in revolt; and by the middle of July he hadalso been informed that Nunziante and other generals in the Neapolitanarmy might be ready to play the traitor if allowed to change sides withoutlosing their rank.1 All this opened up another possible line of action.

Certain southerners exiled in Turin, notably Bonghi, Nisco, Mezza-capo and Pisanelli, were therefore summoned, along with other youngand enterprising men like Ribotti, Zanardelli and Visconti-Venosta,and all sent off to Naples. Their mission was exploratory in the firstplace; but they also had to prepare the ground for an insurrection, incase the Piedmontese should want an excuse to step in and forestallGaribaldi. If the liberals could only stage a revolt in advance of theradicals, they would succeed in preventing Garibaldi's march via Naplesto Rome; and in the process they would also prevent the indignity ofa rebellious subject seeming to hand over Naples to a supplicant KingVictor Emanuel. In other words, they would save the moderates fromlosing control of the national movement.2 The first batch of thesepotential agents provocateurs had arrived at Naples on 16 July, and thefact that on this same day Cavour had his first meeting with theNeapolitan envoys shows how he simultaneously maintained two con-tradictory policies. After an unconscionably few hours in which toobserve the situation, Visconti-Venosta wrote back with a cheerfulconfirmation of Villamarina's reports, saying that he could find no traceof an autonomist party, and that the exiles had nothing to teach thelocal citizens in italxanita? This was good news for Turin, and the taskahead was thus made to seem far easier than it proved to be in reality.People in the north also imagined that amour propre, if nothing else,would force Neapolitans to start a rebellion themselves; for otherwiseNaples might have both to submit to the radicals, and also to receivea humiliating salvation at the hand of their former dependents in Sicily.4

1 14 July, Prince Eugenio to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 327).2 3 August 1912, note by Visconti-Venosta (ibid. p. 340).3 17 July, Visconti-Venosta to Farini (ibid. pp. 340-2).4 10 August, Poerio to De Lequile (G. Bandini, 'Lettere di C. Poerio nel i860',

Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, xxx, 1943, p. 493); cf. 16 April, Elliot to Russell:

Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: July 137Unfortunately Visconti-Venosta had spoken too soon, and his govern-ment therefore was not able to gauge the situation accurately. As aresult, Cavour for a time still refused to implicate himself more thanhe need in the encouragement of violent revolution. The assumption wasthat the ripe pear would fall and not have to be plucked. On 23 July hewas quite hopeful that, with no extraordinary action, he could expectto record the success of Villamarina's Neapolitan rebellion 'in a fewdays' time'.1

Until 26 July, indeed, it was not known that the British governmentwould refuse to join France and Piedmont in their joint plan to haltGaribaldi and reconcile the Bourbons to the loss of Sicily.2 Until thatdate, Louis Napoleon had been hoping that Cavour would conclude analliance with Naples, and that the Great Powers would intervene andstop Garibaldi crossing to Naples. Cavour had not liked this Frenchproposal for foreign intervention in the south, since any such interven-tion was bound to be to some extent at Piedmontese expense, andwould emphasize Italy's servile status. But he had not allowed hisminister in London to oppose it openly, for he did not dare contradicthis powerful ally; and there was also the point that, once Garibaldi hadcompleted the liberation of Sicily, the interests of Piedmont mightequally be endangered by his further progress on to the mainland. Peoplehave usually interpreted Cavour's inaction as evidence of his patrioticdesire' to clear the way for Garibaldi's passage of the Straits';3 but morelikely it was the exact opposite. Lacaita's dramatic mission to Russell,moreover, turns out to be less important than was once thought.4

Cavour's secret orders to Admiral Persano were that he should not helpGaribaldi's crossing, and should rather try to 'delay it by indirect

'the Neapolitans.. .almost all of them, whether liberals or not, feel irritated that theSicilians refuse to accept the portion of a Neapolitan Province which they think theirproper place' (RP G.D. 22/85).

1 23 July, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 362); 16 July,Cavour to Prince Eugenio, shows that Cavour still believed it would be toodangerous to give money or arms to those who were conspiring at Naples (ibid.p. 333).

2 26 July, Russell telegram to Elliot (F.O. 70/312).3 Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, p. 100.4 M. Avetta, 'Studi cavouriani. Una "vexata quaestio" alia luce dei carteggi

cavouriani', Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, vol. xxi, 1934, pp. 52-71.

138 Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: Julymethods as long as possible';1 and these orders must be read in the lightof Persano's conviction that Garibaldi could not easily cross the Straitsof Messina without the protection of more ships than the revolutionariesthemselves possessed.2 Cavour was if anything on the side of Franceagainst Garibaldi; but Britain for her part did not need much persuadingto stand up for Garibaldi against the French—not only because she likedGaribaldi more, but chiefly because she liked France less. At Turin theyfeared that Britain would prefer Garibaldi rather than Cavour at Naples,'even though it meant anarchy and revolution'.3 This was true in part;but Russell's real suspicions were of Napoleon, and he suspected Cavouronly in so far as Cavour was a client of the emperor. British policyremained constant for non-intervention, just because this offered thebest hope of a stable solution being reached in Italy; and especially wasthis so when intervention only threatened to increase French influenceat Naples. It was not so much, therefore, that Cavour patrioticallycontrived to make Russell change his policy, as that Russell's rejectionof the French proposal made Cavour change his; for the last obstacle inthe path of the revolution had thereby been removed. The collapse ofNapoleon's attempt to mediate brought Garibaldi within dangerousreach of Naples and Rome, and Piedmontese policy had to be adjustedaccordingly.

At the end of July, Cavour had to admit that the situation was outof his control and called for quite exceptional methods. Alarminginformation came in from Naples as well as from London and Paris.Letters were written to him on the 23 rd from the south which told ofthe evacuation of Messina by the Bourbons, and of the likelihood thatGaribaldi could no longer be checked short of Naples. Turin was alsoinformed that the liberal middle classes in the south were after allproving too craven to initiate any spontaneous insurrection before theradicals arrived, while the poor lazzaroni were keenly looking forwardto Garibaldi's arrival and already associating the liberator's name witha Golden Age and dreams of hitherto unknown prosperity.4 This was

1 1 August, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, 1949, p. 2).2 2 August, Persano to Cavour (ibid. p. 8).3 i August, Cavour to E. d'Azeglio (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, p. 118).4 23 July, Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, pp. 367-70); 23 July,

Visconti-Venosta to Farini (ibid. pp. 377-83).

Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: July 139doubly dangerous. What Cavour must have found even more threatening,an army of six thousand well-armed and well-organized irregulars hadbeen quietly collected by Bertani in Genoa and Tuscany, and this armywas now preparing to attack the Papal States in a pincer movement tojoin with Garibaldi at Rome.1 If he put off much longer making achoice between his various hypotheses of action, it might well be toolate for his decision to have any influence on events.

Agostino Bertani was by profession a doctor of medicine with asubstantial clientele in Genoa, but he was also a member of the Turinparliament and among the most active of radical politicians. Thoughhe had broken from Mazzini in 1859, and though he now adheredsteadfastly to Garibaldi's programme of'Italy and Victor Emanuel', hewas still not far enough removed from the republicans to make Cavourfeel safe.2 It was his great weakness to regard himself as little less instature as a politician than Mazzini or Garibaldi, and he did not willinglytake orders from anyone. Ever since May, Bertani had been the chieforganizer of the volunteer brigades at Genoa, and officially in charge ofGaribaldi's principal base in the north. In that capacity he had obstinatelymaintained that any agreement with Cavour would check the overflowof revolutionary ferment in Italy, and emasculate the 'party of action'.He had much better reasons for this contention than historians have oftenallowed him; but it cannot be said that he conducted himself with muchtact, moderation or skill, and he proved to be almost as much a barrier togood relations between radicals and moderates as was La Farina himself.

Bertani had all along determined to prepare an invasion of the PapalStates so as to link up with Garibaldi farther south; and in this he hadhad the active co-operation of Mazzini, who feared that Garibaldimight come to terms with Cavour if the conflagration were not quicklystoked up in this new quarter. The proposed expedition was in part apolitical venture, and was intended as a deliberate challenge to Cavour'spolicy of avoiding the 'Roman question' in deference to France. Theextreme radicals were most anxious to raise the question of Rome, soas to break free of French influence, and to confound Cavour, and to

1 A. Bertani, Ire politiche d' oltre tomba, 1869, p. 65; G. Maraldi, La spedizione deimille e V opera di A. Bertani, 1940, pp. 88-98.

2 G. Maraldi, 'La rivoluzione siciliana del i860', Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento,vol. xix, 1932, p. 534.

140 Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: Julyoppose a * Unitarian' against a purely 'Piedmontese' solution for theproblem of Italy. Garibaldi approved of this idea for an attack onPapal territory, but regarded it first of all as a military matter, as adiversionary movement. Medici in June and Cosenz in early July hadtogether forced a postponement of the planned attack, by obeyingCavour and leading all the available volunteers from Genoa to Sicily.But at the end of July Bertani had a larger and better equipped expedi-tion than ever, and was determined 'to have done with Cavour, onceand for all'.1

It is important to stress these different motives inside the radical camp.Unlike the extremists, Garibaldi had viewed this diversion as somethingdirected not against, but in conjunction with, the government of Turin.He had encouraged Bertani to prepare it, but at a later stage hadinsisted that he wait until a landing was first effected on the Neapolitancoast, shrewdly judging that France should not be provoked until therevolution was solidly entrenched on the southern mainland.3 Towardsthe middle of July, Garibaldi had written to tell the king of his inten-tions, and had offered to put this new army of volunteers at the king'sdisposal if he would but lead the diversion. Victor Emanuel was by nomeans averse in principle to the project. Up to the last moment,indeed, there continued to be a fair chance that radicals and moderatesmight meet amicably in such an expedition. Farini as well as Ricasoliwas in the plot,3 and it is less likely that this was bluff on their part thanthat Cavour was keeping it in reserve as yet one more insurance policy;in other words that he was just waiting to see whether this, or a Nea-politan alliance, or a Neapolitan rebellion would best serve his interests.The testing point came at the end of July. On the 30th Garibaldi wroteto tell both Bertani and Ricasoli that he would be ready to cross theStraits in a fortnight's time, and now needed a strong invasion simul-taneously from the north.4 The fact that he told Ricasoli shows that in

1 30 July, Bertani to Crispi (this is missing from ACP, b. 135, but there is a copyin ABCM).

2 2 July, Sacchi from Palermo to Bertani, on a conversation he had had withGaribaldi on 1 July (MRR); Bollea, Una silloge di lettere, p. 282.

3 28 July, Farini to Depretis (copy, CF).4 30 July, Garibaldi to Ricasoli (Lettere di Ricasoli, ed. Tabarrini, vol. v, p. 171);

30 July, Garibaldi to Bertani (ABM).

Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: July 141his mind it was no underhand Mazzinian plot, but rather somethingquite open, for which he might get official help. The precipitate courseof events was now forcing the moderates to abandon their policy ofwatchful waiting, and their intention was not to help but to hinder. Inview of the rival projects which Cavour had lately been maturing, boththe timing and the probable leadership of this proposed invasion mightprove most inexpedient for him. In any case, information was nowarriving that in France there existed 'a reaction in favour of Naples'.1

Bertani had his own plans to start a blaze everywhere. He was alreadysending arms to Naples and the Abruzzi,2 and a responsible officialdescribed how 'things have reached such a point that in Genoa Bertaniis stronger than the government'.3 Neither this state of affairs, nor theimminent invasion of the Papal States in defiance of France, could betolerated by the liberals if they wished to retain their position ofinfluence, because Bertani with an army behind him was far morepolitically dangerous than Garibaldi. Above all, the French alliancemust be preserved intact, even if it meant combating the italianissimi byforce of arms. Cavour therefore could no longer put off becoming arevolutionary himself. He had at once to compete with the radicals ontheir own ground.

On 29 July Ricasoli arrived by summons at Turin for a hurried con-sultation with Cavour and the king, and a policy was devised ' to makethe national principle triumph at Naples without the intervention ofGaribaldi'.4 The intention was to make another and bolder effort toprovoke a' spontaneous' rising before the dictator arrived. Such a risingwould in effect defeat the radicals, and would also establish that theannexation of Naples was based not on right of conquest, but on themanifest wishes of public opinion. For this purpose arms were to besent from Genoa, and Piedmontese troops were to be held in readinessfor prompt invasion of Naples in gracious response to such an un-deniable demonstration of popular feeling. A provisional governmentwas also to be prepared in advance, ready to take office under Liborio

1 27 July, Nigra to Cavour (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 109).2 30 July, Bertani to Crispi (Crispi's Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 328).5 2 August, Lanza to Castelli (Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1, p. 311). Lanza

was the future prime minister.4 30 July, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 412).

142 Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: JulyRomano, one of the present Bourbon ministers whose allegiance hadbeen secretly suborned.1 Ricasoli, who did not mince his words, calledthis a 'coup d'etat after the Napoleonic manner'. He also hinted that, intheir consultation at Turin, they had discussed and even accepted thepossibility that it might provoke a war with Austria.2

Evidently Cavour had by now been induced to master his earlierresolution that he would never follow the contemptible radicals in usingthe methods of underhand conspiracy. Since the Neapolitan liberalswere clearly not going to stir of their own accord until Garibaldi'sarrival, this new plan of sending secret help and positive orders offeredthe northern liberals their only chance of success. The idea was thatLiborio Romano should use the arms sent him and set up a provisionalgovernment, which in turn would invoke the protection of Piedmont.Victor Emanuel would then accept the protectorate thus pressed uponhim, and his troops would land to maintain order and hold up Garibaldi.In later years, some of the agents of this policy tried to persuade them-selves that Cavour had been intending all the time to work in collusionwith Garibaldi, not against him; and some historians swallowed thisattempt at self-justification.3 But in reality the whole point of the planwas for the king to take over government 'au nom de l'ordre, del'humanite en arrachant des mains de Garibaldi la direction supreme dumouvement italien'. Cavour knew what he was doing. 'Le plan quej'ai adopte a des dangers. Mais l'entree de Garibaldi a Naples en a deplus grands encore. Si cela arrive, c'est lui et non Victor Emanuel quisera le veritable Roi d'ltalie.'4

It was to be hoped that the king in the last resort would begin to seematters in this light, and could be converted into feeling some resent-ment at the rising power and arrogance of the revolutionary party.Cavour's ability at the eleventh hour to win over the king againstGaribaldi was eventually to take its place among the decisive facts ofthe risorgimento. At the beginning of August, however, Victor Emanuel

1 30 July, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, p. 411).2 31 July, Ricasoli to Cavour (Lettere di Ricasoli, ed. Tabarrini); 31 July, Ricasoli

telegram to Cavour (BR ASF, f. Z).3 E.g. Alessandro Luzio, Garibaldi, Cavour, Verdi, 1924, p. 190.4 1 August, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 123); 1 August, Cavour

to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 2).

Cavour Plans a Revolt at Naples: July 143continued to have an independent and more 'Garibaldian' policy of hisown, somewhat distinct from that of his ministers; and probably he wasstill ready—or even still hoping—for Garibaldi to reach Rome andmake possible a change in government. We shall see in a later chapterhow Cavour addressed himself to this delicate problem. He still had topersuade the king to be a Cavourian and not a Garibaldian, and to backhis constitutional minister instead of assuming for the monarchy arevolutionary dictatorship.

144

CHAPTER XI

CAVOUR FAILS AT NAPLES:AUGUST

Cavour's decision no longer to be a virtually passive spectator of therevolution was to destroy Garibaldi's occasional hopes that the northerngovernment might connive in his plan to create an immediate diversionon Papal territory. Cavour wanted no movement in the Papal States,at all events not unless Napoleon gave him permission, nor until hecould feel more confident about the success of his agents provocateurs atNaples.1 He acted only just in time to stop what was happening, forBertani had begun to mobilize his men, and Garibaldi had written on30 July with orders to launch the expedition at once. Luckily forCavour, the dictator's letter took a fortnight to reach its destination,and by the time it arrived the government had been able to defeat theGenoese radicals and break up their army.

What happened was this. On 31 July Farini, the minister of theinterior, had hurried to Genoa to see if, in a private talk with Bertani,he could dissuade the radicals without using force. This called for alittle mild deceit. Bertani was told that the government had at lastdecided to intervene openly in aid of Garibaldi, and that the revolu-tionary committee had better ship their volunteers to Sicily so thatFrance should not be provoked into vetoing what was afoot. Aftervarious threats and promises had been made, Bertani was given one dayto think the matter over, and on 2 August he agreed to go quietly.2

Mazzini at first understood by this that Bertani merely intended toplacate the government with apparent connivance, and that instead ofsailing for Sicily he meant to land in the Papal States; but by the 6theven Mazzini was in despair, convinced that Bertani like so many others

1 30 July, La Masa from Genoa to Garibaldi (La Masa, Alcunifatti e documenti deltarivoluzione dell* Italia meridionale, 1861, p. 199); 1 August, Cavour to Nigra (CCCavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 125).

2 1 August, Farini telegram to Ricasoli (BR ASF, £ Z); 5 August, Farini's circularto all governors (ibid. b. N, f. B).

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 145of his former friends had fallen away to the government side.1 Bertanihad in fact been allowed by Farini to think that, once his volunteers hadsatisfied the conventions by breaking up their encampment at Genoa,no obstacle would be made to their concentrating off Sardinia, so thatthey might then invade the Pope's dominions without compromisingthe Turin government. This was a justifiable ruse. Cavour's new objectwas no longer merely to avoid being compromised. At last he had anactive policy of his own.2 What happened in practice was that Bertaniwent off to tell Garibaldi about this new turn in events, and persuadedhim to come and collect these five thousand men waiting off Sardinia,the intention being to lead them thence in a direct landing on the coastof either Naples or the Roman provinces. The two men then sailedto Sardinia for this very purpose, only to find that the bulk of theexpedition had in the interval been forced by Piedmontese warships toleave for Sicily.3 Cavour by this means reasserted the authority of thegovernment. He had split up the volunteer force, and averted theimmediate danger of a diversion. Garibaldi, not best pleased witheither Cavour or Bertani, had to return to his original project of movingup from Messina through Calabria, and Bertani soon led the rest of hismen southwards to join him.

One last effort was made by some of the radicals in the north. Assoon as Cavour had regained his firm control of Genoa, Mazzini movedto more likely ground nearer the Papal frontier. Mazzini's newspaperat Genoa had been censored and confiscated more and more frequentlyas the moderates recaptured their position,4 and towards the middle ofAugust he left his hiding-place and moved south to Tuscany. Here thereexisted a sizeable undercurrent of discontent with Piedmontese rule.5

1 4 August, Mazzini to Caroline Stansfeld (Epistolario, vol. XL, pp. 268-73);6 August, Mazzini to Emilie Venturi (ibid. p. 276). Vol. XL of this national edition ofMazzini's correspondence gives thirty-six letters from Mazzini to Bertani duringJuly i860, and one letter only during August; but vol. XLI, covering the monthsfrom August to February 1861, contains no letters to Bertani at all.

2 Maraldi, La spedizione dei milk e V opera di Bertani, pp. 95-9.3 Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi, vol. 1, Memorie, 1932, pp.

315-16. 4 U Unita Italiana was confiscated on 3 and 6 August.5 4 August, a police report to Ricasoli on public opinion in Tuscany: * a Piedmontese

party proper does not exist at all among us. The idea of absorption arouses an evermore pronounced disgust The systematic predilection for everything Piedmontese

146 Cavour Fails at Naples: AugustRicasoli had so far managed to retain a considerable degree of provincialautonomy at Florence; and one sign of this was that he had allowed, andeven encouraged, Baron Nicotera to organize a band of volunteers notvery much smaller than that which had just left Genoa. Ricasoli andNicotera had originally intended to work in with Bertani for a jointmarch on Rome. Cavour's changed attitude towards the volunteerswas thus not altogether approved or understood by his colleague inFlorence. Despite frenzied notes from Cavour and Farini, Ricasolieither would not or perhaps could not find and arrest Mazzini. Norwere Nicotera's volunteers dissolved. For one thing, the governor ofTuscany was by no means convinced that Cavour was being as bold asthe situation required. He himself was a firm monarchist, for only themonarchy would guarantee the 'conservation of social principles'; buthe had nevertheless come to a private arrangement with the semi-republican Nicotera, whom he wanted available with his men for atime of more forceful action; and he even dropped a hint that, if Pied-mont finally refused to allow a movement in the Papal States, then hewould side openly with the revolution.1 Again he asked Cavour directlyto intervene against Rome.2 He also once more threatened to resign ifhis own independence of the central government was not confirmed.3One way and another his rashness and uncontroUability in this state ofexaltation gave Cavour many anxious moments.

Giovanni Nicotera was one of the more rabid of the radicals. Thoughhe had momentarily accepted the Garibaldian programme, he was lessready to compromise on the republican issue than was Mazzini. Heregarded himself as having an entirely independent command over his. . .and the imposition upon Tuscany of a collection of new and barbarous phrases...make a very bad impression indeed/ So far only military matters had come underTurin directly, but all who had come into contact with the government on thiscomplained of the haughty and knavish behaviour they had met; and if Piedmontever made an alliance with Naples, or did not accept the idea of unification, this wouldbecome open opposition. (BR ASF, b. P, f. A.)

1 9 August, Ricasoli to Corsi (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani); andNicotera's statement about Ricasoli's complicity in II Garibaldi (Naples) of 19 Sep-tember.

2 9 August, Ricasoli telegram to Cavour (BR ASF, f. Z).3 8 August, Ricasoli to Carignano, he had only accepted this post on the under-

standing he had * freedom to operate according to my conscience* (Carteggio diRicasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani).

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 147volunteers in Tuscany, and to be answerable to no one, not even toGaribaldi. In future years he was to become a leading minister of theItalian crown, but even then he was to be notorious for his authoritariantemperament and ungovernable temper. In i860, this unexpectedlytruculent opposition from Cavour was too much for him. In one letterof 4 August, which Ricasoli after his usual manner intercepted, he spokeof continuing his plan to invade Papal territory even if it meant fightingthe Piedmontese.1 Such a suggestion did him no credit. But despitethese outbursts, he went on receiving protection from the governor ofTuscany. These two barons, one of them a conservative monarchist, theother a democrat and republican, occasionally thought and acted onmuch the same lines.

Cavour found Ricasoli's conduct so insupportable that he could notbring himself to write to him for more than a fortnight. Matters weredifficult enough without this degree of obtuseness and irresponsibility.Such little news as arrived from Naples suggested that no insurrectionmight now be possible without the help of Garibaldi, since Neapolitansseemed to want annexation not because it was positively desirable, butnegatively as a lesser evil to the revolution.2 Cavour felt sure that hecould regain his influence in Italy once he could reach a point where itwas possible to come out into the open with a regular declaration of war;but if at Naples he could not bring about an incident 'which appears tobe spontaneous', he would not be able to rely on the approval of Franceand England, and without their connivance it was not so easy to beconfident.3 The ambiguity and embarrassment of his position wassimply this, that he needed an 'incident', and yet could not risk trying

1 4 August, Nicotera to Bertani (copy in BR ASF, b. T, f. P); in busta G andbusta T there are letters and diplomatic documents to Cardinal Antonelli, to theFrench and Spanish ambassadors in Rome, diplomatic correspondence of Prussianconsuls with their home government, some original letters of Nicotera and Guerrazziwhich Ricasoli must have confiscated outright, and copies of Elliot's telegrams toRussell, all intercepted in Tuscany.

2 6 August, Cavour to Prince Eugenio {CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, p. 17); 7 August,Ribotti from Naples to Eugenio and Cavour {ibid. p. 36). In messages of 9, 16 and22 August to Nigra, Cavour and his secretary could not give much news of Naplesexcept what was in the papers {CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, pp. 146, 164, 176).

3 5 August, Cavour to Nigra {CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 138); 9 August,Cavour to Persano {Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 48).

148 Cavour Fails at Naples: Augustto create one too openly. He desired the benefits which Garibaldi hadtaught him might accrue from revolution, but without the drawbacksand without the reputation of being a revolutionary.

Il est evident que le Roi de Sardaigne ne peut pas envahir le Royaumede Naples en pleine paix; ni se mettre a conspirer ouvertement contre sonSouverain. Je ne sais pas ce qui arrivera si Garibaldi s'empare de Naples;mais ce que je sais c'est que si nous suivions une politique d'aventurier...nous serions mis au ban de l'Europe, et quelques vaisseaux de ligne nousmettraient a la raison.1

Cavour thus had to steer a careful course between European dis-approval of an active policy on the one hand, and the growing senti-ment in Italy for adventurousness on the other. He could never on anyoccasion afford to flout Louis Napoleon, but he also had to pick hisground carefully before provoking a public quarrel with Garibaldi. Inone of his most perceptive and magnanimous letters, he wrote on9 August to tell Nigra that he dare not openly challenge Garibaldiunless the radicals involved him with France or threatened to upset hiswhole political system. Nor yet did he dare to resort to his favouritepolitical weapon and recall parliament.

Pour faire Tltalie a l'heure qu'il est, il ne faut pas mettre en oppositionVictor Emmanuel et Garibaldi.... Si demain j'entrais en lutte avec Garibaldi,il est possible que j'eusse pour moi la majorite des vieux diplomates, maisFopinion publique europeenne serait contre moi, et P opinion publique auraitraison, car Garibaldi a rendu a l'ltalie les plus grands services qu'un hommeput lui rendre: il a donne aux Italiens confiance en eux-memes: il a prouve aT Europe que les Italiens savaient se battre et mourir sur les champs de bataillepour reconquerir une patrie.2

This was generously and sincerely said. Kind words apart, however,he was all the more convinced that Garibaldi was a dangerous characterwho must somehow be arrested. For the moment there was little hecould do about it. He could only reconcile himself to Garibaldi crossingthe Straits of Messina, and then wait a little longer to see what happened.3

1 6 August, Cavour to Prince Eugenio (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 18).2 9 August, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, pp. 144-5).3 10 August, Hudson to Russell: 'the fact is neither here nor at Naples does either

Government seem to know what to do. Both Governments see Garibaldi loomingin the distance and the prospect is not agreeable to either of them' (RP G.D. 22j66).

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 149What could be done in preparation for this he did. Money and arms

were sent so that Liborio Romano would be encouraged to raise aninsurrection ahead of Garibaldi in Naples. As a yet more decisive step,on 15 August a battalion of Piedmontese bersaglieri arrived secretly inNaples harbour, to be held ready under hatches for Admiral Persano touse in any profitable emergency.1 Many reports meanwhile began tocirculate in the north about preparations for a possible war, and rumoursspread fast about orders given to munitions factories and of nationalguard officers called up for service.2 Cavour had to recognize that therewas a serious danger of Austria choosing this moment to attack andregain what had been lost in 1859; but he boldly asserted that he wouldnot fight shy of such a war 'if it is the only means of saving us from therevolution'.3 He even recognized and accepted the possibility thatAustria might win and so prejudice the whole cause of national inde-pendence.4 In other words, the king's government had been forced intothe terrible position where they would rather be beaten by Austria thanallow Garibaldi to win on his own, and where they would prefer toplunge the country into a fruitless and disastrous foreign war ratherthan themselves try and find common ground with the Italian radicals.It was still possible and even likely, one must remember, that if liberaland radical patriots did not stand together, the Bourbons might defeatGaribaldi during his perilous crossing; and Cavour well knew that inthat event the national cause would receive a calamitous setback, and hehimself might have to make way for another prime minister whom therest of Europe would find more trustworthy.5 Garibaldi's failure orsuccess might therefore prove equally dangerous. This was the factwhich inhibited the Piedmontese from taking any constructive action inthese critical weeks. Cavour's hope was that he might still be able toarrive at Naples before Garibaldi, but he could be none too confidentof success. On 16 August he wrote: 'we have given Naples everything

1 12 August, instructions to Captain Wright (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. in,pp. 324-5).

2 13 August, La Perseveranza; 14 August (copy of note by U.S. minister Danielto Cass, MRR).

3 14 August, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 157).4 16 August, Cavour to Ricasoli (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 92).5 16 August, Cavour to Cassinis (ibid. pp. 90-1).

150 Cavour Fails at Naples: Augustnecessary for a revolution, arms, money, soldiers, men of counsel andmen of action. If after all this the kingdom turns out to be so rotten asto be incapable of action, I do not know what to do; and we mustresign ourselves to the triumph either of Garibaldi or of the reactionaries.'xHere he was underestimating his own courage and resourcefulness.

While he waited for news of Romano's insurrection and Garibaldi'scrossing, Cavour did what he could and what he dared to make eventsmove in his favour. His success in breaking up Bertani's private armynow emboldened him to make one more attempt to stop the wholerecruiting drive upon which Garibaldi relied for building up hisrevolutionary forces. On 7 August, a preliminary circular from Fariniat the Home Office warned all the provinces that the increase ofdesertions to Garibaldi was gravely compromising the discipline of theroyal army;2 and then, on the 13th, another and more peremptorycircular forbad all further recruitment of volunteers. 'The governmentis firm in its intention not to let itself be overcome by those who haveno mandate or responsibility given them by the king and the nation....The government must fulfil its duty to act as supreme moderator of thenational movement.'3 This was a new voice for any public pronounce-ment, or at least it was a voice which Italians had not heard for threemonths. Evidently the government really had a plan and was confidentabout it. What people still could not quite understand was that toresume charge of the national movement meant for some reasonopposing Garibaldi rather than joining him. This abrupt prohibition ofrecruitment was to arouse great resentment in the south, even amongCavour's friends who could not see what he was about.4 Garibaldinaturally read it as damning evidence that Cavour's only wish was tocurry favour with France. It made Nicotera almost ungovernable.But Cavour kept his own counsel. At this stage he could no longerafford to be so delicate and nice about annoying the volunteers, andsuch a prohibition was a sure method of cutting off their sources of

1 16 August, Cavour to Ricasoli (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 92); this part ofthe letter was omitted by Chiala (vol. 111, p. 331), so as not to give offence.

2 7 August. One copy of Farini's circular is in BR ASF, b. N, f. B.3 13 August, Gazzetta Ufficiale di Torino; 14 August, Valerio's protest from Como

(Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1, p. 313).4 16 August, 1/ Nazionale (Bonghi's paper at Naples).

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 151supply, as well as of husbanding Piedmontese resources against the daywhen Victor Emanuel could openly lead his men into battle. Beforelong it might even become a positive advantage for Garibaldi to beannoyed with the northern government, because he might lose histemper in some public pronouncement, and so give Cavour a long-awaited chance to pose as an offended party.

When on 18-19 August Garibaldi crossed the Straits—a fact whichCavour knew on the 20th—the time seemed ripe for yet more resoluteaction. This was the moment when Cavour prepared a plan to invadethe Papal States himself. Some historians have assumed that Cavourhad determined upon such an invasion as early as I August;1 and theythen built upon this fact an argument which made out Cavour's earlierpolicy to have been more logical and self-conscious than it probablywas. The evidence cited for these interpretations does not bear thisinference. Through the first three weeks of August the hypothesis ofthis invasion was no doubt maturing in Cavour's mind, but he stillwaited until he had more information about the fate of his own plot atNaples and of Garibaldi's landing in Calabria. As soon as he had enoughinformation, he made up his mind to a move which was calculated withextraordinary skill and courage. In one sense it was as courageous asGaribaldi's first expedition to Sicily in May, for though Cavour hadmany more chances of success than had the Thousand, he knowinglyrisked the terrible chance of civil war against the italianissimi. He wasalso planning to lead a Catholic country in fighting the Pope by forceof arms, and somehow he had to do this while still retaining the supportof his Catholic ally in Paris. The stakes were high, but the prospectivewinnings were enormous, nothing less than Sicily, Naples, and thepapal provinces of Umbria and the Marches; in other words a half ofthe whole peninsula. Equally important was the fact that once morethe liberal-conservatives would be able to call the tune, and the kingcould again overtop that overmighty subject Garibaldi.

The latter purpose of course could not yet be publicly acknowledged.Cavour still went on using a simple ambidexterity to confuse people's

1 E.g. Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, pp. 116-17, 169, 211. This wasbased on E. d'Azeglio's recollections twenty-five years later (La politique du comteCamille de Cavour 1852-61, ed. N. Bianchi, 1885, p. 379). But these recollectionswere inaccurate here as elsewhere, and Cavour's letters tell a different story.

152 Cavour Fails at Naples: Augustminds. The revolutionaries were encouraged in the illusion that, byinvading Papal territory, the king was coming to their aid; while LouisNapoleon was simultaneously wheedled with the suggestion that, in aPiedmontese invasion of the south, he had the only method of forcingback the Italian movement into a conservative channel. There have notbeen lacking interpretations which made out that Cavour had all thetime intended his invasion to be in aid of Garibaldi, as a support withoutwhich the revolution could not have survived much longer.1 But thiswas yet another rationalization invented later for political purposes inorder to justify the official policy: for at this particular moment Gari-baldi's course through Calabria was at its most headlong and successful;he was least in need of aid, and most to be feared. Cavour's skill is seenat its best in the way he both confused appearances and also found manyand even contradictory reasons for doing the selfsame thing. On thisoccasion he was making a great virtue out of a hard necessity forcedupon him. He was obliged to move fast if he wanted to crush therevolution; and yet, as he himself confessed, if he had allowed his truemotives to become known, public opinion would have been against himand the plan would have failed. The only hope of success was to givethe illusion that his motives were the very opposite of what in fact theywere.

The invasion of Umbria and the Marches had been originally aradical project, and this project Cavour just took over and improvedupon. Something of this sort had been constantly in the minds ofMazzini and Bertani since May, and Garibaldi had always intended thathis revolution in the south should be assisted by a parallel movement inthe centre. Bertani's mobilization for this particular invasion at the endof July had been one compelling argument behind Cavour's decisionto forestall him, so that the popularity of this move could be stolen forthe liberals and the king—just as Bertani's threat to invade had alsoconveniently given Cavour the wherewithal to justify his own counter-invasion in the eyes of European statesmen. For some months Cavourhad been urged by his colleagues to invade the Marches, on the groundsthat this would be the best or the only way to provoke and canalize arevolution in Naples. Such a scheme had been put to him five months

1 E.g. D. Zanichelli, Cavour, 1926, pp. 389-90; A. J. Whyte, The political life andletters of Cavour, 1930, p . 423.

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 153earlier by Pantaleoni from Rome.1 In April the king himself hadprivately assured the Garibaldians that he meant to synchronize theirmovement in the south with one of his own in the centre.2 GeneralFanti, Cavour's minister of war, had more recently been laying inde-pendent plans for such an invasion, hoping it would restore the moraleof the regular forces and win them some of the glory which they somuch envied Garibaldi.3 Ricasoli too, as we have noticed, had con-tinuously advocated imposing a violent solution of the Roman question,and by early August was already well advanced in a private plot of hisown to bribe the Pope's Swiss Guard.4 The prime minister had thusbeen subjected to a good deal of advice and prodding in this direction.Almost certainly the question of the Papal States had been discussed ingeneral terms at that meeting towards the end of July between Cavour,Ricasoli and the king; and the British minister had already been casuallyinformed that the Pope, if he left, might be offered alternative accom-modation in Sardinia.5 The time came for Cavour to make up his mindto an actual invasion when he began to fear the failure of his first planto seize Naples before Garibaldi arrived. How he carried out his boldproject of aggression must be left for consideration later. It is sufficientfor the moment to say that it was the threat of Garibaldi's advance uponNaples which at once gave colour to Cavour's invasion of the centreand made it necessary. Once again it was opposition to the revolutionrather than motives of high patriotism which was the immediatestimulus to action.

Many reasons have been produced to explain why Cavour failed inhis first scheme for a pronunciamento at Naples. Garibaldi was farstronger than the moderates in the south, and had a much clearer idea ofwhat he wanted, and could act openly instead of by underhand means.Cavour also tried to work through too many unco-ordinated individuals,most of them former exiles sent back to act more or less independentlyin the city of Naples. There was not sufficient co-operation between his

1 20 March, Pantaleoni to Cavour (CC La Questione Romana 1860-1, vol. 1, p. 14).2 25 April, Turr to Bertani (Archivio J. W. Mario MRR).3 5 June, Fanti to his brother Gaetano (// Risorgimento Italiano, vol. for 1914, p. 255).4 3 August, Ricasoli to Cavour, Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani;

this fact is not given in Tabarrini's edition.5 31 July, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).

154 Cavour Fails at Naples: Augustagents, and perhaps they were not given either sufficient powers ofindependent initiative or sufficient clear instructions on possible lines ofaction to be adopted in varying circumstances. Cavour habituallyrelied too much on untried men and mediocrities for this sort ofemployment. He always disliked using strong people of independentcharacter like Depretis or Crispi, Ricasoli or Garibaldi. Principally forthis reason he was not usually successful in picking his subordinates, andit is striking how, man for man, Garibaldi's chosen lieutenants insouthern Italy were far superior to his. Villamarina and Persano wereboth mediocrities, Villamarina dangerously so; and it made mattersworse that ambassador and admiral shared a mutual jealousy and dislike.Both suspected, with some reason, that their master was putting on adifferent face to each of them. Each wrote home to complain of theother, and both of them feared for their dignity whenever they had totry and co-operate harmoniously on the same programme. Apart fromthese, there were two or three people in Naples who seem to have hadsecret and separate supplies of money from Cavour. Of this money adisproportionate amount was spent with small effect on bribes to seedymembers of the aristocracy.1 Cavour's subsidies do not seem either tohave been sufficient for his purpose,2 or to have been sufficiently con-centrated in one place and in one direction. The truth probably is thathe was too fully preoccupied with difficult problems of diplomacy tohave much time for such matters. He was personally disinclined to,and relatively unskilled in, the detailed workings of administration.Moreover, like all the moderate liberals as a class, he sometimes provedto be not quite versatile or reckless enough to make a good revolutionary.

One of the most busy of the returned exiles was Baron Nicolo Nisco,who arrived at Naples on 3 August with a cargo of three thousand guns.3Nisco's particular scheme was to try and work towards proclaiming theregency of the Count of Syracuse on the collapse of the presentNeapolitan government.4 This Syracuse was a penniless Bourbon

1 Note by Borromeo (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 17).2 28 August, Ronchei to Bargoni (MRR); 24 August, Persano to Cavour (CC Lib.

del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 145).3 N. Nisco, Storia del reame di Napoli 1824-60, 1908 (5th ed.), pp. xxix-xxx.4 4 August, Nisco to Ricasoli, he hoped 'this would stop Garibaldi's march'

(Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani).

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 155princeling, of irregular private life, quite without influence in thecountry, and said by Nisco's colleagues to be a positive obstacle toaction. To this man Cavour paid considerable advances in cash. It wasan anomalous situation to find the moderates thus driven to want ruleby such a hireling traitor of a discredited dynasty rather than byGaribaldi. Another well-placed traitor was General Nunziante, uponwhom Cavour set special store. Nunziante had been in his time anotorious reactionary, and was 'considered by the public one of theworst of the Camarilla'.1 His conversion to liberalism, well timed inAugust, was shortly to earn better promotion in the Italian army thanfell to the lot of many senior Garibaldian officers who had fought withgreater loyalty and self-sacrifice for their king and country. It was hisappointed job to spread disloyalty among the Bourbon army; but he,too, turned out not to be worth what he cost, and he quite spoilt Nisco'splan by threatening to leave Naples unless the candidature of Syracusewas dropped.2 Syracuse, Nunziante, and Liborio Romano who wassimultaneously one of King Francesco's sworn ministers and one ofCavour's trusted agents, were certainly an odd trio on whom to bankthe fortunes of a revolution.

Most of Cavour's spies soon enough convinced themselves thatVillamarina's reports, on the strength of which they had acted in thefirst place, were quite wrong, and that southerners were either toofearful or too little interested to revolt. Except in some parts of theprovinces, people preferred to wait until Garibaldi arrived and carriedout the dangerous part of the revolution on their behalf. Cavour wassoon speaking of Neapolitans with contemptuous disparagement as'ces poules mouillees'.3 That future premier of Italy, the tolerantZanardelli, found it impossible to work with them, and he added thatthe returned exiles were little better than they as instruments of boldand decisive action.4 The British minister Elliot, when he heard ofCavour's plan to engineer a revolution, gave it as his view on 11 Augustthat he doubted if Neapolitans had enough pluck.5

1 5 July, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 70/318/342).2 25 August, Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 151).3 13 August, Cavour to Persano (ibid. p. 71).4 29 August, Zanardelli from Brescia to Depretis (ASP Min. Luogo. Interno, b. 4165).5 11 August, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).

156 Cavour Fails at Naples: AugustAnother obstacle was that some former exiles, especially among the

old Neapolitan aristocracy, preferred to play a quite different and lessdangerous game. Since Francesco was trying to work his new con-stitution by holding elections, they chose to accept nomination for theNeapolitan parliament.1 Their idea was probably to have a representa-tive body all ready in existence to vote against Garibaldi when Cavour'stroops should arrive. But such a policy was quite contrary to the planfor revolutionary action.2 Garibaldi had an easy target when he sawCavour's men thus favouring the Bourbon constitution rather than theradical revolution. Their conduct only gave substance to the Mazzinianindictment that Cavour was flirting with the Neapolitan autonomists.In terms of practical politics, it split the liberal committee in Naplesinto two warring factions, the party of order and the party of action;and in general it set a bad example and diminished popular ardour.Villamarina had to report back to Turin that these men would havedone well to stay in exile, since their return had only divided thepatriots and contributed to paralyse any hope of a revolt.3 Here isanother indication that the simultaneous pursuit of many comple-mentary or contradictory policies by the northern government didnot always work out for the best.

Cavour was in this way publicly competing with both Garibaldi andKing Francesco for public favour in Naples. This was neither dignifiednor politic, and in these circumstances the natural reaction of mostNeapolitans was simply to wait and see which of the three contestantsproved most powerful. People knew throughout August that Cavourwas still entertaining Winspeare the Bourbon plenipotentiary, andbelieved no doubt that Piedmont was always ready to make an alliancewith Francesco if ever the Bourbon army could hold fast against therevolutionaries. Cavour's insurance policy of negotiating or pretendingto negotiate an alliance was thus being shown up as a tactical error: for

1 8 August, II Diritto in this connexion gives the names of Bellelli, D'Afflitto,Pisanelli, Silvio Spaventa, Lequile, D'Ayala.

2 6 August, G. Matina from Naples to Garibaldi (ACM 1101); 25 August, Poerioto Mascilli (Nuova Antologia, 16 January 1912, p. 324); 17 July, Visconti-Venosta toFarini (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 1, pp. 340-2); August, Nisco to Cavour (ibid. vol. 11,pp. 203-4).

3 21 July, Villamarina to Cavour (ibid. vol. 1, p. 357); 15 August, Villamarina toCavour (ibid. vol. 11, pp. 85-6).

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 157not only had it antagonized Garibaldi, but it was helping to defeat thesimultaneous scheme to precipitate a liberal pronunciamento at Naples,and was generally creating distrust about Cavour's motives. The attitudeof most Neapolitans was probably expressed by Elliot, when he said ofCavour's policy that 'open war would be infinitely more creditable,and it would avoid all the dangers both of Mazzinianism and reactionthrough which we shall otherwise have to pass'.1 This was a timid, butnot an altogether unjustifiable, point of view for southerners to hold.The warning signs of a peasants' revolt were a powerful argumentagainst making any precipitate move before it was absolutely clear thatCavour would commit himself irretrievably and guarantee themagainst failure. He wanted to keep his hands free; they wanted tocommit him; and neither he nor they wanted to risk a first and un-retraceable step into the unknown.

Cavour's recognition of this state of mind was one of the factors whichhelped to make him finally decide that he must set his own armies inmotion and take part in the civil war himself. He expressed indignationthat the Neapolitans preferred to let others relieve them of the Bourbons;but in reality his anger was due to the fact that they would not relievehim of Garibaldi. Francesco, Napoleon, and also the Neapolitan people,had each in succession failed to arrest the revolutionaries for him, so hehad now no option but to attack this task himself. Perhaps he hopedthat, when they knew that the Piedmontese were actually on the march,the liberal Neapolitans would still rise and appeal for annexation in timefor him to move in before the volunteers could arrive. Preparations forarmed intervention were therefore set more urgently on foot, both togo directly by sea to Naples, and also to march south through the Statesof the Church.

Garibaldi's crossing of the Straits on 19 August had been a considerablemilitary feat. The transports which conveyed his army had no propernavy to protect them, and his commissariat had to meet great difficultiesin improvising food supplies for so many men in rapid movement.But one of the chief obstacles in his path went unobserved, for he hadno idea that the northern government was so far opposed to him and sofar advanced as this with a counter-plan of its own. The rumour hadalready arrived in his camp before this time that Cavour might be

1 20 August, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).

158 Cavour Fails at Naples: Augustintending to invade the Papal States, but there was little thought yetthat this might not be a friendly act.1 Garibaldi continued to believethat royal favour would follow him so long as he was successful, nomatter what the king might have to say in public. Certainly VictorEmanuel was much less of a politician than Cavour, and, unlike thelatter, hardly seems to have changed his policy very much during thecourse of the southern revolution. On 5 August or soon afterwards hesent a message by word of mouth to encourage Garibaldi to go aheadand even attack the Papal States.2 Just possibly this was merely arecognition of what could not be helped, in an attempt to keep thedictator's confidence. More likely it represents the real wishes of theking as distinct from those of Cavour, the king being as headstrong andenthusiastic as the prime minister was cautious and fearful. At allevents, its effect was to make Garibaldi over-confident. Now was thetime when he became really excited over the prospect of reaching Rome,and the historians who censure him for this excitement must take intoaccount the king's perhaps ill-considered words.

But an ominous note was beginning to intrude into this apparentconcord, as the volunteers realized that the king's words were not alwayssupported by the actions of his government. During a critical momentin the passage of the Straits, a Piedmontese warship appeared inMessina harbour, but without stirring even unobtrusively to helpGaribaldi in his hazardous enterprise. When one of his transports ranaground in passage and had to be burnt, still the Piedmontese shipanswered all pleas for aid with a dead silence.3 In view of Persano'smany private protestations of amity, this could not but be taken amiss.It seemed to correspond all too well with Farini's deception of Bertaniat Genoa, and his recent proclamation against any further recruitmentof volunteers. Cavour's smoke screen could not much longer conceal

1 18 August, Commander Forbes at Messina, The Campaign of Garibaldi in theTwo Sicilies, adding that * Cavour has, at least for the moment, ceased to push forimmediate annexation, and a thoroughly cordial understanding exists between theKing and the Dictator', pp. 123, 137.

2 G. Manacorda, 'Vittorio Emanuele II e Garibaldi nel i860 secondo le carteTrecchi', Nuova Antologia, f. 923, 1 June 1910, pp. 413, 426.

3 20 August, G. Medici to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 112); 13 August,Persano to Cavour (ibid. p. 74); 17 August, Professor Amari to Count Amari(Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona, vol. 11, p. 123).

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 159that this new Machiavelli had also the faces of Janus. On 23 AugustII Diritto finally wrote that,' after all these equivocations and contradic-tions, the government has at last come out in open opposition to themovement led by General Garibaldi'. Sooner or later the dictatorwould see this for himself.

Once ashore on the opposite side, however, Garibaldi needed no helpbut that of Bertani's reinforcements, and for some time he paid littleattention to politics. The conquest of Naples which Cavour had dreadedso much was now on the way to becoming an accomplished fact.Enthusiasm for Garibaldi's name tore like a forest fire through Calabria,and the moderate liberals who had been hoping to take over govern-ment in the provinces before his arrival were quite outstripped.1 Every-where the liberals seemed by comparison weighed down with inertia,and it was the radicals who acted.2 Just as in Sicily, the lower classespictured Garibaldi as a god bringing with him comfort and prosperity;and he played up to their ideal by at once reducing the price of salt,abolishing food taxes, and opening up the recently enclosed pastureland on the Sila to the peasants. On the other hand, among thewealthier citizens, 'many who a short time ago were anxiously lookingforward for the arrival of Garibaldi now anticipate with fear themoment of his coming, as likely to be the commencement of a periodof anarchy and confusion'.3 On 28 August the Marquis D'Afflittoexpressed the fear felt by the liberal leaders at Naples: 'pray God', hewrote earnestly, ' that the movement is not discredited by any lack ofrespect towards property'.4 But the rights of property were in factbeing trodden underfoot indiscriminately, as peasants armed with

1 25 August, G. Devincenzi to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 156).2 27 August, Persano telegram to Cavour (ibid. p. 167); 29 August, Mazzini to

L. Ferrari (Epistolario, vol. XLI, 1935, p. 13); 8 September, M. Guerri (Ricasoli's agentat Penne) to Ricasoli: 'this is what the nation may expect from the doctrinaires'(BR ASF, b. N).

3 15 August, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 165/133/443); 4 September: 'in various partsof the country Communist tendencies are already making themselves apparent. Somelarge estates have been regularly parcled (sic) out for division, while in other casesthe timber is being openly cut and carried away by the new self-constituted pro-prietors' (F.O. 165/133/492).

4 28 August, D'Afflitto from Naples to Albanese (F. Zervella, 'La reazione diAriano nel i860', Samnium, January 1943, p. 40).

160 Cavour Fails at Naples: Augustscythes occupied the land, turned their cattle loose on the 'commons',burnt charters and title-deeds, and diverted streams away from theirlord's mill.1 Perhaps in sum this did not amount to very much. Never-theless, the very fear that such things were happening paralysed themiddle classes with terror at Garibaldi's approach, and at the same timewas enough to leave the common people most unwilling to take anycounter-action on behalf of Cavour's rival programme. Furthermore,it soon made even the liberals and the landowners most anxious toestablish Garibaldi's provisional government, for this would be theironly hope of preserving law and order during the most vulnerable daysof emergency. These sentiments of fear put the finishing touches to thecollapse of the Bourbon regime in the provinces, just as they alsoinhibited the action of those liberals who worked for Cavour. Onceagain the peasants were proving to be an important factor in Garibaldi'ssuccess, as they frightened their betters into at least a temporaryallegiance to him.

During the last ten days of August Cavour's attention was con-centrated on preparations for central Italy, and he had little time tomake any detailed plans for the swiftly changing situation at Naples.He remained clear about his main intention, which was to 'fight therevolution with all the means in my power'.2 For awhile it was con-fidently expected that General Cialdini would have time to beatGaribaldi to Naples and so be able to 'dominate the revolution'.3 If itcame to the worst, Persano or Villamarina might lead a last-minuterevolution and set themselves up in charge of a puppet government.By 27-8 August, however, his mood had swung back into pessimismat the 'conduite ignominieuse' of the Neapolitans, and they were beingspoken of scornfully as 'abrutis' who 'n'ont pas du sang dans les veines'.As Cavour put it, 'la conduite des Napolitains est degoutante: s'ils neveulent rien faire avant l'arrivee de Garibaldi, ils meritent d'etregouvernes comme les Siciliens par des Crispis'.4 These snap judgements

1 E.g. the graphic description in II Nazionale of 16 August and 20 September; andpolice reports in Archivio di Stato, Naples.

2 21 August, Cavour to Ricasoli (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 118).3 26 August, Farini to Ricasoli (CF).4 27 August, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 169); 28 August,

Villamarina to Cavour (ibid. p. 176).

Cavour Fails at Naples: August 161were made in a moment of great tension, and this will explain the lackof sympathy or psychological penetration. Cavoiir's agents of coursewere already busy excusing their own and his deficiencies by blamingthe Neapolitans collectively, and he for his part did not see that, in asituation where even his own orders had to be so vague and indecisive,a whole people could be forgiven if they did not manage to thinkquickly and act effectively. Confronted with contradictory advicefrom Persano and Visconti-Venosta, Cavour in fact changed his mindfrom day to day on whether he should or should not antagonizeGaribaldi yet further by trying to set up a puppet government ofliberals. This created even more confusion.1 But in practice there wasnothing helpful Cavour could do, simply because the Bourbon armyhad not put up the resistance which he had expected of them.2

No mere formulations of policy could now prevent the radicalsreaching Naples first, and this in turn was bound to force upon Cavouranother change of policy. In a sense it was true that he was beginningto regain control of the situation; but in another and paradoxical sensethe initiative even in this new phase remained with Garibaldi, becausethe only excuse for invading Papal territory was the presence of thedictator at Naples. The radicals thus forced Cavour to invade the centre;for, quite apart from the need to save the Pope from red revolution, ifthe radical advance could not be checked farther south, Italy might be'liberated' not only up to Rome but up to and including Turin as well.Not only the radicals around Garibaldi, but also some of the oppositiondeputies at Turin were hoping as much; and in government circles thisproduced an anti-Jacobin panic, which strangely developed into beinga major impulse behind the making of a united nation.

1 31 August, Visconti-Venosta protests to Cavour [ibid. pp. 194-5).2 Elliot called this Cavour's fault for not coming into the open and fighting

the Bourbons fairly and 'like a gentleman*. His conduct was 'as discreditable asanything ever done by a Bourbon* (Sir Henry Elliot, Some Revolutions and otherDiplomatic Experiences, 1922, p. 55).

162

CHAPTER XII

POLITICAL DIFFERENCES INSICILY: AUGUST

Since early July, when La Farina left Sicily, the political climate ofPalermo had remained more or less equable. Depretis had arrived on21 July, determined to try and restore confidence between Garibaldiand Cavour, and hoping to find an agreed policy in annexing Sicily toPiedmont with Garibaldi's good will. In his talks with Victor Emanueland Farini preparatory to leaving on this difficult mission, Depretis hadbeen given to expect material help in his task of restoring order in theisland, but assistance was made conditional on evidence of his goodfaith in preparing the ground for a plebiscite and annexation. Cavourintended that, as soon as possible, Depretis should publish the Pied-montese constitution as the first step towards union, and the induce-ment was held out that this would make it easier to find money for theSicilian government. Here was the first step in a programme uponwhich moderates and radicals were not far from agreement.

The arrangement of forces in Palermo at the beginning of Augustdoes not show a straight fight between moderates and radicals. On thecontrary, Crispi for the moment was surprisingly enough on the sameside as Depretis and Cavour, while in so far as there was an oppositionit was to be found in the bulk of those who wanted only a conditionalunion with the north. Many of the autonomists had been hoping tohave a proper Sicilian parliament, and to restore the island constitutionof 1812 and 1848. But they were prevented, for on 3 August Depretisand Crispi followed Cavour's behest in both signing the preamble toa proclamation bestowing on Sicily the Piedmontese statuto, and callingthis 'an inviolable pact binding Italy to Victor Emanuel V It was alsodecreed that public officials should swear loyalty to Victor Emanuel andthe northern constitution, or else be dismissed.2 On the 9th this wasfollowed by the introduction of Sardinian laws on the mercantile

1 Raccolta degli atti del governo dittatoriale e prodittatoriale in Sicilia, 1861.2 15 August, V Unita Italiana (Genoa), in a report from Palermo dated 10 August.

Political Differences in Sicily: August 163marine, on the 18th by that of Sardinian copyright laws, on the 26thby introduction of the communal and provincial law of the 'Regnod'ltalia', on the 28th by the military penal code, and on the 30th by thenorthern laws on public security. A decree of 17 August also declaredthe northern lira with the head of Victor Emanuel to be the onlycurrency, doing away with the oncie and tari peculiar to Sicily. Suchadministrative edicts by Garibaldi's government were of course pre-judging the very issue of annexation which Cavour had thought to bethe principal matter in dispute, yet here they were proposed and sup-ported by both radicals and moderates. Even if there was inevitablymuch more of intention than achievement about them—for example,the old coinage and even many outward signs of a * natural' economywere to be found in Sicily up to the end of the century—they appearedto bear out Cavour's policy to the letter.1 The diary of Count Littatells us that Crispi as well as Depretis had begun to talk in favour ofimmediate annexation at the end of July, and now the formal introduc-tion of Piedmontese laws by Crispi himself seemed a virtual recognitionon his part that annexation was almost an accomplished fact. Confirma-tion by popular vote still had to follow, but the presumption was thata plebiscite would be held as soon as formal union with Piedmont couldbe carried through without giving the European Powers an opening tothwart Garibaldi's further progress. In all appearance Depretis had thussucceeded in harmonizing the radical and hberal policies, and this wastaken as a defeat for the autonomists, a guarantee that formal annexationwould follow as soon as possible.2

But Cavour in his ignorance of Sicily—an ignorance unhappilyfostered and exploited by La Farina—did not understand that thisproclamation of the statuto was an agreed policy between Depretis,Cordova and Crispi, and that Crispi's Precursore, of all the Palermitannewspapers, gave it unqualified welcome.3 The fact that Cavour did notknow of, and so could not use, this growing approximation of opinionin Palermo, must be put down to poor liaison and bad advice, unless weassume that he was in principle averse from any alliance at all with theradicals, that he was more against revolutionism than he was in favour

1 16 August, Cavour to Cassinis (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, p. 90).2 15 August, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 165/133/440).3 5 August, // Precursore.

164 Political Differences in Sicily: Augustof nationalism. For some reason he had now made up his mind thathe could not trust even Depretis, and so there was no one authoritativein Sicily with whom he could speak frankly about the development ofaffairs. Depretis was thus left without a lead, and without the assistancehe had been led to expect, while the patriots were able to read intoCavour's inaction a lack of confidence in the possibilities of Italianunity. Cavour still believed Crispi to be a red republican, and peoplein Turin thought that the introduction of the statuto was simply the workof Filippo Cordova, the Sicilian who had succeeded La Farina as leaderof the Cavourian party.1 Neither supposition was true. Crispi was theminister responsible for promulgating the statuto, and he had sworn theoath of allegiance to Victor Emanuel on 9 August along with the restof the cabinet. On the other hand, the so-called Cavourian or 'annexa-tionist' papers in Palermo had at once found fault with the proclama-tion, for the very reason that Crispi was one of its authors; they arguedthat it was something which should have followed and not precededa popular vote.2 The autonomists were to put their criticism even morestrongly. 'Are we going to become Italians or Piedmontese?', askedone Palermo newspaper.3 Another called this decree 'a violation of theprinciple of national sovereignty', implying that the northern constitu-tion was being imposed on a sovereign people by force.4 La Farina'sold paper, V Annessione, was now veering towards the autonomists inorder to find an ally against Crispi ;5 whereas Crispi himself was somuch a nationalist that he wanted unqualified annexation as soon as thiswould not hamper Garibaldi's progress. ' Sicily shall be annexed un-conditionally, and Italy shall be\\ he wrote with emphasis to Mazzini.6

In this way a bitter conflict, partly over personalities, partly out ofsheer ignorance and doctrinaire reasoning, grew up to spoil the relativeharmony between the chief factions in Sicily. The month of August had

1 August, Cavour to Cordova: * I hope that Depretis will break free of Crispinsinfluence and on your advice publish our statuto * (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. vi,p. 576).

2 8 August, L9 Annessione; 9 August, Cordova to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz.vol. 11, p. 52).

3 11 August, La Forhice. 4 21 September, Tom Pouce (Palermo).5 8 August, V Annessione; 13 August, letter by Perez intercepted by Ricasoli

(BR ASF, b. N, £ N).6 31 July, Crispi to Mazzini (Crispi's Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 364).

Political Differences in Sicily: August 165begun quietly enough. A correspondent of the moderate and CavourianV Opinione had written on 3 August that, 'as for different parties, youwill not find a trace of such among us here'.1 Then the statuto decree,instead of confirming this agreement as one might have expected, wasmade a cause of further discord; and a pamphlet on the 8th could speakof how 'everywhere there was nothing but talk of fusionists, Unitarians,autonomists and separatists'.2 One or other of these labels was adoptedby each of the leading journals, and what until now had seemed butsubtle gradations of opinion soon developed into apparently irrecon-cilable opposites. At Messina one paper came out with the at first sightsurprising statement that, 'between the hypothesis of gradual unificationand that of complete Italian unity there exists an abyss'.3 Depretis madesome effort to bring all parties together on better personal terms, andbegan to send out general invitations to an occasional soiree.4 A slightrelaxation of tension was noticed for a while, and it was hoped that ina few days most people might again be in agreement.5 But suspicionshad returned to antagonize people beyond the possibility of reconcilia-tion, and the two main parties, radical and liberal, were to grow furtherand further apart during the course of the month.

Depretis himself, nevertheless, continued to try and run with bothhare and hounds. In important respects he still adhered to Garibaldi'sprogramme as distinct from Cavour's, and was thus thinking of a fairlyswift passage on to Rome and even to Venice.6 When explaining hisviews later in parliament, he said that in such military matters Garibaldiwas to be trusted. As far as internal politics were concerned, his firstprinciple was to try and reconcile both sides with a 'formula', and hisnatural disposition was to commit himself to neither side until circum-stances forced a choice. The widening gap in Sicilian politics now puthim in an ever more false position. The radicals later claimed that hemust have been working all the time in secret collusion with Cavour,

1 7 August, U Opinione (Turin), report from Palermo dated 3 August.2 P. Bozzo, SuW annessione al regno Italiano della Sicilia, dated 8 August, p. 1.3 18 August, L* Indipendente (Messina).4 11 September, Nievo to Melzi (Dino Mantovani, II poeta soldato Ippolito Nievo,

1900, p. 371).5 10 August, V Annessione.6 20 August, Bargoni to De Bianchi (Memorie di Bargoni, pp. 141-2); 6 August,

Depretis to Garibaldi (ACM).

166 Political Differences in Sicily: Augustand just waiting for Garibaldi to be safely out of the island. The accusa-tion was even made by the autonomists that he had purposely keptSicily without law and order so as to create a panic, which he could thenuse for pushing through annexation.1 This was nonsense; but even sohe certainly gave Cavour to understand that he was not fully behindGaribaldi, and he kept in touch with the prime minister at Turin bothdirectly and through intermediaries like Farini, Cordova and Amari.2

It was also true, as Palamenghi-Crispi said, that 'he was already inpossession of a royal decree, with the date left blank, that appointedhim royal commissioner... as soon as the annexation should beproclaimed'.3 This simultaneous allegiance to both king and dictatorwas bound to present insoluble difficulties as soon as Cavour decidedthat the monarch must declare war on the revolution.

As Garibaldi moved farther away from Palermo, Depretis foundhimself more and more left to his own devices, his own responsibilitygrowing, and a decision less and less easy to postpone. Before long hewas so far out of touch with the dictator as to have to learn the news ofthe war from reports in the daily press.4 On 14 August Amari notedthat the prodictator was thinking in terms of a quick conclusion byformal annexation,5 and Cordova confirms this.6 The ambitiouspolitician in Depretis also let it be known again at Turin that he wouldlike a coalition between Cavour and his own parliamentary party, so asto put up a common front during the national emergency.7 Yet hecould not go on playing for the gratitude and esteem of Cavour withoutthis losing him the esteem of Garibaldi. To break with either mightruin his career, and might even be a signal for the outbreak of civil war,as La Farina was almost pleased to note.8 Depretis was still carefully

1 25 September, Tom Pouce (Palermo).2 E.g. 17 August, Farini to Depretis {CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 99).3 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 342 (edited after his death by T. Palamenghi-Crispi).4 9 August, Depretis to Amari {Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona, vol. 11, p. 115).5 14 August, Professor Amari to Count Amari {ibid. p. 123).6 August, Martini to Castelli {Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1, p. 312).7 Ibid.8 Franchi deliberately omitted the most hostile and offensive remarks in La Farina's

letters, but there are still plentiful references to possible * civil war* between moderatesand radicals; e.g. Epistolario di La Farina, ed. Franchi, p. 361 (17 July), p. 370 (19 July),p. 411 (22 August).

Political Differences in Sicily: August 167feeling every step of his way, trying to preserve the alliance, but neverliking—Cavour had noticed this—to affront public opinion, and neverbeing absolutely clear in his own mind what precisely he wanted orhow to attain it. People generally agreed that his first motive wasambition; * but, if he had any strong views one way or the other, theywere so shrouded in caution and indecision that not even his secretaryquite knew what they were.2

The moment for a choice seemed to have come when on 19 AugustGaribaldi departed from Sicily on his lightning passage to Naples.Many Sicilians who had hitherto been willing to leave all to thedictator's wisdom now saw that, with him gone about other business,and Piedmontese laws being brought in one after the other by hisdeputy, they were likely to lose all say in settling the future status oftheir country if they did not vote soon.3 Those who wanted only a looseunion with Piedmont would have agreed with those who wanted out-right annexation, in considering this matter of self-determination apoint of 'face' and prestige. For these reasons Depretis hoped thathe could proceed to hold a plebiscite in Sicily. He had understoodfrom Garibaldi ever since July that annexation would not be delayedbeyond the moment when the revolution no longer needed Sicily asa base for operations, and there was good reason to think that this timehad come.

Perhaps Depretis did not realize that some arguments still told in theother direction. Even after the capture of Naples on 7 September,Sicily could still be regarded as a source of soldiers and war material;and Garibaldi knew that, once the moderates were in control of Sicily,they would hardly help their political opponents to carry out the veryexpedition on Rome which they dreaded above everything. Garibaldi'slack of confidence in Cavour's good faith had lately received furtherconfirmation from a number of different directions. It had been fearedsince July that Cavour was actively preparing for either an alliance withthe Bourbons or a pronunciamento at Naples, and both alternatives carrieda threat to the radical policy of revolution. In August there had already

1 5 August, Pallavicino to Garibaldi (G. Pallavicino Trivulzio, Le Memorie, vol. m,1882-95, p. 600).

2 20 September, Bargoni to Depretis (Archivio Depretis ASR).3 6 September, II Regno d' Italia (Palermo).

168 Political Differences in Sicily: Augustbeen the dissolution of Bertani's army and the prohibition of furtherrecruitment of volunteers in the north. Garibaldi was therefore able toclaim with good reason that he still needed his dictatorial powers inSicily; and this claim proved to be justified in the end, since the islandwas required as a base and an insurance against defeat right up until thethreat of Bourbon counter-attacks disappeared in October.

Nevertheless, Cavour had by now rendered all such discussion moreor less academic, for he had taken his decision to march through thePapal States and stop Garibaldi's further advance. The plan for invasionwas synchronized to take place along with an intensification of hispropaganda campaign in Sicily, the intention of which was to weakenGaribaldi and if possible to delay him further. Meanwhile, Persano, itwas hoped, might be able to take over the town of Naples with thetroops he already had available on board ship in the bay. In so far as itaffected Sicily, this plan included a well-subsidized attempt to turnpublic opinion towards demanding an immediate plebiscite. Depretiscertainly connived at this, even if he took no very active part in it. Hispolicy till now had been to put through a vote of annexation as soon asever Garibaldi could be persuaded that the military situation allowed it;but now he was ready to go further, and to encourage the familiar'spontaneous' movements as a means of bringing political pressure onthe dictator.

Garibaldi had nominally given complete powers to Depretis, and wasstill trusting him implicitly: ' do whatever you think best and I shallapprove it', so the dictator had written to him as lately as 10 August.1

But it had been tacitly recognized that the annexation question was areserved point which involved strategic considerations, and upon whichtherefore Garibaldi alone could pronounce. Depretis now led Cordovato believe that he was on the point of carrying out a palace revolutionand announcing the plebiscite on his own responsibility.2 ProbablyCordova was wrong about this, whether intentionally or unintentionally.The prodictator knew that there were political as well as military con-siderations beyond his competence and his knowledge, and he mustalso have been aware that these political considerations would enter

1 E. Librino, * Agostino Depretis Prodittatore in Sicilia', Nuova Antologia, December1930, p. 479.

2 24 August, Cordova to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 138).

Political Differences in Sicily: August 169more and more into the situation as Cavour regained the initiative.Depretis retained at least a partial loyalty to Garibaldi, and knew thathe could hardly survive at Palermo without it; but this did not makehis position any more simple or his various responsibilities any easier toreconcile. Another element in the rising temperature of politics in thesouth was the arrival of that fiery radical Bertani to take up the post offirst political adviser in Garibaldi's entourage. Bertani brought with himmore confirmation that Cavour had all along been guilty of duplicityin regard to the southern revolution. The growing indignation,especially over the news of Farini's veto on further reinforcements,made it less likely that Garibaldi would allow a plebiscite, and also moredifficult for Depretis to carry out anything like a palace revolution onhis own. Only if he could persuade the dictator to agree could Depretishope to emerge successfully from such an ambiguous position betweentwo masters; and this would be the more difficult in that Bertani washourly at Garibaldi's side, while he himself was falling ever fartherbehind.

Such, very roughly, was the position in the second half of August.A minute of the Turin cabinet on the 20th shows that, as soon as itbecame clear that Garibaldi was on the move again, Cavour decided totake special measures for obtaining the Sicilian plebiscite.1 He explainedto Depretis that annexation would solve everything, since, 'in theenthusiasm such an act would arouse, all these party bickerings andpersonal animosities would be forgotten'.2 At once, says Amari, theprodictator became 'resolute for annexation, and even Crispi does notnow disagree; though Depretis is afraid that Garibaldi in his exaspera-tion may refuse if we first ask his permission, and may create a scandalif we do not ask him at all'. Evidently it was still possible for Crispi aswell as Depretis to want quick and unconditional annexation. Evenwhen Cavour began to move his troops towards the south, some of theradicals could still hope for a time that this meant, not antagonism, butgrudging acceptance of Garibaldi's programme to conquer Rome.

Depretis had been forced to discard candour and honesty to the pointof keeping not only his secretary, but even Crispi his chief minister,unaware that he might be working with Cordova to halt Garibaldi and

1 E. Artom, L' opera politica del Artom, p. 278.2 27 August, Cavour to Depretis (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 170).

170 Political Differences in Sicily: Augustbring the revolution to an end.1 He later tried to maintain that he hadallowed no one to oppose the dictator's wishes; but there is evidencethat the opposition leaders had first secured his approval for theircampaign,2 and Crispi stated that some of the propaganda literaturesent round the island betrayed by its seal and paper an origin in theprodictator's own office.3 Depretis tried to keep at least the semblanceof impartiality by retaining Crispi in office, even though the radicalleader stood under Cavour's severe censure; but Crispi was not deceivedby this, and Cavour took it as yet more evidence of untrustworthiness.The prodictator was evidently appreciated by neither side. Persano'thought' that Depretis led the right wing pf the revolutionary party,and believed that he sincerely wanted annexation, but 'not even thisright-wing party offers our Piedmontese government any opening forinterference in Sicily. The party of Depretis is nevertheless the onlygroup which even goes so far as wishing us to interfere, and I think thatwe shall have to try and get on with it as best we can.'4 On the29th Asproni gave Crispi a quite different view of the situation, as seenby a radical: 'Depretis wishes to open a way to power for himself, inTurin. He has no liking for Cavour, but he will second him with thisend in view. Cajoled by Cordova into the belief that he is winningCavour's favour by listening to his advice and virtually surrenderinghis own will to him, he regards your achievements and your presencein the ministry with secret disapproval.'5 The peacemaker was becomingsuspected by both sides, and not without reason.

In the absence of a candid statement of policy by Depretis, politicalinterest concentrates on the duel between Crispi and Cordova. FilippoCordova was a very able Sicilian lawyer, in Cavour's opinion the mostcapable of all Sicilians, and later to be a minister at Turin. He wasanother of those Sicilian autonomists whom long residence in Turinhad turned into what he himself styled 'the most Turinese of all

1 30 August, draft letter of Crispi to Garibaldi (ACP, f. 135); 20 September, draftof Crispi to Scelsi (ACP, b. 152).

2 Ed. V. Cordova, Filippo Cordova.. .Discorsi.. .Scritti.. .Ricordi, 1889, vol. 1,p. 108.

3 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 402.4 4 September, Persano to M. d'Azeglio (Raccolta Azegliana MRR).5 29 August, Asproni to Crispi (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 402-3).

Political Differences in Sicily: August 171Turinese in the world'.1 He had been an old colleague of Cavour'sjournalistic days, who had then become a civil servant in Piedmont.In June i860 he had been sent to Palermo so that he might repair someof the harm done by La Farina in baiting Garibaldi. The dictator hadreceived him well. Some of the other radicals, however, rememberedagainst him how he had at first ridiculed as lunacy their plan for aSicilian expedition,2 and he was looked upon as one coming to takelucrative office under Garibaldi only when the fighting and the dangerwere over, perhaps even as an instrument to undermine the dictator'sposition.3 At first they thought he was still something of an autonomist.But soon, when Depretis showed himself too scrupulous to indulge inblatantly disobeying Garibaldi, it was Cordova with whom Cavourmost frequently corresponded, and who had obviously inherited theleadership of the plebiscite party. Cordova first tried to reach someunderstanding with the prodictator, and after frequent interviews thelatter seems to have arranged to allow the circulation of annexationistpropaganda in the provinces.4 This plan of campaign was decided ata meeting on I August to which were called all those prominent citizenswho wanted immediate annexation. At this meeting Cordova madespecial provision for those who still hoped to secure some localautonomy, and even for those who wanted annexation only uponspecial conditions laid down in advance. Attractive schemes of adminis-trative decentralization were propounded for their benefit, and a speechby Farini on this subject was specially reprinted for wide distributionamong those who liked to think of Palermo as a regional capital witha governor-general of its own.5 This helped to win the alliance of amost important, probably the most important, body of opinion in theisland.

Depretis, still trying to bridge the gap, at one point offered to makeCordova minister of finance; but the latter refused because Crispi still

1 1 September, Cordova to Castelli (Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. i, p. 319).2 9 July, Asproni to Crispi (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 318).3 16 October, V Unita Italiana (Genoa), report from Palermo dated 5 October;

18 November (ibid., report dated 9 November).4 2 August, Natoli to La Farina (Epistolario di La Farina, ed. Franchi, vol. 11, p. 388);

V. Cordova, Filippo Cordova, vol. 1, p. 108.5 30 August, Cordova to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 189).

172 Political Differences in Sicily: Augustheld his post as minister for internal affairs. Cavour knew that' Cordova is the only man capable of administering the finances ofSicily',1 yet he specially instructed him on this occasion to refuse thisappointment in the government,2 and then went on accusing therevolutionary government of doing irreparable damage to the financialsituation of the island. On receiving these instructions Cordova turneddown all office involving political responsibility. But it was noticedthat he had no scruples in taking salaried government employment inthe shape of the biggest official legal post at Palermo; and this, more-over, did not prevent him still carrying on agitations all over the islandagainst Garibaldi's published policy.3 A fortnight before Cordovaaccepted this post, the same office had been—perhaps over-ostenta-tiously—refused by Crispi on the grounds that he had not come toSicily in search of jobs and salaries. Cordova was a highly respectableperson, who was carrying on what he thought to be the best policy bythe best available means. But in admitting this, one must also point outthat, in any comparison of worth, morality and self-sacrifice, theradicals do not emerge nearly so badly as some of the liberal historianswere wont to assume.

Cordova's chief opponent in the government may have been a manof less common sense and less moderation, but he also had more vision,more energy and more loyalty than members of the liberal 'party oforder'. Since the middle of July Crispi had again been in control of thepivotal department of the interior, an office which in Italy has usuallycarried enough powers of police and patronage and local gerry-mandering to make it the real centrepiece of government. Crispi's viewsdiffered from those of many other radicals; and since until the middleof September he was to be the leading spokesman of this faction inSicily, the singularities of his creed must be carefully distinguished. It isdifficult to know which he held to be the greater enemy of united Italy,whether it was the narrow-minded Sicilian municipalists, or else thatparty at Turin which put the emphasis on a greater Piedmont. What iscertain is that, unlike Mordini who succeeded as leader of the radicalswhen Crispi left to join Garibaldi at Naples, he did not try to compete

1 29 November, Cavour to Victor Emanuel (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 280).2 9 August, Cavour to Cordova (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 49).3 1 September, Governor of Catania to Crispi (ACP, f. 143).

Political Differences in Sicily: August 173with Cordova for the alliance of those Sicilians who wanted specialconditions of entry into the framework of united Italy. It was Crispiwho had proposed and secured the proclamation of the Piedmontesestatute, when many others would have preferred to restore the Sicilianconstitutional law of 1848. His Precursore strongly criticized the selfish-ness and foolishness of autonomy,1 and was itself reviled by other papersfor sacrificing Sicilian interests to the idea of a unitary state.2

Another common accusation against Crispi was that he was arepublican, all the more dangerous for being so in secret. It is true thathe was still friendly to Mazzini, but Crispi had finally renounced hisown republicanism, and his hope now was that the king would over-turn Cavour and unite all Italians round Garibaldi's revolutionaryprogramme.3 We have already noticed how Crispi's monarchism hadreached the point of sending his friend La Varenne in secret to see theking, and of dispatching humble tributes of loyalty through Correnti.The radicals continually returned in this way to the hope that theycould fall back on the monarchy against Cavour; and perhaps Cavour,by exploiting in emergencies the king's friendly relations with Gari-baldi, gave Crispi too much confidence on this point and let him set toofast a pace. As for the federalists and autonomists, Crispi regarded themas mostly traitors,4 and their policy as just playing the old French gameto keep Italy weak and divided. There is no doubt that he backed thecause of annexation in the cabinet throughout August. Despite allLa Farina said, Crispi's policy had been (so he wrote to Mazzini) that'as to annexation, it will be established bv vote as soon as this can bedone without interfering with our ope] ations on the Continent....The separationists.. .now demand the convocation of the assembly andconditional annexation. But we shall overpower them in the end.'5Like Cavour, he did not want conditions and did not really want anassembly. He chiefly differed from the moderate liberals in wishing towait for annexation until Garibaldi was well established on the con-tinent, and in considering any differences about the method and timingof a vote as altogether subsidiary to military operations.

1 E.g. 29 July, II Precursore. 2 6 September, Tom Pouce.5 23 July: 'let Cavour go on eating his artichoke; but as for our Re galantuomo, he

has never been an egoist like that, and he wants what we are wanting', II Precursore.4 23 September, ibid. 5 31 July, Crispi to Mazzini (Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 363-4).

174 Political Differences in Sicily: AugustCrispi was to change these views only in the last days of August when

he discovered that Depretis was in reality a 'lieutenant of Cavour' withulterior motives, and that the annexation which he had himself alsobeen striving for was secretly intended by Cordova simply as a meansto cut short the revolution. He then realized that the moderates had inmind the continued alienation of Rome and Venice, and the triumphof a 'greater Piedmont' policy over that which aimed to build a newkingdom of Italy. The cause of immediate annexation thus threatenedCrispi personally with political defeat and possibly with a return toexile in England. Suddenly it dawned on him how Cavour had dis-covered a way to recapture the initiative after four months of waitingupon Garibaldi's good will. Sicilian politics therefore took on a newvirulence at the end of August, especially with the arrival of yet moreimperious envoys from Cavour like Casalis and Bottero, and of otherprominent radicals like Asproni and Friscia.

Even more decisive in causing Crispi's change of front was the sus-picion that Rome might after all be out of Garibaldi's reach. So far theplausible assumption had been that they would march on Rome andthence offer Victor Emanuel the crown of Italy. This may have beenfoolishly optimistic, but surely no more so than Crispi's sustaining faithwhich had originally overcome Garibaldi's reluctance to set sail forSicily. Crispi had built his political programme on the knowledge that'Garibaldi had sworn he would not sheathe his sword till he hadaccomplished the double mission of achieving the independence and theunification of Italy.... He therefore does not wish to compromise thecause of unity by premature annexation of Sicily'.1 The radicals firmlybelieved that' the achievement of unity does not depend on an immediateannexation, or on the method of annexation, but just on Garibaldi andhis valiant army'2—that is to say, on the conquest of Rome. NowGaribaldi had hitherto reckoned on the Pope leaving Rome just as in1848-9, and on the practical certainty that the French garrison thenwould also leave, since it would have nothing left to protect. Many ofCavour's party, too, had believed or hoped as much. Cavour himselfand Napoleon III had regarded this as a possible outcome of events, andeven in the Papal Curia there were some who favoured a flight from

1 23 July, Crispi to La Varenne (ACP, b. 140).2 Bozzo, StiW annessione al regno Italiano, p. 17.

Political Differences in Sidiy: August 175Rome. But at the end of August circumstances were changing; thelikelihood was that after all the Pope would stay, and that additionalFrench reinforcements might even be sent to defend him. If this likeli-hood was verified it would probably make Garibaldi's main projectimpossible.

It was such developments which eventually made Crispi change overto join those of the radicals and the autonomists who wanted delayedannexation by an elected assembly. Nothing was certain yet, but asRome receded a little from the foreground of the picture, he came torecognize that delay was requisite and that the timing and the mannerof a popular vote were more important than he had imagined.Immediate annexation would mean surrendering the one place wherethe revolution was firmly entrenched, long before that revolution hadreached its goal. In other words it would signify the defeat of therevolutionaries by the conservatives. The failure to organize a newItaly round Rome would make what was happening seem as if it wereno more than the conquest of other Italian provinces by Piedmont.Crispi was not far wrong in thinking that to make Sicily something likea province of Piedmont was the surest way of forcing by reaction arevulsion of feeling towards separatism. An immediate and unqualifiedannexation would in this manner threaten his dream of a united Italy.1Some of the other radicals had been even quicker to see this point, andhad already begun to seek an opportunist alliance with their enemies ofyesterday, the autonomists who wanted a deliberative assembly. Therewas no deep logic about this, but in the sudden collapse of all their greathopes, it was a question of a last-minute defence to salvage something.Instead of being accepted on their own estimation as conquerors, king-makers negotiating on equal terms with Cavour, the radicals werefinding themselves faced with the prospect of being cast off again bytheir countrymen as pariahs. It would have been strange if, after sucha sudden change of fortune, they had not been thrown off their balance.

1 10 October, II Precursore.

176

CHAPTER XIII

CAVOUR FORCES DEPRETIS TOA CHOICE: 1-8 SEPTEMBER

Once Cavour had reached the decision—with whatever justice—thathe would gain nothing from an alliance with the revolutionary forces,once he no longer needed Garibaldi as a stalking-horse, it was naturalthat he should do his utmost to crush the revolution everywhere. Inthe north his army was gradually moving into position, ready to repelthe 'unprovoked aggression' from Papal mercenaries which he hadtimed to take place on 8 September. In the south he continued withadded vigour his attempt to coax or coerce the Sicilian government intoholding an immediate plebiscite. It was his hope that the concert ofEurope would consider such a popular vote to be a valid excuse foradding yet another province to his master's kingdom.

For three months now Cavour had been trying to engineer thisplebiscite. He had first employed La Farina as his instrument, withlamentable results. Then he had hoped to achieve something by themore refined methods of the tactful Depretis, only to find him tooscrupulous in respecting Garibaldi's wishes to make any overt move.So he next turned to another less scrupulous official of Garibaldi's, andtried out Cordova's scheme of promoting a big propaganda campaignall through the provinces, to work up the appearance or the reality ofa popular agitation which might be used to force Depretis to take sides.Towards the end of August he decided to send in reinforcement a Turinnewspaper editor, Giovanni Bottero, to present Depretis with an actualultimatum.1 The intention was (as one of the more influential govern-ment newspapers unambiguously and rather naively put it) to 'win overthat rich and noble province of Sicily so that its resources may beemployed for the needs of Italy'.2 Bottero was one of Garibaldi'sfellow-townsmen, a faithful henchman of Cavour, but with one footin the camp of that dubious parliamentary Left-centre which Cavour

1 23 August, Cabinet minute, E. Artom, L9 opera politica del Senatore I. Artom,p. 279.

2 4 September, L' Annessione, quoting // Corriere Mercantile.

Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 September 177husbanded so skilfully. This man was sent to demand from Depretis aplebiscite by 15 September, and for this purpose he was armed with thethreat that otherwise the Sicilian government would be treated byTurin as 'an adversary'.1 Moreover, Depretis, though nettled byCavour's abruptness and lack of finesse, had to face the compellingargument that Bottero was the long-awaited bearer of a loan, part ofwhich was payable only if the prodictator cut clean away from thedictator's policy of procrastination.

Under this pressure Depretis agreed to fix a term for annexation,2

and had to hope that a threat of resignation might secure Garibaldi'sconsent to this. He himself was convinced that a plebiscite was nowpossible and desirable. The passage of time had only tended to reinforcethe case for immediate annexation among the undecided middle ofSicilian opinion. Even among those who almost automatically followedGaribaldi's wishes, there were many who in his absence just assumedhis consent to a course of action which carried the greatest promise oftranquillity and stable government. These were the very people whosenon-partisan adherence to common sense ultimately decided most ofthe successive political crises of Sicily in this year. The dictator had atfirst asked them for delay, but he was now far away and busy aboutother things. Surely he was now less in need of a respite, and perhapshe had even forgotten all about them. Bottero's ultimatum, on theother hand, was backed by the certainty that failure to comply withwhat he asked would make Sicily be considered by Piedmont as anenemy. Crispi and his long-term plans thus began to appear ever moreobviously the chief obstacle between them and a return to peace andorder.3

Cavour's project was simple; but he was not free from criticism overthe manner of its execution. Depretis had done his best to reconcile

1 26 August, La Farina to Cordova (Carte Cordova MRR); 26 August, La Farinato Gramignani (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. vi, p. 582).

2 1 September, Professor Amari to Count Amari [La Sicilia nel RisorgimentoItaliano, 1931, p. 119); 4 September, II Diritto; and Scelsi's remarks in L' Annessioneof 6 November.

3 Undated letter to Crispi: 'for my part I think that the Cavourians have takenthis step in order to alarm the quietists and impel them against the policy of Garibaldi,in other words against you, Crispi, whom they consider an obstacle between themand the annexation which they equate with tranquillity' (ACP, b. 156, no. 78).

178 Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 Septemberradicals and liberals and to work by compromise; but Cavour haddeliberately acted to make compromise impossible, and had seemed tocare little for the damage thereby inflicted on the growth of good willand mutual confidence among Italians. Depretis and not Cavour washere the exponent of a juste milieu. If Cavour's method had beenquicker and more certain in achieving its aim, there would have beenless cause for complaint; but writing to Cavour on 1 SeptemberDepretis squarely blamed the prime minister for any delay in settlingthe Sicilian question.

If only you had helped me as you had promised, things in Sicily wouldbe better than they actually are, and annexation would by now be an accom-plished fact, and the Neapolitan business much nearer to a happy ending....

I may incidentally assure Your Excellency that all my ministers withoutexception have been agreed on hurrying up annexation.... If there nowseem to be obstacles in the way of this annexation, not least among thereasons for this is the abandonment in which you have left me for the lastforty days.1

Depretis never had occasion to address Garibaldi in such a tone ofprotest as he here employed towards Cavour. Perhaps this letter mayin part be explained as an attempt by the prodictator to find a scapegoatfor his own inability to fulfil the tentative programme he had settledwith Cavour on 14 July; perhaps, too, there is something in it of a mereangry tu quoque in rejoinder to Bottero's accusation of weakness.Nevertheless, there was plenty of justification for taxing Cavour witherrors which had arisen directly from his reliance upon partisan andinaccurate information. If the politicians of Turin had not under-estimated the difficulties of government in Sicily, the liberals by nowmight have won, and won without splitting the patriots into warringfactions. Once again there is the implication that Cavour was moreconcerned to beat the radicals than to create a united Italy.

It must be admitted that Cavour had left Depretis with no informa-tion about his own larger policy, and without any helpful advice onhow to overcome Garibaldi's objections to an immediate plebiscite.In particular Cavour had had no troops to spare for Sicily, and sent

1 1 September, Depretis to Cavour (G. Maraldi, 'La rivoluzione siciliana del i860',Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, 1932, p. 515; CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 208-9).

Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 September 179none of the arranged quotas of police or money until it was too late forthis to have the political effect he intended. He did not appreciate thatthe tax system there had quite broken down, and that the problems ofkeeping order and rebuilding the administration were quite as urgent asthe political question of annexation which filled the picture seen fromTurin. Depretis had asked for two hundred policemen as an earnest ofwhat Cavour had promised him in July, but Cavour said he could notafford a quarter of this number, and he purposely delayed sending theseuntil he had more certain news of the plebiscite.1 There was also a con-signment of cannon and rifles which did not arrive as promised. Theexplanation cannot have been simply that Piedmont could not sparethe help that was required, because later in the year four hundred police-men were produced for the south within a few hours of Farini askingfor them. The basic reason was political. Cavour did not trust Depretis.To this extent he had himself to thank when the latter's efforts onbehalf of annexation went askew. Depretis was surprised and annoyedthat the Piedmontese were so lax in helping Sicily and conciliatingGaribaldi. It was pointed out that even what little they did do to helpcould have been done with more promptness and less irritation.2 Theprodictator had been striving to improvise food, clothing and arms fortwenty thousand men, though Sicily was a poor country which had justpassed through civil war and revolution; but when Cavour wasappealed to for a loan, this could only be provided after a month's delay,and then was hedged about with conditions which made it not an aid toGaribaldi but a weapon for his overthrow. The result was that, far fromfinding such belated help a contribution towards the desired aim ofimmediate annexation, the patriots in Sicily were divided even morethan before. The radicals were presented with evidence which couldonly mean that Cavour did not want the revolution to succeed tooeasily or too well. The fiction of a common front was abruptly dis-proved, and the old agitation and faction was revived just at the

1 17 August, Farini to Depretis (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, p. 99); 31 August,Governor Mathieu of Cagliari to Depretis, that at last he could send the twenty-fivepolicemen and two officers (Archivio Depretis ASR).

2 3 and 28 August, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari > ed.d'Ancona, vol. 11, pp. 111-12, 127-9); 21 August, draft of letter from Depretis toCount Amari (Archivio Depretis ASR).

180 Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 Septembermoment when—so claimed Crispi's friends—the country had beenreturning to something like peace and normality.1 Crispi could notdeny the lack of law and order; but he accused Cavour's party ofdeliberately provoking and exaggerating disorder, and then exaggeratingreports of it, so that people would blame Garibaldi's government andlook to Piedmont for deliverance.

Depretis himself was the first to complain when Bottero arrived inPalermo with instructions compiled by people who had little idea of thetrue situation in Sicily. In his letter of protest to Cavour, the prodictatorreproved the prime minister for 'fallacious judgements on Sicilianaffairs, since these affairs cannot be weighed up properly from afar,especially by ex parte observers'. An ultimatum for a plebiscite couldhardly do much good, because the prodictator was already persuadedin his own mind that Sicily should be annexed as soon as possible; andCavour's new envoy found immediately that he was preaching to theconverted. In fact, Bottero's arrival was likely to become a positivehindrance, since both Garibaldi and Sicilian public opinion would resentthe implication that annexation was not freely willed but rather imposedon them by Turin.2 Depretis even asserted that the effect of his arrivalwould probably be to ruin any chance of effecting this annexation inthe near future.3 When Bottero told Depretis to rid himself of Crispi,the advice was indignantly rejected: 'do write and tell them at Turin tostop harping on these questions of personalities. So long as annexationis carried out, what does it matter whether this is done by Crispi or byanother?' The only result of such advice was to make Crispi suspiciousof Depretis, and more ready to take counter-action. Bottero thusbrought with him not peace, only further cause of division; and it wasupon division, not reconciliation, that Cavour and Cordova were nowbent. In a letter of 4 September Cordova said that he was not workingin collusion with Depretis over his propaganda campaign in theprovinces; but he added that he was going to persevere with his planto force the prodictator's hand, and 'if Garibaldi does not agree, we areready to do anything to obtain what he is unwilling to grant'.4 Therewas not much room for compromise here.

1 11 September, II Precursore.2 1 September, Bottero to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 209-10).3 4 September, Cordova to Cavour (ibid. p. 240). 4 Ibid. pp. 241-2.

Cavourforces Depretis to a Choke: 1-8 September 181At the end of August and throughout the first week in September

Depretis was desperately trying to avoid an irreparable breach insidehis cabinet. His chief problem was with Crispi, who was now in a mostequivocal position. As late as 24 August the ministry was apparentlystill agreed on prompt annexation, and Amari said that Crispi did notdemur to this.1 But Depretis and the ministers were afraid that Gari-baldi might disapprove when he heard of what they proposed. On the28th Amari told how Crispi was the only minister not 'impatient' forannexation, yet that he did not openly oppose it, but just raised obstaclesto create delay. The arrival of Bottero then was a final cause of division.On the 30th, Crispi's bewilderment at the prodictator's apparent volteface was clearly expressed in a letter to Garibaldi. ' Sicily is in the handsof one of Cavour's substitutes', he wrote. 'Immediate annexation isbeing openly discussed, and it is said that you not only desire it, buthave ordered it yourself. Can this be possible? Let me know.'2Pending the dictator's reply, Crispi did not dare to give way to publicrecriminations. He was beginning to realize that he might have beencaught in the wrong camp, but he could not change sides until he wasmore certain of what Garibaldi and Depretis each intended. Amariwrote on 1 September:

in the cabinet we are all agreed, even Crispi. And since public opinion mustaccuse Crispi always, they have now chosen to accuse him of wanting tohurry up annexation for reasons of ambition. I wish we could get it overquickly and so put an end to this pandemonium into which Sicily is rapidlyfalling. They are expecting an armed demonstration tomorrow, though Icannot tell you yet which party is responsible for this.3

Depretis, too, confirmed that Crispi stood 'fully in agreement' with theother ministers for immediate annexation.4

There are a number of points to remember when trying to identifyand explain Crispi's attitude at this moment. He had always strongly

1 24 August, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,vol. 11, pp. 126-7).

2 30 August, Crispi to Garibaldi (Memoirs, vol. i, p. 403).3 La Sicilia nel Risorgimento Italiano, 1931, p. 121.4 1 September, Depretis to Garibaldi (A. Colombo, Contributo alia storia della

prodittatura di Depretis, 1911, p. 17); as late as 4 September we have corroborativeevidence from Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona, vol. 11, p. 131).

182 Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 Septemberadvocated the union of north and south Italy, and had never wanteddelay for the sake of delay. Nor had he at any time been opposed to aplebiscite, whether or not this was to be held in conjunction with thedeliberations of an elected assembly; and he was in fact shortly to signa decree authorizing a vote by plebiscite alone. His leading principlehad been to subordinate everything to the development of Garibaldi'sstrategy. Ever since the revolutionary army had left Sicily on 19 Augusthe had been out of touch with what was happening at the front, andwould therefore have been surprised but not wholly incredulous whenassured that the dictator now wanted an immediate vote in the island.Perhaps for a moment Garibaldi's astonishingly swift movement up thetoe of Italy may have convinced him that an immediate plebiscite couldno longer hinder the strategy of the war. Such at least was Amari'sinterpretation of Crispi's position.1 He could not yet foresee all theobstacles in the way of an immediate march on Rome; and there alsoseemed a reasonable chance that Cavour might be bluffing the diplomatsagain, and might be ready in the case of Rome as of Sicily to 'pleureret prendre'. One more reason for Crispi's relative quiescence was thefact that Sicilian public opinion, which had never liked the idea of un-necessary prolongation of provisional and makeshift government, wasbecoming less and less friendly towards the radical programme.2 Mostof his radical friends had gone off to Naples with the fighting forces, andhe therefore felt the more isolated. His intention now was just to playfor time while Garibaldi was consulted, and meanwhile to hold hisplace in the cabinet for as long as this was possible without prejudice tohis political conscience or his allegiance to the dictator.3

All depended on what Garibaldi should decide. On 1 SeptemberCaptain Piola left with an explanatory message from Depretis to thegeneral, while Palermo was left tensely expectant as to what the replywould be. The prodictator hoped that Piola would secure permissionto hold a vote forthwith. ' Without the security for the future which

1 7 October, Amari to Cartwright (ibid. vol. n, p. 135).2 1 September, Bagnasco to Crispi: 'I have many letters from Palermo, and they

tell of the general indignation against you and how your very life is in danger'(ACP, b. 152); 7 September, Bargoni to Calvino (Curatulo, Garibaldiy VittorioEmanuele, Cavour, p. 382).

3 20 September, Crispi to Scelsi (ACP, b. 152).

Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 September 183annexation would bring,' he explained, 'the capitalists and property-owning classes will lend us no money here. I could of course compelthem, but the means at our disposal are slender, and it might compromiseus abroad.'* Piola was away for four days, but there was little remissionof the struggle in his absence. On 3 September, Depretis held one of thereceptions in which he used to sound the opinion of Palermo society;and it was noted that Bottero and the Piedmontese consul were present.The latter was being used by Cavour as an intermediary for sendinginstructions about the plebiscite campaign to his agents in various partsof Sicily.z As for Bottero, he had recently been having further con-sultations with members of the government,3 and was living withDepretis in the Royal Palace.4 It was known all over Sicily that, fromthis august address, he was carrying on propaganda for annexation.5

In the first days of September the radical cause was reinforced by thearrival at Palermo of Nicotera and his expedition. Baron Nicotera wasa man more Mazzinian than Mazzini himself, a man who until therevolution broke out in Sicily this year had been confined in a Bourbonprison. He had then formed a contingent of volunteers in Tuscany, butthis had been captured by Cavour and shipped off to Sicily as to a sortof isolation hospital. Depretis in Palermo then refused this contingentpermission to follow on after Garibaldi until their more republicanofficers had resigned. Nicotera was so incensed with this treatment that,against Mazzini's wishes, he refused to accept Garibaldi's monarchicalprogramme.6 His presence in Sicily for those few days was hardlycalculated to aid Depretis in his task of reconciliation, and Cavour'sparty took it as evidence that the republicans might at any momentthrow off the mask and repudiate their contingent loyalty to the throne.But Nicotera was too bitter, too much of an extremist, and too un-

1 1 September, Depretis to Garibaldi (Colombo, Contributo alia storia, p. 17).2 4 September, Consul's report to Cavour, quoted in Maraldi, Rassegna Storica,

1932, p. 566.3 2 September, Depretis to Crispi (ACP, £ 138).4 18 September, L* Opinione, report from Palermo dated 7 September.5 16 September, La Perseveranzay report from Messina dated 9 September.6 12 September, Mazzini to Caroline Stansfeld (Epistolario, vol. XLI, p. 67);

24 September, La Gazzetta del Popolo (Turin) gives Nicotera's letter of 13 Septemberto II Latnpo (Milan), saying that he never had shouted and never would shout * Vivail Re'.

184 Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 Septembertrustworthy to be given much confidence by the other revolutionaryleaders, and he had little influence in the south during the remainder ofthis year.

The activity of these days of waiting was described by ProfessorAmari, who was now in the cabinet. 'We are taking every step we canto push through the vote, and also to see that we secure a majority forannexation, though without letting it appear that the government isexerting any pressure. In any case', he continued ingenuously, 'howcould we exert pressure? All the soldiers have gone off to the front andthe national guard only expresses the state of public opinion.'x On the4th Amari himself drew up a form of proclamation for the plebiscite,so as to have all in readiness for Piola's return: his draft was approvedby Depretis 'and by my colleagues', which presumably includedCrispi. It is interesting and important to note that, at the same time, thecabinet approved another complementary document outlining thespecial franchises and privileges which Sicily should be given under thenew regime from Turin; this document, too, was drawn up by Amari,and the intention of its author was to specify in more detail the con-cessions which he understood Cavour was ready to make in answer todemands for local self-government.2 Some of the autonomists wereflattered in this way with expectation of favours to come if only theywould vote for annexation unconditionally. Amari's second documentwas afterwards to be conveniently forgotten, but he himself at the timewrote it in complete good faith.

Outside the cabinet room the state of agitation in Palermo lookeddangerous. This agitation ran at a deeper level than mere politics, asone can see from the fact that it continued much the same whetherunder the Bourbons, under Garibaldi, or under Cavour after November.Some people were always ready to exploit disturbances for privateinterest, and to others a riot was as good as a play. Sometimes thesuccessive piazza demonstrations seemed to be on the point of merginginto a class war like that which had been disturbing the big estates ofthe interior. The Marchese Torrearsa feared that private passions werein this way creating a conflict from which even civil war might

1 4 September, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. cTAncona,vol. 11, p. 131).

2 7 October, Amari to Cartwright (ibid. p. 137).

Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 September 185result.1 La Farina's example had thus been followed by various agitatorswho exploited political disagreements to incite the mob to violent action.2

Each political group in turn was claiming to have genuine popularfeeling on its own side and to be opposed by merely artificial demon-strations from the other. That is to say, each put its own interpretationon the facts. One report thus ascribed this febrile agitation to thefrustrated wish of everyone for early union with Piedmont.3 Anothergave a different explanation:

on 5 September Palermo was a real battlefield.... Petitions of all varietiesrained in from every quarter. Some wanted annexation today, others onlyon Garibaldi's arrival in Naples, and others after the conquest of Venice;but the greater number wanted annexation only when Garibaldi should findit most convenient Round these petitions there joined up demonstrations,and the public peace was in real danger.4

There was further disagreement on the method to be used. Somepeople wanted a plebiscite. Eight hundred others signed a petition forannexation to be carried out as soon as convenient by means of anassembly.5 The middle and upper levels of society were naturallyfrightened at the prospect of lower-class unrest, and hoped for a quickresolution of the political impasse such as would guarantee security andpeace. Some preferred conditional annexation, others unconditional,some a plebiscite and some an assembly; but, even for those who normallyhad no strong political views, annexation at almost any price was likelyto offer very solid advantages. Only an explicit pronouncement byGaribaldi could at this stage have persuaded the majority to favourfurther postponement.

Depretis was waiting anxiously to hear from Piola that Garibaldiapproved his change of mind, since on this the success or failure of hiswhole mission depended. When Piola at last caught the advancingarmy at Fortino on 4 September, Garibaldi was fully taken up with

1 Ed. De Stefano, 'Documenti del Risorgimento negli archivi privati di Trapani',Rassegna Storica, 1942, p. 799.

2 4 and 6 September, Tom Pouce (Palermo).3 12 September, La Perseveranzay quoting the Palermo correspondent of L* Opinione

in a report dated 7 September.4 11 September, II Precursors5 4 September (Archivio Depretis ASR).

186 Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 Septemberdirecting the headlong march on Naples, and he hurriedly dictated areply to confirm that Depretis might act in whatever manner he thoughtfit. Evidently Garibaldi was still convinced that Cavour either wouldnot or could not stand out against the revolution. But Bertani happenedto overhear what had been said, and at once remonstrated that it wastantamount to abdication: the annexation of Sicily would cut Garibaldioff from his base, and after Farini's circular against the volunteers therewas no guarantee that Cavour would not use this to hinder rather thanto help. The dictator therefore altered his reply to the Sicilian govern-ment, and on second thoughts wrote instead: 'I am always disposed todo what you recommend, but on this one point of annexation I thinkthat Bonaparte must wait a little longer. I prefer that all should bedone simultaneously when we reach Rome.'1 In principle Garibaldiwas never anything but in favour of annexation, and moreover hewanted it with no conditions attached so long as this did not meanthat the revolution had been defeated and brought to a close. But heinstinctively felt that Cavour was playing a deep and reprehensible game.To his simple mind, the policy of annexation seemed to have beendesigned by Napoleon and then imposed on a not unwilling Cavourjust in order to pull the fangs of the red revolutionaries. Bertani hadamplified and exploited this suspicion, and Garibaldi therefore, onthinking again, drew up this unequivocal negative, adding like a truedictator that Depretis should expel half a dozen of those troublesomeconspirators who were disturbing Sicily in his absence.

When Piola arrived back at Palermo with this answer on 5 September,he found the town more disturbed than ever. Crispi and Cordova hadjust been having a public scene with a brisk exchange of insults. Cor-dova had been circularizing the urban and provincial authorities in theisland to persuade them that they should send in reports of the wide-spread desire for a plebiscite, and some local officials had replied thatCrispi threatened them with expulsion if they did any such thing. Onthe 4th Crispi had been openly charged with this in front of Depretis,and denied all knowledge of it. As a counter-charge he accused Cordovaof conspiracy against the government.2 Both parties to this controversy

1 A. Bertani, Ire politiche d* oltre tomba, pp. 74~7-2 7 September, Sardinian consul to Cavour, quoted by Maraldi, Rassegna Storica,

1932, p. 567.

Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 September 187were so self-righteous about their own inaccuracy, and so deaf to anyinformation or advice which did not come from their immediatefriends, that neither can be considered a reliable witness as to the stateof public opinion. Crispi, conceited as ever, thus described the atmos-phere of mutual recrimination and the reception of Piola's messagefrom Garibaldi: 'the ministers and the prodictator were confused andfrightened. Only the minister for internal affairs remained impassive,saying that the agitation in the town was factitious, and that immediateannexation would be dangerous. But he stood alone, and it was evenproposed that the annexation should be ordered in despite of Garibaldi'sopposition.'1 No decision was taken yet on this proposal, althoughthere was general agreement that Garibaldi's answer was unacceptable.It was decided that they dared not publish his reply, on the grounds thatpublication would merely prolong the uncertain situation in which thegovernment had a dual responsibility to two incompatible persons andprogrammes. We may guess, on the contrary, that its publication wouldhave converted many of the waverers to Garibaldi's policy of post-ponement; but this would still have left Depretis with all the difficultiesof provisional government, and irreparably at odds with Cavour.

This rebellion in the cabinet against the dictator's ruling compelledCrispi finally to make up his mind. Early the following day, at 7 a.m.on 6 September, he presented his resignation. 'Depretis pleaded withme again and again to stay at my post, but I was adamant. The conductof Bottero and Cordova has been such that I made their expulsion fromthe island a condition of my return to power.... And so Depretis istrying to find my successor, although nobody wants the job owing tothe difficulty of keeping public order with three thousand escapedprisoners still at large.' The day continued in general scenes of agitation.'An immense crowd of people walked up and down the Toledobewailing my resignation and demanding the dismissal of the otherministers.'2 These demonstrators carried the slogan of 'we wantannexation, but only when Garibaldi says so'.3 Later in the day Crispisent off a personal messenger to tell Garibaldi what was happening. Theman chosen was Paolo Orlando, one of the famous family of radical-minded industrialists from Sampierdarena. He was to explain to the

1 7 September, Crispi to 'Luigi' (Orlando?; ACP, b. 152). 2 Ibid.3 11 September, V Opinione, report from Palermo.

188 Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 Septemberdictator that Crispi had resigned because 'Depretis had promisedCavour to secure the plebiscite. And between you and Cavour,between Italy and the foreigner, I had no doubts about my choice/*Crispi's statement continued:it is not true that the country really desires immediate annexation. Thecommunal councils have either completely disregarded the pressure broughtto bear by our enemies, or have voted in an entirely different direction....I regret not to have been able to join you, but Depretis forbade my going,fearing I should enlighten you on the true state of affairs.... From this distanceI can only warn you not to believe the prophecies of imaginary danger incase you are really opposed to annexation. Sicily will obey your slightestsign. If Depretis, Cordova, Bottero and their helpers had not stirred up thecountry, no one in Sicily would have given a thought to immediate annexa-tion. Drive out the agitators, issue a programme that shall clearly set forthyour views, and the country will at once be quieted.

Crispi was a ferocious partisan, and we cannot know whether thisinterpretation of public opinion was accurate. But it would be hard tosay either that the author of these words disbelieved what he said, orindeed that they do not contain at least a good deal of the truth.

While Orlando went to state Crispi's case, Piola was sent back againby Depretis to Garibaldi with a warning that five of the ministers wouldhave to resign if a popular vote were not taken at once.2 Further delay,said the prodictator, would make the country ungovernable. He too,but only vaguely, hinted at resignation. He insisted that he was underno pressure from Cavour, but had reached this decision by an inde-pendent study of affairs in Sicily. Answering one of Crispi's objections,he stressed that there would be plenty of time between the vote itselfand the actual surrender of power 'during which no one could troubleus'. He concluded by saying that he would have come in person to putthis case, but feared what would happen while he was away. Bargoni,his secretary, had even thought for a moment that Cordova andTorrearsa were purposely trying to entice Depretis to go and seeGaribaldi, so that they might then use the mob in his absence to carry

1 6 September, Crispi's draft (ACP, f. 135); the English edition of Crispi's Memoirsgives the date wrongly as 10 September, vol. 1, pp. 407-8; 6 September, Sacchi fromPalermo to Bertani: 'this prodictator is more for Cavour than for Garibaldi' (MRR).

2 6 September, Depretis to Garibaldi (Archivio Depretis ASR and ABM).

Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 September 189themselves into power. This fact will serve as a reminder that Depretiswas by no means entirely identified with the party of Cordova, just ashe never succeeded at any point in winning Cavour's confidence.Bargoni states in a letter of the 7th that Depretis never would havedecreed the plebiscite without Garibaldi's prior consent, and this beliefwas probably correct.1 But at the same time the prodictator alsobelieved that the welfare of Sicily and his own future career dependedon his ability to secure that consent.

The day of 7 September brought a slight relaxation of tension.Crispi wrote to Garibaldi once more, this time to recall the radicalprogramme of 22 June when the dictator had preached to the Palermomunicipality on the text of 'no annexation before Rome'. Crispiearnestly besought him not to weaken when so near to the consumma-tion of the whole risorgimento.2 A second letter was written by theradical minister to Luigi Orlando, the brother of Paolo, which indicatesthat the prodictator had momentarily yielded a point to keep Crispifrom open opposition while Garibaldi was consulted. 'Today the agita-tion has changed a little, though it is not exhausted. Cordova andBottero have disappeared. Depretis is now of the opinion that annexa-tion cannot be immediate, and that we must wait.'3 On Crispi'ssuggestion Bottero had been requested to leave Sicily,4 even if anotherof Cavour's agents, Casalis, had just arrived to take his place.5 Crispiwas now able to admit that his own resignation had been little morethan a point of personal dignity, in that 'Depretis had preferredCordova to me'.6

The prodictator had known his man, as he was again to do twenty-five years later when Crispi was once more his minister for internal

1 7 September, Bargoni to Calvino (ACM, no. 2988).2 7 September, Crispi to Garibaldi (ACP, f. 135); at the same time he wrote to

Depretis insisting that he be allowed to resign, and Depretis in reply begged him notto abandon his post but to come and discuss new proposals (ibid. f. 138).

3 7 September, Crispi to Orlando (ACP, b. 152).4 11 September, Sardinian consul to Cavour, quoted by Maraldi, Rassegna Storica,

1932, p. 569.5 7 September, Bargoni to Calvino: * Casalis arrived yesterday from Turin and is

preaching annexation like a man possessed... .He and Sant* Onofrio are most active'(ACM).

6 7 September, Crispi to Correnti (ACP, f. 135).

190 Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 Septemberaffairs and he premier of all Italy. Depretis feared not only Garibaldi'sresentment but also the mischief Crispi might make at Naples if allowedto resign, and probably he also still valued the other's tremendous driveand energy too much. This was why he made sufficient concessions totide over the next day or two. 'I am tired, absolutely worn out', wroteDepretis, 'and but little satisfied with people and the march of events inSicily.' It was greatly to his credit that, two months after La Farina'sexpulsion, he still held at least the partial allegiance of both radicals andmoderates; but the cracks were now widening, and the effort to betactful in so many directions simultaneously was proving too strenuous.With desperate cleverness he held out the bribe to Bertani's 'Com-mittee in Aid of Garibaldi' that, until the plebiscite was held, it wouldbe hard to find the expected contribution to their funds: 'for un-fortunately our affairs in Sicily are still much upset by agitation, and ifthe country does not emerge quickly from the crisis, it will be difficult,very difficult indeed, to restore the finances'.1 In two further lettersdated this same 7 September, Depretis repeated to his carissimo amicoGaribaldi an admonition that further postponement would but playinto the hands of'the few but busy separatists'; whereas on the otherhand, a plebiscite would remove uncertainty about the future, and sowould restore enough credit and financial stability to permit a betterflow of military equipment for the volunteers.2 It may be imagined howpuzzled Garibaldi must have been when presented with such contra-dictory pieces of advice.

A cross-section of Palermo opinion in the newspapers of 8 Septembershows that there was still a wide divergence of views. The Annessioneand the Precursore took their usual opposite stands, the one againstCrispi, the other for him. It was clear that the radicals were unpopularboth with those who wanted quick annexation by plebiscite, and alsowith the municipalists who resented their authoritarian and prematureintroduction of Piedmontese laws. The quasi-Mazzinian Unita Italiana

1 7 September, Depretis to Macchi (Archivio Depretis ASR).2 7 September, Depretis to Garibaldi: 'all I want is to come and talk to you.. .for

I am sure I can be of as much help to you at the front as here. You may rest assured,however, that while I remain in Sicily, I shall do my utmost so that your intentionsand your orders are exactly executed'; he also mentioned 'a certain bettering ofconditions in the country, especially in its financial situation' (ABM).

Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 September 191of Palermo noted a general rejoicing after Crispi's resignation, andcommented that the high hopes once entertained of him had now beendestroyed. But its. sister paper, Quadrio's Unita Italiana of Genoa,carried a quite different picture in a report from its Palermo corres-pondent of this very same day: 'public opinion is on Crispi's side....The better sort of people [i buoni] reproach Depretis with not publishingGaribaldi's reply, which would have decided the whole question andtranquillized people's minds/1 The Cicala Italiana expressed astonish-ment that the same old agitation for annexation had so soon begun allover again, and exclaimed that Cavour was going on the wrong tackif he really wanted national unity: 'everyone who opposes the will ofour liberator is putting party spirit before the good of the country, andstands for opinions which are false and which will have unfortunateresults for us'.2 Tom Pouce tilted against both parties, against Cordova'splot for an immediate plebiscite, and against Crispi's intention to voteupon annexation only when Garibaldi wished it.

They both represent factions in disguise.... We do not deny that theremust exist a right of petition under a dictatorship, but we cannot toleratethe Jesuitical way in which people are going around houses and shops toextort signatures for a petition which must be unintelligible to most of thosewho read it... .It is for us to await the moment of our complete redemption.. . . Either the annexation must be put off, or else, if it is to come soon, thenit should be attended by conditions.3

In these remarks we again meet the conviction of the autonomiststhat Crispi stood for an attitude not identical with that of Garibaldi,but that he rather represented a faction whose proclamation of thePiedmontese statuto revealed an intention to by-pass Sicilians andimpose on them an alien law. If people were impatient with theextreme radicals that is to say, it was often because by a mistakenanalysis they were thought to be more Cavourian than Cavour. Sicilynow had a free press for the first time in twelve years, and after thislapse of time most of the writers perforce belonged to one of these two

1 Cf. 8 September, V Unita Italiana (Palermo), with 13 September, L' UnitaItaliana (Genoa).

2 8 September, La Cicala Italiana (Palermo).3 8 September, Tom Pouce.

192 Cavourforces Depretis to a Choice: 1-8 Septemberexternal 'factions', and had received their training in politics andjournalism either at Turin or among the Mazzinians of the diaspora.It is not among these exotics, but rather among the independent journalswhich could criticize both sides, that one must look for hints about thereal sentiments of Sicilian 'public opinion'. One will then see that therewas far from being a straight fight between Cavour and Garibaldi,between liberal patriots and radical patriots. And one will also see thatSicilians were far from being unanimous about the merits of quick andunconditional annexation.

193

CHAPTER XIV

DEPRETIS FAILS TO PERSUADEGARIBALDI: 8-14 SEPTEMBER

On 8 September, the temporary lull in Palermo was disturbed by thearrival of two pieces of information. Too late for inclusion in theevening papers came the eagerly awaited telegram from Bertani tosay that Garibaldi had entered Naples in triumph on the 7th; and atonce Depretis sent off to notify Crispi of the fact, hoping no doubt thathe would now think the capture of Rome sufficiently near for theplebiscite to be held.1 But Crispi had already heard of a second piece ofnews which complicated the issue, namely that Piedmontese troopmovements were being reported in the north. This tallied with otherinformation received during the past three weeks which suggested thatthe Turin government might be meditating some more active interven-tion in the Italian civil war. It might signify that Cavour had decidedto throw in his lot with Garibaldi. Alternatively, it might mean that hewas invading the centre and south only to defend the cause of order andthe French alliance against the advance of red revolution. Crispi's presentmood was to expect the worst. Although Cavour might let it be inferredthat his aim was to help, some of the radicals already feared, and correctlyfeared, that it would rather be to hinder.2 For this reason the good newsof the conquest of Naples did not resolve the ministerial tension.

In the streets of Palermo, however, Garibaldi's triumph at Napleswas greeted with tremendous enthusiasm, and a dangerous turbulencewas converted into general festivity. The gainers from this were thethird force in Sicily, people who were happy neither with Cavour'spolicy of immediate annexation, nor with the revolutionary extremismof Crispi. Bargoni wrote thatthe triumph of Garibaldi at Naples... was providential from our point ofview, because the drive for annexation had become very strong. Apparently

1 8 September, Depretis to Crispi (ACP, f. 138).2 11 September, // Precursore, notice dated 8 September; 6 September, // Diritto.

MS 13

194 Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 Septemberthe plan had been to overthrow Garibaldi's dictatorship in Sicily, whilesimultaneously on the mainland the Cavourians would try to precipitate theannexation of Naples before the revolutionaries could forestall them. Gari-baldi would then have had to continue the national risorgimento in his islandhome of Caprera. But now things are changing, and the agitators havedisappeared.1

At the same time Bargoni's statement shows that people were losingpatience with the tactless and intransigent Crispi: 'rightly or wrongly,his continuance in office was thought to be impossible'. This seems tohave been a general impression.

By 9 September Crispi's proffered resignation had still not beenformally accepted. Depretis was hoping that, if Piola brought back ahelpful reply from Naples, it might yet prove possible to hold thecabinet together, round an agreed policy of annexation with Garibaldi'sconsent. On the 9th Crispi's friends organized another demonstrationfor his return to power, apparently without his knowledge.2 Thedemonstration was broken up by the police, and arrests were made oftwo 'awocati' and others 'who said they were representatives of thepeople'.3 The police were no longer taking orders from Crispi, andquite rightly so, since he had followed his offer of resignation by arefusal to attend to his ministerial duties; but hereafter he had theadditional grievance against Depretis that favourable discriminationwas being accorded to demonstrations from the opposite side. The partyof Cordova thought it was entitled to some revenge for the arrestsCrispi had made when he was unassailable, and now it was reinforcedby Bottero who had returned and was directing political operationsfrom a Sardinian frigate in the bay.4

If Crispi had fallen from the active exercise of power, his eclipse didnot automatically involve that of all the other radicals who made upthe 'party of action'. Probably the policy which most accuratelyrepresented the radicals was that which can be associated with the moremoderate Bargoni. Much of the unrest in Palermo had grown up out

1 9 September, Bargoni to Mordini (AMB).2 20 September, Crispi to Mordini (AMB).3 21 September, // Nazionale (Naples), report dated 9 September.4 11 September, Sardinian consul to Cavour (quoted by Maraldi, Rassegna Storka,

1932, p. 569).

Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 September 195of personal hostility to the vain, unscrupulous, if brave and single-minded Crispi. Now that this personal obstacle was removed, some ofthe autonomists near the centre of enlightened public opinion were todiscover a new sympathy with the main group of his fellow-workers.Many others who were not sympathizers still disapproved of themethods and suspected the motives of Cordova and company. Theycould see that the race between Cavour and Garibaldi to reach Naplesfirst had been easily won by the latter, and realists had to adjust them-selves to this victory for radicalism. Crispi must have told everyonethat Garibaldi had specifically confirmed his own opposition to animmediate plebiscite, and that Depretis had nevertheless refused topublish or to accept the dictator's orders on this point. People likeTorrearsa, who wanted good government and hence quick annexation,also recognized how futile it was to plunge Palermo into dangerousfaction fights when all would really have to be settled at Naples. If onlyCavour had managed to win the race, well and good: he would haveimposed annexation, and they would have had to fight rather for thepreservation of their local institutions. Instead, Garibaldi had won. Thehope of all realistic annexationists who were not fanatically devoted toPiedmont or Cavour ought therefore to be that, first accepting Gari-baldi's wishes for temporary postponement, they might then prevailon Cavour to meet Garibaldi half-way and concede a representativeassembly as well as a plebiscite.1

Public opinion is indefinable and essentially unascertainable. It is noteasy to agree with Bolton King when he assumes that public opinion atthis, or indeed at any time, definitely favoured Cavour's solution ofunconditional annexation which finally prevailed. There can be littledoubt that most educated Sicilians were eager for some form of unionwith the north, even if they would not have used Cavour's word'annexation' with its slightly unfortunate implications. But here thedifferences began. On this same 9 September, a correspondent of theliberal-conservative Perseveranza wrote from Messina that even themost earnest annexationists in that 'Cavourian' town wanted a maxi-mum of administrative and judicial autonomy. This particular corres-pondent himself had sympathized when Crispi, countering Bottero's

1 Ed. De Stefano, 'Documenti del Risorgimento negli archivi privati di Trapani',Rassegna Storica, 1942, p. 799.

13-2

196 Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 Septemberunwarranted attempt to * arrange annexation', had made answer thatSicilians as a free and proud people would rather ask Piedmont to joinherself by vote to them.1 The same writer added that those whofavoured deferring the vote were gaining converts in Messina. Theywere using to good effect the argument of'no ingratitude to Garibaldi','no talking to the man at the wheel'. Once more we have an examplehere of the influence wielded in Sicilian politics by an apotheosizedGaribaldi the Liberator, all-wise and generous. Admiration for thedictator, if it was not always unbounded, was a stronger sentiment thanthe respect reserved for that cold, remote intellect which most Sicilianshardly knew by the name of Cavour; and this admiration was alwaysthere to attract some people to the dictator's policy of waiting toproclaim national union in Rome. Likewise the tremendous pride ofSicilians in themselves and their island told in favour of the policy ofconditional annexation by means of an assembly. Surprisingly enoughit was Crispi, smarting under the sense of being deceived and defeated,who now voiced these sentiments. Underneath his outward showinghe occasionally revealed some of the deepest prejudices of his fellow-islanders. ' Cavour thought he had to deal with Emilia and Tuscany.But he was wrong. Sicily is something quite different, and must receivedifferent treatment than other provinces.'2 Now that matters were notgoing so well for them, the radicals were evidently changing course.

Meanwhile, Piola had been gone for several days on his second missionto find Garibaldi and present him with Depretis's new protest. Whenlate at night on the 7th he caught up with the general, the latter was inbed after his entry into Naples, and too exhausted to hear Piola'sbusiness. Crispi's rival embassy of Orlando and four other friends mayhave already forearmed Garibaldi with the other side of the story. Atall events on the 8th Piola had again to report failure. 'The dictator', hewrote, 'does not understand the sad state of Sicily, and does not believeyour government to be so lacking in force that it cannot wait anylonger.'3 Garibaldi's orders were that Depretis should take no actionfor another fortnight until the prospects of advance on Rome becameclearer. The political difficulties in Palermo bulked less large when

1 16 September, La Perseveranza (Milan), report from Messina dated 9 September.2 7 September, Crispi to Correnti (ACP, f. 135).3 8 September, Piola from Naples to Depretis (Archivio Depretis ASR).

Depretisfails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 September 197viewed from Naples. Instead of Piola being allowed to return with anexplanation of these new orders, he was even instructed to stand by inNaples to help with a naval landing at Ostia. This shows the true bentof Garibaldi's mind. The general had no patience with civilian wranglerswho purposely or accidentally acted to hamstring him and restrict hisfreedom of movement in the middle of such a campaign. He was con-vinced that, were he himself at Palermo, his policy would be acceptedwhatever it was. He did not understand how his deputy could be anyless respected than himself, and he cannot have known that Depretishad kept Sicily ignorant of his recent instructions to postpone a vote.On this 8th of September his mind was probably filled with thoughts ofRome, at last after many years almost within his grasp.

A second letter from Piola later on the 8th gave Depretis the informa-tion that Garibaldi planned to move on Rome within three days, butmade no mention of Piola's original mission to secure approval for aplebiscite. The atmosphere of Naples had apparently prevailed on himtoo, and he seemed more interested in whether Cavour would promotehim for his services during the Sicilian revolution.1 The dictator himselfwrote to Depretis on the 9th, and as the draft for this letter reposes inthe Archivio Bertani, with corrections by Bertani upon it, we mayrecognize the source of Garibaldi's political inspiration at this time.Bertani had a special grudge to wipe off against Cavour, since thelatter, after much public abuse, had recently prevented his own pro-jected invasion of the Papal States. Bertani's advice to Garibaldi con-tinued to be that he should oppose Cavour's conspiracy for engineeringannexation: once the revolution was victorious at Rome, VictorEmanuel could be offered the crown of a united Italy; this would con-stitute a final triumph of the revolution, and perhaps could be accom-panied by a demand for Cavour's dismissal. Garibaldi's letter to Depretistherefore argued that, 'if I must once again deny myself the pleasure ofannexation', this would only be because the proclamation of UnitedItaly must come from the Capitol and not be the result of piecemealdeclarations from provincial capitals. 'You know that your project ofannexation means tearing away one province from its revolutionary

1 8 September, Piola from Sapri to Depretis (Archivio Depretis ASR); 12 September,Persano to Depretis, * Piola has failed in his duty by not returning with an answer toyour demand' {ibid.).

198 Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 Septembersolidarity with the others. By the revolution and not by annexationshall we be redeemed.'x Surely Sicily could wait another two weeks.

During 9 and 10 September nothing of all this was known at Palermo.Depretis was still playing for time until he heard from the dictator. Hespoke fairly and civilly to a deputation of worthy Palermitans whocalled on him to ask for a representative assembly to be summoned.2

Crispi wrote to him each day in case there was a ship leaving for Naples,but every time was met with some such reply as: 'nothing today, butdo come and talk things over'.3 Meanwhile, to the extreme annoyanceof the prodictator, Bottero had defied the ban put upon him and landedin Sicily once more.4 Depretis mournfully saw himself alone, 'aban-doned', without force to keep order and carry out his decrees, withoutgood trustworthy subordinates, without the moral courage to decidefrankly for either Cavour or Garibaldi, yet distrusted by both sides.Openly to gainsay Garibaldi would be dangerously like politicalsuicide. On the other hand, as La Farina wrote to Cordova, 'eitherDepretis will carry through the annexation, or else our armies will doso—it is for him to decide if he will return to Turin hissed or applauded' .5

This was a hard choice. In despair he wrote off to Admiral Persano,hoping it might be possible to spare some warships. Perhaps, witharmed forces at his command, he would be strengthened against the ebband flow of public feeling in Palermo.6

There were a number of far-fetched rumours abroad in the city. Itwas being said, for instance, that Cordova and Bottero were plotting tomake one of Victor Emanuel's children into king of Sicily. Anotherrumour was current about Crispi attempting to reunite Sicily andNaples into a joint southern state. 'Nothing can equal the febrileagitation of public opinion in the last three days', wrote L' Annessione.In streets and cafes there were animated discussions, some groupsholding that any decision should be left to Garibaldi, and that the

1 9 September, draft of Garibaldi's letter to Depretis (ABM).2 11 September, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,

vol. 11, p. 133).3 10 September, Depretis to Crispi (ACP, f. 138).4 11 September, Melino to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 280-1).5 11 September, La Farina to Cordova (Carte Cordova MRR).6 10 September, Depretis to Persano (Archivio Depretis ASR).

Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 September 199annexationist party was ruining the country, others that Garibaldireally wanted annexation and was only being dissuaded by Bertani;but everyone of course 'claimed to speak in the name of the people'.1

The Precursore boasted that the capture of Naples had brought overmore people to the radical way of thinking, because 'while annexationwas necessary so long as the Bourbons ruled at Naples, to annex nowthat Garibaldi is there would be tantamount to snatching Sicily fromits liberator and throwing it to the person who had sold Nice.... Nowthat the moment has come to create the new monarchy of Italy, this isno time for annexations! We must go full out for Rome.'2

All these rumours and disputations were then suddenly emptied ofimportance by the arrival, on the n th , of Piola's report, and by theknowledge that Garibaldi had for the second time rejected Depretis'sproposal for an immediate plebiscite. Crispi was jubilant; the annexa-tion party was quite confounded. Amari, with typical moderation andcommon sense, reacted at once: 'Garibaldi says he only asks for a fort-night's delay before annexation. How could we possibly deny thisrequest to him after he had handed over to Persano all the Neapolitanfleet!'3 The surrender of the fleet to the Piedmontese authorities wassurely convincing testimony of the general's good faith. It might alsobe assumed that he could see matters in better perspective from Naplesthan they could in Palermo.

But what line was Depretis to take? He could hardly agree withAmari, who cannot have known the extent of his undertakings toCavour. Nor did he like the idea that Crispi might go alone to Naplesand poison Garibaldi's mind by a partisan account. There was, how-ever, a fair chance that, since the dictator had once been swayed byBertani, with a little more persuasion he might change his mind backagain. Depretis therefore decided to go in person to Naples, statingdecisively that he would not return unless with authorization for whathe wanted.4 Possibly Garibaldi's letter of the 9th let Depretis thinkhimself indispensable and so made him over-confident. But in any case

1 11 September, V Annessione, notice dated 9 September.2 11 September, It Precursore.3 11 September, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,

P- 132).4 14 September, Cordova to La Farina (quoted in Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 411).

200 Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 Septembersome drastic resolution of the deadlock was necessary. Either Cavourand Garibaldi had to be reconciled in a common policy, or someoneelse should take over the government who could rule in the name ofone or other without ambiguity. Failing this, the administration atPalermo would continue paralysed, and in the absence of policy and ofpolice, of confidence and common enthusiasm, mob agitation wouldhave free rein. Persano had sent none of the ships which the Siciliangovernment had requested. Too late did Cavour realize Depretis'spredicament and promise the immediate despatch of a much-needed,much-requested battalion of soldiers, and the remainder of his agreedloan.1 This was not a spontaneous assistance for Sicily, but only a last-minute effort to strengthen Depretis. A concurrent plan was nowhastily improvised to bring back part of the Piedmontese fleet andcapture Sicily with the prodictator's connivance. But by the time thatthe news of this wild scheme reached the island, Depretis had set off onhis journey to Naples.

He started off before noon on 11 September, arrived at dawn on the12th, and saw Garibaldi at 9 a.m. On the same boat with him travelledCrispi and the Baron Nicotera. Depretis had been hoping to returnimmediately with everything settled, but once at Naples he found thatnothing could be decided during two days of'stormy discussions'.2 Inhis absence from Palermo an insurrection by Cordova had been feared,3but the deputy prodictator sent reassuring telegrams.4 A calm hadsettled over the Sicilian capital, for now that positive and apparent stepswere being taken to resolve their political disagreement, the factiousconspiracy of both extremes was temporarily stayed. People welcomedthis attempt to compel Garibaldi back into Sicilian politics to choosewhat was best for them: it had been his absence and his preoccupationwith Naples which had lain at the root of their uneasiness, and they hadbeen jealous of Naples for usurping his attention. * There is now no

1 10 September, Vice-Governor Magenta of Genoa to Depretis, with orders fromFarini (Archivio Depretis ASR).

2 25 September, Professor Amari to Cartwright (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,vol. in, p. 212).

3 18 September, L' Unita Italiana (Genoa), report from Palermo of 13 September.4 Three or four of these exist in the Archivio Depretis and the Archivio Mordini

at Barga.

Depretisfails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 September 201further question of precipitate annexation,' said one paper: 'the peopleare quite satisfied with the knowledge that Garibaldi is to decide theirfate.'1

We have three separate drafts of an edict which Depretis took forGaribaldi to sign, his intention being to establish the fact that he stillpossessed the dictator's confidence, and hence that he should return toSicily with a programme of reform, concord and immediate annexa-tion.2 This suggestion provoked considerable debate, as we can see fromthree other drafts which represent counter-proposals by Garibaldi andBertani, each of them progressively modifying the prodictator'sdemands. The first of these counter-suggestions was that the followingreply be made to Depretis:

I do not accept the resignation you have offered me. This is no momentfor good citizens to stand down from their office when they are helping mein the holy war of national unity. Go back to Palermo. Continue yourreform of the laws in the direction of making more uniform the institutionsof our common country. Try and conciliate people by filling their mindswith the sentiment of nationality, the love of Italy, and devotion to VictorEmanuel. I am sure that the Sicilian people will help me in our task.

After this text had presumably been rejected as offering no new con-tribution, a second draft, also dated the 14th, was a little more explicit.' Go back to Sicily with full powers as before, but with one limitation,that of not speaking further of annexation.' It went on to say thatannexation would follow as soon as Rome fell, when Garibaldi wouldoffer a kingdom to Victor Emanuel on two conditions: first, that theofficers of the revolutionary army should be compensated for their lossof livelihood and be allowed to transfer their commissions to theregular army; and secondly, 'that His Majesty will promise me on hisword as our Re galantuomo to prosecute the Italian movement until wepossess our natural frontiers entire, and that meanwhile he will allowme to march with my army of volunteers to the present boundaries ofthe state in order to prepare for this final war of liberation'. The thoughthere is Garibaldi's to the letter. But its cut-and-dried manner ofexpression, and the doctrinaire defiance of all considerations not only of

1 12 September, Tom Pouce (Palermo).2 All are in the Archivio Depretis ASR.

202 Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 Septemberdiplomacy but of personal pride in the king and in Cavour, also revealthe hand of BertanL Its rejection along with the first brings us tothe third and final form of reply to Depretis, which we possess inBertani's own handwriting and which speaks for itself: 'the presentstate of affairs in Sicily makes it advisable for me to accept your resigna-tion and that of your ministers. With my whole heart I thank you forall the good you have done.'x

During the two days from the 12th to the 14th Garibaldi had beenunwilling to admit the existence of such a split as this implied. But thefirm refusal of Depretis to accept these proposed half-measures left onlyone way out, and the prodictator's resignation is dated 14 September.2Perhaps it was Depretis's misfortune to have arrived at Naples in theshort period when Bertani was established as the ruling force of thecivil government, with Crispi now by his side to provide chapter andverse in criticism of the prodictator's conduct of affairs. Depretis wasunwilling to return to Sicily unless he could promote his career byobtaining annexation and becoming royal commissioner in the island.That truly would have been a great achievement. But, failing that, hehad to confess defeat; and he did so with a good grace. At Palermothey had expected Depretis back on the 14th, and the national guardwas out all day ready to welcome him home.3 Amari had been con-fident that he would return with some agreed programme, and was nowwriting that Crispi's policy could not possibly win, since 'the only forceleft in Sicily which is worth anything at all is the national guard, andthat force will have none of Crispi at any price'.4 But Amari, likeDepretis, was counting without his host.

At all events, the radicals and moderates in Sicily could no longercontinue after 15 September in the illusion that each party was covertlyworking for the other, and that Cavour and Garibaldi were acting inharmony. Realization of this fact eventually forced the undecidedmiddle in Sicilian politics to distribute itself, and this in the end was togo far in helping to resolve the whole political controversy. Before

1 All three are in Archivio Bertani MRM.2 14 September, Garibaldi's acceptance in Archivio Depretis ASR.3 15 September, V Annessione.4 14 September, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,

vol. n, p. 133).

Depretis fails to persuade Garibaldi: 8-14 September 203such a result could happen, however, the same realization infused agreater virulence into both sides. With the Cavourians it was the cuefor a more relentless and intensified campaign on behalf of annexation.To many others in Sicily it made clear that, since an ultimate Pied-montese victory seemed certain in the very near future, a guarantee ofinsular autonomy might have to be won now or never, if need be bymore forceful measures. In this way there was generated a last-ditchbitterness among all those who wanted an alternative system to thePiedmontese: and this included regionalists, separatists, republicans,federalists, and all the various sects inside the radical 'party of action'.

204

CHAPTER XV

GARIBALDI SUCCEEDS AT NAPLES:1-15 SEPTEMBER

Outside the narrow world of Palermo, in the first fortnight of Sep-tember the whole condition of southern Italy was rapidly changing. Itwas a new complication in the story that the national movement hence-forward had three or more separate centres of policy-making. Inaddition to Palermo there was Turin, and now there was also Garibaldi'sswiftly-moving headquarters on the mainland. Activity at the twocapital cities of Sicily and Piedmont henceforward had to take intoaccount the problems which arose and the decisions which were madeat this third centre of operations; and the inevitable delays in com-munication put yet another obstacle in the way of synchronizing andharmonizing policy.

Until the last moment Cavour never quite gave up hope that hemight forestall Garibaldi and arrive first in Naples. As he told Nigraprivately—sending different 'official reasons' separately for reference toNapoleon—'vous savez tout ce que j'ai fait pour devancer Garibaldia Naples. J'ai pousse l'audace jusqu'au point ou elle pouvait aller sanscourir le risque de voir eclater la guerre civile; et je n'aurais pas memerecule devant cette extremite, si j'avais pu esperer d'avoir pour moil'opinion publique.'1 It may be that in making this extraordinarystatement Cavour was not being strictly truthful, but was just concernedto induce in Nigra a useful state of mind. Against this, however, onemust remember that Nigra was his most trusted confidant and alreadyknew the extent of Cavour's multiple policy.2 One must also keep inmind those different * official reasons' which were sent in a regulardespatch. The English habit of publishing official correspondence hadforced Cavour to reserve his secret thoughts for a parallel series ofprivate letters, 'destinee a n'etre jamais publiee, ni meme communiquee

1 12 September, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 202).2 E.g. 28 November 1858, Cavour to Nigra (ibid. vol. 1, 1926, p. 221); 1 March

i860, Cavour to De Roussy (ibid. vol. in, p. 131); 9 January 1861, Cavour to LadyHolland (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. vi, p. 667).

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September 205a de nouveaux ministres..., avec la certitude qu'ils seront maintenussecrets, maintenant et dans l'avenir'.1 In this case a private letter to hisfavourite minister suggests that his hostility to Garibaldi was unbounded,or at least was limited only by the instinct of self-preservation. Theclash which now developed is almost always blamed squarely onGaribaldi, who is said to have showed incapacity and pettiness againstCavour's moderation and statesmanship. But this thesis needs revision.

In the first week of September Cavour's many agents in the southwere busily at work, some of them trying to anticipate Garibaldi byspringing a palace revolution of their own, others hoping to neutralizethe effect of Garibaldi's probable victory by first winning control of thenavy and the forts commanding Naples. Their general orders had beento secure Tappui des classes sociales les plus elevees et les plus intelli-gentes' against the radicals,2 and in this they had registered some minorsuccess. Without much hesitation the Bourbon Count of Syracuse hadaccepted a sizeable monetary inducement,3 and Persano optimisticallyhoped that with a few thousand ducats he had already won over theroyal Neapolitan navy.4 It should perhaps be stated that the existenceof this subterranean plot was generally known, at least by the end ofAugust,5 and cannot have come as a surprise either to Francesco orGaribaldi. In the long run it did no good and much harm.

One particular respect in which Cavour's activity glaringly con-tradicted Garibaldi's was in the attempt he made to preserve theBourbon army from disintegration. While Garibaldi was striving withall his power to defeat this army, some of its senior officers were secretlyworking in Cavour's employ to keep it in being for later use if need beon other purposes. Not only this, but many people suspected that theseother purposes, as well as including another national war, might alsoinclude the more immediate function of checking Garibaldi's advance.By 4 September this whole plan was shown to be as impolitic as it had

1 23 January i860, Cavour to Desambrois (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. in, p. 19).2 2 September, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 213).3 19 October, Farini to Cavour (ibid. vol. in, 1952, p. 141).4 6 September, Persano to Cavour (ibid. vol. 11, pp. 246-7).5 30 August, II Diritto quotes II Movimento, to say that Cavour planned 'to use the

alarm and confusion at Naples to proclaim a provisional government containingthose Cavourian exiles who have returned with the task of causing a revolution therewithout Garibaldi and before Garibaldi'.

206 Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 Septemberbeen ineffective. Persano realized that the employment of the dubiousGeneral Nunziante had been a mistake, for it had alienated many of theNeapolitan liberals from Cavour's programme. By delaying the break-up of the Bourbon army, of course, it had also been an unambiguouschallenge to Garibaldi. The newly-formed Committee of Order atNaples thereby came under grave suspicion of being as much opposedto Garibaldi as to Francesco; and when the liberals at last put out apetition for annexing Naples to Piedmont, no one would sign it.Cavour's original plan had thus served only to discredit the moderatecause. It had quite failed in its more immediate purpose, for by thistime hardly any units of the Bourbon army remained intact.1 Persanoconcluded, somewhat late in the day, that it would be wise to changeabout and seek some agreement with the less extreme among therevolutionaries. A few weeks earlier such a volte face might perhaps havereconciled people, and have averted some of the subsequent troubles.

The parallel, and not always wholly co-operative, activity ofVillamarina had proved equally stultifying. Cavour's official represen-tative at the Bourbon court had rather built his hopes of an insurrectionon one of Francesco's chief ministers, Don Liborio Romano, who hadsecretly promised to change sides as soon as his master's position provedhopeless. The plan was that Romano should then form a provisionalgovernment, and should formally request Cavour to land his troopsfrom Piedmontese ships waiting for this very purpose in the harbour.Here was another scheme to try and save Naples from Garibaldi. ButLiborio Romano turned out to be a frail and undependable ally, and assoon as Garibaldi was undeniably leading in the race for Naples hetransferred his treachery into the radical-revolutionary camp. Villa-marina thus had to fall back on his second line of defence, and workedupon the liberal Committee of Order to try and incite them to over-throw the Bourbon government.2 The ambassador's simultaneousnegotiations with both the ministry and the committee were inconsistent,and only aroused suspicions all round. As a third line of defence he hadalso tried to purchase the support of the mob leaders in the city.3 Thislast action cannot have helped his standing with the middle and upper

1 4 September, Persano to M. d'Azeglio (Raccolta Azegliana MRR, 564/10/9).2 7 September, E. Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 250-1).3 8 September, S. Villamarina to Cavour (ibid. pp. 262-3).

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September 207classes upon whom success in the last resort depended. All 'honestcitizens' were at this moment in terror of a jacquerie, since disorderswere already breaking out on their country estates at the approachingcollapse of civil government.1 Almost all the nobility had by now fledabroad from Naples.2 Most other people in the town were waitingtensely and without committing themselves until they knew the upshotof this three-sided political quarrel. Villamarina wrote in disgust toCavour on the 7th about their supine and cowardly inaction: 'dans larue quelques individus du peuple crient, mais la masse demeure d'uneapathie indigne et ne se prete a aucune demonstration qui puisse forcerla main au General. Pas de caractere, de dignite ni de courage; c'estdegoutant/ And he added: 'jusqu'a present il nous a ete impossibled'obtenir que la flotte arbore le pavilion Sarde et se mette sous lesordres de Persano; ils ont peur de Garibaldi'.3

Zanardelli and others among Cavour's agents provocateurs had alreadyrecognized defeat and left Naples before Garibaldi arrived there on the7th. Shortly afterwards Ribotti and Mezzacapo, the two senior officersof the northern army who had been sent to Naples, were ordered hometo rejoin their corps; and the rest followed later. Garibaldi had wonthe race, and this clumsy effort to beat him had considerably strengthenedBertani and the extremists. The dictator had no particular affection forBertani, but he was easily convinced by what he saw of this plot thatthe revolution would have to remain strictly autonomous and un-compromising. A fortnight earlier, when passing through Calabria,he had strongly favoured political collaboration, and the newly appointedcivil and military authorities there had been obliged to take an oath toVictor Emanuel and the Piedmontese constitution.4 But on arrival atNaples he was going to find evidence that Cavour had been trying tohalt the revolution and simply annex Naples to a greater Piedmont.5

Alongside this there was another impressive fact. For Garibaldi had

1 11 September, Brenier from Naples to Thouvenel (C. Maraldi, Documenti francesisulla caduta del regno meridionale, ed. Omodeo, 1935, p. 169).

2 31 August, Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 197).3 7 September, Villamarina to Cavour (ibid. p. 251).4 30 August, Governor Plutino from Reggio to Cavour (E. Artom, L' opera

politica del Senatore Artom, p. 145).5 1 September, L* Amico del Popolo (Naples); 4 September, II Garibaldi (Naples).

208 Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 Septemberfound in the provinces that it was the radicals and not the moderateswho showed themselves most public-spirited, most careless of countingthe cost, most willing to sacrifice themselves in aid of his advance. Asusual it was the 'party of action' and not the 'party of order' whichhad risen to this particular kind of occasion, and 'honest citizens' there-fore had only themselves and Cavour's party to thank if nearly alwaysthe radicals had come to power in the towns and villages of thecountryside.1

At the eleventh hour the Committee of Order in Naples did make aneffort to forestall the revolution and set up a provisional government,hoping thereby to demonstrate that they had revolted spontaneouslywithout waiting to be 'conquered', and so could claim to have somesay in the new government; but this move of theirs came far too late tobe of any help to Garibaldi, and he merely looked on it as anotherattempt by the Cavourians to usurp his power. Commander Forbesdescribed how a deputation from Naples came to meet the dictator onthe 5 th: 'Dr Tommasi, of the Cavourian party, had the audacity toread him an address, tantamount to saying that he was a very finefellow, but that he was not wanted in Naples, where they were going toform a provisional government and to annex immediately; at the sametime he presented a printed list of its members.' Forbes commented onthis that' their conduct was not only ungracious but ungenerous to thelast degree, and that it paved the way for that wretched system ofintrigue between the two factions which was so speedily to followGaribaldi's entry into Naples, where his presence had now become anecessity, not only to prevent a civil war in the streets, but a disruptionwhich might cause an infinity of harm to the national cause'.2 Themoderate Bonghi, as well as Persano, agreed that the Committee ofOrder fell lamentably in popular estimation when it appeared that itwas as much directed against Garibaldi as the Bourbons.3 The mis-calculations of Cavour and his subordinates had thus rather lessened thanimproved the chances of the moderates coming into power at Naples.At the same time they were also to give Garibaldi yet more evidence

1 8 September, La Perseveranza (Milan), correspondence from Naples dated4 September.

2 7 September, C. S. Forbes, The Campaign of Garibaldi in the Two Sicilies, pp. 228-9.3 c. 4 September, Bonghi to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 238).

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-13 September 209that Cavour was his bitter enemy. Not many more days were to go bybefore all pretence had to be dropped and the latent quarrel came intothe open.

By 7 September, however, Cavour had momentarily been forced tochange the emphasis of his policy, and to try once more to convinceGaribaldi that he was a friend who could be trusted. His coup hadfailed and it remained to put the best face possible on the fact. Hetherefore wrote with orders that Persano should go and see the generaland try to persuade him that they should jointly prepare the conquestof Venice.1 Cavour at this moment was just on the point of launchinghis army on Naples by way of the Papal States, but it was obviously inhis interest to play for time and to confuse public opinion about hisintentions. In truth it was not Venice which filled his mind, but ratherthis other subtle plan to ward off the revolutionaries from their objectivein Rome. To this object he now bent his whole attention.

Admiral Persano at this point sent back to Turin an alarmist telegramwhich was to have some importance. It stated that Garibaldi wasbitterly critical of Cavour's behaviour, and that he was under theinfluence of the republicans and was determined upon challengingLouis Napoleon at Rome.2 This telegram was written before Persanohad spoken to the general himself. It was based merely on hearsayevidence supplied by that same Tommasi who had just aroused Gari-baldi's worst anger by his tactless address. It was also written 'in thecertainty that there was nothing to get alarmed about'.3 But it will beseen in the next chapter that Cavour either became, or pretended tobecome, very alarmed indeed. While still keeping up the outwardillusion of friendship, at heart Cavour became the more convinced thatan open cleavage could not be put off much longer. This particulartelegram had mentioned that Garibaldi was making outrageous state-ments against Cavour, and its recipient now began to fear more par-ticularly than before that the revolutionaries were planning to displacehim in the king's favour. The premier was therefore able to use thiscasual but opportune report from Persano to prejudice the king againstGaribaldi, and no doubt he particularly stressed its hint about the danger

1 7 September, Cavour to Persano (ibid. pp. 252-3).2 7 September, Persano to Cavour {ibid. p. 250).3 C. Di Persano, Diario 1860-1, part 11, 1870, p. 112.

210 Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 Septemberof republicanism. It does not matter that in tenor it was an isolatedexception among the admiral's communications, nor that it was nottaken very seriously by those who knew its author.1 The next day, assoon as Persano had been able to see Garibaldi for himself, he correctedthis previous statement. He now reported to Turin that the dictatorhad conceded everything, that the new ministers chosen for Napleswere good men and Cavourians, and that the republicans had beenquite routed.2 This was a fair apology and partial redress, but it wascontained in a letter sent through the post and did not reach Cavour forsome days. The Piedmontese invasion of the Marches at this momenthad just severed telegraphic communication between north and south,and no telegrams at all could be received in Turin from Naples between9 and 28 September. In the interim, communications were slow, andPersano's original telegram thus helped to set the tone for Cavour'spolicy at a crucial period. It was in these few days after the 9th thatgovernment and revolutionaries became publicly irreconcilable.

Hearsay and misconstruction apart, the actual deeds of Garibaldi uponhis arrival in Naples were noteworthy for their moderation and states-manship.3 He showed far more sense of good will and compromisetowards his political opponents either than they credited him with, orthan they were prepared to show him in return. Instead of Persanohaving to try and capture the port and the strategic forts which dominatedthe city of Naples, Garibaldi actually requested that the Piedmontesesoldiers in the bay should be disembarked from their troop-carriers inorder to garrison the town. Enactments of the revolutionary govern-ment were all given out in the name of'Italy and Victor Emanuel\ Thefirst number of the new Giornale Officiate carried the cross of Savoy—although the printer in error used the pre-constitutional form whichhad been disused in Piedmont since the absolutist days of 1848. Gari-baldi's very first decree of all, moreover, gave the whole Bourbon

1 8 September, Nigra to Cavour: 'je crois cependant que Persano exagere un peu,selon son habitude* (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. rv, p. 197).

2 8 September, Persano to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 261-2); also11 September, Persano to Cavour: 'if I am not mistaken I think that Garibaldi is nowconvinced of the necessity of following your policy, and abandoning his own morerash and risky one' (ibid. p. 272).

3 A. J. Whyte, on the other hand, called them 'deplorable' (The political life andletters of Cavour, p. 428).

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-13 September 211fleet to Admiral Persano. This act alone might well have shamedCavour's hostile suspicions. Piedmont was being presented with a moresubstantial navy than she already possessed, in which there were fiveships able to outgun any of her own.1 What was more important, theywere the only ships that the revolutionaries could have used in the com-bined operations now being set on foot against Rome. Cavour was infact receiving the most valuable gift he could have been given, and some ofthe extreme radicals at once recognized it as a signal loss to their cause.2

The only explanation for this moderation is that Garibaldi mustsurely have expected Persano to aid him in his next move upon Rome.Otherwise to surrender those ships was virtual abdication. Evidentlyhe still felt that the government at Turin would be swept on by themomentum of public opinion; or else that Cavour once more must beopposing him only verbally and for form's sake; and in either case that,in the last resort, the king would accept anything from the revolutionariesso long as they were successful. Twice already this year, over theexpedition to Sicily and the crossing from Sicily to Naples, Cavour hadpurposely allowed the revolutionaries to think that his public state-ments might have been 'for diplomatic consumption only', not neces-sarily to be taken at their face value. With one hand he had tried hardto dissuade, but the other was held ready to help if and when success wasrecorded. This had been a policy of opportunism, not of design. It wasnot long-premeditated, but rather stumbled upon, and then rationalizedex post facto and lifted to the dignity of being called a programme. Forotherwise Cavour would surely have devised some arrangement where-by Garibaldi would have known when the government was in earnestand when only pretending. The limitations of such opportunism nowbecame apparent, for Garibaldi imagined that, as in Sicily and Naples,he would also be given a fair chance to succeed against Rome. Theresult was that Cavour found himself in a position where he had toface the possibility of fighting a civil war against his fellow-patriots.

At Turin, Garibaldi's surrender of the fleet was probably taken as yetmore evidence that he was nothing more than 'a well-meaning goose'

1 The superiority of the Neapolitan fleet is underestimated by C. Randaccio, Storiadella marina militare Italiana 1860-70, vol. 1, 1886, pp. 196-9; see Elliot's dispatch of26 September, F.O. 165/135.

2 22 September, V Unita Italiana (Genoa), report from Naples dated 12 September.14-2

212 Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September—the description is Sir James Hudson's. True enough, the dictator wasa simple-minded man with little keenness of intelligence, and so was aneasy butt for the clever politicians in the north. But if Cavour and theothers had been still cleverer than they were, perhaps they would nothave made the cardinal error of underestimating Garibaldi out of whatwas sometimes mere snobbery and priggishness. They took his foolish-ness and incapacity so much for granted that they never gave him thecredit that was his due. They all too often assumed or pretended that hewas a puppet of the republicans. It seldom occurred to them that hecould be more popular than they were, or even in his own way moreefficient in governing southern Italy at such a time. Garibaldi's instinc-tive feeling for public opinion sometimes made him the equal of Cavourin knowing what was expedient. The dictator's obeisance to St Gennaroat Naples in September, for instance, or to St Rosalia at Palermo inJuly, exemplified his political tact at its most successful, though this wasa quality which the liberals refused to allow him. Indeed, it showed apolitic deference to public superstition against his own private convic-tions such as was not in keeping with Cavour's nature to have everdisplayed. This anxiety not to shock local susceptibilities was the verypoint upon which subsequent Piedmontese rulers in Naples were to beby comparison most open to criticism.

The common people of Naples were conquered at once by hisbenevolence and his success. Marc Monnier noted that ' Garibaldi estun saint pour les lazzarones. C'est Dieu qui l'envoie pour sauver lepays; plusieurs l'appellent Jesus-Christ; ses officiers sont les apotres.'1Depretis wrote to Cavour from Naples on the 13th: 'the governmentmust not forget that the popularity of the general is immense. He isaccompanied by a torrent, which can have its course regulated, but notbe dammed up.'2 For many Neapolitans, no doubt, the delight overGaribaldi'sjoyeuse entree was mixed up with a moderate dose of straight-forward carnival spirit. Probably it did not betray intelligent apprecia-tion of altered political conditions, so much as relief at escape from ahalf-known danger, and perhaps a willingness to welcome whateverking might reign. Different levels of society must have viewed himwith very different feelings. The possessing classes were always terrified

1 Marc Monnier, Histoire de la conquete des deux Sidles, 1861, p. 302.2 13 September, Depretis to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 290).

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September 213that the revolution might cut society into two halves,1 and many weresoon hoping that Piedmontese forces would shortly arrive to save themfrom social anarchy or a Bourbon counter-attack. The dictator's greaterinterest in conquering Rome than in defending their big estates fromdamage was to them as inexplicable as it was deplorable. As early as9 September, the British minister remarked how the fear that Garibaldi' was determined to pursue his theory of Italian unity to its most extremelength filled the reflecting portion of the community with apprehensionand gloomy foreboding'.2 A week later, and the national guard wassometimes firing on the Garibaldians. Many of the Neapolitans 'wouldgive their ears to get rid of him and are quite astonished to find thathe did not come here in order to be their very humble servant'.3 Theappearance of such sentiments among the politically conscious classeswas to be historically important, but it never much affected theenthusiasm for the dictator among the common people. In later yearsthese few months were often looked back to with regret. Despite allthe disadvantages of civil war and insecurity, there was still someattraction in being ruled con amore instead of con forza.

Garibaldi's policy after 7 September continued to be as empirical asever, pursuing his advance until he met a force too strong for him. Hisinterest was almost entirely in the military situation and not in politics.He was in a hurry, because his campaign would have to be over beforethe winter rains came in November, and already on 8 September he wasplanning to move on towards Rome in three days' time.4 His soleconcern was the Holy City. On the 10th he sent a note for publication inSicily, to confirm once more that union with the kingdom of Sardiniawould be effected only when the acquisition of Rome made possible afull union of all Italy.5 When he heard about Cavour's invasion of thePapal States, his instinctive reaction was to fit this into his own scheme,and to hope that the king's ministers must have been carried away bysuccess, by public opinion, by the king himself, and perhaps also by

1 10 September, // Nazionale (Naples).2 9 September, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 165/133/499).3 18 September, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).4 8 September, Piola from Sapri to Depretis (Archivio Depretis ASR).5 10 September, Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Giuseppe Garibaldi, vol. rv, 1934,

pp. 298-9.

214 Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 Septembertheir own better nature, to connive at a march on Rome. 'Garibaldia ete on ne peut plus charme de la decision que vous avez prise d'occuperTUmbrie et les Marches', wrote Villamarina to Cavour on the 10th.But the dictator had then gone on to express some doubts which hehoped would be forwarded to Turin: 'si cette decision avait ete priseavec la pensee de former un cordon autour du Pape pour sauver unepartie de ses Etats, elle produirait le plus mauvais effet'. He already toldVillamarina that he was shocked to find signs at Naples of anotherpropaganda campaign for annexation such as he had already met inSicily. He repeated that he had no confidence in diplomacy as amethod, yet he allowed it to be known that he would first wait to seeif the French could be induced to leave Rome of their own accord.1

This was an attitude of guarded optimism, but by no means one ofirreconcilability or defiance.

In another interview of this same day with Elliot and AdmiralMundy, Garibaldi gave the impression that he was 'an enthusiast, whohad determined to risk all on the prosecution of his idea of Italian unity'.2

On the subject of Venice, 'he was confident in the present humour ofthe Italian people, that the King could not decline the undertaking with-out the sacrifice of his whole position and popularity Garibaldianswered that he had no alternative but to go to Rome, and he declaredthat he did not even look upon it as an enterprise of any considerabledifficulty.'3 Obviously he would have shared the general belief thatthe Bourbon columns retreating upon Capua and Gaeta would crumblejust as the rest of Francesco's army had disintegrated all the way fromPalermo.4 At Naples, and even at Turin, it was quite possible to believethat the French would prefer to abandon Rome rather than risk a warwith the last ally they had left in Europe. So long as the nation wasreally united, it would not be worth Napoleon's while to pit himselfagainst it by force of arms. On this hypothesis, Cavour could only bewaiting for Garibaldi to occupy the city with his 'irresponsible' and'uncontrollable' forces, so giving Victor Emanuel the excuse to arriveand 'restore order' in the accepted manner. Garibaldi, now as always,

1 10 September, Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, p. 273).2 Mundy, H.M.S. Hannibal at Palermo and Naples, p. 244.3 10 September, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 165/133/502).4 The Westminster Re view, January 1861, vol. xix, p. 133.

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September 215was quite ready to be disowned in the event of failure; but as successwould make Italy a nation state at last, the gamble seemed well worththe risk. No one who was grateful to him for his defiance of all cautionand prudence in May could blame him for now wanting to chance hishand again. However mad his plans may have seemed to a moderateman like Elliot, 'one must admit that his landing at Marsala did notappear a much less desperate undertaking'.1 Thayer, Bolton King,Trevelyan and Whyte were all agreed in deploring Garibaldi's 'maddesign on Rome' as something supremely nonsensical and unrealistic;but there was something to be said in its favour; and there is somesignificance in the fact that the king and Cavour made such half-hearted efforts to argue him out of it.

No doubt sheer lack of brains also played its part in making Garibaldimisunderstand or fail to sympathize with Cavour's position. But ifmisunderstandings had accumulated all through the summer, the chiefresponsibility for them must be sought elsewhere. Garibaldi had neverconcealed his intentions and never deviated one jot from his publishedprogramme; but Cavour on the other hand had never once publishedwhat anyone could feel sure was his real purpose, and even today it ishard to judge from his many contradictory statements what were histrue opinions at any one moment. What historians cannot know forcertain today, Garibaldi can be forgiven for not knowing amid all theuncertainties of the actual moment. The lack of co-ordination betweennorth and south became much more pronounced after 9 September, forcommunications had become so slow that any threat or friendlymessage from either party took up to a week to reach its destination,and often arrived in a quite different context from that for which it hadbeen devised.2 In the absence of definite information, the wildestrumours were current in the south. It was said for instance that Cavourmight be forced to change his cabinet, to eliminate Garibaldi's par-ticular betes noires Farini and Fanti, and so to make possible more co-operation with the radical programme.3 There was another rumour that

1 11 September, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).2 E.g. the letter written on 14 September by Kossuth to Garibaldi at Cavour's

request did not reach its destination until the 21st (Politica segreta di Napoleone HI e diCavour in Italia e in Ungheria 1858-61, 1895, ed. L. Chiala, pp. 134-40).

3 14 September, II Nazionak (Naples).

2i6 Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 Septemberthe king was being kept in a state of ignorance by Cavour and wassecretly searching once more for occasion to break out and accept thefull Unitarian policy.1 Garibaldi was in the middle of a confused medleyof hints and threats and advice, but the northern government neverdared to give him an honest statement of their real policy. All thingsconsidered, he can hardly be blamed for thinking the accomplishmentof the great ambition of his life to be at last within his grasp.

It must be remembered that the Piedmontese prime minister waslooked on by many of the radicals as a defaitiste, and even as an actualtraitor tied to Napoleon's apron strings, as someone who was moreanxious on behalf of Piedmont and the institution of monarchy than onbehalf of Italy and Italians. That this should be so was in part a failureof publicity and human relations. When Cavour dealt with rough menof the common people like Garibaldi he proved to be much moreunapproachable and embarrassed than was Victor Emanuel. Sur-prisingly little effort was made to extend any confidence towardsGaribaldi, or even to treat him as worthy of much consideration; andthe result was to confirm the dictator in the impression that he wasbeing deceived and exploited. But besides this failure to treat Garibaldifairly and with respect, there were incidents which could not easily beexplained away. Cavour had tried hard to stop the Thousand settingout in the first place. Garibaldi's store of rifles had been impounded atMilan in May, and other munitions had been sequestered later. Althoughsubsequent reinforcements under Medici and Cosenz had receivedofficial aid from Turin, it was significant that these expeditions hadsailed while La Farina still hoped to win the government of Sicily onbehalf of Cavour. It could not be denied that La Farina had set on foota most tactless assault on Garibaldi's authority, and had done so in thename of the Piedmontese government itself. After that, when thesemeans had failed to capture the revolution, the enrolment of volunteersin the north had been abruptly forbidden, without satisfactory explana-tion, and Bertani's expedition had been forcibly diverted, first on onepretence to Sardinia, then on another to Sicily. For eight weeksnegotiations had been going on at Turin for an alliance between theHouse of Savoy and the very Bourbons against whom the volunteerswere fighting. In the meantime Garibaldi's agents in the north had on

1 16 September, A. Scialoia to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, pp. 310-11).

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September 217frequent occasions been hindered, and one envoy who had been sentexpressly to negotiate with the government had simply been dismissedoffhand as an impostor. An attempt had then been made to stopGaribaldi from continuing his advance beyond Sicily. Undertakings tosend money and policemen to help restore law and order in Sicily hadnot been honoured. Admiral Persano had given many private words ofsympathy to the volunteers, but his practical insincerity was exposedwhen the Piedmontese ships had stood aloof and unhelpful duringGaribaldi's perilous crossing of the Straits. Finally, instead of assistingthe volunteers to conquer Naples, a heavily subsidized counter-plot hadbeen directed against Garibaldi as well as against Francesco. Thesewere accumulated grievances which Garibaldi had at the back of hismind.1 If on any point they were based on misunderstanding, Cavourhad not done much to explain his conduct. But in fact they were notbased on misunderstanding. Garibaldi was quite correct to think ofCavour as his enemy, even necessarily his enemy. Cavour needed thisenmity in order to retain the French alliance and win the support ofconservative Naples.

In the second week of September at Naples this conflict came to ahead. Garibaldi by now had learnt to expect more hindrance than helpfrom Cavour, but still trusted that victory in the south might force thegovernment of Turin into a more open and co-operative policy. Eventhis last hope could not be held much longer. Already the more per-ceptive among the radicals were realizing that Cavour's unexpectedinitiative in Naples and Umbria might conceal beneath its speciousexterior an intent to excommunicate the 'party of action'.2 The opposi-tion newspapers at Turin had been hinting, at least from 6 Septemberonwards, that Cavour might be intending by this move to opposerather than to co-operate with the revolution.3

According to Villamarina, Garibaldi's attitude was still far from un-friendly as late as the 10th. But the realities of the political and militarysituation were beginning to dawn upon him, and while he continued toput his trust in Victor Emanuel, he became ever more impatient with

1 Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Garibaldi, vol. iv, pp. 382-90.2 31 August, G. Deideri from Genoa to Garibaldi (ACM, no. 916); 1 September,

Mazzini to Caroline Stansfeld (Epistolario, vol. XLI, p. 27).3 6 September, // Diritto (Turin).

2i8 Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 SeptemberCavour, and ever more assured in his 'holy horror of diplomatists'.1

On the n t h Garibaldi wrote directly to the king, asking him to send aman who could take over the civil government of Naples, but askingalso whether Cavour and Farini could be replaced in the government.2

This was a decisive moment in the development of the breach betweendictator and prime minister, and it shows that Garibaldi still thoughtthe king was on his side. The arrival of Depretis at Naples with hisresignation then revealed that Cavour's propaganda for annexation hadsuccessfully upset the chances of compromise government in Sicily, andin addition to all these other grievances Garibaldi therefore found him-self obliged to leave the front at a critical moment to go and pacify thefactions at Palermo. During the three days he was away, the badgeneralship of one of the more ' Cavourian' among his subordinates wasto earn the volunteers what turned out to be their first real militarydefeat of the year. It was a small check, but important in its effects,and it was to mark the furthest limit of his advance. Garibaldi neverforgave Cavour for thus forcing him to leave the battle area, butCavour had good reason to look upon this Bourbon success at Caiazzoas a real triumph for the liberal cause.

Meanwhile the identical faction fight over annexation was developingat Naples as in Sicily, with the same object and the same result. Thefollowing account by Commander Forbes must surely have been alittle excessive, but it shows what a bad impression was being createdon one neutral observer by the conduct of Cavour's party at Naples.Forbes told of the

immediate annexationists, who, finding they cannot attain their wishes byfair means, do not scruple to foster anarchy in every possible way, not evendisdaining to make use of reactionary plots. In short, the game at Turin isbecoming more and more apparent; the Piedmontese would create anarchyin the South in order to have a plausible pretext for action.... Though com-mitting an act of revolution, Piedmont must step in as a conservative powerto stay anarchy and stifle republicanism; and if they do not exist, the worldmust be made to believe so.3

1 IT September, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).z 11 September, Garibaldi to Victor Emanuel (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv,

pp. 212-13).3 11 September, Forbes, Campaign of Garibaldi in the Two Sicilies, pp. 241-2.

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September 219Though perhaps exaggerated, there was more than a little truth in this,more anyhow than in the counter-accusation that the radicals werepurposely abetting anarchy to prepare the ground for social revolutionand republicanism.

On 13 September the Sardinian ambassador at Naples addressedGaribaldi some slightly tactless remarks about hurrying up the processof annexation. This made a bad impression, but not quite so bad asVillamarina's refusal to let the Sardinian troops now on shore in Naplesgo out and help the volunteers at the front.1 Garibaldi had invited thesetroops to garrison the city, and they had accepted his invitation eventhough Piedmont was at peace with the Bourbons. When thereforethey refused his second request to help in fighting the Bourbon army,this can hardly have been due to a wish to avoid being compromised.The fact that they preferred to stay behind the lines and control the cityof Naples was bound to give the appearance that their primary inten-tion was to check the revolution rather than fight the Neapolitan king.Possibly the situation might have been handled with greater tact if onlysomeone other than the vain and petty Villamarina had been on thespot to represent Cavour's views; but Villamarina had none of the artsof a diplomat,2 he did not even possess the confidence of Cavour andthe king,3 and in any case he had been left several weeks without newsfrom the north.4 Garibaldi was allowed to see that Cavour was plottingbehind his back, buying up newspapers in Naples, making bad bloodbetween him and the king, and allowing the two battalions of bersa-glieri to land on the pretext of helping him but really to see that hedid not escape.5 'At Palermo they wanted annexation so that I shouldnot cross the Straits; at Naples they want annexation so that I cannotcross the Volturno'—so he now told the Sicilians. 6 The belief inCavour's double-dealing thus came to overlay every other thoughtin his mind, and the worst possible construction was now put on the

1 13 September, Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, p. 289).2 18 September, P. S. Leopardi to Cavour (ibid. p. 319).3 12 October, Farini to Cavour (ibid. vol. in, p. 92).4 15 September, Villamarina to Cavour (ibid. vol. 11, p. 303).5 Garibaldi, Memorie Autobiografiche, 1888, pp. 382-4.6 17 September, Garibaldi's proclamation, Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Garibaldi,

vol. iv, p. 301.

220 Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 Septemberinvasion of the Marches which a few days ago had seemed such ahopeful augury.

This sharp worsening of relations became publicly known on the15th. On that date the Giornale Officiate at Naples made public a privateletter from Garibaldi to Brusco in which the general forswore recon-ciliation to the man who had sold Nice to the French. Possibly thisletter was in fact written by Bertani; or else Bertani just seized on amomentary aberration of an annoyed Garibaldi and saw to the publica-tion of this tactless and ill-tempered letter so as to drive another wedgebetween minister and dictator. It came very opportunely for Cavour,who was already seeking the best ground for a public separation, and atthe worst was even ready for a civil war. Here he was provided with agratuitous and plausible pretext. Garibaldi's request to the king for theprime minister's dismissal had been a gage of defiance, and Cavour wasnow able to accept the challenge with some confidence. The wholeincident is one more example of the difference in mettle and tact andcleverness between these two great national leaders. It was Garibaldi'sletter to Brusco which provoked the open clash between them, and forthis reason he is usually taxed with responsibility for the cleavage. Butwhat on his side was an unpremeditated outburst in a fit of bad temperwhen things were going badly, on the other side was something morecalculated and deliberate. It must also be remembered that, while toGaribaldi the prospect of civil war against Cavour was inconceivable,to Cavour himself it was something which had already been acceptedas a possible outcome of a consciously-adopted line of action. Until theend of October, and indeed even throughout November and December,Cavour went on fearing that he might possibly have to repress thevolunteers by force.

It will be realized that this was the outcome of a difference in politicaltheory as well as in political practice. To the great majority of radicalsthe nation was something sacred and indivisible, something which wasideologically sacrosanct and which in itself constituted a whollysufficient justification for what they were doing. Cavour on the otherhand should perhaps be called a patriot rather than a nationalist. In hisown way he was like them an idealist, but he was far more pragmaticand empirical in his approach to the national problem. Whereas theradicals argued from the theory to the facts, he began with the facts and

Garibaldi succeeds at Naples: 1-15 September 221was ready to fight for national unification only when the facts seemedto justify it, only when the forces making for unification seemed to besufficient and to have enough momentum of their own. Whereas hispolitical opponents had all the virtues and faults of one-track single-mindedness, he saw the complexity of res publica. He believed forinstance that good government might be more important than self-determination. In his opinion the aim of statecraft was not simply toachieve nationhood, but was also concerned with such things as con-stitutional government, free trade, 'the principles of social conservation',respectability, the juste milieu, and a tact des choses possibles. In the nameof these other principles of action he could do what to the radicalswould seem something sacrilegious. Not only Garibaldi, but alsoMazzini and even Victor Emanuel said at various times, and surelymeant, that the making of Italy was more important than any otherpolitical principle whatsoever, whether monarchy or republic, con-servatism or radicalism, or the primacy of any one province over therest. But on this point—and not entirely to his discredit—Cavourdisagreed. In the middle of September i860 he was far more acutelyaware of what was happening than the others, and now knew his ownmind better than they did theirs. If he had artfully manoeuvred intoa position where he could and did claim to be an aggrieved party, thismust not be allowed to conceal from us that he had most to gain fromthis cleavage with Garibaldi, that he had planned it, and that he alonewas ready for it when it came. The story therefore must now be lookedat in more detail from his point of view.

222

CHAPTER XVI

CAVOUR BREAKS WITH GARIBALDI:SEPTEMBER

Cavour at Turin naturally looked upon this widening gap verydifferently from Garibaldi at Naples. By the beginning of Septemberhe realized that he had reached what he himself felt to be the supremeand critical phase of the risorgimento.1 Appreciative as he was of someof the great things Garibaldi had done for Italy, he was now convincedeven more that the man was fundamentally a menace and a nuisance.He had told Nigra that he would not shrink from civil war against theradicals if only he could win public opinion; but his own conduct overNice and Garibaldi's conduct in Sicily had left him for some monthswithout enough public support, and it was a difficult question how farand how directly and when he could dare to oppose the radicals andyet have public opinion on his side. A decision could not be put offmuch longer. The more territory Garibaldi won, the greater would bethe momentum of the revolutionaries, the larger their army, the morethey would be master of the situation, the more difficult to resist them,the more they would be able to speak on terms of equality with Cavour,and the more humiliating it would be for Piedmont and the king.Garibaldi nominally ruled over as large a territory and as many Italiansin the south as did Victor Emanuel in the north. There was seriousdanger that, by comparison with the victorious dictator, the warlikereputation built up with such difficulty by northerners for their kingwould be lost, and Victor Emanuel would appear to be merely a friendof Garibaldi the kingmaker. By i September Ricasoli was desperatelyand insolently addressing the government on this theme, saying that'les Italiens cherchent en vain leur Roi'; and so touched both Cavourand His Majesty on the raw.2 Garibaldi was almost within strikingdistance of Rome, and his arrival there—so at least Cavour imagined—

1 8 September, Cavour to Plutino (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. II, p. 260).2 1 September, Ricasoli to Cavour (ibid. p. 207); 2 September, Cavour to Ricasoli

(ibid. p. 212).

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 223would undermine both the royal prestige and the French alliance onwhich the liberal-conservatives based their policy, and perhaps alsowould invite the foreign intervention in Italy which Cavour had doneso much to avert. It might even threaten the Piedmontese constitution:for though Cavour was probably not altogether deceived by his ownpropaganda about the dangers of republicanism, still after n Septembera dictator who held power by right of conquest was asking the king todismiss the elected and responsible representative of 'the people' inparliament. Quite apart from this there was also the fact, as the Britishminister at Naples put it, that 'no country has a greater interest thanPiedmont in the prevention of the spread of extreme revolutionarydoctrines'.1 Almost any risk was worth running rather than let Gari-baldi proceed on his way unopposed; but better if possible to let theradicals make a false step, and so bring upon themselves responsibilityfor a breach which Cavour could pretend to deplore.

Cavour had been preparing for this contingency at least since themiddle of August. The circular of 13 August forbidding the enrolmentof volunteers had been the first unambiguous action taken. But he alsorecognized frankly that the only way to win public opinion was tocapture some of Garibaldi's prestige. He would therefore have to joinin the revolution, in order to inherit and legitimize what the radicalshad gained for Italy. The real test would be whether he could dethronethem and become their heir without positively fighting them, whetherhe could win without seeming mean and ungrateful, and in practicalterms whether he could reach Naples in time. Hence his decision toattack the Pope, so as to steal the revolutionary thunder at the same timeas he secured a passage to the south for his troops. This was what G. M.Trevelyan called 'the crowning act of Cavour's life, and the greatestexample of his political genius'.2 Military units were first called upin readiness for 'autumn manoeuvres' on the frontier.3 Nicotera'svolunteers in Tuscany, which had been allowed and even encouragedto gather there before this change in policy,4 were broken up despite

1 31 August, Elliot's memorandum (F.O. 70/319).2 Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the making of Italy, p. 209.3 18 August, 1/ Opinione (Turin).4 23 August, Ricasoli to Cavour (Lettere di Ricasoli 9 ed. Tabarrini, vol. v, p. 213);

26 August, Ricasoli to Farini (BR ASF, b. T, £ P).

224 Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: SeptemberRicasoli's violent protest. If the compulsory disbandment of theGenoese volunteers earlier in the month had been due rather to Frenchsusceptibilities over any invasion of Papal territory, the disbandment ofthose in Tuscany was now due to Cavour's plan for invading thatterritory himself. The volunteers would have been useful to him asauxiliaries in this campaign, but there were political reasons why theroyal army and the king's government should monopolize whatprestige was attached to this bold venture. A mixture of tact, firmnessand deceitx was needed to inveigle Nicotera away to remote Sicily atthe beginning of September, but this delicate move was just effected intime.3 On 29 August the cabinet formally decided to invade the PapalStates, but Cavour and Farini had irrevocably decided as much on theirown initiative at least since the 26th.3 For some reason Depretis wastold of this plan but not Garibaldi, Persano but not yet Villamarina.Probably the whole episode was much more impetuous and empirical,much less considered and organized, than one might suppose.

No doubt it had suddenly struck Cavour that, since Garibaldi mightin any case cross the Papal frontier soon and spread the conflagrationinto central Italy, he himself could gain nothing and might lose muchfrom standing idle. He believed that France would probably opposea Garibaldian invasion, whereas she might possibly be induced to favouran alternative Piedmontese invasion if this was put to her as a lessexpensive way of preventing the spread of revolution and saving atleast Rome to the Pope. If France could only be persuaded to acceptthis policy, such an invasion was likely to pick up for Sardinia enpassant the Papal provinces of Umbria and the Marches, and presumablythe southern provinces of Naples and Sicily as well. It would provideItalians with an alternative focus of enthusiasm to Garibaldi, perhapsoutshining the latter in military prowess, as well as preventing his

1 31 August, Nicotera's protest to the Governor of Leghorn (BR ASF, b. A, f. P).2 The Governor of Leghorn reported that all the volunteer units left between

1-7 September. News had come in just before this that 145 English volunteers hadcaptured the island of Montecristo as a first step to landing on the Papal coast;27 August, Ricasoli to Cavour (BR ASF, f. Z).

3 26 August, Farini to Depretis (quoted by Librino, in Nuova Antologia, December1930, p. 485); 28 August, Cavour to Prince di Carignano: 'nous avons decide d'inter-venir dans les Marches et dans TUmbrie en suscitant un mouvement dans ces provincesqui justifie l'entree de nos troupes' (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 185).

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 225further inarch up the peninsula. Cavour thus had everything to gain.If he also stood to lose a little, at least it was tolerably certain that on anyother calculation his losses would be yet greater; for if he remainedinactive or followed any other line of action, then Europe might endthe policy of non-intervention; and yet if he stood out any longeragainst the current of national feeling, it would assuredly sweep himaway.1 All through the risorgimento Piedmont was able to take risks inthe happy conviction that, while she had the whole peninsula to gain,her own existing frontier was virtually guaranteed against defeat bythe strong interest of France against Austrian encroachment.

Judging by Cavour's private as well as public pronouncements—andto people of different political allegiances—his main object was to* combat the influence of Garibaldi', and 'to prevent the revolutionextending into our kingdom'.2 It was more important at this momentto fight against the revolution than against Austria, and risks wouldhave to be taken against the revolution which would not for instancebe worth taking simply to win Venice from Austria.3 He was going toinvade the Papal States because 'it is at Ancona that we shall gain themoral force we need to be able to dominate the revolution'.4 This wasan example of that attitude of mind which made the radicals say thatCavour was only half a patriot. They did not allow that there might begood reason for him to lack confidence in the force of nationalism. Intheir eyes he was guilty of the moral blemish of preferring to expandPiedmont rather than make Italy, to fight Garibaldi rather than co-operate with him. The radicals wanted to make Italy, and on this pointthey were more realistic than their opponents admitted; but althoughtheir own more apocalyptic and catastrophic programme was in a senseto be justified by its own success, it was unfair of them to deny thatCavour too might have his own realism in advocating a more Fabian,but still surprisingly radical, strategy.

1 28 August, U.S. Minister Daniel to Cass: 'the Sardinian Government will nothave the power to arrest the current. It would be destroyed if it attempted to do so'(copy in MRR).

2 31 August, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, p. 192); 4 September,Cavour to Carignano (ibid. p. 223); E. Delia Rocca, Autobiograjia di un veterano,vol. n, 1898, p. 35.

3 27 August, Cavour to Valerio (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. in, p. 351).4 3 September, Cavour to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 218).

226 Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: SeptemberIf Garibaldi's lodestar stood above Rome, Cavour's was fixed in the

firmament above Paris, and at the end of August Farini went off posthaste to Chambery in the hope that Louis Napoleon would agree towhat the Piedmontese government now proposed.1 Napoleon wasprobably as imprecise as ever, but our knowledge of this interview iseven more shadowy and partisan than of that at Plombieres in 1858.He certainly gave Farini to understand that, things being as they were,he would allow the Piedmontese to go and restore order in centraland southern Italy, or in other words that the doctrine of non-interven-tion did not apply to this one sub-alpine state. His only conditions seemto have been that Cavour should be both quick and successful, and alsothat the invasion should appear to onlookers not as a conquest, but asthe response to a spontaneous insurrection which indicated beyonddispute the manifest wish of the people. Apparently it had not beendifficult to bring Napoleon to this pitch. Cavour's representative atParis had helped matters by insisting with the Emperor that Garibaldistood for Britain, and was being backed by Lord John Russell to reduceFrench influence in southern Italy.2 French public opinion, as seen inthe Revue des Deux Mondes, the Temps, the Constitutionnel, and thePatrie, had been becoming increasingly alarmed by Garibaldi and theMazzinians.3 The Catholics in France had to admit that, if they did notwant their country herself to have the expense of fighting Garibaldi'sforty thousand volunteers, then Cavour's scheme offered the best hopeof saving their pockets and at least guaranteeing the Pope his asylum inRome. The Emperor personally was aware that a moderately strongItaly, while it might have other disadvantages, would at least help tohold Austria on the Mincio frontier, and so give him scope to develophis own private schemes on the Rhine. For these various reasons,Cavour could feel cautiously sure that in the last resort Napoleon wouldhave to stand by 'the only ally which France possesses'.4

1 For some reason, Massari, writing in 1872, tried to deny that Cavour was heretrying to obtain Napoleon's consent (G. Massari, II Conte di Cavour, 1935 ed. Milan*p. 328).

2 23 August, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigrat vol. rv, p. 177).3 24 August, G. Lanza to Castelli (Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1, p. 316).4 31 August, Cavour to Bruno the Sardinian consul at Geneva (P. Matter, Cavour

et Vunite Italienne, vol. in, p. 382).

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 227The rest of Europe needed less careful handling. Cavour continued

to keep in mind that Austria might choose to attack while his armieswere engaged in the centre: but he calculated that this was unlikely,since in Austria's present state the least military reverse might cause thecollapse of her whole empire;x and Britain at least, if not France as well,gave 'the most categoric guarantee* to Piedmont against an Austrianattack at this difficult moment.2 He made a special effort to neutralizefeeling in northern Germany, and for this purpose boldly advocated theunification of Germany as well as of Italy. As Cavour saw it, these twostates would become 'les deux pierres angulaires du nouvel edificeeuropeen', for they did not exclude, but rather implied, each other;3

at least it was politic to say as much, even if he did not intend a greatdeal by the words.

In Great Britain, Lord John Russell had already been won over byGaribaldi to see that the Neapolitan Bourbons could no longer survive,and that Italy must be a single and not a dual state.4 Russell was not yetready to permit the upset in political balance which would follow theacquisition of Venice; and Cavour—no doubt advised by Hudson—made clever use of this point, announcing that his invasion in theMarches was precisely 'to avoid the Venetian difficulty'.5 Such anattack upon the Pope's dominion was especially gratifying to ProtestantEngland. Lord Shaftesbury wrote to Cavour with the nihil obstat ofExeter Hall, to say that 'your revolution is the most wonderful, themost honourable, and the most unexpected manifestation of courage,virtue and self-control the world has ever seen!'6 It was Garibaldiwhom Cavour should have thanked for this. Englishmen had made of

1 13 September, Cavour to General Lamarmora (N. Bianchi, Storia documentatadella diplomazia europea in Italiay vol. VIII, pp. 692-3); 20 October (ibid. pp. 693-4).

2 24 September, Emilio Visconti-Venosta from Turin to his brother Gino (AME).3 9 September, Cavour to the editor of the Deutsche Zeitung (CC Lib. del Mezz.

vol. 11, 268).4 6 August, Russell to Hudson (RP G.D. 22/109); 6 August, Russell to Elliot: 'the

Bourbons of Sicily seem determined to be faithless to the end.. . . The trick aboutevacuating Sicily shall be the last that they shall play me. . . . Do not follow the Kingto Gaeta or any other place where he may lay his false head on his uneasy pillow'(RP G.D. 22/111). 5 7 September, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).

6 12 September, Lord Shaftesbury from Paris to Cavour (CC Ing. vol. n, part 11,p. 123).

15-2

228 Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: Septemberthe general their hero, and had erected him into the great rationalist, notto say Protestant, who would clear up the hocus-pocus of Rome. TheTimes, for instance, hoped that he would submit the liquefying ampouleof St Gennaro's blood at Naples to chemical analysis. The son of oneBritish cabinet minister, the Duke of Somerset, had joined Garibaldi'svolunteers in the south. The Duke of Wellington had secretly sent him.£50. In London his picture had sold ' by the million' to help pay for therevolution. Workmen in Glasgow gave up their half-holidays to makemunitions for him, and a collection at the Athenaeum on his behalf hadrealized -£300 in one night.1 G. M. Trevelyan has shown in his threebooks on Garibaldi how British public opinion learnt to idealize himas a model of gallantry and chivalry, and how, largely through him,they came to contemplate the risorgimento as a liberal protest againsttyranny and reaction.

Once satisfied about the attitude of the Powers, Cavour gave theorder to launch the spontaneous insurrection which Napoleon required.A revolt was engineered by Ricasoli, timed to break out the other sideof the border on 8 September.2 Where possible, Papal troops were firstcorrupted with cash.3 On 5 September the National Society sent roundto its adepts in the Marches a circular with details of how much pay the'volunteers' should receive, and with instructions about how deputa-tions could be sent to invoke the aid of Victor Emanuel against theoppression they were suffering. Ever since the end of August, GeneralFanti had been making preparations for his offensive, spreading theconvenient rumour that this was in some way intended to help

1 One contemporary diary at Naples describes the persecution of Garibaldi by hisEnglish fans: 'some ladies who sought an interview with him later at the Hoteld'Angleterre, asked him for a kiss a-piece, and that each might cut off a lock of hishair. General Tiirr. . . looked somewhat out of patience, standing guard overGaribaldi with a comb, and raking down his head after each operation.' * Extractsfrom the journal of an Englishman at Naples', Macmillans Magazine, December i860,vol. in, p. 154.

2 30 August, Ricasoli telegram to Farini to say that all was arranged (BR ASF,f. Z); even Hudson knew about it more or less accurately: 'the insurrection,I expect, will break out on the 9th inst., and the Sardinian intervention will be almostsimultaneous' (report dated 7 September, RP G.D. 22/'66).

3 31 August, Ricasoli to Farini, mentions having already spent about .£15,000(Cartcggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani; omitted from Tabarrini's collection).

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 229Garibaldi at Naples. On the 5th it was announced that, as minister ofwar, he was leaving to inspect the troops on their autumn manoeuvres.1

No one could have been very surprised when an ultimatum was thensent to Cardinal Antonelli on the 7th, protesting against certain notvery clearly specified massacres perpetrated by General Lamoridere'smercenary army, and threatening invasion if this army were notdismissed. A deputation from over the border duly arrived more orless on time at Turin to ask for Victor Emanuel's intervention. Theprepared insurrection also broke out according to plan on the 8th, butunfortunately it misfired.2 Cavour bewailed in private that ^'insurrec-tion de l'Ombrie est tres peu de chose. C'est deplorable. Nos amisveulent-ils conquerir l'independance sans sacrifices?'3 But since newsof the ultimatum was by this time public property, it was all the morenecessary to expedite the invasion; for otherwise the French might havetime to protest, and Antonelli could present a reasoned reply, and thehesitant insurrectionaries would be altogether subdued.

Cavour of course kept up the pretence and the confusion by givingout different explanations of what he was up to, one explanation for theGaribaldians, another for home opinion in the north, others to Britainand France. The most important person to placate was the Emperor ofthe French, who was certainly not an enthusiastic observer of what wasafoot. Napoleon's conditional approval at Chambery must now haveweakened considerably after this partial failure to meet his stipulations:the spontaneous insurrection had not materialized, and Garibaldi hadnot yet begun the march on Rome which was to have been the excuseto make Cavour's aggressive action seem plausible. For this reasonCavour was driven into exaggerating his legend about sansculottes atNaples and Palermo, and Persano's misguided but in one sense timelyalarmist telegram of the 7th was immediately sent off to Paris for use as

1 5 September, La Perseveranza (Milan).2 8 September, Vincenzo Ricasoli to his brother Bettino: 'we are really surprised

that the inhabitants of the Papal States are so afraid and will not make up their mindsto do anything at all... .1 have done everything to send them men and help... .TheItalians are a lot of big sheep, and the heroism of Garibaldi is easily acquired whendealing with this sort of person.' To be published in the edition by Nobili andCamerani, Carteggio di Ricasoli. Vincenzo was a spy, but in Tabarrini's edition of theseletters the ugly word is excised from Fanti's letter of 9 September.

3 10 September, Cavour to Ricasoli (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 270-1).

230 Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: Septembernecessary.1 These minor hitches in Cavour's engineered revolt werethus a contributory cause of his clash with Garibaldi, for a public breachnow became all the more a necessary element in self-justification. Italy(as well as Garibaldi) had to suffer for this fact. Another result was thatthe French alliance received a setback. Napoleon's subsequent with-drawal of his legation from Turin can only in part be explained as afiction to keep up appearances. It also expressed a feeling that he hadbeen deceived, because Farini had given him to understand that Pied-mont would wait for a proper pretext such as would give the impressionshe had right on her side.2 As things had turned out, the whole ofEurope, and his own subjects in particular, could appreciate the patentfraud. To Frenchmen the Pope had been put in the right against Cavour,and to the British so had Garibaldi. Gramont indignantly commentedon the invasion and its mock motives that 'c'est creer le desordre pouravoir le droit dc retablir l'ordre'.3 Antonelli was also enabled to makea dignified rebuttal of the ultimatum, pointing out that Cavour'sprinciples of conduct were clearly uncivilized, or at least that theycompared badly with those observed by governments which he had theeffrontery to call harsh and oppressive. Cavour himself was launchinga cruel and unprovoked war on false pretences: ' you, signor conte, knowperfectly well how those outbreaks arose, whence came the money andarms for them, and whence the instructions to commence'. Reason,law and morality were against the Piedmontese, and what they weredoing they did only in the name of brute force.4

Cavour had, however, gained his main point, and France did notintervene. The Emperor had been made an accomplice, first by hisacceptance of Nice, and then by his irresolution at Chambery; and alsoby the fact that Piedmont was now an indispensable buffer state, forthe creation of which thousands of Frenchmen had died at Magentaand Solferino. Furthermore, Victor Emanuel was at last forceddefinitely to choose his minister's side against Garibaldi. Another signof success was that the regular army was soon winning what Cavourhoped would be 'a prestige quite overshadowing such glory as a run

1 8 September, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 197)." 26 September, Nigra to Cavour (ibid. pp. 233-4).3 9 September, Gramont to Thouvenel (Matter, Cavour, vol. in, p. 385).4 12 September, // Gionmle di Roma, reply dated 11 September.

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 231of good luck had conferred on Garibaldi and his volunteers'.1 Thiswas perhaps an unfortunate comparison to challenge, since all theconcentrated efforts of official Piedmontese historiography were neverquite able to make Cialdini's march to Ancona as glorious as Garibaldi'sprogress from Quarto to the Volturno. But at all events it was truethat the skilfully-provoked engagement at Castelfidardo on 18 Septem-ber brought about a rout of the untrained Papal army barely a weekafter hostilities had begun. Although Cavour himself was far fromthinking so, some moderate and responsible Italians were led by thissuccess to agree with Garibaldi that they were within sight of Romeitself and the culmination of Italian unity.2 Garibaldi's views on thispoint are customarily taken as proof of his folly and unrealism, so it isas well to stress that, if so, he stood in good company. Not everyonehad been so sure that France would intervene against Garibaldi's marchon Rome. Cavour's own intervention, therefore, could still for a timeseem different from what it really was; that is to say it could appear notas a move to by-pass Rome in the interests of the French alliance, butrather as an attempt to settle the Roman question quickly before theFrench could stop him, and before the Garibaldian anti-clericals couldreach Rome from the opposite direction.

Cavour no doubt was delighted that people could so misinterpret hismotives, because this all helped to confuse his opponents in the south.Not the centre but the south was his chief preoccupation, and once hisinvasion had been successfully launched, he could turn again to see whatwas happening to Garibaldi at Naples. On 7 September Persano had

1 21 September, Cavour to Cialdini (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, p. 336).2 10 September, Bettino Ricasoli to his brother (Lettere di Ricasoli, ed. Tabarrini,

vol. v, p. 234); 29 September (ibid. p. 244); 21 August, Dr Pantaleoni to Cavour(CC La Questione Romana 1860-1, vol. 1, pp. 33-4); 27 September, Poerio from Turinto Lequile and de Simone (G. Bandini, 'Lettere di C. Poerio nel i860', RassegnaStorica del Risorgitnento, 1943, pp. 501-2); 27 September, G. Lanza, the Speaker of theHouse of Deputies, to Castelli (Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, p. 326); 29 September,Emilio Visconti-Venosta to his brother Gino (AME). All these were roughly inagreement with Garibaldi. Against them were those like d'Azeglio who werefrightened that the Pope might leave Rome, and those Uke Cavour who tliought thatthe French alliance was too important to be worth the risk. On 20 September,Cavour's semi-official paper L' Opinione announced that the presence of the Frenchgarrison at Rome was not to be considered as incompatible with Italian independence.

232 Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: Septembersent his alarmist telegram, a telegram which, true or untrue in what itsaid, was a providential weapon in turning the king against Garibaldiand justifying the invasion in the eyes of Napoleon. Garibaldi at Napleshad to be opposed. If Cavour had any serious thought of compromise,he would surely have made a greater effort to show how he had latelybeen converted to many of the dictator's views. It is true that the previousweek he had written some outwardly friendly words in one of the fewletters he ever sent to Garibaldi;1 but this temporary descent from hisdignified aloofness was in reality another direct result of the cabinetdecision to invade the south, and can only have been intended to keepGaribaldi quiet while he completed his own preparations to crush therevolution. The decision was now taken and was irrevocable. We donot know if Cavour's messenger ever reached Garibaldi on this occasion;but only deeds and not words would have counted for much at thispoint, and now that the liberals had the initiative again, they argued thatthere was less need for them to concede anything substantial.

However surprised and pleased Cavour was to be when he heard ofGaribaldi's first moderate actions at Naples,* this could not move himfrom his obvious duty. He had already decided upon a split. The firststep was to find out how far the king would stand by him now thatGaribaldi was challenging his right to represent the nation in this newrevolutionary phase. Armed with Persano's telegram, he and Farinihad gone to see the king on the 8th, and after dwelling on the disagree-ments in policy between government and revolutionaries, had offeredto resign if Victor Emanuel could find other ministers more capable ofcollaboration with the radicals. According to Cavour's own accountof this meeting, he explained that new ministers could at this point beappointed without offence, whereas a change in government couldnever be made once Garibaldi's defiance became public, for then peoplewould take it to be the result of unconstitutional pressure by a self-appointed dictator. On these representations the king loyally and'constitutionally' confirmed his support of the ministry, and added(says Cavour) that if necessary he would oppose Garibaldi by force.3

1 31 August, Cavour to Garibaldi (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 191).2 10 September, Cavour to Villamarina (ibid. p. 271); 11 September, Cavour to

Fanti (ibid. p. 275); 11 September, L' Opinione (Turin).3 8 September, Cavour's memorandum (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 258-9).

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 233Obviously this was something which had been demanded by the primeminister as a matter of confidence.

Judging by the king's quite unusual impatience against Garibaldi inthe next few days, Cavour must have put his case very well in thisinterview. Such an assurance by the king gave Cavour the confidenceto proceed to his next step. Till now he had never been at all sure of hismaster, who had more than once seemed to be rather in Garibaldi'scamp than his own. The radicals for their part were still confident thatthe monarch was an orthodox Garibaldian in secret.1 The dictator wasacting at this moment on the tacit assumption that, in the last resort, hecould appeal to the Throne against the government.2 He had also anexplicit conviction that the Court would approve of his invading thePapal States.3 When on 11 September Garibaldi wrote to the kingasking him to dismiss Cavour and Farini, we have Bixio's evidence thatthe dictator here had believed with good reason that he was playing notso much his own game as the king's.4 Bixio explained that Garibaldiwould always obey a royal order, even to the point of renouncing hisadvance on Rome; but the king not only made no such precise order,but had apparently given Garibaldi the impression that he was anxiousto get rid of his prime minister and adopt a bolder policy. The implica-tion drawn, and probably intended, was that Victor Emanuel did notwant Garibaldi to desist until quite sure that Rome was out of his grasp.Thus the king as well as Cavour had a double policy. Probably noharm was meant by it, and there was nothing in Sardinian constitutionallaw which made it illegal. But in fact it had had most unfortunateresults. The king was severally encouraging both Cavour and Garibaldiin policies which were inconsistent with each other and which nowthreatened to collide, knowing or hoping that he could accept which-ever succeeded and disown whichever lost. This plan brought its own

1 9 September, Sineo to Garibaldi (ACM, no. 1291); 5 October, Sineo's letterprinted in // Risorgimento Italiano, January 1908, p. 10.

2 There had been a long history of personal messages between them via Amari,La Masa, Litta, Trecchi, and others; Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona, vol. 11, p. 108;E. Librino, in Nuova Antologia, December 1930, p. 471; M. Rosi, II risorgimentoitaliano e V azione a" un patriota, p. 199.

3 G. Manacorda, 'Vittorio Emanuele II e Garibaldi nel i860 secondo le carteTrecchi', Nuova Antologia, fasc. 923, 1 June 1910, p. 413.

4 18 September, Astengo to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 316-17).

234 Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: Septemberdefeat. Cavour chose his moment cleverly to drag out this ambiguousdealing into the open, and forced an embarrassed sovereign to choosebetween being a constitutional or an unconstitutional monarch. Theking prudently decided to be constitutional and to drop his unofficialallies on the Left.

Persano's somewhat irresponsible communication had served theprime minister well. It may be appreciated that Cavour did not wantthe radicals to seem too friendly at this moment, for on the legend oftheir relentless and uncompromising opposition depended his only goodexcuse for Piedmont invading the Papal States. It was indeed far moreimportant to win Napoleon's collaboration at this moment than Gari-baldi's, and Cavour therefore exaggerated the import of a few isolatedand unrepresentative remarks in order to commit both Napoleon andVictor Emanuel to his policy. This may have had the incidental resultof dividing Italians from each other, but in other respects it was a usefulexpedient well adapted to his prime object. Garibaldi's political actionswhen he arrived in Naples had been moderate, so much so that bothautonomists and Mazzinians were even accusing him of favouritismtowards Piedmont;1 but when seen from Turin, this was quite out-weighed by the dictator's unalterable opposition to Cavour personallyand to the French. Pretences were kept up for a few days more. On12 September the king wrote a letter to Garibaldi with congratulationsupon taking Naples; but he now added an admonition that the regulararmy and the volunteers would have to co-ordinate their advance,so that Garibaldi should keep the king fully informed of his plans,and take his next forward step only with royal consent.2 Garibaldiobediently submitted to this. It is notable, however, that even thoughthe king had now decided in favour of Cavour and moderation, hisletter still put no specific veto on the Roman expedition, and indeed didnot mention the city. Presumably it was intended as a means to slowdown Garibaldi's march, by letting him continue in the belief thatgovernment and volunteers might both be converging on the HolyCity and so needed to act in concert. The king had allowed himself to

1 14 September, Brenier from Naples to Thouvenel (Maraldi, Documenti francesisulla caduta del regno meridionale, pp. 170-1).

2 12 September, Victor Emanuel to Garibaldi (Curatulo, Garibaldi, VittorioEmanuele, Cavour, p. 351).

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 235be convinced by Cavour that Garibaldi was now a rebel against thesovereign, not just a political opponent of the minister. He there-fore did not dare even now say to Garibaldi in so many words thathe must desist entirely from thoughts of Rome; and consequently theambiguity remained, and the revolutionaries were still left to imaginethat the king was secretly on their side. This lack of frankness succeededin its aim of keeping Garibaldi loyal to the throne; it also hadthe effect, perhaps not altogether unwelcome to Cavour, of makingthe dictator more confident in publicising his strictures against theministry.

The true policy of the northern government only gradually becamemanifest. On 11 September it was still possible for the Turin public tothink that there was no conflict, and that Garibaldi's first actions inNaples proved that he 'is not a man of party but a man of the wholenation'.1 But in private La Farina had already been writing cheerfullyon the 10th that 'the breach between General Garibaldi and the king'sgovernment is imminent, I would say is almost a fait accompli'. LaFarina added in more detail that the king was going to stop the marchon Rome, by force of arms if necessary, and also had a plan for sendingtroops to take over Sicily from the dictator.2 This of course must haverepresented the upshot of Cavour's interview with Victor Emanuel onthe 8th. To see the significance of this change in policy one must re-member that it all took place while Garibaldi was more or less amicable.Not until the n t h did Garibaldi write his letter to the king requestingthe replacement of the existing ministry. By the 14th, Cavour wouldhave known about this letter, and would have noted Garibaldi's resolveto advance as soon as possible on Rome.3 The telegraph lines from southto north had been cut on 8-9 September, and the greater difficulty ofcommunication must have added to the growing suspicion on bothsides. The last telegrams received by northern papers from Naples weredated the 8 th, and after that the published correspondence from

1 11 September, II Diritto.2 10 September, La Farina to G. Ingrassia (Epistolario di La Farina, ed. Franchi,

vol. 11, p. 417).3 14 September, Cavour to Nigra shows that Cavour had received it (CC Cavour-

Nigra, vol. iv, p. 211); Trevelyan has this episode wrongly, Garibaldi and the making ofItaly, p. 191.

236 Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: Septembersouthern Italy was almost always five days in arrears.1 On 14 SeptemberNapoleon announced that he was withdrawing his minister fromTurin in protest against Cavour's conduct, and this would have madethe feeling of tension far worse.

The populace of Turin knew all this on the 15 th. They were alsoinformed that Count Trecchi had arrived in Turin with importantletters to the king from Garibaldi, and the purport of these letters mighthave been guessed from the tone of Garibaldi's proclamation of fivedays before which received publication in the newspapers of this date.2The general public in Piedmont learnt with dismay of the dictator'sprotest against 'those miserable people who...while others werefighting on the barricades of Palermo for the freedom of Italy.. .weretalking of the annexation of Sicily.. . .If I had listened to them, shouldI have been able to continue the fight for Italy?.. .Annexation willcome soon, but only when we can proclaim it from the top of theQuirinal hill.' This news of Garibaldi's intentions came to most peopleas a complete surprise. Il Diritto, for instance, which claimed to be thebest-informed paper for radical policy, had repeatedly given positiveassurances that he did not mean to march on Rome and risk war withthe French. This journal now tried to explain Garibaldi's proclamationaway, by saying that he would surely change his plans when he heardof Cavour's invasion of the Marches.3 Such a lame excuse was in-sufficient to conceal the growing political division from the multitude;but this no longer mattered so much to Cavour, because he was at longlast finding that the whole length of Italy for the first time respondedto his direction.

All this was much less clear at Naples than it was at Turin. Anotherweek went by before Garibaldi himself properly knew how fast theinitiative was passing to the opposite camp. Appearances still suggestedthat the king stood with him against Cavour, and he hoped that thePiedmontese would find themselves obliged to co-operate in thecapture of Rome. On the 17th his official Giornale at Naples announced

1 E.g. 21 September, Cavour to Valerio, says that he has had no news from Naplesfor five days (CCLib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 338); 21 September, La Perseveranza reportedthat the last news from Naples which had reached Milan was dated 11 September.

2 15 September, // Diritto; 17 September, La Nazione (Florence), report fromTurin dated 15 September. 3 X6 September, II Diritto.

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 237proudly that Perugia had been taken by the soldiers 'of our king'.Then on the 18th arrived Vimercati with the king's reply to the letterin which Garibaldi on the n t h had asked for Cavour's dismissal. Onemight expect that Vimercati in private must have tried to make thedictator see reason and postpone his advance on Rome; but, to judgeby his official communication, once more something of the same vague-ness and ambiguity was deliberately retained. The king's reply simplysaid that a change of ministry was inopportune 'for the moment', andit was signed 'your most affectionate Victor Emanuel'.1 Vimercati'sprivate thoughts were anything but friendly, and even before seeingGaribaldi he managed to convince himself that Naples was full ofirreconcilable revolutionaries, and that king and dictator could nolonger run together.2 Putting all these facts together, one will see thatthe official Piedmontese policy was now quite clear, but yet that it hadalso been decided to continue in the dangerous attempt to keep Gari-baldi confused about what was being planned. It was still important notto offend him by any outward sign of antagonism; but if, short of this,he could be gently dissuaded from any rash initiative, then this mightgain time for the Piedmontese troops to reach the frontier of Naplesbefore the volunteers could cross into Papal territory.

In the meantime, Cavour on 16 September appointed parliament tomeet after a long recess, fixing the date of convocation at 2 October.His idea was that Garibaldi's programme might then receive a publicand authoritative repudiation, and also that the policy of invading theMarches might be formally and retrospectively approved by the legalrepresentatives of the people. The publication of Garibaldi's intentionin the newspapers made it impossible to keep up much longer thepretence of amity and collusion; but luckily Cavour was now arguingfrom strength, and the weapon of parliament, long held in reserve,could be brought out with confidence. On the 17th the premier wroteto Villamarina that 'le projet d'attaquer les Fran^ais annonce a l'Europenous oblige de separer notre cause de celle de Garibaldi'.3 The ministerial

1 N.d., Victor Emanuel to Garibaldi (Curatulo, Garibaldi, Vittorio Emanuele,Cavour, p. 353).

2 18 September, Vimercati to Castelli (Carteggio di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1,PP. 323-5)-

3 17 September, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 308).

238 Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: Septemberpress now became suddenly and sharply critical of the government atPalermo and Naples. But no anathema was pronounced until it wasknown how the dictator would react to Vimercati's mission. On the21st Garibaldi replied that 'he would like to go to Rome, but submitshimself to the orders of the king':1 nevertheless, this reply would nothave been received in the north for some days yet, and in Cavour'spresent mood it would hardly have been trusted; and in any case it stillsuffered from the ambiguity that the king's orders carried an implicationof delay only. Before it arrived there was another catastrophe, forGaribaldi's defiant letter to Brusco against Cavour was printed in thepapers of Turin on 22 September. Cavour could now afford to berighteously indignant. As he said, ' Garibaldi, enivre par le succes, s'estcru le maitre des destinees de l'ltalie'.2 People at Turin were astonishedand scandalized. The Gazzetta del Popolo called it 'a national disaster'that such a manifest dualism had begun in Italy. Even II Diritto nowgave up hope of a reconciliation and said that one or other party wouldhave to give way. The breach, that is to say, was at last public property.But Cavour had at least secured that he himself appeared the innocentand offended party. Public opinion showed a mixture of alarm andfear. At Turin people were increasingly apprehensive that, if therevolutionary army once reached the Papal States, then the doctrinesof the revolution might even penetrate through into Piedmont. Thispervasive sentiment of fear was all that Cavour needed to make himfeel completely confident. Tell the Emperor, he wrote to Nigra, that

si Garibaldi persevere dans la voie funeste ou il est engage, dans quinze joursnous irons retablir Tordre a Naples et a Paler me, fallut-il pour cela jeter tousles Garibaldiens a la mer.

L'immense majorite de la nation est avec nous. Les debuts [recte debats]du Parlement le prouveront. Gianduia est furieux contre Garibaldi. LaGarde Nationale de Turin marcherait contre lui si besoin etait. Les soldatsde Fanti et de Cialdini ne demandent pas mieux que de debarrasser le paysdes chemises rouges....

Nous avons ete conciliant, meme faible en apparence, pour avoir le droitde frapper et de frapper fort lorsque le moment serait venu. Il fallait attendre

1 21 September, catalogue of royal archives, quoted by Bollea, II RisorgimentoItaliano, November 1917, p. 456.

2 22 September, Cavour to E. d'Azeglio (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, p. 127).

Cavour breaks with Garibaldi: September 239que ces Messieurs jettassent le masque monarchique qu'ils portaient. Main-tenant le masque estjete, et nous irons de l'avant. Le Roi est decide a en finir.1

It was Cavour who this time was quite carried away by his ownsuccess. More than once in these days he repeated that Garibaldi was inleague with Mazzini,2 and perhaps he believed as much. He even tookurgent steps to put the port of Genoa in a state of readiness lest the rebelswere meditating an attack on Piedmont itself. This was all as excessiveas his original analysis was inaccurate. Garibaldi was in fact casting off nomask, for he had never concealed his views. On the other hand, Cavourhimself, by his own confession here, had spoken fair words so that hemight strike and strike hard when he was strong enough. All this talkof civil war, moreover, was perhaps a little too enthusiastic in tone tobe quite seemly in the mouth of a responsible minister, especially as it wasdirected against the man who had just conquered half Italy for the king.

No doubt the problems in Cavour's path were too manifold anddifficult for him to remain quite as equable as he was wont. At allevents he was to prove nowhere near so magnanimous in victory as hehad been in defeat. He revelled in these difficulties, the more of themthe better.3 By his own choice he was obliged to be diplomat, politician,administrator and even general all in one; for he had never collectedabout him enough good men to take some of the responsibility off hisshoulders. This made it all the more exciting that such a great successwas now within his grasp. The radicals had been cleverly and decisivelyout-manoeuvred, and he could move over to the offensive both againstthem and against the other enemies of Italy. His own kingdom ofSardinia, with its population of eleven millions, looked like inheritingtwo millions more in the centre and nine in the south. The remote dreamof Dante and Machiavelli was suddenly becoming real, and the visionblinded him to some of the more delicate colours which were alreadycoming into the picture.

1 22 September, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, pp. 221-2).2 24 September, Cavour to Magenta (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 352); 24 Sep-

tember, Cavour to E. d'Azeglio: *il a fait lui-meme sa paix avec Mazzini' (CC Ing.vol. n, part 11, p. 128).

3 28 September, Cavour's words reported by H. d'Ideville: '"j'aime les situationsdifficiles et je suis servi a souhait, cette fois", fit—il en riant et en se frottant les mains.'Journal d'un diplomate en Italie, vol. 1, 1872 (2nd ed.), p. 163.

240

CHAPTER XVII

THE RADICALS AT BAY:SEPTEMBER

In this rapid development of the political conflict the views of the govern-ment were clear enough. The manifold views of the opposition leaders,however, were probably not clear even to themselves. Events weremoving too fast for them. And not only were their ideas confused, butalso, in consequence, even the rough strength of the various forcesranged against the government was—and still is—hard to assay. Forthere were too many separate groups in opposition, and their respectivefolio wings are too shadowy for proper analysis. It is not even easy tobe sure whether or no they were a real danger; nor whether Cavour'sexpressions of fear and horror over the * party of action' represent hisconviction or were simply a pretext. We know that he was going todefeat the opposition from the Left, as in a previous critical phase ofPiedmontese history he had defeated the opposition from the Right.But one must not postulate the result before tracing the process. Normust one automatically take his own valuation of the politics of therevolutionary party. For he tended to underestimate their sense andtheir loyalty and readiness to compromise, as sometimes he over-estimated alike their wickedness, their folly, and their internal cohesion.

If his opponents lost, it was not just because individually they lackedhis great skill. They were also quite hopelessly divided among them-selves. It was a fact that the strongest among them were not thedangerous extremists he imagined. For example, the two prodictatorswhom Garibaldi chose in the south, Depretis and Pallavicino, were bothmoderate and conciliatory men, as well as good at their job, and bothof them retained a fundamental and overmastering loyalty to thegovernment of Turin. Yet Cavour had little use for them, either fortheir ideas or for their efficiency; and in a number of ways he madetheir task more difficult by his aristocratic contempt and uncooperative-ness. It is instructive to find that Cavour's special representatives in thesouth, notably La Farina and Farini, proved on comparison to be more

The Radicals at bay: September 241incompetent than these two prodictators; and furthermore, it is difficultto believe that Cavour can have selected them without this being forthe very reason that they were known enemies of the radicals. It was,indeed, part of Cavour's considered scheme to be uncompromising—inwhich point he differed both from Mazzini and from the king his master.Garibaldi's lieutenants whom he ranted against as concealed Mazzinianswere really working for him far better than he knew, and were evencovering up some of his own mistakes. He could afford to write themoff as incapable; but at their worst they were no more incapable thanVillamarina or his other select counter-revolutionaries at Naples. Theirdisreputability was certainly no greater than that of the unspeakableGriscelli, nor their lack of political tact more notable than what lay inhis own resort to such a vile instrument. Their headstrong defiance ofdiplomacy in wanting to attack Rome had, if anything, been exceededby that of Ricasoli. They had acted illegally and dictatorially without adoubt, but no more so than Cavour when he held the GaribaldianColonel Zambianchi in prison for ten months without trial or charge.Their attitude to the king was often as respectful as, and often more respect-ful than, his own. Certainly they had been reckless and had arrogantlyflouted Cavour's advice; but their doing so after all proved to be one ofthe most important contributory factors in the making of Italy. We shallalso see how, only a few weeks after Cavour took over the south from theradicals, all the accusations which he had lightly made against Garibaldi'sgovernment were being made with redoubled force against his own.

Cavour's superlative qualities as a diplomatist are unchallenged, butthey do not make him necessarily more reliable a judge in his owncause than were his opponents. Doubtless some of these radicals wereoften incompetent, and sometimes all of them were outrageous, but itcould be maintained that on the whole they had proved to be the betterItalians. Garibaldi and Mazzini were both ready to buy national unityat any price, even if it meant giving up republicanism, committingpolitical suicide, and surrendering to their lifelong personal enemies.Victor Emanuel, like them in this, said he was ready to become simplemonsu Savoia and clap his hands at Mazzini's success if this sacrifice werenecessary for the making of Italy.1 But Cavour, until a few years back,

1 c. 31 August, N. Nisco on his visit to the king (Storia civile del regno d' Italiayvol. iv, 1888, p. 339).

MS 16

242 The Radicals at bay: Septemberhad considered talk of Italian unity as 'silly nonsense'; and if he wasnow changing his mind, he showed remarkably little generosity oracknowledgement to the people who taught him that he had beenmisreading the times. He was right to be impatient with their incapacity,but Italy would have been more solidly built had he known how to bemore friendly to other people who were fighting in the van of thenational movement. In this he proved to be a victim as well as abeneficiary of the type of parliamentary system he had developed, forhe found that this system enabled him to proceed without beingobliged to take account of any criticism to the left of Rattazzi.

Urbano Rattazzi and the parliamentary Left were too little aware ofwhat was going on and of what Cavour had up his sleeve to be muchof a danger to him at this moment; nevertheless it is interesting to notetheir views. During August and September the attitude of this 'con-stitutional opposition' altered more than once with the development ofevents. When in mid-August Cavour made his first overt move to stopfurther units going to reinforce the volunteers, it must then have seemedto Rattazzi that diplomatic considerations were forcing the primeminister into line with the reactionaries. For Cavour could not saypublicly that he was preparing to be more revolutionary than therevolutionaries. Politicians at the time, like historians since, thereforehad to guess whether his main motive really was the fear of Mazziniand 'the return of the party of action on the political scene'.1 Probablyit was. At all events the opposition press drew the conclusion thatCavour had broken with Garibaldi. They pointed out that he wasgoing back on his promise in cutting off vital supplies to the south.2

Instead of being a symbol of Italian independence, his name now'stood for Italian dependence on the foreigner'.3 His action might evenresult in Garibaldi's march being checked, and in that case 'Italian unitywill be postponed for twenty years'.4 'But we believe', said II Diritto,

1 26 August, L' Opinione, Cavour*s semi-official paper, said that it was.2 25 August, // Movimento (Genoa) said that Farini's suspension of recruitment had

at first been taken as something designed for diplomatic consumption only, but nowthe order was apparently being enforced; although Farini had promised Brusco inCavour's presence that the government would not cut off Garibaldi's supplies.

3 24 August, L' Unione (Milan).4 10 September, L* Unita Italiana (Genoa).

The Radicals at bay: September 243'that Italy will be made by the exertions of Victor Emanuel andGaribaldi, without reference to Cavour, and even if necessary againsthim.'1

When after all this Cavour suddenly launched his invasion, for a briefmoment the Piedmontese radicals changed their reproaches into joyfulexcitement. 'The monarchy has crossed the Rubicon, it has given wayto the pressure of national aspirations.'2 Only the more skilled parlia-mentarians realized that there was more in this than was at first apparent.Francesco Guerrazzi and others met on 9 September to discuss this newdevelopment, and decided to warn Garibaldi that Cavour was workingin a contrary direction. Some of the radical deputies were then sentsouth to put to the dictator how he might co-operate with the parlia-mentary opposition in overthrowing the ministry.3 Among theseradicals there were some who were close to the throne, whom the kingused to patronize in his frequent moments of impatience with Cavour.Ferrari was one of the opposition deputies to sail for Naples, and he tookGaribaldi a message from Sineo which said that the king approved ofhis project to advance on Rome, adding that there seemed good chancesof success.4 From our knowledge of the king, it is more than possiblethat this was an authorized indiscretion, made before seeing Cavour onthe 8th; and from our knowledge of Riccardo Sineo, it is unlikely that thisradical deputy would have risked his reputation if the message had notbeen genuine. In later days Sineo gave further information about this. Heasserted that, at one moment in September, the king privately admittedthat he was going to replace Cavour and Farini by a Rattazzi govern-ment in which Garibaldi had confidence.5 Quite possibly Garibaldipossessed information about this episode when on 11 September hewrote to ask the king for this very replacement: because the dictator'sletter was certainly written on advice from someone, and the mentionof Farini's name as well by both Sineo and Garibaldi, when this is read

1 1 September, // Diritto (Turin).2 11 September, V Unita Italiana (Genoa).3 13 September, II Diritto; n September, F. Campanella from Genoa to Dolfi,

confiscated by Ricasoli's police (BR ASF, b. T, f. C).4 9 September, Sineo to Garibaldi (ACM, no. 1291); later in September, Sineo

himself travelled to Naples.5 5 October, Sineo's letter, II Risorgimento Italiano, January 1908, p. 10.

16-2

244 The Radicals at hay: Septemberin conjunction with Bixio's statement (see above, p. 233), gives all themore point to the fact that Garibaldi thought he was obeying the king.If so, then the breach between Cavour and Garibaldi was in one sensejust another aspect of the tension between minister and sovereign.Sineo went on to say that Cavour got wind of this plot and exerted allhis powers to convince Rattazzi and the king that it was too dangerousa game for them to attempt. Perhaps the embarrassment at exposure ofhis 'unconstitutional' behaviour was one reason why the king nowbecame so annoyed and so outspoken against Garibaldi. In other wordsVictor Emanuel, having thoughtlessly assisted in causing this split, thenwith equal thoughtlessness widened it further in an endeavour to coverhis own initial responsibility. This conclusion is based on circumstantialevidence, but it is a convenient and likely as well as a specious argument.The Royal Archives are still secret; but as more and more becomesknown about Victor Emanuel, it is clear that he lies at the bottom ofmore than one apparent enigma in risorgimento history. The monarchywas determined to win, heads or tails; and quite rightly so, except thatsuch Machiavellism can be justified only by success, and in the presentinstance it was not altogether successful.

Some of the northern radicals had also welcomed and helped toaugment these differences growing up between Turin and Naples.Rattazzi and Brofferio had both kept up direct correspondence withtheir friends round Garibaldi, for they never lost sight of the fact thatthe revolution had happened in Cavour's despite and might possibly beused to unseat him. Their hopes had rather grown during the summeras Garibaldi's popularity outshone that of Cavour, and until quitelately they believed that the ministry at Turin was not very firmlyestablished.1 When Cavour managed to reassert himself and to impressthe king with the terrible prospect of Garibaldi provoking war withthe French, messages were urgently sent by Rattazzi's party to dissuadethe dictator from any further thought of Rome. They particularly askedhim to reassure people publicly about this; and they also suggested thathe should write a moderate letter to the king promising to annex the

1 2 September, Rattazzi to Depretis (Archivio Depretis ASR); also cf. 14 August,BrofFerio to Crispi (ACP, f. 135); 6 December, BrofFerio to Garibaldi, complainingthat the dictator had not answered his three or four letters earlier this year (ACM,no. 844).

The Radicals at bay: September 245south at once if only Cavour resigned.1 In other words, the oppositionleaders in Turin were exploiting Garibaldi in order to overturn Cavour.Presumably they imagined that the volunteers would even renouncethe culminating expedition on Rome merely in order to assist their ownparliamentary coup. The suggestion was made that Garibaldi mightleave the front line and appear in parliament, so as to strengthen theirchances of defeating the ministry.2 Letters were written to stir him upagainst Cavour, and to make him understand that the moderates haddeclared war on the radicals, so that he must look to his own defence.3When the existence of this 'tremendous duel' between the two mencould no longer be denied, the Diritto finally called on Cavour toabdicate and so save Italy from civil war.4 Arguments were put forwardto say that both sides were now agreed over their general aims, thedisagreement being merely based on personalities, so that if onlyCavour put his country before his desire for power, he would resign.5At the end of September, Asproni gave expression to these secret hopesof the parliamentary Left: 'I think that we shall be able to strike Cavourdown from Naples; that is to say we shall do so if only Garibaldi beginsto understand something of political matters... or at least puts sometrust in his real and wiser friends.'6

This effort to widen the gap between Cavour and Garibaldi did noservice to Italy. If the intention was to make both of them more sus-picious of each other and more irreconcilable, it certainly succeeded.In other respects it was wasted effort, because Garibaldi was interestedonly in Rome, not in parlour politics. If he distrusted Cavour, this wasonly because the latter showed so little enthusiasm for unifying Italy;but he also retained an equal dislike and distrust for Rattazzi. This latest

1 17 September, Marazio editor of // Diritto to Macchi, Luzio, Garibaldi, Cavour >Verdi, pp. 216-17; 25 September, Macchi from Genoa to Cattaneo (ACP, f. 127);as late as 2 October, II Diritto went on saying that it had never occurred to Garibaldito march against the French in Rome.

2 22 September, Galeotti from Florence to Massari (Archivio Massari MRR).3 26 September, Macchi to Cattaneo (ACP, f. 127); 27 September, F. Gola to

Garibaldi (ACM, no. 1012).4 24 September, // Diritto. 5 28 September, ibid.6 29 September, Asproni to Brofferio (Raccolta Martini MRR, 342/23/9); 21 August,

another letter from Asproni to Brofferio had hoped and expected that the results ofGaribaldi's advance would shortly be felt at Turin (ibid.).

246 The Radicals at bay: Septembermanoeuvre was assuredly not one which inspired confidence in thelatter as an alternative candidate for the premiership.

Cavour knew he had not much to fear from Rattazzi and theparliamentary opposition, provided at least that the government didnot allow Garibaldi to get away with a monopoly of national sentiment.The person who appeared to worry him most was still Mazzini, nowdangerously close to Garibaldi at Naples. Mazzini continued to be con-sidered a cloak-and-dagger assassin. His ideas and his moral integritywere both completely underestimated and misunderstood at Turin.1

The terror he managed to inspire in people was quite extraordinary.Italy later claimed him as a hero, but only after his death, when he wasno longer thought dangerous; for during his lifetime this lonely exilewith his tiny band of followers was believed to be turning Italy upsidedown. On 17 September, after hiding in Genoa and Florence for fourmonths, escaping arrest 'like an eel',a Mazzini had eventually reachedNaples on the same boat as Vimercati. This added very considerably tothe alarm of all 'honest citizens', Cavour among them; and for thepurposes of history it is perhaps more important to observe that alarmthan to explain how unjustified it was. Republicanism was a purelymythical spectre, but like other myths its power was quite out ofrelation to its veracity.

Legend apart, Mazzini could in fact claim that 'not a single wordabout a republic or about anything which could divide Italians into twocamps has passed our lips for the last three years'.3 During his Londonexile, although the Sardinian ambassador had been careful to see thatarticles against him regularly appeared in the English press, Mazzinihad never once replied with public criticism of the Sardinian govern-ment which he so much detested.4 Poor and despised, he could stillshow himself morally superior to the government by which he had

1 25 September, U.S. Minister Daniel writing to Cass about the Mazzinians: 'theycare nothing in fact for a republic or for Italy. Their real object is Power, and theyare endeavouring to establish a gulf between [Garibaldi] and Piedmont for the solepurpose of setting up a government under their own auspices' (MRR).

2 16 May, Cavour to Talleyrand, asking him (just as in former years) for the loanof French policemen to come to Italy and help track Mazzini down (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. in, p. 297).

3 1 August, Scritti politici di Mazzini, ed. naz., vol. xxm, 1933, p. 146.4 E. Morelli, Atti del XXIV congresso di storia del risorgimento 1936, 1941, p. 422.

The Radicals at bay: September 247been condemned. The making of Italy was what mattered most to him,under whatever auspices; and while it stuck in his gorge to raise his ownvoice for Victor Emanuel, he accepted and in a sense welcomed whatwas happening, and said that he would actively try and prevent anyonecampaigning for a republic.1 The monarchy was winning, but he wasproud to note that this was only by public conversion to his methodsand his aim of unity. His own technique of revolution had turned outto be completely successful in the south, despite all Cavour's contemptfor it as unrealistic. Mazzini had there proved his point that popularinitiative could sometimes be worth more than a foreign ally. Garibaldihad used this technique not only in conquering a whole kingdom, butalso in restoring to Italians a priceless self-confidence, as some of themoderates themselves confessed. The events of this year had onlyconfirmed Mazzini in disgust at Cavour's alternative method ofdiplomatic calculus and 'Machiavellism'. The myth of 'Italy', onthe other hand, had proved to be another most powerful incentive toaction, far outweighing nice calculations of what was possible orexpedient. Honest faith in a mission or a principle, said Mazzini, wasworth a great deal more even in practical politics than Cavour wouldallow, more than a French alliance for instance, which might fail youat any moment, more than a calculating guile which could deceive evenyour own friends. The method of merely calculating what was expedienthad already proved on numberless occasions to be a paralysing influenceagainst action. The method of diplomacy was often useless, and some-times harmful.2

Mazzini had changed his mind more than once during the recentrapid succession of events. He had been overcome with despair onhearing of Cavour's decision in August to forbid the further recruitmentof volunteers. Then he had received inside information that Cavourgenuinely intended to invade the Papal States, and his dismay changed

1 21 August, Mazzini to F. Stanzani (Epistolario, vol. XL, pp. 338-9).2 1 September, L* Unith Italiana (Florence): 'diplomacy signifies the treaties of

1815.. . ; or Germans invading Naples and Piedmont, as in 1821. . . ; or the Frenchoccupation of Rome and the Austrian occupation of the legations...; Nice and Savoysnatched away from Italy.... Diplomacy means a wavering indecision before the ideaof unity.. .and negotiations with the Bourbons at Naples Diplomacy meansleaving Garibaldi to fight his battles alone.'

248 The Radicals at bay: Septemberto a momentary satisfaction.1 As early as 7 September, however, hehad already realized that Cavour's motive was not to win Rome, butrather to save Rome from Garibaldi, and he guessed that only a furtherreckless initiative by the radicals could fend off such a result.2 He hadhad small hope of achieving this when he set out himself for Naples,but nevertheless his arrival there caused great panic.3 Afterwards itcame as a surprise to the moderates when they discovered how littlepolitical influence he had managed to win during his stay in the south.4

In their great fear of republicanism, they had not believed at the timein his tactical conversion to more moderate counsels, nor in his casualand distant treatment by Garibaldi. There are nine letters extant fromMazzini to Garibaldi between September and November, but these donot show that he aspired to a directing hand in affairs; and while theyreveal mutual sympathy and admiration, there is little real cordiality inthem, and not a little distrust.5 Whereas newspapers in northern Italywent on saying that Mazzini was 'ruling' in Naples and Sicily,6 inreality he was out of touch with the dictator, and spent his time inretirement, writing or visiting Pompeii and Paestum. In so far as hehad any influence it was not so insidious as some people have imagined.7

He candidly reproached the more extreme republicans like Nicoterawith refusing to collaborate with Victor Emanuel,8 and personally hewas now reconciled to the position of camp follower in the triumph ofthe monarchy.9

1 2 September, Mazzini to Botta (Epistolario, vol. XLI, p. 36).2 7 September, Mazzini to Sacchi (ibid. p. 49); 7 September, Mazzini to Crispi

(ibid. p. 50). 3 18 September, II Nazionale (Naples).4 25 September, Fasciotti the Sardinian consul at Naples to Cavour (CC Lib. del

Mezz. vol. 11, p. 365); Maxime du Camp, who disagreed with Mazzini, yet wroteof what he had seen that 'je dois dire qu'a Naples il fut admirable de devouement etd'abnegation. Avant d'aimer une forme politique, il aime sa patrie' (Expedition desDeux Sidles, 1861, pp. 248-9).

5 Before long Garibaldi had reached the point of calling Mazzini ' a real obstacleto the unification of Italy' (MRR, 395/20/3).

6 13 October, La Nazione (Florence).7 Nazari-Micheli, for example, concluded of this year that 'the real struggle was

not between Cavour and Garibaldi, but between Cavour and Mazzini' (Cavour eGaribaldi nel i860, p. 195; Thayer, Life and times of Cavour, vol. 11, p. 379).

8 c. 22 September, Mazzini to Caroline Stansfeld (Epistolario, vol. XLI, pp. 98-100).9 19 September, Mazzini to Matilda Biggs (ibid. pp. 92-3).

The Radicals at hay: September 249Mazzini lives by himself [wrote Asproni with some perplexity], aloof

from everything, a spectator of what is going on. Not only does he not putforward his republican ideas, but he restrains the haste of the more impatient,and preaches that it is imperative to subordinate every sentiment to unity.He has aged considerably, and his face shows how much he has suffered.I think this man has a gigantic spirit and an intellect above everyone's.1

Mazzini was not to be feared at Naples, and he does not figure pro-minently in any of the political struggles which were to follow there.But one cannot deny that his presence accidentally did the revolutionariesa great disservice. It played Cavour's game by frightening the moderates,and certainly took its share in turning them and the king againstGaribaldi.

More dangerous in practice was Bertani, who had brought his largereinforcement of volunteers to join Garibaldi's forces at the end ofAugust. On arrival at Naples, Bertani in his usual dynamic fashion setabout organizing everyone, including the dictator. Garibaldi nevershowed much cordiality towards him, because several times recentlythe man had shown that he could follow an independent and irre-sponsible line of policy. Nevertheless Bertani was welcome. He camewith yet more confirmation of the glad news that there were fairchances of receiving royal support in deposing Cavour and completingthe march on Rome. Bertani was a single-minded man, an idealist, aman of great energy, and a good organizer. Where others failed toprevail by sweet reasonableness on the mind of Garibaldi, his self-confidence and blustering efficiency sometimes succeeded; and for afortnight, during Garibaldi's more intransigent phase in the middle ofSeptember, Bertani was the keeper of the dictator's conscience, andcorrected and probably wrote some of his official letters. Cavour'sagents on the spot sent back word that he was a secret republican.2

These agents do not always seem to have been able to distinguishradicalism from republicanism, and in consequence they sent homemisleading reports, which then had a big effect on Turin opinion. Oneresult of this was that Cavour misunderstood and exaggerated Bertani's

1 29 September, Asproni to Brofferio (Raccolta Martini MRR).2 25 September, Fusco from Naples to Ranucci (CF); Nazari-Micheli repeated the

story that he was a blind follower of Mazzini (Cavour e Garibaldi nel 1860,1911, p. 158;Thayer, Life and times of Cavour, vol. n, p. 374).

250 The Radicals at bay: Septemberinfluence on the conduct of affairs.1 Nevertheless, as Garibaldi was toobusy fighting to bother much about civilian affairs, such a man in thisposition could do much harm. He had certainly encouraged Garibaldito think that the king was on his side in order to convince him that therewas no need to be half-hearted about the advance on Rome.2 He alsoantagonized the liberals by using this chance to introduce fantasticmeasures of social reform.3 In the end it was Bertani's extremism andhot temper which did as much as anything to lose the day for his party,since he was loath to concede very much to expediency or even to goodmanners. The more respectable elements in Neapolitan society weresoon crying for his blood,4 and towards the end of the month Garibaldisent him back to Genoa. This action is convincing testimony of Gari-baldi's will to compromise. Perhaps it speaks less well for his good sensethat he had not acted sooner. But his forced visit to Sicily, and then thebattle of Caiazzo, had not left him much time for Neapolitan politics;and it was not Garibaldi's fault that Pallavicino did not arrive earlier totake up the burden of civil government.

Most of the other radical leaders also came to Naples in the first weekof Garibaldi's dictatorship. Crispi, Nicotera and Depretis landed fromSicily on the 12th. Alberto Mario and his wife Jessie White Mario werealready there. In the same boat which brought Mazzini on the 17tharrived Aurelio Saffi and Professor Saliceti. Carlo Cattaneo andGiuseppe Ferrari, the two chief federalists in Italy and two of thestrongest intellects among the deputies in parliament, also came toNaples. Cattaneo ranks in Italian history rather as an educator than asa politician. His federal views never became a principle of politicalaction in Italy. He had been persuaded by Bertani against his own will

1 N. Nisco, who was an agent of Cavour at Naples, later confirmed from his ownpersonal knowledge that they had been in error here (Storia del reame di Napoli 1824-60,vol. in, 1908, p. 129).

2 E.g. 17 September, Bertani's telegram to say that 'the Marches are in full insur-rection, and 20,000 Piedmontese soldiers are supporting the volunteers', in Paterno'sbulletin (ASP collezione particolare).

3 J. W. Mario, Agostino Bertani e i suoi tempi, vol. 11, 1888, pp. 198-202.4 23 September, II Nazionale, referred to one of Bertani's measures as *a challenge

to society, a negation of the moral principles on which society rests... the exaggerationof popular sovereignty, of the absolute right to work, of a contempt for every socialdistinction*.

The Radicals at hay: September 251to come south and give advice, but he was not a practical man. It wasa source of discord that he criticized Mazzini almost as much as he didCavour. He told Bertani that the main body of radicals was too muchlike Cavour in wanting to impose a programme by force. He calledthem half Jacobin and half Bonapartist, and he blamed them for neverquestioning whether an imposed unification of Italy was as desirable asa free association of autonomous states.1 * Sicily and Naples are notregions.. .but states', he wrote.2 Federalism, like liberty, was in hisview a point of principle, republicanism only a matter of convenience;and federalism to him was the only form of national union compatiblewith liberty. In holding such views, Cattaneo in fact was being tootheoretical, perhaps also too much of a 'liberal', and certainly wasshowing too little national arrogance, to do more than confuse counselat Garibaldi's headquarters. The one political axiom which at this timeit was impermissible to call in question was that of unification. In thissense, but in this sense alone, he must be called an eccentric.

Garibaldi had never been in a situation where he had to choosebetween so much miscellaneous and even contradictory advice. Hismind was not naturally tempered to submit so many distinct choices toany adequate process of reasoning, but as usual he proceeded by instinct,judging in the main by what seemed militarily possible.3 Probably hecould not understand Cattaneo's federal doctrine at all. He was toodistrustful of Mazzini to put much faith in that quarter. He cannot besaid to have liked Bertani, and he had a poor opinion of Rattazzi andhis parliamentary party.4 The one person he would instinctively obey,the king, sent him only vague letters which, under a non-committalfriendliness, thinly concealed a new note of acerbity and mistrust.Garibaldi himself could not penetrate the secret of this dubiety. Theexplanation is either that Victor Emanuel was embarrassed over leavingthe general in the lurch after earlier hints of good will; or else it wasbecause in Turin they did not wish Garibaldi to know yet that Rome

1 Undated draft letter from Cattaneo to Bertani (Archivio Cattaneo MRM).2 C. Cattaneo, Stati uniti d' Italia (1861), ed. N. Bobbio, 1945, pp. 190-1.3 G. Guerzoni, Garibaldi, vol. 11, 1882, p. 215. Guerzoni was with Garibaldi at this

moment.4 9 September, Astengo from Naples to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11,

p. 269).

252 The Radicals at bay: Septemberwould be by-passed; and probably, too, they wanted the volunteers tobecome properly involved in the Roman question, so that their owninvasion of the Marches could be more readily justified. Garibaldi wasa man to be feared, a man who also had to be made out as a dangerousenemy, yet whose open hostility could not be provoked for the momentwithout some risk.

Once again a complicated political conflict was to be resolved inmilitary terms. On 17 September the Garibaldians could still be hopefulthat an agreement was being reached by which the French garrisonwould leave Rome and allow them to advance.1 As late as the 19th,Garibaldi issued a proclamation for volunteers to come in by land andsea so that they might all join in this final phase of action, his idea beingto meet the Piedmontese in Rome and thence march with them againstVenice.2 But on this same day, the 19th, Tiirr's miscalculation inGaribaldi's absence exposed the volunteer army to the military reversewhich has already been described. The immediate strategical problemhad been how to cross the Volturno and outflank Capua, but Tiirr'sover-hasty tactical advance left them with a highly vulnerable salientat Caiazzo, and they shortly had to fall back again upon the river. Therecapture of Caiazzo by the Bourbons on the 21st even opened up thepossibility of a counter-attack on Naples, and a panic began in the city.Garibaldi had been away at the time, for this was the very momentwhen Cordova's intrigues had compelled him to go and appoint a newprodictator in Palermo. It made him realize that there was stifferopposition ahead than had been expected, and that he might have toadjust his plans in consequence. Vimercati said more than once that,for all he could see, the Rome expedition was being abandoned.3

As long ago as 11 September Garibaldi had sent to ask the king to lethim have the Marquis Giorgio Pallavicino as a prodictator to run thegovernment at Naples. After a week's delay Pallavicino set out, and on22 September he arrived on the same boat as Cattaneo. The marquisbelonged to one of the richest and noblest families of Lombardy.Twenty years before, he had been a national hero, after imprisonment

1 18 September, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).2 19 September, Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Garibaldi, vol. iv, p. 305.3 20-1 September, Brenier from Naples to Thouvenel (Maraldi, Documenti francesi,

pp. 176-8).

The Radicals at bay: September 253by the Austrians in the fortress of Spielberg. Once he had been adisciple of Mazzini, but he had now decisively broken with republi-canism.1 While by no means a friend of Cavour, he was at least inoccasional correspondence with him. Pallavicino was a moderateradical, who had once been president of the National Society, and neverforgot that Piedmont possessed resources without which Italy could notbe made into a nation. If he did not go and visit Cavour before leavingTurin, this was so as not to arouse the suspicions of Garibaldi, for unlikeLa Farina and Depretis he wanted to arrive in the south without anyentangling commitments. Partly as a result of this, Cavour had no goodwords for him or his mission.2 Garibaldi saw Pallavicino on the 22nd,and told him that he had no intention of being duped again by Cavourand Fanti as he had been in similar circumstances during 1859. But themarquis nevertheless received the impression from this interview thatGaribaldi's criticism of the government was in part a matter of mis-understanding on both sides, and that it still left room for negotiation;accordingly he returned home at once so as to discuss the possibility ofcompromise with Cavour and the king. It was noticed at Naples thathis own calmer counsels had made some impression on the dictator;Garibaldi was now ready to be more friendly if only Cavour would butguarantee that those volunteers who wished to join the national armywould not be turned adrift.3

Back at Turin on the 23rd, Pallavicino found that Vimercati hadpreceded him with a less conciliatory tale, and that Cavour hadmanaged to prevail upon the king. A personal letter from Garibaldiwas presented to Victor Emanuel, but the latter put the message rudelyin his pocket unread, and began a tirade against the impertinence of onewho claimed to be on a level with his king. He became quite furiouswhen Pallavicino interpolated that Garibaldi had after all done somethings which merited gratitude.4 While Garibaldi was apparently stillopen to persuasion, the king clearly was not. Pallavicino then saw

1 19 June, Pallavicino from Turin to Garibaldi, 'distrust Mazzini and the Maz-zinians: they spoil everything they touch* (ACM, no. 1169).

2 21 September, Cavour to Valerio (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 338).3 22 September, Cordova to Cavour (ibid. pp. 346-7); 25 September, // Nazionak

(Naples).4 G. Pallavicino-Trivulzio, Le Memorie, vol. 111, pp. 605-9.

254 The Radicals at bay: SeptemberCavour on the 24th, and found him at first quite reasonable and evenready or feigning to give way. At a second meeting on the 25th theprime minister was quite changed, and said he was ready to combatGaribaldi and take die consequences. Pallavicino was shocked, andpointed out that this might leave the way open for the Mazzinians totake over at Naples; to which Cavour replied 'so much the better', forthis would give an excuse to obliterate them. Pallavicino could onlyexpostulate that the Mazzinians were not Croats, but Italians, and thatwar against Garibaldi would be fratricidal. This had no effect. On theway back to take up his post at Naples, he wrote to explain once morethat Garibaldi had the same aims as the Turin government, but was justafraid that Cavour might be creating only a new cisalpine Gauldependent on France.1 If unwarranted, this fear could surely beallayed without difficulty.

The result of these exchanges was not known to Garibaldi for threeor four days. In the interval he continued to show signs that hismomentary rage was passing. Perhaps he still had hopes that VictorEmanuel would dismiss Cavour after hearing what Pallavicino had tosay. He told people that he had not deserved harsh treatment from theking. Gradually he was becoming reconciled to the situation. Pied-montese troops were known to be moving up towards a position whereshortly they might stand between him and Rome, so that one way orthe other the future would depend upon them. So while Bertani wantedto halt General Cialdini on the frontier, Garibaldi now expressed thehope that the Piedmontese would soon cross into Neapolitan territory.2

When his secretary ran into angry opposition from the liberal ministersat Naples, he confirmed the latter in office3 and refused to sign some ofBertani's decrees.4 On the 25th, Bertani therefore gave up his post.Mazzini sadly read into these events the conclusion that there was nofurther possibility or intention of moving on Rome. The rumour hadalready reached him of the dictator's truly Garibaldian answer to the

1 26 September, Pallavicino to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, pp. 371-2).2 26 September, Villamarina to Cavour (ibid. pp. 374-5); 26 September, Astengo

to Cavour (ibid. p. 377).3 22 September, Villamarina to Cavour (ibid. p. 345).4 23 September, three of Bertani's decrees were repudiated by Garibaldi (ACP,

f. 138); 25 September, Bertani to Garibaldi (ACM, nos. 813, 814).

The Radicals at bay: September 255king, 'Sire je vous obeirai'. 'He is dejected, discouraged, quotes linesof our poets, and talks of Caprera... .The weakness of the man issomething fabulous', wrote Mazzini.1 'Gar after plenty of waveringsand steps taken towards us has yielded to the King and to the moderateshere... .Bertani is going to be sacrificed by him to the moderates.9 % Onthe 27th, in the first decree for some time which he had signed alonewithout Bertani's countersignature, Garibaldi welcomed ' our brothersof the Italian army commanded by the brave General Cialdini.... In ashort while we shall be able to shake them by the hand.'3 This wassensible and realistic. Garibaldi, one might say, was now being moremoderate than the moderates themselves.

Pallavicino returned to Naples on the 27th, and the next day went toreport to Garibaldi at Caserta. The dictator was perplexed and disap-pointed to discover that the king had been so surly and abrupt; yet hehad no thought of rebellion. His attitude was a placid one of acceptanceand resignation. Elliot now added his own impression that, althoughno announcement had yet been made, Garibaldi had been persuaded bythis news not to continue his advance.4 The general confessed amaze-ment that Mazzini should be considered in the north as so dangerous,and put forward the shrewd suggestion that Cavour must be just usingthe name as a scarecrow to frighten people into supporting a conserva-tive policy.5 Whether intentionally or unintentionally, Cavour was notbehaving as though he properly understood the situation at Naples.Villamarina himself wrote at this time to warn Cavour that theinformation on which he had latterly built his policy had been incorrect,since the dictator would in no circumstances disobey the king or thinkof proclaiming a republic.6 Medici also sent a letter to Cavour on the28th to put him on guard against some of his more partisan advisers,for if anyone said that Garibaldi's entourage was dangerous they mustbe judging from passion and not from reason.7 But these warnings

1 25 September, Mazzini to Caroline Stansfeld (Epistolario, vol. XLI, pp. 106-8).2 27 September, Mazzini to Emilie Venturi (ibid. pp. 115-16, 118).3 27 September, 1/ Giornale Officiate di Napoli.4 28 September, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 70/320/536).5 28 September, Pallavicino, Le Memorie, vol. in, p. 609.6 29 September, Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 390).7 28 September, Medici to Cavour (ibid. pp. 387-8).

256 The Radicals at hay: Septembercarried no weight at Turin, where in the flush of success people had noroom for second thoughts.

The news brought by Pallavicino aroused mixed feelings in Naplesitself. The conservatives tended to be overjoyed, the radicals disconcerted.Probably among most people there was distress to learn that Garibaldiand Cavour had not been reconciled, and this was sometimes ascribedto the extremist views and bad tactics of the men round each of them.1

One thing which cleared the air a little after the 30th was the departurefor the north of some of the secondary leaders among the variousfactions, bound for Turin where parliament was about to open. AsCavour regained the initiative, the centre of gravity of the Italianrevolution was shifting northwards, and Bertani, Ferrari, Asproni,Depretis, Cordova and Scialoia took themselves off in pursuit of it.Political disagreements were then a little less bitter for a few days.

As Garibaldi became more subdued, Cavour became more confidentand excited. He no longer had to make shift to adapt himself to Gari-baldi's unaccountable whims, but was himself once more in charge ofevents. His invasion of the Papal States had evoked but little oppositionthroughout the rest of Italy. D'Azeglio, it is true, had resigned fromhis post as governor of Milan, prophesying doom to come,2 and thearistocrats of the old school did make some protest at the immorality ofattacking Pius IX and King Francesco on such a trumpery excuse.3 Butthe most prominent reaction was one of delight. Cavour found fewvoices to criticize him when he justified his conduct by raison d'etat.'I do not know if the means adopted were perfectly regular', he wasto tell parliament afterwards; 'but I do know that the end was holy,and that the end will justify any irregularities there may have beenin the means.... Never was war conducted with greater generosity,

1 30 September, II Nazionale.2 12 September, M. d'Azeglio to Castelli (Carteggxo di Castelli, ed. Chiala, vol. 1,

p. 322); 16 September, d'Azeglio to Arese (copy in Raccolta Azegliana MRR);7 June 1861, d'Azeglio to Pacetto (MRR); all these contradict and illuminate Cavour'sstatement in L' Opinione of 25 September that d'Azeglio's resignation had no politicalimplication.

3 E.g. 16 October, Brignole-Sale in the Senate: 'were we not at peace with thatking?.. .Had not our government publicly and frequently disapproved the Sicilianrevolution?.. .Had not the king of the Two Sicilies given to his people a constitutionwhich had been the object of our hopes and advice to him?' (Atti Parlamentari).

The Radicals at bay: September 257magnanimity and justice.'* This last phrase was a little excessive. Many-people who resisted Cialdini's attack had inevitably been dressed incivilian clothes, and many peasants and even some of the clergy weretherefore being shot summarily on capture for the crime of defendingtheir religion, their legitimate sovereign and their fatherland, or evenfor no crime at all. Some people preferred to use the word 'barbarous'when describing this conduct; and the Bourbon government at Gaetawondered how Victor Emanuel could stoop to this level when hehimself made such extensive use of irregular volunteers.2 Fortunatelythe army continued its quick and triumphant progress, and ten daysafter Castelfidardo the town of Ancona had fallen.3 Royal commis-sioners were appointed as civil governors, Valerio in the Marches, sincehis appointment might please the democrats, and in Umbria Napoleon'scousin, Pepoli, to pacify the French. The political absorption of thesecentral provinces was already beginning as advance troops moved downtowards the Neapolitan frontier.

Towards the end of September the success of the war made it possiblefor Cavour to think more seriously again about what General Fanticalled 'operation Naples'. Advice was now coming in from people sodiverse as Gladstone, Napoleon, Nigra, and even princes of the Houseof Savoy, that he should at this point make some magnanimous gesturetowards Garibaldi; in this way the radicals and the south might beconquered by generosity, and the victory of Piedmont would not bemarred by bitterness and division.4 Louis Napoleon was particularlyanxious lest Garibaldi should be made into a popular martyr and

1 16 October, Cavour in the Senate. Ibid.2 23 October, Elliot to Russell; 26 October, Casella to Elliot (F.O. 70/321).3 Incidentally the army had no maps of the Napoletano until Villamarina sent some

in October, and Admiral Persano had to sail his ships to Ancona with no charts ofthe Adriatic. In other words, national unification had not even been a remotehypothesis for the planning staffs at Turin.

4 16 September, Gladstone to Lacaita: * Garibaldi has shown such admirable intelli-gence and good sense along with all his other fine qualities that one must not distrusthim in anything' (Charles Lacaita, An Italian Englishman Sir James Lacaita, 1933,p. 151); 16 September, Prince di Carignano to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11,p. 305); 24 September, Nigra telegram to Cavour: 'faites une derniere tentative deconciliation et tachez de gagner ces hommes en leur faisant de larges concessions'(CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 222); 22 September, II Nazionale.

258 The Radicals at hay: SeptemberCavour labelled as an ingrate.1 Lord Palmerston gave his gratuitousopinion that the government 'ought to treat Garibaldi as an ally and notas an enemy'.2 Palmerston also pointed out that Garibaldi had puthimself in the right by his steadfast loyalty to Victor Emanuel, and bysuch actions as his voluntary cession of the Neapolitan fleet.3 ButCavour was adamant: 'il n'y a pas de conciliation possible entreGaribaldi et le Gouvernement du Roi.'4 Fanti had express orders to useforce if necessary to disarm the volunteers;5 though, when a false rumourspread that Garibaldi had given similar orders against the Piedmontese,the liberals held up their hands in pious horror. Cavour thought fora moment of going south himself,6 but on second thoughts decided tosend Farini as civil governor of Naples7 and Ricasoli for the same postin Sicily.8 These decisions, it must be remembered, were taken longbefore there had been any plebiscite in the south, and even without anystate of war being declared between Piedmont and the recognized kingof Naples; but Cavour was not the man to wait for nice formalities togive him technical justification for what he intended to do.

Cavour felt sure that right as well as might was on his side. He care-fully selected certain arguments which he thought would satisfyPalmerston and sent them to London:

Garibaldi n'a aucune idee politique precise. Il reve une espece de dictaturepopulaire, sans parlement et avec peu de liberte. Ses adeptes Bertani etautres acceptent sa dictature comme un moyen d'arriver a la Constituante etde la Constituante a la republique.

Vous ne pouvez pas vous faire une idee du desordre qui regne a Naples.Les fous de toute l'Europe s'y sont donne rendez-vous. Jersey tout entiers'y est transported

1 1 October, Panizzi from the British Museum to Cavour, that Napoleon had saidas much to him personally (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. vi, p. 606).

2 28 September, Palmerston to Russell (RP G.D. 22/21).3 24 September, E. d'Azeglio to Cavour (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, pp. 129-30).4 27 September, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 383).5 21 September, Cavour telegram to Fanti [ibid. p. 333).6 22 September, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 222).7 24 September, Emilio Visconti-Venosta to his brother Gino (AME).8 c. 26 September, Farini to Ricasoli, adding that the plan was to go ' and establish

monarchic authority, morality and common sense in Naples and Sicily' (Carteggio diRicasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani; to be published).

9 27 September, Cavour to E. d'Azeglio (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, p. 133).

The Radicals at bay: September 259Cavour still misread Garibaldi's character enough to be worried thatthe latter might try to oppose the advance of Fanti,1 and he instructedVillamarina in that case not to hesitate before overturning him andsetting up a provisional government in collaboration with GeneralMedici.2 His chief strength was that he had momentarily prevailedupon the king to distrust Garibaldi and resent the appeal for thedismissal of a constitutional ministry. As Poerio described in a letter ofthe 27th, 'the king is indignant, and if there were once some differencesbetween him and Cavour, these have now been dispersed... Rattazzihas spontaneously given his support to the ministry, and I do not thinkthat in the Chamber there will be twenty votes supporting Guerrazzi.'3It was on this day, the 27th, that the details were finally decided for theplan which this more favourable situation made possible. Cavour sentoff to tell Nigra what was proposed, that the king Vest decide.. .amarcher sur Naples pour mettre Garibaldi a la raison et jeter a la merce nid de republicans rouges et de demagogues socialistes qui s'estforme autour de lui. . . . C'est Vultimatum insolent apporte par cet imbecilede George Pallavicini qui a decide le Roi/4 No doubt Cavour had madeas much of this 'ultimatum' as he could. All had depended on theking's decision. Fortunately Garibaldi had been induced to overreachhimself, and in the selfsame action had both antagonized the king andattracted public responsibility for the clash between north and south.The radicals had again been outmanoeuvred.

In being so uncompromising and ruthless, Cavour had been movedin part by Garibaldi's request to the king for his replacement, but inpart also by the unexpected sharpness of Napoleon's protest against hisattack on the Pope. 'It is by driving the Mazzinians into the sea that weshall receive from Napoleon a plenary absolution', he wrote.5 If onlyFrance could be mollified, the rest was easy. In northern Italy, publicopinion was already on his side, as a juste milieu which saved them from

1 29 September, R. de Cesare, Una famiglia di patrioti, 1889, p. ccxiii, on whatCavour had just said to Spaventa.

2 25 September, Cavour to Villamarina (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 361).3 27 September, Poerio to Lequile (G. Bandini, 'Lettere di C. Poerio nel i860',

Kassegna Storica del Risorgimento, 1943, pp. 501-2).4 27 September, Cavour to Prince di Carignano (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv,

pp. 235-6).5 30 September, Cavour to Pepoli (CC La Questione Romana, vol. 1, p. 44).

17-2

260 The Radicals at bay: Septemberthe Pope and Mazzini. Cavour had never been so popular in Piedmontas he was now that he had regained the initiative for Turin and forconservatism,1 and this popularity gave him the firm impression thatthe cult of Garibaldi was on the wane and could be attacked withimpunity. He could not guess what would be the price to be paid forthis in the future. 'The Garibalditis is on the way to a cure', he toldPepoli, and 'I flatter myself that the discussions in the Chamber willfinish it off/ 2

The prospect of parliament reopening came to Cavour as a tonic.It was not only that he knew himself to be a master of parliamentarytechnique; but also, like a true liberal, he preferred to encounter hisenemies in public debate. He knew that those most prone to Gari-balditis were not prominent in either Senate or Chamber of Deputies.It is true that Garibaldi was himself a member of parliament; andironically enough, earlier in the year it had been he who denouncedCavour in the Chamber for violating the constitution by ceding Niceand Savoy. But that episode had only confirmed the radical general inhis abiding contempt for a body which could slavishly ratify thisviolation of national territory. Cavour was thus quite right to say thatGaribaldi's favourite form of government was a popular dictatorship,3

and the knowledge was particularly instrumental in making parliamentlook on the invitto duce of southern Italy with fear and distaste. The primeminister knew that he was sure of a large majority as soon as the Chamberreopened on 2 October, when all these disagreements could be broughtsafely into the open.

1 28 September, H. d'Ideville at Turin, *il est impossible d'etre aussi populaire',Journal d'un diplomate en Italie, vol. 1, p. 163.

2 30 September, Cavour to Pepoli (CC La Questione Romana, vol. 1, p. 44).3 E.g. G. Tivaroni, * Garibaldi e la dottrina della dittatura', prints Garibaldi's letter

to Lallemand of 3 December 1869, Rivista del Risorgimento, 1897, pp. 669-71.

2 6 l

CHAPTER XVIII

MORDINI THE NEW PRODICTATOR:17-25 SEPTEMBER

By the middle of September, Italian affairs in general were driving onat what Lord Palmerston called 'railway speed', but the island ofSicily seemed to have been left in something of a backwater, andSicilian politics had again taken on the appearance of being more localthan national. As a French observer in the south commented on18 September, 'on ne semble etre d'accord en Sicile que sur un seulpoint, la haine du nom napolitain, et de tout lien politique, memeabstrait, avec ce royaume'.1 Apart from this one point of agreement,Sicilians were becoming ever more restless and anxious as the battlemoved farther away. Depretis's attempt to find a highest common factorof consent had ended in his resignation on the 14th. As a result of this,Garibaldi had most reluctantly to leave his military preoccupations inorder to come and repair these growing differences. On the 17th thedictator arrived unexpectedly in Palermo for a six-hour visit, intendingto find out for himself what was amiss and to select a new civil governor.

Crispi's candidacy for the vacant prodictatorship was out of thequestion, since he had aroused too much personal antipathy to be theinstrument of pacification, and was too much of a partisan and toolittle of a diplomat to be able to find a compromise and secure people'sconsent to it. Before returning to Sicily the dictator had, it is true, askedCrispi to come with him as adviser, but the latter was too muchfrightened of the changed atmosphere of backbiting and populardemonstrations, and was too eager to remain on the centre of the stageat Naples. There is not much doubt that his presence in Sicily at thismoment would have been more hindrance than help. But possibly itwas an error of judgement on his part thus to minimize the importanceof Sicily for the fortunes of his party, and not to be at hand to take anactive share in the choice of Depretis's successor.

1 18 September, Brenier to Thouvenel (Maraldi, Documenti francesi sulla caduta delregno meridionale, p. 175).

262 Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 SeptemberBertani was more far-sighted than this. Probably he had been behind

the approach made to Aurelio Saffi, former triumvir of the Romanrepublic of 1848, to come and accept the post of prodictator,1 and thenhe even took it upon himself to write out and sign a decree nominatingCalvino to this position.2 Bertani's views, however, did not prevailwith Garibaldi nearly as often as the moderate liberals chose to think;nor did they prevail on this occasion. A description of the actualelection was sent to Crispi by one of the prodictatorial secretariat whowas a radical but also a friend of Cordova:

No sooner had Garibaldi arrived than he tackled the reform of the govern-ment. He first put up Parisi as prodictator, on your recommendationI should imagine. But such a choice would have been the downfall of ourparty. Parisi betrayed us under Depretis; and then, when he saw us back inpower again, pretended as hard as he could to be on our side; or perhapshe is indeed with us for the moment, but then would betray us again aseasily if it should ever serve his turn.... He ought not even to remainMinister of the Interior as he is now The only suitable Minister of theInterior is yourself. Everyone now is unanimous in calling eagerly for you,for what Garibaldi said here has completed the restoration of your reputationand your political beliefs

But to return—when I saw the decree nominating Parisi as prodictator1 was dismayed, knowing what our friends would say about it.... Likeeveryone else I was despairing of any alternative, when suddenly my eyecaught Mordini, and I knew he was the man. Some people turned up theirnoses when I proposed him, and said he was too close to the republicans;others said, * Mordini? Who knows him? But my proposal met with sup-port from Sutera, Cacioppo, Ugdulena and Calvino; he was put up to theGeneral and was accepted instead of Parisi.

It was all very fortunate, for Mordini's appointment has been welcomedby everyone, even by our enemies. He is courteous but strong: his publishedprogramme is that of Garibaldi, and his first acts have won him both loveand respect He has reappointed Bargoni as secretary-general to thegovernment. Bargoni has a good reputation, though my own view is thatas a Tuscan he is something of a 'municipalise, that is to say he does notlove us Sicilians as he ought. But we shall see.3

1 22 September, L' Unita Italiana (Genoa); 7 October, // Nazionale (Naples)contains a letter from Sam about this.

2 14 September (ABM). 3 22 September, Navarra to Crispi (ACP, f. 135).

Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 September 263In the circumstances Antonio Mordini was an excellent choice. He

had been born into the small agricultural nobility of Tuscany, and haddistinguished himself in the 1848 wars of liberation at Florence andVenice. At the present moment he was a lieutenant-colonel andauditor-general of Garibaldi's army. While belonging to the 'party ofaction', and though further towards the left than Depretis, he was alsoa loyal deputy in the Piedmontese parliament. He had voted in theTuscan assembly for the annexation of his home province to the king-dom of Victor Emanuel, and since then had taken an oath of allegianceto the king. In addition to having done good service for Garibaldi andfor Sicily in i860, he was already known in the south as a distinguishedpatriot,1 and he combined in himself the loyal monarchist and theradical, the convinced annexationist and the non-Piedmontese. Yet forall that, Mordini's appointment was not liked at Turin. Cavour gaveundue regard to the fact that he had once been a republican (like manyof the liberal-conservatives!), and soon transformed him imaginativelyinto a rabid follower of Mazzini.2 Mordini had in fact split off fromMazzini at the time of the Genoese insurrection of 1857, and sub-sequently had supported the Piedmontese war of 1859. Earlier in i860he had again specifically renounced the republican leader.3 Cavour'ssuccessors after i860 were to find in him a capable prefect and minister,and he finished life as a respectable senator, if anything rather to theRight of Italian politics.

This was the man whom Garibaldi now presented to the citizens ofPalermo as his deputy. In a public speech to them the dictator reaffirmedhis own determination to push on to Rome. Not until Rome had fallendid he mean to proclaim the new kingdom of Italy under the gallantmonarch of Sardinia in whose name he had already conquered thesouth. Far from opposing annexation, he wanted only to postpone it

1 20 June, II Paese (Palermo).2 Nazari-Micheli still refers to him as a * secret Mazzinian', Cavour e Garibaldi nel

i860, p. 166; Whyte also calls him a republican, The political life and letters of Cavour,p. 428.

3 5 June, Mordini to P. Cironi (who was editor of the radical Unita Italiana ofFlorence and a friend of Mazzini): 'just as Cavour committed a grave error in sendingLa Farina to Sicily, so others are equally wrong to push forward the name of Mazzini.What we need now is abnegation of our own private wishes in the interests of concord9

(Rosi, II risorgimento e V azione d' un patriota, p. 197).

264 Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 Septemberin the interests of other yet unredeemed provinces of Italy; and he gavehis audience to understand that he was agreed on this principle with theking, but that Cavour alone stood against it. This was not an accuratestatement of the situation, but Garibaldi still thought it was true, andhad good reason to do so. At all events his confident assertion musthave carried conviction with the Palermitans. To understand theirreaction to Garibaldi's speech, we must forget that he was not to reachRome and that the king had by now decided against him; for he him-self did not know this yet, and his assurance to the contrary must havedone much to calm Sicilians and unite them behind his apparentlyirresistible advance.1

A radical newspaper thus described the sudden effect on people: 'themiracle happened and in a few hours Palermo was bewitched. Dare wehope that these signori annessionisti will have done with their trouble-making now that Garibaldi has silenced them?'2 The party of Cavourwas momentarily at a loss, and even the irreconcilables must have seenthe uselessness of further agitation. Those who objected found it bestto keep silent. Their chief hope was to wait for the arrival of thePiedmontese, whose armies were now winning their first victory inthe north at the very moment that Garibaldi's were suffering their firstmilitary reverse. With General Fanti approaching the Neapolitanfrontier, the long-term prospects for the liberals were good. It musthave seemed that there would be not long to wait until Cavour re-imposed his will upon the revolutionary movement, either to crush itor to co-operate with it. Whether for one reason or the other, thefebrile agitation of Depretis's last days now diminished a little, at leastfor a day or two.

Nevertheless, though active propaganda weakened, private sentimentin favour of annexation (if perhaps only in Garibaldi's good time)was bound to grow stronger unless the new administration couldeffect a second miracle and increase the efficiency of government. Thewildest opinions continued to circulate in Sicily, and Cordova's friendsnaturally exploited whatever discontent and opposition they couldfind. One of Ricasoli's informants wrote privately on 19 September instronger terms than anyone ever dared to voice in public. 'We are now

1 G. Oddo, I milk di Marsala, 1867, p. 891.2 20 September, L* Unita Italiana (Palermo).

Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-2$ September 265drifting into civil war... .The national guard will not support this newministerial combination.... In Sicily all are unanimous in favour ofannexation, and differences exist only about the method of its accom-plishment; these differences, too, will disappear the moment it ispossible to emerge from this inferno of a most tyrannical dictatorship.'1A more dispassionate judgement would perhaps not have found verymuch tyrannical about a government which tried to rule a naturallyanarchical country during a civil war with no censorship, no armedforces to spare for domestic affairs, and only a tiny body of police. Thisqualification, however, does not altogether invalidate the politicalcriticism. Many people continued to have private doubts aboutGaribaldi's obstinate adherence to his earlier policy.

The moderate and sensible Amari for this reason refused to joinMordini's cabinet: 'the country wants annexation and quiet,' he said,* all except a small knot of crack-brains and mischief-makers. Garibaldi'spresence here has made us swallow the pill, but it is not so certain thatwe shall digest it.'2 Some days later, Amari wrote to a friendly politicianin England that the fall of Depretis had been caused by a combinationof place hunters, Mazzinians, Garibaldians and autonomists; and hebewailed that *le bas peuple dans son honnete naivete adore en Garibaldile heros du my the, qui, par consequent, a toujours raison vis-a-vis deshommes politiques sans sabre ni chemise rouge'. Amari's one hope wasthat the Piedmontese army would soon arrive in Sicily. If they werenot careful, he thought, there might be a rebellion against Garibaldi,a rebellion which would bring about a civil war in which Garibaldiwould triumph.3 Torrearsa on the other hand, who was but littleremoved politically from Amari, chose to support the new prodictator,4

and his provisional and conditional support was perhaps more typicalof the general opinion. There were doubts and suspicions on more sidesthan one, but the most sensible attitude was to wait and see. A reassuring

1 19 September, G. Fiorenza to Ricasoli {Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili andCamerani).

2 18 September, Professor Amari to G. P. Vieusseux (Carteggio di Amari, ed.d'Ancona, vol. in, p. 209).

3 7 October, Amari to Cartwright (ibid. vol. 11, p. 134).4 20 September, Marchese Torrearsa to his brother Giambattista ('Document! del

risorgimento negli archivi privati di Trapani', Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, 1942,p. 800).

266 Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 Septembercomment which has come down to us from 20 September remarked that'the country is now quieter, though much doubting the good faith ofthe annexationistsV Members of Cavour's party also noted this restora-tion of tranquillity.2 It should have been some satisfaction to themwhen Mordini's ministers took the oath to Victor Emanuel and thePiedmontese statute.3 In 'the provinces Mordini had a good responsewhen he asked for moderation, calmness and unity.4 On the whole asatisfactory reception was accorded to the new prodictatorial regime,and Garibaldi's personal recommendation gave it a flying start among*le bas peuple'.

One reassuring influence with members of the annexation party wasthe widespread belief that Mordini could not last more than a fortnight.5At the very worst they felt sure that Garibaldi would hardly choosecivil war when Cavour at last revealed his intentions and offered combatas the only alternative to surrender.6 But the new prodictator was infact to remain in power for seven weeks, skilfully piloting his govern-ment through many storms. The change in personnel of his new regimehelped to cut out some of the old personal animosities from politics.7

The radicals were in a cheerful and generous mood, because so far as theycould see the capture of Rome was imminent. Even Crispi himself nowlaid down as Mordini's first duty the preparation of the island for a vote.Apart from preparing for this act of union, the prodictator had toorganize men and munitions for Garibaldi's advance, to try and create

1 20 September, Chiarenze from Palermo to Crispi (ACP, b. 156).2 21 September, Sardinian consul from Palermo to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz

vol. v).3 22 September, L9 Annessione.4 18 September, the governor of Catania wrote to Mordini to say that everyone

in his province agreed with the dictator, and 'any move against his policy has beenrejected' (MRR); 20 September, the governor of Castroreale told Mordini that'public spirit here moves with the general current and is developing satisfactorily'(MRR, 221/23/9); 18 September, governor of Catania in a telegram to Mordinidescribed how ' your prodictatorial pronouncement is published here and has broughtjoy and confidence to people once more* (AMB).

5 25 September, La Gazzetta del Popolo (Turin), report from Palermo dated21 September.

6 25 September, Amari to Cartwright (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona, vol. in,p. 212).

7 28 September, Mordini to Bertani (ABM).

Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-23 September 267a body of police to enforce the law in Sicily, and to improve theadministration at Palermo. He addressed himself to all these tasks.Mordini was like Depretis in possessing a conciliatory disposition, andthis must have helped him keep the peace so that political problemscould resolve themselves with time. His policy was to make anotherattempt at reconciliation and compromise, and he was not to knowthat a compromise solution now had little chance of success. In practice,while everyone cried concord, one side interpreted this to mean thatGaribaldi should surrender, the other that Cavour should resign.1 Sucha difference of opinion could not continue for long unresolved, but theprodictator managed, partly from policy, partly from weakness,2 topostpone his decision.

After the first week it still seemed that things were 'not going at allbadly when you remember the great difficulties of the situation'.3

There was certainly some opposition to Mordini but it was notalarming, and while it was realized that matters could not continueindefinitely in this state of suspension, there was nevertheless little tofear immediately unless Cavour decided to take over Sicily by force.On 24 September the official Giornale criticized those who made up theopposition, on the grounds that they were trying to precipitate annexa-tion. For however desirable this end might be in itself, the commoncause might suffer if it were enacted with too much haste.

The government will act severely against those who disturb the mutualconfidence between it and the people, and if necessary will take such specialsteps as would be its right and its duty in these circumstances....

All of us in Sicily are annexationists, and none more so than the presentministers.... The champions of precipitate annexation know this perfectlywell, but for their own private purposes they choose to turn a mere question

1 26 September, La Cicala Italiana (Palermo).2 3 November, La Valle di Giosaffat (Palermo): 'Mordini has the kindest of hearts,

is affable, weak of character, and knows nothing of the country; so that he lets himselfbe influenced now by the aristocracy, now by the populace. The result is that,continually oscillating between these two extremes, despite his sincere and nobledeclaration that he will not represent a government by party, he comes to representa government by the piazza.*

3 25 September, S. Castiglia from Palermo to Crispi (ACP, £ 135); 26 September,Mordini to Crispi: 'I think I have now been able to acquire sufficient force in thecountry* (ACP, f. 140).

268 Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 Septemberof timing into a major question of substance.The clear proof of their sinisterdesigns is the insinuation that differences of opinion exist between GeneralGaribaldi and our Re Galantuomo; as if it were not notorious that one andother are bound by indestructible ties of affection and esteem, and that bothhave but one aspiration, the making of Italy.1

There can be no doubt that Mordini believed this doctrine of theharmony of interests, and the fact continues to be an important clue toboth his motives and Garibaldi's in continuing their defiance of Cavour.

If these were his public statements, Mordini's private views can befound in a letter to Bertani which he wrote on the 25th to describe whatwas happening:

I at once set about getting to know the public and making myself knownby them. The composition of the new ministry created an excellent im-pression. The country can see from this that we represent no exclusive view;and while we shall be firm in following the programme of Garibaldi, wehave no intention of making our government represent a single party. Thisis one proof the more that we have no special axe to grind, for there existsonly one political path we can follow. Our full attention is concentratedon administration, which for one cause or another is in a chaotic conditionhere.

In such a state of chaos the arrival of Casalis was fatal. Not that he carriesmuch influence. But his previous conduct, as Crispi will know, should haveprevented him coming. His first move was to go and see Cordova.... Andhe lost no time in spreading about the rumour that Depretis would soon beback here as royal commissioner at the head of four thousand Piedmontesesoldiers. In my position, without material forces to aid me, it will be disas-trous if people undermine the moral force upon which alone we have torely, that is to say by spreading it about that my government is a matter ofonly a few days.

The agitators are taking advantage of the presence of Casalis, and makeout that this confers on them from above an authorization to intrigue. Theyare going about to extract signatures for an address beseeching the king tosend soldiers to the island. But fortunately they are meeting a general rebufffrom the common sense of the people. They also tried to make the CivicCouncil follow up this address, but I forbad it. Their actions have helped todisturb the general calm here. . . so much so that, after leaving Casalis free

1 24 September, II Giornale Officiate di Sicilia.

Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 September 269to sow his wild oats in order to find out what he was really up to, I took stepsto have him put under arrest.... The Sardinian consul then asked if he mighthave him in custody at his own house, and I agreed.1

Cordova and Casalis had evidently not delayed for long in renewingtheir propaganda campaign for annexation. This campaign was wellorganized. It had begun in August by the formation of a central com-mittee in Palermo, with the purpose of persuading local authoritieseverywhere to send in reports to convince Depretis and Garibaldi ofthe 'unanimous wish' of their locality for immediate annexation.Cavour had been kept in touch with the development of the movementby his consul at Palermo, and during the first ten days of September,until Depretis fell, he had been confident of its success.2 The consul'scorrespondence shows that most of the details had been worked outwith the active aid of this official representative of Piedmont. Heattended meetings of the committee, and Cavour already in Septemberwas making a note that he should be given the Cross of St Maurice forhis political activity against Garibaldi's government.3 This same mandid his best to impress upon Cavour that Mordini, despite the fact thathe had voted for annexation in the recent Tuscan assembly, was atheart a republican.4 After Mordini's appointment the collection ofsignatures for annexation still continued in the streets and cafes.5 Thegovernor of the province of Noto discovered that Bottero had been themedium for passing on instructions from Cavour to the Piedmontesevice-consul at Messina, and this official had been retailing these instruc-tions to all other consular officials in eastern Sicily. Their orders werethat they should each try and make the provincial governors raise asubscription and use it to oppose the policy of Garibaldi's government.6

By mischance it happened that the governor of Noto was loyal, and soreported what he heard to the government; but for the most part Crispihad appointed to governorships those local figures whose territorial

1 25 September, Mordini to Bertani (ACP, £ 140).2 4 September, Cavour to Prince di Carignano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 223).3 Cavour's note written on the letter sent by Rocca from Palermo on 25 September

(ibid. vol. v). The decoration was duly given him in April 1861.4 21 September, Rocca to Cavour (ibid. vol. v).5 20 September, Giornale di Catania; cf. 8 September, Tom Pouce (Palermo).6 22 September, the governor of Noto to Mordini (AMB, b. 28).

270 Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-23 Septemberposition gave them the most influence, and these men often pursuedindependent policies of their own against that of the Palermo govern-ment to which they were nominally responsible. Of course it some-times happened that Cordova slipped up and selected as recipient forhis propaganda some man who disapproved of this method of pro-cedure: in that case the 'unanimous wish' of this or that locality waslikely to be reported as being against immediate annexation. Butwhichever way they told, reports of this type are fallible as evidenceof the state of public opinion. People's views were surely more diverse,more complicated, more unreasonable, even more unintelligible thansuch crude statements tried to make out. As one of these provincialradicals had ruefully and ingenuously commented, 'in general theinterior districts of Sicily reveal a great ignorance of political principles,so that little or no difference is made between annexation to Piedmontand Italian Unity'.1 The subtleties of the political conflict were farabove the heads of ordinary Sicilians; and as for the dominant per-sonalities in local government, they would always tend to put a simplereturn to peace and quiet in the centre of their political programme.

Crispi in August, when he was minister for internal affairs, hadchosen to take a firm stand against disaffection. There was good reasonfor a government to resent disloyalty among its own appointedservants, and to be impatient of opposition in a time of war emergencyunder a dictatorial regime. The government had originally beenorganized as a dictatorship because, for a country like Sicily, dictator-ship was the only organization of power which could satisfy the demandsof war and the rebuilding of a totally wrecked administration. Crispitherefore claimed that there should be only one policy, laid down bythe government, and that party strife ought to await quieter times. Hetold Garibaldi that he had documentary proofs of how Cordova, thoughstill nominally a judge in the Palermo court of appeal, was obstructingthe policy and administration of the dictator's government. In replyhad come a telegram on 12 September ordering Cordova at once toanswer these charges at Naples. This was still before the resignation ofDepretis.

After Cordova, Crispi and Depretis had all left Sicily, BartolomeoCasalis became the leader of the annexation movement with whom

1 27 August, questura of Piazza to Crispi (ACP, b. 152).

Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-23 September 271Mordini had to deal. Casalis first made some attempt to induceMordini's colleagues to desert him and so force the prodictator'ssubmission. He also let fall a hint that people should hesitate beforecollaborating with a man on the Piedmontese black list who wasshortly and inevitably to be dismissed with all his followers. This wasaccompanied by the other actions described in Mordini's letter quotedabove. On 24 September Casalis wrote a letter to Bottero, whichillustrates in the first place the degree of misconception about the newprodictator, and in the second place the extent to which Cavour wasfomenting rebellion against Garibaldi. In this letter Casalis explainedthat he intended to leave shortly for Naples, * because all my work hereis now ready':

Mellino has been able to do his part admirably: he has won over theartillery units in Palermo to place themselves at his disposition, and theregiment of cavalry too; and he has arranged everything else with the moreinfluential citizens of Palermo whom you know about.

So here we have everything ready and are only waiting for the order tomove. The deputation to the king is leaving on the same boat which bringsyou this letter, that is if the government does not stop it. Mordini5 governmentis like that at Naples in working against annexation and for a republic. Mazzinianpropaganda is being carried out with an admirable activity and a mint ofmoney. I wrote formerly from Naples to tell Cavour what I now tell you,that it is time to end this business. A breach is now unavoidable, and we musttherefore bring it about quickly before they can prevail on public opinionto support them. Otherwise the advance of Mazzinianism will precipitatea bloody civil war. We must move at once. Mellino has also paid carefulattention to the press, with the result that all papers are on our side exceptthe Precursore....

Depretis did well to resign and leave Garibaldi isolated among Bertaniand Crispi and the other more or less disguised Mazzinians. Thus, when ourgovernment thinks the moment ripe to break with these fools who arecompromising our cause, Depretis will be able to return on one of ourwarships to Palermo as royal commissioner.1

Not unsurprisingly, Casalis was arrested on this same day, before hecould carry out his plan. The Piedmontese consul had already preparedfor the eventuality of his arrest, and was ready with his offer to Mordini

1 24 September, Casalis to Bottero (Bollea, Una silloge di lettere del risorgimento,p. 346).

272 Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 Septemberthat he himself should be allowed to look after the prisoner in his ownconsulate. Mordini, perhaps weakly, agreed to this proposal, and soincurred the odium of oppression without its advantages. A moderateand fully justifiable action was now publicized to the world as an act ofgross tyranny. On the 25th Casalis and Mellino took ship for Naples.

Cavour knew about what was happening in his name. He had beenalready informed that his friends in Palermo 'had a scheme ready for apronunciamento, which would substitute a new provisional govern-ment for that of Garibaldi, and would proceed to annex the islandimmediately'.1 His informants give the impression of being moreextreme and alarmist in their letters to Cavour than when writing totheir other friends, perhaps purposely exaggerating the difficulties inSicily so that Mordini might seem the more a villain and they them-selves the more heroic. But it was on such information that Cavourmade up his mind that henceforward he would exclude all idea ofcompromise. He even decided to take away the few policemen he hadformerly sent to help Depretis in the maintenance of law and order,making the excuse that they now might be used to serve Mazziniinstead of the king, and adding in explanation that there was no moreroom for reconciliation between Garibaldi's government and the king's.2Probably this was also because he did not want Mordini to win thereputation of being able to restore order on his own. Annexation mustbe forced on an unwilling government—if necessary by adding tothe anarchy in Sicily, so that the radicals would lose and the liberal-conservatives would gain in popular estimation.

House-arrest and expulsion were mild answers to the activity ofCasalis, but they were enough to colour the accusation that this wasa dictatorial reign of terror. On 24 September, as part of the same plot,there fled from Sicily to Genoa several former Piedmontese officials.These men had originally been allowed by Cavour to go and fill seniorposts in Garibaldi's ministry of marine, in case it ever became necessaryto usurp control of the Sicilian navy.3 On their return to Genoa they

1 18 September, Cordova to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. n, p. 321).2 27 September, Cavour to Villamarina (ibid. pp. 383-4).3 20 September, La Gazzetta del Popolo (Bottero's paper at Turin), report from

Palermo dated 25 September; 30 September, Dafieno from Genoa to Depretis(Archivio Depretis ASR).

Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-23 September 273made statements to the press, which Mordini wisely published in theofficial Giornale at Palermo so that the public could judge of their truth:

In Palermo the police are carrying out a real terror. The populace iswaiting with the greatest anxiety for the armed assistance of Piedmont. Noone is any longer sure of being able to sleep in his own house. Public opinionin Palermo is even beginning to come out with recriminations against Pied-mont for its delay in helping the island. Everyone now believes that thepresent prodictator and his ministry are aiming to create a republic, andpeople are furious at the fact.1

This legend was easily enough believed by northerners, for whoseconsumption it had of course been devised. The familiar bogey ofrepublicanism could always be brought out with good effect on specialoccasions like this, even though there was not the least chance ofrepublicanism emerging triumphant from southern Italy, or even ofbeing freely propagated there. The whole issue had been prejudged, toMazzini's dismay, from the first moment that Garibaldi had landed atMarsala in the name of the king. The only active republican leader inSicily had been Nicotera, and he was deprived of his command becauseof this very fact. Republicanism was merely a revenant, and it wasdragged back into active life just because it had some political usefulnessas a scare to the politically neutral. No doubt these statements to thepress would have been generally believed in the north, where it wasimportant to work up feeling against the radicals before parliament meton 2 October. The sense of mission and manifest destiny among thePiedmontese would simultaneously be flattered, for the article assuredthem that the northern troops were eagerly awaited in Sicily asdeliverers from the hated dictatorship of Garibaldi.

Mordini, however, would hardly look on matters in that light.Garibaldi had again confirmed the radical programme in his speech of17 September, and this had virtually forced the new prodictator into amore coercive policy than that of Depretis. .Such a coercive policy wasat least partially successful in checking the organized disloyalty amonglocal authorities and the notorious beguiling of the armed forces fromtheir allegiance.2 Conspiracy had to be quelled. There was hardly any

1 4 October, Giornale Officiate di Sicilia, quoting the Gazzetta di Genova of i October.2 4 October, V Annessione admits this.

MS 18

274 Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-23 Septemberreal danger of governmental terror when news was freely published,especially as almost all the press had apparently been bought by Cavour'sagents. With so little physical force to back him, Mordini had rather torule by the moral force of the admiration which Garibaldi's personalityinspired. The programme of his government, too, was not so veryunwise and dangerous as the moderates made out. At all events, itseemed obvious enough to an observer in England that Garibaldi hadgood arguments for delaying annexation, because the annexation ofSicily would deprive him of his base, and of further supplies of muni-tions and troops.1 If there was any lack of wisdom, it was certainly notall on one side. Cavour himself was being accused of short-sightednessin his policy of quick, unconditional annexation. 'If his campaignsucceeds, he will pay dearly for his victory', said Asproni: 'in less thansix months we shall have a bloody and fatal conflagration. NeitherNaples nor Sicily will endure in peace the yoke of Turin and the lawsof Piedmont.'2 This prophecy was not far wrong. If Mordini did notsucceed in what he tried to do, neither did the moderates when it wastheir turn to try and rule in southern Italy. If his methods and policywere foolish, it is possible to argue that theirs were equally so.

Mordini did his best to carry out Garibaldi's political programme.What he could not do in a few weeks was to remedy the economicunrest, the agrarian disorder, the high prices, the administrative dis-organization, the lack of police and revenue, all of which made every-one long for the end of the war and the restoration of regular govern-ment. These deficiencies were serious; but to put this in perspective itmay be noted that much the same accusations were being made byGuerrazzi and others against Cavour's administration in the north atthis time; and Cavour was having to make precisely the same reply asMordini, that in an emergency politics had to come first, and adminis-trative reorganization could only follow afterwards when politicalquestions were less exacting. It was not just a group of politicians, thatis to say, who stood in the way of law and order. The very samecriticisms were also to be made by Sicilians against Cavour afterMordini had yielded up his power in November. For Sicilian discontent

1 28 September, Lord Palmerston to Russell (RP G.D. 22/21).2 29 September, Asproni from Naples to Brofferio (Raccolta Martini MRR,

no. 342/23/9).

Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 September 275was as much social as political in origin, and it was to continue undersuccessive liberal governments quite as strongly, if not more so, thannow under the radicals. All one can say for the present is that inSeptember i860 it was a powerful reinforcement to the cause ofannexation, the objective towards which many people looked as if itwere a magic refuge from all their troubles.

It was on 24 September that Mordini handed over Casalis to thecustody of the Piedmontese consul and deprived the absent Cordova ofhis post as procurator-general of the Palermo government. Then on the25th a number of Sicilian notables left individually from various partsof Sicily to go and ask Cavour if he would lend armed support to thechampions of annexation. As Garibaldi had not been impressed bytheir desire to end the revolution, Casalis had decided that they oughtto appeal directly to the king in whose name the dictator claimed to beruling. The deputation was headed by Father Lanza and Prince Bel-monte, its main support coming from the Palermitan aristocracy.1After having led numerous Sicilian revolutions during centuries offoreign domination, the titular aristocracy in Sicily were now alarmedto find themselves entirely excluded from the new revolutionarygovernment, and even sometimes threatened in their lordship over theprovinces. Ever since Marchese Torrearsa and Baron Pisani hadresigned in June, the nobles had scarcely been represented at all inGaribaldi's successive ministries. Cavour on the other hand had courtedthem, despite their autonomist instincts; for he knew that they wouldfind Garibaldi's government too radical, and that they would prefersubmission to Piedmont as a lesser evil if this meant the return of orderand monarchy. Mordini was to them a Tuscan 'foreigner', who ruledthrough a combination of other foreigners and Sicilian intellectuals andlawyers. The revolutionary government was also supported by a large'foreign' army, which claimed to have 'conquered' Sicily, and this factwas by no means always well received by natives of the island.

No doubt most of the nobles would have liked to receive some degreeof local self-government in Sicily with all the confirmation of theirpower and position it would imply. But they had some reason at firstfor thinking that this would come more readily from Cavour than from

1 25 September, De Stefano Rosario to Crispi (ACP, f. 135); n October,L' Assembled (Palermo).

18-2

276 Mordini the New Prodictator: 17-25 Septemberthe radical Unitarians, and they were not yet to know that liberal Pied-mont was to be less lenient on this point than either Garibaldi or eventhe tyrannical Bourbons. Their secular strife with Naples made themthe first to react against the radicals when Garibaldi tried to reimposeupon Sicily submission to a remote secretariat in Naples. They alsocould argue that the absence of law and order might sooner be eradicatedwith the help of Piedmontese men and money. Communal anarchyand the dislocation of trade would hardly be remedied as quickly by atemporary prodictator. It seemed to them that Mordini's real intentionwas to postpone the advent of settled government in the interests ofother Neapolitan and Roman provinces for which most Sicilians hadlittle or no feeling but one of resentment. All this contributed toweaken the prodictator's position, especially with the aristocracy whoselanded property made them particularly vulnerable in times of dis-order. Mordini took good note of their attitude, and was soon lookingabout him for some way to capture the interest of this important elementin public opinion.

277

CHAPTER XIX

FURTHER CONTROVERSYOVER ANNEXATION:

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBERDuring the first ten days of Mordini's rule, the old labels of annexa-tionist, delayed-annexationist and conditional-annexationist wereshuffled again, as gradually the true political bent of the new pro-dictatorship revealed itself. Depretis had come to grief over attemptingto hasten the union of Sicily and the north, because he had here beenpitting himself against the indifference of Garibaldi and the hostility ofthe radicals and autonomists. Mordini therefore decided to try andmake an alliance between the radicals on the one hand, and a group ofautonomists on the other, hoping to secure a common agreement forpostponing and limiting the vote of union. The formation of thisalliance, and its provision of greater strength to the cause of Garibaldi,was later to be Mordini's proud boast.1 But the more extreme membersof the 'party of action' were at first only confused by it, for they werefar more interested in creating unified central government than inqualifying this by the acquisition of local autonomy.

Those who thought of the new prodictator as just another of theradicals thus missed an important political distinction. There was, forinstance, a certain coolness which now grew up between Mordini andCrispi. The former criticized both Crispi and Cordova for letting a mererivalry of personalities obtrude to confound politics and weaken ad-ministration; and his remarks on this point came to the ears of Crispi,who took offence at them.2 Mordini then set himself deliberately toassociate with the group of people who put Sicily first, and whoresented the action of both Crispi and Cordova to superimpose either

1 24 January 1861, Mordini to Crispi: 'the present force behind Garibaldi is basedon the alliance of our party with the old autonomists, an alliance which I formedduring the prodictatorship' (ACP, f. 140).

2 2 October, Calvino from Naples to Mordini (AMB, b. 30).

278 Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct.national or Piedmontese interests upon them. This association inpeople's minds of Crispi and Cordova is one example of how the twoactive parties were still looked upon as extraneous, and as having moresimilarities than incompatibilities between them. There was certainlyone element in the radical party which thought of itself as having morein common with Cordova than with the 'little Sicilian' party whichwanted local autonomy.1 Another illuminating point was that, althoughthe main body of radicals disliked Cordova, they did so preciselybecause his past history made him suspected of autonomist predilec-tions, and by no means just because he now seemed to champion agreater Piedmont.2 These confusions all helped Mordini in his earlyexperiment with what in later Italian history became known as 'trans-formism'. Instead of accepting the party system as he found it, hisobject was to split up the existing groups and fabricate as many piecesas possible into a new broadly-based ministerial coalition. He arrivedwith the reputation of being a radical, but he quickly adapted himselfto try and establish that he was independent of both extraneous factions,both the nationalist and the Piedmontese. How far he had succeededby the end of the month may be seen in the following anecdote relatedby one of Crispi's friends in the government of Palermo:

Last night at the theatre, the Duke of Verdura [mayor of the city] washeard to make the following remarks: * Mordini is on the right lines, andeven though he arrived in Sicily with ideas contrary to our own, neverthelessnew acquaintance with the needs of the island has brought him round to ourpoint of view. He first wanted to introduce a certain special law, but whenhe found it was against our wishes he abandoned it.'

I do not know if the Duke was just flattering himself; but I do know thatour local aristocrats are showing themselves expert at winning Mordini'sear, and that none of our party is near him. Even though he has some regardfor me personally, yet I have scarcely seen him at all.3

The same shift in the prodictator's policy is evident in an importantdifference which developed between him and Bertani. Bertani hadbecome Garibaldi's secretary at Naples, and was determined thatMordini and Sicily should not be allowed to abandon orthodox

1 22 September, Navarra to Crispi (ACP, f. 135).2 18 September, L' Unita Italiana (Genoa), report from Palermo dated 13 September.3 2 October, V. Cacioppo to Crispi (ACP, b. 156).

Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept.-Oct. 279radicalism. In order to preserve the political solidarity of the south hehad therefore introduced into decrees the ominous words 'Dictatorshipof the Two Sicilies'. To observers in Palermo this implied a continuanceof the loathed Neapolitan connexion, and even carried a hint that, whenGaribaldi had moved on to Rome, Sicily might be left under the ruleof a Neapolitan prodictator. Just as many liberal Neapolitans had aidedthe Bourbons rather than lose their domination over Sicily, so therewere many Sicilians who might have opposed even Garibaldi rather thansubmit again to their dependence on Naples. This mutual animosity,that is to say, was sometimes stronger than any liberal or nationalsentiments; and we have already seen that, paradoxically enough, it hadbeen perhaps the mainspring of action in this the most decisive of all therevolutions for the making of Italy. Regional jealousy was quicklystirred up again when, in two decrees of 16 and 20 September, Bertanitook further and more practical steps to centralize government atNaples. The intention here was only to establish a strong, unitarydictatorship such as could stand up to Cavour and prepare the conquestof Rome. But the Sicilian government protested at such an under-mining of its authority and prestige, and pointed out very pertinentlythat Cavour's party could at least offer something preferable to makingthe island a subordinate province under Naples.1 Bertani replied to thisprotest by repeating the mistake most northerners tended to make,saying that the autonomists were indistinguishable from separatists andtherefore were enemies to be resisted.2 Mordini, far from agreeingwith this crude diagnosis, had properly seized on the distinction betweenautonomists and separatists, and by allying with the former had avertedthe danger of their union. Basing himself on this alliance, the prodictatorwas to succeed in keeping Sicily independent for several more weeks;and then, when this no longer served Garibaldi's purpose, he was to usethe alliance to pilot Sicily through further political storms to the safeharbour of union with the other provinces of Italy.

First, he set himself to repair the damage done to morale throughBertani's centralization decrees. By moderate action he might hope to

1 20 September, V Unita Italiana (Palermo); 25 September, Castiglia to Crispi(ACP, f. 135).

2 21 September (copy), Bertani from Naples to Mordini (AMB; the original isin the Carte Bargoni).

280 Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct.convert some of those who put local autonomy above immediatesurrender to Piedmont; and he might then form an alliance betweenthis group and those other people who preferred a completely unifiedItaly to the immediate economic advantages of 'annexation'. As aTuscan, Mordini would be aware that there was already considerablefeeling in other provinces against the over-hasty imposition from Turinof uniformity on the Piedmontese model. Furthermore, having solittle in the way of police or financial resources behind him, he wasobliged to walk warily and to try and keep in with as many as possibleof the various currents in local sentiment. Both these facts led him half-way to meet the party of Ferrara and Emerico Amari. One of Cavour'sagents reported that, if the autonomists were in a numerical minority,they were yet as a group 'stronger and more energetic' than those whowanted unqualified annexation.1 They also included some of the mostintelligent and popular people in Sicily among their number.2 WhenMordini formed his coalition between various shades of radical andliberal, this new coalition was said to outnumber those who wantedimmediate and unqualified annexation.3

Within a fortnight he had made much progress. Four days after hisappointment he had begun to insist with Garibaldi on the specialposition and special needs of Sicily, and between this date and 4 Octoberthe alliance between 'Mazzinians and autonomists'—as one paper alittle misleadingly put it—became an accomplished fact.4 The apparentanomaly was striking, and Crispins more strictly Unitarian friends atPalermo wondered what on earth was happening to the radical pro-gramme. The people who were profiting from the replacement ofDepretis by Mordini seemed to be, not the radicals, but the autono-mists. The one minister to survive the replacement was Enrico Parisi,who had first won Garibaldi's attention on 17 September, and thenmanaged to nominate most of Mordini's cabinet before Mordini washimself appointed. The result was that four of the ministers hadautonomist leanings, including this same Parisi in the important position

1 16 September, the Sardinian consul at Messina to Villamarina (AME).2 16 October, P. Morello from Palermo to Ricasoli (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili

and Camerani).3 29 September, Bargoni from Palermo to Bertani (ACP, f. 140).4 4 October, U Annessione.

Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct. 281of minister for internal affairs.1 Their influence on the prodictator wasbound to be strong. It was with their help and advice that Mordini wasto win over the mayor of Palermo; and the importance of this may begauged from the fact that the civic authorities at Naples were in similarcircumstances to lead the opposition against Garibaldi's radical policy.One description of what was happening told how, while Depretis hadalways remained a continental, Mordini in this way ' made himself aSicilian'.2 The mayor for this year was the Duke of Verdura, and hehad hitherto been associating with that group of aristocrats whichwould have welcomed annexation in preference to Bertani's enforcedjunction of Sicily and Naples. Mordini's intelligent cultivation of theirlocal pride now gave such people another choice. Instead of ignoringlocal sentiment like Bertani, the prodictator frankly recognized thatsome Sicilians wanted freedom from Naples at any cost. Union withPiedmont was to some of them, not something inherently desirable, somuch as the price they would willingly but not enthusiastically pay forthis freedom. The motives behind the annexation campaign were thusby no means always patriotic. Some people would have been positivelyglad to have Naples stay outside the union, and were quite ready tosacrifice the mainland provinces to the ambition of a Lucien Murat ora Prince Napoleon.3

This loose but effective coalition took some of the sting out of thearistocratic deputation which set off for Turin on 25 September.Father Lanza's deputation had been designed essentially as a propagandagesture, to provide Cavour with an excuse for claiming to possess thesupport of public opinion if ever it became necessary to eject theGaribaldians forcibly from the south. Mordini ascribed little importanceto it, since clearly the deputation had no mandate from any body of

1 22 September, Cacioppo to Crispi (ACP, f. 135). This radical says that Raffaelewas the leader of the * separatists', together with Emerico Amari, Ferrara, Fiorenza,Marchese Roccaforte, Guarneri, Costantino, Parisi, Piraino, Peranni and Scrofani,the last four of whom were ministers actually in office. He added that these threehad figured among the authors of a petition on 3 September asking for an assemblyfor Sicily and repudiating Victor Emanuel. Cacioppo hoped that the 'annexation'party would not combine with these separatists, especially as these latter found supportright down among the plebs.

2 Quoted boy Rosi, II risorgimento e V azione d' un patriota, p. 211.3 13 June, L' Italia Una (Palermo), in which E. Navarra complains of this fact.

282 Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept.-Oct.people, but merely expressed individual opinions.1 Nevertheless, hewas wrong to be so little concerned. Lanza arrived in Piedmont oni October, just when Cavour was about to inform parliament of theattitude he intended to take towards Garibaldi, and possibly the primeminister would have been influenced to take a yet stronger line by thisaccess of local support for his defiance of radicalism] In return Cavourtold this small group of Sicilian notables that, in his opinion, Turincould not be the capital of the new Italy.2 This audacious statement musthave helped to allay the fears about Piedmontese provincialism on whichMordini thrived; and it suggested that Cavour was not going to leaveGaribaldi a monopoly of the magic appeal of Rome.

As events moved fast towards the incorporation of the south into thekingdom of northern Italy, the principal arguments ceased to revolveround the question of a plebiscite in Sicily. Taking the plebiscite forgranted, the real question became whether it should be accompaniedby a representative and deliberative assembly. In the first fortnight ofOctober this problem was to dominate Sicilian politics.

Those who wanted a plebiscite, and nothing else, had on their sidethe important and ultimately decisive fact that the financial andmilitary support of Piedmont was mobilized against the very idea of anassembly. Northerners had good reason to fear that such a quasi-parliament might try to impose conditions or discuss constitutionalfundamentals. It certainly would delay annexation at a critical momentwhen all Italian provinces ought to be ranged under one supremeauthority against the danger of Austrian invasion. From Cavour'spoint of view, Garibaldi's independent dictatorship had to be terminatedquickly, especially as it was now so near to provoking war with France.3The solid and substantial La Perseveranza, one of the leading newspapersof northern Italy, while it allowed that a representative assembly mighthave served some purpose once, as a limitation on dictatorial power,now held that it would be superfluous, since Sicilians would soon be

1 4 October, V Unita Italiana (Palermo); 7 October, II Diritto (Turin); 25 Sep-tember, Mordini to Bertani: 'not a few of the aristocrats are favourable to mygovernment', A. Arzano, II dissidio fra Garibaldi e Depretis, 1913, p. 57.

2 14 October, II Plehiscito (Palermo), Raeli's report from Turin dated 7 October.3 22 September, G. Dina (editor of V Opinione) to I. La Lumia (MSS La Lumia,

Biblioteca Communale Palermo).

Further Controversy over Annexation: SepL-Oct. 283represented in an Italian parliament. And it added that 'the wish todictate conditions for entry into the kingdom of Italy would be a con-tradiction of the principle of unity which has already been proposed andaccepted.... It would be a challenge to national sovereignty, and awrong done to other regions which have also contributed their shareto the liberation of the south/ *

Several months earlier Cavour's party had been all for calling aSicilian assembly, but now they feared that, instead of being a rubberstamp to seal annexation to the existing kingdom of Piedmont, it mightturn out to be a constituent assembly, and proceed to discuss a newconstitution and the inauguration of a new state. As an example ofthe kind of danger which threatened, one Palermo paper pointedlymentioned that Sicilians wanted Victor Emanuel the First, king of anew Italy; they did not like Cavour's offer of Victor Emanuel theSecond of a kingdom already based on Turin.2 Here was dangerousheresy indeed. Public discussion of such heterodox views by thesouthern intelligentsia was bound to be dangerous. It was all the moreimperative to rush Sicily into a quick act of abdication by plebiscite.The influence of republicanism seemed to be discernible in the fact thatannexation was being postponed even after the acquisition of Napleshad removed earlier reasons for delay. Perhaps Cavour had soundedthe alarm too often not to be himself occasionally deceived by his owndiplomatic propaganda into thinking Mazzinianism a real danger whichonly outlawry and persecution could subdue. The personal enemiesof Bertani and Garibaldi constantly assured the prime minister thatthese men were tools of Mazzini. The prophet himself had been forsome months at large in Italy, eluding the diligent searches of Cavour'spolice, and was now on the scene of action in Naples. La Farina waseven developing the wild theory that the Mazzinians in Sicily were inleague with both the reactionaries and the separatists, and were bentonly on destroying the region from which they would soon be evictedby the advancing armies of Victor Emanuel.3

Cavour was thus ready to increase his pressure on Sicily for a plebiscite.He had spread abroad his wishes, both through the agency of official

1 12 October, La Perseveranza. 2 27 September, Tom Ponce.3 7 October and 21 October, II Piccolo Corriere d' Italia (in G. La Farina, Scritti

Politici, vol. 11, 1876, pp. 344-6).

284 Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct.representatives, consuls and naval officers, and unofficially throughLa Farina, Cordova, Bottero, Casalis, Mellino and others whom he hadsent for the purpose. He was in personal correspondence with some ofGaribaldi's generals. His agents controlled a number of papers in thechief cities of Sicily, and Mellino had won over nearly all the Palermopress with subventions. Through these newspapers he had let it beknown that unconditional annexation through a plebiscite might berewarded by a liberal allowance of local autonomy, and in this way hewas competing with Mordini for the allegiance of the more moderateautonomists. The influential Michele Amari, for instance, pinned hisfaith for the future in these hints from Turin, and proclaimed:

pas de conditions dans l'annexion! Il sera seulement entendu que la Sicilegardera toutes les libertes administratives compatibles avec P unite politiquede la nation. Le programme de Farini les a indiquees a peu pres pour toutesles regions composant l'ltalie. D'autres exceptions seraient necessaires pourune ile comme la Sicile....l

Two of the leading papers in Palermo, which were especially activein helping to spread this belief, printed documents purporting to showCavour's special regard for the need of Sicily to have its own peculiarinstitutions.2 These same papers also put it about that the nationalparliament would later make a free concession of 'conditions' to theisland, so that a plebiscite would not prevent, but would rather leaddirectly to, the grant of local autonomy. In II Plebiscito, the youngMarquis di Rudini, who in later days was himself to inherit Cavour'soffice, wrote as follows:

there are some people who would like five hundred Sicilian deputies to spendtime in vain chatter and demand conditions from an executive authoritywhich has no right to grant them. Such conditions would reduce the annexa-tion to a contract in which all the advantages would be for Sicily and all thedisadvantages for the other party.... Meanwhile the whole of Europe maybe plunged into war, or something else may occur to prevent Italy beingformed. And then what would happen to us ?...

In any case we may be sure that regional liberty cannot be denied us.Parliament will have to provide for it, for in the national parliament all Italy

1 7 October, Amari to Cartwright (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona, pp. 136-7).2 L' Annessione (e.g. 27 September), and // Plebiscito.

Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct. 285will be represented, and we shall be in a majority by reason of our com-munity of interests with our brothers on the continent. Moreover, let it notbe said that we cannot rely on the word of Victor Emanuel.1

This article by di Rudini very clearly states the fear of many leadingSicilians that an assembly would now be fatal to the cause of annexation.On the one hand, a debate upon this highly controversial subject wouldprolong matters unduly: in the meantime an invasion by Austria mightgive an opening for another European congress to intervene in Italy,and then Catholic and legitimist pressure might prevail to stop thewhole process of unification. On the other hand, there was also thepoint that an assembly might haggle for prior terms, and Piedmontmight then refuse to accept an offer of conditional annexation. Theresult would only be to throw Sicily back into the scrummage betweenGaribaldi and the Bourbons.

Cavour was to exploit both these sentiments. But yet more decisivewas the fact that he now could hold over Sicilians the argument offorce majeure. Many of those who earlier had opposed annexation had torecognize the uselessness of its further postponement once Piedmontesetroops had reached Ancona on 28 September.2 Cavour already had itin mind to send Persano with warships and troops to Sicily if Garibaldiresisted much longer,3 and the general expectancy of such an invasionsufficed to turn many people away from the project of an assembly.4

Besides this direct pressure from Turin, there were certain miscel-laneous and even opposite interests in the south which were becomingbound up with the cause of quick annexation. La Farina thus sum-marized some of them:the national party wanted annexation as one step towards the speedy con-stitution of national unity; the timid because it would insure them against

1 16 October, II Plebiscito.2 G. Cadolini, Memorie del risorgimento, 1911, p. 457.3 12 October, Farini to Cavour: 'a short time back you were thinking of sending

Persano and the fleet to make an armed demonstration [a rompere i vetri] at Palermo.It seems to me that if you now sent Cordova, Casalis and Melino with the fleet, andthey issued an appeal to the Sicilians, it should not be hard to put an end to the Mordiniregime' (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 11, p. 93).

4 7 October, Sutera to Crispi (ACP, b. 139); 26 September, Mordini to Crispi(ACP, f. 140); 20 September, L' Annessione.

286 Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct.the dangers of more war and more revolution; merchants and industrialistsin order that they might take up again in peace the exercise of their com-merce and industry; the landowners to recover their lapsed rents; and allhonest men so as to end a state of affairs where there was no law and nomagistrates.1

The class of lawyers, which in Sicily comprised a large proportion ofthe politically minded, sought in annexation the reopening of thecourts and hence re-employment after months of practical idleness.2Again, those Sicilians who were already fighting or were liable toconscription could not help but associate Garibaldi's policy with theneed for further exertions on their part; whereas annexation would putall the responsibility and the exertion on to the shoulders of Piedmontand her army.

Another interesting point of view was put forward by the governorof Patti, who wrote to tell Mordini that he had full confidence in what-ever Garibaldi decided, and was eager for national unification, but yetthat, for the immediate needs of the present, annexation was essential.Annexation would bring 'the supreme advantage of associating our-selves with a people which is distinguished for its sense of the practicable,a calm and disciplined people which has been already accustomed tofree constitutional life for a dozen years'.3 He went on to say that thePiedmontese connexion would no doubt mean more public works andeducational advances, and 'credit for the development of agricultureand industry, as well as laws to release us from the tyranny of ecclesiasticalmortmain'; and also soldiers to keep order in the countryside. It wouldsatisfy the general wish of ordinary citizens to settle down and terminatethe period of revolution, and fulfil their hope of being at last able toorganize government properly. 'For the idea that everything is pro-visional has become so firmly established that everything proceeds moreslowly and insecurely than it should.'

This fact, that the revolutionary government was thought to be notproperly set up, was most important. Not only had Garibaldi laid itdown that administrative reorganization must be subordinated to themain task of military provision, but Cordova and Casalis had started

1 3 March 1861, La Farina, Scritti politici, vol. n, p. 359.2 30 August, V Annessione prints a protest by the lawyers.3 19 September, governor of Patti to Mordini (MRR, 221/23/8).

Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct. 287a rumour that the enactments and appointments of the revolutionarygovernment were but temporary and would be soon quashed by thePiedmontese. It was partly for this reason that taxes were not paid, thatnew laws and decrees were disregarded, and that those men best fittedfor government service often refused to compromise themselves bytaking up appointments. The state treasury being empty, and confidencelow, many government employees found that their salaries were morethan two months in arrears.1 There was thus a good response when eventhe mildly autonomist La Forbice mentioned the hope of better govern-ment to come:

If a division of Piedmontese troops arrived tomorrow, conscription couldbe enforced automatically.... And as for our capitalists, why, with a stronggovernment they could trust, they would rush to contribute.... On theother hand, a provisional government has no prestige, its employees haveno security of office and know it, nor is there enough money to pay for allthe things that ought to be done. Every official is irked by this knowledge,and the public service suffers accordingly And the minister who knowsthat tomorrow he will no longer be minister is reluctant to make any energeticor vigorous dispositions.2

For the same reason, there had been very few subscriptions in answer toan appeal for a government loan launched on 27 August. People evidentlydid not have faith that a provisional government could guaranteetheir money.3 All these facts told the same story. Even Crispi's paperonce had had to admit that 'every day which goes by brings anadditional argument for ending this transition stage as soon as possible'.4

There were still more arguments which counted in the same direc-tion. One carried special conviction with the important class ofhigh-ranking officers in Garibaldi's army. For these valiant and self-sacrificing men had little chance of retaining their rank, or even ofcontinuing in their profession, unless they could make their peace withCavour. Since General Fanti was already half-way through the PapalStates, it was evident to them as to others that the revolution wasvirtually at an end, and so there was a noticeable tendency among them

1 27 September, Scavo to Crispi (ACP, b. 155).2 7 October, La Forbice.3 16 September, Sardinian consul at Messina to Villamarina (AME).4 21 August, // Precursore.

288 Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept.-Oct.to bow to the rising sun.1 For another and much more numerous groupof people in Sicily, the general hatred of Naples took shape in a wish notto be forestalled by that province in joining the new kingdom of Italy,and equally in a determination not to wait until a joint annexationmight be arranged by Garibaldi for both southern provinces in one.The fear was even being expressed that Naples was trying to reassertagain through Garibaldi the metropolitan claims which she had latelyexercised over Sicily.2

Evidently the glamour and prestige of Garibaldi had diminished sincethe magnetism of his personality had been transferred to distant Naples.He had departed from Sicily on 19 August and, though his return forsix hours on 17 September momentarily revived all the old enthusiasm,he did not revisit the island again this year. Had he possessed any ideaof antagonism or disloyalty to Victor Emanuel, he would no doubthave responded to the appeals of the radicals, and would have returnedto reorganize his volunteers. But he did not return. In his absence onother business the Sicilians felt leaderless, forgotten by the one man whohad so inspired them. It was but a short step from this to feelingexploited by a prodictator whose ideas they not unjustly thought todiffer from his, and misled by doctrinaire Unitarians who appeared towork more in Neapolitan than Sicilian interests. Garibaldi had flatteredtheir self-esteem and brought out the best in them. But, once he hadgone, this same self-esteem was wounded by the tactless tendency of hisministers to 'exasperate Sicilians by treating them as conquered peoplewho must submit to the will of their conquerors'.3 They had alsodenuded Sicily of troops, and left good citizens in the fear of civil warand social revolt.4 In this natural desire for self-esteem, for peace, quietand prosperity, we have the measure of Sicilian liberal sentiment in thisyear: it had first been directed against the Bourbons, it was nowresulting in opposition to the prodictatorship, and it was finally to turn

1 25 October, L' Unita Italiana (Palermo).2 11 September, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,

vol. 11, p. 132).3 26 September, II Nazionale. L was Crispi who made this 'theory of conquest

official and strong... .And hence the separatists, with their various sections of autono-mists, conditionalists, Bourbonists, and the formalists who want a Sicilian assembly,all regained ground and influence/

4 17 September, Sardinian consul at Palermo to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. v).

Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept.-Oct. 289people against Piedmont, from whom in its turn salvation had beenexpected. Unfortunately these popular wishes were mostly unrealizable,and for reasons which lay deeper than politics. Salvation for this much-conquered island was hardly to come in the next few years from thenorth, any more than in times past it had come from most other pointsof the compass in succession.

The fundamental problem of Sicily was economic and social. Thoughthis is not the place to pursue in detail the social question, it must bementioned as something which had considerable repercussions onpolitics. The middle and upper classes, though they contained peopleholding all manner of opinions, were collectively becoming moreanxious for a settlement at any price; and, as events were developing,the obvious settlement was an adherence to Cavour's demand forannexation to the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. No other practicalalternative, whether of a republic, a federal state, an independent king-dom, or of foreign absorption, had so far emerged as a likely possibilityfrom the confused history of their revolution. Meantime trade waslanguishing, rents were unpaid, and there was fear of the violence ofthe common people.1 August had seen the climax in a long story ofpeasant unruliness, rick-burning, cattle-slaughter, tax-avoiding, charter-destroying, frequent land-occupation, and in many cases assassinationand jacquerie.2 No sooner was it clear that the revolutionary govern-ment had not the resources for an adequate defence of life and property,than the most powerful of human sentiments was thrown into the scaleson behalf of Piedmont. It was especially important that the people mostaffected by disorder were of particular strength in local government;and they considered themselves as the voice of public opinion, as notonly the most vociferous but also the only weighty element in politics.

It was these same people who made up the national guard, a forcewhich in Sicily and Naples was to be a political as well as a military organ,3

1 12 September, L' Indipendente (Messina).2 D. Mack Smith, 'The peasants' revolt of Sicily in i860', in Studi in onore di Gino

Luzzatto, vol. in, 1950, pp. 227-34.3 E.g. 6 September, F. Ugdulena to Crispi, describing how a move to put up a rival

candidate for governor of Messina was defeated by the national guard, becauseFabrizi its leader happened to be a radical (ACP, f. 135). Elsewhere, of course, thenational guard was almost always to take a conservative line.

MS 19

290 Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct.and which opposed in turn both Crispi1 and Mordini.2 The nationalguardsmen were to be a fine means of propaganda for annexation,3and the officers casually disobeyed military orders whenever theseconflicted at all sharply with their political views.4 Moreover, thedispatch of all available troops to help Garibaldi in his great battle onthe Volturno had left them the only organized force in the country.In Palermo, and still more at Naples, they were to exert a well-directedpressure in the final political crisis over the plebiscite.

This middle- and upper-class element in the population was particularlystrong at Messina, a town which by reason both of its position and itscharacter was to prove more important than Palermo in the denouementof this political conflict. The privileged port of Messina was the seat ofthe largest mercantile community in the island, and its dockyards andalso its rich countryside had been very much disturbed by war con-ditions. In July, before Garibaldi arrived there, a report had describedhow, 'Messina is in a miserable state. Skilled men are unemployed, theowning classes ruined, commerce is at a standstill.'5 On i Septemberthe director of customs wrote to tell Crispi about the numerousassassinations lately recorded to the account of the so-called camorristi.'Messina is stricken with horror... .Many officials are abandoning theirposts Anarchy reigns supreme/6 This was no isolated piece ofevidence. The governor, Ugdulena, wrote on the 20th: 'on my arrivalhere I found Messina dominated by a handful of cut-throats... whowere in league with the smugglers.'7 Meanwhile, the scanty forces of

1 12 September, L' Italia (Messina).2 19 September, Fiorenza to Ricasoli (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani).3 E.g. 25 October, La Perseveranza says that for three days before the plebiscite

they wore the cockades of the annexation party.4 22 October, L' Annessione: l everyone knows that the national guard is not purely

a military body, but rather, and chiefly, a political organization, formed as a guaranteefor the constitution.... For this reason there can be no doubt but that it has a right toquestion its orders when there is a danger to the state of which its members are citizensand whose liberties they have to defend.'

5 12 July, La Costanza (Palermo); 15 August, the head of the carabinieri said it wasstill impossible to collect the customs (ASP Ministero Polizia, b. 1548).

6 1 September, director of customs from Messina to Crispi (ASP, f. 138).7 20 September, Ugdulena to Mordini (ASP Ministero Polizia, b. 1548); 12 Octobe r,

report by the head of the carabinieri (ASP Segreteria di Stato, b. 1561).

Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct. 291public order at Messina had to be depleted in order to save the LipariIslands from anarchy.1 There were several pirate ships working off thecoast.2 All the time the town had to continue in a state of siege becauseof the Bourbon garrison still holding out in the citadel, and armisticeswere periodically interrupted by shelling and sorties which made lifedangerous and insecure. The result of all this was that the arrival ofregular Piedmontese troops and Persano's navy was eagerly awaited.It was not so much a question of politics as of security. Since there wereonly two battalions of volunteers available to contain the citadel, re-inforcements were badly needed,3 but Garibaldi could not spare a manfrom the main theatre of war. The Messinese had consequently feltabandoned by him, ever since he had left for the continent withoutreducing this enemy strongpost.

This all helps to explain the mixture of fear and dissatisfaction in thispeculiarly vulnerable, but also politically most important, corner ofSicily. The fear of anarchy and private vendettas made 'honest citizens'yearn for the restoration of peace and quiet. There was little temptationfor them to confuse this simple issue by the addition of complicatedpolitical questions like radicalism and nationality. At all events thesehonest citizens openly 'professed to remain detached from the nationalmovement'.4 It was for administrative rather than political reasons thatthe civic council at Messina memorialized Garibaldi to ask for annexa-tion as quickly as possible.5 On 5 October the Piedmontese consul hadto report that everyone was flying from the city with all their posses-sions, for about the fifth or sixth time in as many months; and he guessedthat in two days' time no one would be left at all. Hence arose the'hatred' against the government. A plebiscite was considered 'the onlyway to solve the question of the Bourbon garrison in the citadel....People are speaking publicly against Garibaldi as against a traitor'.6 The

1 10 October, governor of Messina to Bargoni (AMB).2 16 October, governor of Messina telegram to minister of public security

(ASP Segreteria di Stato, b. 1561).3 1 October, Mordini telegram to Garibaldi (AMB).4 2 September, Sardinian consul at Messina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. v).5 8 September, V Annessione prints their memorandum of 28 August; 19 August,

Sardinian consul at Messina to Villamarina shows that the civic council voted forannexation at its very first meeting after being liberated (AME); 15 October, IIPungolo (Naples). 6 5 October, Sardinian consul to Villamarina (AME).

19-2

292 Further Controversy over Annexation: Sept-Oct.holding of an assembly was feared because it might lead to the introduc-tion of 'a system of abhorred separatism';1 for there were specialreasons why a close connexion with northern Italy would be particularlyadvantageous to a trading community. It contributed even more to thediscontent of the provinces that the old civic antagonism againstPalermo was still alive. During earlier Sicilian rebellions in this century,many prominent citizens of Messina had sided with the Neapolitansagainst Palermo. Differences were intensified in i860 by the complaintthat Palermo was monopolizing the jobbery and appointments andcontracts of war.2 Added to all this, the sudden necessity to provisionGaribaldi's army when it was preparing to cross the Straits, and thenthe equally sudden reduction of that army to a simple garrison, hadcaused a boom, then a slump, and so unemployment.3 Economicunrest thus merged with political discontent against the provisionalgovernment at Palermo. Not many days in October were to passbefore these cumulative grievances were to have their effect on thecourse of the revolution. Messina was an important town, and we shallsee that its wishes could not be left unheard.

1 17 October, Omnivagus (Messina).2 27 October, La Valle di Giosaffat; the seamen of Messina complained that there

were no Messinese in the national marine (petition in AMB, b. 30); 6 September,the director of customs reported that his men were not being paid; in the Archiviodi Stato, Messina (Atti vari del i860), there are references to civic funds being requisi-tioned by Garibaldi's army, and factories being taken over; 6 September, Ugdulenato Crispi, passes on the lawyers' complaint that at Messina the courts were so long inabeyance (ACP, f. 135).

3 16 August, La Cicala Italiana (Palermo).

293

CHAPTER XX

MORDINI SUMMONS AN ASSEMBLY:5 OCTOBER

By the beginning of October, some formerly doubtful points had beenmore or less settled so far as Sicily was concerned. First, the postpone-ment of at least the outward form of union with Piedmont was hardlypossible much longer. Secondly, this would have to be decided by aplebiscite, with or without the addition of a representative assembly todecide ways and means. Some men of high standing and repute con-tinued to advocate that there should be this prior summons of a con-stitutional assembly, just as there had been local parliaments in Tuscanyand Emilia when those other provinces had considered the samequestion of annexation some months earlier. Among Sicilians therewas a number who would have welcomed this as a good chance to debatethe terms on which annexation should be voted. Not many peopleoutside Sicily would have looked very favourably on this idea at thetime, but in later years the impression was to gain ground that somegood might have been done, and some evil have been avoided, hadSicily either demanded or else been spontaneously granted partialautonomy from the first. Arguments were frequently put forward ini860 to show that the island had special needs and interests which aparliament at Turin or Rome would never have the time and know-ledge to attend to; and hence, that Sicilians should thrust them forwardfor consideration while their island still had some independent status.Probably most of those who wanted autonomy were also hoping fora speedy union with Piedmont; but their ambition was for a uniontempered by conditions. The radicals round Crispi had different ideasabout this: they rather wanted to delay annexation, so as to keep forthemselves and the revolution some further freedom of movement;but, provided they could gain this one point, they would then have beenreluctant to make any conditions which might prejudice the formationof a unitary state. We have already seen how this inherent difference ofapproach was partially overcome by Mordini, as some of the radicals

294 Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 Octoberand the autonomists were drawn together. The common denominatorbetween them was found in this proposal to call an assembly, theradicals seeing in it a means of delay, and the autonomists an assertionof the right of Sicily to have some particular say in her own affairs.

On 1 October a dozen prominent men, styling themselves membersof the 'Sicilian parliament', wrote to Mordini with an official requestthat he should call an assembly as well as hold a plebiscite. The parlia-ment of which they claimed membership was that of 1848. Since it hadnever been 'legally' dissolved, it offered some constitutional basis fora representative assembly to meet once more. Their petition incidentallymentioned that they hoped it would be possible to achieve 'the forma-tion of an Italy strong, free and independent, and they were ready tosacrifice everything necessary to this end'. But they were also proudthat ' Sicily had now regained its own distinct personality and assuredits emancipation from any government based on Naples'. Althoughthey wanted national unity, it should be accompanied by conditions,'by measures and restrictions which would ensure that the needs of eachregion, and inveterate local customs, and the forces of tradition were allduly respected'.1 Even more interesting was their belief that, if onlyGaribaldi would decree the indispensable separation of Sicily fromNaples, this fact alone would pacify the island and free it 'from all thatmight be harmful in the uncertainty of provisional government'.Hitherto this argument from 'uncertainty' had been used rather tojustify the alternative thesis of straight annexation by plebiscite. On3 and 5 October these same dozen Sicilians, including ministers, peersof the realm, and members of the 1848 parliament, submitted furthermemoranda to Mordini to ask that a vote might be held without moredelay. These autonomists were thus agreed with Cavour's party intrying to force Mordini and the radicals to give up their policy ofindefinite delay, and this fact must have counted a good deal with theprodictator, since he now needed their support. In order to keep hisnew coalition intact, he would have to try and meet their wishes.

But if these petitioners were grouped with the Cavourians in wantinga speedy conclusion to the revolution, they clearly did not agree with

1 1 October (petition in AMB); the signatories included the director of the bankof Sicily, the president of the Palermo civic council, and the director-general ofexcise.

Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 October 295the idea of a straightforward annexation by plebiscite. This was whatgave Mordini his cue. One might even say that the main interest of thepetitioners was not in the matter of timing, so much as in the methodto be used for a vote:

A people cannot be said to have full freedom in voting unless there hasbeen previously the free exercise of the right to formulate the alternativesto be voted on. And the exercise of this right cannot be conceived orassured except by means of an assembly freely chosen by the people.... Allthe more is this true of Sicily, where the principle of constitutional repre-sentation has formed for so long such a vital part of our laws and customs.1

It was the proud contention of Sicilians that they possessed the oldestparliamentary institutions in Europe, and this insular school of thoughtthus put the emphasis firmly on ancestral tradition and constitutionalprecedent. Such a view sharply differentiated them from those whostood behind Cavour in his appeal to the foreign, new-fangled (andeven revolutionary) doctrine of a plebiscite by universal suffrage.

The opening days of October in this way witnessed a furthernarrowing of the terms of conflict. Mordini's chief preoccupationremained that of how to reconcile Garibaldi's programme with theexigencies of public opinion, and these petitions must have suggestedthat he could not put off some form of popular vote much longer. Hehad already persuaded Garibaldi to override Bertani's centralizingdecrees and confirm the administrative independence of Sicily fromNaples. The result of this had been both to strengthen his hand with theautonomists, and at the same time to give him back some of the powerswithdrawn from his armoury by Bertani. Both of these facts in theirturn were to lead on 5 October to Mordini's publication of a decreesummoning an assembly. In this decfee he made no mention at all ofa plebiscite; and the assembly was to be for Sicily alone, without anymention of Naples. As far as he could see, this was the only methodnow left by which he could satisfy public opinion while still postponingthe surrender of power.

Postponement and delay had become the first principle of his strategy.As a mere prodictator under Garibaldi he was unwilling to take muchpositive initiative on his own, nor could he be sufficiently in touch with

1 3 October and 5 October (AMB, b. 30).

296 Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 Octoberpolicy as it was developing at Naples and Turin to feel confident indoing anything much but await events. He could not know yet thatGaribaldi had no hope of reaching Rome. He was fully aware thatCavour was trying to force through immediate annexation, but he alsobelieved that Garibaldi was acting in full accord with the king and waseven in negotiation with the cabinet at Turin.1 He may have suspectedthat Cavour's apparent opposition was a mere bluff to deceive the restof Europe, while Garibaldi went on to take Rome. No enlightenmenton the broader political situation had been forthcoming from Naples.It is important to know that Sicily was left without instructions duringthis vital week, since the dictator was fully occupied with the Volturnobattle and its aftermath. Mordini, therefore, had no option but to go ontrying to play for time, so as to leave Garibaldi's hands as free as possible.But he had to reconcile this with the growing concentration of opinionagainst any continuance of the state of uncertainty. These two considera-tions met together in his decision to call an assembly.

By 5 October, even some of the more extreme radicals could see thatonly by making considerable concessions to other points of view couldthey succeed in keeping any initiative for themselves. One of Mordini'sless moderate associates wrote on that day to Crispi at Naples:' I feel weare going under, and that the reactionaries [i tristi] will triumph yetagain, and that our United Italy will be still to seek. All the same', headded, *I shall do what I can, and shall not neglect any chance ofkicking the Cavourian carcass.'2 The precarious situation at Palermomade it hard to be dispassionate. Plots against the prodictator werebeing hatched by officers of the guard and certain leaders of the aristo-cracy.3 For the last fortnight the Piedmontese consul had been agitatingfor Cavour to send him 'a few Piedmontese regiments',4 and we knowthat Cavour did have plans for sending troops to take over the island byforce. On the 2nd Crispi wrote to warn Mordini that 'a reaction had

1 Mordini's letter of 3 or 4 October to Crispi (ACP, f. 140).2 5 October, Navarra to Crispi (ACP, b. 156).3 19 and 20 October, V Annessione: the opposition meetings were held in the house

of the Prince Pignatelli, who was commandant of Garibaldi's Guardia Dittatoriale,and those present included Baron Pisani, I. La Lumia the editor of the GiornaleOfficiate, Marchese di Rudini, and other prominent aristocrats like Scalia, S. Elia andFlorio.

4 21 September, Sardinian consul to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. v).

Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 October 297been planned to take place at Palermo by means of the militia with the aidof troops summoned from Turin to help enforce prompt annexation'.1

In such a situation the radicals could not afford to remain fixed in theirold ideas. Bertani admitted to Mordini that they were rapidly losingground, and now sent words of encouragement for this change of mind:

as for this assembly idea, I as a Unitarian do not like it, and yet in the faceof so imminent a danger of our absorption by Turin without guarantees,and without the acquisition of Rome or Venice, I think it is the only possibleexpedient. If you are decided, and if Garibaldi agrees, go ahead at once,absolutely at once.... Perhaps after receiving his vote of confidence in parlia-ment Cavour will strike.... It is important for us to provide not only forpossible victory, but for a last-ditch defence and the best way of retreat. Solet us have the assembly, if Garibaldi agrees.2

To Cattaneo, on the same day, Bertani wrote that 'the prompt reunionof parliament in Sicily and Naples is our only hope now'.3 This was asignificant use of words—'parliament' and 'reunion'. Nothing but afree vote of the people could avail to put pressure on Cavour; becauseCavour had apparently decided on intervention in Sicily, and Bertaniknew that it would be immoral, even if it were possible, to resist him byarms. The physical weakness of the government at Palermo was sharplystressed on this very 5 October by the embarkation of the last remainingsoldiers and artillery for Naples. Morally, however, the governmentmight still be made strong if there was yet time to summon a parliament;for this would link up with previous traditions of representative govern-ment, and if only such a parliament could once meet, Cavour wouldhardly dare to dissolve it or disregard its wishes, claiming as he did toact in the name of the people.

Such considerations as these would no doubt have been discussed bythe ministers when on the 5th they met with the prodictator anddecided unanimously to call an assembly. Perhaps they also still hopedto make the surrender of Sicily conditional on Cavour's capture ofRome, as well as on the grant of local self-government. By this logicSicily would be preserved for united Italy, and would not become just

1 2 October, Crispi to Mordini (ACP, f. 135).2 6 October, Bertani to Mordini (AMB, b. 30).3 6 October, Bertani to Cattaneo (ACP, £135).

298 Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 Octoberan appendage of Piedmont. A decision reached in a freely electedSicilian assembly would obviously carry great importance withEuropean opinion, * and whatever happens on the continent, Sicily maythus be made into a pivot for any national movement in the future'.1

It would also be a safeguard against any subsequent attempt to sacrificeSicily like Nice as the purchase price of a French or Bourbon alliance.

There was no time to ask Garibaldi's opinion on this proposed step.The telegraph line to Naples was interrupted, and when telegrams didarrive they were often undecipherable, even to the point where treasonin the post office was suspected.2 Three ships had arrived in successionfrom Naples without a single word from the dictator, because, unknownto Mordini, the battle of 1-2 October had left Garibaldi with no timeto think of Sicilian politics. The prodictator felt a heavy responsibilityon himself, to make some decision which would at once appeaseSicilians, and yet which would still preserve intact the programmewhich Garibaldi had laid down in his Palermo speech of 17 September.He was entitled to believe that he would have been informed if everthat programme was to be altered.

Certain evidence about the development of Garibaldi's views reachedPalermo in successive reports from three envoys whom Mordini hadsent to discover what exactly was happening on the mainland. The firstof these envoys was Count Castellani-Fantoni, one of the oppositiondeputies who had recently arrived from Turin, and who had set offagain for Naples on 21 September. This man had written back on the27th to say that Garibaldi was veering towards immediate annexation.'The misgovernment at Naples has generated the need, or at least thedesire, for immediate annexation, and personally I think we should befoolish to oppose it. Garibaldi feels this too, and an order of the day byhim in the official Giornale this evening leaves no doubt on the point,to everyone's satisfaction.'3 This letter must certainly have arrived andbeen seen by Mordini before 5 October. But though it showed thatGaribaldi was weakening in his resolve, it said nothing about themethod to be used for annexation, and on the matter of timing it was

1 5 October, Bargoni to Calvino (ACM, no. 2989).2 29 September, Bargoni to Bertani (ACP, f. 140); Crispi's telegram from Naples

of the 4th was delivered in Palermo only on the 6th (ACP, f. 143).3 27 September, Castellani-Fantoni to Mordini (AMB).

Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 October 299contradicted by what little news had come from Bertani and Crispi.Mordini probably saw the actual order of the day in the NaplesGiornale Officiate, and if so he would have observed that in fact itmarked no fundamental change in the dictator's plans. He would alsohave noticed in the same issue the fall of the Pisanelli-D'Afflitto cabinetat Naples. This cabinet had been closely associated with the policy ofimmediate annexation, and its resignation appeared to indicate thetriumph of postponement. There was some truth in this appearance.Garibaldi had, it is true, been weakening between 20 and 30 September,but in fact it was only the stalemate on the River Volturno in Octoberwhich finally thwarted his intention to win Rome before holding apopular vote.

The second envoy was Saverio Friscia, whose report from Napleswas probably the latest indication of Garibaldi's policy which Mordinireceived before deciding to call a Sicilian parliament. Dr Friscia probablyreturned to Palermo on 4 October, which is the date of his long reportpublished on the 5th in the Giornale Officiate di Sicilia. He was a formerexile from Sicily who in politics was a Mazzinian radical. He hadoriginally been sent to Naples a fortnight before to protest againstBertani's centralization decrees of 16 and 20 September, but Garibaldi'sreply to him was now received by Mordini in a different context to thatfor which it had been designed. Friscia's report tells how the dictator'said that he placed the very fullest confidence in Mordini to carry outthe programme Garibaldi had put before the people... and chargedhim to use largamente the powers given him and hereby take fulllatitude to act in that sense... and to receive praise in advance forwhatever he might decide to do \ This report would now be interpretedas an obvious encouragement for Mordini to choose an assembly, andthe reference to Garibaldi's original programme would have signifiedthe * march on Rome' quite as much as * submission to Victor Emanuel'.Friscia had, however, even more encouragement to give than this.'Garibaldi protested that it was his firm wish that the administrativeautonomy of Sicily should be respected, for this autonomy was just andsacred, and.. . Sicily and Naples were administratively separate andwere under one government only in so far as this was necessary toachieve the unity of Italy.' In all likelihood this reply from Garibaldihad been designed simply to reassure Sicily about its independence of

300 Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 OctoberNaples; coming on 4 October, however, it must have had the furthereffect of inciting Mordini not to wait on Naples, but to summon aseparate assembly if local conditions made it seem desirable.

What Mordini was not to know was that, since giving his messageto Dr Friscia, Garibaldi's views would have been sensibly modified bythe intervening battle of the Volturno. A third Sicilian envoy at thefront, Salvatore Calvino, thus drew up a despatch on the 4th, whichwas not sent till the 5 th, and which then arrived in Sicily too late toaffect the issue. Its substance was that 'dictator approves conciliatorypolicy, no longer hopes to go on to Rome9, The italics here are fromCalvino's draft. The telegram then continued: 'if Piedmontese troopscome, let them land as at Naples. Manufacture and send rifle bulletsespecially for Enfields.'1 This was unequivocal; but it was too late.

Garibaldi was out of touch with Sicilian affairs. Communicationswere slow, and in any case he was fully taken up with the biggest battlehe ever encountered. He can have had little idea how, during his ownabsence from Sicily, the unanimity of adoration which always greetedhim personally might be less willingly accorded to his deputies; norcan he have known how the enthusiasm of an earlier date was beingclouded over by economic and political unrest. It had come as a surprisewhen Mordini sent Friscia to ask for the restoration to Sicily of thosegovernment departments which Bertani had transferred from Palermoto his central secretariat at Naples; because Garibaldi had not appreciatedthat Sicilians would continue to dislike Neapolitans even after theBourbons had been removed. For the moment he was in no positionto be bothered with political strategy, with the petty trasjormismopolitics of Palermo, or even with planning how to make radicalismprevail in the long run against the orthodox liberalism of Cavour. Hischief concern with Sicily was that the island should send him more andmore munitions. Though Calvino had arrived in Naples on 30 Sep-tember, Garibaldi saw him only on 3 October, and then detained himaltogether for a week longer without letting him return. Mordini hadsent Ca vino to present Garibaldi with certain definite and urgentrequests: namely, that he should allow more arms and men to remainin Sicily; that he should give the Palermo government more power andprestige, and not for instance transfer the Sicilian ministries of war and

1 5 October, Calvino to Mordini (AMB, b. 28; the draft is in ACM).

Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 October 301marine to the continent; and that he should not communicate withprovincial governors and service chiefs in Sicily except through themedium of the prodictator. But Garibaldi seemingly cared for none ofthese things, and Calvino's replies therefore arrived in Sicily too late toaffect the issue. Mordini made his decision of 5 October in ignoranceof the fact that events had now overtaken him.

The cabinet meeting of 5 October in Palermo is partially known tous through a minute which runs as follows:

discussion was opened on the condition of the country, in the light of thecontinued progress of the national cause on the continent, and of the repeatedannouncements of a possible armed intervention in Sicily. As it was con-sidered that such intervention might give a preponderant voice to one specialparty, thus disturbing the free manifestation of opinion, the Council unani-mously agreed that the electoral colleges should be summoned on the basisof the dictator's decree of 23 June i860, in order to launch the country alonga path that might assure it the free declaration of its wishes. The Council alsoagreed that an exact account of this intention should be made to the dictator,so that we might have his final determination in the matter.1

There was also a published version of this cabinet decision, and it wassignificantly different in some respects from the private minute. Itsstated reason for holding a vote was not the fear of armed intervention,but simply because ' the day is coming ever nearer when the kingdomof Italy will be formed under the constitutional sceptre of VictorEmanuel'. Of course the public statement said nothing of foreignpressure or the danger of a Piedmontese invasion. Nor did it say any-thing about seeking Garibaldi's approval; on the contrary, an announce-ment was to be made at once which carried the implication that thecalling of a deliberative assembly was the dictator's preordainedpolicy.2

Mordini felt a little guilty about what he was doing, for he knew thathe was committing Garibaldi on what might be a highly importantpoint. He therefore sent off to Naples a copy of his decree, with theexplanation that it was only a tactical move made under pressure, andthat pending the dictator's orders there had been no pronouncement on

1 5 October (MRR, cartella 221).2 5 October, Raccolta degli atti del governo dittatoriale, 1861.

302 Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 Octoberwhen exactly the assembly should meet.1 The next day he followed thiswith another note to elaborate the point that the decree would nottie Garibaldi's hands, for the assembly would not meet yet, and thenwould take up further time in discussion; and in any case Garibaldiwould be under no obligation to give practical application to its adviceuntil his own good time. If necessary he could delay matters still moreby having a subsequent plebiscite to confirm its decisions. This isimportant evidence for any judgement on Mordini, and it tells againstthe general assumption later made in the north that a rabid prodictatorhad unscrupulously lured an unwitt ng Garibaldi from the truepatriotic and liberal path. Evidently Mordini's guilty conscience wasnot for having chosen an assembly rather than a plebiscite; it was forhaving chosen anything at all. His genuine assumption was still thatGaribaldi required him to postpone annexation in order to make timefor developing the revolution. He was at pains to make it clear that'by this method I have left the dictator all the time he may require topush on with his own policy as he best knows how'. That is to say,Mordini was still thinking in terms of the Rome expedition which,unknown to him, had now been rendered impracticable. His justifica-tion was that the assembly decree had been 'merely a step to ward offthe Cavourian tempest... to conserve the island for Italy and forGaribaldi'.2 All this, he insisted, merited that Garibaldi should approvehis action and send confirmation at once.

Mordini scarcely need have worried on this last point. The face of therevolution was rapidly changing, but Garibaldi had meant what hesaid when he gave back a free hand in politics to his prodictator. Eventshad been succeeding each other too fast for there to be any intricateplan of policy which Mordini could upset, and Garibaldi was as usualbeing ruled rather by instinct and opportunism. The centralizing decreessubordinating Sicily to Naples had come not out of Garibaldi's head,but from the radicals round Bertani who had taken it upon themselvesto try and mould the dictator's policy for him. Since the end of Sep-tember, Bertani had given way to Crispi as Garibaldi's right-hand man;and circumstances now forced both Crispi and Bertani to see thatMordini's alternative scheme offered the radicals their only hope of

1 5 October, Mordini to Garibaldi (ACP, f. 140).2 6 October, Mordini to Garibaldi (ACP, f. 140).

Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 October 303even partial victory in the struggle for political survival. Crispi sent offa telegram as soon as he heard of it: * the dictator approves the decreefor electing deputies. Summon assembly for the day which suits youbest. For this purpose we revoke the law of 16 September, and leaveyou with a free hand as you request. Bravo Mordini. Get on with theelections, and campaign for some good deputies.'1 In the light ofMordini's future action it is important to note this justification of hispolicy by Garibaldi's secretary. He must have received Crispi's messagewith some relief.

As for the immediate reaction of Sicily to the decree, Mordini reportedthat it was 'prodigioso eccellente'.2 Most of the provinces welcomedthe news almost with exaggerated applause.3 Even Messina reportedthat the great majority received it very warmly.4 Another doubtfulcity, Catania, hailed the decree 'with satisfaction, yet [pero] consideringit to be the natural fulfilment of previous dictatorial pronouncements'.5

It is clear, that is to say, that the opposition to Mordini had as yet nofault to find with what a week later was to be described as the mostcontroversial and sinister of measures. Far from the assembly beingunwelcome, the grudging word pero indicates that this decree was onlylogical and should perhaps have come long ago. Cavour himself at anearlier stage would have been extremely glad at the announcement ofsuch an assembly, though now he was one move ahead of his partisansat Palermo, and had learnt to see how dangerous this particular institu-tion might be. Cavour's friends in Sicily, however, were jubilant,because to their untutored eye the decree seemed to imply that theprovisional regime would soon be ending, and there was little thoughtthat underneath might be concealed a different inspiration. In all

1 Undated draft in MRR, 221/3 I / I ; *5 October, // Giornale Officiate di Siciliapublished a decree to this effect signed by Garibaldi and Crispi at Caserta on 7 October.

2 7 October, Mordini to Garibaldi (Carte Sirtori, Ambrosiana Library, Milan).3 Many reports are in MRR: Trapani reported great public joy and bands playing;

Sciacca told of 'an inexpressible joy ' ; Girgenti said that 'the impression createdcould not have been better'; Patti reported 'enormous applause... and allapprehensions have now disappeared, everyone saying that the future of the countryis assured'; at Castroreale there had been 'an explosion of enthusiasm which is quiteindescribable'.

4 7 October, governor of Messina to Mordini (MRR).5 8 October, governor of Catania to Mordini (AMB, b. 28).

304 Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 Octoberappearance, the implications of the choice between plebiscite andassembly had still not been generally grasped.

For the best cross-section of contemporary opinion we may turn oncemore to comments in the local press. La Forbices conclusion was'better late than never',1 and 'the assembly decree has been publishedonly after the government had lost highly precious time in blessedsomnolence'.2 The strongly Cavourian Regno d* Italia, which had beenagitating unequivocally for the plebiscite, now took Mordini's moveas a convenient basis for compromise; and 'since they offer us anassembly instead, let us take it'.3 Still more positive was the commentof La Farina's old paper, V Annessione. A fortnight later this journaltried to create the legend that the decree of 5 October had encounteredan indifferent silence.4 But on the 8th it expressly mentioned thepopular joy at its reception, and again on the 9th it referred to the generalexultation. True, there was already a suspicion that there might be acatch somewhere, since the complete unexpectedness of Mordini'sannouncement had left people 'without time to think'. But thecomments made by this paper in its issue of the 9th were if anythingmore favourable and bore fewer reservations than in that of the daybefore. It considered that Mordini's instructions to provincial governorsabout the assembly were admirable, and agreed that Sicily had receivedthe decree with exultation, but only warned Mordini not to let it leadto long discussions and delay.5 This suggests that general approval wasmaintained between the 5 th and the 9th. Mordini had succeeded forthe moment in satisfying most people who mattered, Garibaldi on theone hand and the local Cavourians on the other. Had he acted earlier,he might conceivably have won the day.

Remarkably and significantly enough, the only Sicilians whopositively objected to his decree from the first were the extreme radicalsof Mazzinian colour, whose overriding concern for unity made themfear in an assembly the utterance of latent separatism. By a strangeirony, the people whom Cavour always considered the villains wereonce more the very people who almost alone with him now deploredanything like a Sicilian parliament. In the opinion of orthodox liberals,

1 7 October, La Forbice. 2 16 October, ibid.3 6 October, II Regno d' Italia. 4 17 October, V Annessione.5 9 October, ibid.

Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 October 305Mordini was by definition a Mazzinian pur sang, and therefore theexistence of an extremely useful political distinction escaped them. Theydid not know, for instance, that the radical governor of Noto acceptedthe assembly decree under protest: he would have preferred a straightplebiscite by universal suffrage, and took what was offered merelybecause it carried with it some possibility of conciliation; but he fore-told that many deputies would turn up to the assembly simply to votefor unconditional annexation.1 The governors of Corleone and Acidisliked the new decree heartily. The latter, for instance, sent to say that'a very sinister effect has been produced by this convocation of deputiesin Palermo; in view of the dictator's promise, we had been hoping forrepresentatives of the people to meet only on the Capitol in Rome'.He concluded by asking Mordini if Garibaldi's specific warrant couldbe shown for this change of front, since he himself at Acireale had nointention of executing the decree until a satisfactory explanation couldbe made.2 An answer duly came from Bargoni, secretary-general tothe Palermo government, explaining that, if Garibaldi had once thoughtof waiting until he could hold an assembly at Rome, now he had changedor amplified his views and wanted one first in Palermo. The rejoinderto this from the recalcitrant governor was a brusque resignation.3 Yetanother radical, Navarra, a leader-writer for the Precursore whom Crispihad left behind with instructions to watch over and report on Mordini,feared that with this assembly 'the Sicilians will end up by proclaimingtheir autonomy under a king of their own'.4 This was a possibilitywhich the radical Unitarians would have deplored above everything.

For the only other class of people who reacted immediately againstthe proclamation, we must look to the north of Italy. Only one motivewas there allowed to the prodictator, that of wanting an assembly justin order to hinder Cavour's policy of simple annexation.5 In Sicilyitself, however, at least until the new mot d'ordre came from Turin,Cavour's supporters gave Mordini at any rate a grudging approval, andhis decree had a smooth passage for four or five days. Crispi's telegramof the 6th giving Garibaldi's blessing to the assembly reached Palermo

1 13 October, Scelsi to Mordini (MRR, 221/31).2 10 October, governor of Acireale telegram to Mordini (AMB, b. 28).3 12 October, ibid. (MRR).4 8 October, Navarra to Crispi (ACP, b. 156). 5 9 October, La Perseveranza.

306 Mordini Summons an Assembly: 5 Octoberon the 7th,1 and this contributed its part to the general pacification. Thepreponderance of common-sense opinion in the centre of Sicilianpolitics was probably quite agreeable to what was proposed. LaForbice came out once more against any fusion with Piedmont, that isto say against any annexation which meant the simple acceptance of thePiedmontese constitution and laws. It also opposed the other extremeof making Sicily a separate kingdom, for the convincing reason 'that inthe present state of affairs we could find absolutely no one to take onthe post of king'. No, Sicily should vote to become part of a kingdomof Italy under King Victor Emanuel, and not a state of its own. Thesame paper then went on to reject as invalid the parallel of Tuscany—forthis province had been quoted by Cavour's party as having voted forunion not with Italy, but with the existing kingdom of Sardinia. The caseswere not parallel, for earlier in the year the goal of unity had seemeddistant, whereas now a new kingdom of Italy was almost in being.2

The Palermitans in general probably waited only to know Garibaldi'smind before being quite certain of their own. It was often difficult forthem to understand either of the active parties, which both seemed tohave concealed and possibly disreputable motives, 'and which werefighting without understanding one another, like the Jesuits andJansenists'.3 But after Garibaldi's confirmation became known on the7th, there was little further reason for them to doubt Mordini's goodintentions. At Messina, too, there was a relaxation of tension; and aftera truce with the Bourbon garrison on the 8th iiad allayed fears somewhat,the radical governor intervened in the theatre amid cheers to read outthat Victor Emanuel had begun his march towards Naples.4 The fullwidth of the gap dividing radicals and moderates could have beenappreciated at this point by Cavour alone, since he now had the picturein perspective and at last saw his goal clearly before him. It was butimperfectly or spasmodically perceived by Garibaldi, and hardly at allby the generality of Sicilians. Their thoughts were fathered by the hopethat they might be able to combine the security represented by VictorEmanuel with the enthusiasm and lofty ideals generated by their dictator.

1 The date of receipt is marked on the form (AMB, b. 28).2 8 October, La Forbice.3 G. Crescenti, in a pamphlet II nuovo regno d' Italia, dated Palermo 27 September, p. 4.4 8 October, report by the Sardinian consul at Messina (AME).

307

CHAPTER XXI

PALLAVICINO FIGHTS FOR APLEBISCITE: 8 OCTOBER

For a few days after Mordini made his decision of 5 October, Sicilianpoliticians were able to continue within the bounds of their closedworld, little regarding and little able to regard the course of events atTurin and Naples. The difficulty of communication was such that,although Cavour in the north knew on the 6th about Mordini's decreeof the day before, people in Sicily did not know for a full week aboutCavour's speech of the 2nd to parliament. During this week, owing totheir ignorance of Cavour's attitude, even the most conservative dailypapers at Palermo had no major disagreement with Mordini's newstatement of policy, and people were content to know that a Sicilianassembly would soon be meeting. The position was described on the9th by consul Goodwin to Lord John Russell—Lord John being nowa convert to united Italy, but Goodwin still sharing some of theautonomist sentiments he found about him in Palermo.

The decree of the 5 th convoking the electoral colleges on the 21st inst.for the election of a national assembly has been favourably received. Prepara-tions are making to give effect to its provisions by all political parties. Theday for the meeting of the assembly will be shortly fixed, and an early dayis confidently looked for. The sole business of the assembly will be to laydown the conditions for the entrance of Sicily into the Italian union.1

By itself this would be too partisan a testimony to carry much assurance.But from other sources we have already seen that the bulk of Sicilianopinion on the 9th was still expecting a local parliament to meet and discusswhat conditions they would attach to annexation. This was regarded asthe most likely way to reach a highest common factor of agreementabout their future status. A description of the current state of mindwas given by Goodwin, who expanded his statement yet more explicitly:among these conditions, which at present are subjects of speculation, thefollowing appear indispensable... first, the provision for the payment of the

1 9 October, Goodwin to Russell (F.O. 165/134).

308 Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 Octoberinterest of the national debt at present amounting to a million of ducats perannum, exclusive of 600,000 ducats for the interest of the floating debt:secondly, the determination of the quota to be contributed by Sicily towardsthe common expenses of the states: and thirdly, the retention of the laws andtribunals. For the last forty years Sicily has possessed a code of laws and asystem of judicature framed on French models, which however exceptionableon the score of centralization, have on the whole well answered their purpose.The abolition of the Court of Cassation and the removal of the seal of justice,in the last resort, to a foreign capital would entail upon suitors long voyagesby sea and great loss of time besides heavy expenses.

While informal discussion was already beginning on these conditionsof union, Mordini, reinforced by approval from Naples, set about hispreparations for convening the assembly. On the 7th he had writtenround to all provincial governors explaining the idea of such a conven-tion. 'I am not one of those who think that the government ought tohave its own candidates in the elections', he said. 'Governors, there-fore, must not even indirectly suggest candidates for their districts.'Their job was just to see that everyone was encouraged to vote, and thatno party should by deceit or intimidation bring such pressure to bearthat voting was blind or unspontaneous.1 Mordini assured them that aplebiscite by universal suffrage would follow afterwards as the finalconsecration of union. He explained that, if it had been thoughtnecessary to precede the plebiscite by an assembly, this was meant as anact of concord to pacify growing differences of opinion; for it wouldserve as a forum where they could freely discuss those differences with-out fear of outside pressure.2 Mordini by now really does seem to havethought of what he had done as an act of concord. Although he hadbegun by calling it a check to Cavour, the favourable reception on allsides in Palermo had been so impressive that by the 9th he even thoughtthe news would be well received in Turin.3 He now appointed4 November as the date for this local parliament to meet.4

1 7 October, II Giornale Officiate di Sicilia; the next issue announced the appointmentof a committee of architects to choose a building to house the assembly.

2 9 October, a second letter to governors, signed by Mordini and Bargoni (MRR,cartella 221).

3 9 October, Mordini to Mangini (copy in AMB).4 9 October (Raccolta degli atti del governo dittatoriale).

Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 October 309Late on 9 October Mordini sent off a telegram to tell Garibaldi what

a good effect had been scored by his proclamation for a Sicilian assembly;l

but there were nevertheless several details about this message and itsdespatch which suggested that all was not quite well with his plans.There was, for instance, the great difficulty in communication which itreflected: for though sent on the 9th, this telegram did not reach eventhe other side of the Straits until after noon on the n th . A second andmore ominous sign was the fact that Mordini should have needed oncemore to ask Garibaldi to send back occasional informatory letters, or atvery least the reports of the Stefani agency; for the prodictator'sgovernment was inviting ridicule by never knowing on time eitherGaribaldi's policy or the military bulletins from the front, and some-times it had to await the Genoa newspapers to learn even the chief itemsof news from Naples. The same telegram also contained the complaintthat, though a ship had just arrived from Naples, it was without Parisior Calvino; for these two Sicilians were both urgently wanted back fortheir important jobs at Palermo, and originally had been sent only todiscover what was happening on the mainland. As a final point, thetext reveals that Cavour's speech given to parliament a week earlier wasat last known in Sicily. On 2 October Cavour had publicly placed hisveto on any solution other than unqualified annexation by plebiscite.The arrival of this ultimatum must have given Mordini serious cause toworry about what effect it would have on Sicilian opinion.

The reports from Turin about the proceedings in parliament were infact going to change the whole aspect of affairs in the south. They hadreached Naples two days before, with the result that events there hadalready changed direction before Mordini could take stock of the newsituation. There was by now another complication, in that Garibaldi'sheadquarters at Caserta had become one more centre of action andpolicy-making, along with Naples, Turin and Palermo. Indeed,Palermo was now the least important of these four centres. Mordinidid not fully realize it, but in fact the Sicilian government henceforwardwas too far out of touch with what was happening to preserve muchinitiative or even much freedom of movement on its own. Those partyleaders who had not gone northwards for the opening of parliament hadnaturally tended to congregate round the person of the dictator. For

1 9 October, Mordini to Garibaldi (Archivio Garibaldi MRR).

310 Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 Octoberthis reason one has to follow events at Caserta and Naples before theirrepercussions can be identified in Palermo at several days' remove.

The political situation at Naples was roughly this. Since I October,Garibaldi's chief adviser and secretary had been no longer Bertani butCrispi, another of the enrages but a cleverer and slightly more moderateand tactful man than his predecessor. Garibaldi was by no meansproving himself the uncompromising and reckless revolutionary whichCavour supposed. Though many of the radical leaders had arrived inNaples, they were there as soldiers or private citizens, and Crispi alonehad been given important political office. Against the urgent advice ofhis secretary, Garibaldi had appointed a cabinet of ministers as a self-imposed check upon his dictatorial will. He had even dismissed Bertaniat the request of the more conservative Neapolitans, and had nominatedtwo successive ministries of moderate liberals who were perpetually atodds with his secretariat and enthusiastic for the ideas of Cavour. Hehad followed this up by appointing a prodictator for Naples in theperson of Marquis Pallavicino, a man of compromise and moderationwho had already decided that it was his first duty to secure immediateand unconditional annexation to Piedmont. Certainly Mazzini wasstill in Naples: but, although Cavour chose to think Garibaldi a meretool of this arch-agitator, in fact Mazzini was quite off the stage uponwhich all these rivalries of interest and doctrine were to be played out,and by this time had given up Garibaldi for politically lost.1

The dictator had personally been hoping to abstain from politics, andhad rather been engrossed throughout the first few days of the monthin his close-fought battle along the River Volturno. On I October theroyalists made their first big attack of the whole southern campaign, butthe volunteers held firm all along the line, and over two thousandprisoners were taken. For political reasons this engagement was goingto be played down by northern generals and military historians.2 Inreality it was one of Garibaldi's finest military ventures, in which hedefied the pundits by showing himself a master of defensive strategy,and in which he proved fully able to control a larger force of men than

1 2 October, Mazzini to Caroline Stansfeld: 'nothing can be done without him—very little, I fear, with him' (Epistolario, vol. XLI, p. 126).

2 Colonel C. Cesari, La campagna di Garibaldi ne\Y Italia tneridionale, 1860, p. 193,published by Ministero della Guerra, UfFicio Storico, 1928.

Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 October 311the Piedmontese regulars had numbered at Castelfidardo or indeed inthe whole of the Crimean War. Some of the Piedmontese troops whohad been already landed at Naples, and who so far had been obliged torefuse Garibaldi's urgent requests for aid, were at last permitted byVillamarina to join in the battle, because of the danger of a counter-attack on the city. Between three and four hundred of them came upin the later stages of the fight, and suffered half-a-dozen casualties fromshell-fire.1 This must have had considerable moral effect, just as did thepresence of British sailors 'on leave' helping to man the guns. It wasthe first occasion Piedmontese troops had fought side to side with thevolunteers; and it warned the Bourbons that Cavour was going to payno regard to the diplomatic niceties of breaking off diplomatic relationsand declaring war. Furthermore, it carried the implication that thePiedmontese were no longer worried that the volunteers could continuetheir march upon Rome. In reality Villamarina had had to act on hisown authority, for Cavour had left him no instructions to cover sucha situation. The ambassador had been confronted with the fact that thePiedmontese were already compromised against the Bourbons by theirmilitary occupation of the port and fortresses of Naples. If he refusedto give yet more material help to Garibaldi at a moment of such peril,this refusal would only be interpreted as a wish that Garibaldi mightlose, and it would have the worst possible effect on Cavour's reputationamong liberal Neapolitans.2 It did not matter that the Piedmontesetroops were abruptly withdrawn once the immediate danger was over.The important fact was that, without being consulted, and without anyenthusiasm, Cavour had momentarily found his men fighting alongsidethe volunteers.

It is usually stated that Garibaldi's new-found docility henceforwardwas due to the stiffer resistance he met on the Volturno, and to the factthat his almost complete lack of artillery and cavalry now becameimportant for the first time in these different conditions of warfare.But the political effect of Villamarina's decision was quite as important,for this went part of the way to restore Garibaldi's faith in the goodintentions of the Piedmontese.3 Until now, the fair words of the Turin

1 3 October, Colonel Santa Rosa to Fanti (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, 1952,pp. 25-6). 2 2 October, Nisco to Cavour (ibid. p. 14).

3 5 October, Villamarina to Cavour (ibid. p. 45).

312 Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 Octobergovernment had been contradicted by almost all the appearances, inparticular by the presence of three thousand soldiers waiting idly atNaples; but after 2 October there was more tangible evidence of apositive will to collaborate. Garibaldi still seems to have been hopingthat Cavour might eventually be dismissed and that the king wouldthen make Rome the object of the campaign;1 but by 5 October he hadgiven up hope of being able to proceed much farther before the Pied-montese advance column arrived from the north, and he was alreadybeginning to prepare his volunteers for the next campaigning season inthe spring of 1861.2 With the realization that there was small possibilityof further advance at the moment, he was also brought up sharply andmost reluctantly against the political struggle developing behind thelines. In his ignorance of politics, he had not realized that a prodictator,a cabinet of ministers, and a secretary-general, all with more or lessundefined powers, might sometimes collide and bring government toa stop.

Back in the city of Naples, the more respectable citizens were in muchthe same state of alarm that they had been before Garibaldi's arrivala month before. They were terrified either that the Bourbons wouldreturn victorious and let loose the lazzaroni in a counter-revolution, orelse that Garibaldi would risk his forces in a drive on Rome and leavethem without defences or orderly government. Garibaldi's invasion,coming on top of the breakdown of the Bourbon administration, hadexaggerated the natural lawlessness of the city and district of Naples,and there were dangerous signs that lower-class unrest was becom ngassociated with political reaction and loyalty to Throne and Altar. Theliberating army had not proved universally popular, because of itsrowdyism, its deserters and its requisitioning of private property, andabove all because it had not eliminated the fear of a Bourbon counter-attack.3 Admiral Mundy reported that, though there were somethousands of Calabrians with the volunteers, only ten Neapolitans had

1 4 October, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 70/320/549).2 6 October, Garibaldi's proclamation to Molise, Edizione nazionale degli scritti di

Garibaldi, vol. iv, p. 312.3 8 October, Elliot to Russell: 'the decline of Garibaldi's popularity has been one

of the most curious things imaginable... if the Sardinians do not quickly come tosave him he will rapidly lose more ground' (RP G.D. 22/85).

Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 October 313joined the patriot forcesx—Commander Forbes ironically put the figureat a single man,2 and Tiirr said it was eighty.3 At all events the numberwas remarkably small, and there is little doubt that the war of liberationwas felt less keenly at Naples than in some other parts of Italy. Mindfulof what had chanced on other occasions, the citizens were judiciouslywaiting to see who won before committing themselves. They evenshowed reluctance to attend gala occasions in the San Carlo theatre, incase this might turn out in the end to be public alignment with thelosing side. The sense of regional separatism was probably less strongwith them than among Sicilians, but one visiting deputy from Turinwas impressed to find a 'universal' desire to keep their own laws andautonomy, and was already foretelling a revolutionary secession ofthe south if the northern system of union was imposed there toounyieldingly.4

Early in October the Neapolitans were more interested in an immediaterestoration of law and order than in what long-term arrangementswould come about thereafter. They knew that Cavour had calledparliament to meet on 2 October, and it was to be expected that hewould then ask for special powers to annex the south by simple decreeand so end the state of uncertainty and provisional government.5 In themeantime, while they waited for news of this to filter through fromTurin, the new prodictator Pallavicino issued a proclamation to raisetheir spirits, promising them a splendid future. 'Under the rule ofVictor Emanuel, I promise you order and liberty, the impartial adminis-tration of justice.. .expansion of the national guard, schools for thepeople, railways, and encouragement of all types of agriculture, com-merce and industry.'6 All this alluring prospect was held out toNeapolitans if only they accepted Pallavicino's offer of a plebiscite andimmediate annexation. The alternative offered by Crispi, on the otherhand, would involve them in further fighting and a prolongation of thestate of emergency. The radicals were known to stand for a continuationof war and revolution, as well as for anti-clericalism, and any number

1 16 October, Mundy, H.M.S. Hannibal at Palermo and Naples, p. 324.2 Forbes, The campaign of Garibaldi in the Two Sicilies, pp. 314-15.3 16 October, Elliot to Russell (RP, G.D. 22/85).4 5 October, II Diritto, letter from Cavalleri.5 5 October, II Giornale Officiale di Napoli. 6 6 October, ibid.

314 Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 Octoberof Utopian political ideas, all the things that is to say which good honestcitizens most disliked. The wealthier classes had an abiding dread ofMazzinianism, which was often identified with social as well as politicalrevolution. They were particularly worried that Garibaldi seemed toplace more confidence in the canaglia than in the galantuomini.1 Theyalso suspected the radicals of wanting to call an assembly as a way ofprolonging the emergency and perhaps tying the hands of Cavour. Thesuspicion was fully justified. If people had only known, one ofBertani's last acts before falling from grace had been to ask Garibaldiwhat he thought about the 'idea of calling a parliament in this part ofItaly as a counter-balance to that of Turin'.2 Perhaps this proposal fora southern parliament had hardly been a very serious suggestion at thetime, but the threat became dangerously real when on 6 October therewas published in Naples the news of Mordini's pronouncement aboutthe assembly in Sicily. This news horrified the Neapolitan conservatives,and was just the lead which the radicals had been waiting for. After thecollapse of their own private schemes for the conquest of Rome, Crispiand his friends had to recognize that Mordini had surpassed them inperception and skill. Crispi at once proposed in council that Naplesshould fall into line with Palermo, and at this suggestion all the latentpolitical differences came to the surface.3

For one day discussion was adjourned. Garibaldi, who had hithertomaintained that any form of vote should be put off until the end of thewar, had lately been wondering whether there was anything further togain by postponement. He had empowered Mordini to modify hisoriginal plan if local conditions made it necessary, and now assumedthat his prodictator in Sicily must have acted for the best. Accordingly,his first reaction was to give Mordini's decree his formal approval, and—so said Crispi—to order a corresponding assembly for the mainlandprovinces of the south.4 His ministers at Naples had already discussedthis very question on 2 October, with much heat and to little purpose.But on hearing of Mordini's action they now met again on the 7th,

1 13 October, vice-consul Astengo to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. m, p. 107).2 23 September, Bertani to Garibaldi (Curatulo, Garibaldi, Vittorio Emanuele,

Cavoury p. 386).3 16 October, L' Indipendente (Naples).4 18 March 1865, Crispi to Mazzini (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 442).

Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 October 315clearly shaken by the news and by Garibaldi's reaction to it. After somedebate they voted by three against two in favour of following theSicilian example as the dictator suggested. One of the minority wasRaffaele Conforti who nominally presided in the cabinet, but even hewas wavering, and earlier in the day had apparently favoured anassembly.1 Crispi described how Pallavicino was present at the discus-sion and opposed the decision with all his might. Then, unable to givea casting vote, the prodictator had gone off immediately to put hisviews at Garibaldi's headquarters in Caserta. Pallavicino at this pointbegan to hint at resignation, and perhaps this threat helped to carry hisviews, for Garibaldi now overrode the ministerial decision and gavehim a mandate for a plebiscite. This appeared to be a rebuff not only tothe cabinet, but even more to the dictator's radical secretariat. Crispinevertheless saw a way to reconcile this new decision with the old.Far from making difficulties, he even smoothed the way to a settlement.His compromise suggestion was that Garibaldi's mandate must betaken, not as alternative, but as something complementary to theministerial decision, in other words that Naples should have bothassembly and plebiscite, the latter merely to indicate the general opinionwhether for union or no, and the former to discuss, implement andapply the findings of the general will. Crispi says that he therefore* arranged matters' accordingly.2

Further light is thrown on this change in Garibaldi's and Crispi'sviews by Francesco De Sanctis, the great literary critic and futurenational minister of education. De Sanctis was at this time serving underGaribaldi as governor of Avellino in the hinterland of Naples, and wasperhaps the most moderate, balanced and acute intellect of all theactors on this particular stage. Until now he had adhered to the radicalprogramme of proceeding to Rome, and had loyally discountenancedthe premature campaign for precipitate annexation. But on 6 Octoberhe saw Garibaldi and told him that the invasion of the Marches byCavour, together with the threat of intervention in Italy by the otherstates of Europe, had changed his mind. In his opinion there was nolonger any alternative to falling in with the wishes of Turin if the

1 8 October, Parisi to Mordini (Rosi, II risorgimento e V azione d' un patriota, p. 418);12 October, Cattaneo to Bertani (Archivio Cattaneo MRM).

2 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 443.

316 Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 Octoberrevolution was to be concluded without disaster. De Sanctis leftGaribaldi on the 6th under the impression that he had carried his point;but when he returned on the 7th, he found the dictator talking withCrispi, and once more of the opinion that annexation should be madeconditional on the redemption of Rome and Venice—this obviously hadbeen the substance of Crispi's advice in the interval. So De Sanctis wentback to seek out Pallavicino at Naples, where he must have arrived justafter the Neapolitan cabinet had voted in favour of calling an assembly.Both of them then returned together to put the opposition case atCaserta. 'The discussions were long and lively', said De Sanctis, 'butCrispi showed himself generous, and not only yielded but inducedGaribaldi to yield too.' Garibaldi insisted on one point only, that thewording of the plebiscite should mention Italy united and 'indivisible',so as to render the vote invalid if Cavour failed to reach Rome or cededany more provinces in compensation to France.1 This mild and un-prejudiced account of events shows that tempers were still more or lessunruffled, and that Crispi was still ready for compromise, while Gari-baldi as usual was wavering between confused alternatives, swayed thisway and that in each successive interview. It hints also that Crispi mayhave kept his thoughts about an assembly to himself.

This brings us to the moment, late on the 7th, when some newsarrived from Turin to embitter the feelings of those who fought eachother in the dictator's presence. This was the account of Cavour'sspeech to parliament on the 2nd. Contrary to the advice of Cavour'sbest Neapolitan counsellors,2 this speech had insisted quite firmly on theunconditional surrender of the south, and had employed the provocativeand somewhat humiliating word 'annexation' which a growing bodyof opinion in Naples and Sicily was now trying to avoid. The receipt ofthis news coincided with a report that the Piedmontese General Fanti,a strong personal enemy of the dictator, was about to send his advancetroops across the northern frontier into Neapolitan territory.3 This hadall the appearance of being a joint political and military offensive againstthe radicals. Evidently Cavour had no intention of waiting upon the

1 F. De Sanctis, Opere complete, ed. N. Cortese, vol. xiv, 1938, p. 53.2 E.g. 14 September and 4 October, // Nazionale (Bonghi's paper at Naples).3 Telegram from the governor of Teramo, received in Naples on 6 October

(ACP, f. 143)-

Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 October 317result of a popular vote before taking over southern Italy; on thecontrary, he seemed suspiciously eager that the plebiscite should beconducted in the presence of Sardinian troops. The implication of allthis for Garibaldi was, first, that 'compromise' would now meancapitulation; secondly, that there was but little time left if he wantedany other policy than that of unconditional surrender to prevail; andthirdly, perhaps also that his own eventual submission could hardly bemuch longer delayed. Yet another piece of news also arrived at the sametime, namely that on 3 October Victor Emanuel had arrived at Anconato assume command of the northern army. Hitherto Fanti and Cialdinihad been in command, until it was quite certain that there was nofurther danger of any military check. What remained now was for theking to win the political battle against the Garibaldians. Cavour'sexpectation was that Garibaldi, who had also held the rank of generalin the royal service, would not submit easily to General Fanti whom heso much disliked; whereas he would loyally obey if called to order bythe king. Hence Victor Emanuel's arrival at Ancona at this precisemoment.

Naples knew of all this by 7 October, and the various parties in thesouth reacted to the news according to their kind. Garibaldi's mood wasone of resignation. He was miserable about it, but passively resigned,and still retained some slight hope that the king might have somehidden purpose. As for Crispi and the more extreme radicals, theymust have realized that for them it was now or never. Cavour's publicchallenge put them on the defensive, and left them altogether at adisadvantage tactically. To Pallavicino and the liberal-conservatives, onthe other hand, Cavour's words and the king's presence near thefrontier brought an enormous access of support.

On 8 October, as a result of the news from Turin, and of Garibaldi'smeeting with Pallavicino and De Sanctis, the same ministers at Napleswho by a majority had decided for an assembly the day before, changedtheir minds and voted unanimously for a plebiscite. Crispi was one ofthem—since he had arrogated to himself the slightly ridiculous title of'minister of foreign affairs' with a seat in the cabinet. His vote on thisoccasion shows that, if not fully convinced, at least he had been forcedto transfer his attack from the principle to its application and wording.1

1 Pallavicino, Le Memorie, vol. in, p. 626.

318 Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 OctoberLater on he recounted what he had said at the meeting which took thisdecision:

I declared that the Southern provinces, owing to the special conditionsunder which their revolution had taken place and in consideration of theimportance of their position as regards the rest of Italy, could not accept theformula that had been adopted when the people of Tuscany and Emilia hadcast their vote. Our country must not give herself to another, must not annexherself, which verb savours overmuch of servitude, but must rather expressher desire that union be achieved.... A plebiscite under the conditions thatprevailed in the Central provinces might now be regarded not as a simplehalt by the way, but as a complete renunciation of our determination toredeem the entire peninsula.1

These doubts were to be partially resolved by the wording of the decree,wherein it was said that the plebiscite would be for an 'indivisible*Italy; and it was to such a carefully phrased conclusion that all theministers at last agreed.2 October 21 was fixed for the vote.

This agreement lasted but a few hours, yet it was enough to have animportant effect on more than just Naples or southern Italy. Why didCrispi give his consent to this decree ? Probably because he still hopedthat a plebiscite could be held conjointly with an assembly which wouldgive him all he wanted in delay and publicity. It may be that he wasalso relying on Mordini to keep Sicily free and independent after theannexation of Naples, as a fortress and a centre of operations for theradicals. It is likely, moreover, that he feared that Garibaldi might havedefinitely changed his mind in favour of a quick vote: in which case themost that could be obtained was a declaration in favour of 'Italy oneand indivisible'. This particular wording, if ever the occasion arose,could always be interpreted to mean postponement of the actual unionuntil after the fall of Rome and Venice.

It was only when Crispi had time to reassure himself about Garibaldi'sreal opinion in another interview, and to reflect on how unlikely it wasfor Cavour to be moved by a mere form of words, that he reverted inhis tactics to an aggressive championing of the assembly. Garibaldi, too,changed his mind again almost at once in the same direction. But bythen it was too late. The plebiscite decree of the 8th, unsigned it is true

1 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. i, p. 443.2 8 October, // Giornale Officiate di Napoli.

Pallavicino Fights for a Plebiscite: 8 October 319by Garibaldi, but approved by all the ministers including Crispi, wastelegraphed by Pallavicino to all provinces, and was to leak throughvia Reggio into Sicily. Once known in Messina and Palermo it was todestroy all possibility of Mordini being able to proceed with his plan tocall a local parliament, because it gave Sicilians the impression thatGaribaldi had rejected the idea of a similar assembly at Naples, andhence that Mordini on 5 October must have been acting disloyally andon his own initiative. For this result Crispi must be held largelyresponsible. He had misread the situation.

The dramatic irony of the situation did not stop at this. It will beseen in a later chapter how, a few days afterwards, the policy of con-ditional annexation by assembly again prevailed in Naples, and oncemore Crispi had a brief moment of triumph, once more Pallavicino wasin despair. But the news then came back from Sicily that Pallavicino'sdecree of the 8th had been seized on delightedly by the plebiscitariansin Palermo, and that Mordini had had to yield to their pressure. Thisnews in turn had repercussions in Naples. The result was that Sicily,having first been compelled by Naples to change over from an assemblyto a plebiscite, then forced Naples to follow Sicily on precisely the sameissue. There is a sense in which Crispi's government in the south can besaid to have died by its own hand.

320

CHAPTER XXII

PARLIAMENT SUPPORTS CAVOUR:OCTOBER

Cavour would not have understood very accurately what was going onat Naples and Palermo, especially during the three weeks' break in thetelegraph service in September. But this hardly mattered, since at lasthe knew his own mind and could take positive action in accordance withwhat he knew. While Fanti carried out the military invasion of pontificaland Neapolitan territory, Cavour concentrated on dealing with all thediplomatic and political repercussions of this invasion as they arose. Hefirst applied himself to the problem of how to meet the angry protestswhich had come in from Russia, Prussia and Spain against the illegalityand immorality of his war policy. They had complained that he hadneither awaited the Pope's reply to his ultimatum, nor declared war;and that he had flagrantly violated the very principle of non-interven-tion from which he had formerly derived so much benefit. But to theseprotests Cavour was able to oppose the active encouragement of GreatBritain and the passive connivance of France. The balance of power wasthus on his side, as it was invariably on Italy's side during the later andsuccessful years of the risorgimento.

A second problem was more difficult. For a long time he had beenperplexed how to combat the revolution without openly attackingGaribaldi. His difficulty was to catch up with the remarkable conver-sion of public opinion to Garibaldi's beliefs, yet to do this withouthaving publicly to acknowledge either his former impercipience, or hispresent debt to the revolutionaries. He had, if possible, to retain all theadvantages, with none of the disadvantages, of being at once theirenemy and their friend. By the beginning of October, however,certain points told strongly in his favour when he came to tackle thisacrobatic feat. There was first the tremendous fact that the invasion ofcentral Italy had now restored his popularity. At the very same time,the volunteers were suffering their first military check on the Volturno.His information now led him to believe that Garibaldi was no longer in

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 321any position to make difficulties over the entry of Piedmontese troopsinto the south of Italy.1 Another point was that Cavour had outflankedRattazzi, so that the parliamentary Left had no alternative policy tooffer, and did not even know the facts on which to base one. At Turin,'public opinion is ferociously anti-Garibaldian, and insists that we enda system of government that so much dishonours Italy and the cause ofliberty'.2 People there were in general most enthusiastic over the asser-tion of Piedmontese influence in the peninsula. Most of them weresufficiently anxious about losing the privileged position of a capital citynot to be too eager for Garibaldi to reach Rome,3 and they were alsoburning with monarchist zeal against this self-appointed upstart dictatorin the south. Asproni wrote from Turin on the 4th to Crispi that' theking is completely back in Cavour's hand'; and he added maliciouslythat Rosina, the king's mistress who had had a considerable share in theformer breach between monarch and minister, 'has been placated withlarge gifts, and now is all in favour of Cavour'.4 According to Bertani,himself now in Turin, people there were so excited and incensed as tocall Garibaldi 'a traitor and a rebel'.5 This was the result of reports sentback by Piedmontese agents in the south; for the terror of social revolu-tion, together with a lack of understanding about their opponents, anda desire to overdarken the picture for purposes of self-justification, hadcombined to make these agents mislead northern opinion on the subjectof Naples and Sicily. But Cavour was delighted at the result, becausean irate public opinion made things easier for when he could launch hiscampaign against the 'Garibaldian hordes'. The long-term results ofthis were to be most unfortunate. For the moment, however, it gavehim just the right atmosphere to win the vote of confidence he required;and in these circumstances a parliamentary debate was the naturalexpedient to which he turned.

1 2 October, Cavour telegram to Fanti (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, 1952, p. 6).2 2 October, Cavour to Victor Emanuel (ibid. p. 9).3 4 October, Asproni (a deputy) from Turin to Crispi: 'all speak of Garibaldi with

anger and contempt.... The secret motive for this is neither love and esteem forCavour nor hatred of Garibaldi—it is the fear of losing the Capital that is drivingthem all crazy' (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 434).

4 Ibid. These words were excised from the published version, but can be seen inthe original (ACP, f. 138).

5 6 October, copy of Bertani to Cattaneo (ABCM).

322 Parliament Supports Cavour: OctoberThe Baron Ricasoli at Florence was advocating a different system.

Ricasoli and Medici represented another current of opinion among the'moderates', which would have preferred the king to be proclaimed adictator until the emergency had passed and the process of unificationwas complete. 'Royal dictatorship will be the proof of the practicalsense of Italians', wrote the governor of Tuscany in a remarkablestatement on I October. 'Dictatorship will inaugurate stupendouslythe new monarchy. No one will deny the magic significance of thisword.'1 Ricasoli thought that a dictator was necessary if the Italianswere to round off the kingdom by incorporating Rome, and he wasbeginning to suspect that Cavour was too much of a Piedmontese towant the completion of Italian unity.2 He had little enough sympathywith the radicals who were ruling at Naples, 'those swindlers andmadmen' as he called them;3 but nevertheless his confidence in theking, and his distrust of Cavour, brought him far closer to Garibaldithan he can have suspected. In his almost mystical desire to reach Rome,his voice sounded like that of Mazzini himself. 'Without Rome Italianlife will be sterile, and the achievement of nationality will mean littlemore than mere economic betterment. It will be a union of territoryand not a real fusion of interests. Turin municipalism once again willinterfere with the need for a truly national life.'4 This might have beenMazzini writing. No wonder Cavour brought his correspondence withRicasoli once again to an angry stop; for the prime minister now hadless need of the other's help, and he realized the danger implicit in thisfundamental difference of approach. An attempt was made to try andinduce the Iron Baron to go and become royal commissioner in Sicily,but the latter interpreted this as just a plot by the Piedmontese so thatthey might the more easily control Tuscany in his absence. 'I prefer tostay here and keep alight the Italian flame, and to combat the mostinfamous, vile, stupid, immoral and senseless domination [of Cavour'sgovernment from Turin].. . . Without Rome we shall not have Italy

1 i October, Ricasoli to Bianchi at Turin (Lettere di Ricasoli, ed. Tabarrini, vol. v,pp. 253-5).

2 3 October, Ricasoli to Bianchi (ibid. p. 257).3 3 October, Ricasoli to Silvistrelli (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani;

not given by Tabarrini).* 7 October, Ricasoli to Bianchi (BR ASF, b. N, f. H).

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 323Though we are now twenty-two millions in number, we are acting asif we were only two.'* Ricasoli was confident—as much so as Garibaldi—that a show of force against Louis Napoleon would suffice for theattainment of Rome; and when parliament did nothing to demonstratethis antica virtu which he felt, he reviled it for such humiliating behaviour.In parliament they were just making empty speeches and empty laws,when as yet Italy did not exist.2 Ricasoli's anxious longing for adictatorship shows that he was not properly in touch with the liberalmajority in parliament upon which Cavour so much relied. Thedeputies at Turin would hardly propose that Victor Emanuel becamea dictator, for this would be at their own expense. They and Cavourdistrusted the king, and feared that he might exploit any increase inpower by breaking loose from their tutelage to back a triumphantGaribaldi.3

During all these months before October, Cavour had not botheredto call parliament, because he had not needed its approval for any of hissuccessive policies towards Garibaldi's revolution. Nor had he eventhought fit to consult the deputies about his invasion of the Marches.If he had now decided that he would drive the Garibaldians 'into thesea', this too was quite on his own initiative. Parliament, in fact, wasnot really so active a force in the constitution as Cavour sometimesliked people to think. What he himself prized about it was its verypassiveness. It was useful as an inactive partner; as a dead weight whichcould sometimes be brought in with good effect against the king andGaribaldi; as a platform and a means of publicity, through whichCavour could create and reinforce the impression that he was a liberalfighting against both revolutionaries and reactionaries. The Turinparliament was a largely hand-picked and submissive body, and Cavourknew that it made a minister stronger to have such an instrument readyfor emergencies. If he ever were obliged to suppress Garibaldi by force,there would be an obvious advantage if he could 'colour his designbetter'4 in a parliamentary statement which would admit just enough

1 7 October, Ricasoli to Bianchi (BR ASF, b. N, f. H).2 9 October, Ricasoli to Bianchi (ibid.).3 8 October, Bianchi to Ricasoli (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani;

not given in Tabarrini).4 N.d. (late September?) Farini to Ricasoli (ibid.).

324 Parliament Supports Cavour: Octoberof the truth to make him appear even more in the right. Until thismoment in the year he would have found it very hard to colour hisvarious designs publicly in a manner which redounded wholly to hiscredit. But now Garibaldi had put himself in the wrong and publishedhis criticisms of Cavour; whereas the Piedmontese had at last put them-selves in the right by a 'national' policy in the Marches. If the dualityof power and policy within the state could no longer continue un-resolved without prejudice to the national cause, now was the momentto recall parliament after its long recess throughout the summer. A freevote was worth more than any dictatorship, said Cavour. 'I thinkthat for Italy to have constituted herself a nation without sacrificingliberty to independence is not her least title to fame. She has not passedthrough the dictatorial hands of a Cromwell. She has freed herselffrom monarchical absolutism, but without falling into revolutionarydespotism... .Parliament is the only moral force capable of overcomingthe sects and winning us the sympathy of liberal Europe.' So wroteCavour, in a fine statement of his liberal creed, on the day that parlia-ment was opened.1

In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on 2 October, Cavourdefined his new attitude to the situation in southern Italy with com-prehension and skill. All his rhetorical gifts were needed to patch overthe inconsistencies. His object was twofold: to secure approval for theannexation of the south, and to win what amounted to a vote 01censure on the radicals. In other words he had simultaneously to condemnthe revolution and to accept its fruits. Indeed, he had to force theradicals to yield up those fruits as to their rightful owner, making him-self out to be at once Garibaldi's natural heir and also his conqueror.With an eye to the public record, he carefully paid tribute to Garibaldi,'a name so justly dear to the multitudes'. Yet, as kindly as he could, hetold the deputies that they would have to choose one thing or the other.'Revolution and constitutional government cannot coexist for long inItaly without their dualism producing an opposition which can benefitonly our common enemy.' 'There must be no more revolutions, orelse Europe will have reason to think that revolution is not for us ameans but an end, and in that case Europe would cease to give us help.'Cavour no longer disowned Garibaldi's invasion of southern Italy as he

1 2 October, Cavour to V. Salvagnoli (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 12).

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 325had done in his previous statements of policy; indeed he went to theother extreme, and claimed that it was 'a necessary consequence of thepolicy initiated by Charles Albert and followed for twelve years by thegovernment of Victor Emanuel'. This was a concession to the Savoyarddiehards, whose thoughts never stretched much beyond Turin, and whoneeded to be convinced that legitimism and Catholicism and 'Pied-montism' were not being trodden underfoot by the newly-theorizedpopular sovereignty of a united kingdom. With this same audience inmind, Cavour carefully left out any mention of Rome; and he evenmade the positive statement that, once Venice had been acquired, 'theera of wars and revolutions in southern Europe would be closed for ever'.Perhaps Cavour was here just sounding out opinion, to discover how farhe could go without offending the majority. But it was a portion of hisspeech which particularly annoyed Ricasoli; for, without Rome as thenew national capital, Florence and the other provincial capitals wouldcontinue to be dependent on the 'infamous' domination of Turin.

Turning to southern Italy, Cavour tried to establish that his govern-ment had a right to interfere in what was happening there. If Garibaldicontinued in power much longer, it would be the Mazzinians whocame out on top.

Garibaldi's expedition sailed in the name of Victor Emanuel The kingand parliament cannot now allow provinces recently emancipated to remainfor long in the uncertainty of provisional government....

The generous prince whom all Italy proclaims as the initiator and duce ofthe national risorgimento has special obligations towards the people of southItaly, for their liberation took place in his name, and he is responsible for theirfate before Europe and before posterity. Not that he means in any sense todispose of the peoples of southern Italy by his sovereign fiat; it is just that hehas a duty incumbent on him to give them the chance of emerging fromprovisional government by the free manifestation of their wishes What-ever their choice, it will be religiously respected.Cavour spoke of free wishes to be 'religiously respected', but then wenton to limit the very narrow bounds within which those wishes must lie.Southerners were, indeed, to have only one choice after all, either toapprove or disapprove a circumscribed formula of annexation.

We must give it as our opinion that annexation ought not to be accepted[by parliament] if it were offered to us only under special conditions. For

326 Parliament Supports Cavour: Octoberthat would be to shackle the future ordering of the nation, and would intro-duce a radical fault which would be the seed of discord and antagonism tocome.He conceded that a federal form of state might sometimes justifiablyexist 'in certain peculiar conditions'; yet a pact of surrender which wasmade dependent on the continuance of local autonomy would be'contrary to the trends of modern society.. .and would constitute areal relic of the middle ages'.1

On the basis of these arguments, Cavour asked to be empowered byparliament to arrange by decree for the assimilation of all provincesthat might vote for 'annexation to the state'. In the analogous case ofTuscany, earlier in the year, parliament had been called on simply toaccept or reject a popular vote which had already occurred; but in thecase of Sicily and Naples Cavour thought it necessary to put a 'moralcompulsion' on the voters well in advance, before they took other ideasinto their heads.2 Here was another anomaly, for while any stipulationof conditions by southerners was specifically ruled out, Cavour carefullystipulated his own. Northerners were thus taking advantage of the factthat their own 'assembly' was already in existence, whereas the southso far had none. Sicily and Naples were now told that they had to votein a p1;ebiscite by universal suffrage; for anything else would proveunacceptable to Louis Napoleon; and it was also feared that a selectassembly of notables would be much harder to manipulate. ThenCavour made quite clear that the plebiscite could choose nothing elsebut simple 'annexation'; so that, for instance, there could be no questionof common submission by both Piedmont and Sicily to an altogethernew state of Italy. After all, was he not addressing his speech to theparliament of Turin, where even the radicals and the reactionaries hadthis local pride in common ? What he now demanded from parliamentwas powers to accept and 'regulate' all those provinces which mightdecide in a plebiscite to 'make part of our constitutional monarchy'.He was in a mood which was at once defiant and triumphant. Anopposition request for papers he rejected out of hand, giving theremarkable reason that in the British parliament—so he thought—papers were only laid after the events with which they dealt had been

1 2 October, Atti Parlamentari.2 4 October, II Diritto (Turin) deplores this compulsion.

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 327concluded.1 He was already looking forward to revoking some ofGaribaldi's enactments in the south, and with this in mind he made apoint of publicly stating that some of the dictator's legislation wasultra vires. It was perhaps a strange doctrine to maintain that dictatorialpowers were limited so precisely; and equally strange was the implica-tion that Cavour and the Turin parliament, as well as knowing theexact extent of Garibaldi's provisional authority better than thegeneral himself, were virtually sovereign already over affairs in thesouth. Cavour also asked parliament to authorize him to dispense withthe legal need to give the south as many representatives in parliamentas existing laws would allow, since this would slow up business in theChamber; and he explained further that there was a smaller number ofwealthy families in the south whose position was such that they couldprovide a deputy to carry the responsibility of self-government.2

This partial disenfranchisement of the south, and the treatment ofNaples and Sicily as if already subject to Turin, did not pass withoutcriticism. Cavour's parliamentary legerdemain was notorious, evenamong people who frankly admired him as the greatest statesman Italyhad ever produced.3 But the tone of parliament at this particularmoment of national triumph was not friendly to would-be critics.Giuseppe Ferrari was not well received when he replied to Cavour onthe 8th with facts he had found and opinions he had formed during hisrecent stay in Naples. Ferrari claimed to speak on behalf of thoseGaribaldians who were not able to come and speak for themselves.These men were about to be excluded from government and deprivedof rank by others who had sat comfortably at home while they them-selves were on the battlefield. They had conquered half of Italy for thecrown, and so deserved at least that their views should receive somerespect and consideration. Ferrari maintained that, despite all the diffi-culties of a large-scale civil war, Garibaldi's government had proved farbetter than that of Farini in Emilia during the revolution of 1859; andhe also asserted that, if there was unruliness and anarchy in the south,

1 5 October, Atti Parlamentari. 2 6 October, ibid.3 E.g. A. Bianchi-Giovini in L' Unione (Milan) of 24 July—adding: 'in his ministers

Cavour likes to find servants not colleagues, and in parliament he sees a meeting ofpupils rather than a deliberating assembly He is intolerant of every shadow ofopposition.... Under Cavour's despotism the constitution is derisory.'

328 Parliament Supports Cavour: Octoberthis was in part because the natural disorder of a revolution had beenaggravated by artificial agitation stimulated by Cavour's envoys inorder to force through a precipitate annexation. He then went on tocastigate the 'racial contempt' of the Piedmontese for other provinces:

Wherein consists the Piedmontese system? It consists in imposing onesingle state upon all the other states of Italy.... Unconditional surrender ofthe south would mean that Piedmont could abolish all the Neapolitan lawsand replace them with her own.... Whereas the legal system now prevailingin the Two Sicilies is very good... and better than any other at presentexisting in Italy.

Ferrari's speech was frequently interrupted, and he was called to orderby the chair for criticizing the Cavourian party in Sicily, though hespoke in terms far more mild and respectful than those being used byother deputies against the Garibaldians. People did not like to hear himpublicly assert that there was a cleavage between upper and lowerItaly,1 a cleavage which was geographical, climatic, social, economic,cultural, linguistic, political, and even racial; nor did they like it whenhe accused Cavour's government of making this division still worse.The task of solidifying a national consciousness was obviously going toprove so difficult that a conspiracy of silence was beginning even nowabout the 'southern question'. The need to create a sentiment ofcommon nationality was so urgent in people's minds that all talk ofprovincial differences and rivalries had to be kept to a minimum. Bytacit agreement of the liberal party, any ideas which could be thoughtof as tainted with federalism or republicanism were not to be discussed,not even in parliament.

This intolerant and peremptory attitude of the majority makes it themore interesting to see what other arguments were being put forwardby the opposition. Ferrari was an eccentric federalist. Guerrazzi wasill and did not speak. Rattazzi was probably too anxious for his reputa-tion and his sovereign's good opinion to give any lead, and Cavourskilfully kept his leading opponent quiet, with private offers of jobs andpublic expressions of esteem. But Sineo had less to gain or lose, and

1 8 October, Ferrari: 'the literary separation between north and south Italy is sodeep that we know the literature of St Petersburg far better than that of Naples, andthrough no fault of our own' (Atti Parlamentari).

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 329spoke up for Garibaldi in the parliamentary session of the 8th. Hepointed out that Garibaldi and his generals had had no time in thefighting of the previous month to answer the malicious stories aboutthem in the press. Sineo himself had found no republicanism at Napleswhen he visited it. If Mazzini was there it was because Naples was stilla free country like England—and 'unlike Piedmont' was the barbedimplication. Cavour had never in his life been in such peril as Garibaldihad known in Sicily; and yet Cavour had added to that peril, deliberatelyarousing opposition against the revolutionary government whileBourbon armies were still fighting in both Sicily and Naples. Parlia-ment had not protested in 1859 when during the revolutions of centralItaly Farini and Ricasoli had had to suspend freedom of the press; butunder Garibaldi the press had been free and altogether there was reallyless to protest about. The revolutionary government in Sicily hadexpelled La Farina and Cordova, but cases of arbitrary imprisonmentand expulsion had been taken for granted in central and northern Italy.Sineo pointedly stressed that, when Tuscany had joined Piedmont, noemphasis had been put on the word 'annexation', and there had beenno parliamentary censure of 'anarchy' and 'misgovernment'. Thereason for this discrimination, he said, could only be that in centralItaly the government had been conservative, while in southern Italy itwas radical. Another interesting point of comparison was that Fariniin Emilia had become dictator after a practically bloodless revolutionin which society had not disintegrated; but Garibaldi had had to rulea far larger and more insubordinate country after it had been torn bycivil war and social revolution. Far more pressing problems hadpresented themselves in Sicily than in Emilia, said Sineo, and they hadnot been bungled as people supposed, but had rather been attackedwith surprising success.

The discussion was taken up again on the 9th. Desiderato Chiaves,a conservative from Turin, reminded the more radical deputies thatPiedmont was the province which had borne the burden and heat ofthe day, and which had kept alight the flame of Italian nationalism whenthe rest of the peninsula was in bondage. Something was surely due toPiedmont for having made greater sacrifices than any other region ofItaly. After Chiaves, a speech by Bertani was heard in dead silence. Inview of what the press had been saying about him, people had not

330 Parliament Supports Cavour: Octoberexpected this firebrand to be so pacific; but Bertani was not the man tobrowbeat parliament, and his only significant contribution to thedebate was the suggestion that Cavour should go to Naples and shakeGaribaldi by the hand. Filippo Mellana, another member of the Left,defended Garibaldi's refusal to annex Sicily earlier. While Messina wasstill in Bourbon hands, and while a Bourbon ambassador was stillaccepted in Turin, surely the dictator could not have handed over therevolution to Cavour without bringing it to a standstill. Piedmont wasobliged to work by diplomatic methods, the same which had forced thesurrender of Nice to France as a payment for her help. Far from thediplomatic method being obviously better than the revolutionary, thevery contrary was arguable: even the other countries of Europe wouldrather Italy was made by revolution than that she should again bebeholden to France for her liberation. Mellana foretold that the impliedvote of censure in this motion before parliament would only result inGaribaldi retiring to Caprera, and the army of volunteers built up withsuch difficulty would then dissolve instead of being kept in being forthe next step against Venice. Any censure of Garibaldi would beresented in the south; especially as the whole issue had been quite un-necessarily raised in parliament. It was known that Cavour already hadadequate powers to act. By coming to request a specific and un-necessary parliamentary vote on this issue, when other and graver issuesof peace and war had gone without notice, he was gratuitously and itseemed deliberately antagonizing some of the boldest and most worthyspirits in the country. His action was an intentional rebuff to peoplewho had selflessly sacrificed themselves to win half Italy for themonarchy of Savoy.

These were the main criticisms made by opposition speakers; butwhen it came to a vote, most of them tried to preserve the illusion ofa national front. It was recognized that the government had haddifficult decisions to take, and that, once taken, people should rallytogether if possible, and not vitiate the new nation at birth by exag-gerating opposition beyond a certain point. After such a gruesome civilwar, the need was above all for concord. When La Farina begandescribing to the chamber how Sicily still lacked some of the basicsanctions of a civilized society, the Genoese Lorenzo Pareto expressedthe general horror that any Italian, let alone a Sicilian, should demon-

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 331strate such shameful things to any foreign observer. Italy should beunited and strong, said Pareto, and not waste time in talk. AntonioMosca of Milan agreed with him that Cavour must have his affirmativevote: the motion as presented was, in Mosca's view, infelicitouslyexpressed, impolitic, and unnecessary since Cavour knew that he hadthe requisite powers already; yet the ground had been so chosen thatevery liberal must vote in favour of it. Even Bertani had to agree withthis. It was evident, explained Marco Minghetti on behalf of thecabinet, that Europe might tolerate, but could hardly approve, whatwas happening in Italy; and it was therefore necessary to hurry up theprocess of annexation, so as to present the world with a fait accompli.This was an argument which would have had an appeal for all sides, andas the opposition saw that they themselves had now no chance ofprevailing, better far that Cavour should succeed than that a dividednation be exploited again by the rest of Europe.

Cavour concluded the debate with his trump card. Whether he hadbeen impressed by the sense of the meeting, or whether he realized hewould have to go one more step towards the revolution if he was tohold an adequate majority, on 11 October he explicitly said that Romewould one day have to become the capital of Italy. This evokedtremendous enthusiasm. In a sense it might have seemed a dangerousstatement, for it risked losing the support of sincere Catholics in orderto win that of the patriots from Ricasoli to Garibaldi. But the patriotswere by now almost irresistible; and Cavour had collected enoughevidence over the past eight years to show that many or most educatedCatholics put the nation first, so much so that they were ready to faceinterdict and anathema for their national faith. In any case, publicopinion in the north was hopeful that the Pope and the French wouldabandon Rome, and Cavour could hardly afford to stand out againstit.1 Even Mazzini must have been tempted to cheer at this belatedconversion of a new pupil. The Chamber, now aroused to greatexcitement, first gave a unanimous vote of gratitude to Garibaldi, andthen by 290 to 6 decided to accept the unconditional 'annexation' ofany provinces which asked for it. On 16 October Cavour spoke again,this time in the Senate, stressing to this rather different audience that his

1 30 September, II Diritto; 1 October, Panizzi to Cavour, that even Napoleonbelieved as much (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 40).

332 Parliament Supports Cavour: Octoberpolicy had been essentially conservative and not revolutionary; in factboasting that he had fought against the revolutionary principle anddefeated it. The end would justify the irregular means he had had touse, or so at least he said. This was the occasion when he made hiscomparison of Piedmont and Prussia, and foretold that by 'puttingherself at the head of the German movement, Prussia will continuegradually to develop her liberal institutions'. At this date it would havebeen heresy to suggest, as Cattaneo was suggesting, that nationalismmight not after all prove to be so liberal and liberating a force. Cattaneowas now a deputy for Milan, and went on being repeatedly elected, buthe never brought himself to attend in parliament to take his oath ofallegiance to the 'perversion of liberalism' which had won the day. Therest of parliament did not agree with him in this diagnosis. There wereeighty-four senators in favour and twelve against Cavour's motion. Onthe 19th, this short session of parliament, having done its job, was closed.

Cavour had been quite confident that he would find parliament anenthusiastic supporter, for he knew its composition, and he had provedits mettle in the debate over Nice in May. Experience had also shownthat his most powerful opponents were a danger only when they couldwork secretly upon the king while the Chamber was not in session. Hetherefore had already been preparing the detailed application of hisvictory over the radicals. In a sense his triumph had been too complete.He had done all he could to diminish the prestige of Garibaldi,1 and hadsucceeded so well that he had deluded himself into underestimating thedangers which a different parliamentary situation might have exposed.It did not occur to him that any of the opposition criticisms put forwardin the Chamber were anything else than 'foolish' or 'boring'.2 He wascertainly surprised and delighted at the extent of his success.3 Perhapsthis helped to blind him to the advantages of going himself to Naples,and seeing for himself whether the state of society and opinion there

1 20 September, II Diritto: t evidently the government has tipped off all its journalsto denigrate Garibaldi... to discredit him before public opinion. A government hasa thousand means of directing public opinion; it has money, newspapers, governors,intendants, mayors, armed forces, authority, the arm of justice, and inducements andthreats of every conceivable variety.'

2 10 October, Cavour to Victor Emanuel (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. 111, p. 75).3 13 October, Cavour to Farini (ibid. pp. 100-1).

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 333justified making concessions to Garibaldi. He had once thought oftravelling to the south along with the king, but had now given up theidea. Just before parliament met he helped to neutralize Rattazzi bydangling before him the offer of becoming a viceroy in Sicily orNaples.1 A week later he rejected this plan too. On one point alone hewas quite sure, that the king would have to go first and meet Garibaldi,for Victor Emanuel was the one man with whom the dictator wasproperly submissive. Cavour could not himself have endured the ordealof personal relations with the king on such a mission, and Rattazzi wastoo keen a monarchist and a courtier to be given so much independentauthority.

For the delicate task of advising the king and taking over the govern-ment from Garibaldi, Cavour finally chose Farini and Fanti for Naples,and Montezemolo, aided by La Farina and Cordova, for Sicily. It canhardly have been an accident that these five men were among thosewhom the Garibaldians most detested, the very men above all to whomthey would have felt most humiliated and aggrieved to hand over theircommand and the fruit of all their labours. The coincidence was tooextraordinary to have been unintentional. Not only were they Gari-baldi's personal enemies, but La Farina and Cordova had recently beenexpelled from Sicily for disturbing the peace, and their return might beexpected at once to revive all the passionate factiousness which had beenallayed by the prospect of regular and conservative government. Italywas most of all in need of conciliation at this moment, and the kingsuggested sending Valerio instead to Sicily as a man more in Garibaldi'sconfidence. Cavour replied by offering to resign.2 The threat ofresignation was repeated later on a similar point, and such a rare andremarkable fact suggests that he felt as strongly over this as upon anyact of his political life. The appointments were clearly deliberate, andanti-Jacobinism was the most important criterion of choice, not co-operativeness, nor administrative ability. They were certainly notcalculated to weld people into a common front on this critical birthdayof a new nation.

The opposition was bitterly offended at these nominations, and sowere many of the moderates. Admiral Persano protested to Cavour on

1 2 October, Cavour to Farini (ibid. p. 10).2 3 October, Cavour telegram to Farini {ibid. p. 19).

334 Parliament Supports Cavour: October6 October against sending Farini, since Garibaldi was known to dislikehim intensely: but Cavour replied that he was frightened lest othersshould try to influence the king's mind at Naples, and Farini alone couldbe relied on to remain unyielding.1 Pallavicino likewise wrote inprotest, seeing that the appointment was likely to arouse the sleepinglion in Garibaldi and make the essential task of carrying through theplebiscite still more difficult.2 Ricasoli was altogether contemptuous ofFarini's suitability for this administrative post,3 and the event was toprove his worst fears justified. But Cavour resented the accusation oftactlessness more perhaps than anything else. He was still being guidedby people who either knew nothing of southern affairs, or had alamentable parti pris. Public opinion in the north laboured under thesame handicap. Most of those who became correspondents in Naplesand Sicily for northern newspapers were of the same political party,nearly all of them being former exiles who were chosen for this taskbecause they were safe Cavourians. The public in Piedmont was there-fore influenced by people who were out of touch with the south, andout of sympathy with Garibaldi; and the result was that most northerners,Cavour himself included, were ill-informed about southern opinion.Even when a liberal Neapolitan like Mancini wrote against thisappointment of Farini, Cavour took no heed.4 He soon enoughacknowledged that it was going too far to send General Fanti to Naples,but he was not prepared to discuss his other nominations even with theking, and all five people, Fanti included, were shortly on their way tothe south.

On 3 October the king landed at Ancona with Farini, who was nowhis viceroy designate of Naples. There he joined his troops, and togetherthey began their march towards the Neapolitan frontier. A request wasfirst sent back to enquire of Cavour whether the chief aim was to savethe town of Naples, or to defeat the Bourbon army, or to suppressGaribaldi.5 It is interesting to note that it had not been thought

1 6 October, Persano, Diario 1860-1, part 111, pp. 98-9.2 10 October, Pallavicino, Le Memorie, vol. 111, p. 624; there is also an undated

protest by General Medici (Archivio Medici MRR).3 3 October, Ricasoli to Bianchi (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani).4 27 October, Cavour to Mancini (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 207).5 1 October, Fanti telegram to Cavour (ibid. pp. 3-4).

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 335desirable or possible to settle this important question before they leftTurin. Cavour's answer shows that even he could not yet be very clearabout it: they were told to march towards the frontier, hoping that thearmies of Garibaldi and Francesco would dissolve at the news of theircoming, but also ready to intervene in case a Bourbon counter-attackthreatened to recapture Naples.1 Farini made a half-hearted protestagainst Cavour's dispatches, and the fact that he was apparently 'toomuch preoccupied with Garibaldi, and too little with the king ofNaples'.2 But Napoleon's orders were that the Bourbon armies mustremain for the moment unchallenged. Cavour's only excuse for invadingthe Marches had been that he must bring Garibaldi to heel, and Francewould only have allowed Victor Emanuel to move if his proclaimedenemy was 'the revolution'. So Cavour told Farini on the 5th that heshould 'first restore order at Naples' and bundle Garibaldi off toCaprera. He should then form a new cabinet in Naples, and 'work upunanimous manifestations in favour of annexation'.3 Technically thePiedmontese troops had no right to cross into the southern kingdom,but this was an unimportant detail.4 Cavour now told the Bourbonminister at Turin that Francesco had abandoned his capital, and so hadin fact abdicated; and that the consequent anarchy in the south forcedKing Victor Emanuel to go and re-establish order.5 Fortunately LordJohn Russell, after hearing a fortnight before of Bertani's casual sugges-tion to make SafFi prodictator of Sicily, was counselling an immediateinvasion to restore conservative government in the south.6 WhenGaribaldi himself asked Cialdini to cross the frontier, there was nofurther reason for delay.

It is evident that Victor Emanuel and Farini (who was still ministerfor internal affairs) had set out before Cavour had been able to decide

1 1 October, two telegrams from Cavour to Fanti (ibid. pp. 1, 4).2 5 October, Farini to Cavour (ibid. p. 43).3 5 October, Cavour to Farini (ibid. pp. 38-9).4 8 October, La Perseveranza remarked on the presence of a Bourbon ambassador

still in Turin, but explained that 'if there is anything anomalous or bizarre inthe situation, it certainly is not on the part of our government, but rather on thatof the Bourbons, for they obstinately try and maintain regular diplomatic relationswith us*.

5 6 October, Cavour to Winspeare (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. v).6 1 October, Lacaita to Massari, quoting Russell (ibid. vol. ill, p. 5).

336 Parliament Supports Cavour: Octoberwhat precise attitude should be adopted towards Garibaldi, and as aresult they were soon issuing orders at cross-purposes from Ancona andTurin. When the prime minister had decided not to accompany theking he had presumably weighed this up, because he was quite awareof the possibility that 'camp politics' might even lead the country to'another Villafranca'.1 The analogies with 1859 were, indeed, far frompleasant. Sometimes it was only by the long-distance threat of resigna-tion that he managed to prevent the king making some small conces-sions to Garibaldianism.2 As new information arrived at Turin heinevitably had to change his mind on the detailed application of policy,and his efforts to control matters from afar therefore could not help butsometimes be confusing. On 3 October he was hoping that the kingwould proclaim himself a dictator; but on the 4th he was alreadyreproving Farini for signs of a separate 'politique au camp'. Beforemany weeks had gone by he had given up hope of being able torestrain the king any further, and was only anxious for the latter tocome home quickly so that he could do no more mischief.

The one principle of conduct which Cavour thought they hadagreed upon in advance was a refusal to compromise with the radicals.He repeatedly insisted upon an 'inexorable' attitude to all Garibaldi'scivilian followers. In this he was seconded by Farini, who had alreadymade up his mind even before crossing the frontier that 'in Sicily andNaples people are finding the rule of these vulgar proconsuls as odiousas that of the Bourbons '.3 It was an unhappy augury for the futuregovernment of southern Italy that this doctrinaire conviction wasalready so unquestioned, for there was much good as well as bad inGaribaldi's rule, and the subsequent application of this warped standardof political values to the south was going to have bad results. Farini,moreover, went on mistakenly assuming that Garibaldi would haveliked to resist the northern army if only he had the means.4 This, too,helped to put their relations on a wrong footing from the very start.

1 4 October, Cavour telegram to Farini (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 31).2 A. J. Whyte repeats the legend that it was the other way about, Cavour being

moderate and generous and the king intransigent [The political life and letters ofCavour1848-61, p. 436).

3 6 October, Farini to Borromeo (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 53).4 6 October, Farini to Cavour (ibid. p. 49).

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 337Worse still, the refusal to compromise was based on an inner contradic-tion which was not properly understood. Cavour thus wrote to theking on the 2nd that 'we must employ the greatest regard towardsGaribaldi, but without accepting the least compromise with the systemhe represents'. Again on the 4th he told Farini that, 'without cedingan iota to Garibaldi, we must not irritate him, or else public opinionwould abandon us'. Farini was instructed to be 'inexorable' and yetnot show himself ungrateful; for if the national hero were treated badly,then the present 'ferociously anti-Garibaldian' sentiments of the publicwould swing back violently to become a 'tremendous reaction' againstthe government. The distinction implicit in all this advice was not agood one, whether judged by morals or politics. It may be assumedthat even Cavour himself, had he gone to the south, would have beenunable to resolve such an inner incompatibility; and he may even haverealized as much when he made up his mind to stay at home. Therewere some arguments against being generous, but also others againstbeing ruthless; and the eventual attempt by default to be both generousand ruthless at once would have needed, to say the least, great finesse inexecution. As things turned out, the subordinates he chose for this taskwere not fitted either by temperament or ability to work out on theirown what he omitted to tell them.

During the first fortnight of October, while parliament was stilldebating what to do, the Piedmontese troops moved down to thefrontier and entered the Abruzzi. Villamarina sent them from Naplesa rough map of the countryside, enclosing with it for Farini's benefita paean of praise about Garibaldi's good faith and rectitude and hisprowess comparable with that of Homer's heroes.1 Now that the lionwas tamed, his good qualities apparently were becoming moreappreciable, and were sometimes more appreciated. Garibaldi himselfbelied Farini's suspicious hostility by writing to congratulate the kingon the success of the royal army against the Papalists. The dictatorpromised to come half-way to meet them, in order to present hishomage and receive his orders for the rest of the campaign.2 He stilldid not quite understand that Farini's first objective was Naples and not

1 8 October, Villamarina to Farini (CF).2 4 October, Garibaldi to Victor Emanuel (Epistolario di Giuseppe Garibaldi, ed.

E. E. Ximenes, vol. I, 1885, p. 135).

338 Parliament Supports Cavour: Octoberthe Bourbon stronghold of Gaeta. The king then replied with con-gratulations to Garibaldi on the battle of the Volturno.1

Farini was not up to the level of this mutual admiration. He had thetask of writing a proclamation which the king issued on 9 October fromAncona, addressed to his future subjects in southern Italy. One mustremember that this was a fortnight before the plebiscite, and a fullmonth before Garibaldi finally handed over power in the south. Thisproclamation was not in all respects very happily phrased. WhenCavour read it he was not pleased to see the French soldiers of the Popedismissed as 'a set of cosmopolitan ruffians'. Nor was it politic to claimfor the king a right to speak in the name of the people of Italy against'a faction that was ready to sacrifice the national triumph to dreams offanatical ambition'. This, presumably, was a reference to Garibaldi andhis radical friends. The king undertook in his proclamation that he'would never allow Italy to become the roost of cosmopolitan sects'.' People of southern Italy! my troops are advancing among you torestore order. I am not coming to impose my will on you, but to seethat your will is respected. I know that in Italy I am closing the era ofrevolutions.'2 The implication of this was that Garibaldi governedagainst the wishes of the people, and that his government was needlesslyinefficient and disorderly. It also announced publicly that the king wascoming, not to accept the revolution with gratitude, but rather toterminate it as something disreputable. To judge from this proclama-tion, all seemed to be over except the voting. Cavour even began torefer in official decrees to 'those provinces not yet annexed'. Alreadythe prime minister was looking forward to when Farini would beproperly installed as 'dictator' of Naples.3 If necessary he and Fantiwere ready to use force; and if Garibaldi did not publish the plebisciteon his own, then they were going to use their troops to organize a votein his despite.4 Cavour said, and perhaps was not talking only for therecord, that he would rather resign than appear to be ungrateful to

1 9 October, Victor Emanuel to Garibaldi (Curatulo, Garibaldi, Vittorio Emanuele,*Cavour, p. 354).

2 16 October, II Giornale Officiate di Napoli.3 10 October, Cavour to Farini (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 76); 16 October,

Cavour to Farini (ibid. p. 122).4 12 October, Farini to Cavour (ibid. pp. 92-4).

Parliament Supports Cavour: October 339Garibaldi;1 but this policy was bound to carry with it the appearanceas well as the reality of ingratitude. In any case, his appointed deputynow was out of immediate range and beyond restraint. Farini wasdetermined 'to clear away all traces of Garibaldianism'. As he wroteto Cavour on the 13th, 'it is said that they intend to proclaim a con-stituent assembly. Just let them try it! I shall then carry out another"second of December" on 26 October/2

Garibaldi at Caserta did not know that his chosen successor wasnurturing such unfriendly sentiments. But he soon read the menacingphrase about 'closing the era of revolutions', and the other aKoutdriving out the 'sects' which were said to be sacrificing the nation totheir own ambitions. This could only mean that Venice and Rome werebeing repudiated, and that the sectarian Garibaldi was to be treated asa nuisance and an enemy rather than as a friend and deliverer. ThePiedmontese had certainly chosen their tactics clumsily. They wereallowing it to be believed that they opposed nationalism as well asradicalism. There was a glaring contrast between Russell's justificationof Piedmontese action—namely that Italians should decide their ownfate by themselves—and Farini's argument that the king was advancingmerely because of the urgent need to restore order. The latter excusehad been used to justify the Austrian invasion of 1859, and might aseasily be used to support a Bourbon counter-revolution in 1861 ifVictor Emanuel failed in his set task. For this reason the royal proclama-tion was sharply attacked in the opposition press, both for its angry andprovocative language against Garibaldi, and for its gratuitous resuscita-tion of the republican spectre, and in general for the way it 'awakenedungrateful memories, offended legitimate pride, and embittered peopleby sowing hatred and rancour'. Garibaldi had sent a letter of submis-sion, and this was the public reply to him.3 Reports of this proclamationreached the dictator not long after the news that Cavour had unjustifiablyproposed to parliament the 'annexation' of the south. Confronted bysuch evidence of personal mistrust and political enmity, Garibaldi'sconciliatory mood left him as suddenly as it had come; and the politicalsituation at Caserta and Naples once more became tense and dangerous.

1 8 October, Cavour to Farini [ibid. pp. 63-4).2 13 October, Farini to Cavour (ibid. p. 103).3 14 October, // Diritto (Turin).

340

CHAPTER XXIII

MORDINI CHANGES HIS MIND:9-13 OCTOBER

Cavour's first speech to parliament, moderate in phraseology but un-compromising in tone, was known in Sicily on 9 October, a week late,and*was published in the newspapers of Palermo on the 10th. This wasthe first time Cavour had pronounced so outspokenly on the affairs ofsouthern Italy, and the fact that he was speaking ex officio made hischallenge to the revolution even more startling. It remained to seewhat effect this would have on Mordini, and whether the prodictatorialgovernment would surrender quietly and without making furthertrouble.

Several communications sent to Sicily from the north give us someidea of early reactions against what Cavour had said. The Genoesecorrespondent of the Palermo L'Assembled thus wrote a letter from thepoint of view of an autonomist, full of astonishment at Cavour's volteface, and giving his explanation of the reasons for it. The prime ministerhad formerly assured him many times, and in the presence of CountAmari, that Sicily had a just title to self-government. They had pointedout to Cavour how, even in the worst days of Neapolitan domination,Sicily had never been deprived of her supreme court, or of her distinctfinancial system with its separate treasury and national debt. But if shewere now to be merged in with the rest of Italy, these old privilegeswould be threatened. Under a centralized system she would be less freethan before; and there would be the added disadvantage that, insteadof the capital city being twelve to fourteen hours distant at Naples, itwould lie half-way across Europe in remote Turin. These argumentshad been put to Cavour, and apparently he had once been convincedby them. If he had now changed his mind, this particular correspondentput it down to his wish for northern Italy to share in the profits fromthe immense patrimony of mortmain property in the island; becauseSicily was mistakenly thought in the north to be a wealthy country,which could and should contribute a large quota to the expenses of

Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 October 341union. Another point in Cavour's change of mind might have beenthat the deputation of Sicilian nobility had just arrived in Turin, forthis would have shown that he was on stronger ground than he had atfirst imagined; indeed that he could make almost whatever demands heliked, in the confidence that Sicilians would pay any price to emergefrom revolutionary government and war conditions. This same com-munication from Genoa then pointed out to readers at Palermo thatCavour had discreetly left open a line of retreat, in case the Sicilian votedid insist on imposing conditions. Cavour in parliament had only said*it is our opinion that no conditions should be allowed', not that this hadactually been decided. What was more, the correspondent added,6 Victor Emanuel had always declared that for his part he would accepta conditional vote by Sicily'. Much anxiety was felt in Genoa lestCavour had wounded the amour propre of Sicilians, and so reduced thechances of forming a national union. Sicily was advised to retrieve theposition by voting for conditional annexation as if nothing had happened,confidently assuming that Cavour would accept the accomplished factif his bluff were called.1

For a second reaction to Cavour's speech, we have a letter written toMordini by the editor of // Diritto, Annibale Marazio, expressing theviews of the parliamentary opposition at Turin before they heard ofMordini's proposal to hold an assembly. The first fact to face, he wrote,was that Cavour had won this particular round. Parliament at Turinwould be solidly behind the government against the extra-parliamentaryleft-wing agitation of a military dictator, and if necessary would sendVictor Emanuel into the field against the volunteer army in the south.The opposition deputies had therefore agreed that they should give uptheir earlier plan to postpone annexation until the fall of Rome andVenice. The only hope of retrieving their position was to surrendergracefully, pour mieux sauter later on. Mordini was told that:you must first persuade public opinion through the press that Cavour'sproposal to parliament is an outrage, insulting alike to Garibaldi, and to thehistoric traditions of Sicily, and her right to express her opinions freely ina vote. You must prepare a legal agitation against the proposal and its author.

The bearer of this letter, Sig. Guarneri, thinks it might be best to call anassembly on a restricted suffrage. I support this plan provided you can carry

1 11 October, L* Assembled, report from Genoa of 5 October.

342 Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 Octoberit out in a few days, and provided you can determine clearly in advance theterms of reference for the assembly in such a way as absolutely to excludethe possibility of separatism. In this way Sicily would keep its local autonomy,and be guaranteed against any supersession of its laws or any mania for fusion.. . . But I do not think it would ever do for Sicily to be given a viceroy,a separate ministry or a distinct parliament.

If this assembly can meet before the arrival of the royal troops, its veryexistence will be a protest against the policy of Cavour.... For if Cavourwere to dissolve it, he would incur strong opposition.

But, came the conclusion, assembly or no, the essential task remains thesame, first to inform public opinion of the implications of Cavour'slatest step, and then for the revolutionary government to abdicate at asign from Garibaldi, without any open opposition or recrimination.This would give the parliamentary Left the most favourable groundon which to prepare a subsequent attack against the government atTurin.1

These counsels would probably have been known in Sicily by10 October, the day on which Mordini printed the text of Cavour'sspeech in the Giornale Officiate. Notwithstanding everything Cavoursaid in that speech, the prodictator was determined to try and hold onto his assembly, and in the same issue of the ioth he printed anotherdenial of the persistent rumours that Garibaldi was not agreeable to hisdoing so. For several days more, indeed, it seemed likely that thePalermo government might be able to continue undisturbed in itsproject. On the n t h Mordini told Garibaldi that perfect tranquillitycontinued;2 and even at Messina, a town which was always in the vanof any opposition to Mordini, the first news of Cavour's speech seemedto provoke talk only, not active opposition.3 In all appearance, that isto say, the first public evidence of a clear-cut defiance of Garibaldi byCavour was not in itself enough to deflect Sicilians from their allegianceto the dictator's government. True enough, people were much worriedby this evident cleavage inside the nationalist party, and began toquestion Mordini's policy more often. But governors continued to

1 4 October, Marazio to Mordini (AMB, b. 30).2 11 October, Mordini telegram to Garibaldi (Carte Sirtori, Ambrosiana Library,

Milan).3 11 October, governor of Messina to Mordini (AMB, b. 28).

Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 October 343report that their provinces would scrupulously follow whateverGaribaldi's wishes were known to be.1

At Palermo there was immense activity in preparation for theelection of deputies. Rival programmes were being canvassed anddiscussed.* As late as the 14th the autonomist VAssembled spoke of afrenzy of electioneering, with a hundred rival lists of candidates, rangingfrom Bourbonist, absolutist and liberal-separatist, down to the otherextreme of those who wanted the most complete assimilation intoPiedmont. The partisans of immediate annexation were themselvesdivided deeply by considerations of method and timing. There werethose of the French centralist faith, who declared that prosperitydepended on strong, centralized government. Or there were those whohoped and believed that Cavour was working on a plan for regionaldevolution and local self-government, from which Sicily in particularstood to benefit. Others were for delay in annexation: some becauseGaribaldi appeared to desire it; some because they hoped thereby toobtain an altogether new constitution for Italy; others because theyresented the prospect of Piedmontese absorption, and because a delaywould leave them more time and opportunity to secure satisfactorysafeguards. Among people who wanted to impose conditions therewas also appearing yet another division, between those who required'administrative' devolution only, and those who demanded a full'governmental' devolution.3 Some Sicilians were against any idea ofannexation at all. This category included the separatists; but it alsoincluded their extreme opposite, those who were uncompromisingUnitarians before everything, whether monarchist or republican, andwho feared that an incomplete union might weaken the desire andpursuit of the whole.

If the reception of Cavour's speech did not at once put an end to thiscanvassing between rival factions, it did nevertheless suffice to give the

1 10 October, governor of Modica telegram to Mordini, showing that he had onlyjust heard on the 9th of Mordini's decree of the 5th (AMB); 13 October, governorof Syracuse to Mordini, using the term * constituent assembly' (MRR, cartella 221).

2 12 October and 13 October, La Forbice (Palermo); 15 October (Goodwin'sPolitical Journal, F.O. 165/134).

3 14 October, L! Assembled (Palermo); in its issue of the 12th it said that the'inexorable annexationists' were all standing together in one single electoral com-mittee, while the other groups were split and weak.

344 Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 Octoberopposition to Mordini what for five days it had lacked, a policy.Published by Mordini on the 10th, the press of that date took sides overit. // Regno A" Italia, which a few days earlier had accepted the assembly,if with reluctance, now recognized it as a new waste of time, as anattempt to set up a constituent on the 1848 model with a Mazzinianstamp, and hence as a danger to Italy and to France and to all Europe.1

VAnnessione thought it could discover in Cavour's speech a clue toexplain Mordini's concession of a vote on the 5th: never had theMazzinians been so clever in their deceit. Very pertinently it pointedout that, although Mordini's government had sworn an oath to theking and issued all its acts 'in the name of Victor Emanuel', now it hadbeen placed in opposition to the policy of that king's legally constitutedgovernment.2 This would make Mordini not only a political opponent,but a rebel who could be forcibly corrected. A third annexationistpaper, // Plebiscite, led off in its first number with an eloquent andpersuasive appeal to Sicilians:

For us in Sicily, annexation means order and justice... .It will destroy anypossibility of the Bourbons returning.... We shall annex ourselves inde-pendently of Naples, and we shall lose none of our rights in doing so, becausewe shall be joining not Piedmont but Italy... .Perhaps we shall even be ableto change the institutions of Piedmont, because these institutions will notbe so suitable in a new state which includes the whole of Italy....

To insist on conditions would now imply that we did not want Italianunity: it would signify a wish to separate off from the kingdom of VictorEmanuel, either to fall again under Francesco, or to turn republican, or elseto remain in our present transitory state of uncertainty....

We of the annexed provinces will together make up eighteen millions,while the province of Piedmont numbers but four; and so with five times thenumber of deputies we shall lay down the law, not have it imposed on us....

Now that our gracious king is threatened by the Pope, by Austria, andby the Bourbons in Gaeta and Messina, will you add to his difficulties ? No,in God's name.3

Of the other Palermo newspapers, La Forbice as usual took a middleview, this time if anything rather inclined to that of Cavour. It agreed

1 10 October, // Regno <T Italia.2 10 October and 12 October, L' Annessione.3 12 October, II Plebiscito.

Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 October 345that no conditions should now be attached to union, for Sicily could notclaim to be ruled differently from other provinces, and neither couldPiedmont accept conditions on behalf of a future parliament of allItaly. Moreover, if Cavour should take it into his head to refuseacceptance, a vote for conditional annexation would create a highlyindecorous and inconvenient situation. The paper also agreed on givingpride of place to a plebiscite over an assembly, since the former methodwas that favoured by the French Emperor whose good will had to becultivated. Nevertheless, it added, now that the decree of 5 Octoberhad stipulated for an assembly, to change this plan just because ofCavour's speech would cover Sicily with ridicule. Even though theymight not want to alarm Europe by calling a constituent assembly, itwould yet be necessary to alter the Piedmontese constitution, and thisrepresentative meeting of Sicilian notables would thus have a usefuladvisory task to perform. One more point made by La Forbice was todeplore Cavour's failure to state that he meant to declare the existenceof a new kingdom of Italy.1

Crispi's former journal, // Precursore, took much the same line,representative in this case of those stricter radicals who looked askanceon Mordini's attempt to compromise with autonomism. This paperclaimed to speak for the great majority of Sicilians in wanting annexa-tion without any conditions.

Hence there is no need to fear that we shall attach conditions to annexation.The only thing Cavour has to fear is that the assembly will vote annexation,not to Piedmont, but to a kingdom of Italy under the constitutional sceptreof Victor Emanuel.... Cavour is devoured by the ambition to piedmontiseItaly, and for this reason imposes on us annexation to Piedmont, thus pre-venting the formation of the great nation promised us by the king Aboveall we put our faith in the king.2

Let us be under no illusion: if they force southern Italy simply to joinitself to Piedmont, it will not be long before we see the south making everyeffort to regain its autonomy, with immense loss to the national cause.3

In this prophetic utterance is to be found the logic which led manystrict Unitarians to oppose Cavour's demand for annexation.

1 10 October, La Forbice. 2 12 October, II Precursore.3 io October, ibid.

346 Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 OctoberAnother paper, La Valle di Giosaffat, commenting afterwards on the

disappointment with which Cavour's public statement had beenreceived, wondered very pertinently how he could both reject thestipulation of any conditions by Sicily, at the same time as he himselflaid down very narrow conditions indeed on which alone he wouldagree to union. It added that this very Cavour, who now wantedprecipitate annexation, was the same who earlier this year refused tostir a finger when Sicilians had pleaded with him for help, the same whohad given as his grounds for inaction that 'a Sicilian revolution wouldbe a premature movement, so Piedmont could not help you'.1 This wasan accurate statement of Cavour's views a few months earlier, but it wasperhaps a more spiteful than helpful reminder in the present circum-stances. Several days later the same paper wrote another article ofprotest with a more substantial criticism:

Naples and Sicily both wanted annexation, yet we never gave the Turinparliament any right to impose on us the form and the substance of our termsof annexation. It is a strange case, and perhaps unparalleled in history, whenthe representatives of eleven million Italians usurp the right to vote an antici-patory law imposing conditions on more than eleven million other Italianswho as yet have no legal representation in their parliament.2

V Assembled, the journal associated with Francesco Ferrara theautonomist, pointed out a further contradiction in Cavour's scheme: forhow could he both repudiate any conditions and also promise to respectthe vote religiously whatever it should be ? Despite all Cavour's hintsabout local autonomy, wrote Ferrara, here he had at last thrown off hismask to reveal a plot of protracted deception. The result could only beto give votes to the party in favour of a separate island state, and wouldmerely confuse those annexationists who had been promising Sicilylocal self-government in the name of Cavour himself. Compared withthe enlightened deliberations of an assembly, a vote by direct suffrageunder the present conditions prevailing in Sicily would in any case beutterly capricious and unrevealing.3 And how could Cavour honestlythink that Sicily was imposing her will on other provinces if she merelydecided not to depend on Naples for judicial appeals, or if she desiredsome financial independence for purely local affairs?4

1 27 October, La Valle di Giosaffat. 2 i November, ibid.3 10 October, L' Assemblea. 4 I 2 October, ibid.

Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 October 347It was a significant commentary on public opinion in Sicily that,

when it was finally decided in favour of the plebiscite, this was due notto Cavour's statement but to a message seeming to come from Gari-baldi. While the issue was still in doubt, the town of Reggio receivedPallavicino's decree dated the 8th which purported to give the approvalof Garibaldi for a plebiscite at Naples. The arrival of this news wasshortly going to clinch matters in favour of the plebiscite both in Sicilyand on the continent. Reggio Calabria was a town lying on the straits,almost opposite to Messina, and all telegrams between Naples andPalermo stopped there. This breach in the telegraph line had helped tocause the irregularities and inaccuracies in transmission, and so hadcontributed to keep the two capitals out of step. It also had meant thatnews from Naples sometimes reached Sicily as a secondhand report bythe governor of Reggio, a fact which gave that functionary someimportance. This governor was one Antonio Plutino, a patriot andowner of large estates in Calabria, who had contributed largely to theexpenses of Garibaldi's expedition and had valiantly led his contadiniduring the revolution. Politically he was a liberal-conservative, and hewas one of the few people in the south to be directly in correspondencewith Cavour. As both governor and latifondista, the lack of governancein his province made him doubly eager for a plebiscite and the speedyarrival of northern troops.

On the evening of 11 October, many printed copies of the Neapolitanplebiscite decree arrived in Messina 'by private hand' from Reggio.This was the information which induced people to suspect that Garibaldiwas after all in agreement with Cavour for a plebiscite.1 Plutino waslater accused of flooding Messina with copies of the decree on purposeto embarrass the government.2 If he really did so, it would have beenquite understandable on his part. But however it came about, theobvious conclusion drawn in Messina was that Mordini must have beendeceiving people as to Garibaldi's real wishes, and covertly working forquite a separate radical-autonomist policy of his own. This suspicionconnected up with the other notion that the prodictator was too mucha representative of the rival city of Palermo, that he was the mouth-piece of those bureaucrats in the capital who wanted in their own

1 13 October, governor of Messina to Mordini (MRR, no. 221/31/8).5 13 October, Mordini in code to Crispi (ACP, £ 138).

348 Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 Octoberinterest to postpone the surrender of power. No less disliked wouldhave been the possibility that, with Pallavicino's simple plebiscite,Naples might steal a march on Sicily and annex herself at once, whileSicilians lost their just priority and had to endure the longueurs anddissensions of an assembly.

The news from Reggio was known to the people of Messina about9 p.m. on the n th . Early the next morning a large crowd came to thecentral piazza and sent a deputation to the provincial governor. Hereplied that he knew nothing about the decree, but to pacify them saidhe would make enquiries.1 Francesco Ugdulena, the governor ofMessina, was a friend of Crispi, but not one of the extremists. In hisprivate opinion he claimed to be dismayed at the idea of a plebiscite,2but in his public practice he proved to be one of those trimmers whosecommon sense made them yield to superior force rather than standunshakable on a preconceived doctrine. Both sides were to revile himfor his part in this business: some of the radicals blamed him for thecollapse of their hopes for an assembly,3 and a few weeks later Cavourrewarded his help by dismissing him from office.4 In reality he was oneof those radicals who allowed the exercise of power to modify theiridealism, and who put unconditional unification of the various regionsof Italy above any mere tactical alliance with local autonomism.

Ugdulena found the decree from Reggio quite unexpected; and hebecame really alarmed when, 'the news once public, almost the wholepopulation of Messina made a peaceful but imposing demonstration,including the military garrison and the national guard'.5 A slightlydifferent version came from a person who said that the great majority,even of those who wanted a plebiscite, still disapproved of the demon-stration. 'It was organized and led by a handful of quite ridiculouspeople, of the kind who are always ready to shout in the marketplace, but who are the first to hide when things threaten to become

1 12 October, Sardinian consul at Messina to Villamarina (AME).2 25 October, Ugdulena to Crispi (ACP, f. 138).3 25 October, Asproni from Palermo to Crispi: 'that wretch Ugdulena had no

little influence in wrecking our plan for an assembly (ACP, f. 138); 13 October,Ugdulena telegram to Garibaldi, advocating a plebiscite as ' more conformable to thepublic law of Europe' (Carte Sirtori, Ambrosiana, Milan).

4 8 December, II Precursore. $ 13 October, Ugdulena to Mordini (MRR).

Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 October 349violent.'x Nevertheless, there were armed men in the demonstration,soldiers on edge because of the powerful Bourbon garrison still in thecitadel and because of their arrears of pay, national guardsmen because oftheir political alignment and middle-class representation; and this waswhat persuaded Ugdulena to warn Mordini that in his view an assemblywas now out of the question. Moreover,' on 12 October the civic councilof Messina held an extraordinary session to consider the news that theplebiscite had been proclaimed on the continent, and Signor Cacopardo,the chairman of the council, sent circulars round the island to protestagainst the prodictator's forcible imposition upon us of an assembly'.2

As before at Palermo, the civic authorities were claiming to pronounceon national politics, on the grounds that no other representative bodyexisted to champion sectional interests against the radical democrats inpower.

While Messina was being thus thrown into confusion, Mordini atPalermo had been proceeding on the assumption that his assembly wasgenerally acceptable. On 12 October a wild exchange of telegramsmarked the development of this new crisis. At 6 a.m. Ugdulenatelegraphed to Mordini the bare news of the decree brought over fromReggio the previous evening, and warned him that a strong partywould exploit it as corroboration for their own desire to have a plebis-cite.3 This notice was probably sent before the demonstration occurred.Mordini replied as soon as he received a second telegram with news ofthis popular outburst. He told Ugdulena that

you should reject anything from Reggio which concerns the mainland pro-vinces and not ours, and whose introduction into Sicily may foment partystrife here. I am sorry that you did not tell me at once this morning of thedemonstration. I should have given you more explicit instructions if youdid not think yourself competent to act energetically on your own. You mustnot allow people to discuss governmental action, for in calling an assemblywe acted with the dictator's approval and had his subsequent confirmationand praise. Yesterday I received a telegram from Crispi, and today anotherfrom the minister of war at Naples, but neither contained a word about thisplebiscite decree, precisely because it does not concern Sicily.

1 13 October, V. Cianciolo from Messina to Mordini (AMB, b. 31).2 Gli ultimi conati del Borbonismo e Mazzinismo, Italia, i860, pp. 64-5.3 12 October, Ugdulena to Mordini (MRR).

3 50 Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 OctoberHe added, what was later confirmed to be true, that in all probabilitythe decree was signed not by Garibaldi, but simply by the Neapolitanprodictator Pallavicino; and he charged Ugdulena to calm people andkeep Palermo informed while the dictator was consulted once moreabout this latest turn of events.1

During the course of the 12th at least three other telegrams were sentto Ugdulena by Mordini, though it is impossible to know the time oreven with certainty the sequence of their despatch.2 One just asked forthe full text of the Reggio decree. A second insisted that 'the convoca-tion of the electoral colleges had Garibaldi's full approbation. The datefixed for the assembly was his own suggestion. The different conditionsof Sicily and Naples made it advisable to have different methods ofvoting in each. It is essential that people respect the decisions we havetaken. No party must be allowed to impose its will on the dictator andhis representatives. You must see that no disorderly manifestation takesplace.' It can be seen from this response that Mordini's composure andself-confidence had been seriously shaken, so that he had to fashion anot very convincing excuse for Garibaldi's apparent sanction of onething in Naples and another in Sicily. In a third telegram he showedhimself obviously aware that, despite his own excuses, all was not well,and he was beginning to have serious doubts whether Garibaldi mightnot have changed his mind. 'Remember that the telegraph line mustbe completely closed except for government service. Tell me at once ifever you hear of this Naples decree from any other source. And let meknow if you are sure of its authenticity, and whether it has any particularreference to Sicily.'

In reply to these various communications from Palermo, Ugdulenasent a succession of despatches later in the day. One at noon told ofthe demonstration of the Messinese, and of how he had calmed itby saying that he would send off to Reggio for more information aboutthe news from Naples: 'had it not been for this wretched decree,the people, if somewhat reluctantly, would have obeyed the wishesof the government'. Towards nightfall he sent three more telegramsto Palermo. The first of these was obviously in reply to Mordini'squestion: 'the decree has no mention of Sicily, but its authenticity has

1 12 October, Mordini to Ugdulena (AMB).2 12 October, Ugdulena telegrams to Mordini (MRR, cartella 221).

Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 October 351been guaranteed to me by the governor of Reggio.' The second ranas follows:

8 p.m. At this very moment has arrived a ship from the governor ofReggio with a bundle of copies for me of the Naples plebiscite decree. Sincethis morning, no further manifestation has occurred in the streets.... Peoplethink that a plebiscite would be more conformable to international law. Theyfear that any other method will put Sicily below Naples, and make Siciliansseem less reasonable and their vote less acceptable. During the period inwhich the assembly dragged out its debates, Sicily would remain isolatedand separate, what time Naples became part of Italy. You will have to explainall this to the country, and we shall have trouble unless you change yourmanner of voting.The note went on to say that the people of Messina had observed thatthe plebiscite decree emanated from Naples, where Garibaldi wasthought to be, while the assembly decree came only from Palermo.Hence arose the suspicion that Mordini was working against Garibaldi,a suspicion reinforced by the popular belief that the dictator was in closetouch with Victor Emanuel whose government in Turin had now comeout publicly for annexation by plebiscite. Hence also the cry of thedemonstration in Messina that morning, 'down with the deputies whoare betraying us'. Five minutes afterwards Ugdulena sent his thirddispatch: 'a telegram has arrived from the governor at Reggio withfurther assurance that the decree is genuine. Messina is deluged with aninfinite number of copies, and this will make the summoning of anassembly most difficult, for it will now be thwarted in all manner ofways/

In actual fact, despite all appearances, on this 12 October Garibaldihad still not decided conclusively in favour of Pallavicino's plebiscite;but this was of little importance against the other fact, that Pallavicinoand Plutino had secured the arrival of'an infinite number' of leaflets inMessina which gave the contrary impression. Too late did Mordinicommandeer the telegraph system for government service only, becausesoon after midday the Piedmontese vice-consul at Catania had alreadysent the news to his colleague the consul at Palermo,1 and this was a suremeans of dispersing it throughout the island. Mordini simultaneouslyfelt himself threatened from the other side, for he had just heard of the

1 12 October (AMB).

3 S2 Mordini Changes His Mind: g-13 Octoberresignation of another radical governor who maintained that the sum-moning of a Sicilian assembly ran right against Garibaldi's plan to holda constituent assembly at Rome. The prodictator's decree of the 5 th wascaught between fire from two directions at once, from radicals on oneside and Cavourians on the other. He could not help but be impressedby the growing sense of alarm. Cavour's friend, General Carini, waseven writing to warn him of nothing less than civil war, and to pointout that certain of the clergy were already preaching that all annexa-tionists were traitors to Sicily.1

Mordini continued to hold some hope that he could calm things down,and either reconcile or contradict the strange news from Reggio. Atsome moment in the day he sent offa message to all provinces explainingthat, as there had so far been no confirmation of the Reggio decree, theyshould therefore ' go on with the work of preparing calmly for theelections'.2 To Naples he sent further telegrams asking why no one everbothered to keep Palermo instructed officially about developments onthe mainland, and in particular why his messengers Calvino and Parisiwere still unaccountably detained. Crispi was asked, 'tell me whetherthis decree is genuine, and why no one informed me—it is beyondbelief. To Garibaldi he sent a note in code with a desperate suggestionof how to retrieve the situation: 'it is absolutely necessary for you tocome in person and open the assembly on 4 November. I expect acategorical answer at once to say you will come.'3 This latter requestwas despatched at 10.30 a.m., and this shows that, even before hearingin detail from Ugdulena at Messina, Mordini recognized that only anexplicit and public declaration by Garibaldi could now save the day.It is also important that the message was received in Naples the sameevening, so that (as will be seen in the next chapter) this sign of weakeningin Palermo would have been known to Garibaldi in time to influencehim in favour of yielding finally to the plebiscitarians.

On 13 October the news received from Reggio was in all the papersof Palermo. The Giornale Officiate just remarked that the decree borethe signature only of Pallavicino not of Garibaldi, and mentioned thatthe Palermo government had once more asked the dictator for his

1 13 October, Carini to Mordini (AMB, b. 30).2 12 October, Mordini to governors (MRR).3 12 October (ACP, f. 135).

Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 October 353instructions. The party of Cavour was greatly excited, and took steps topublicize the decree in meetings.1 Deputations were sent to Mordini,but he refused to see them. What irked him most was not so much thefact of what had happened, but the manner of its happening: once againthe lack of consideration for Sicilian affairs by the radicals at Naples wasresulting in the prestige and authority of his government beingchallenged. Early in the day he worked off some of his dissatisfactionupon Ugdulena:instead of sending me the text of this decree, you just asked me what youshould do about it. I replied with a request for you to send me at least thatpart of it which would tell us if it was in the form usually adopted by Palla-vicino. I still have had no reply. Be careful not to hold out promises orhopes to the people Again last night I received despatches from Napleswithout a word of this decree. Meanwhile the government is ready to followeither course, but cannot exceed its powers and change on its own initiativea line of conduct so much approved by the dictator.2

It is just conceivable that Mordini was here being disingenuous, butit is not likely. Garibaldi's silence was inexplicable unless there wassome special reason why he wished Sicily to have an assembly. Perhaps,like Bertani and the extreme radicals, the dictator wanted to hold on toSicily as a basis for action in the future, and so to delay annexation there,while yielding on the mainland. There was still no absolute certaintythat the Neapolitan plebiscite decree of the 8 th was genuine. But what-ever the explanation of the apparent discrepancy, Mordini must surelyhave expected that his assembly plan was consonant with Garibaldi'swishes, since a week had gone by without his receiving any instructionsbut those approving his action. What was more, having had to act oncealready without specific instructions on the 5 th, he would be moreanxious than ever not to force the dictator's hand again by unilateralaction and without particular authorization. For the moment, there-fore, everything was suspended until Garibaldi chose to clear up thecontradiction by a personal message.

Messina meanwhile continued to force the pace. Ugdulena replied:'this evening the civic council met, and instead of preparing for the

1 16 October, P. Morello from Palermo to Ricasoli {Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobiliand Camerani).

2 13 October, Mordini to Ugdulena (AMB).23

3 54 Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 Octoberelection of deputies, voted an address to yourself and to the dictator infavour of a plebiscite. Since the movement is general, you will perceivehow impossible it is to make any frontal attack upon it. The demonstra-tion contained both soldiers and national guardsmen.'1 This address bythe civic council made an express appeal to the moderates, by insistingthat a plebiscite would end the state of alarm more expeditiously; butit also appealed to that section of the radicals which regarded theassembly as 'a kind of abhorrent separatism'. Once again we meet thistactical alliance of Left and Right against Mordini's experiment in trans-formism; and its force was far from being one of mere inertia. Themunicipality's resolution did not stop at giving advice, but even statedin so many words that Messina would suspend the elections.2

Such an open strike of local authorities must have been a stronginfluence on the government. There was also the ominous suspicionthat, while telegrams from Naples to Sicily were now coming throughwell enough, the absence from those telegrams of any reply to reiterateddemands for enlightenment suggested that some messages to Napleswere being held up, probably at Reggio and possibly by design. Inconsequence it was now decided to send a ship to Naples, as the onlycertain way to obtain an answer, and with the intention of forestallinga deputation to Garibaldi which was said to be leaving from Messina.A ship was duly provided for this purpose by Admiral Persano. Butbefore it could sail, the situation had developed to the point whereMordini was forced to yield and concede a plebiscite.

The prodictator had prided himself on not being deaf to the voice ofpublic opinion, and the impact of the recent news from Naples nowmade that voice unmistakable. The changing strength of opinion atPalermo can be gauged through successive communications in cipherwith Naples during the course of the 13 th. Mordini first told Garibaldithat' the situation continues most difficult. Messina asks for a plebiscite. . . I cannot understand what has prevented Calvino or Parisi returningor writing.' Then, in case the dictator was perhaps too busy to reply,Mordini sent a note to Pallavicino, asking him to press the matter andfind out why Palermo had been given no news for four days.3 At

1 13 October, Ugdulena to Mordini (MRR).2 15 October, vice-consul Richards sends a copy to Elliot (F.O. 165/134).3 13 October, Mordini to Pallavicino (AMB).

Mordini Changes His Mind: 9-13 October 35510.45 a-m- he also sent a telegram to Crispi, though it arrived at Naplesonly the next morning: 'the decree of the 9th for a plebiscite hasproduced the worst possible effect, all the more so in that I was toldnothing about it in time/ Still without information, he was at lastforced to give up the struggle. In the afternoon he sent three despairingtelegrams to Garibaldi in succession:

In order to obtain concord [he wrote], I now think it necessary to havea plebiscite. I would have already published a decree about this, but I fearedit might be against your wishes. It is inexplicable that Crispi, Calvino andParisi should have left me without a word for four entire days, and that noone in Naples should have foreseen the entry of your decree of the 7th intoSicily and have given me the necessary instructions about it. I beg you tolet me have a reply and tell me what you want me to do. Perhaps I shallhave to make some decision on my own authority if I see that the publicgood demands it.

More imperative still was the next:

If you want an assembly, come here at once in person, and send a telegramwith your actual signature which I can publish. The provinces have decidedfor a plebiscite. In any assembly now I visualize a great deal of trouble, andI repeat that it will not be possible without your coming in person.

As there was still no reply, he followed this with an ultimatum:

If the dictator does not agree I shall be compelled to resign.The situation today is such that you must authorize me imperatively and

at once to alter the election into a general plebiscite.*1 Undated draft (MRR, no. 221/23/20).

23-2

356

CHAPTER XXIV

GARIBALDI MAKES HIS DECISION:9-13 OCTOBER

Mordini had been forced into his desperate position by the swift changein Sicilian opinion, and by the failure of either Garibaldi or Crispi tosend him instructions. He was unwilling for the second time to actaltogether on his own at Palermo, especially as political developmentsin Sicily had become so much dependent upon events at Naples. Butthen the news of Pallavicino's decree had finally allowed him to thinkthat Garibaldi at Naples could not really object if Sicily came into lineby giving up her elected assembly: and on the strength of this he gave in.

His impression, however, was incorrect. Garibaldi's characteristicvacillation was never more in evidence than now. On the 6th Crispihad found the dictator favouring an assembly. But on the next day thenews of Cavour's speech had arrived at Naples, and produced 'tres boneffet sur l'esprit de Garibaldi'.1 Pallavicino came away from him on the7th with the conviction that he was now for a plebiscite, and on thisbasis the Neapolitan government had issued the decree which threwMordini into such despair. The more conservative papers at Naplesannounced with much satisfaction that Pallavicino had triumphed overCrispi, the conservative ministry over the radical secretariat.2 'In theshort space of twenty-four hours the position has been completelychanged. We have stopped short on the brink of anarchy... .Thesectarians had just begun to spread among the people a discontent withthe new order of things... and were providing food for the generalsentiment of anxiety which prevails among the multitude'; but then theprodictator's intervention had saved the day.3 On the 8th, however,the pendulum began to swing back once again, and when in the eveninga crestfallen Crispi accompanied Mordini's emissary Parisi out toCaserta, he surprisingly won from the dictator an opinion which implied

1 8 October, Villamarina telegram to Cavour (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 244).2 E.g. 8 October, II Nazionale. 3 9 October, ibid.

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 October 357that Pallavicino had misinterpreted his words the day before. Garibaldi,it now seemed, really wanted just the same system for Naples thatMordini had already selected for Sicily on the 5th, and it thereforeappeared that the plebiscite decree had been forced through by Palla-vicino under false pretences.

After this there was inevitably a return to discord and confusion.Alexandre Dumas's paper, L'lndipendente, wrote that 'from the 8th tothe n t h signori Parisi and Pallavicino spent their time in going to andfro between Naples and Caserta, one after the other; and curiouslyenough they each brought back different answers'.1 Crispi maintainedthat, for these three days, Garibaldi remained 'staunchly in favour of theAssembly',2 The Neapolitan prodictator would perhaps have inter-preted the situation in a quite different sense. But whichever camenearer the truth, of one thing there can be little doubt, that Pallavicino'splebiscite decree of the 8th had in a sense been premature, and did notcoincide with any firm opinion in the dictator's mind.

On the 9th Garibaldi summoned Pallavicino to come and see himabout revoking this decree. Crispi's diary recorded: 'Mistake in thehour. We do not arrive until after Pallavicino has left. Garibaldideclares he has arranged with Pallavicino for an assembly. We submitthe draft to him which Cattaneo has prepared, and he endorses it.'3Cattaneo also went out to Caserta on the 9th, and after waiting severalhours found Garibaldi free to discuss the situation. His version of theinterview stated that Crispi received orders to present his project for anassembly to Pallavicino and talk the matter over.4 Cattaneo gave a

1 16 October, L' Indipendente. This and other early numbers of Dumas's paper aremissing from the bound copy in the Biblioteca Nazionale, Naples; but this loose copyis to be found in ACP, f. 127.

2 13 October, Crispi to Bertani (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 451).3 9 October, ibid. p. 483. Writing some years later to Mazzini about this same day,

Crispi said: 'I do not know what passed between the General and his Pro-Dictator...Garibaldi, however, assured me that the idea of an Assembly had been accepted. Itis a fact that he lent his approval to the draft of the decree that was presented to him,and with his own hand wrote the following words beneath it, which were addressedto Pallavicino:—"This appears to me to represent precisely what we agreed upontogether, and is perfectly satisfactory to me. If you consent to all this, send me a copyof the above decree, duly endorsed, and I will sign it also'" (Ibid. p. 445).

4 10 October, Cattaneo to Lemmi (Archivio Lemmi MRR).

358 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 Octoberpicture of the situation as he saw it in a letter written in English to hisEnglish wife:

the Sicilians are decided to have an Assembly, to look about every thingthat concerns the annexation to all Italy (not directly to Piedmont). TheGeneral wishes that the Neapolitans should do the same. Pallavicino doesnot like the idea of an Assembly, but he will be forced to yield to a strongerwill. What is really ridiculous is that M. [Mazzini] is now for an Assemblyand is beginning to be federal.1

Carlo Cattaneo himself was a warm champion of the assembly, andnot only for tactical reasons like Crispi, but also as a point of dogmawhich related to his whole scheme of political thought. Indeed, as theleading Italian federalist, his ideas were almost as divergent from thoseof Crispi as they were from those of Cavour. It was true, nevertheless,that the radicals of both persuasions were at one over the tactics of themoment, and in this critical position their various shades of disagreementwere less pronounced than at most other times during the risorgimento.Mazzini was present only in the background, as a fount of advice whichwas not often taken. It surprised many to find him at this momentscarcely differing at all from his life-long opponents, the federalists.The coalition between them, however, was fighting in a hopeless cause,for by 9 October Garibaldi had now lost both military and politicalinitiative. The armies of Victor Emanuel were on the point of enteringthe Regno, and between two and three thousand additional Piedmontesetroops landed at Naples from Genoa on this very day. These politicalquestions were usually solved in the last resort by considerations ofpower, not by considerations of cleverness, or good intentions, or evenjustice; and while Piedmontese power was growing, the check toGaribaldi's momentum was already resulting in a sudden increase ofdesertions from his volunteer army, so that the ratio of strength betweenthe two armies was rapidly altering.

Despite Garibaldi's vacillation, Pallavicino for his part was thereforestill able to hope on the ioth that the plebiscite would follow asarranged. The prodictator sent off to ask Cavour not to let the kingcome to Naples until the vote had been taken, or otherwise Europemight say that voting had been under pressure. He apologized that the

1 IT October, Cattaneo to his wife (ACP, f. 127).

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 October 359wording had to be for 'Italia una e indivisibile', but explained that 'itwould have been impossible for me to make these seven millionItalians swallow the bitter pill of simple annexation to the ancientmonarchy of Savoy'; and he added, 'I have reason to think that theresult of the plebiscite will conform to our wishes'.1 It may be notedin parenthesis that Pallavicino himself, before many months went by,was to rally again to the radical opposition against Cavour's policy ofannexation and absorption. For the moment, however, he wasprimarily concerned to oppose the radical policy of delay and discussion,and preferred to force matters through by a snap vote, relying on thewisdom of his fellow northerners to concede freely in more tranquiltimes the devolution which they would not yield in a crisis and to force.

As the temper of politics grew hotter in Naples, Bonghi's Nazionalewent so far as to group all the radicals together under the name of'republicans', and began to imagine republican plots everywhere;though the same paper had hitherto been loud in its denial that suchviews existed at all in the south. A few days earlier this same conserva-tive journal had been criticizing Cavour's project for 'annexing' thesouth;2 but now it substantially changed its ground, terrified that'Mazzini is bent on social revolution'.3 There was enough reason alreadyfor opposition to the radicals without having to resort to this oldrepublican canard. By their obstinate refusal to surrender to uncom-promising and superior force, Crispi and his friends were open to theaccusation of imperilling the future of Italy. Bertani himself, who asa deputy had publicly voted at Turin in favour of Cavour's 'law ofannexation', was covertly writing to Cattaneo that 'the immediatereunion of the Neapolitan and Sicilian parliaments is now our onlyhope'.4 This was far more deceitful than was the plan of those whoaimed to win annexation through the verbal fiction of united Italy. Theradicals were exasperated and angry at what was happening. They stillclung to power, even when there was not much left for them to do with it.

The political conflict was intensified on the n th . Crispi saw thedictator at dawn.5 Garibaldi was also visited by representatives of the

1 Pallavicino, Le Memorie, vol. in, pp. 623-4.2 4 October, II Nazionale. 3 10 October, ibid.4 6 October, Bertani to Cattaneo (ABCM).5 11 October, Crispins diary, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 483.

360 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 Octobernational guard wanting a plebiscite,1 and then by representatives of the'National Association' asking for an assembly.2 Back at Naples therewas a cabinet meeting at midday.3 All the ministers except Crispi werenow behind Pallavicino, despite their majority vote on the 7th for anassembly.4 In order to thrash the matter out, the dictator thereforecalled an ad hoc council, which was attended by Pallavicino, Crispi,Cattaneo, Calvino, Parisi, Mario and Caranti among others.

VIndipendente gave a long account of this meeting, writing from theradical-federalist standpoint favoured by Alexandre Dumas its editor.'Pallavicino was against the other members of the council, and pointedout how that in this country, where the spirit of autonomy was sostrong, an assembly and its attendant discussions would even imperilthe success of any vote in favour of annexation.' The prodictator thenspoke of the danger of civil war; but the very mention of such apossibility so angered Garibaldi that 'he burst out in an eloquent attackon the prodictator's government'. At this Pallavicino resigned, andturning in Crispi's direction said: 'there is the man who has caused allthe discord between us. Without him Italy would by now have beenunited, and with him we shall get no further towards our goal.' Crispiremained dumb with astonishment for a moment, and then was said tohave replied quietly and respectfully. Garibaldi for his part retorted toPallavicino: 'signor Crispi is the best of my friends. He is courageousand disinterested. He has shared all the dangers I have had to endure,and has been more useful to me than anyone else.'5

So much for Dumas's version of this meeting on the n th . Crispi'saccount of the controversy told much the same story.6 Pallavicino inhis diary also confirmed how Garibaldi accused him of' Cavourianism';and admitted that he had been 'cut to the very quick by Garibaldi'spraise of Crispi as the necessary man who was more useful to him at the

1 15 October, La Bandiera Italiana (Naples). Copy in Biblioteca Universitaria,Naples.

2 18 October, II Popolo d' Italia (Naples).3 Summons to Crispi (ACP, f. 135).4 B . Caranti, Alcune notizie sul plebiscite delle provincie Napoletane, 1864, p . 3 5 ; but

one authority says that Anguissola sided with Crispi, Gli ultimi conati del Borbonismoe MazzinismOy i860, p. 62.

5 16 October, V Indipendente.^13 October, Crispi to Bertani (Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 451).

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 October 361moment than anyone else'.1 Pallavicino was so 'convulsed by grief andrage' that Caranti had almost to carry him to the station on theirreturn to Naples.2

This prodictator who had momentarily resigned was a noblemanwhose politics normally ran closer to Garibaldi than to Cavour, evenif much nearer to Cavour than to Mazzini. His position at this momentwas therefore most significant, as that of a near-radical who yet saw thatunited Italy could hardly be won except by making accommodationsto Cavour's policy. The one thing he wanted to avoid at all costs, andwhich now seemed to threaten him, was a deadlock and even possiblecivil war between Cavour's party and Garibaldi's. And as the Turinparliament had decided against accepting a conditional annexation, itappeared to him that any talk of an assembly could gain nothing andwould only be an element of discord. Two forces were contending forpolitical primacy in Italy; and if conflict between them was avoided, itwas due in part to Pallavicino. In part it was also due to Mordini. Andin part it should be ascribed to the complicated accidents of chronologywhich in this critical week kept Naples and Sicily out of step.

The next day, 12 October, was a time of great confusion. Pallavicino'sadherents in Naples had been busy overnight to repair the damage doneat Caserta, and at the cafe d'Europa 'had concerted a great annexa-tionist demonstration to take place during the day of the 12th'.3 Every-where there was a noticeable feeling of disquiet. Rumours had beencirculated among the national guardsmen that Mazzini was on the pointof proclaiming a republic. The senior officers of this civic militia eventook it upon themselves to mobilize their men against this feared risingby the 'party of action';4 and before long their show of force had animportant effect on politics. The leading conservative paper in the townwanted a special effort to be made against the threat of republicanism,and for this purpose invoked the aid of the twelve thousand nationalguardsmen as well as the seven thousand Piedmontese soldiers who weregarrisoning the Neapolitan forts.5 This same paper made out that Crispi

1 12 October, Pallavicino's diary, Le Memorie, vol. in, p. 627.2 Caranti, Alcune notizie sul plebiscite, p. 36.3 D. Salazaro, Cenni sulla rivoluzione Italiana del i860, 1866, p. 67.4 17 October, U Unita Italiana (Genoa), report from Naples dated 13 October.5 12 October, J7 Nazionale.

362 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 Octoberhad attempted a coup d'etat in order to push through his idea of anassembly, and explained that what the radicals intended by this assemblywas a constituent body packed with their own nominees for the purposeof imposing a republic.1 This was well calculated to frighten people atNaples, for a republic was dreaded as something 'red' and anarchic,associated with ententes and the guillotine, and the civil population was inno position to know that the editor's statement was a wild exaggeration.

The news of Pallavicino's resignation was common property inNaples quite early on the 12th, and caused great excitement there. Theday soon became noisy with popular demonstrations and clamours,when, as Crispi said, 'we were one and all cursed and applauded byturn'.2 The shouts of Down with Crispi 'were the most frequent of all',so the victim himself confessed, though he claimed that the police wereinstigating the crowd to demonstrate.3 The generality of citizens ofcourse cannot have known of the political struggle going on roundGaribaldi, and can have but partly guessed at the issues in dispute andthe size of the controversy. One rumour contributing to the popularalarm was that Garibaldi had been killed, and that the news of his deathwas being hushed up until Victor Emanuel arrived.4 The crowd wasfickle as always, and with sufficient inducement could probably havethrown its weight on either side.

Both main factions among the politicians in Naples appealed to thedictator to come from Caserta and quieten the populace.5 Garibaldi at

1 17 October, ibid.2 18 March 1865, Crispi to Mazzini (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 446).3 18 October, Crispi to Bertani (ibid. pp. 453-4). Another picturesque episode,

related by V Unita Italiana (Genoa) of 1 December, told about La Sangiovannara,a Neapolitan woman of the common people, whose popularity gave her an unofficialleadership among the lazzaroni. ' She was a real woman of the people, that is to sayan excellent woman at heart, but ignorant, and prone to follow the first suggestions,whether good or bad, which came to her from the people she trusted. Now themoderate party had been able to get hold of her, and to use her as one of the mostactive propagandists for immediate annexation The good woman confessedingenuously that she had believed those who depicted Mazzini to her as a friend ofthe Bourbons and of the Pope, and she told how she contributed to the agitationscrying "death to Mazzini".'

4 12 October, Cattaneo to Bertani (Archivio Cattaneo MRM).5 Cattaneo and Tiirr—see Tiirr's note scribbled on the back of Gusmaroli's telegram

of 13 October (MRR, no. 168/49).

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 October 363last reluctantly consented to leave the front line once more and play thepolitician himself. Later on he was to accuse Cavour's government ofagain having intrigued behind his back expressly to weaken him anddivert his attention from defeating the Bourbon army. Instead of beingable to concentrate on attacking Capua, he had had to return first toPalermo in September, and now to Naples in October, this being theonly method of pacifying angry political demonstrations which—itwas claimed—had been engineered for the purpose by paid agitators. 1

The northern government had intervened to stop him on three occasions,so he wrote at about this date: first in May to prevent him going toSicily, secondly in July to prevent him crossing the Straits of Messina,and thirdly in October to prevent him crossing the river Volturno.2

There is no doubt that Cavour had hindered as well as helped themilitary campaign in the south. He had wanted Garibaldi to succeedin part, but not too much, and not too easily; and for most of the timehe had been more anxious to hinder than to help. To that extent thedictator had just cause for recrimination.

One person who had visited Garibaldi on the n t h had then foundhim again expecting that a march on Rome might still be possible,perhaps with aid from the king.3 Probably his own political opinionswere much the same, or rather his lack of confirmed opinion was stillmaintained. He certainly went on hoping for the capture of Rome,whether this year, next year, or sometime. He had strong criticismsagainst Cavour and the Neapolitan conservatives, but in the main hejust wanted both political factions to keep quiet while he was able tocontinue with the war. And yet the vagueness of his political ideas,when taken together with his conciliatory disposition, had given eachfaction to believe that he might be on their side, and this had onlyencouraged both to intransigence. The same fact explains why con-servatives and radicals should have combined on the 12th in asking himto come to Naples, since each faction hoped for his support. GeneralTiirr thought that the dictator would simply proclaim a plebiscite andrestore Pallavicino to office; while the radical hide gave out that he

1 Note by Garibaldi, probably written in 1861, II Risorgimento Italiano, January 1908,p. 8.

2 Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Garibaldi, vol. iv, p. 313.' 11 October, Persano, Diario 1860-1, part iv, pp. 15-18.

364 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 Octoberwould convoke an assembly, 'to prevent us being just handed overbound hand and foot to Piedmont'.1

Amid an 'indescribable din' in Naples, Cattaneo wrote on the 12thdepicting the situation to Bertani, and referring to Pallavicino as 'asimple unfortunate, with ideas that cannot be his own'. In another note,written in English and possibly intended for the London press, he saidthat Pallavicino still allowed the principle of a representative assemblyfor Sicily, while opposing it for Naples2—and in this statement he wasprobably correct. Cattaneo also wrote to Pallavicino personally:the general says he will be in Naples at midday for a meeting of the cabinetin the Palazzo d'Angri; and he has asked me to let you know in friendlyterms that he hopes you too will come to the meeting, since it concerns thefuture of our country

Let me for my own part.. .remind you that in your house, on the 7th,Conforti [the chief minister in Pallavicino's government] was in favour ofan assembly, but on the 8th he changed his mind. It is people like this whoare now under suspicion of holding up munitions supplies to our armies,and who are refusing to give Garibaldi eighty thousand francs to pay forfirearms which have been already ordered and received.

You are wrong to think that there could be any dualism between anassembly in Naples which met to cede the country, and the national parlia-ment which accepted that cession. There could be no dualism between themen that electors would return to our local assembly, and those, practicallythe same, they would send to the national parliament. Nothing of the sorthas appeared in the local assemblies of Switzerland or the United States,though these particular bodies are actually invested with sovereign powers.Your objection is a mere dream, and one suggested to you from outside.

For my part I even believe in the need for permanent local assemblies,not only to bring internal concord, but as instruments of progress in theirown right. Surely we are out to bring the people of Italy together as brothers,not to suppress or silence them. The real dualism today is rather that disastrouscleavage between our virtuous and warlike leader and those who have saidthat they are ready to consider even the prospect of civil war. And whichof these two sides are you on? A Garibaldian ministry is now our only hope.3

Cattaneo was a great Italian. But like Mazzini he was far greater asa prophet or thinker than as a practical politician. It had been only

1 12 October, V Iride (Naples). 2 12 October (ACP, f. 127).5 12 October, Cattaneo to Pallavicino (Archivio Cattaneo MRM).

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 October 365by using great pressure that Bertani had persuaded him at all to comesouth to Naples, and now he was ill and anxious to return home. Forhim an assembly was desirable chiefly in so far as it signified a con-stituent assembly, the means whereby annexation could be madeconditional on local autonomy, if not on the creation of a federal state.To the radicals round Crispi, on the other hand, it was rather a meansto postpone annexation until the moment when a united kingdom ofall Italy could be formed; they thought of it as an instigation to makePiedmont co-operate in attaining unity, an attempt to avoid theimposition of a provincial hegemony from the north. Cattaneo's letteris interesting in its suggestion of how near this leading federalist stoodat this moment to Garibaldi and the Unitarians. Its reasoning was byno means negligible, however much its manner of presentation wasdeficient in tact. It was at least a fair statement of the wider views ofone school of thought, and it also mentions the immediate criticismswhich were being made against the conservative ministry of Conforti.Pallavicino gave a short reply to it, also dated the 12th: 'your letter isa tissue of sophistries, and unworthy of your great ability. I have notthe time to confute it. I have given in my resignation, and will notretract it. Either Mazzini and Crispi go at once, or else I shall leavemyself on the first ship.'1

Meantime, Garibaldi arrived back in Naples from Caserta, and thesecond council meeting took place as arranged.2 The Giornale Officiatecarried Conforti's detailed description of what happened. Accordingto this account, Garibaldi first reproached the conservative ministers fortheir lack of solicitude in providing him with adequate money andmunitions, and also for their dismissal of several radical governors whohad been appointed in the provinces. To this Conforti made formalanswer in his capacity as minister for internal affairs; but the reply leftGaribaldi still dubious, and Conforti then suggested that, if he lackedconfidence in them, they should resign. Garibaldi thought this overawhile, and then agreed. The ministers therefore all signed a form ofresignation, and Garibaldi just asked them to remain in office until he

1 12 October, Pallavicino to Cattaneo (ibid.).2 Pallavicino says that Garibaldi never came to Naples on the 12th at all

(Le Memorie, vol. in, p. 629); but these memoirs were written at a much laterdate.

366 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: g-13 Octoberhad appointed their successors.1 Slight variations on this official versionoccur in the account given in Dumas's Indipendente, where Garibaldi wassaid to have accused the ministers of replacing his own nominees in theprovinces with new governors who were actually reactionary, that is tosay involved with the ancien regime.2 This vexed question of whetherradicals or conservatives should govern in the provinces had been thesubject of bitter dispute for the past month between the ministry andthe dictator's secretariat, and Conforti had taken advantage of Bertani'sdisgrace and Garibaldi's absence at Caserta to make important changesin the governorships. It is interesting that Conforti's account of thismeeting made no mention of the political issue of plebiscite versusassembly, but confirmed Cattaneo's statement that the ministers' lossof face arose first of all out of their misconduct of administration.Dumas agreed about this, and even added (what can hardly be true)that the ministers seemed to care little one way or the other about thepurely political controversy.3

Once the ministry had resigned, Garibaldi had to look around for asuccessor. He did not agree with Crispi that a dictator should ruledictatorially through mere technical, non-political administrators, butobstinately believed that there should be ministers who in some wayrepresented public opinion. His notions of dictatorship were notnearly so austere as Cavour imagined. Indeed, all the half dozen or soministries which he appointed in the south were either entirely com-posed of moderates, or at least had only a minority of radicals; but thisfact was never understood in Turin. On 12 October he found himselfwithout a responsible cabinet, and though his secretary was delightedabout this, he himself was really uncomfortable. It even looked asthough, with no responsible government in office, and with only ninedays to go, either plebiscite or assembly would turn out to be impossibleby the specified date of voting, 21 October.4

For a few hours Crispi, as secretary-general to the dictator, was leftin sole charge of affairs, and he made what use he could of the briefinterval. His diary for the 12th runs: 'Garibaldi entrusts the govern-ment to the heads of departments and myself until the assembly beconvoked. The decree is signed.' The decree here mentioned was one

1 17 October, II Giornale Officiate di Napoli. 2 16 October, U Indipendente.3 19 October, ibid. 4 12 October, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 165/133).

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: g-13 October 367for an assembly, conformable with that already published in Sicilyseven days before, and complementary to that decree of four daysearlier which had prescribed a plebiscite for Naples. Crispi wantedboth plebiscite and assembly. For a time he had even persuaded Palla-vicino to agree on this; and Garibaldi gave his signature to his proposal,1

whereas so far as we know the dictator had not signed Pallavicino's earlierdecree of the 8th for a plebiscite alone. Another ordinance then broughtboth southern provinces into line, by giving Sicily a plebiscite toaccompany the assembly already proclaimed in Palermo. The radicalsat last thought that they might have found an acceptable compromisewhich gave them the substance of victory, and news of all these pro-ceedings was at once despatched to Mordini. Unfortunately for Crispithis news was to arrive in Sicily too late to save the situation. Palla-vicino, even though technically out of office, had in fact already wona decisive victory by his earlier plebiscite decree of the 8th, for this hadby now reached Sicily and forced Mordini to yield. The only hope forCrispi was at Naples. He did make some effort there to publicize hisnew decree of the 12th for the convocation of an assembly;2 but he washandicapped by the fact that the police force and the official Giornalewere still controlled by the resigning ministers. Conforti and the otherswere evidently looking on their resignation as a tactical gesture ratherthan as anything permanent.

While Crispi had been busy in this direction, Garibaldi was beingunsuccessful in his attempt to form a new ministry. Colonna, the mayorof Naples, nearly succeeded in completing an administration,3 but earlyon the 13 th he was dissuaded from this by Pallavicino.4 Crispi wrote totell Bertani on the 13th that 'up to the present we have no ministry, andthe General is disinclined to form one'.5 Crispi was still hoping that

1 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 456-7.2 12 October, a fragment in English exists among Crispi's papers, evidently intended

for the English press: ' . . .General Garibaldi does not approve of an irregular votationsuch as took place at Nice.. .M. Pallavicino admitted the principle [i.e. of an assembly]for Sicily, but opposed it for Naples.. .* (ACP, f. 127).

3 13 October, Colonna to Garibaldi, saying that his task was rendered harder bythe general belief that Crispi (who as a Sicilian was unpopular at Naples) wouldremain in office (ACM, no. 889).

4 Salazaro, Cenni sulla rivoluzione del i860, p. 68.5 Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 453.

368 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 OctoberGaribaldi would fail to find a new ministry and a new prodictator, andwould have to bring the various governmental departments directlyunder himself and his secretariat. But this was counting withoutPallavicino, who wrote to the dictator later on the 13th virtuallyreturning himself to power; like the ministers, he had decided to stayin office, on the plea that 'to leave the country without a governmentwould be a crime'.1

It is easy enough to reconstruct the motives of the prodictator.Pallavicino had just told Cattaneo that he would not retract his resigna-tion, and indeed this resignation had been already accepted; but he hadbeen dismayed to find that his bluff was being called, that his enemyCrispi was not expelled, as he demanded, but even called by Garibaldi'the necessary man who is more useful to me than anyone else*. Theconservatives had not gained by the prodictator's disappearance. Onthe contrary, a decree for an assembly had received Garibaldi's signaturein the interval. Pallavicino would not have known yet the news fromSicily, where his plebiscite decree of the 8th had by now arrived andsucceeded so well. What he might have feared was that the absence ofGaribaldi's signature on that original decree of the 8th would by nowhave told against the plebiscite, especially when Sicilians came to hearabout Crispi's new assembly decree of the 12th which Garibaldi hadpersonally signed. All this helps to explain why Pallavicino was nowattempting a return to power, sincerely convinced that such a plan alonewould save the cause he had been fighting for. It was presumably acalculated step, for his former prime minister, Conforti, simultaneouslymade a public speech in which he was quoted as saying that, despitetheir voluntary resignation of the 12th, the ministers would not leavetheir posts except 'under coercion'.2

On his return to Naples the next day, 13 October, Garibaldi beganby clearly supporting the policy of Crispi. His first step was to arrestthe chief of police, who was accused of working on Conforti's ordersto manipulate the mob for political purposes.3 He then personally

1 13 October, Pallavicino to Garibaldi (ACM, no. 1168).2 18 October, Crispi to Bertani (ABCM).3 13 October, Crispi's diary (Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 484); on the 14th Garibaldi said

he could be released again, but Tiirr thought it inadvisable, see notes by Garibaldiand Tiirr dated 14 October (MRR).

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 October 369addressed the people from the balcony of one of the public buildings,and told them to stop their agitation and their shouting of 'Death toMazzini'. As usual the effect of his words was magical.1 Crispi calledthis speech 'Garibaldi's last triumph; because he was soon afterwardsovercome by the evil genius which presented itself to him under thename of "concord", and so asked for another conference'.2 The dictatornever liked to flout any manifestation of what he took to be genuinepublic opinion, and he had to recognize that no liberal and responsibleNeapolitan politician would join an administration unless Crispi'sradical programme was dropped. Garibaldi's refusal to stand on hisdignity is another testimony to his realistic approach, his essentialmoderation, and his good sense. It was on this day that he must havereceived the king's letter from Ancona, the same which congratulatedhim on the Volturno battle and looked forward to an early meetingbetween them both. This, too, would have helped to open his mind toconcession.

The third and last conference between the various disputants tookplace at 2.00 p.m. on the 13 th. A representative selection of the leadingpoliticians in Naples was summoned to it, leaving out Mazzini of coursewho continued to remain inactive. Pallavicino, Conforti, and FrancescoDe Luca led for the moderates, Crispi, Cattaneo, Aurelio Saliceti for thevarious shades of radical. The Giornale Officiate described how Garibaldifirst put to them the question 'whether we should follow the plebisciteby an assembly as in Sicily\3 An affirmative answer came from Cattaneo,who proclaimed his federal views, and was for making the Italianunion conditional on terms. Conforti argued against this that, once thepeople had voted by universal suffrage, there could be no question ofany assembly to judge or alter the expressed will of the majority.Conforti continued:

the Turin parliament has voted not to accept conditional annexation. Shallwe then force a division in Italy? Shall we lengthen the life of our interimgovernment ? Shall we prove those foreigners right who ridicule our internal

1 19 October, L' Unita Italiana (Genoa), report from Naples dated 13 October,'as if by magic, the General had hardly finished speaking when all the white favoursfor annexation disappeared from people's hats'; also 14 October, II Nazionale.

2 18 October, Crispi to Bertani (ABCM).3 17 October, II Giornale Officiate di Napoli.

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370 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 Octoberdiscords ? N o ! we Neapolitans must not haggle over conditions, as if wehad not yet emerged from the middle ages. We are not giving ourselves toany foreign power on whom we must impose conditions; we are givingourselves to ourselves.... We Neapolitans, who have been so much calum-niated by the world, certainly have no intention of increasing these calumniesby insisting on our municipal claims; all we want is that Italy should bemade, and quickly.

VIndipendente gave some variations on this official account. 'Noneof those who opposed Pallavicino and Conforti mentioned the imposi-tion of conditions on the union of south to north Italy Only Saliceti,speaking of the defects of the Sardinian statute and of the other laws ofPiedmont, indicated that the assembly would have to decide whatreforms might be desirable/x Another description of events came fromProfessor De Luca. His version of this dispute recounted how, whenPallavicino referred to the veto placed on an assembly by the vote ofthe Turin parliament, Cattaneo leaped up and pointed out that thisparliament represented only part of Italy, not the whole, so thatCavour's refusal to accept conditions was itself a condition imposed byone province upon others. De Luca added that Saliceti called theplebiscite superfluous, seeing that the one point it could decide, namelythe sovereignty of Victor Emanuel, had been formally proclaimed sinceMay in all the decrees of the revolutionary government, as well as byall the municipalities severally and also by popular acclamation; therewas in fact nothing for a mere plebiscite to do, since the government ofsouthern Italy had been already carried on for some time in the nameof the king of Sardinia. Saliceti thereupon proposed the calling of aNeapolitan assembly, so that there would be some body to discuss thedifficult questions of the transition and the transference of power. Thisproposal was not agreed to by the meeting, and De Luca himself putforward the opinion that, in view of the publication of Pallavicino'sdecree of the 8th, to call an assembly without a plebiscite would nowmake people suspicious of a plot. He added, nevertheless, that in hisopinion a plebiscite should be followed by an assembly, 'not with theidea of approving or rejecting what will have been decided by popularvote, but in order to complete it politically, and to advise on the methodof unification, this being a question which the plebiscite by itself could

1 19 October, U Indipendente.

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 October 371not deal with'. De Luca added 'that the mode of voting so far chosenwould discredit us abroad, because being open and public it wouldarouse suspicions of pressure'. Apparently Conforti agreed with thisdiagnosis, and promised to try a different procedure.1

Aurelio Saliceti, the former triumvir of the Roman republic, wasanother person to give his story of what happened in this conference.He began by saying that Conforti's account was a complete fabrication'in every syllable'. He then distinguished himself clearly from Palla-vicino and the plebiscitarians on the one hand, and from Cattaneo andthe federalists on the other. What he wanted was first a declaration ofunion with the north, then the summons of a southern parliament todebate the terms of this union, and then a plebiscitary referendum toconfirm both the union and the terms. His own contribution to thedebate had included the following words:

the revolution preceded and did not succeed the arrival of General Garibaldi;it made possible his entry into Naples Thus the choice of a king and ofunion with the rest of Italy had been decided as zfait accompli, and it wouldbe absurd to ask the people who accomplished this whether they now desired it.

If there was one thing the revolution could not do in itself, this was toestablish on what terms the union should be carried out. To a question ofthis nature you could not reply with a simple 'yes* or 'no'. The extremelycomplex nature of the problem, the dignity of the country, and the greatnessof its interests, all demanded tranquil and mature discussion; and this couldtake place only in a parliament elected by universal suffrage, whose proposalscould then be submitted for popular approval, just as had already happenedin the central Duchies and Tuscany, and was about to happen in Sicily....The approval which the people would then give to the deliberations of thisparliament would constitute the plebiscite which the decree of 8 Octobercalled for.2

The dramatic conclusion to this conference was described somemonths afterwards by Cattaneo. The sense of the meeting had favouredthe radicals, and a decision was reached which might easily have hadfar-reaching results.

I left Garibaldi half an hour after the dissolution of the meeting in whichfive votes against two had recognized the necessity of an assembly like that

1 20 October, ibid.2 23 October, ibid., letter from Saliceti dated 18 October.

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372 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: g-13 Octoberwhich had been chosen in Sicily. But after this decision had been reached,Pallavicino once more resigned his office and inveighed against Crispi. Atlast Garibaldi lost patience, and got to his feet saying, 'if you will not havethe assembly, to hell with the assembly; I am off to Caprera'. No onepresent made the slightest observation. Only when Pallavicino offered toshake hands, I refused, and told him what I thought of him.1

Cattaneo was hardly master of his feelings at this moment, for all hishopes and plans had suddenly collapsed as soon as Garibaldi gave up theeffort to understand and reconcile these two points of view. Up to thevery last moment the radicals had felt themselves on the brink of a localand yet important success. But the Piedmontese army was by now onlya few hundred miles away, and as Farini had every intention of usingforce to prevent an assembly meeting, it was perhaps as well for Italythat the dictator's common sense prevailed once again. 'In the endGaribaldi, exhausted by the obstinacy of the two parties, decided thateach prodictator should act as he thought best, and that in consequencethere should be a plebiscite in Naples and an assembly in Sicily.'2

The losing party not unnaturally discovered in this turn of events acarefully planned coup de theatre, and there was some truth in what theysaid. Vlndipendente, for instance, told how at the critical moment of themeeting petitions were handed in by the military, covered with a volumeof signatures 'which they had been gathering for the previous twenty-four hours at great expense of the secret funds which we had thoughtabolished'. So far as can be seen, the really decisive stroke withGaribaldi was this intervention of the soldiers and the national guard.In particular there was the action of General Tiirr, that gallant Hungarianof Garibaldi's irregulars. This man was of all Garibaldi's senior officersthe one nearest to Cavour, and not only because of his politics, orbecause his future career was at stake, but also because Cavour wassecretly exploring the possibility of an alliance with the people ofHungary against the Austrian Empire. Tiirr's own military future, nowthat Garibaldi's star was waning, lay on the chance of transferring tothe regular army of the king. At this moment he had been sent backfrom the front to take over as commanding officer in the city of Naples.

1 26 April 1861, Cattaneo to his wife (Archivio Cattaneo MRM); 19 October,V Unith Italiana (Genoa).

2 16 October, U Indipendente.

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: g-13 October 373He was living there at the same house and table as Pallavicino,1 and it iseasy to guess where he absorbed the opinions which made him one ofthe chief instruments in Garibaldi's change of mind.

General Tiirr, by the afternoon of 13 October, had in his possessionnumerous letters and petitions drawn up by the commanders of thenational guard. Certain senior officers of this essentially middle-classand conservative organization had met together after Pallavicino'sresignation on 11 October, and told the ex-prodictator that 'theypromised to initiate a petition at once among their men on behalf of theplebiscite \ a Pallavicino was thus aware quite early of this move on thepart of the chief organized force in the city, and the knowledge maywell have helped to influence him in deciding to take office again. Thetwo generals in charge of the national guard for the city and provinceof Naples had then written a joint letter to Garibaldi on the 12th,claiming to speak on behalf of the whole force; and they told how 'thenational guard is gravely concerned to see the country moved by furtheragitation which is threatening public order and tranquillity Weturn to beg our idolized Giuseppe Garibaldi that his handiwork shallremain intact, and that the disasters threatening us and all Italy may beavoided. Indeed for our part we are determined to avoid them at allcosts.'3 It was said that this address 'had a great effect on the dictator,who set great store by such demonstrations', especially since thenational guard was his chief defence against the social disorder to whichthis letter referred. Just as in previous moments of the risorgimento, theguard was proving to be a political as well as a military organization,and acted as though possessing a right of initiative in political matters.Without waiting for any government permission, it had been mobilizedby its officers on 12 October against the 'danger of republicanism'. Onthe following day' the national guard had gathered together under armsand stood with the rest of the population behind the ideas of Palla-vicino'.4 Its officers had their petition ready for the dictator at this finalcouncil meeting; and just when Pallavicino had resigned a second time,Tiirr entered the council chamber with a handful of addresses for

1 G. Locatelli Milesi, '1/ epopea Garibaldina del i860', Tridentum, May 1910,p. 210.

2 Salazaro, Cenni sulla rivoluzione del i860, p. 67. 3 Ibid. pp. 70-1.4 Caranti, Alcune notizie sulplebiscite, pp. 39-42. Caranti was Pallavicino's secretary.

374 Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 Octoberpresentation. Garibaldi had his head swimming with the subtleties ofhalf a dozen clever and opinionated lawyers, contending with eachother over a problem which was far from simple. Tiirr's interventionthen proved to be the last straw. The dictator's curt phrase brought themeeting to an end: 'if this really is the desire of the Neapolitan people,let it be so.'1

These several versions tell much the same tale, from widely varyingpoints of view. Garibaldi's changefulness had continued up to the verylast minute; but the moderates had finally won, and a simple plebisciteby itself had been assured, at least for the mainland province of Naples.Conforti now issued a simple statement to say that Garibaldi had con-firmed the former ministry in office.2 As one witness commented, 'inthis way was resolved the question which was so important that for onemoment it had threatened the whole outcome of Italian unity'.3

Slightly different was the verdict of II Pungolo, which upbraided bothparties in the dispute. The people of the capital, said this newspaper,had been kept entirely uninformed about the issues of the controversy,and it was precisely their fear of what they did not understand whichhad caused all the alarm and agitation at Naples. The Pungolo firstindicted II Nazionale, which had tried to tell the people that the disputewas no more than a question of personalities, with Crispi as the chiefvillain. But it also blamed the Indipendente on the other side forromanticizing the conflict, and likewise those other papers which hadjust portrayed what had happened as a mere palace revolution. 'Theproject of assembly had nothing wrong about it except inopportune-ness. One month ago it would have been possible, but now no longer.'Luckily for Italy, this paper concluded, when Garibaldi's friends triedto make of him a Cromwell, he stayed a Garibaldi.4

This was a realistic and intelligent acceptance of the situation. 'Whatwould once have been a generous thought, would now be a deplorableerror. For now the question is one of very existence, not of the par-ticular manner of existence. The congress of diplomats meeting inWarsaw threatens us with the end of non-intervention. Hence we must

1 Salazaro, Cenni sulla rivoluzione del i860, p. 81.2 13 October, II Giornale Officiate di Napoli.3 Salazaro, Cenni sulla rivoluzione del i860, p. 80.4 15 October, // Pungolo (Naples).

Garibaldi Makes His Decision: 9-13 October 375answer this threat at once with a, fait accompli.9 * In accepting this logic,the dictator's luminous intuition had once more decided what hisintellect and his heart had not been able to settle. Evidently he was adictator with a difference. Despite Bertani's representations on the onehand, and La Farina's misrepresentations on the other, he believed inpublic opinion as much as did Cavour. Indeed, this faith was almost anobsession with him. He was thus quite ready to resign his powers whenhe felt this to be the will of the people.

1 Explanatory proclamation to the citizens of Salento, among miscellaneous'proclaim' in Biblioteca Nazionale MSS, Naples.

376

CHAPTER XXV

THE PLEBISCITE IN SICILY:OCTOBER

Although they had failed to carry Garibaldi with them at Naples, theradicals clung for a few more hours to the hope that they might keeptheir foothold in Sicily. But by 13 October, though Crispi did not yetrealize it, his foolish omission to keep Palermo informed had forcedMordini into surrender. Crispi should no 4tmbt have visualized earlierthat there was the possibility of serious trouble arising from the slow-ness in communications with Sicily. Briefly recapitulated, the situationat Palermo was that Mordini's project for an assembly had seemedwidely acceptable, at least until the n th . Then on the 12th there hadspread rumours of Pallavicino's decision for a plebiscite; and especiallyas this decision was mistakenly believed to be Garibaldi's, it had success-fully captured public opinion. Mordini's despairing account of this factwas contained in perhaps the only telegram during this period to reachNaples in less than twelve hours, and what it said may well have had aninfluence on Garibaldi's mind. Its effect on Crispi had been to make himsuddenly aware that his preoccupation with Naples might be losing himSicily too; and so he had bent all his efforts to what then seemed the bestcompromise still attainable, that Sicily as well as Naples should eachhave both plebiscite and assembly.1 This device now offered the onlychance of keeping radical supremacy in the south, at least for a littlelonger, and so of forcing Cavour to sacrifice some of his more extremeclaims before the revolution was concluded.

It was in the afternoon of the 13 th that Garibaldi ruined this desperatehope and decided that each prodictator should decide as the situation inhis particular area suggested, which meant that Naples at least wouldhave a plebiscite only. This left Crispi no hope at all except in Sicily,where a local parliament had been summoned to meet in three weeks'time. At once he sent Mordini a belated explanation of what had beenhappening, and tried to excuse his earlier silence on the grounds that he

1 12 October, draft decree (MRR).

The Plebiscite in Sicily: October 377had hoped to arrange a joint policy for both provinces together. Nowthat this wish had been disappointed, he was sending two decrees to Sicilywith Garibaldi's signature, confirming the previous grant of full powersof initiative upon the prodictator, and ratifying actions which theSicilian government had already taken. 'Keep steadily on at your post.You have a great mission to fulfil, and I am sure that you will not fail.They are now attacking the honour of the men on our side.'1 Thismessage, with the attached decrees, Crispi consigned to Calvino andParisi who were at last allowed to return. But bad weather held uptheir departure for a further day, and the two decrees could not bepublished in Sicily until the 15 th, by which time Mordini had given upall hope and capitulated.

The events of these two intervening days had shown what might beexpected from Naples and Palermo being so far out of touch with eachother. On the evening of the 13 th, although Mordini had alreadyreached the conclusion that Sicily could not hold out much longer, atelegram sent by Parisi from Naples at 6 p.m. indicated that on themainland the matter was still under discussion, and that the Sicilianenvoys at Garibaldi's side even thought that their mission was goingwell.2 An hour later Crispi was still optimistic. 'The dictator receivedall your telegrams', he told Mordini, 'and will come in person ifpossible to open the assembly. You will receive an answer to yourquestions by Parisi and Calvino who will return as soon as the weatherclears up.'3 Crispi continued on the 14th to imagine that somethingcould yet be salvaged from the wreck. Three more telegrams whichhe sent on this day to Mordini confirmed that the latest decision for aplebiscite concerned Naples alone and not Sicily, and that Mordini'sdecree of the 5th for a Sicilian assembly still stood intact. PerhapsGaribaldi—and certainly Crispi—would come to Palermo for theinauguration of this regional parliament.4

1 13 October, Crispi to Mordini (ACP, f. 135).2 13 October, Parisi to Mordini (AMB).3 13 October, Crispi to Mordini (MRR, cartella 221).4 14 October, Crispi to Ugdulena: 'the plebiscite is for Naples, not for Sicily. It

was decreed by the Neapolitan prodictator and not by Garibaldi. In Sicily you canhave a plebiscite later if the assembly thinks fit' (ACP, f. 135). Also 14 October,Crispi to Mordini: 'the dictator decided yesterday that there should be no change in

378 The Plebiscite in Sicily: OctoberThese communications all arrived too late. For by now Mordini was

in despair. On the evening of the 13 th he had been threatening toresign. But then came Crispi's sudden burst of reassuring messages,which only left him more perplexed than before. We have seventelegrams that he sent or at least drafted to Garibaldi on the 14th, andknow that they were taking twenty-four hours to reach theirdestination.

The position is untenable. Believe one of your most faithful followers,and authorize me to proclaim a plebiscite here. Every hour and even momentis precious.1

Again:

from Crispi's dispatch I understand that you are still decided for a Sicilianassembly. But I assure you that, if the assembly was necessary at one stage,it has now become impossible owing to the decree at Naples authorized byyourself which gave out that a plebiscite would be for the benefit of thecountry.... I have made unbelievable efforts to procrastinate today. Thereis no knowing about tomorrow. But if you persist you will have to comehere yourself and at once.2

It must have helped to influence Mordini's judgement that the citycouncil of Palermo met on the 14th and followed that of Messina inelecting to send a deputation to Victor Emanuel.3 Even his formerfriends among the autonomists were now swinging over against him.Naples would take pride of place if she annexed herself to Piedmontthrough her plebiscite on 21 October, because Sicily would have towait until 4 November before her assembly could hold even its firstmeeting. The prospect of having to follow on behind Naples washumiliating. The councils of Caltanisetta and Syracuse also, being likeother municipal councils representative of propertied interests in theisland, passed formal votes in favour of a plebiscite as the quickest way

what you enacted for Sicily and Pallavicino for Naples. Because of this falling outof step of the two provinces I have resigned and shall return to Sicily in order to sitin the assembly. Garibaldi will come and open it if he can' (ibid.).

1 14 October, Mordini to Garibaldi (AMB).2 14 October, Mordini to Garibaldi (Archivio Garibaldi MRR and Carte Sirtori,

Ambrosiana, Milan).3 16 October, V Annessione (Palermo).

The Plebiscite in Sicily: October 379of ending the revolution.1 This was a concerted policy to employ theonly representative organs in existence for expressing the generalsentiments of liberal-conservative opinion. The mayor of Caltanisettawas Baron Trabonella, a man of consequence in local affairs, and theowner of most of the sulphur mines, but his political horizon was anarrow one. So far as we know, he had favoured the Bourbons inApril; he certainly supported Garibaldi in June, and Piedmont inOctober. In each case, that is to say, his vote went to the governmentwhich offered the best hope of law and order at the moment. Thisattitude was fully justifiable, and probably it was not untypical either.One may even suspect that it was the most common of all sentimentsduring this year of national revolution, and that it was as powerful asthe more specialized impulse of patriotism in helping to form a nationalstate.

Faced by non-cooperation or passive resistance on the part of theclasses which were most politically conscious and socially powerful,Mordini first tried to restore his position by announcing that Ugdulenahad been sent to request Garibaldi to allow a plebiscite; and in the mean-time he pressed Crispi to hurry on Garibaldi to give his permission.Still no news came through, and Mordini saw that, in case he was forcedto act on his own initiative again, he had better prepare some sort ofjustification. So he sent round to all provincial governors to ask whatthey would advise him to do now it was official that Naples at least wasto vote by plebiscite. Some remote parts of Sicily were cut off fromevents, and Syracuse in the south-east, for example, had only just heardof Mordini's notice of 9 October in favour of the assembly. Thegovernor of Syracuse had even written on the 13 th welcoming thisSicilian parliament and contradicting the vote of his municipality.2Apparently the governor of Caltagirone only heard on the 13 th aboutCavour's speech of the 2nd, and he on the other hand reported that ithad converted his district to the plebiscite.3 This was without any doubtthe more representative view, and most of the provinces now replied toMordini's latest request by asking him to follow Pallavicino's example.

1 16 October, Bargoni telegram to governor of Caltanisetta (AMB); and15 October, minutes of the Syracuse civic council (MRR).

2 13 October, governor of Syracuse to Mordini (MRR).3 13 October, governor of Caltagirone to Mordini (MRR).

380 The Plebiscite in Sicily: OctoberIt seems reasonably clear that, if Mordini had hitherto been reluctant

to order any change in his public policy, this must have been due to hisbelief that Garibaldi was against the immediate annexation of Sicily byplebiscite. Whether the dictator still intended to march on Rome, orwhether he had some other plan in mind, his former instructions madeit certain that he had wanted some delay in annexation. In Mordini'sfrantic appeals to Garibaldi on the 13 th and 14th one can find littlesupport for La Farina's accusation that the prodictator was defyingpublic opinion and trying to stay in power. On the contrary, in so faras we can ever identify public opinion, it seems to have been Mordini'snature and policy to follow it whenever he could. Public opinion hadwelcomed his project for an assembly after 5 October; but after12 October it had changed to want a plebiscite; and he had done hisbest to persuade Garibaldi to sanction first the one and then the other.

On 15 October the political unrest in Palermo found its final resolu-tion. Parisi must have arrived back from Naples early in the morningwith Garibaldi's decrees and Crispi's advice to hold out. Then at 2 p.m.came a message from the dictator: 'in answer to your note of the 13 th,do just as you wish and I shall approve your action'. If the prodictatorhad really been trying merely to hold on to power, he could have con-tinued with his assembly and justified himself with this latest authoriza-tion; but he chose not to. Whatever Crispi may have hoped that hemight do after receiving this message, there was no doubt about it inhis own mind, and he replied: 'Parisi and Calvino have arrived andtold me of your patriotic intentions. So I have ordered the publicationof the decree prescribing a plebiscite for 21 October, and with the samewording as that at Naples.'* It is significant of the change of temper inSicily that it was Parisi himself, with his autonomist reputation, who asminister for internal affairs officially made the proposal on which thisnew decision was taken. A decree announcing die plebiscite was readyfor insertion in the Giornale Officiate of the 15th, and that evening specialmessengers left Palermo to carry its text to all parts of Sicily. Only sixdays remained in which to alter the whole machinery of annexation.Mordini gave the governors of each province a public explanation ofrecent events, assuring them that Garibaldi's wishes had really been for

1 15 October, Mordini to Garibaldi (AMB, b. 28, and Carte Sirtori, Ambrosiana,Milan).

The Plebiscite in Sicily: October 381an assembly, but that at Naples, where matters were less tranquil thanin Sicily, a quick and final settlement of affairs had become so urgentthat a plebiscite was necessary. Once the dictator had acknowledgedthis priority of the expedient over the desirable, Sicily could not helpbut do the same, he explained, since regional pride would not admit ofher trailing behind Naples in union with the kingdom of Italy. On thispoint the ministers in council were as unanimous as they had formerlybeen over the assembly.1

The immediate reaction throughout Sicily was one of great relief.To all appearances the danger of Garibaldi pitting himself againstCavour was over, and there was a good chance of quickly being able tobring the revolution to an end. People at large would have beenignorant of all the back-stage wrangling and disagreement, and wouldsee only that Garibaldi had found a compromise formula which theymight assume to be the best solution in the circumstances. Even theUnitarian radicals tried to look on the better side of it. 'They wereassured that the wording of the plebiscite made no mention of eitherannexation or conditions, and did not in the least compromise the causewhich is so vital to Sicily and Italy.'2 Under the new decree, peoplewere to be asked to vote on the following proposition: that 'the Sicilianpeople desire to form an integral part of Italy one and indivisible underVictor Emanuel as their constitutional king'. To this they could sayonly 'yes' or 'no' . The particular phrasing had been chosen so as not tooffend by any suggestion of 'annexation' to the kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. It had further given the radicals to believe that their constituentassembly would in any case have to follow some time, for the implica-tion was that they were voting to join a new state of Italy, and not analready existing state possessed of a ready-formulated constitution.3

Some people, indeed, regarded the use of these words as imposing yetanother very important condition on Cavour; for it would allow themto hold that the vote was nullified if ever Cavour took it into his headto cede any further part of Italian territory to France, or even if hefailed to carry on the revolutionary momentum until the final con-summation of the national movement. Thus the Precursore, until it

1 15 October and 16 October, announcements by Mordini in // Giornale Officiatedi Sicilia.

2 25 October, L' Unita Italiana (Palermo). 3 20 October, ibid.

382 The Plebiscite in Sicily: Octoberunderstood that the new policy meant the defeat and resignation ofCrispi, at first tried to make out that a plebiscite on such terms was avictory for Garibaldi over Cavour.1 Likewise the radical Indipendenteof Messina now agreed that a plebiscite with this particular formula waswelcome; and it praised Pallavicino for having thus healed the divisionbetween radicals and moderates which had persisted ever since Gari-baldi's breach with Cavour had become public a month before.2

In more conservative and in Piedmontese circles there was naturallysome cavilling over the heretical phrase 'Italia una e indivisibile'—Villamarina thought it 'bad taste'3—but on the whole the party ofCavour in Sicily was well pleased. // Regno d' Italia gave thanks toMordini for so well interpreting the people's wishes: a plebiscite wasquick and safe, and would solve the main issue, while leaving thequestion of conditions to be argued out if necessary in a future parlia-ment.4 The satisfaction was even more general over Mordini's plebiscitedecree of the 15th than it had formerly been over his assembly decreeten days before. Messina reported that 'the government is everywhereacclaimed'.5 Even the two leading 'autonomists', Dr Raffaele andProfessor Ferrara, were so far carried away by the excitement as towear the token €sV which was in everyone's hat to signify their accep-tance of union with the north.6 Mordini himself had a great receptionat the theatre with the mayor of Palermo and the commandant of thenational guard, and a large crowd came to the Royal Palace and cheereda speech he made from the balcony.7 He sent to tell Garibaldi of thegeneral enthusiasm and how Palermo was illuminated each night incelebration.

If there was any doubt about the way that people would vote, it wasremoved by Garibaldi's statement on the 15th that the two Sicilies'already formed an integral part of Italy one and indivisible', and thathe proposed to hand over to King Victor Emanuel the dictatorial

1 15 October, II Precursors3 18 October, L9 Indipendente (Messina), Mario's paper.3 11 October, Villamarina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 85).4 15 October, // Regno d' Italia (Palermo).5 15 October, Ugdulena's secretary to Mordini (AMB, b. 28).6 30 October, La Perseveranza (Milan), report from Palermo dated 24 October.7 17 October, II Giornale Officiate di Sicilia.

The Plebiscite in Sicily: October 383powers conferred on him by the nation.1 In sending this informationto Mordini, the dictator instructed him to welcome any landing ofPiedmontese troops, but not to relinquish the government itself untilhe received express orders.2 Mordini then followed Garibaldi inpublishing a declaration that he intended to yield power to the king,and he virtually directed Sicilians to confirm this by a favourable voteon the 21 st.3 Not everyone in southern Italy was pleased by thesepremature and peremptory demands. Elliot described how Garibaldi'sdecree of the 15th 'has, I am told, given considerable offence to theNeapolitans, who would rather have had the appearance of themselvesdeciding on their future condition instead of having by their votes onthe 21st simply to ratify the transfer of the Kingdom to Victor Emanuelwhich has thus been decreed by the Dictator'.4 But at the sametime that Garibaldi's decree was published, the Giornale Officiateprinted the king's advance proclamation to the people of southern Italyas if they were already his subjects.5 Both king and dictator werelooking on the plebiscite as a mere formality. Just as Cavour wasissuing decrees 'for those provinces not yet annexed', so official noticeswere already being given out in Naples 'by approval of the king'.General Cialdini with his northern army was already over the frontier,and he was communicating directly with local officials in the Neapolitanprovinces.6

Preparations in Sicily were hurried through so that the plebiscitemight without fail take place on the 21st and so coincide with that ofNaples. In the city of Palermo itself, out of a total population of aquarter of a million, there were only just over forty thousand registeredvoters, of whom thirty-six thousand were to vote. ' Universal suffrage'was thus something of a misnomer. Many citizens had not enrolled onthe register at all, 'misunderstanding its importance; and many othersin five months had lost their identification cards, often not knowingwhat they had been intended for'.7 On the day before the election the

1 15 October (Raccolta degli atti del governo dittatoriale).2 18 October, Garibaldi to Mordini (AMB).3 17 October, // Giornale Officiate di Sicilia.4 18 October, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 70/321/585).5 16 October, // Giornale Officiate di Napoli. 6 20 October, ibid.7 17 October, // Regno d' Italia.

384 The Plebiscite in Sicily: Octoberregister had to be opened again.1 The original decree of 23 June aboutthe conduct of the vote had allowed each locality to make its ownregulations about this. Messina now asked, vainly, for ten more days ofpreparation. Syracuse had formed no electoral roll, and a proclamationinvited people merely to sign on in an open register. At Palermo,'great crowds' had to vote without any previous formality at all.2

The excitement in the capital city was immense over this novel formoffesta, and everyone in the street embraced everyone else. Peoplebecame quite frenetic when, on the 20th, Mordini made the gesture ofhanding over all public order to the sole care and trust of citizens. All-night festivities preceded the great day in most places, with nocturnalilluminations, and the streets * beautifully decorated with tapestry andSardinian flags'.3 The 21st was a Sunday, and voting was generallyconducted in the churches after mass. The prodictator with the ministersand civil servants and the archbishop all voted in the cathedral. Whenevening came many people had still forgotten to vote, so the city councildecided that it would be in order to keep the poll open all through thenext day as well.4 Consul Goodwin reported that 'in Palermo theelection was conducted with good humour and good order'.5 Crispi'sPrecursore became eloquent and hyperbolical:

to a person coming from England, that is to say from the first country of theworld, where the most liberal institutions have been rooted for centuries andhave reached their most extended manifestation, to a person coming fromgreat Albion nothing could arouse greater admiration than to see our peoplevoting with order and dignity on a matter of such weight.... The historyof constitutional states tells us that the people are usually indifferent at thefirst exercise of their new rights, so that the first elections normally showa very small number of votes. Yet in Sicily there was no elector who did notcrowd to the booths to record his vote. Oh! what a miracle has Garibaldi'sgenius inspired.6

1 20 October, ibid.2 8 November, L* Indipendente (Naples), report from Syracuse dated 27 October;

22 October, L9 Annessione (Palermo).3 22 October, vice-consul Richards from Messina to Elliot (F.O. 165/134).4 25 October, V Unith Italiana (Palermo).5 25 October (Goodwin's Political Journal, no. 23; F.O. 165/134).6 23 October, // Precursore.

The Plebiscite in Sicily: October 385It would be easy to show how in many particulars the system adopted

was not a good method of testing the will of the people. Voting waspublic, on a rostrum, with two open urns for all to see which wasselected; and one imaginative pro-Bourbon described the mise en scene asbeing 'before a semicircle of disguised Lafarinian agents, with crabbedfaces and an air of mystery, seated in the centre of the nave'.1 Outsidethe big towns, in areas where the villages were still feudal and wherelandowners had made up their minds that Piedmont offered the besthope of restoring order, the publicity which surrounded the votingmeant an almost compulsory 'sV. In some places, for instance Trapaniand the island of Ischia, the ignorant peasantry fled to the mountains,under the impression that the voting was only a plot to inveigle theminto an ambush and then press them for military service.* A corre-spondent of one paper described how, in his own village, the head of themunicipio first rose to explain the significance of'yes' or 'no' , only tobe met by voices crying 'we want neither Victor Emanuel nor Fran-cesco, but Don Peppino'—that is to say, Giuseppe Garibaldi—at whichthe speaker, somewhat nonplussed, told them that in that case theyshould vote 'yes', which accordingly they did.3 One governor hadwritten to draw attention to this sort of problem, and to state that thecomplete illiteracy of nearly all the peasants made a secret ballotimpossible. He received the following unhelpful reply from the govern-ment: 'if an illiterate voter is at the mercy of the presiding official, thedefect lies in the fact not in the law.'4

Small wonder that some few looked on with amazement at handingover such responsibility to the ignorant mob, and prophesied doom tofollow.5 But as a device carefully suited to a certain limited objectivethere was much to be said for it. The moderates had known what theywere about when adopting such a bold innovation. From their point ofview it was essential that the people should give the semblance of

1 P. Oliveri, Episodi della rivoluzione Siciliana, 1865, p. 64.2 30 October, governor of Trapani telegram to Mordini (AMB, b. 28); 25 October,

V Indipendente (Naples).3 1 November, V Unita Italiana (Palermo).4 8 October and 11 October, correspondence between the government and the

governor of Mazzara (MRR).5 Oliveri, Episodi della rivoluzione Siciliana, p. 61.

386 The Plebiscite in Sicily: Octoberpopular approval to annexation; and they could feel quite sure that,with the national guard on duty, with a public ballot, with Garibaldi'spersonal directive, and presiding magistrates all of whom had taken anoath of loyalty to King Victor Emanuel two months before, there couldbe no doubt of the results. All that was needed was to combine disciplinewith excitement. The national guard was therefore marched down tothe poll as a body and in uniform to give the example of a solid vote,bearing flags and favours for 'si'.1

The existence of minor irregularities is comparatively unimportant,but deserves some passing notice in view of later doubts about thevalidity of the plebiscite. Not only had the compilation of the registerbeen mishandled, but electoral tickets sometimes fetched a price on theblack market.2 Although Mordini did more than Pallavicino to keepthe forms of a free election, provincial governors were less educatedthan he in * constitutional rule'. The governor of Caltanisetta made odduse of Mordini's prohibition against employing patent governmentpressure; and both purposely and unwarrantably he read into it animplication that the electoral manifestations of the opposition, ofautonomist 'agitators' with their 'clandestine press', were likewise tobe forbidden.3 The prodictator had prided himself on allowing freedomof expression in the press for the annexation party—more at least thanCavour usually allowed to the Mazzinians—but here one of that partywas taking pride in having driven all opposition groups undergroundin his province. Perhaps more typical was the governor of Girgenti,who reconciled the double pull of his conscience by instructing hissubordinates 'not to influence the freedom of the vote, but neverthelessto elevate public spirit up to that height which the interests of Italy andthe common aspirations of all Sicily demand'.4 In Noto and Modica,and perhaps elsewhere, the provincial governors practised a venial formof deceit when they chose not to risk the continuation of conscriptionfor the moment, and suspended the levy until after the voting was

1 25 October, La Perseveranza; 22 October, report by the commander of the nationalguard at Milazzo to his inspector-general at Palermo (MRR).

2 11 October, P. Grofani gave the price as two scudi each, writing to Mordini(AMB); 12 October, U Assembled made it five francs each.

3 13 October, governor of Caltanisetta to Mordini (MRR).4 29 October, governor of Girgenti to Mordini (MRR).

The Plebiscite in Sicily: October 387over.1 One of the big differences between Victor Emanuel's rule andFrancesco's was going to be this novelty of conscription, and it wason this head more than any other that the subsequent rebellion wasto develop against Piedmontese domination.

It would, of course, have been quite impossible to avoid all use ofwhat one may call false pretences. Imperative reasons of state demandedthat a tremendous majority should emerge from the poll, and theauthorities would have been more than human if they had not made themost of an unlearned and gullible electorate. It had not been accidentalthat Cavour had chosen the method of ' universal suffrage', a methodwhich in theory he disapproved, and which to some people seemedhighly dangerous. His most loyal supporter among southern news-paper editors fearfully pointed out how even England had not yetarrived at such an advanced degree of democracy. Ruggero Bonghithought that universal suffrage was 'quite unsuited yet to the social,moral and educational conditions of the people of Italy and especiallyof Neapolitans'.2 To give one small example, Maxime du Campdescribed what he saw in Naples at the time of the plebiscite, when'bien des gens des quartiers populaires, apres avoir crie "vive l'ltalieune !", nous disaient: "L'ltalie, qu'est-ce que c'est? une, qu'est-ce quecela signifie?".'3 The general ignorance would have been even worsein Sicily. Yet it was this same fact which made a popular vote safe forCavour. Lord John Russell missed the point here. The English ministerwrote to Elliot that 'universal suffrage is no favourite of mine, andI should be afraid that a few sweating madonnas and canting friars mightpervert that mode of voting into a machinery for restoring Francesco IIof pious memory... .The project has indeed a Gallic taste in it whichI do not fancy.' He added, however, that doubtless Cavour knew hisown business best.4 In reply to this, Cavour through Hudson 'said hedisliked it as much as you do, but it is his only weapon against France,which is doing all she can to trip up Italy's heels'.5 This was a good

1 10 October, governor of Modica to Mordini (MRR); and Gli ultitni conati delBorbonismo e Mazzinismo, Italia, i860, p. 66.

2 18 December, // Nazionale (Naples).3 Maxime du Camp, Revue des Deux Mondes, 1 September 1862, p. 8.4 11 October, Russell to Elliot (RP G.D. 22/109).5 19 October, Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).

25-2

388 The Plebiscite in Sicily: Octoberargument ad hominem, but there were yet more realistic reasons still.Elliot wrote as follows about this system of voting: 'I do not apprehendthat the proportion of negative votes would under any circumstanceshave been very large, but with the present arrangement there is still lesschance of it.' So far as he could judge 'there are still, especially in thecapital, many persons forming a large proportion of the educated classeswho would prefer that Naples should remain a separate kingdom,provided they were secure from the return of the Bourbon dynasty'.In these circumstances, voting by universal suffrage presented no test ofpublic opinion, for it offered only one simple question, and the answerto that question could be no more than yes or no. This really meant thatthere was no choice at all, since everyone would have to vote 'yes' ifthey wanted to emerge from uncertainty and disorder. 'Many who areseparatists will therefore give the affirmative vote. In fact both theterms of the vote and the manner in which it is to be taken are wellcalculated to secure the largest possible majority for the annexation, butnot so well fitted to ascertain the real wishes of the country.'1

To vote 'no ' indeed had no meaning at all, for the only alternative toVictor Emanuel was Francesco, and the clock could not have been putback short of a bloody counter-revolution, and perhaps could not havebeen put back at all. In any case, the long history of numberless revolu-tions in southern Italy had instilled into people an automatic sense ofthe little gain derivative from revolution, as well as a temperamentalinclination to approve whatever king might reign. Garibaldi had wonthe ordeal by battle, and this made a vote for the Bourbons unrealistic.There was little or no idea among the people that he might representa different principle from Victor Emanuel, and so the course beforethem was clear. The really live issues between radicalism and con-servatism, or between autonomism and centralism, were not at thistime up for consideration, let alone the more rarefied notions of republicor federation. But all parties would have been positively or negativelyagreed together in voting for Victor Emanuel, whether what theywanted was to prevent reaction or to stop revolution. Marc Monniernoted on the 22nd that 'd'opinions franchement, positivement an-nexionistes, il n'y en a guere; mais l'annexion est la seule solution

1 16 October, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 165/133/579); Mundy, H.M.S. Hannibal atPalermo and Naples, p. 256; Elliot, Some Revolutions..., pp. 97, 101.

The Plebiscite in Sicily: October 389possible'. He went on to describe how the common people exercisedtheir vote:depuis quarante siecles qu'il existe, c'est la premiere fois qu'on le consulte surses destinees.... Il fallait done les voir hier, ces va-nu-pieds devenus citoyenset tenant dans leurs doigts cette carte d'electeur qu'ils ne savaient pas lire.Ils se reunissaient par groupes, musique en tete et bannieres deployees, enchantant l'hymne de Garibaldi; ils criaient a tue-tete en choeur, 'Si, Si*...et entouraient des hourras dignes des fetes britanniques.1

On 21 October the people of Sicily voted by 432,053 votes against667 'to form an integral part of Italy one and indivisible under VictorEmanuel as their constitutional king'. The complementary figures forNaples were 1,302,064 in favour, and 10,312 against, which stillamounted to a more than ninety-nine per cent majority.2 With threeseparate armies fighting in the former regno, this result hardly repre-sented a free and accurate test of opinion. The Bourbon forces werestill in Messina, Gaeta, Capua and other smaller fortress towns. The cityof Naples already contained seven thousand Piedmontese troops whohad come by sea, and another still larger column had lately crossed theAbruzzi frontier. Just when a free ballot was meant to be taking place,General Cialdini in one province was summarily shooting all peasantsfound with firearms.3 But Sicily was a good deal more settled thanthis, and the majority there was larger. Rather less than one-fifth of thepopulation voted.4 The details from each village were given in dribletsby the Giornale Officiate as they came in. Out of a total of 292 Siciliandistricts, it seems that there were 238 with no negative votes at all.Perhaps no less surprising is that there should have been only eighteendistricts where the authorities made return of any votes which were nulland void. In one case mentioned by the Giornale, 'the excess for thiscommune of ninety-four voters over and above its registered numberis due to the presence of voters from other communes'.5 Equally

1 Marc Monnier, Garibaldi: histoire de la conquete des deux Sidles: notes prises surplace dejour en jour, 1861, pp. 367-8.

2 3 November, II Giornale Officiate di Napoli gives the final figures.3 21 October, L. Zambeccari to Pallavicino (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, pp. 164-5).4 29 October, L' Indipendente (Naples) said that the number of abstentions was

high, owing to the propaganda of the clergy; 21 October, Elliot telegram to Russell,says that there were not so many abstentions as he had expected (F.O. 165/133).

5 25 October, Giornale Officiate di Napoli.

390 The Plebiscite in Sicily: Octoberremarkable, but more typical, the returns from Patti show that, out of1646 eligible voters, everyone voted and every single person for 'st\At Palermo, out of forty thousand registered, there were more thanfour thousand abstentions and only twenty negatives. Messina, out oftwenty-four thousand actually voting, had only eight negatives. LaForbice apologized for the fourteen negative votes out of three thousandat Alcamo, saying that their existence did at least serve to show howfree was the vote.1 Alcara had even more, twenty-seven negatives outof 384; Caltabellotta, forty-seven out of five hundred. But these wereexceptional.

The largest number of hostile votes in any one district was at Girgenti,with seventy out of a possible two thousand five hundred. // RegnocT Italia could not conceive how there could be so many 'inept' votersbold enough to declare against the majority; the figure was said to be'shameful and irritating', and it was some relief to know that 'thecitizens of Girgenti have protested in the most clamorous demonstra-tions against the horde of imbeciles' who had caused it.2 Such was thescandal in this instance that the governor had to write full of contrition.It was due, he lamely apologized, not to his failure in preparing theelections, but to the abnormal influence of the clergy in his area.3 Thisparticular calumny on the clergy, one may note, was not perhapsaltogether disinterested. The same governor had already been writingto Mordini about the' material interests' which argued for the seculariza-tion of Church lands in Sicily.4 Evidently the landowning class whichwas emerging with even greater strength from the revolution was alreadybent on making the most of its victory. The dissolution of the monasteries,and the sale at cheap prices of the nationalized ecclesiastical lands, was tobe one of the most important factors in the growth of a newly-rich classafter i860.

La Farina at Turin was overjoyed at the results of the plebiscite. Heinterpreted them to mean that all Cavour's enemies in Sicily numberedless than one per cent of the people, including in this number Bour-bonists, Papalists, separatists, autonomists, federalists and Mazzinians.' It was a victory no less important and striking than that of Magenta

1 23 October, La Forbice (Palermo). 2 3 November, II Regno cT Italia.3 29 October, governor of Girgenti to Mordini (MRR).4 20 October, governor of Girgenti to Mordini (AMB).

The Plebiscite in Sicily: October 391and Solferino.'x Mordini, however, somewhat naturally read the resultsin a different light, and was equally delighted that he had been able tofollow public opinion and yet see Garibaldi's policy reconciled withthat of Cavour, without bloodshed, and by means of a compromiseformula that seemed so far to satisfy almost everyone. Some news-papers of the other party generously paid tribute to the prodictator forhaving followed public opinion as soon as ever it had decided for aplebiscite.2 The civic council of Palermo had unanimously made hima citizen so that he should be able to head the vote himself. Withjustifiable pride he addressed to the people a public pronouncement afterthe results were known:

Italy exists, and it has been created by the plebiscite One step more andwe shall have a nation which will be strong and feared, protected by itsgirdle of Alpine frontiers. And then we shall see what can be done by thegenius of a country which has already been mother to three civilizations.3

'Everyone has won and no one has lost', he said when thanking hisministers for their collaboration. 'If there is anything lacking it is onlythat time did not permit us to fulfil all the glorious mission left us byGaribaldi.' <

1 21 October and 28 October, II Piccolo Corriere <T Italia, quoted in G. La Farina,Scritti politici, vol. IT, pp. 345-6.

2 3 November, La Perseveranza, report from Palermo dated 27 October; 21 October,II Pungolo (Naples), report from Palermo dated 18 October.

3 24 October, Mordini's printed proclamation (MRR).4 22 October, Mordini to his ministers (MRR 221/23/9).

392

CHAPTER XXVI

THE DOUBTFUL SIGNIFICANCEOF THE VOTE:

OCTOBER-NOVEMBER

The terms in which the plebiscite had been cast made it difficult toestablish the precise significance of this overwhelming majority vote.Most of the leading political figures claimed for one reason or anotherto be more than satisfied with what had occurred, Garibaldi as well asCavour, Mordini as well as La Farina. If what had been achieved wasless than the radicals had hoped a month earlier, it was far more thanmight have been expected in May when they first conceived their out-rageously daring expedition to the south. But this multiplicity ofapproval only serves to show how variously these results could beinterpreted. Cavour was the man who had tried hardest to bring theplebiscite about, and his only concern had been to settle matters quicklyby an impressive vote of whatever sort. He had not been able to con-sider whether, and if so how, he could also sound southerners abouttheir more detailed wishes; because this would have added yet a furthercomplication, and his other plans might well have collapsed under it.Hence his interpretation of this simple 'yes' and its significance had tobe intuitive. Important consequences were soon to follow from thefact that his particular interpretation was not to be in all respectsaccurate or justifiable. It was easy enough to see that the vote signifieda universal desire to return to peace and quiet and good governance.But beyond this point there were many varying reasons, both ideal andmaterial, why different people should have wanted to put themselvesunder the constitutional monarchy of Piedmont-Sardinia.

It was a fair preliminary assumption that many people had votedconsciously out of national sentiment. If the ordinary citizens of thesouth sometimes did not know what the word' Italy' meant, the conceptof national unity had at all events penetrated the espritsforts, the thinkingand acting leaven of middle-class liberals who were such an initiating

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct-Nov. 393force in the national movement. Grispi and La Farina were each at thecentre of a small and rival group of patriotic Sicilian intellectuals.Something can be learnt from the fact that La Farina's Credo Politico,written originally as a programme for the National Society severalyears before, was specially republished in its eighth edition at Palermojust before the vote took place. The intention was probably to instructSicilians about what had been going on in the north during their yearsof cultural and political isolation, and no doubt this publication wasmeant to influence the plebiscite. La Farina in this essay gave as aprincipal argument for national unification the economic and militarypower which it would bring. A unified Italy would make possible moregovernment enterprise in economic affairs, a greater planned concentra-tion of capital, a larger internal market, and the deliberate creation ofoutlets for commerce abroad. This pamphlet thus twisted Mazzini'smystical idea of unity almost out of recognition, infusing into it newtheories from the school of Friedrich List in Germany. But the par-ticular twist was well calculated to attract a class of people hithertoresistant to pure Mazzinianism. A new level of smaller and less hide-bound landowners had appeared in the south since the * abolition' offeudalism and entails earlier in the century, and now formed an uppermiddle class in the countryside which could appreciate the doctrines ofeconomic nationalism quite as well as could the merchants of Messina.These landowners had good reason to hope that the anti-clerical govern-ment of Turin might secularize for their profit the enormous ecclesi-astical estates, which for centuries had been growing ever larger inmortmain on the close alliance of Church and State. In these and otherways, the more politically important elements in Sicilian society wouldsee great material advantages in annexation. They stood to profit veryconsiderably from the paradoxical fact that annexation would givethem at once more political radicalism and more social conservatismthan they had known under the ancien regime. The poorer classes nodoubt would have much preferred the reverse combination of politicalconservatism and social radicalism; but luckily the poor did not matterso much, and had no adequate representation in Cavour's parliament.It was important that the Italian radicals were politicians rather thansocial reformers. Garibaldi in Sicily had, it is true, linked up hismovement with a peasants' revolt; but Garibaldi was primarily a

394 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov.nationalist, and by August he had deliberately turned against his earlierallies as soon as he realized their divergence of aim. By that time thesocially-conservative classes had also realized that to accept the nationalrevolution might be the best means of retaining their status andimproving their prosperity.

The affirmative vote was generally taken to be a vote for bothnationalism and social conservation; but though this was technicallycorrect, one significant qualification to this truth went unobserved, andcertain dubious inferences were improperly drawn from it. The con-servative newspapers had for tactical reasons laid undue stress on thehalf-truth that Mazzini was a social revolutionary. This had at least beeneffective in practice, for one Swiss observer noticed that 'la peur deMazzini les a tous rendus emmanuelistesV But Cavour went yetfurther, and was remote enough from Sicily to ascribe the favourablevote in part to what he termed the fear of'Garibaldianism'. This wasa good deal less than a half-truth, and in practice it amounted to a majorerror of judgement. It contributed largely to the general misunder-standing at the time, and later to the selection of unsuitable treatmentfor the south. Other conservatives like Bonghi, who had been watchingmatters from closer at hand, recognized on the contrary that, if thepopolo minuto was now beginning to conceive of Italy and nationalindependence, this was simply due to Garibaldi and his enormousprestige.2 Pasquale Mancini, the future foreign minister of the 1880's,was hardly a radical Garibaldian, but his diary in Naples at this timerecords one entry that, 'if the people now accept union with Piedmont,it is because Garibaldi wished i t . . . . He could have proclaimed himselfking like Masaniello.'3 Depretis in parliament was bold to give Cavourthe lie direct on this point, saying that 'in fact Garibaldi will turn out tohave been the greatest annexationist of us all, since the annexation ofhalf Italy we can consider his handiwork'; but the deputies listened tothis contradiction of their cherished assumptions in a profound andsceptical silence.4 A corroborative opinion came from the Britishminister at Naples. Elliot had for some time been saying that, without

1 16 October, Marc Monnier, Garibaldi: histoire de la conquete des deux Sidles,p. 361. 2 9 October, // Nazionale.

3 12 November, G. P. Mancini, Impressioni e ricordi 1836-1864, 1908, p. 177.4 11 October, Depretis, Atti Parlamentari.

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov. 395the enthusiasm generated by Garibaldi, Sicilians would have reverted totheir 1812 constitution in preference to the Piedmontese statuto.1 It wasthis same opinion of Elliot's about Garibaldi's influence which hadconverted Lord John Russell to believe in Italian nationalism, and thushad had a quite decisive effect just when France had been on the pointof bringing the revolution to a stop. The radical Quadrio, indeed, tookthis argument so far as to make it a positive accusation against Garibaldi,on the grounds that he had prejudged and predisposed the future ofSicily by imposing annexation on the people through his dictatorial will.2

Cavour, on the other hand, continued to believe that Garibaldi hadcombated annexation, and hence that the plebiscite was a vote againstthe dictator and all his works. This in turn led him to imagine thatpublic opinion would permit a completely intransigent attitude towardsthe radicals, and even that sternness would be welcomed. In what wastaken to be an intentional snub he wrote to thank Pallavicino for thesesplendid results, implying that they were due to the prodictator and inspite of Garibaldi. For a brief moment after 22 October, when a suddenthreat from Austria made him appreciate the need for national unity,he showed a kindlier attitude towards the volunteers and hinted that hemight need their help in the north. But a few days later, as soon asBritain and France had guaranteed him from this particular danger, hewas urging Farini to take a whip and 'throw them into the sea', to'play the dictator in fact if not in name.. .and pitilessly sweep awaythe ordure left by Bertani in that stable'.3 This was more than a lack ofcharity; it was a lack of common sense. Events were to show thatCavour did not possess adequate resources to subdue the south, and hemight have been well advised to retain the volunteers as an auxiliary tohelp in keeping order and in assaulting Gaeta. Instead they were dissolvedfor what were essentially political reasons; and, being treated as anuisance, they accordingly behaved as such.

Cavour made the excuse that the radicals were irreconcilable; butnow that he had publicly announced his conversion to the doctrine ofItalian unity, this was not true, and Cavour must have known it was

1 1 June, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 70/317/243).2 M. Quadrio, II libro dei mille del Generate Giuseppe Garibaldi, 1879, p. 185.3 2 November, Cavour to Farini (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 261); 3 November,

Cavour to Farini (ibid. p. 275); c. 4 November, Cavour to Farini (ibid. p. 287).

396 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov.not true. No effort was made to concede any substantial point to thedictator, and sometimes not even to show him the most elementarycourtesies. Certainly Garibaldi replied churlishly, but it must be re-membered that he had just been called upon to surrender a life-longambition. The radical leader was in any case known to be no politician,and to be rather a man who acted in temper and on impulse. This wasthe big difference between them. Garibaldi's bark was worse than hisbite, and though he said ill-tempered things, still he told Mancini thatCavour should come south in preference to Farini.1 This was notirreconcilability. But no concessions were made, and, as a result, in thenext six months Garibaldi's petulant but justifiable irritation was tobecome a grave cause of weakness to the state. He would certainlyhave been a difficult person to deal with as a national figurehead, but hecould have been invaluable in helping to rally the south during thetesting period which lay ahead. The evidence suggests, however, thatCavour did not think this worth the trouble. Indeed, he was ready togo to extraordinary lengths to avoid it. By deliberate calculation hedid not want the radicals to have more status and influence in the newItaly than he could help. His information was that Gaeta would fallwithout much difficulty, and that the south was praying for the king tocome and deliver them from a revolutionary dictatorship. He there-fore did not need Garibaldi's help, and yet would positively gain fromhis enmity. Cavour's political supporters in the south were nowreferring to Garibaldi as a 'beast' and a 'madman', and were going toall lengths so that Cavour should give no credit to their local enemieswho had done so much more for the national cause than they. This sortof information and advice only influenced the northern government tomould its policy on the basis of a false premise.

Another false and dangerous assumption was that the almost unani-mous vote of the south signified a ready willingness to be absorbed intothe northern kingdom. Here was plenty of scope for disagreement andmisunderstanding. Cavour had purposely gone on using the word'annexation', notably in his motion to parliament. Garibaldi hadpurposely preferred a more non-committal terminology. But howevermuch care was taken over the exact wording of the plebiscite, the veryfact that it was a plebiscite and not an assembly ruled out any subtleties

1 21 October, Mancini to Cavour (ibid. p. 161).

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov. 397of differentiation and inference. Cavour therefore did not know howlittle expectation or desire there was in Sicily and Naples for a rigidlycentralized administration under Turin. He had been told that muchdiscussion was going on in the south about the future organization ofthe state, about where the national capital should be located and soforth;x but his own preoccupation was rather to see that such discussionwas kept as subdued as possible. Perhaps he then became the victim ofhis own propaganda; for southerners were so convinced of his liberalsentiments that they trusted him, and as discussion never turned intoagitation he was not fully aware of their strength of feeling.

One might say that the misunderstanding here was almost deliberatelycultivated. The newspapers of Cavour's party in Sicily had alwayscarefully avoided any hint of absorption of the south by the north, andhad rather paid lip-service to the need for administrative devolution inthe Italy that was to come.2 When Farini, as minister for internalaffairs at Turin, had been deputed by Cavour to work out an officialstatement of policy about local government, he had publicly recom-mended the devolution of power on to the historic regions of thepeninsula, and the abandonment of the system of highly centralizeddepartments hitherto practised in north Italy. Farini's statement ofpolicy, seemingly so full of promise for the future, was expresslypublished at Palermo on 30 August, and Cordova had specially sentcopies all through the interior of the island for the deliberate purposeof winning over the autonomists to the cause of annexation. A corre-spondent noted that 'the effect it made has been enormous... .Peoplehere think that it must have been designed on purpose for Sicily,where more than anywhere else special insular conditions make us feelthe need of an administrative autonomy for running internal affairs.'3

Another medium for the communication of these same sentimentshad been the Sicilian Count Amari. This man technically held the postof Garibaldi's representative attached to the government of Cavour,though his politics and conduct in fact made him more representativeof Cavour than of Garibaldi. At the end of August he was briefed by

1 21 October, Mancini to Cavour {ibid. p. 158).2 E.g. 28 June, L' Annessione (Palermo).3 5 September, La Perseveranza prints a report from the Palermo correspondent of

V Opinione dated 31 August.

398 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov.Cavour to pass on further hints to Sicily, and to say that as muchregional autonomy would be allowed as was compatible with nationalunity. He wrote in this sense to his cousin, Professor Amari, who wasthen a minister in the government at Palermo: * conclude the annexationat once and you will then receive ever ything you desire.'1 The professortook him at his word, and based his campaign for the plebiscite on theassumption that Farini's scheme to set up distinct and autonomousregions in Italy was a foregone conclusion. He even was given tounderstand that there would be a special concession to Sicily of somepolitical as well as administrative devolution, with the appointment of'pseudo-ministeres'; and it was said that 'Cavour, si je ne me trompe,est bien dispose a cela\a In October Cavour was to write personally tothe Sicilian General Carini with a gloss on this theme for him topublish: ' Sicily can count on my ministry to promote a system of wideadministrative decentralization. The government will put before parlia-ment its project to introduce this system of regions, and then it will befor parliament to push it through.'3

All this was good strategy—it would be wrong to call it simply astratagem—if Cavour wanted to bring over to the cause of unqualifiedannexation men of autonomist inclinations. Even if he was sincere,however, this idea of local self-government was never much more forhim than something speculative and theoretical, and once the immediatepolitical advantage had been gained, it turned out that the cabinet wasnot sufficiently agreed to bring it anywhere near to practical application.Accordingly this scheme for dividing Italy into partially autonomousregions died before birth. Cavour had been well aware of its publicityvalue,4 and some people had said from the start that the proposal wasno more than 'a mere hoax to attract the public opinion of Naples andSicily'.5 At any rate there was a widespread misunderstanding aboutwhat he intended, and the extent of this misunderstanding is shown bythe fact that even newspapers of Cavour's own party continued to

1 31 August, Count Amari to Professor Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. cTAncona,vol. 11, p. 130).

2 7 October, Professor Amari to Cartwright (ibid. p. 137).3 24 October, II Regno d* Italia, letter from Cavour dated 19 October.4 29 August, Cavour to Nigra (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 186).5 Cattaneo's magazine 1/ Politecnico (Milan), vol. ix, September i860, p. 285.

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct-Nov. 399insist on the necessity for some kind of local autonomy, being sincerelyconvinced that it was desirable.1 The later policy of centralization,though it had some compensations, was taken by many people in thesouth to be both foolish and a breach of implied contract; and thisassisted in giving the union a bad start. It all went back to the fact thatannexation had to be carried through by plebiscite and not by assembly.Not only just the south, but the whole of Italy was to suffer for the votehaving had to be taken under these pretences.

Palermo newspapers before the end of October already bore signsthat there was misunderstanding about what had happened and whatwas going to happen. La Valle di Giosaffat, for instance, speaking forsome of the moderate autonomists, still thought and hoped that anassembly was going to follow on after the plebiscite. This paper hadopposed Mordini's government, and wanted a quick union with Pied-mont, but it also warned Cavour not to take away from Sicily thoseinstitutions and privileges which even the Bourbons of Naples had notdared to touch. Although the thinking classes might believe liberty tobe worth paying for, the common people' understand nothing of liberty,just as they understand nothing about annexation'; and if they werenow to find that they had to pay more taxes or had to depend on Turinfor legal redress, they would revolt in a matter of months.2 This was afrightening thought. Union with northern Italy had been put to thecommon people as an automatic solution to their troubles. Few of themhad stopped to think, for instance, that 'Italy one and indivisible'mightneed an enormous government bureaucracy, and an astronomical

1 E.g. 12 September, // Nazionale. The doyen of Neapolitan exiles, Poerio, hadtold Hudson * that the majority of their Countrymen will accept the Constitutionwith the Bourbons rather than lose what they call the Autonomia Neapolitana', 16 July,Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22j66). Elliot also had an interesting comment to Russellon 6 August: 'the most thinking people here, without being themselves favourable to[union], are almost all of opinion that it is not now possible to arrive at any solution with-out in the first place passing through the annexation which they believe will be foundimpracticable, and that the permanent arrangements will rise out of its ruins But thevery softness of the Neapolitans, and their inability to make any effort by themselves toescape from a system they dislike, may perhaps be the means of the annexation goingon longer than is expected even though the country is not satisfied* (RP G.D. 22/85).

2 27 October, La Valle di Giosaffat, report from Messina dated 22 October;1 November, ibid.

400 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct-Nov.expenditure on armaments and railways and the other appurtenancesof a Great Power. No doubt there were many who stood to gainmaterially and at once from unification; but for the vast majority ofsoutherners its first impact was to be a heavy increase in taxation andthe cost of living, with little immediate and apparent gain therefrom.When one Sicilian in January 1861 was asked who Cavour was, thereply came that he was a cigar merchant who had increased the priceof tobacco1—such was the first impression produced on one level ofsociety by united Italy. For Cavour was not even going to wait for therelevant facts to be ascertained; he just assumed that, if the Genoesecould pay taxes on a Piedmontese scale without rebellion, so couldother Italians.2 This was bad logic. Northerners could rarely get it outof their heads that 'Naples and Sicily were among the richest provincesof Italy',3 and so a sad disillusionment was in store for both sides.

Another and more dreadful warning came from II Precursore. 'IfPiedmont is deceiving us and forcing through a premature vote in orderto make us subject to another province of Italy and not to a unified state,if she is going to treat us as a conquered people, applying to us her owninferior system of laws, then you may be sure that tomorrow the revolu-tion will break out more violently than ever.'4 This radical paperspecifically claimed that the acceptance of the plebiscite by Turin con-stituted a bilateral contract: the wording of the plebiscite was signifi-cantly and designedly different from that used in Tuscany, and the votehad been cast in such terms that it would be invalidated by any failureon Cavour's side to place the acquisition of Rome in the forefront ofhis programme.5 Crispi, whose mouthpiece this journal was, laterembroidered the same theme in a letter to Mazzini:

The plebiscite of the Southerners did not signify the annexation of theformer kingdom of Sicily to the Sardinian provinces, and even where thiswas implied, it did not mean that annexation was to be immediate Thehonest men of either party should have been satisfied, for all possibility either

1 3 January 1861, La Farina to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. iv).2 30 October, Cavour to Valerio (ibid. vol. m, p. 232).3 28 September, La Gazzetta del Popolo (Turin); 9 December, Cassinis to Cavour:

'this island is the paradise of Italy... an eternal spring.. .immense wealth. . . '(CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. rv).

4 25 October, II Precursore (F. Lo Presti). 5 21 November, ibid.

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov. 401of federation or of a republic was thus excluded. Meanwhile, as the meansby which union was to be achieved could not be established by directsuffrage, this must be done by the Assemblies. Those who were opposed tothe Assemblies either did not understand the decree of October 8, or wilfullymisinterpreted its meaning. Consequently the ministers at Turin were en-trusted with a mission that should have been fulfilled by the local parliaments.1

Another paper, UUnita Italiana, though it had recommended peopleto vote 'yes', maintained all the same that one could vote thus and stillexpect a later constituent assembly to model a fundamental constitutionfor the Italian kingdom.2 This journal had supported annexation pureand simple, but had also assumed that the acquisition of Rome wouldsooner or later demand the convention of an assembly where the oldPiedmontese statute could be debated and if necessary modified.3 Justbefore the plebiscite was held, it printed a statement from the formerminister Guarneri, saying: 'I shall vote for annexation, but only on theunderstanding that the plebiscite will determine the time and not themethod of our merger into the Italian state.'4 Of course no such privateinterpretation was in any way binding on the new rulers of Italy, andprobably they would have looked upon this statement as belonging toa lunatic fringe beyond the bounds of respectable political intercourse.In any case they knew of many counter-arguments in favour of makingthe process of unification as quick and simple as possible, and it mighthave seemed a fair gamble that, so doing, things would probably turnout for the best. There was, however, a price to be paid for speed andconvenience. The idea was beginning to gain currency that the Pied-montese had all along in this year acted with a disingenuous andMachiavellian lack of frankness, and that one of their chief aims fromthe start had been to exploit national feeling simply for purposes ofprovincial self-aggrandizement.5 This thought did not help to reconcilethe different sections of the nation to each other.

1 18 March 1865, Crispi to Mazzini (Crispi, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 447).2 20 and 25 October, L9 Unith Italiana (Palermo).3 23 August, ibid. 4 20 October, ibid.5 E.g. 26 October, Merimee from Paris to Panizzi: 'les Piemontais.. .ont manque

a toutes les conventions politiques, a tous les principes internationaux, et ce qui a mesyeux est le pire, c'est qu'ils n'ont jamais agi avec franchise' (II Risorgimento Italiano,April 1920, p. 181); E. Cenni, Napoli e V Italia: considerazioni, 1861, p. 77; C. Baldi,Breve studio sulla letteratura storica-politica del risorgimento italiano 1860-1, 1907, p. 63.

MS 26

402 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct-Nov.This was the start of plentiful misunderstanding on both sides, and

suspicion and mistrust were not long in germinating. On 16 OctoberProfessor Amari had written to ask the prodictator for an ad hoc councilto consider the peculiar interests of Sicily. As Amari had fought hardfor the plebiscite and on behalf of unconditional annexation, no onecould call him partisan, he said; and yet here he was, acting on theconviction that the new government in the north would make specialarrangements for the island, and hence that an advisory body should beappointed.1 This preliminary council at Palermo would perform onefunction of the representative assembly about which so much had beenspoken; but as it would be advisory only, and in no sense a constituentbody, Amari thought that the government of Turin would look uponit as an acceptable compromise which did not derogate from parlia-mentary sovereignty. On 19 October this council was duly appointed,two days before the plebiscite took place, and no doubt this appointmentmust have had an important effect in reassuring the voters that Cavour'sundertaking about decentralized government was receiving seriousconsideration. When the vote was over, however, it gradually becameclear that Cavour was adamant against anything which savoured in thevery least of a representative assembly, because he feared that this wouldfavour those autonomists or radicals who wanted to call his system inquestion. He was quite ready for Sicilian members to attend the parlia-ment at Turin, where tempers were cooler, the environment moreinhibiting, where old traditions of thought and behaviour were stronger,and where straightforward annexation would be defended by a com-fortable ministerial majority. But a purely Sicilian body meeting inPalermo was obviously dangerous, and if Sicilians had not taken this pointalready, so much the worse for them. Perhaps Cavour did not properlyappreciate that, intentionally or unintentionally, most of those whovoted had not been allowed to know what the vote was really about.The Marquis di Rudini had just been persuading his fellow Sicilians toapprove unconditional annexation on grounds which now almost seemlike deliberate deceit—namely that regional self-government could notbe denied by Piedmont, and that the word of Victor Emanuel waspledged on this point.2 The process of deception then came full circle;

1 16 October, Professor Amari to Mordini (AMB, b. 30).2 16 October, II Plebiscite, article by di Rudini.

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov. 403for Cavour did not appreciate that the docility of the south was some-thing artificial, and he therefore based his policy on the assumption thatno special concessions were needed. People's memories in politics areshort, and these intimations and half-promises were forgotten as thecentralistic implications of 'unconditional annexation' graduallybecame evident. Amari's council of state duly published a report inNovember,1 but its recommendations were discarded with contumelyby Cavour. Sicilian autonomy was hardly thought of again as apractical proposition until eighty-five years had gone by.

One cannot say that everyone was completely taken by surprise.On 25 October the British consul at Palermo, Goodwin, prosilyremarked that 'the step taken by the Sicilians in annexing their islandto the Italian States without limit or condition is a leap in the darkfraught peradventure with serious consequences'.2 The leading radicalsand autonomists were already aware, before the vote was taken, thatthey had been beaten. 'Cavour has won', lamented V Unita Italiana ofGenoa: 'the first act of the drama ended at Villafranca, the second isnow ending at Naples. God help Italy!'3 The southern radicals saw thatthey were being tricked into a sham plebiscite in which their real viewscould have no expression, and in which their wish for national unifica-tion forced them to vote for annexation to Piedmont. 'Instead of afree vote by the flower of our best citizens, it has been decided to consultthat of the multitude, ignorant and easily influenced';4 and yet, 'if weare given simply the alternative of Francesco II or Victor Emanuel,there cannot be much doubt about our choice'.5

This was precisely Mazzini's position. Mazzini had recognized sincethe beginning of October that 'the great majority of the country hasspoken now clearly enough that monarchy will be chosen as the wayto unity; and there is nothing bad in bowing to the national will, saveto try gently to modify and transform it'.6 He would have preferredthe continuance of dictatorial rule until the unification of Italy was

1 18 November (AMB, b. 30)2 25 October, Goodwin to Russell (F.O. 165/134).3 17 October, L* Unita Italiana (Genoa).4 19 October, // Pungolo (Naples), letter by Ricciardi.5 22 October, L9 Indipendente (Naples).6 c. 6 October, Mazzini to Emilie Venturi (Epistolario, vol. XLI, p. 136).

26-2

404 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct-Nov.complete; and once this course had been rejected, he would still havepreferred an assembly to a plebiscite, or would have welcomed bothtogether if necessary. The simple plebiscite by itself he disliked. A blindvote without prior discussion was open to great abuse. It had, forexample, been the method used by Napoleon to legitimize his coupd'etat. The very fact that a different method was chosen from that usedin Tuscany and Emilia was as much as to say that citizens of southernItaly were inferior to those of the centre, and it would thus offend theirdignity. It would also suppress any free expression of views in the southon whether annexation should be immediate or conditional. There wasno logic in barring an assembly in the south, when at the same time thedeputies at Turin had been able to debate at length in their assemblywhether and on what terms to accept this annexation. Mazzini madehis protest, but he then advised everyone to vote, and to vote 'yes', soas to obtain an enormous majority for submission to Victor Emanuel.He even told the republicans, or those of them who were not specificallybound by public pledges, that they must campaign actively for themonarchy.1

The radicals were more or less reconciled to defeat. They had triedtheir hardest to force a revolutionary policy on Piedmont, and hadsucceeded better than all but the most sanguine among them could havehoped. They now realized that surrender was their wisest and mostpatriotic course, and after 15 October they gradually split up or returnedinto exile. It was as well for Italy that they did so, for if the revolutionarygovernment had not surrendered over the plebiscite issue, Farini wasintending to march in to Naples against them,2 and this would irre-parably have turned Left against Right, south against north. Cattaneoreturned to Lombardy even before the vote was held, inveighing against'the king of Turin' for having imposed centralization on a countrywhich, far more than most others, was adapted to federalism. Bertaniand Mauro Macchi, when they voted in parliament for Cavour's lawof annexation, had been secretly praying that Crispi would somehowstill avert or postpone its application; but then Crispi had been defeatedby Pallavicino, and had left his post in Garibaldi's government. After

1 19 October, II Popolo d' Italia (Naples), quoted in Mazzini, Scritti politicly ed. naz.,vol. xxm, pp. 278-80.

2 12 October, Farini to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 93).

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov. 405this it was difficult for the extreme Left to rediscover a distinctive andpractical opposition policy. There was some hope that Crispi andMordini would manage to spend their last days of office setting asidea large sum of money for the 'party of action'.1 The radicals badlyneeded money, for they had exhausted their resources over the Sicilianexpedition, and wanted to restock so that their journals could be revivedand their election fund refurbished. As soon as Bertani saw his olivebranch scorned by the deputies in parliament, he had become hard andunyielding once more, and soon was again suggesting that Garibaldishould retire to Sicily and keep his army intact there for some newventure.2 He sometimes wondered whether Garibaldi, Mazzini andCattaneo could not somehow be persuaded to see eye to eye, and in thisway perhaps Italian politics could be brought to life again.3 In themeantime there was no denying that Cavour had momentarilyrecovered his popularity by the invasion of central Italy, and theopposition would therefore have to wait until he came to debate thedifficult problems of internal reorganization before they could hope todetach part of his majority and encompass his defeat.4

Garibaldi remained the chief hope of the' party of action \ For nearlythree weeks after the plebiscite he continued to rule in Naples andSicily, until the king could arrive and the certified results of the votecould be formally presented. The dictator's actions continued to provethat he was no would-be Caesar. He did not try to make politicalcapital out of the grievances of the south or of his volunteer army. Heconfirmed the moderates in office, and did what he could to see that theking took over a working administration. If he fell short on this lasttask it was due in part to his own incapacity for administration, in partto his concentration upon the war effort, but perhaps even more to theway he was being called upon to surrender his power. Pallavicino'svictory over Crispi deprived his government of its most energetic man,and the political defeat of the radicals took away much of the original

1 30 September, Bertani to Mordini (ACP, b. 135); 4 October, Asproni fromTurin to Crispi (ACP, f. 138; not given in the published version of CrispinsMemoirs).

2 25 October, Bertani to Garibaldi (copy in ABCM).3 24 March 1861, Bertani to Garibaldi (ACM, no. 1512).4 15 October, // Pungolo (Naples), report from Turin dated 12 October.

406 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct-Nov.excitement and enthusiasm which had attended his movement. As thevision of a march on Rome faded away, so the volunteers realized thatthey had little left to fight for; and as morale cracked, so desertionsmultiplied. Such a scratch army as this was no good for defence, buthad only been successful when it had a goal and a triumphant sense ofmission. Neapolitans knew that Victor Emanuel was coming soon witha different programme, and this was the most important factor inbringing governmental activity to a standstill. Many people did notwant to be compromised in the eyes of Cavour by gratuitously servingthe dictator. And the result was a virtual interregnum. Since therewere three separate governments ruling in different parts of the regno,the populace was just waiting for one to overcome the others andrestore the land to peace and normality.

In these three weeks anarchy spread contagiously, and early signs ofa Bourbon counter-revolution began to appear in every province fromCalabria to the Abruzzi. Garibaldi was waiting to submit his powersto the king, but unfortunately the king had to delay his arrival. ThePiedmontese did not want it to be thought that the plebiscite had beeninfluenced by the presence of northern bayonets. They were anxiousnot to occupy too much Neapolitan territory before the attested resultsof the vote had proved their right to annex the south. For this reason,and even more because General Fanti did not want to inflate Garibaldi'sprestige any further, the seven thousand Piedmontese soldiers atNaples were not yet permitted to aid the volunteers attacking Capua,even when the latter were in trouble.1 Another reason why the kingdelayed his arrival was because, on Fanti's advice, he wanted to enterNaples only when he had shown his mettle in some signal feat of armsagainst the Bourbons.2 Once he had staked his reputation on this, evenCavour had to agree that it would be undignified to invite comparisonwith the dictator until he had some success to his credit. Naples wastherefore left in a state of uncertainty. The point was eventually reachedwhere this was called deliberate policy, an attempt to show up Garibaldi'sregime as a symbol of anarchy.

1 17 October, Farini to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 131); 18 October,Persano to Cavour (ibid. p. 137).

2 27 October, Farini to Cavour (ibid. pp. 207-8); 31 October, Farini to Cavour(ibid. p. 239).

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov. 407Farini, whom Cavour had designated to be the future 'dictator' of

Naples, by now knew more or less about the troubles which lay aheadof him. 'The reputation of our government is at stake: if we fail to setup an honest and strong rule at Naples we shall be jeered throughoutEurope.'* His first impression of the Neapolitans was not flattering, andcompared unfavourably with Garibaldi's. As he wrote to tell Cavour,they were barbarians who cared little for liberty: 'the country here isnot Italy but Africa, and the bedouin are the flower of civic virtue whencompared to these people.'2 This was not a hopeful commencement toannexation. But the diplomatic difficulties in sight were perhaps evenmore alarming still. While the king was slowly marching through theAbruzzi, ingratiating himself by the distribution of medals to the localnotables and endowments to the churches, Cavour was seriouslyperturbed between 20 and 30 October by the diplomatic congress ofWarsaw, where Austria had hoped to turn Europe against Italy.Another disaster was that, on 26 October, Louis Napoleon put his vetoon Persano's naval blockade of Gaeta, and this at once became a seriousimpediment to the national forces. It was a more hopeful sign when, onthe same day, Garibaldi advanced to welcome the king in person and tomake arrangements for the transference of power. By the end of themonth the danger threatening from Warsaw also turned out to havebeen more in apprehension than reality. The volunteers and regularswere then allowed to combine in the final assault on Capua; and whenthis fortress fell on 2 November, the king could at last turn his facetowards Naples.

The concluding days of October had inevitably witnessed someintensification of party differences, with all the personal intrigue andjostling for place which Garibaldi found so distasteful, and to which hewas so unequal. When he heard that his successor was to be none otherthan the detested Farini, he had at first made up his mind to leave Naplesbefore the northern troops arrived.3 But sensibly he gave way to

1 13 October, Farini to Guglianetti (ibid. p. 102).2 17 October, Farini to Cavour (ibid. pp. 131-2); 27 October, Farini to Cavour

(ibid. pp. 207-8); cf. 29 October, Garibaldi to Victor Emanuel, where he describesthe Neapolitans as intelligent, docile and self-sacrificing, and full of good will (ibid.p. 224).

3 21 October, Mancini to Cavour (ibid. pp. 160-1).

408 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct.-Nov.entreaties that his own popularity should not be dissociated from thenew regime in this difficult moment of transition. The general'spopularity was still enormous among the common people.1 At thespecial instance of the king, the dictator therefore entered the city inthe same carriage with Victor Emanuel himself. On 8 November heofficially handed over his power. His last request of the king was to beallowed to stay on in the south as viceroy with ample powers insteadof Farini, using his influence there to tide over the difficult period ofunification; but the king said he must first consult with Farini, and ofcourse the proposal was then turned down as quite incompatible withthe triumph of liberal-conservatism.2 All they could offer him werethings that he did not want and which he refused, money, titles, a castle,and even a private steamer for his own use. Farini boasted that, in thecourse of these delicate exchanges, he personally had never once spokento Garibaldi, nor even so much as looked him in the face.3 The wholesituation was a little unreal; and what should have been a triumphantclimax to six months' valiant effort turned out to be an anti-climax,slightly sour and graceless.

The time had come for Garibaldi to leave southern Italy. If he wassorry about anything, it was chiefly that he had not been able to bestowRome as well as Naples and Sicily upon his sovereign. He was also, andforgivably, a little sorry for himself. As he sadly remarked to thePiedmontese admiral, * this is what happens, Persano, they just treat menlike oranges, pressing out the juice to the last drop, and throwing chepeel away into a corner'.4 The king offered to make him a full general,but he answered that he had not come to Sicily to make his career, andthe notice of his appointment was crumpled up and thrown out of thewindow. There was still other work for him to do with the volunteers.He had given his promise not to retire into respectable idleness untilItaly was a great nation,5 and was determined that there should be nomore than a temporary hiatus in the revolution. Mazzini tells how he

1 4 November, E. Maison, Journal d'un volontaire de Garibaldi, 1861, p. 193.2 E. Delia Rocca, Autobiografia di un veterano, vol. 11, 1898, pp. 96-7.3 14 November, Farini to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 324).4 8 November, Persano, Diario 1860-1, part iv, p. 119.5 29 September, Garibaldi's speech at Caserta (Edizione nazionale degli scritti di

Garibaldi, vol. iv, p. 310).

The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct-Nov. 409went to see the retiring dictator before he departed, and how theydiscussed whether there was any means of overthrowing Cavour duringthe winter months and then proceeding to the redemption of Venice.1On one point Garibaldi felt certain, that he ought to retain his freedomof action for another military campaign in the spring of 1861, and hisfarewell proclamation to the volunteers accordingly warned them tobe ready again at any moment.2 Frequent private and public referencesto another movement in preparation for March 1861 suggest that hemay have mentioned this date to the king and not been discouraged.The national revolution was everything to him, domestic politics inthemselves were nothing—this was where he chiefly differed from thepoliticians of Turin. As he said, 'it does not matter to me if the primeminister be called Cavour or Cattaneo (though far better the second),so long as on 1 March 1861 Victor Emanuel shall be found at the headof five hundred thousand soldiers'.3

When on 9 November Garibaldi quietly left with his bag of seedcornfor the lonely island of Caprera, the moment had come when Cavourcould set about curing the last symptoms of'the Garibaldian disease'.The calling of parliament had already effected a cure in the north. Itwas obvious that the south would need a longer time to forget andrecover. Cavour had the option of killing by kindness, that is to say ofneutralizing opposition by winning over the radicals and autonomistshe had just outplayed. But instead he decided that Garibaldi had to bereduced by all possible means to life-size, so that the legend of hissuccess and his benevolence should be forgotten. Hoping to smoothover the transition, the Giornale Officiate kept silence on Garibaldi'sdeparture for several days. In another unfortunate display of badmanners, the king had called the volunteers out for a special inspectionbut then omitted to turn up himself. Farini expressly forbad thesinging of Garibaldi's hymn, and when he came to assume officially theposition of viceroy, he too made no mention of his predecessor. It wasall of a piece that the city of Turin, when it summoned citizens tocelebrate the fall of Capua, did not think fit to refer to such a dangerous

1 8 November, Mazzini to Caroline Stansfeld (Epistolario, vol. XLI, pp. 184-5).2 G. Bandi, I mille, 1903, p. 339.3 28 November, Garibaldi from Caprera (Edizione nazionale degli scritti di Garibaldi,

vol. iv, p. 337).

410 The Doubtful Significance of the Vote: Oct-Nov.and despicable character;* nor did the parliamentary deputation mentionhis name when they carried their official congratulations to Naples andSicily on the revolution just completed.2 In sum this amounted to morethan mere bad manners, it was calculated policy. Garibaldi had shownhimself at his best when he went into retirement, and his successorsappeared gauche and clumsy in comparison.

1 6 November, II Diritto (Turin), pointing out that this was noticeably differentfrom the practice at Milan.

2 Ed. De Vecchi, Le carte di Giovanni Lanza, vol. n, pp. 175-7.

CHAPTER XXVII

CAVOUR'S GOVERNMENT IN THESOUTH: NOVEMBER-DECEMBER

Despite many forebodings in the south, Cavour convinced himself thatcompromise would now be undignified, unnecessary and even unwise.Michele Amari's council of state made a report on the special needsand interests of Sicily, and the report was signed by twenty-threerespectable and even prominent people; but its suggestions could by nomeans be accepted, for it was assumed that they threatened to questionthe whole system of centralized monarchy. Cavour was too busy tohave enough time left over for affairs in Sicily, and in any case theabsence of the king and some of the ministers in southern Italy fornearly three months meant that no new departure in policy couldeasily be considered. The prime minister had to concern himself farmore with the opposition of those who championed 'little Piedmont'than with those who wanted a 'little Sicily'; and for domestic consump-tion in Turin he therefore had to gild the merger of Piedmont intogreater Italy by stressing that it was just another annexation in the'artichoke' tradition of Piedmontese aggrandizement. Another diffi-culty was that any special concession to the south might upset theprocess of levelling out between one region and another, and so mightdamage the delicate plant of nationalism before it was strong enoughto fend for itself. Safer far to graft the new provinces on to the old,imposing on them common institutions and so far as possible a commonway of life which had already been found to be both tough andbroadly acceptable. The only alternative would have been to allow aconstituent assembly to recast the very fundamentals of the state; andthis would be dangerous, and possibly also impracticable. It had to be' annexation' and not 'fusion', for this first word signified that Italy wasno new creation, but a development and projection of that virilesubalpine kingdom which had contributed much the largest share tothe national cause.1 As a demonstration of this, although the existence

1 27 September, La Perseveranza, answering II Nazionale of Naples.

412 Cavou/s Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.of a kingdom of Italy could now be proclaimed, Victor Emanuelwasdeclared to be not the first but still the second of that name. The newparliament was to rank eighth and not first in the official calendar.Cavour had formally stated that he would accept only unconditionalannexation, and he consistently maintained that the plebiscite gave himthe unqualified submission which he had required. Notwithstandingall the hopes of Sicilians and the hints given earlier from the north,Piedmont was in fact going to impose her institutions; just as if, despitethe modified formula of the plebiscite, it was really an 'annexation',and as if the revolution of Sicily had been all along a 'conquest'. Cavourcould at least argue in self-justification that some intelligent Sicilianspreferred this.

Possibly this was the only policy which in the circumstances couldhave succeeded at all. It was not only that Piedmont had sacrificed hermen and money most liberally for the common cause, but she was alsoof all the five main states in Italy the one with the hardiest political lifeand traditions; and this must in any case have given her a dominant partto play. What could be objected to was less the fact of her hegemonythan its manner, and in particular the ostentatious insistence that thesouth was a backward and primitive region which would have to be'piedmontized' for its own good. A prevalent assumption in Turinnow made out that Naples was rotten 'jusqu'a la moelle des os',1 andwas the worst country in Europe for 'weakness, vice and filth'.2Nature was said to have endowed the south liberally as a Garden ofEden, but only to have these natural endowments squandered by afeckless and irresponsible population. This was an astonishing mis-conception, and a highly dangerous one. People could in all seriousnessspeak of how 'with our strength, our greater courage, our superiorintelligence and morality, with our experience and character, we shallbe able to govern and to tame' the south.3 Even if there was some truthin this basic assumption, it was not always very tactfully expressed, andits authors were often blinded by this self-satisfaction to a correct view

1 30 November, Cavour's words quoted by Hudson to Russell (RP G.D. 22/66).z December, diary of General Solaroli at Naples with the king (CC Lib. del Mezz.

vol. v).3 6 November, Pantaleoni from Rome to Cavour (CC La Questione Romana,

vol. 1, p. 70).

Cavou/s Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 413of other things. Furthermore, if the south was after all so backward,why then was it not accorded special laws and specially kind andliberal consideration?

One example of this lack of tact may be found in the letters of theminister of justice at Turin. They show that he knew nothing of southernlaw codes—one thing upon which Neapolitans especially prided them-selves—and yet he had already secured in October a cabinet decisionthat Piedmontese laws should as a matter of principle be introduced atonce. There was no idea even of waiting until parliament could meetand debate such a measure. On the contrary, it was intentionallycalculated to present the deputies with a fait accompli, so as to escapeunwelcome discussion and not to waste parliamentary time oivtrivialities. There was little appreciation that it might be better to graftwith care, and not to try and impose new growth too radically on oldstock. There was no suggestion even of holding an inquest by expertsto see what could or should be done, and how best to set about it.The one doubt of the minister of justice was whether the south wassufficiently advanced for the introduction of juries :* he thought probablynot. In other words, the south had the worst of both worlds. She wasgoing to be despised and resented as a depressed area, but withoutreceiving the specially favourable attention which she needed and hadbeen promised, without being cushioned against the impact of a newfree-trade world in the north, without being allowed special laws andinstitutions which might have been more suitable to her experience andcapabilities.

Such 'piedmontization', as it was already being called with deroga-tory implication, may have been in substance legitimate;2 but it was toosuddenly and too universally introduced, it ignored the human element,overstressing symmetry and rounded edges, and assuming that societycould easily be taken apart and put together again. By a piece ofpolitical sentimentalism, these important geographic, economic andmoral disparities were sometimes treated as non-existent, though it wasupon them that this self-conscious superiority had first been based,People were torn up by the roots, and then it was wondered why they

1 30 October, Cassinis from Turin to Mancini (Archivio Mancini MRR).2 B. Croce, Pagine Sparse, vol. n, 1943, p. n o ; G. Racioppi, Storia dei mod di Basili-

cata e delle provincie contermini nel i86ot 1910, p. 321.

414 Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.wilted in the glorious release which liberal Piedmont was meant to bebringing them. This was a policy which seemed to grow up empiricallyand almost by accident. In fact it arose naturally from the attitude ofmind with which northerners approached the 'Augean stable', asd'Azeglio called the south; and it contributed its share to the unbalancewhich has affected Italian life ever since.

Cavour was wont to call the radicals doctrinaire and revolutionary,but they were not so doctrinaire as this, nor so revolutionary. His chiefarticle of attack against his political enemies was precisely that uponwhich his own system turned out to be most vulnerable. Mazzini knewmore than Cavour about the south, and had a better opinion ofsoutherners. He knew that they were ill-educated and inevitably un-practised in honest self-government, but he acted on the assumptionthat their instincts were good and that they had at least something toteach the rest of Italy. The federalists, too, were not after all so veryunpractical by comparison. One of Cattaneo's favourite themes, andone which bolstered his belief in regional devolution, was that anychange of law or custom was wrong if made just for the sake ofuniformity or administrative convenience; such a change would breakwith tradition and thereby inflict a wound which would not heaLCattaneo believed that Italy could not help but be many societies as wellas one society. Local differences had been so deeply embedded inItalian life since the Middle Ages, that in i860 even the volunteer unitsfrom neighbouring towns like Florence, Pisa and Leghorn were onoccasion at odds through municipal jealousies;T and the feeling of Sicilyagainst Naples had overridden all class barriers and political divisions tomake one of the most fundamental motives in the national revolution.Cattaneo accepted such provincial feelings and tried to make the best ofthem. Cavour's government rather tried to pretend that they did notexist, or at least that they could be suppressed and then ignored withimpunity. But, so treated, they were only driven into subversivechannels.

Many susceptibilities were offended by the insensitive and high-handed treatment which was sometimes allotted to the rest of Italy bythe Piedmontese. Some people—and not only Tuscans—were, forinstance, convinced that Florence would make a better capital of Italy

1 16 August, police report (BR ASF, b. P, f. A).

Cavour}s Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 415than Turin, whether on political, strategic, historical or cultural grounds.1

Piedmont was perhaps the least Italian among Italian provinces, her dia-lect was remote from classical Italian, members of her ruling classes(including both Cavour and the king) still spoke French or patois forpreference, and her history was transalpine as much as cisalpine. Somesoutherners thought that there were 'invincible arguments' for havingthe capital city at Naples, since this was far the largest city in the penin-sula and strategically much better placed than Turin.2 Each of the mainregions of the peninsula had its own local patriotism, and not leastPiedmont itself. By the end of October Ricasoli was feeling that onlythe speedy acquisition of Rome would make Italy a nation; for 'other-wise the scandalous Piedmontese bureaucracy will impel us to anotherrevolution to get rid of a yoke which I find more antipathetic than theAustrian. They will not believe that we want to be Italians and have anItalian soul rather than be automatons on their model.'3 It is astonishingthat so much ill will as this should have been so quickly generated,especially as Ricasoli was next in importance after Cavour himselfinside the moderate-conservative party. Again, when Cavour antici-pated the plebiscite by issuing decrees for 'those provinces not yetannexed', Sicilians pointed out very pertinently that this was gratuitousregional arrogance, and that the form of vote said nothing of annexationand nothing of Piedmont or Sardinia, but only of union with Italy. ' Sowhich are these provinces "not yet annexed"? Does he mean theRomagna, or Venice, or even Piedmont itself?... His decree is in factpremature and illegal, and is bound to offend people; it represents theaction not of a friendly government, but of a party out at all costs tooverthrow another.'4

The clash of interest between north and south was seen clearly whenProfessor Amari, who earlier in the year had been persuaded by Cavourthat Sicily would receive regional self-government, approached theprime minister for his bond. 'Regional councils are indispensable forthe conduct of local affairs', said Amari, and 'it would be a mistake to

1 M. cTAzeglio, Questioni urgenti, 1861; Palmerston and Prince Napoleon alsoadvised this.

2 E. Cenni, Napoli e V Italia: considerazioni, pp. 92 ff.3 28 October, Ricasoli to Silvestrelli (Carteggio di Ricasoli, ed. Nobili and Camerani).4 1 November, L* Unita Italiana (Palermo).

416 Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.think that local "self-government" was not useful and even necessaryfor Italians.'1 But an unexpectedly discouraging reply came to thisappeal. ' Cavour could not allow that Sicily should have any elective anddeliberative council.'2 Here was an unexpected change of temper. Oneinteresting point about it is that Cavour had only just received con-firmation from one of his own cabinet colleagues that 'autonomism'was the prevailing sentiment in both Sicily and Naples.3 It may be, thatis to say, that he now thought his earlier intentions were probably toodangerous to carry out. Whatever the reason for it, a similar change inthe same direction is noticeable in L' Opinione, the paper in whichCavour's private views were usually seen. In September this paper hadbeen writing about the special need of Sicily for regional autonomy.But by December, when the plebiscite had been fought and won, it wascalling decentralization just a temporary expedient: 'we are admirersof the strong, unifying system of France, even though we do not thinkit would be possible to introduce this in Italy all at once. Our pro-vincial traditions are too strong for us to cancel them in the space of afew months.'4

For all their protests, the statesmen of northern Italy do seem to havefound much to admire in French administrative practice, and historywas to show that in practice their policy was to compel the south intotheir centralized system. Hints continued to be dropped that, whenpassions had cooled and present problems had been settled, it mightbecome possible to introduce 'a real regional self-government';5 yetCavour's mature wish, it appears, was not for as much regional

1 19 December, Professor Amari to Count Amari (Carteggio di Amari, ed. d'Ancona,vol. 11, p. 144).

2 16 December, Count Amari to Professor Amari {ibid. p. 141).3 9 December, Cassinis from Palermo to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. iv).4 13 December, V Opinione; for the link between this paper and Cavour see

L. Chiala, Giacomo Dina e V opera sua nelle vicende del risorgimento italiano, especiallyvol. 1, 1896, p. 321.

5 15 January 1861, Cavour to Montezemolo: 'we are in favour of decentralization;our political ideas do not allow that a capital city should tyrannize over the provinces;nor will we tolerate a bureaucracy that subdues every part of the realm to an artificialcentre, and against which both our national traditions and our geographic conforma-tion would be in conflict. I hope that when quiet times return.. .we shall be able toconcede a real regional self-government9 (Bollea, Una silloge di lettere, pp. 423-4).

Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 417devolution as was consistent with unity, but rather for as much centrali-zation as he could possibly achieve over the inherent municipalismor campanilismo of the Italian people. He believed in a strong Italy.Cabinet policy continued to be to impose as much as possible ofPiedmontese laws on the south before parliament could meet andquestion the process;1 and when Amari protested that this was illegal,the bald answer was shamelessly given in public that 'the action of thegovernment must not be judged by the rigid criterion of what waslegal, only by what was expedient in the circumstances'.2 Whenparliament met and Ferrari rose to put forward his scheme for a radicalreorganization of the state by large concessions of local autonomy, hewas three times called to order on the grounds that 'the integrity of thekingdom of Italy cannot be discussed'.3 This particular issue had alreadybeen settled out of court, and without even hearing what the defendanthad to say.

The process of 'piedmontization' was in the long run to do muchgood as well as harm in the south, for Piedmont had much to teachother provinces in the way of honest administration. But the newgovernment was overconscious of this fact, and did not also realize thatit might have something to learn. The dominant class in the south wasone of landowners, tenacious of privilege and tradition, who werequick to resent this narrow, unsympathetic, unimaginative bureaucracyclamped down on them, with its rigid rules of behaviour, and inabilityto adapt itself to a new milieu with a different culture and differentvalues. Such as they were, the benefits of the new system were slow tosink downwards, whereas its weak points were obvious at once.

It would enlarge too much the scope of this work to discuss in anydetail the years of emergency government in the south after Novemberi860, with all the various political experiments and expedients whichwere tried in turn to help assimilate the south into the northern system.Many reputations were ruined in the process, thousand of lives werelost, a large-scale, cruelly-fought and protracted civil war had to beendured, harsh and illiberal laws had to be applied; and it was all only

1 30 January 1861, Cassinis, minister of justice, to Mancini (Archivio Mancini MRR).2 5 April 1861, Amari and Cassinis, Atti Parlamentari.3 4 April 1861, Atti Parlamentari.

27

4i8 Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.partially successful, because Naples and Sicily still obstinately continuedin many of their own ways, and any gains had to be set off against thegrowth of bitter feelings between north and south. The developmentof a 'southern question' in Italy is a history all of its own. But the firstfew months of Cavour's government constitute an important chapterin the story, as well as providing an illuminating epilogue to thehistory of Garibaldi's dictatorship. Many of the arguments used againstGaribaldi's 'incompetence' and 'tyranny' are put into a better perspec-tive when viewed alongside the later conduct of his very critics. Forthose same critics proved to be equally incompetent and even moretyrannical when they came to tackle the same problems, though theywere far cleverer men than he, and had far greater resources, as well ashaving the benefit of his own earlier experience to guide them. Someadditional light is also thrown by this epilogue upon the plebisciteitself, on its significance, on the motives behind the affirmative vote, andon the whole issue of whether a plebiscite was so much more suitablethan an assembly. Not many days went by after 21 October i860before the ninety-nine per cent majority for 'annexation' began to lookvery dubious.

Luigi Carlo Farini, whom the king took to Naples with him as hisviceroy, did not last in office as long as Garibaldi had done, and hisperiod of government was inglorious as it was brief. Like othernortherners, he came full of confidence that he knew the answers betterthan Garibaldi and Crispi; but after only a few hours of personalacquaintance with southern problems he began to fear that this wouldbe the tomb of his political reputation.1 He arrived with no set policy,and was overtaken by disaster before he had really decided what heintended to do. At first he gave out hopefully that his governmentwould be one of concord, but when it came to deeds he showed thathis set policy was precisely the reverse. The most influential, andapparently the most popular, man in Naples was Liborio Romano2 acamorrista who successfully managed to serve Francesco, Garibaldi andCavour in turn; and Romano squarely blamed the returned exiles forhaving given Farini the wrong advice. In their stay at Turin and

1 10 November, Farini to Cassinis (CF).2 In the elections of February 1861, Liborio Romano was elected in eight colleges,

and no one else was elected in more than three, Cavour included.

Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 419Florence between 1848 and i860, these southerners had learned todespise their less fortunate brethren who had stayed at home. Now theywere back again at Naples with Farini, and 'modestly believed thatthere was nothing good here except themselves, and held our provincesto be ungovernable, degraded and immoral'.1 They also had a particulargrudge against the Garibaldians which they were determined to repay,for Garibaldi had first succeeded at Naples where they had failed, andthen had managed to govern without resorting to their help as much asthey would have liked. Unfortunately, these frustrated and embitteredmen were those upon whom Cavour chiefly relied for advice, and theysoon filled all the important departmental posts in Farini's government.

The manner in which Garibaldi's last days in Naples had been sospoiled by a sense of neglect and ingratitude gave the worst possiblestart to the new viceroy. Cavour protested he was sorry for this, but,if he spoke true, he must have realized too late the dangerous con-sequences of his own policy. He had received numbers of warnings,both from his own friends in the south and also from leading statesmenin other countries, that he must prevent Garibaldi appearing as avictim. But in practice he found it impossible simultaneously todepreciate Garibaldianism and to pacify Garibaldi. On this dilemmahis policy came to grief. Nor did he even try very hard to resolve it.For he had made up his mind in advance that it would be impolitic ifnot impossible to make the least compromise in substance. The firstday of the new regime in Naples revealed to Elliot that there was'serious dissatisfaction among some classes' at the treatment given tothe dictator, for which the 'Ministers cannot be acquitted of want ofconsideration and generosity'.2 Cavour's lack of generosity or under-standing in this matter comes out particularly in small points from hisprivate correspondence, for example in his innuendo about the volun-teers who had been eager only to hold exalted rank and skulk behindthe lines in the gay society of Naples.3 What seemed an unnecessarilyrigid scrutiny was now applied to those volunteer officers who wantedto transfer or return to the regular army; only about a quarter wereadmitted, after long delay. Survivors of the original Thousand fared

1 Ed. G. Romano, Memorie politiche di Liborio Romano, 1873, pp. 97-8.2 9 November, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 70/321/625).3 26 October, Cavour telegram to Persano (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 190).

27-2

420 CavouSs Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.better, and sixteen of them eventually became regular generals; butfor most of the others, the impression was all too common that theywere undesirables, who had joined Garibaldi for their own privateamusement, and whose very existence constituted a sign of disrespectto General Fanti and his colleagues. On the other hand, the formerBourbonist officers, since they came from a regular army even if adefeated one, were sometimes taken on more readily, and had theirpromotions confirmed even when these had been won in fightingagainst the Garibaldians. There was a widespread sense of disgust evenamong the conservatives when the traitor Nunziante at once becamea general in the Sardinian army.1

Another point of ungenerosity which did not go unnoticed was thatPallavicino had a high order bestowed on him by the king, whileMordini, who had been a prodictator for longer, and was in exactly thesame position except that he was not a marquis and had been more loyalto the dictator's wishes, was offered none. Garibaldi wrote to expos-tulate with Pallavicino, saying that he had thought him above acceptingsuch a reward in these circumstances. Mordini then tried to smoothover the slight by saying that he personally did not want any decoration.But foreign newspapers, notably The Times and the Debats, seized onthis and other signs of political discrimination and ingratitude toimpugn the government. Even Pallavicino had to protest to Cavourthat none of his own recommendations for public recognition wereacted upon by Farini. Garibaldi's ministers had been moderate enough,and Farini's neglect of them was now taken—as was certainly intended—to be a deliberate discourtesy. Small wonder if the Garibaldians, manyof whom had sacrificed everything for Italy, became a focus of dis-content in the regno.

One particular source of embarrassment was the inability to explainwhy Cavour was not accompanying the king to Naples and Palermo,for the two had gone together to Milan and Florence and the otherregional capitals on similar occasions in the past. Legend has it thatCavour's absence was due to 'an exquisite sense of delicacy towards thedictator';2 but it may be doubted if his views in reality were either sosimple or so considerate. For a while he had debated whether he ought

1 28 November, La Farina from Naples to Cavour (CCLib. delMezz. vol. 111, p. 396).2 I. Nazari-Micheli, Cavour e Garibaldi nel i860, 1911, p. 187.

Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 421to go and see at first hand the facts on which to base a policy for thesouth. Perhaps if he had gone he might have realized the need tomodify his attitude in detail. Upon consideration, however, he beganto fear that he could not increase his reputation at Naples, but only loseit with nothing to gain thereby, and this would be a disaster for himselfas well as for the country.1 He gave two other excuses to Lady Hollandwhen she pleaded with him to come and see things for himself: first, thedangers of the diplomatic situation; and second, the fact that theGaribaldians at Naples had an 'absurd antipathy' towards him.2 Butthese were hardly satisfactory as explanations, because by the beginningof November both France and Britain had assured Piedmont against anAustrian invasion, and Garibaldi had already intimated that he wouldrather hand over his command to Cavour than to Farini.3 Moreplausible than these semi-public explanations is the remarkable excusewhich Cavour gave privately to Farini on 9 November:

the king does not like me, and is jealous; he puts up with me as a minister,but is glad when I am not at his side. Also La Rosa [the king's mistress] isat Naples, and my arrival there would irritate her As the representativeof the monarchical principle I am ready to sacrifice for the king my life andeverything I own; but as a man I ask of him but one favour, to remain asfar away from his person as possible.4

This was a statement which carries some conviction with it, forseldom is one more sure of having Cavour's genuine thoughts thanwhen he was writing in private to a close friend with a letter that couldnot have been intended to leak out into general currency. It is the moreinteresting to note that Farini in reply quite discounted this particularargument, and repeated an urgent request that Cavour should comesouth himself. In the next few days the prime minister had confirma-tion severally from Farini, Montezemolo, La Farina, Cordova, Manciniand his own minister of justice Cassinis, that his presence at Naples was'absolutely necessary' for the successful solution of the southernquestion; and all of these men had the advantage over him of basing

1 14 December, Cavour to Cassinis (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. iv, pp. 122-3).2 c. 4 November, Cavour to Lady Holland at Naples (ibid. vol. vi, p. 642).3 21 October, Mancini to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, pp. 160-1).4 9 November, Cavour to Farini (ibid. p. 302).

422 Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.their advice on first-hand evidence about conditions at Naples and theking's state of mind.1 All his most trusted correspondents in Napleswere thus at one in giving him the same advice. But Cavour remainedadamant in the face of these petitions. He gives the impression of beingnonplussed, of having no solution to offer the south for the momentexcept the unpopular one of repression, and hence of preferring to stayat home to preserve his reputation for the public good. Because of thishe never broadened his experience by travelling to the centre or southto see for himself the new Italy which he had done so much to create;and the result was that no long-term policy for the south had beenworked out by the time of his death. In two hours' conversation withLacaita,' Cavour acknowledged that he knows the people, the country,the laws, etc. of England much better than he does those of Naples, andhad therefore to rely on the information given by the exiles'.2 Worsestill, his presence in Turin, while the king was in Naples and Sicily,created a dangerous duality of government. Cavour said he had fore-seen this; and he also said that he had known before Victor Emanuelleft Turin that it was a great mistake to let the king go off at all.3 Thesewere surprising admissions to make. Past precedents showed clearlythat Victor Emanuel was almost bound to adopt a distinct policy of hisown, and in practice Cavour was hardly going to be able to make hisown wishes prevail even by repeated threats of resignation. In one casepower was divorced from responsibility, in the other it was divorcedfrom a knowledge of the relevant facts; and the combination of thetwo was most regrettable in this critical hour of Italian history.

Victor Emanuel and Farini were thus allowed to go and lose theirreputations instead. Even before they could arrive in Naples the generalimpression was growing that the results of the plebiscite were un-trustworthy, and hence that both the basis and the justification for theirpower were insecurely founded. Among people who had personally

1 14 November, Farini to Cavour (ibid. p. 321); 13 November, Montezemolo toCavour (ibid. p. 318); 13 November, La Farina to Cavour (ibid. p. 320); 14 November,Mancini to Cavour (ibid. pp. 330-1); 20 November, Cassinis to Cavour (ibid. pp.349-54); 23 November, Cordova to Cavour (ibid. p. 372).

2 8 December, diary of Lacaita (An Italian Englishman, ed. C. Lacaita, p. 157).3 16 December, Cavour to Cassinis (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. iv); 23 December

(ibid.); 23 December, Cavour to Farini (ibid.).

Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 423observed the proceedings at Naples, there were some who had neverbeen deceived. Admiral Mundy noted that 'under regulations such asthose I must chronicle my opinion that a plebiscite by universal suffragecannot be received as a correct representation of the real feeling of anation'.1 Elliot, who did not underestimate the immediate wish forannexation, still thought that 'the vote has been the most ridiculousfarce imaginable, and there was never even a pretence of confining it tothose who were qualified, people of all countries and all ages and bothsexes having had no difficulty in recording their voice'.2 A thirdBritish citizen who witnessed the voting was the public orator ofCambridge University, W. G. Clark, and he said much the same:' Cavour made a flaw in his claim by resting it on a successful repetitionof that French juggling imposture which is as discreditable to statesmenas the miracle of San Gennaro is to priests.'3 As a device it had servedwell enough its primary purpose: it had given Louis Napoleon toimagine that a unitary state was the will of the people, and thereforecould not be gainsaid without peril. But in the process it had alsodeceived Cavour into adopting a more high-handed attitude than thesituation warranted or than he could properly afford. The king, on theother hand, quickly learnt the true state of affairs from what he saw onthe spot. Victor Emanuel 'had thought to come at the call of the wholepopulation', and was disillusioned to discover that 'he is here as a con-queror'. By 6 November what he had seen of the provinces hadchanged his mind about the significance of the plebiscite. 'His Majestyseemed perfectly aware of the little value it deserves as an evidence ofthe deliberate wishes of the Nation.'4 Here was another reason for thetwo leading representatives of united Italy—monarch and minister—falling out of step with each other.

The king's government certainly came into a bad inheritance. AsFarini put it, 'I had to take over the legacy of Garibaldi, that is to saymany debts, no money in the exchequer, thirty or forty thousandundisciplined soldiers, and some of the provinces in sedition'.5 But it

1 22 October, diary of Mundy (H.M.S. Hannibal at Palermo and Naples, p. 258).2 30 October, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).3 W. G. Clark, * Naples and Garibaldi', in F. Galton, Vacation tourists in 1860, 1861,

p. 65. 4 6 November, Elliot to Russell (F.O. 70/321/627).5 29 December, Farini to Cavour (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. iv),

424 Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.made matters worse that Farini arrived without the least idea of whathe was going to do. In the same way as he had left Turin withoutknowing what attitude he should maintain towards the Bourbons, sohe had not even settled with Cavour what powers his viceregal govern-ment should possess on arrival at Naples.1 One is reminded of the way-La Farina was sent to Sicily in June, with no very clearly defined policyto carry out, and yet with sufficient powers to tie the hands of the homegovernment and do a lot of mischief. The citizenry had been led toexpect sudden and important provisions from Farini, but days nowwent by without a single enactment of any sort, and it soon emergedclearly that the new government had no panacea. A week had not goneby before there were cries in the street of 'Down with Victor Emanuel,we want Garibaldi', even of 'Viva Mazzini' and 'Viva Francesco'.Farini sadly concluded that 'annexation must have been approved bythis people not out of warmth of national feeling, but in fear of aBourbon return and of Garibaldismo9,2 By 14 November he wasbegging Cavour to replace him with a new governor. Many of thesentiments which had successively weakened people's allegiance toFrancesco and Garibaldi were at work once more against VictorEmanuel. The same social revolution which at one point had contributedso much to Garibaldi's original success was breaking out again, this timeagainst the national movement and in the name of the Pope and theBourbons. As pious Catholics, many elements in the populationsecretly or openly resented the new secular government which haddeclared war on the Pope. The rule of Victor Emanuel was to provemore rapacious and before long also more efficient than the old, and itwas to be disliked for its efficiency as well as its rapacity by the peasantswho formed the enormous majority of the people. From the point ofview of the peasants, the landlord class was now more than ever incontrol; and hence the social counter-revolution represented by thedissolution of the monasteries and enclosure of common lands was toreceive official encouragement to an extent that had never been knownunder the ancien regime. The trend of the times was already apparent.By 16 November Farini reported that the beginnings of a Bourboncounter-revolution were perceptible in each of the fifteen provinces,

1 3 November, Farini telegram to Cavour (ibid. vol. in, p. 273).2 14 November, Farini to Minghetti (ibid. p. 328).

Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 425and this rebellion was always intimately connected with a peasants'revolt against the well-to-do classes.1

It was not surprising that the new regime had enemies; what reallysurprised people was that it had so few friends. Cordova and La Farina,after their first fortnight in Naples, had to tell Cavour that there was'a most absolute indifference about the new order of things'; 'a con-stitutional Unitarian party does not exist here'.2 The ninety-nine percent majority had dissolved like the morning mist. Cavour had assumedthat Garibaldi was despised, and also that Neapolitans would be wonover by the glitter, the honour, and the gaiety of the royal court. Buthe was wrong. With the replacement of Garibaldi by the king, en-thusiasm fast ebbed away.3 The Re Galantuomo found that the wordgalantuomo had a specially discreditable meaning in the rural districts ofthe south, where it was used to describe a landlord who was all too oftenthe local tyrant; and the king now seemed to many people just anotherbullying overlord who squeezed the country dry for his own entertain-ment. Three days after his entry into Naples it was reported that'Victor Emanuel's reception.. .has not been in the least enthusiastic,though the whole town was anxious for his arrival. '4 A few days later,George Russell wrote from Naples to his uncle Lord John that therewas 'very strong feeling' for the exiled Bourbon king among the lowerclasses. Victor Emanuel 'is not liked, Cavour is distrusted... ReGalantuomo (a sad misnomer) does nothing to correct this state ofthings. He cannot succeed in ingratiating himself—at least he does nottry to do so.' 5

The king certainly does seem to have behaved badly. He showed farless attention to the Neapolitans who crowded to see the panache of

1 16 November, Farini to Cavour (ibid. pp. 340-1); and also report of October(ibid. p. 81).

2 23 November, Cordova from Naples to Cavour (ibid. pp. 371-2); 28 November,La Farina from Naples to Cavour (ibid. p. 396).

3 Marc Monnier, Notizie storiche sul brigantaggio, 1862, p. 39.4 12 November, Elliot to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).5 November, George Russell to Lord John Russell (RP G.D. 22/73). He went on:

'the Army are unpopular and take no pains to make themselves agreeable to theNational Guard or to the people. I suspect that the Government will yet find thatthey have made a great mistake in disbanding 20,000 Garibaldians, and that they maysoon be in want of the help they would have given them.'

426 Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.majesty, than to his mistress and her children who had accompanied himon his march from Ancona. Whereas Garibaldi and the Bourbonmonarchs had moved about freely and naturally among the people,Victor Emanuel thought it was expected of him to be splendid anddignified, and so secured the reputation of being proud and remote.His private opinion of the Neapolitans was that they were 'canaille',1

an opinion which he no doubt embroidered freely in his special brandof unregal language. Mercifully his coarser remarks would have beenunintelligible to most people for being in his own peculiar vulgartongue. He only intended to stay in the south for form's sake, until thefall of Messina and Gaeta had testified to his valour and enhanced hisrenown. Meanwhile, he went coursing in his new hunting estatesalmost every day, only appearing in the city for an occasional half-hour.As one shopkeeper told George Russell, 'if he can find better shootingthan we can give him he will soon be off'. The British consul, Bonham,wrote: 'during the stay His Majesty has made in Naples he has becomeextremely unpopular, indeed against the Piedmontese in general thereprevails a strong feeling of dislike caused no doubt by the overbearingmanner in which they treat the Neapolitans'.2 Before very longLacaita had to conclude that 'the sooner the king goes away the better';3

and Cavour was again informed that 'the friends of annexation are ina very small minority. You must not be deceived by the results of therecent plebiscite, which were due to the general abomination of theperjured dynasty, the aversion to Mazzinianism.. .and in some part tointimidation.'4

From the various reports which came in, Cavour eventually madeup his mind that the king had 'lost his prestige' and should return homeat once, since his presence at Naples 'made all government impossible'.In the first place there was this swift waning of the king's reputationwith the Neapolitans, in the second there was the deviation of his policyfrom that of the cabinet. Whereas Cavour had laid down a plan of'nocompromise', the king had been so impressed with Garibaldi's loyalresignation that he pledged his word to show gratitude and justice to

1 9 December, Victor Emanuel to Cavour (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 287).2 27 December, Bonham to Russell (F.O. 70/322/69).3 22 December, Lacaita to Russell (RP G.D. 22/85).4 c. 27 December, Lacaita to Cavour (C. Lacaita, An Italian Englishman, p. 159).

Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 427all who had aided the making of Italy.1 As a first step, 6le Roi.. .en sesentant fort de l'amour de tout le peuple Italien et de l'autorite que luia donne, il croyait devoir effacer tout souvenir des anciennes factionset divisions liberates en amnistiant le peu de condamnes politiques'.2

But this would have included the dreaded Mazzini himself, and thecabinet at Turin urgently and unanimously sent word back that suchan amnesty could not be permitted. There was a second sign of weakeningwhen the king first met Mordini; for though Victor Emanuel hadintended to be severe, this 'Mazzinian firebrand' turned out to be a farmilder and more sensible man than he had expected, and Mordini infact was given permission to go back and rule in Sicily for another threeweeks until the royal party could reach Palermo. Cavour was amazed,and sent a brusque reminder that the king was a constitutional monarchwho should not act like this on his own authority; at all costs the sovereignhad to keep out of 'the impure hands of Mordini'. As a third cause ofdispute, the king more than once publicly reproached General Fanti forthe lack of generosity shown by the army to the volunteers.3 Hereagain Victor Emanuel probably showed more common sense than hisadvisers; but the conflict of policy thus revealed, though it wasimplicit in Cavour's original pronouncements, was intolerable. Cavouragain, and this time Fanti as well, threatened to resign if the kinginsisted on showing leniency to the Garibaldians. 'For the love ofGod', wrote Cavour, 'do not make any more concessions to the partyof Crispi and Garibaldi, or else government will become impossiblein Sicily.'4

Farini's counterpart in Sicily was the Marquis di Montezemolo, aPiedmontese noble who had married a Russian princess. He was chosenfor this job because La Farina had told Cavour that Sicily, being sothoroughly aristocratic, wanted a change from the vulgar lawyers andsoldiers of fortune who had lately lain so heavily on Palermo society.Montezemolo—so Cavour from a comfortable distance assured the

1 31 October, Victor Emanuel to Garibaldi (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 240).2 12 November, Farini to Minghetti (ibid. pp. 315-16).3 12 November, Farini to Cavour (ibid. p. 316); 25 November, Cassinis to Cavour

(ibid. p. 378).4 25 November, Cavour telegram to Farini (ibid. p. 376); 29 November, Cavour

to Cassinis (ibid. p. 399).

428 Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.king early in November—was eagerly awaited in Sicily 'as a Messiah'.But after his arrival at the beginning of December he proved to be onlylittle less of a failure than Farini on the mainland. As formerly governorof Nice at the time of its cession, his appointment to Sicily was read asyet another deliberate insult to Garibaldi; and the fact that Cordova andLa Farina were nominated his two chief assistants to take over fromMordini is proof that injury and insult were intended. These appoint-ments by Cavour were no casual oversight of a busy man. He waswarned that they were unwise.1 Cordova had himself protested thatGaribaldi would take such nominations amiss, but the protest wasoverruled.2 The king, too, was 'furious' at having to be accompaniedby La Farina on his official visit to Sicily; but again Cavour, judgingmatters from afar, stood quite firmly upon his dignity, and threatenedto resign if there was the least concession on this point.3 It was importantfor Cavour to have the 'annexationists' in charge when the time cameto 'make the elections' in the New Year, and he did not stop to thinkthat he might be acting to defeat his own purpose. Before those elec-tions could ever be held, Cordova and La Farina had been forced out ofpower by a convincing demonstration of public opinion, with thenational guard almost at open blows with the police. Such tactlessappointments only convinced the radicals and autonomists that officialstatements about concord and compromise were but empty words.4

Amari was a friend of Cordova and La Farina, but he referred to theirselection at this critical time as 'des imprudences impardonables'.When the king arrived at Palermo, he found that the country was farmore settled and better ordered than La Farina had ever allowedCavour to believe.5 But then a few weeks of the new regime sufficed,just as at Naples, to arouse the old antagonisms and to quench much ofthe enthusiasm for unity which Garibaldi had aroused; and by the end

1 2 November, Lanza (Speaker of the Lower House) to Castelli (Le carte di Lanza,ed. de Vecchi, vol. n, p. 179).

2 Ed. V. Cordova, Filippo Cordova.. .Discorsi.. .Scritti.. .Ricordi, 1889, vol. 1,pp. 109-10.

3 25 November, Cavour to Cassinis (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 375);26 November, Cavour to Cassinis (ibid. p. 386).

4 15 December, Mordini to Garibaldi (AMB).5 9 December, Victor Emanuel to Cavour (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 287);

7 December, Victor Emanuel telegram to Cavour (Lib. del Mezz. vol. rv).

Cavour's Government in the South: Nov-Dec. 429of the year it was apparent that Sicily was repenting of annexation.1This was in part due simply to ignorance, tactlessness and lack ofimagination. The wrong people were selected for the job, and they setabout their work the wrong way. At root it was also a simple failureof generosity, and this was a commodity which would have cost little.

Of course there was great depression in ministerial circles at Turinover these unforeseen difficulties. The northern press had taken forgranted that annexation would solve all problems in the south, and wasnow thoroughly perplexed. Cavour tried to pass off on the inquisitiveyoung Baron Holstein an impression that all was well;2 but he reallyknew that the situation was very serious indeed. His immediate reac-tion when he heard of southern resistance was to outline a policy of'thorough'. He had omitted to work out any constructive programmebefore Farini set out for Naples; and now it was too late, because thisearly appearance of public discontent compelled him to use the methodof repression. He had to insist once more with the king that there shouldbe no compromise at all. It was 'absolutely necessary' that Pied-montese laws should be introduced at once, without waiting forparliament; and if the local advisory panel of Neapolitans objected tothis, then the panel should be dissolved forthwith. He explained thatthe grenadiers were there to help enforce this plan if necessary. Cavour'sintention was quite clear, and did not admit of any discussion: it was'to impose unity on the most corrupt and weak part of Italy'; and thereshould be no hesitation in using force for this if necessary.3 There wasno reason why Farini should allow the existence of a free press.4Opposition could not be tolerated, for the national cause itself was atstake.*

It is not a mere question of a ministerial crisis, but of saving the countryfrom a tremendous catastrophe. If, when parliament opens, they can say

1 2 January 1861, Montezemolo to Cavour (Lib. del Mezz. vol. iv); 4 January 1861,Cordova to Cavour (ibid.).

2 8 December, Cavour to Lanza (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. iv, p. i n ) .3 14 December, Cavour to Victor Emanuel (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, pp. 292-3,

heavily mutilated in Chiala's version); 16 December, Cavour to Farini (Lib. del Mezz.vol. iv).

4 15 December, Minghetti (minister for internal affairs) to Farini (Lib. del Mezz.vol. iv).

5 18 December, Cavour to Victor Emanuel (Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 294).

430 Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.that Garibaldi governed southern Italy better than we, then we shall beruined...; and this may bring about the collapse of the moderate party,and leave Italy sliding down the slope towards revolution.1

Once again he repeated that force must be used at the least sign ofdisorder; and he added that northerners must be brought in to ad-minister the south, however much the local inhabitants complained.'The government had to destroy Garibaldi's prestige/2 If Neapolitansnow did not want unification, then unification must be imposed onthem; and 'better a civil war than an irreparable catastrophe'.3 A terri-fying prospect was thus opened up.

Goaded by these injunctions, Farini made some effort to speak sharplyto the king. He even permitted himself what he called the 'grossillegality' of deporting a number of people to the islands. He wasappalled to find that there were hardly any liberals at all throughout thesouth, and ' there were less than a hundred believers in national unityamong seven million inhabitants'.4 Cavour criticized Farini for makingconcessions to the autonomist party, just as the king was criticized formaking concessions to the Garibaldians. At Turin the other ministersin the cabinet were unanimous that he 'should not give way one inch',and they could not even see that there was any difficulty about this.5

But Farini found that things looked more difficult from close at handthan from the blurred and distant prospect of five hundred miles away.He and Montezemolo had the full resources of Piedmont behind them,soldiers, police, money, the best brains in Italy, the king with all hisauthority and prestige—all the advantages in fact which Garibaldi hadnot possessed—and yet the situation became positively worse inDecember. Soon there was not a single accusation once made againstGaribaldi which was not being levelled at the government of Cavour.Exactly the same complaints were made about disorder, about theappointment of bad administrators, about persecution of oppositionleaders, and about rushing through controversial legislation so as to

1 23 December, Cavour to Farini (A. Colombo, La missione di G. B. Cassinis nelleprovincie meridionali, 1911, p. 54).

2 8 December, Lanza to Cavour (Le carte di Lanza, ed. de Vecchi, vol. 11, p. 184).3 14 December, Cavour to Farini (Lib. del Mezz. vol. iv).4 12 December, Farini to Minghetti (ibid.).5 18 December, Cavour to Devincenzi (ibid.).

Cavour's Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 431avoid proper debate. On top of everything else, about 10 DecemberFarini became seriously ill; but this only made worse a situation that wasalready very bad.

By the turn of the year Naples was in a sorry situation. Brigandagewas assuming * grave proportions' in the Abruzzi;x there were frequentrisings with the cry of ' Viva Francesco II '; 2 'passive opposition' wasgrowing up everywhere against the system of government by emigres?The state of public confidence was shown by the fact that governmentbonds, which had stood at 112 when Garibaldi arrived, were at 77by the middle of December and still falling.4 Some of the liberal-conservatives at last realized that they might have been slightly wrongin their estimation of Garibaldi, and that a government which succeededhis would be inevitably unpopular.5 Cavour had some hopes that theking would regain his prestige in the storming of Gaeta. This last-remaining major Bourbon fortress had been calculated to fall a fewdays after the regular troops arrived to take over from the incompetentGaribaldians, but the calculation proved to be insecurely based. Threemore months were needed before the town surrendered, and thehumiliation of this reverse turned the regular army generals even moreagainst the volunteers. Before Gaeta eventually surrendered, the kinghad had to return home for the opening of parliament.

Domestic disagreements only became worse in the absence of anational victory which could rally Right and Left in a common act of

1 29 December, Valerio telegram to Cavour (ibid.).2 10 January 1861, Spaventa to Nigra (ibid.).3 14 January 1861, Arrivabene to Nigra (ibid.).4 c. 16 December i860, Mancini to Cavour (ibid.).5 22 December, Lacaita to Russell: ' the appointment of Farini was a great blunder.

He is utterly unfit for the task he has to perform, and is hated by everybody excepta small circle round him... .The aristocracy, powerless to build, but powerful tospread disaffection and disorder, especially in the provinces where they still own mostof the lands, are disgusted to a degree that a small country doctor, as they call Farini,should be at the head of the government... .The Ministers, who ought to have takencare that the laws should have their execution and have postponed any radical changestill after the meeting of a parliament and the fall of Gaeta, are on the contrary dis-playing a feverish activity to model everything on the Piedmontese pattern... .Theannexationist party diminishes every day, and the Muratist party is making giganticstrides The Mazzinian party is also gaining strength The liberal party, disgustedwith the men in authority, do not come forward to restore order' (RP G.D. 22/85).

43 2 CavOUT'S Government in the South: Nov.-Dec.rejoicing. It was thus particularly tragic that the Bourbons retainedtheir foothold on Neapolitan soil under French protection; and theradicals were thereby enabled to pour scorn on Cavour's French allianceas something that did not even have the virtue of being realistic. LordJohn Russell hoped that Italy would proceed at once to the incorporationof Venice and Rome;* and had this been possible the monarchy mightwell have recovered some of the lost ground, and perhaps would havebeen able once more to bridge the gap between moderates and radicals.Until quite recently, even Cavour had been hoping that Garibaldi couldbe harnessed to a Venetian enterprise in the following spring. But nowthe general was regarded as a dangerous man, whose popularity mightovertop that of the king. Moreover, as Naples was turning out to beas much a liability as an asset, it would be asking for trouble if any bignew venture were undertaken in foreign policy.

Another problem for the government was that recent events hadgiven the parliamentary opposition new life. By the end of November,BrofFerio was boasting that people were beginning to doubt theinfallibility of Cavour, and that his overthrow might soon becomepossible.2 Pallavicino commented that * Cavour is reaping what he hashimself sown'.3 For a moment the 'party of action' really did thinkthat there was some chance of unseating the prime minister. Cattaneorejoiced at the 'enormous diminution' of his 'artificial popularity';4

and Cairoli was glad to find that people, 'if not cured, were at leastconvalescent from the Cavourian disease'.5

1 8 December, draft memorandum by Russell for the cabinet: 'in view of thesedangers, H.M.'s Government see no prospect of a permanent solution except in therelinquishment by Austria of her rule in Venice' (RP G.D. 22/27); the Queen, whenshe saw this, 'was astonished', it was 'objectionable' (ibid.); on the n t h she wroteto chide her Foreign Minister: li£we are a little determined with this really bad unscru-pulous Sardinian Government and show them that we will not encourage or countenancefurther piratical and filibustering proceedings, they will desist, the Queen doubts not'(RP G.D. 22/14); on 14 February, Russell sent E. d'Azeglio congratulations on thefall of Gaeta, and added: 'I trust the entry of the Piedmontese army into Rome willnot be delayed beyond this spring or summer' (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, p. 188).

2 25 November, BrofFerio from Turin to ? (MRR).3 25 November, Pallavicino to Caranti (Le Memorie, vol. in, p. 655).4 15 December, Cattaneo to Albert Robinson (Archivio Cattaneo MRM).5 n January 1861, B. Cairoli (the future prime minister) to Bellazzi (MRR).

Cavou/s Government in the South: Nov.-Dec. 433But the target of their attacks was meanwhile quietly confident that

these present difficulties would melt away as soon as the first parliamentof all Italy could be opened. This was Cavour's particular brand ofutopianism, as admirable, often fully as effective, but sometimes quiteas escapist and possibly misleading as Garibaldi's trust in the king, orMazzini's faith in 'Dio e popolo'. Cavour may have misunderstoodSicily and Naples, but he knew his own strength at Turin; if he wasnever properly at home in a revolution, he had at least been bred toa skill in parliamentary government. One of the finest statements ofhis liberalism is dated 29 December:

Pour ma part je n'ai nulle confiance dans les dictatures et surtout dans lesdictatures civiles. Je crois qu'on peut faire avec un Parlement bien des chosesqui seraient impossibles au pouvoir absolu. Une experience de treize anneesm'a convaincu qu'un ministere honnete et energique, qui n'a rien a redouterdes revelations de la tribune, et qui n'est pas d'humeur a se laisser intimiderpar la violence des partis, a tout a gagner des luttes parlementaires. Je ne mesuis jamais senti faible que lorsque les Chambres etaient fermees. D'ailleursje ne pourrais trahir mon origine, renier les principes de toute ma vie. Je suisfils de la liberte, c'est a elle que je dois tout ce que je suis. S'il fallait mettreun voile sur sa statue, ce ne serait pas a moi a le faire. Si Ton parvenait &persuader aux Italiens qu'il leur faut un dictateur, ils choisiraient Garibaldiet pas moi. Et ils auraient raison.

La route parlementaire est plus longue, mais elle est plus sure. Les electionsde Naples et de Sicile ne m'effrayent pas. On assure qu'elles seront mauvaises:soit. Les mazziniens sont moins a craindre a la Chambre que dans les clubs....L'atmosphere calme, pesante meme, de Turin les calmer a.. . . La majorite dela nation est monarchique, Farmee est pure de toute teinte garibaldienne, lacapitale est ultra-conservatrice. Si avec ces elements nous ne nous tirions pasd'affaire, nous serions de grands imbeciles.1

1 29 December, Cavour to Comtesse de Circourt (CC Ing. vol. 11, part 11, pp. 284-5).

28

434

CHAPTER XXVIII

CONCLUSION

The government was going to recover much of its lost ground in thefirst months of 1861, when by hook and crook the ministerial party wona convincing success in the parliamentary elections. But althoughCavour had relied heavily on a victory in parliament, this meeting ofa new legislature was not automatically going to bring about themagical results he had expected. Soon afterwards, early in June 1861,Cavour died, still a comparatively young man and at the height of hispowers. In the feverish activity of his last months he could never turnhis attention properly to the southern question, and when he died hehad still not found the time to consider in detail what other policyexcept a negative repression would serve to integrate these provincesinto the old kingdom of Sardinia.

The unhappy state of the south was thus described by a former primeminister of Piedmont, Massimo d'Azeglio, in August 1861:at Naples we overthrew a sovereign in order to set up a government basedon universal suffrage. And yet we apparently need sixty battalions to holdthe people down, and it seems that even this number is not enough....

Suffrage or no suffrage, there is no need of battalions of troops this sideof the River Tronto, only beyond it. The only conclusion is that there musthave been some error in the plebiscite, and we must accordingly change ourideas and our practical policy. We must ask the Neapolitans once againwhether or not they do want us there.1

Confirmation of this terrible position came in the same month fromDiomede Pantaleoni, sent specially by the government to report onaffairs in the south:

A Unitarian party does not exist at Naples. I would dare to assert that thereare not twenty individuals who want national unity, and these are emigres,or else people who have government posts. The revolution came aboutbecause of middle-class hatred against the Bourbons, and because of the

1 2 August 1861, d'Azeglio to Matteucci (Massimo d'Azeglio: scritti e discorsi politici,ed. de Rubris, vol. in, 1938, pp. 399-400).

Conclusion 43 5admiration for Garibaldi.... Many people do not even know who VictorEmanuel is. It was Garibaldi who liberated them, and Garibaldi wasa Unitarian and proclaimed Victor Emanuel as king. You would haveto be mad to think that the people want to be ruled from Turin, or thatthey are reconciled to the destruction of their former system of localgovernment.1

Pantaleoni reported that communications between Naples and theprovinces were as often as not completely severed, that conscriptioncould not be worked, that the strongest party in existence withoutdoubt wanted a return of the Bourbons, and that the country could beheld down only by force. This was the extremity of disillusion; but itwas only the beginning of a four years' civil war.

The situation was not much better in Sicily. As soon as Italy'sattention was taken up with the war for Venice, another Sicilianrevolution was to break out; another provisional government was setup in Palermo, and it had to be suppressed by an expeditionary armyfrom the north. The high hopes in which people had voted for annexa-tion were being sadly disappointed. In the long run time was going toheal many of these wounds, and national unity in time brought with itmaterial as well as ideological compensations; but the sense of disappoint-ment remained. One Sicilian sorrowfully recalled how, at the time,'the affirmative vote meant to the great majority the inauguration of anage of economic and social prosperity: no one then imagined it couldconceal a new slavery V Another repented long afterwards that in i860he had been so contemptuous of regional autonomy: 'if only we hadmanaged to behave otherwise, we should certainly be happier now.. . .Forty years have gone by since our annexation, and in almost nothingare we better off, even though they have sucked the very best bloodfrom the veins of Sicily. '3 Such disgruntled opinions as these may havebeen immoderate and unfair; but it is not so easy to say that they wereunrepresentative or altogether unfounded.

1 21 August 1861, Pantaleoni from Naples to Minghetti (quoted by F. Delia Peruta,'Contribute alia storia della questione meridionale', Society vol. vi, no. 1, March1950).

2 L. Natoli, Rivendicazioni attraverso le rivoluzioni siciliane del 1848-60, 1927, p. 208.3 R. Silvo di Pietraganzili, II Piemonte e la Sicilia dal 1830 al i860, 1903, vol. 11,

p . 347-28-2

436 ConclusionPeople are generally agreed that the worry of southern Italy, and of

Garibaldi's angry, wounding remarks in parliament, were among thecontingent causes of Cavour's death. But he died at the very highestpoint of his success, a few weeks after the existence of a kingdom ofItaly had been officially proclaimed and parliament had given himanother overwhelming vote of confidence. The heroic age of therisorgimento was just ending, and his own name was not to be associatedwith the prosaic years to come.

By Cavour's own confession the methods he had employed wereoften irregular. Not for nothing did he acknowledge his debt toMachiavelli as a master of statecraft. His adaptability and tacticalresource had proved quite astounding. He had been flexible enough torealize that Mazzini's concept of national unity was more practicablethan he had once thought, and he had then outbidden the radicals in hiszeal, and outplayed them at their own game of revolution. At the verymoment when he seemed most helpless between France on one sideand the advancing army of Italian volunteers on the other, he had withexquisite tact threatened Napoleon with Garibaldi, and Garibaldi withNapoleon; so doing, he had neutralized both of them, and had himselfintervened as a tertius gaudens to inherit the Papal States from one and thewhole of southern Italy from the other. He was not content with this.At the very same moment he was sending arms to Hungary, in case heneeded a revolution there, either to check an Austrian invasion or to helpwin Venice.1 He was even considering the preliminary moves for annex-ing Trieste, knowing that 'we must sow so that our children may reap'.2

All this was a fine example of resourceful opportunism. Armed at allpoints, most fertile in expedient, he seized and concentrated on everyweakness in his opponents: on Garibaldi's^/fe/e for Victor Emanuel, on

1 3 December, Cavour to Count Groppello (CC Cavour-Nigra, vol. iv, p. 282);this shows that, at a time when Cialdini was lamenting the lack of equipment in thesouth, Cavour sent arms to the Danube, hoping to smuggle them into Hungary;when they were captured, he denied all knowledge of them, and tried to put theblame on Garibaldi. The British government knew that Cavour had sent the guns,and was only confirmed by this and by Cavoui's denial into thinking him untrust-worthy. See Solaroli's note, Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, 1934, p. 1201.

2 30 October, Cavour to Valerio (Lettere di Cavour, ed. Chiala, vol. iv, pp. 78-9).But for his realistic appreciation of the Slav and German interests in Trieste, seeCavour's letter to Valerio of 28 December (ibid. p. 139).

Conclusion 437Rattazzi's ambition for power, on the prevalent dread of revolution, onBritish suspicion of France, and on the fact that Napoleon could neitherjoin with Britain nor oppose her. These were all exploited to goodeffect. In his treatment of the radicals he knew that they would sacrificethemselves and pay any cost so that Italy became a unified nation. Withthe conservatives he had to tread more delicately, for his cession toFrance of their stronghold in Savoy had been a bitter blow. This was nodoubt one reason why another connubio with the parliamentary Leftcould only have weakened him.1 He could rely on the grudging supportof the radicals as soon as he accepted their nationalist programme; buthe had to win the conservatives at the price of a breach with Garibaldi,by ending the revolution and extending their power throughout thelength and breadth of Italy.

Cavour's success had much that was paradoxical about it. Somehowhe managed to persuade people to back a revolution on the excuse thatthis was the way to prevent revolution. He and the whole moderateparty had first to swallow the unpalatable doctrines of universalsuffrage and popular sovereignty which they abhorred. He found him-self justifying a monarchy established 'by will of the people', and theright of rebellion against a regularly constituted government. In theprocess he had brought good Catholics to the point where they cheer-fully sang Te Deums for the invasion of the Papal States. Liberals hadlikewise been softened until they thought nothing of harsh repressionof the opposition press, and countenancing arbitrary arrest withouttrial.* Southerners, who had rebelled in great part because they wantedto be rid of the excessive centralization of government in the city ofNaples,3 had to accept and like an even greater dependence upon

1 31 October, Cavour to Audinot (MRR 61/66/1).2 5 October, Zambianchi's protest from prison to the governor of Genoa against

Cavour's sham boast about Piedmontese liberal institutions (Archivio di Stato, Genoa,Pratiche Gabinetto 192); on 8 November he protested again to Minghetti that he hadreceived better treatment than this even in Patagonia and the Papal States, for thereyou were at least given reasons for your imprisonment (see MSS Minghetti, Bologna);when Farini was asked about this case, he answered that no trial would be necessary,since all the world knew Zambianchi was guilty (see Lilla Lipparini, Minghetti, vol. 1,1942, p. 355).

3 E.g. even Massari, the most 'Cavourian' of southern deputies, agreed about this;2 April 1861, Massari in parliament, Atti Parlamentari.

43 8 Conclusionremoter Turin. Not least in difficulty, the king had to be in appearancea constitutional king, that is to say he had to do what Cavour wanted,at the same time as he went on thinking himself the real master incharge.1

On close inspection Cavour and Garibaldi become—probably likemost people—at once greater and lesser than first appearances hadsuggested; and it was in their least generous and least perceptive side,namely their hostile attitude to each other, that they found one of themainsprings of action with which to create a unitary state. Upon thetension between these two the fate of Italy for a time depended. IfGaribaldi renounced caution and set out for Sicily, a decisive considera-tion with him was his fury at Cavour's sale of Nice, and his convictionthat the government could not be stimulated to remedial action exceptunder the stress of imminent danger. When, later on, he sailed acrossthe Straits to Naples, this was partly so that he might defy the French inRome, and so overturn the Napoleonic alliance upon which Cavourrelied. If Cavour then invaded the Marches, this was because he wasfrightened that the revolution would reach Rome and even penetratehis own kingdom of Sardinia. In January 1861, Cavour apparently stillconsidered the 'struggle against Garibaldianism' to be his main task.2

The two men were temperamentally as well as politically anti-pathetic. To see how deep a rift lay between them, and how ineffectivewere the attempts to bridge it, one must reach behind the sentimentallegends of later official history. Some people have professed to see noevidence at all that Cavour * was either hostile, or uncertain, or treacherousin his actions towards the revolutionary forces under Garibaldi', and tofind no support for the theory 'that he was ready to make use of themfirst and then throw them on one side'.3 The contention of this presentbook has been almost precisely the opposite. Cavour was sometimestreacherous, often uncertain, and always more or less hostile to Gari-

1 The king had written an illuminating letter to Prince Napoleon on 14 April 1859,which Luzio published in the Cornere della Sera for 17 March 1931: 'Cavour has losthere in the opinion of serious and enlightened people, because of his fureurs momenta-nees, and because of his unlimited trust in people who do not deserve his confidence....Luckily, I am the master here. I am a king who governs in fact as well as inname.'

2 13 January 1861, Cavour to Poerio (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. iv).-• I. Nazari-Micheli, Cavour e Garibaldi nel 1860, 1911, p. 194.

Conclusion 439baldi; and indeed one can almost say that he was necessarily all of thesethings. The rift between them, it is true, was deliberately widened byarrogant diehards on both sides, chief among them La Farina andBertani, who had too little charity and vision to know what they weredoing. It was also exploited by Rattazzi's party at Turin, who used itas an argument for saying that Cavour must resign; and this forcedCavour into opposing Garibaldi the more relentlessly as an enemy ofparliamentary government. But fundamentally it represented just thenatural division between Left and Right, between rashness and caution,radicalism and conservatism, between the method of the sword and themethod of diplomacy. One side believed in all or nothing, while theother saw the value of circumlocution and gradualism. Yet both werenecessary for the making of Italy.

Cavour was too clever and too practical a man to be very consistentin his attitude towards the revolution. He had begun by looking onGaribaldi's expedition as reckless folly, doomed to failure like that ofthe Bandiera brothers several years before. Then he became frightenedthat it would succeed too well, that it would spoil his own scheme ofgradual expansion by Piedmont under the benevolent protection ofNapoleonic France. There were some moments when he was afraid thatGaribaldi was a puppet of the republicans; others when he feared thatthe radical leader was representing dictatorial against parliamentarygovernment; at other moments his was just an aristocratic contemptfor an uneducated man, for a vulgar soldier who was too big for hisboots and with whom one could not carry on ordinary relations as witha responsible adult.1 Sometimes Garibaldi was to be feared as someonewho might betray the monarchy, at other times as someone who wastoo good a monarchist to be a good parliamentarian, someone to whomthe monarchy might owe too much. At all times, however, Cavourwas superbly self-confident that he himself was the only man to betrusted with affairs of state. Neither Garibaldi, nor any other person inItaly, Ricasoli and the king included, should in his view have the powerof independent initiative, or else disaster would follow.

Not even the events of i860 were to shake this self-confidence;indeed they only increased it. For four months Cavour had had tosubmit to a succession of failures, first in not being able to stop Garibaldi

1 27 October, Cavour to Mancini (CC Lib. del Mezz. vol. in, p. 207).

440 Conclusionleaving for Sicily, then in not being able to annex the island after thefall of Palermo, then in La Farina and Depretis failing to tame Garibaldiand prevent him crossing the straits to reach Naples as a conqueror. Upto this point Cavour had played a much less important and much lesshappy part than is often thought in the movement which conqueredhalf Italy from the Bourbons. He had done more to hinder than tohelp, basing himself on a bad miscalculation about the political forcesat work and the readiness of Italy for nationhood. But finally he hadmanaged to reassert his influence triumphantly over events. He hadsuccessfully arrested Garibaldi's advance on Rome, and had ensured thetriumph of liberal and centralized monarchy over all the other radicaland federalist alternatives put forward by his opponents.

The contribution of the radicals to Italian unification cannot usefullybe measured against Cavour's. In his more magnanimous momentsCavour had the perception to see that the radicals were invaluable, eventhough he had been compelled to discard them like orange peel—to useGaribaldi's expression. The failure of Cavour's party to win or even tostart a revolution in either Palermo or Naples is the best indication ofwhat Italy owed to the revolutionaries. Cavour was wont to look uponthem as unpractical ideologues; but the real ideologues were rather themoderate liberals in Sicily and Naples who talked and did little butawait the issue of events; not the perhaps extravagant thinkers whoacted and bore the burden and heat of the day's labour. The moderatescould not easily forgive their own failure to rise and deliver themselves,and this did not make them take any more kindly to being liberated bypeople they called 'thieves' and 'assassins'.1 But one must rememberthat the very word 'moderate' was often claimed merely for propa-ganda purposes by people who were bigots in their moderation, andwho were sometimes a match for any extremists in violence of language.They are often better described as 'conservatives'. They were trimmers,sometimes for worthy, sometimes for unworthy motives, people wholacked strong views and clearness of aim, people who for the most partlacked drive, fire and audacity. Italy owed them a great deal, but noteverything.

1 3 November 1861, V. Imbriani to Emma Herwegh (Felice Orsini e Emma Herwegh,ed. Luzio, 1937, pp. 117-21).

Conclusion 441It was Garibaldi, Crispi and Bertani who took on themselves the

principal risk and responsibility of failure over this revolution in thesouth. These radical enthusiasts would have been mercilessly killed hadthey failed, and as mercilessly condemned by Italians and by history.As events turned out, it was their misfortune to be blamed even fortheir success. Cavour was always quite ready to disown them, andindeed he even expected to do so; and they knew as much and werecontent. Looking ahead to Aspromonte and Mentana one can see whatmight easily have happened in i860. Cavour's successors twice allowedor incited Garibaldi to risk his life and the future of Italy, but subsequentlyhad to order their troops to fire upon and wound him, to arrest him andhis men, and then to cover him with the obloquy of failure. This waswhat Garibaldi knowingly risked again and again. If he had beenambitious for himself, his conduct would not have been so admirable;but he was in everything unostentatious, not least in his gracefulsurrender of office in November; and when in April 1861 Musolinoproposed in parliament to make him a gift from the nation, this pro-posal had to be withdrawn at Garibaldi's own wish. If he had notdutifully obeyed the king, this too would have made him lack some-thing of greatness. But he was as loyal in obedience as he was resolutein command. There were many of the trappings of vulgar dictatorshipabout him; and yet one must not leave out of account how he impressedmen of intellect as well as of action with his claims to be considereda liberal and essentially a good man.

Garibaldi's chief service to his country in i860 was as a fighter. Hestill remains probably the greatest Italian general of modern times. Hehad a fine instinct for strategy, and a better grasp on most elements ofthe art of war than his critics have often allowed. The regular generalsderided his contempt for passwords and uniforms and punitive discip-line; but when all is said and done, it needed very remarkable team-work and leadership to raise and provide for forty thousand soldiers,1and his great enthusiasm and will-to-win brought Italy her finestmilitary victories of the whole risorgimento.

As a civil governor Garibaldi suffered from being unintelligent,inexperienced and prone to take bad advice; but when he really turned

1 At least one close spectator refused to believe the legend that Garibaldi was a badorganizer (Gustav Rasch, Garibaldi e Napoli nel i86oy ed. Emery, 1938, p. 107).

442 Conclusionhis attention to a point, one cannot help being impressed with whatMarc Monnier called his 'rare bon sens qui lui tient lieu de science etd'art politique'.1 As an administrator he does not compare so veryunfavourably with Farini, who had far greater experience, far greaterresources, and no military distractions to take away his attention.Despite the arrogant conviction of the moderates that they were theonly repository of political wisdom and skill, it seems that Sicily wasmore anarchical after Montezemolo than after Mordini. In May i860the good sense and right political instincts of Garibaldi had served Italybetter than the wiles of Cavour. In June and afterwards it was hisresistance to Cavour's policy of immediate annexation which madepossible the acquisition of central and southern Italy. And finally,looking back in the light of later events, it is not so clear now as it wasto Cavour that annexation was better obtained by plebiscite alonewithout the aid of a consultative assembly.

Garibaldi had an instinctive understanding of some southern prob-lems, an understanding which often escaped observers in the north.Unlike the Piedmontese conservatives, for instance, he had the goodsense to see that Mazzini presented no danger to law and order inNaples, except perhaps in so far as the 'moderates' might stir uppopular riots against him. Garibaldi understood both Mazzini and thesouth better than Cavour ever did, for the same reason that he hadmuch more knowledge of and sympathy with the common people.Instead of assuming that southerners were idle and corrupt, and insteadof trying to impose a cut-and-dried system upon them, he had workedby appealing to their good nature; and this had evoked a far morepositive response than greeted his more technically efficient successors.What he gave them was enthusiasm, faith in a cause, and a fine exampleof self-sacrifice and courage. These were the very qualities whichMazzini all along had said were necessary for making Italians consciousof their strength, for making them politically conscious and politicallyresponsible. Mazzini's chief objection to the Cavourian system was thatit did not start by teaching the nation an awareness of its nationhood,and did not go on to persuade the common people that they ought toco-operate in building their own nation. The party of Cavour was in

1 10 September, Marc Monnier, Garibaldi: histoire de la conquete des deux Sidles,pp. 302-3; 15 September, p. 312.

Conclusion 443general ignorant and frightened of the common people, and preferredto impose its will with the aid of diplomacy, rather than to rouse thissleeping giant and give it ideas above its station.

Once again here was evidence of the sheer practicality of the radicalidealists. By comparison, the stolid opposition of southern peasants in1861 was to show the essential unpracticality of the hard-headed menwho worked more by calculation and 'interest'. In comparing theliberal with the radical method, one must first remember that diplo-macy exacted a price, Savoy and Nice in exchange for Tuscany; and asa second point, that the radicals in southern Italy had proved thecommon people to be a superb initiating force. In the eyes of thepopulace Garibaldi was a hero who brought out the best in them. Hestood for all that seemed good in the risorgimento, all that was heroic,romantic, honest, and 'popular' in the sense of 'of the people'; whileCavour, for all his skill and success, stood for many of its worst aspects,for what was matter-of-fact, for duplicity, lack of generosity, for shadybargains with Louis Napoleon, and all that was double-faced anddeceitful. Early in 1861 some of the deputies had to conclude thatGaribaldi would not have been so bad after all as a royal viceroy in thesouth; and though historians have usually ridiculed Garibaldi's offer totake this post, he could hardly have done much worse than Farini andmost of his many successors. At least there would probably have beena more friendly and enthusiastic spirit in Naples and Sicily. Peoplewould not so easily have been able to say afterwards that the greatmajority of Italian citizens were quite detached from, and uninterestedin, the movement for national independence.1

The plebiscites in the south rounded off the process by which akingdom of four or five millions in population became one of twenty-two millions. The radical Crispi could fairly claim that 'what you callour "faction" has shed its blood for the cause of national unity andpresented half Italy to the house of Savoy'.2 Crispi himself had a greatfuture to look forward to in the new kingdom of Italy; but Garibaldiand Mazzini now found that their work was mostly done. Garibaldireturned to his bees and his beans on the island of Caprera, Mazzini

1 E.g. Benito Mussolini, in his speech of July 1943 to the Fascist Grand Council,quoted by himself in his booklet // tempo del bastone e della carota, 1944, p. 18.

2 7 September i860, Crispi to Correnti (ACP, f. 135).

444 Conclusionsadly went back into exile at London. In February 1861 Mazzini wrotea memorandum in English for the British foreign minister, protestingagainst Cavour's 'rancour against all other parties and men, and innateantagonism to popular interference and all that he calls revolutionary9.*It was bitter for this visionary to see that materialism had succeeded toidealism. He had thought to evoke the soul of Italy, he said, but all henow found before him was its corpse. And yet Mazzini's faith in thefuture remained as clear and confident as ever. ' Our nationality is nota thing merely of square miles but of ideas and principles. And as soonas Italy will learn that she may proceed in her work with the whole ofher forces and shielded from Bonapartist interference, she will desertthe policy of Cavour for a better and more dignified one.' This was thefaith which, in one very real sense, removed mountains. The combina-tion of square miles and idealistic principles together made up a forcewhich was unbeatable.

Meanwhile, the only consolation left to the radicals was perhaps tosay 'I told you so'. Long after the event, Jessie White Mario, who hadbeen one of Garibaldi's entourage in Sicily and Naples, wrote that

to the violent, hurried annexation of the southern provinces was due all theseries of disorders and the unhappiness which ensued. If only these provinceshad been administered sensibly and kindly by persons sympathetic to thepeople, as Tuscany was for example, there would have been none of thatboycotting of conscription in Sicily, nor the brigandage which raged in theNapoletano.2

This was only part of the truth, but it was an important part; and thestorm of recrimination between moderates and extremists on this pointwas to remain a constant theme of Italian politics.

1 19 February 1861, Mazzini to Russell (RP G.D. 22/73).2 J. W. Mario, In memoria di Giovanni Nicotera, 1894, p. 49.

445

INDEX[NOTE: The letter q appended to a page-number indicates that the page contains aquotation from the person who is the subject of the entry; but this is limited to a fewof the leading persons and their more significant statements.]

Abba, Giuseppe, 86Abruzzi, the, 141, 337, 406, 407, 431Acireale, 305* Action, party of. See RadicalsAlbert, Prince (Consort), 35Alcamo, 390Alcara, 390Amari, Count, I2n., 340, 397-8Amari, Emerico, 280, 281 n. 1Amari, Michele, 4, 66, 77, 83, 117, 166,

199, 428; and regional autonomy, 67,72-4, 184, 284, 398, 402-3, 4ii , 415-16,417; on Crispi, 121, 169, 181, 182, 202;on Depretis, 120, 169, 265

American opinion, 27, 33 n. 3, 103, 225n. 1, 246 n. 1; constitution, allusions to,68-9, 364

Ancona, 225, 231, 257, 285, 317, 334,338

Anguissola, Amilcare, 360 n. 4Annessione, L\ 41,49,66, 83,164,190, 284,

304, 344Annexation, piecemeal ('artichoke'), 13,

37, 42, 50, 53, 76, 411Annexation, the word, 67,195-6, 316, 318,

381, 396-7,411-12Annexation of Naples, 133-5, 141» 157,

206-7, 214, 217, 274, 288, 318, 335, 345,360, 388, 394, 396, 399 n. 1, 418, 424;conditional or delayed, 299, 313-14, 316,319, 359, 365, 369-70, 404; uncon-ditional or immediate, 62, 194, 208,218-19, 298-9, 313, 316, 324-6, 328,331-2, 339, 346, 353, 359, 361, 369-71,378, 381, 404, 430, 442, 444

Annexation of Sicily, 8, 11-12, 18, 30, 35,37, 41, 45-6, 52, 58, 77, 89, 91, 100-1,107, 123, 129, 170, 265-6, 275, 281,289, 351-2, 378, 381, 392-7, 4i8, 429,

435; conditional, 14-15, 61, 63-7, 71-4,78, 162, 171, 173, 185, 186, 191, 195-6,277, 280, 282-3, 284-5, 293-4, 308, 341,343, 344, 404; unconditional, 12, 14, 51,54, 60, 62, 63, 64 n. 2, 67-70, 72-4, 164,169, 184-5, 192, 195, 280, 284, 293, 295,305-6, 309-10, 324-6, 331-2, 339, 341,344-6, 402-3, 411-12; delayed, 13, 18,45, 47, 53-4, 57, 62, 63, 64, 73-4, 109,118-20, 167-8, 173, 174, i8j-6, 187,189, 191, 195, 196-9, 201, 213, 236,263-4, 274, 277, 283, 293, 299, 302, 341,343, 353, 380; immediate, 31, 47~5O, 54,56-7, 60, 62, 73, 76, 79 n. 1, 87, 90, 98,117, 121, 163-4, 166, 169, 171, 174-81,187-8, 190, 191-5, 198-9, 201-3, 219,267, 269-70, 272, 280, 283, 285-6, 288,291, 296-7, 313, 316, 328, 341, 386,398-9, 400-1, 404, 442, 444; by meansof assembly, 63, 66, 74-5, 173, 175, 185,196, 282-5, 293, 307, 345, 358, 399

Anti-clericalism, 60, 104, 231, 313, 393Antonelli, Cardinal, 229, 230Aristocracy, Neapolitan, 154, 156, 207,

431 n. 5 ; Piedmontese, 13, 256; Sicilian,11, 40, 60, 74, 75, 78, 83, 89, 275-6,278, 281, 296, 341, 427

Army, Bourbon, 155, 156, 205-6, 420; inSicily, 49, 90, 94, 116, 123-4, 161, 214,291, 329, 344, 389; on mainland, 214,218-19, 252, 310-12, 329, 334-5, 344,389, 406, 431-2

Army, Papal, 228, 229, 231, 338Army, Piedmontese, 50, 56, 131, 193,

419-20, 427; against Papal States, 223,230-1, 237, 254, 257, 264, 285, 311, 337;and Naples, 135,149, 210, 213, 219, 237,238, 255, 311-12, 316-17, 321, 334-5,337, 358, 361, 372, 389, 406-7, 425 n. 5,

446 IndexArmy, Piedmontese (cont.)

431; and Sicily, 265, 268, 273, 286, 287,296-7, 300, 383, 435

Army, revolutionary, 3, 18-20, 47 n. 4,238, 292, 425 n. 5. See also Volunteerforces

Asproni, Giorgio, 4, 174,256; on Cavour,245, 274; on Depretis, 170; on Mazzini,249; on Victor Emanuel, 321

Assembled, L\ 340, 343, 346Assembly, constituent, 5, 24-5, 64, 65, 74,

283, 339, 344-5, 352, 362, 365, 381, 401,411

Assembly, representative, for Naples: plusplebiscite, 315, 318, 367-71, 376, 404;versus plebiscite, 5, 314-17, 319, 326,356-8, 360-2, 364-6, 369-70, 372, 374,376, 399, 404, 4i8, 442

Assembly, representative, for Sicily: an-nexation by means of, 63, 66, 74, 173,175, 185, 196, 285, 293, 307, 345, 358,399; plus plebiscite, 63, 73, 195, 282,284, 293-4, 302, 308, 367, 369, 376,381-2, 399, 401-2, 404; versus plebiscite,5,63-7, 71-2, 75-6,185, 283,295, 304-5,309, 319, 326, 345-6, 348, 349, 351-3,355-6, 372, 378, 380-1, 399, 401-2, 404,418, 442; Mordini's summons of, 295-309, 314, 319, 341-5, 349-56, 376-80

Athenaeum Club, 228Austria, 339, 407; and Tuscany, 34; and

Venice, 18, 32, 35, 432 n. 1, 436;Cavour and, 22, 43, 49, 52, 104, 132,133, 149, 372, 436; French rivalry with,102, 225-6; non-intervention of, 26, 27,50, 93, 227, 421; risk of war with, 27,132, 142, 282, 285, 344, 395

Autonomy, local, for Naples, 313-14, 398;advocates of, 156, 234, 313, 416,430,435

Autonomy, local, for Sicily, 12, 42, 173,293, 295, 299, 307-8, 342» 345, 398, 403,435 {see also Annexation, conditional);advocates of ('autonomists', 'munici-palists'), 8,14-15, 24, 31, 53-4, 60-5, 67,72-4, 78-9, 82, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166,170, 172-3, 175, 184, 190, 191, 195, 203,265, 277-8, 279-80, 288 n. 3, 293-5, 343,347, 365, 378, 380, 382, 386, 397-9,

402-3, 416, 428; Cavour and, 7, 14, 31,53-4, 62, 67-9, 275, 284-5, 326, 340,343, 346, 397-9, 402-3, 409, 414-17;Mordini and, 276-81, 284, 293-5, 345,378

Autonomy, regional, in Italy, 5, 145-6,251, 326, 343, 388, 397-9, 415-17

Avellino, 135, 315

Balance of power, the, 22, 32, 35, 320Bargoni, Angelo, 106-7, I 2 0 , 188-9, 193-

4, 262, 305Bellelli, Gennaro, 156 n. 1Belmonte, Prince, 275Bentinck, Lord, 66Bertani, Agostino, 4, 105, 107, 108, 120,

251, 256, 283, 321, 330, 331, 335, 365,395; character of, 139, 249-50, 310, 439;his revolutionary policy, 204, 43, 106,139, 141, 249-50, 2974, 353, 3594,404-5, 441; his designs on Papal Statesand Rome, 26, 115, 139-41, 144-6, 152,249-50; chief adviser to Garibaldi, 169,186, 197, 199, 201-2, 207, 220, 249-50,254-5, 262, 271, 278, 314, 375; dis-missed, 250, 302, 310, 366; his cen-tralization decrees, 279, 281, 295, 299,300, 302; Cavour's attitude to, 30, 70,83, 87, 150, 258, 441

Bixio, Nino, 43, 82, 233Bonghi, Ruggero, 136, 208, 387, 394Bonham, Edward, 426Bottero, Giovanni, 174,176-7,178,180-1,

183, 187, 188, 189, 194, 195, 198, 269,284

Bourbon, House of, 2, 11, 14-15, 33, 44,60, 81, 93, 95, 114, 131, 154, 157, 227,276, 300, 388, 424, 434-5- See alsoFrancesco II and Naples (kingdom of)

Brenier, Baron, 261Brescia, 106Britain, 8, 15, 66, 230; anti-French senti-

ment in, 32, 34-5, 52, 102, 137-8, 226,437; Cavour's relations with, 32-4, 94,95, 102, 104, 137-8, 147, 227, 229, 258,320, 387, 422, 436 n. 1, 437; designsattributed to, 12, 31, 47; Italian policyof, 32-6, 227, 395, 421; public opinion

Index 447in, 33, 63 n. 2, 138, 227-8; volunteersfrom, 224 n. 2, 228,' 311. See alsoRussell, Lord John

BrofFerio, Angelo, 19, 113, 244, 245 n. 6,432

Brusco, Enrico, 220, 238, 242 n. 2

Cacioppo, Vincenzo, 262, 281 n. 1Cacopardo, Letterio, 349Caiazzo, 218, 250, 252Cairoli, Benedetto, 4, 432Calabria, 347, 406; Garibaldi's landing in,

4, 131, 151; his advance through, 145,152, 159, 207

Caltabellotta, 390Caltagirone, 379Caltanisetta, 378-9, 386Calvino, Salvatore, 262; on annexation,

62; on Crispi, 121; on La Farina, 86,119-20; with Garibaldi at Naples, 300-1,309, 352, 354-5, 360, 377; returns toSicily, 380

Campanella, Federico, 115Capital of Italy, rival claims for, 282, 321,

325, 331, 340, 397, 4U-I5Caprera, 194, 255, 330, 335, 372, 409,

443Capua, 252, 363, 389, 406, 407Caranti, Biagio, 360, 361, 373 n. 4Carignan, Prince de, 84Carini, Gen., 352, 398Casalis, Bartolomeo, 134, 286; in Sicily,

174, 189, 268, 270, 284; arrested andexpelled, 269, 271-2, 275

Caserta, 255, 309-10, 315-16, 339, 356-7,362, 366

Cassinis, Giovanni Battista, 84, 413, 421Castelfidardo, 231, 257, 311Castellani-Fantoni, Count, 298Castelli, Michelangelo, 109Castroreale, 303 n. 3Catania, 303, 351Catholic opinion, 6, 28,151, 226,285, 331,

424, 437Cattaneo, Carlo, 4, 432; federalism of, 5,

524, 53, 250-1, 332, 358, 365, 369, 404,414; with Garibaldi, 250, 357, 360,3644, 366, 370, 371-24

Cavour, Camillo di, 5, 43,60, 76,146,182,267, 287, 297, 303, 306, 372, 400;character of, 2, 21, 26, 27, 38-9, 84, 89,90-1,93,98,99,104,111-12,150-1,154,216, 220-1, 239, 242, 419, 438-9, 442;as diplomatist, 24-5, 27, 48, 92,154,211,239, 241, 247, 320; as politician, 3, 6,22-3, 91-2, 100, 104, 111-14, 129-30,136, 145, 151-2, 260, 274, 398, 423,433, 436-40, 442; as student of publicopinion, 30, 103, 1104, 112, 114, 125,131, 152, 204, 212, 238, 3214, 331, 375;in popular estimate, 6, 23, 25, 92, 103,129, 196, 244, 259-60, 320,405,432,443.

And annexation, 12-13, 18, 31, 48-51, 56, 57-8, 67, 77, 90, 98, 1004, 1014,107, 129, 163, 178, 186, 193, 195, 197,207, 218, 264, 269, 272, 274, 275, 281,289, 296, 305, 309, 313, 316-17, 325-64,339, 340-6, 359, 370, 376, 383, 396-8,411-12, 415, 442; and local autonomy,7,14, 31, 53-4,62,67-9, 275,284-5, 326,340, 343, 346, 397-9, 402-3, 409, 414-17; and plebiscite, 63, 66-7, 70, 169,176-8, 183, 188, 283-5, 295, 309, 317,326, 347, 381-2, 387, 392, 395, 402, 412,423, 437; and republicanism, 11, 22, 80,116, 210, 223, 246; and unification, 1,12-13, 17, 22, 27, 30, 37, 53, 69, 844, 92,100-14, 103-4, I 24, 131, 164, 178, 191,221, 241-3, 245, 322, 341, 345, 361, 395,411-12, 416, 436.

His opponents, 3-4, 19-20, 28, 43,55-6, 64-5, 98, I I O - I I , 113, 133, 139,173, 221, 225, 240-1, 244-6, 260, 279,304, 321, 322, 328-30, 332, 390, 411,414, 440; his supporters, 2, 4, 17, 19,51 n. 4, 52, 54, 74-5, 83, 135, 154, 160,176, 202, 240-1, 260, 284, 305, 323, 331,334, 348, 382, 396-7, 437; and Bertani,30, 70, 83, 87, 150, 258, 441; andCordova, 45, 62, 163, 166, 170-2, 176,180, 333, 421, 425, 428; and Crispi, 42,44, 58, 81, 82,154, 162-4, 170, 173, 427,441; and Depretis, 38, 89, 105-7, 1084,109-10, 119, 154, 162-7, 170, 174, 176-80, 187-9, 198-200, 240, 394; andFarini, 4, 68, 85, 166, 215, 224, 232,

448 IndexCavour, Camillo di (com.)

240-1, 258, 333-7, 395, 397, 407, 421,424, 429-30; and Francesco II, 18, 22,40, 84, 92, 93, 94, 101, 113, 124, 156-7,217, 256, 258, 335; and La Farina, 13,29, 30, 31, 37-9, 40tf, 41-2, 44~5, 71, 79,84-5, 87, 89, 91-2, 96-7, 99, 106-8, 117-18, 163, 176, 240-1, 333, 421, 424-5,427-8, 439; and Mazzini, 22, 24, 26-8,39, 53, 87, 99, 103, 107, 113, 146, 239,241-2, 246-9, 251, 254-5, 263, 283, 310,386, 409, 412, 433, 442; and Mordini,39, 263, 269, 272, 284, 302, 308, 427;and Napoleon III, 17, 25-8, 31, 34, 52,67, 90, 99, 100, 102, 104, 113, 132, 137,138, 144, 148, 152, 157, 175, 186, 204,216, 226, 228-30, 234, 236, 238, 257-8,259, 326, 423, 436-7, 443; and Palla-vicino, 240, 253-4, 334, 358-9, 361, 395,420, 432; and the Pope, 104, 114, 133,151, 153, 161, 174-5, 214, 223, 230, 256,259, 320; and Rattazzi, 4, 19, 25, 43, 56,79, i n , 112, 242-4, 246, 259, 321, 333,437, 439', and Ricasoli, 4, 25, 28, 38, 84,104, 113, 114, 141-2, 146-7, 153-4, 222,224, 258, 322, 325, 331, 415, 439; andVictor Emanuel, 22, 25, 29, 30, 80, n o ,115, 126-7, 1324, 142-3, 173, 209, 216,223, 232-6, 239, 241, 243-4, 259, 283,321, 323, 3254, 333-7, 406, 412, 420,421 q, 422-3, 426-9, 431, 438-9; his atti-tude to Garibaldi, 18, 21, 23-6, 28-31,42, 45, 49, 78, 80, 83-7, 89-99, 1014,103-7, i n , 115-16, 122-5, 127-9, 131,1324, 133, 136-8, 1424, 1484, 149-53,156-7, 160-1, 168-9, 179, 193, 202,2044, 205-9, 211-12, 214-25, 230, 232-5, 237, 2384, 239, 242, 244-5, 248, 256,2584, 259-60, 266, 269, 271-2, 282, 285,310, 317, 320-1, 323, 324-54, 327, 332-9, 342, 363, 366, 394-6, 409, 419-20,427-8, 430, 432-3, 436-41; his parlia-mentary speeches of 2 and 9 Oct., 256-7,307, 309, 316, 324-64, 327, 331-2, 340-7, 356, 379, 396; his death, 434, 436.

See also under Austria, Britain, France,Naples, Nice, Papal States, Parliament(Turin), Radicals, Rome, Venice

Cavour's correspondence, national editionof, 29 n. 1, 39 n. 3

Chambery, 226, 229, 230Chiaves, Desiderato, 329Chieti, 135Church, the. See Catholic opinion and

ClergyCialdini, Gen., 160, 231, 238, 254, 255,

257, 317, 335, 383, 389, 436 n. 1Cicala Italiana, 191Clark, W. G., 423Clergy, 2, 6; Sicilian, 59, 60, 352, 389 n. 4,

390; south Italian, 257Colonna, Andrea, 367Committee of Order (Naples), 206, 208Communications, defective, 144, 204, 210,

215, 235-6, 298, 307, 309, 320, 347, 354,376, 378, 435

Conforti, RafFaele, 315, 364, 365-6, 367,368, 369-704, 371, 374

Conscription, in Naples, 43 5; in Sicily, 47,52, 57, 59, 69, 77, 286, 287, 385, 386-7,444

Conservatives. See Liberal-conservativesConstitution, Piedmontese, 162-5, 167,

173, 190, 191, 266, 306, 345, 370, 395,401

Constitution, Sicilian (of 1812), n , 14, 33,58, 66, 162, 395; (of 1848), 31, 66, 162,173, 344

Cordova, Filippo, 4, 62, 264, 268, 275,286; character and career of, 170-2;sent to Sicily, 45; in Sicily, 83, 163-4,166, 168, 169, 170-2, 180, 186-9, 194-5,198, 200, 252, 397; leaves Sicily, 256,329; returns, 333, 428; at Naples, 421,425; his annexation campaign, 188,269-70, 277-8, 284

Corleone, 305Cornhill magazine, 33Corrao, Giovanni, 7Correnti, Cesare, 79-81, 173Corriere Mercantile, 105Cosenz, Enrico, 26 n., 27, 99, 140, 216Credo Politico (La Farina), 393Crimean War, i n , 311Crispi, Francesco, 21, 73, 75, 85, 98, n o ,

200, 269, 288 n. 3, 290, 299, 348, 382,

Index 449393, 405, 441; character and career of,24, 42-3, 82-3, i2i, 154, 187, 194, 195,261, 310, 360; and the monarchy, 13,43-4, 804, 814, 162, 164, 173; and re-publicanism, 41, 43-4, 81-2, 164, 173,362; and Sicilian annexation, 13, 42, 47,62-4, 67, 71, 79, 118, 120-1, 162-4, 169,1734, 174, 175, 177, 181-2, 184, 186,1874, 1884, 189-91, 193, 195-6, 199,202, 266, 293, 303, 359, 376, 377, 400-iq, 404; and unification, 13, 42, 44, 62,64, 804, 814, 121, 172-5, 318, 365, 443.

And Cavour, 57, 62, 79-81,162, 173-4 (see also under Cavour); and Cordova,170-4, 186-9, 270, 277-8; and Depretis,120-1, 162-3, 169-70, 174, 180-1, 184,186-91, 193-5, 198-9, 202; and Gari-baldi, 4, 10, 13, 20-1, 24, 42-3, 78, 82,86, 88, 120-1, 174, 181-2, 187-9, I91*195-6, 199, 261, 270-1, 302, 310, 316,318, 356-7, 359-60, 366, 368-9, 405;and La Farina, 39, 41 q, 42, 44-6, 57,60-1, 70-1, 77-8, 794, 814, 82, 86, 89,96, 393; and Mazzini, 42-4, 53, 82, 173,400; and Mordini, 266, 277, 296, 302-3,305, 314, 3i8, 349, 355-6, 376-80; andPallavicino, 313, 315-16, 319, 356-7,360-2, 365, 367-8, 372, 404-5; hisdecree of 23 June, 57-9, 66-7, 77; atNaples, 200, 250fF.

See also under Naples (kingdom of)Currency, Sicilian, 163

D'AfHitto, Marquis, 156 n.i, 159, 299D'Ayala, Mariano, 156 n. 1D'Azeglio, Emanuele, 151 n. 1, 432 n. 1D'Azeglio, Massimo, 3,104,134, 231 n. 2,

256, 414, 434Decrees: of 23 June (Crispi: registration),

57-9, 66-7, 77; of 3 Aug. (Depretis andCrispi: statute), 162-5, 173, I9i» 266;of 16 and 20 Sept. (Bertani: centraliza-tion), 279, 281, 295, 299, 300, 302; of5 Oct. (Mordini: Sicilian assembly), 295-309, 314, 319, 341-5, 349-57, 376-8o; of8 Oct. (Pallavicino: Naples plebiscite),317, 319, 347-57, 367-8, 370-1, 376,378, 401; of 12 Oct. (Garibaldi: Naples

assembly), 366-8; of 15 Oct. (Mordini:Sicilian plebiscite), 380-2

De Luca, Francesco, 369, 370-1De Meis, Angelo, n oDepretis, Agostino, 5, 128, 224, 256, 281;

background and character of, 105-6,108-9, 119-20, 154, 167, 240; sent toSicily, 107-9, 118; royal commissioner,108, 166, 202, 268, 271; his decrees of3-17 Aug., 162-5, 173, 191, 266; hisresignation of prodictatorship, 201-2,208,261,265,271; at Naples, 200-2,212,218, 250.

And annexation, 109, n 9-21, 162-3,165-70, 174, 176-7, 1784, 180-4, 186-91, 194, 196-9, 201-2, 277, 394; andCavour, 4, 38, 89, 105-10, 119, 154,162-6, 169-70, 174, 176-7, 1784, 179,1804, 187-9, 198-200, 212, 240, 394;and Cordova, 168-70, 180, 188-9; andCrispi, 120-1, 162-3, 169-70, 174, 177,180-1, 184, 186-91, 193-5, 198-9, 202;and Garibaldi, 105-9, 119, 162, 165-70,176-9, 181-3, 185-91, 194-202, 2124,218, 240, 261, 277, 3944, 440; andVictor Emanuel, 105, 108, 162, 166

De Sanctis, Francesco, 4, 315-16, 317Devolution, 53, 68, 343, 359, 397-8, 402,

416-17. See also AutonomyDictatorship, Garibaldi's conception of,

21, 258, 260, 366; 'of the Two Sicilies',279; 'parliamentary', 112; 'royal', 80,322-3, 336

Diritto, II, 23, 39,111-12,159,236,238,245Du Camp, Maxime, 387Dumas, Alexandra, 357, 360, 366

Elia, S., 296 n. 3Eliot, Sir Henry, 223; on annexation, 8;

on the plebiscite, 388, 423; on Cavour,157; on Garibaldi, 213, 214, 215, 255,394-5, 419; on Victor Emanuel, 130

Emilia, 50, 196, 293, 318, 327, 329, 404England. See Britain

Fabrizi, Nicola, 289 n. 3Fanti, Gen., 257, 258; at enmity with

Garibaldi, 17, 50, 215, 253, 316-17, 406,29

450 IndexFanti, Gen. (cont.)

420; and invasion of the Marches, 153,228-9, 238, 259, 264, 287, 320; in com-mand at Naples, 333"4, 338, 427

Farini, Luigi Carlo, 39, n o , 171, 284, 327329; in Turin cabinet, 31 n. 1, 68, 81,95, 130, 144-6, 397-8, 437 n. 2; viceroyof Naples, 179, 258, 333-9, 372, 395,404, 4074, 408-9, 418-24, 429-31, 442-3; and Cavour, 4, 85, 240-1, 333-9, 395,407, 421, 424, 429-30 (see also underCavour); and Depretis, 162, 166; andGaribaldi, 17, 50, 116, 150, 215, 218,233, 242 n. 2, 243, 333, 336-9, 407-9,418, 421, 423, 442; and invasion ofPapal States, 224, 226, 230; and VictorEmanuel, 232, 243, 335-6, 338-9, 408,430; and volunteer recruitment, 150,169, 186, 242 n. 2

Federalism, 5, 22, 68-9, 326, 388, 440;advocates of, 4,15, 53, 61,115,173,203,250-1, 328, 358, 360, 365, 369, 404, 414

Ferrara, Francesco, 4, 68-70, 98, 280, 281n. 1, 346, 382

Ferrari, Giuseppe, 4, 53, 243, 250, 256,327-8, 417

Florence, 113,146,246, 322, 325,414,420,422

Florio, Vincenzo, 296 n. 3Forbes, Cdr. C. S., 21, 103 n. 3, 208, 218,

313Forbice, La, 287, 304, 306, 344-5, 390France, 40, 51,144,257,298, 330, 345,416,

421; her interests in Rome, 25, 55, 71,139, 174-5, 214, 223, 231 n. 2, 331, 438;her relations with Britain, 32, 34, 52, 94,102, 137-8, 226, 437; Cavour's relationswith, 17, 22-3, 25-7, 29, 31, 35, 49, 52,55, 87, 90, 92-3, 100, 102, 104, 111-12,115-16, 123, 125, 132-3, 137-9, 141,147-8, 150-1, 193, 214, 223-6, 229-31,237, 244, 247, 254, 259, 282, 316, 320,335, 338, 381, 387, 395, 432, 436-9;Garibaldi's relations with, 17, 23, 52, 87,140,186,214,226,234,236,254,316,436,438; Mazzini and, 17, 90, 247, 404,444.

See also Napoleon III, Nice, and underNaples

Francesco II, King, n , 73,135,155, 205-6,387, 388, 403, 424-5, 43i; and Austria,27; and Sicily, 18, 58, 69, 94, 125, 344;Cavour and, 18, 22, 40, 84, 92, 93, 94,101, 113, 124, 156-7, 217, 256, 258, 335

Friscia, Saverio, 174, 299-300

Gaeta,257,338,344,389, 395, 396, 407,431Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 12, 28, 30, 36, 51, 73,

94-6, 100, 104, 113, 121, 128-9, 163,225, 267, 365, 430; lands in Sicily, 4,10;crosses Straits, 4, 151, 157-8, 217;advances through Calabria, 152, 159-60, 182; enters Naples, 4, 167, 193, 212;recalled to Sicily, 218,250,252,261,288,363; lays down dictatorship, 409-10.

His character, 2,16, 21,154, 212, 220,231, 250, 251, 257 n.4, 302, 363, 375,396, 405, 407, 441-2; his moderation,18, 20-1, 41, 48, 78-9, 84, 87, 99, 106,117-19, 2 1 0 - n , 232, 234, 240, 255, 3io,366, 369,405; his vacillation, 15-16,316,318, 356, 358, 374; as military leader,4, 21, 122, 157, 213, 231, 251, 310-11,405, 441; in popular estimation, 1 0 - n ,16, 21, 25, 62, 99, 103, 138, 159, 196,212-13, 244, 260, 264-5, 274, 288, 300,306, 320-1, 337, 369, 384-5, 389, 394-5,408,424-5, 431, 435, 442-3; British en-thusiasm for, 33-5, 138, 227-8; his con-ception of dictatorship, 21, 258, 260,366; his policy, 16-18, 20-1, 43, 45-6,62, 117-19, 212-13, 363, 442; and an-nexation, 31, 454, 49-50, 57, 61-2, 63n. 2, 64, 74, 90-1, 109, 118, 167-8, 174,177, 180-1, 185-7, l 8 9 , 197-201, 213-14, 219, 2364, 263-5, 269, 274, 279,285-6, 288, 291, 298-302, 304-6, 314-16, 330, 342-3, 353, 358, 360, 380, 394-6, 442; and plebiscite, 18, 49, 169, 178,182, 190, 195-7, 199, 315, 318-19, 338,347, 349-58, 366-9, 372-4, 376-83, 386,392; and republicanism, 27, 58, 70, 210,212, 241, 273; and unification, 1,17-20,37, 454, 62, 76, 116, 1224, 174, 196-8,201,213-15,221,227, 231,241,245,263268, 299, 305, 316, 382, 394, 428, 435-

His opponents in Sicily, 75-6, 275-6,

Index291; his opponents in Naples, 155, 159-60, 206, 213, 279, 281, 419; his sup-porters, 2, 4, 19, 77, IIO-II , 154, 160,244-5, 327-30; and Bertani, 26, 83,108, 139-40, 145, 169, 186, 190, 197,199, 201-2, 207, 220, 249-51, 254-5,262, 271, 278, 295, 302, 310, 314, 330,375, 405; and Cordova, 171-2,180, 333,428; and Crispi, 4, 10, 13, 20-1, 24,424, 43, 78-9, 82, 88,120-1,173-4,181-2,187-9,19i»195-6. 261-2, 270-1, 302-3, 310, 315-16, 318, 356-7, 359, 3604,366-9, 405; and Depretis, 105-9, 119,162, 165-71, 176-9, 181-2, 185-6, 188-90, 194-202, 212, 218, 240, 261, 277,394, 440; and Fanti, 17, 50, 215, 228,253, 258-9, 316-17, 333, 338, 406; andFarini, 17, 50, 116, 150, 215, 218, 233,243, 333-9, 396, 407-9, 418, 421, 423,442; and La Farina, 37-40, 44-5, 49, 79,84, 85-90, 97-9, 101, 106-7, m . 1I7~18, 171, 216, 333, 375, 428, 440; andMazzini, 17, 19-21, 39, 43, 76, 99, 139,239, 247-8, 251, 255, 283, 310, 408-9,442; and Mordini, 262-3, 266, 268, 274,277, 288, 295-6, 298-305, 309, 314, 319,342, 347, 349-56, 376, 378-80, 382-3,391, 420; and Pallavicino, 252-5, 310,315-17, 334, 356-7, 360-1, 364, 368,372, 420; and Persano, 42, 87-8, 105,122-3, 132, 137-8, 158, 208-11, 217,231-2, 333-4, 408; and Victor Emanuel,15, 17, 20, 29, 45, 48, 66, 80, 84, 101,114-16, 119, 1224, 125-7, !3°, J 3 2 , 136,140, 142-3, 151, 158, 173, 201, 207, 209,211, 214-15, 217-20, 222-3, 230, 232-9,243-4, 250-1, 253-5, 259, 263-4, 268,273, 275, 288, 296, 312, 317, 323, 325,333, 335-8, 35L 363, 369, 382-3, 388,405-9, 426, 432, 433, 435, 436, 439, 441;and Villamarina, 206-7, 214, 217, 219,255, 310, 337; his attitude to Cavour, 5,17-20, 23, 26, 52, 80, 87, 90-3, 101, 118,122,145, 150, 157,167-8, 186, 205, 208-9, 211, 214-15, 217-20, 233-8, 243,245,253-4, 256, 259-60, 264, 268, 312, 324,339, 347, 356, 363, 396, 409, 421, 436,438, 442.

See also under France, Liberal-con-servatives, Naples (kingdom of), Nice,Piedmont, Rome

Gennaro, St, 212, 228Genoa, 7, 96, 239, 272, 341; Bertani at,

26, 83, 139-41, 144-5, 250; France and34-5; Mazzini at, 19, 53, 83, 115, 246

Genoa, Duke of, 12, 63 n. 2Germany (Prussia), 35, 227, 320, 332Giornale Officiate of Naples, 210, 220,

298-9, 367, 389, 409; of Sicily, 88, 267,273, 299

Girgenti, 83, 303 n. 3, 386, 390Gladstone, W. E., 32, 257Glasgow, 228Goodwin, Consul, 14, 41, 63 n. 2, 307

403Governors, Neapolitan, dismissal of, 365-6Governors, Sicilian, and assembly pro-

posal, 304, 305, 308, 342-3, 352, 379,380, 386, 390

Gramont, Due de, 230Griscelli, Giacomo, 88, 241Guarneri, Andrea, 41, 74-6, 281 11. 1, 341,

401Guerrazzi, Francesco, 243, 259, 274,

328

Holland, Lady, 421Holstein, Baron Friedrich von, 429Hudson, Sir James, 30, 34, 35, 38,131,153,

212, 227, 228 n. 2Hungary, 372, 436

India, 15Indipendente, L\ 357, 360, 366, 374, 382'Intellectuals', Sicilian, 8, 14, 393Ireland, 15Ischia, 385Italianissimi, 23, 92, 94, 129, 141, 151

King, Bolton, 47, 195, 215Kossuth, Louis, 104, 215 n. 2

Lacaita, Sir James, 98, 137, 422, 426La Farina, Giuseppe, 39,166, 283, 330, 380;

character of, 38, 81-2, 85-6, 99, 439; his1st mission to Sicily, 29-31, 37-87 pass.,

29-2

452 IndexLa Farina, Giuseppe (cont.)

91, 99, i n , n 8 , 424; his expulsion, 88-90, 96-8, 100, 108, 117, 333; his 2ndmission, 333, 425, 428.

And annexation, 30, 40-1, 45-6, 51,54, 57, 66, 73, 78, 87, 117, 198, 285-64;and plebiscite, 31, 49-50, 58, 66, 176,284, 3904, 393; and Cavour, 13, 23,29-31, 37-45, 48, 57, 66, 71, 75, 79, 84,85, 89, 91-2, 96-7, 99, 106-7, 117-18,163, 176, 240-1, 284, 333, 421, 424-5,427-8, 439; and Crispi, 39, 41-2, 44-6,54, 57,60-1, 70-1, 77-9, 81-2, 85-6, 89,96-7, 393; and Depretis, 105-6, 1094,1984; and Garibaldi, 37-40, 44-6, 48-9,75, 79, 83-4, 854, 86-90, 974, 98, 101,106-7, i n , 117-18, 171, 216, 333, 375,393, 428, 439, 440; and Mazzini, 13, 37,39; and Victor Emanuel, 38,45,89,235,428

La Lumia, I., 296 n. 3Lamoriciere, Gen., 229Land, possession of, in S. Italy, 9, 48, 75,

135, 159-60, 213, 276, 286, 289, 390,393, 417, 424

Lanza, Father, 4, 109, 275, 281-2Lanza, Gen., 14 n. 2Lanza, Giovanni, 141, 410, 428 n. 1,

430 n. 2La Varenne, Charles de, 30 n. 2, 80, 173Lawyers, and annexation, 48, 60, 61, 286Lequile, Prince de, 156 n. 1Liberal-conservatives (*moderates', 'party

of order'), 53,113,149,151,152,232,275,328, 392, 430, 437; characteristics of,172, 241, 440, 443; opposed to radicals,2-3, 13, 39, 54-5, 80, 89, 165, 179, 192,202-3, 245, 306, 359, 388, 432, 439, 440,444; rapprochement with radicals, 106-7,140, 162-3, 165, 178, 190, 278-80, 305,354, 382; prominent, 4, 41, 83, 104,136,159, 322, 334, 347, 415; and annexation,13, 54, 64, 173-5, 272, 331, 359, 379,382, 385, 393-4; and France, 17, 223;and the monarchy, 80-1, 114, 323; andrepublicanism, 263; and the Sicilianrevolt, 4, 7-9; Bertani and, 250, 255;Crispi and, 42, 82,173-4; Garibaldi and,

20-1, 30, 83, 90,127,160,167, 212, 245,254-5, 258, 310, 363, 408, 431, 442;Mazzini and, 248-9, 394, 442; Mordiniand, 274, 288, 304-5, 354; Neapolitan,130,133,135-6,138,141-2,156-7,159-61, 206, 208, 254-6, 264, 279, 310, 314,317, 334, 363, 365-6, 368-9, 374, 440

Liguria, 22, 102Lipari Is., 291List, Friedrich, 393Litta, Count, 56, 66, 121, 125-6, 163Lombardy, 12, 22, 114Louis Napoleon. See Napoleon III

Macchi, Mauro, 404Malmesbury, Lord, 34Malta, 15Mancini, Pasquale, 4, 334, 394, 421Manna, Giovanni, 91, 93, 95-6Marazio, Annibale, 341-2Marches, the. See Papal StatesMario, Alberto, 4, 98, 250, 360Mario, Jessie White, 250, 444Marsala, 20, 215, 273Mazzini, Giuseppe, 4, 26, 28, 58, 105, 260,

359, 394, 4H, 427, 433*, in England, 19,246, 443-4; at Genoa, 19-20, 53, 83,115, 246; in Tuscany, 145-6; at Naples,246, 248-9, 283, 310, 329, 358, 369, 442.

His character, 241, 246-9, 444; hispolicy, 37, 43, 54; and annexation,53 4» 358, 403-4; and the monarchy,11-12,17, 20, 43,183, 247-8, 4034, 404;and republicanism, 5, 11, 13, 113, 115,146, 241, 246-9, 273, 361, 404; andSicilian revolt, 7-8, 19-20, 24, 53, 247;and unification, 1, 11-13, 17, 22, 53,103, 221, 241, 247, 249, 322, 393, 4034,436, 444; and Bertani, 26, 83, 115, 139,144, 152; and Cavour, 20, 27, 39, 43,53-4, 87, 90, 99, 107, 113, 139, 146,241-2, 246-9, 254-5, 283, 310, 331, 409,442, 444; and Crispi, 42-4, 53-4, 82,173,400; and Garibaldi, 17,19-21,39,43,76, 99, 139, 239, 248, 251, 2554, 283,310, 369, 408-9, 442; and Mordini, 54,263; and Pallavicino, 253, 254, 361, 365.

See also under France

Index 453Medici, Gen., 2611., 27, 29, 30, 140, 216,

255, 259Mellana, Filippo, 330Mellino, 271-2, 284Messina, 158, 165, 195, 303, 306, 342, 344,

378, 382, 384, 389; surrendered to Gari-baldi, 131, 138; disturbances in, 290-2,347-54; plebiscite result at, 390

Messina, Straits of, 94, 123, 148; Garibaldireaches, 122, 140, 292; his crossing of,151, 157-8, 217; opposition to hiscrossing, 49, 92, 125, 127, 137-8, 363,440

Mezzacapo, Luigi, 136, 207Milan, 113, 216, 256, 332, 420Milazzo, 96, 98, 116, 121, 124Minghetti, Marco, 4, 331Mob agitation, in Sicily, 78,79,86,90,107,

119, 184-5, 188; at Naples, 206-7Modica, 386Monarchy, the. See Victor Emanuel, and

under Crispi, Liberal-conservatives, Maz-zini, Mordini, Radicals

Monnier, Marc, 212, 388-9, 394, 442Montecristo, 224 n. 2Montezemolo, Marquis di, 333, 421, 427-

8, 430, 442Mordini, Antonio, 120, 172, 275-6, 282,

290, 361, 384, 405, 442; appointed pro-dictator, 262-3; summons assembly,295-309, 314, 319, 341-5, 349-57,376-80; orders plebiscite, 354-6, 367,377, 380-2, 386, 391; hands over office,428.

His character and career, 262-3, 267;and annexation, 263, 266, 269, 271, 277,280-1, 298, 302, 380; and autonomists,276-81, 284, 293-5, 345, 378; and themonarchy, 263, 344, 383; and re-publicanism, 263, 269, 271, 273; and'transformism', 278, 280, 300, 354; andBertani, 268, 278-9, 295, 297, 300;and Cavour, 394, 263, 268, 269, 272,296, 302, 304-5, 308-9, 340-2, 427;andCrispi, 266, 277, 296, 303, 305, 318, 349,352, 355-6, 376-80; and Garibaldi, 39,262-3, 266, 268, 273-4, 277, 288, 295-6,298-305, 309, 314, 319, 341-2, 347,

349-5<5, 376-83, 391, 420; and Mazzini,54, 263, 305; and Pallavicino, 350, 353,354, 420

Mosca, Antonio, 331Mouimento, 105Mundy, Adml. Sir George, 214, 312, 423Municipalists. See under Autonomy, localMurat, Lucien, 28, 281Musolino, Benedetto, 441Mussolini, Benito, 443 n. 1

Naples (city of), 200, 202, 205, 208, 218,237, 250, 252, 256, 270, 298, 372-3, 388,435; as centre of action, 261, 309-10,316, 360, 365; as potential capital, 415;Cavour avoids, 258, 332-3, 336, 420-2;Garibaldi captures, 4, 167, 193, 212;Mazzini at, 246, 248-9, 283, 310, 329,358, 369, 442; Piedmontese agents at,136, 144, 153-6, 161, 205, 207, 241,271-2, 321; Piedmontese forces at, 149,168, 210, 219, 311-12, 358, 361, 389,406; unrest at, 312, 361-4, 374, 406;Victor Emanuel enters, 408, 425

Naples (kingdom of), Britain and, 33, 35,94,102,137-8,147; Cavour and alliancewith, 18, 52,90-6,101,104,113-14,124,131,133,135-7,140,156-7,167; Cavourand Piedmontese invasion of, 5, 84,100,151-3, 157, 160-1, 195, 204, 209, 217,224, 231-2, 238, 257^9, 264, 320, 335-6,338; Cavour plans rising in, 100, 122-4,127, 133-7, 140-2, 144, 147, 149-57,160-1, 167, 206, 217, 229, 440; Crispiand annexation of, 44, 58, 198, 313-19,356-8, 360-2, 366-9, 372, 374, 376-7;Farini viceroy of, 179, 258, 333-9, 372,395, 404, 407-9, 418-24, 429-31, 442-3;France and, 94, 100, 102, 133, 137-8,141, 147, 152, 224, 335, 432; Garibaldi'sdesigns on, 18, 21, 50, 54, 61, 63, 75-6,90, 94, 98, 101,118, 122-7, 130-42,145,148-50,152-3,155-6, I59-6I, 438, 440;Garibaldi's government of, 210-12,232,234-5, 238, 249-50, 252, 254-5, 299,3io, 333, 367^9, 405-6, 418-19, 43O-i;Sicilian hostility to, 4, 7-12, 14-15, 44,52, 60-2, 68, 71-6, 78, 261, 276, 279,

454 IndexNaples (kingdom of, cont.)

281, 288, 294-5, 299, 300, 344, 348, 351,378, 381, 388, 414, 437-

See also under Annexation, Assembly,Autonomy, Liberal-conservatives, Pied-mont, Radicals

Napoleon III, Emperor (Louis), 51, 88,114, 127, 214, 345, 407; and Britain, 34,102, 138, 226, 437; and Garibaldi, 49,52, 137, 157, 186, 209, 226, 232, 234,257, 323, 436; and Naples, 100, 133,137, 229, 232, 234, 326.

See also under CavourNapoleon, Prince (Jerome), 12, 281, 415

n. 1, 438 n. 1National guard, of Naples, 135, 149, 213,

289-90, 313, 360, 361, 372-3; of Sicily,9, 184, 202, 265, 289-90, 348-9, 354,386, 428; of Turin, 238

National Society, 38, 45, 86, 88-9, 120,228, 253, 393

Navarra, E., 262, 296, 305Navy, Bourbon, 40,199, 205,207,210-11,

258; Piedmontese, 25-6, 40, 123, 145,158, 168, 198, 200, 206, 211, 217, 257n. 3, 285, 291; Sicilian, 20, 87, 123, 138,197, 272

Nazionale, //, 359, 361-2, 374Nazione Armata, 106Nice cession, 12, 39,40,230, 298, 330,428,

443; plebiscite on, 18, 23, 31, 67; debateon, 25-6, 260, 332; Cavour and, 17, 20,28, 30, 31, 35, 52, 67, 91, 106, n o , i n ,220, 222, 260,438; Garibaldi and, 17-18,20, 23, 91, 97, 106, 220, 260, 438

Nicotera, Giovanni, 4, 150, 200, 223-4,248, 250, 273; character of, 146-7, 183-4

Nigra, Costantino, 204, 257Nisco, Nicolo, 136, 145, 250 n. 1* Non-intervention', policy of, 26, 29, 32,

50, 135, 138, 225, 226, 320, 374Noto, 269, 305, 386Nunziante, Gen., 136, 155, 206, 420

Omodeo, A., 116, 126Opinione, L\ 90, 95 n. 3, 133, 165, 416* Order, party o f . See Liberal-conserva-

tives

Orlando, Luigi, 189Orlando, Paolo, 187-8, 196Ostia, 197

Palermo, 14, 56, 68, 75, 89, 113, 183, 202,290, 306-8, 343, 376; as seat of govern-ment, 21, 28, 41, 43, 44, 57, 78, 96, 117,171, 200, 292, 309, 347, 377, 435; civiccouncil of, 45-6, 77, 86, 378, 384, 391;council of state at, 402; Garibaldi'scapture of, 10, 26, 29, 66y 440; Gari-baldi's recall to, 218, 252, 261-4, 363;La Farina's arrival at, 37, 40; plebisciteprocedure at, 382-4, 390-1; rising at,7-9; unrest, real or alleged, at, 77-8,83, 86, 184-7, 194-5, 198, 229, 273,296-7; Victor Emanuel's visit to, 420,427-8

Pallavicino, Giorgio, 4, 250; character andcareer of, 240, 252-3, 310; becomes pro-dictator of Naples, 252; resigns, 360,362, 365; resumes office, 368; resignsagain, 372-3.

And annexation by plebiscite, 310,313, 3I5-I7, 319, 347-8, 350-4, 356-9,364,367-73,376,379, 382,386,395,404-5; and Cavour, 240, 253-4, 259, 317,334, 358-9, 361, 395, 420, 432; andCrispi, 313, 315-16, 319, 356-7, 360,365, 367-8, 372, 404-5; and Garibaldi,240,252-5, 310, 315-17, 334, 351, 356-7,360-1, 363-4, 367-8, 420; and Mazzini,253, 361, 365; and Victor Emanuel, 252,253-4,313,317,358,420

Palmerston, Lord, 32, 35, 91, 258, 261,415 n. 1

Pantaleoni, Diomede, 153, 434-5Papal States (Romagna, Umbria and the

Marches), 1, 13, 22, 29, 35, 50, 71, 99,146-7, 415; Cavour's invasion of, 3, 5,151-3, 157-8, 161, 168, 209-10, 213-14,217,220,224-31,234,236-7,252,256-7,287, 315, 320, 323-4, 335, 436, 437, 438;Garibaldi's designs on, 140, 155, 213-14,233, 237; Mazzini and Bertani's designson, 19, 26, 28, 83, 113, 115, 122, 139,141, 144-5, 152

Pareto, Lorenzo, 330-1

Index 455Parisi, Enrico, 262, 280, 281 n. 1, 309, 352,

354-5, 356-7, 36o, 377, 380Parliament, Neapolitan, 156, 297, 314,

359; Sicilian, 31, 66-7, 72, 162, 294-5,297, 304, 342, 359, 402

Parliament, Turin, 64, n o , 130, 165, 256,263, 337, 346, 361, 369-70, 393, 394,404, 405, 412, 413; Cavour and, 19,25-6, 29, 56, 112, 148, 223, 237, 242-6,260, 313, 321, 323-7, 331-2, 341, 402,409, 417, 429, 432-4, 437; Garibaldiand, 223, 260, 436; proceedings of 2 and9 Oct. in, 324-31

Parma, Duke of, 12Patti, 286, 390Peasants, Sicilian, 8-9, 48, 59, 265, 266,

289, 385, 389, 393; south Italian, 6, 135,157, 159-60, 257, 389, 424-5, 443

Pepoli, Gioacchino, 257Peranni, Domenico* 281 n. 1Persano, Adml., 224, 257 n. 3, 291, 354,

407; character of, 105, 122, 154; andCavour, 23, 40, 89, 108, 123, 132, 137,154, 161, 208-10, 229, 232, 234, 285,333; and Crispi, 824,97-8; and Depretis,108, 1194, 1704, 198, 200; and Gari-baldi, 42, 87-8, 105, 122-3, 132, 137-8,158, 199, 209-11, 217, 332, 408; atNaples, 149, 160-1, 168, 205-6, 208;Neapolitan fleet surrendered to, 199,210-11; his alarmist telegram to Cavour,209-10, 229, 231-2, 234

Perseveranza, La, 49, 79-80, 90, 195, 282Perugia, 237Petruccelli della Gattina, F., 43, 55, 105Piedmont (' Piedmont-Sardinia', * Turin

government'), 1, 5, 12, 22, 39, 60, 223,238-9, 253, 324, 329, 330, 332, 392, 404;and France, 193, 224-7, 230, 415, 439;and Naples, 40, 93, 101, 118, 122-7,130-1, 133-4, 137-8, 142, 156, 207, 218,311, 334, 339, 406, 413, 426, 429-30,435; dominance of ('piedmontization',and see Annexation), 6, 13, 17, 24, 32,35, 50, 102, 104, 172, 174-5, 216, 225,278, 321-2, 325, 328, 345, 365, 387,400-1, 411-15, 417, 439; Garibaldi'sloyalty to, 17-18, 20, 48, 98, 118, 122,

140, 199, 2 1 0 - n , 234, 240, 258, 311-12,382-3; parties in, 2, 14, 87, 439; statuteof, 162-5, !67, 173, 190, 191, 266, 306,345, 370, 395, 401.

See also under Army, Navy, Parliament(Turin)Pignatelli, Prince, 296 n. 3Pilo, Rosolino, 7, 27Piola, Capt., 41, 182-6, 188, 194, 196-7,

199Piraino, Domenico, 281 n. 1Pisanelli, Giuseppe, 136, 156 n. 1, 299Pisani, Baron, 41, 48, 57, 74 n. 1, 76, 275,

296 n. 3Pius IX. See Pope, thePlebiscite for Naples, 290, 334, 338, 348-9,

351, 353, 355, 377-80, 383, 406, 443;plus assembly, 315, 318, 367, 369-71,376, 399, 404; versus assembly, 5, 316-17, 319,326,356-60, 366, 369-70, 372-4,376, 381, 404,418,442; conduct of, 389,423; validity and significance of, 387-8,392-410 pass., 418, 422-3, 426, 434-5

Plebiscite for Sicily, 18, 48, 49, 68, 70,119,162-3, 167-9, 176-80, 182-4, 186, 188-91, 193, 199, 290, 291, 443; Crispi'sdecree for, 57-9,66-7,77; plus assembly,63, 73, 195, 282, 284, 293-4, 302, 308,367, 369, 376, 377 n.4, 381-2, 399,401-2; versus assembly, 5, 14, 31, 63,65-7, 71-2, 75, 185, 283, 295, 304-5,309, 313, 326, 345-9, 351-5, 372, 378-81, 399, 418, 442; conduct of, 383-6,389-90; validity and significance of,386, 390-410^55., 412, 418, 435

Plebiscite, II, 344Plutino, Antonio, 347, 351Poerio, Carlo, 259, 399 n. 1Police, at Naples, 367; in Sicilian revolu-

tion, 8, 9, 48, 59, 79, 194, 265, 267,272-4, 280, 428; reinforcement with-held, 179, 217

Pope (Pius IX), the, 88, 133, 214, 231 n. 2,331, 344, 424; Britain and, 33, 104, 153;Cavour and, 104, 114, 133, 151, 153,161, 174, 214, 223, 230, 256, 259, 320;France and, 55, 127, 151, 174-5, 224,226, 230, 259

456 IndexPrecursory //, 44, 163, 173, 190, 199, 271,

345, 381-2, 384, 400Prince Consort, 35Prussia See GermanyPungolo, II, 374

Quadrio, Maurizio, 115, 191, 395

Radicals ('party of action', 'revolu-tionaries'), 37, I2i, 145, 183, 248, 256,288, 349; characteristics of, 3, 172, 208,241, 414; policy of, 55, 194-6, 313-14;divisions among, 14-15, 58, 65, 113,191, 240, 358; opposed to liberals, 2,13,39, 54-5, 80, 83, 89, 141, 165, 179, 192,202, 306, 359, 388, 432, 439, 44o; rap-prochement with liberals, 106-7, I4°»162-3, 165, 178, 190, 278-80, 305, 354,382; in Turin parliament (see alsoRattazzi), 242-6, 251, 326, 332; leading,4, 42, 83, 106, 139, 146, 174, 250, 348,369, 441; and annexation, 53-4, 58, 62-4, 75, 90,163,174, 272, 293, 296-7, 345,353, 393, 444; and assembly, 63-6, 75,175, 294, 304-5, 3H, 348, 352, 354, 362,3^5, 367, 376, 381; and autonomists, 62,63-5, 79, 163, 175, 276, 277-8, 293-4,345; and France, 52, 55, 139, 216; andmonarchy, 55, 80-1, 173, 233, 241, 243,388, 432; and Naples, 122, 136, 138,159, 161, 182, 195, 205, 211, 302, 310,314, 316-17, 322, 353, 358-9, 363, 366-7, 369, 371-2; and Piedmont, 13, 58,113, 140, 149, 203, 404; and plebiscite,50, 63, 65, 190, 381-2, 403-5; and re-publicanism, 5, 55, 80, 219, 273, 359,361; and Rome, 5,13, 55,65,122-3,136,139, 161, 169, 174, 241, 266, 314; andSicilian revolt, 4, 8, 18-21, 31, 55, 57,113,274-5; and unification, 13,14, 53-4,65-6, 140, 174, 220-1, 225, 241, 251,277, 293, 304-5, 348, 365, 381, 403, 437,440, 443; Cavour and, 55-6, 58, 65,66-7, 79, 80-1, 92, 98, 100, 106, 113,115,129,131,139,140-2,148,152,167,169, 173, 178-9, 193, 216-17, 220-3,225, 232, 234, 239-46, 257, 259, 304,306, 324, 332, 336, 395-6, 402, 409, 414,

428,432,436-7,440; Cordova and, 171,278; Depretis and, 106, 108-10, 119-20,162,165, 178, 190; Mordini and, 277-8,280,293-4, 318, 345, 352

Raffaele, Giovanni, 77, 86, 281 n. 1, 382Rattazzi, Urbano, 105, 113, 328; as candi-

date for premiership, 25, n o , 243-4,437; and Cavour, 4, 19, 56, 79, 110-12,242, 244, 246, 259, 321, 333, 437, 439;and Crispi, 43, n o ; and Garibaldi, 19,243-4, 245, 251

Recruitment of volunteers, veto on, 150,168, 169, 186, 216, 223, 242 n. 2, 247

Reggio, 347-52, 354Regno d'Italia, II, 304, 344, 382, 390Republicanism, 22, 74, 82, 246, 248, 283;

supporters of, 2, 5, 8, 24, 43-4, 70, 73,99, 115, 131, 139, 146, 183, 203, 210,212,246-7,263,273, 343,404,439; mis-leading allegations about, n , 44, 58, 75,80-1, 84,96,173, 209-10, 219, 249, 258,269, 271, 273, 359, 361-2, 373

Ribotti, Ignazio, 107, 136, 207Ricasoli, Bettino, 39, 84, 146, 224, 329,

334; as candidate for premiership, 25,113; his meeting with king and Cavour,141-2, 153; organizes rising in PapalStates, 228, 241; prospective governorof Sicily, 258, 322; and Cavour, 4, 28,38, 104, 114, 130, 146-7, 154, 222, 322,325, 331, 415, 439; and Garibaldi, 28,80, 114, 130, 140-1, 322; and VictorEmanuel, 28,80,114,126,130,146,222,322-3

Ricasoli, Vincenzo, 229 n. 2Riso, Francesco, 8Rocca, Consul, 186 n. 2, 269, 271Roccaforte, Marchese, 281 n. 1Romagna. See Papal StatesRomano, Liborio, 141-2, 149, 150, 155,

206, 418Rome, 50, 65, 71, 339, 341, 401, 432; as

national capital, 325, 331; as symbol ofItalian unity, 13, 54, 55, 174-5, 322-3,415; Cavour and, 22,25, 55,64, 84,139,174, 224, 325, 331, 400; Garibaldi'sdesigns on, 5, 13, 17, 18, 21, 24, 27, 64,115-16, 122-3, 136, 138-9, 143, 158,

Index 457I65, 167, 169, 174-5, 186, 189, 196-7,201, 209, 211, 2I3-I6, 222, 226, 229,231, 233, 234-8, 243-5, 248-52, 254-5,263-4, 279* 282, 296, 299, 300, 305, 316,321, 352, 363, 408, 438, 440

Rosalia, St, 212Rosina, Contessa di Mirafiori (royal

mistress), 321, 421, 426Rudini, Marquis di, 4, 71, 284-5, 296 n. 3,

402Russell, George, 425, 426Russell, Lord John, 32-5, 91, 102, 104,

124 n. 1, 137, 138, 226, 227, 307, 335,339, 387, 395, 432

Russell, Odo, 33Russia, 320

Sacchi, Gaetano, 99Saffi, Aurelio, 115, 250, 262, 335Salerno, 134Saliceti, Aurelio, 250, 369-71Sangiovannara, La, 362 n. 3Sardinia, island of, 15, 22, 34, 35, 51, 102,

153Sardinia, kingdom of. See PiedmontSavoy, House of, 1, 13, 15, 18, 80, 216,

257, 359. See also Victor EmanuelSavoy, province of, 22; ceded to France,

12, 23, 25, 26, 33, 34, 35, 91, 260, 437,443; plebiscite in, 31

Scalia, Luigi, 296 n. 3Sciacca, 303 n. 3Scialoia, Antonio, 4, 256Scotland, 15Scrofani, Baron, 281 n. 1Separatism, 24, 65, 292, 304, 305-6, 342;

advocates of, 12, 17, 60, 72-4, 79, 165,190, 203, 279, 281 n. 1, 283, 286 n. 3,343, 346; Crispi and, 44, 173, 175

Shaftesbury, Lord, 227Sineo, Riccardo, 4, 243-4, 328-9Social problems in Sicily and Naples, 8-9,

60, 274-5, 289-92, 393-4, 424-5Societa Nazionale. See National SocietySomerset, Duke of, 228* Southern question', 5, 328, 418Spain, 320Spaventa, Silvio, 4, 156 n. 1

Spezia, 52Stabile, Mariano, 61Statute, Piedmontese, proclaimed in Sicily,

162-5, 173, 191, 266Swiss Guard, Papal, 153Syracuse, 378, 379, 384Syracuse, Count of, 12, 154-5, 205

Taranto, 134Thackeray, W. M., 33Thayer, W. R., 24 n. 1, 215, 248 n. 7Thousand, The, 4, 10, 19, 26, 29, 39, 43,

82, 91, 103, 216, 419-20; compositionof, 24. See also under Volunteer forces

Times, The, 8, 228, 420Tom Pouce, 191Tommasi, Dr, 208, 209Torrearsa, Marchese di, 38, 41, 57, 62,

72-4, 75-6, 86, 184, 188, 195, 265, 275Totti, Pasquale, 88Trabonella, Baron, 379'Transformism*, 278, 280, 300, 354Trapani, 303 n. 3, 385Trecchi, Marquis, 115, 236Trevelyan, G. M., 1, 127 n. 1, 137 n. 3,

151 n. 1, 215, 223, 228, 235 n. 3Trieste, 102 n. 4, 436Triple Alliance, 42Turin, 13, 23, 66, 136, 204, 210, 235-6,

309, 409; as capital city, 282, 321, 325,340, 397, 415

Turin government. See Parliament (Turin)and Piedmont

Ttirr, Gen., 98, 228 n. 1, 252, 313, 363,368 n. 3, 372-4

Tuscany, 1, 34, 51, 145, 196, 322, 444;'exchanged' for Nice, 12, 17, 443; as-sembly in, 64, 263, 293; annexationvote in, 115, 139, 147, 183, 223-4, 263,306, 318, 326, 329, 371, 400, 404

Ugdulena, Francesco, 262, 290, 348-54,379

Umbria. See Papal StatesUnification of Italy, 8, 15, 44, 50, 61, 67,

68, 71, 73, 165, 270, 285-6, 294, 306,328, 344, 359. 370-1, 392, 399-401, 434;Britain and, 32-6; France and, 32, 100.

458 IndexUnification of Italy (cant)

See also under Cavour, Crispi, Gari-baldi, Mazzini, Radicals

Unita Italiana, V (Genoa), 145 n. 4, 191,403

Unita Italiana, V (Palermo), 190-1, 401United States. See AmericanUniversal suffrage. See Plebiscite

Valerio, Lorenzo, 28, 38, 107, 108, 130,257, 333

Valle di Giosaffat, La, 346, 399Vasto, 135Venafro, 135Venice, 50, 330, 341; Britain and, 32, 35,

227; Cavour and, 18,22, 84,94,102 n. 4,132, 174, 209, 225, 325, 432, 436; Crispiand, 54, 316, 318; Garibaldi and, 165,214, 252, 339, 409, 432

Verdura, Duke of, 278, 281Victor Emanuel, King, 5, 27, 50, 248, 275,

283, 285, 306, 339, 341, 378, 387, 402,415; at Ancona, 317, 334, 338; onadvance to Naples, 306, 334, 338, 362^405-7; enters Naples, 408; at Naples,420, 422-7, 429-30; in Sicily, 428.

Character of, 158, 244, 425-7; asfocus of nationalism, 8, 17, 20, 28, 29,30, 41, 45, 55, 73, 74, 162-3, 174, 197,207, 210, 247, 273, 306, 325, 344-5,381-3, 388, 403, 412; and making ofItaly, 221, 241, 243; dictatorial powerproposed for, 80, 322-3, 336; Britainand, 33-5; France and, 71, 335.

And the Bourbons, 94, 96, 101, 113,148, 335,406,431; and Cavour, 22,24-5,29, 80, n o , 115,126-7, 141-3,152,173,209, 214, 216, 230, 232-6, 243-4, 253,259, 321, 323, 333-7, 396, 420-3, 426-9,431, 438 n. 1, 439; and Crispi, 80, 81,173; and Depretis, 105, 108, 162, 166;and Garibaldi, 15, 25, 30, 48, 66, 80, 83-4, 96, 101, 114-16, 119, 122, 132, 136,140-3, 148, 151, 158, 173, 201-2, 209,

213-15, 217-18, 220, 222-3, 230, 232-9,243-4, 250-1, 253-5, 259, 263-4, 268,288, 296, 312, 317, 323, 325, 333, 337,345, 363, 382-3, 406-9, 426, 432, 433,435, 436, 439, 441; his letters to Gari-baldi, 125-7, 130, 234, 237, 338, 369;and La Farina, 38, 45, 894, 428; andMordini, 263, 427; and Papal States,152-3, 158, 228-9, 234, 257; andradicals, 80-1, 211, 243, 332; and Rome,115, 143, 215, 233-5, 238, 243, 264

Victoria, Queen, 8, 34, 35, 432 n. 1Villamarina, Marquis de, 156, 241, 382;

his character, 154, 219; his ignorance ofNeapolitans, 133-7,155', his intrigues atNaples, 206-7; and Cavour, 123, 132-5,154, 160, 207, 214, 219, 224, 237, 255,259, 311; and Garibaldi, 214, 217, 255,259, 3 i i , 337

Vimercati, Ottaviano, 237-8,246,252,253Visconti-Venosta, Emilio, 4, 136-7, 161Volturno, river, 4, 219, 231, 252, 363;

battle at, 290,296,299, 300, 310-n , 320,338, 363

Volunteer forces, 414; Bertani's, 139,144-5, 150, 216, 249; Cosenz's, 26 n., 27,99, 140, 216; Garibaldi's {see alsoThousand), 13, 17, 25, 28, 29, 39, 49,90, 116, 118, 121, 123, 132, 190, 201,216-19, 220, 231, 234, 245, 252, 253,258, 288, 310-12, 320, 330, 341, 358,395, 405-9, 419, 427, 43i, 436; Medici's,26n., 27, 140, 216; Nicotera's, 146, 183,223-4.

See also Recruitment

Warsaw Congress, 374, 407Wellington, Duke of, 228Whyte, A. J., 24 n. 1, 152 n. 1, 210 n. 3,

215, 263 n. 2, 336 n. 2Winspeare, Giovanni, 91, 93, 95, 156

Zambianchi, Col., 27, 241, 437 n. 2Zanardelli, Giuseppe, 4, 136, 155, 207