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FOR REFERENCE ONLY Boeing 757 ENGINEERING CONTINUATION TRAINING Q3 & Q4 2018

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Boeing 757 ENGINEERING

CONTINUATION TRAINING

Q3 & Q4 2018

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Contents:

1 INTRODUCTION

2 757 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

3 757 UK MAINTENANCE RELATED MOR

4 SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETINS

5 PROCEDURES REVIEW

6 APB WINGLET MODIFICATION

FOR REFERENCE ONLY 1 Introduction This module covers aspects identified in the period since June 2018 and includes all engine types.

2 B757 Airworthiness Directives The following pages lists the Boeing 757 AD’s issued from June 2018 to Dec 2018. If a full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website (http://ad.easa.europa.eu) or you can navigate from the Quality Tab on TechCom. Some superseded and superseding ADs have not been included as there is no material change. US AD No.: 2018-16-05 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 57 Wings - Wing Skin / Shim - Inspection Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 757- 57A0073 RB, dated July 14, 2017.

Reason: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of bolt rotation in the engine drag fitting joint and fasteners heads; an inspection of the fastener holes revealed that cracks were found in the skin on two airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for skin cracking and shim migration at the upper link drag fittings, diagonal brace cracking, and fastener looseness; and applicable oncondition actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

US AD No.: 2018-18-07 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 53 Fuselage - Skin Longitudinal Lap Splices -

Inspection

Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-53A0104, dated November 6, 2017

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Reason: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the longitudinal lap splices of the fuselage skin are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive inspections of the longitudinal lap splices of the fuselage skin for cracking and protruding fasteners, and applicable corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

EAAS AD No.: 2018-0202R1 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 72 Engine – Low Pressure Compressor Blades – Inspection Manufacturer/s: Rolls Royce

Applicability All fan blades, all Part Numbers (P/N), except those that are post-SB/post-mod 72-C946, which can be visually identified by a blue triangle etched on the blade aerofoil suction surface close to the leading edge tip.

Reason: During engine overhaul, inspection of a high life set of low pressure compressor (LPC) fan blades revealed small cracks in the blade roots on the concave root flank. These cracks had originated at the edge of bedding from multiple origins. Root cause analysis indicated the cause of the crack initiation to be the absence of the anti-frettage coating. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to fan blade failure, possibly resulting in release of high energy non-contained debris from the engine, with consequent damage to the aeroplane.

US AD No.: 2018-14-10 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 73 Fuel Control Turbine Engines - Electronic Engine

Control Software - Installation Manufacturer/s: Pratt & Whitney

Applicability This AD applies to: (1) All Pratt & Whitney Division (PW) PW2037, PW2037M, and PW2040 turbofan engines with electronic engine control (EEC), model number EEC104-40 or EEC104-60, installed, with an EEC software standard earlier than SCN 5B/I; and (2) All PW PW2037, PW2037M, and PW2040 turbofan engines with EEC, model number EEC104-1, with part numbers (P/Ns) 1B7484, 1B7486, 1B7984, or 1B7985, installed, with an EEC software standard earlier than SCN 27A.

Reason: AD 2017-12-03 required installing a software standard eligible for installation and precludes the use of electronic engine control (EEC) software standards earlier than SCN 5B/I. This AD requires

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

installing a software standard eligible for installation and preclude the use of EEC software standards earlier than SCN 5B/I or SCN 27A. This AD was prompted by an unrecoverable engine in-flight shutdown (IFSD) after an ice crystal icing event. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

US AD No.: 2018-19-23 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 52 Doors - Cargo Door Control Switches -

Replacement / Installation Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company airplanes; certificated in any category; as identified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) of this AD. (1) Model 747-8F and 747-8 series airplanes as identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-52-2307, Revision 1, dated May 2, 2018. (2) Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747- 400, 747-400D, 747-400F, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes, as identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-52-2308, Revision 1, dated June 18, 2018. (3) Model 757-200, 757-200PF, 757-200CB, and -300 series airplanes, as identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-52-0093, Revision 2, dated November 14, 2017

Reason: AD 2013-01-02 required replacing the control switches of certain cargo doors. This AD requires replacement of certain cargo door control switches with a new, improved switch; installation of an arm switch in certain cargo doors; operational and functional tests; and applicable on-condition actions. This AD also adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD was prompted by reports of uncommanded cargo door operation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

US AD No.: 2018-22-06 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 73 Engine Fuel & Control - Metering Valve Pilot Valve -

Removal / Replacement Manufacturer/s: Pratt & Whitney

Applicability This AD applies to all Pratt & Whitney (PW) PW2037, PW2037M, and PW2040 turbofan engines with JFC104-1 fuel control units (FCUs) with serial numbers listed in the Accomplishment Instructions, FCU Serial Number List, of PW Alert Service Bulletin PW2000 A73-172, dated October 16, 2017.

Reason: This AD was prompted by an uncommanded high thrust event that occurred during approach on January 16, 2016, and during landing on April 6, 2016. This AD requires removal of the metering valve pilot valve (MVPV) within certain fuel control units (FCUs) and the MVPV's replacement with a part eligible for installation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

US AD No.: 2018-20-13 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 28 [Correction] Fuel - Motor-Operated Valve Actuators -

Replacement / Maintenance or Inspection Program - Revision

Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability This AD applies to all The Boeing Company airplanes, certificated in any category, identified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) of this AD. (1) Model 737 airplanes, excluding Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. (2) Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 series airplanes. (3) Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series airplanes.

Reason: This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed motor-operated valve (MOV) actuators of the fuel shutoff valves. This AD requires replacing certain MOV actuators of the fuel shutoff valves for the left and right engines (on certain airplanes) and of the auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel shutoff valve (on Model 757 and Model 767 airplanes); and revising the maintenance or inspection program to incorporate certain airworthiness limitations (AWLs). We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

EASA AD No.: 2018-0259 Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ ATA 46 Information Systems – Electronic Flight Bag

Universal Serial Bus Receptacle – Modification Manufacturer/s: Fokker Services B. V.

Applicability Fokker F27 Mark 050, F28 Mark 3000, F28 Mark 0070 and F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes; Airbus A318, A319, A320, A321, A330 and A340 aeroplanes; Avions de Transport Régional (ATR) ATR42 and ATR72 aeroplanes; Boeing 737, 757, 767 and 777 aeroplanes; and Bombardier (formerly Canadair) CL-600 and (formerly De Havilland Canada) DHC-8 aeroplanes; as identified in Appendix 1 of this AD.

Reason: Several occurrences on various aeroplanes have been reported of smoke and fumes in the cockpit, due to overheating of an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) USB receptacle, which had been installed by FS Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), SB, or minor modification, either an Engineering Change Request (ECR) or Compliance Record Report (CRR), as applicable. Investigation results revealed that each of these events was caused by a short circuit in the EFB charging cable.

3. 757 UK Maintenance Related MOR’s The following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest. As the Information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated. “No part of the MOR publication may be reproduced or transmitted outside of the organisation without the express permission in writing of the Civil Aviation Authority Safety Data Office.” ATA 30 Engine duct clamp missing RB211.

. Upon opening the #2 eng idg service Panel an air duct clamp fell out of the aperture. Clamp found to be from the inlet cowl anti ice connection to the inlet cowl, the duct had become detached. The clamp was found to have a locking spigot missing (see photos for Clarification). Therefore the #2 eng anti ice would not have worked if Required. The clamp was replaced with no further issues. ATA 25 Wording missing from Maintenance Manual.

I was tasked with the job of replacing a door escape slide, however reading the maintenance instructions the words "safety pin" is missing in several places. ATA 73 Engine slow to spool up causing the aircraft to yaw in flight.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

From ground idle and flight idle the left engine was slow to spool up compared to the right engine causing the aircraft to yaw in flight. Currently the aircraft is AOG in the hangar with the defects being both FFG as defective items to be replaced as the cause. An action has been assigned to the reliability engineer to upload information on the work completed. ATA 22 Switch body in the panel found rotating due to a missing washer.

During the auto land 40 test for an auto land upgrade the switch on the captain’s side for the instrument source select was found to be rotating in the panel when it was required to be moved by the Autoland test. On disassembly of the switch from the panel it was found that the locking tang washer which stops the switch rotating in the panel was found to be missing. On inspection the nav switch below was also found to have the same washer missing. Immediate / suggested action: Two washers obtained from serviceable switches from stores rendering 2 serviceable switches u/s for having their washers used. Due to the switches being used in case of a loss of instruments both switches, both sides, on pcf aircraft to be inspected for correct installation including locking tang washer. Tang washers to be obtained to ensure stock of switches not depleted. ATA 52 Door disarming and opening issues due to the girt bar in automatic position and the door lever in the manual position.

Currently on a C Check at 2 **** ******* - Lasham, the following occurrence was encountered. Whilst rigging passenger door 1R the emergency power system trigger was found sheared. A replacement trigger and attachment pin have been ordered. ATA 52 Door bustle catching on the rear galley lower stowage compartments.

On inspection found door bustle not correctly seated with large gap between door trim and bustle. Bustle removed and found door slide also protruding. Installation inspected and found slide not correctly installed into upper slot locators. Slide removed and inspected for packing condition and damage. Noted block taped into the recess at the back of the slide. This was removed and found to be packing used during slide shipment. This was interfering with the door hi-locks. Slide then re-installed I.A.W AMM 25-66-01. Bustle now also seated correctly, and serviceable. ATA 72 FOD found in engine post shop visit. Engine ****** overhauled at Iberia was despatched to JAX for A/C ****** currently undergoing cargo conversion. Initial inspection of the engine at JAX revealed 2 loose bolts and 1 nut and washer located in the rear of the LPC case between the Fire-wall and rear seal approximately 1 o-clock position Viewed from rear. A single loose nut located front end RH hand side attachment bracket Loose clamp on the LPC case rear of the Kevlar wrap. Chaffed LPC case fire wire element located under ***. P3 muscle air pipe bent, however pictures from Iberia show this pipe to be in good condition prior to despatch.

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

ATA 20 Incorrect assembly of window 2R exterior opening mechanism. Wire installation found in incomplete condition.

Found during t/s on *** four wires straight cut; not protected and unsafe stowed behind engine anti ice panel. Wire numbers: w********. Wires capped and stowed and mddr for clarification opened. Request sent to engineering and t/s department. ATA 27 Lock wire used instead of collar on summing lever fastener on elevator PCA.

*** Have discovered the discrepancy below on *****, and are submitting an MOR. "***** is currently on a C-Check visit at ***. During routine inspection of the left elevator bay, the fastener on the summing lever of the L/H elevator I/B PCA was found to be secured by lock wire rather than a collar as per IPC. Please see attached IPC extract. L/H elevator I/B PCA is being replaced anyhow due to wear" . Please see attached images; 'Incorrect' fastener retained using lock wire and 'Correct' fastener retained with collar. Elevator PCA P/N: *****. Collar P/N: *****. ATA 78 Nr.1 pylon thrust reverser hinge fitting was found to have the aft upper bolt hole larger than normal.RB211

During a #1 engine change on the aircraft, corrosion was noted on the outboard aft skin of the #1 pylon. The pylon was removed and sent to ****** to have the skin replaced. During the skin replacement process, the outboard aft thrust reverser hinge fitting was found to have the aft upper bolt hole larger than normal. Review has shown that the hole dimension exceeded the maximum permissible per Boeing Service bulletin 757-54-0015, and more appropriately, Service Bulleting 757-54-0049 Rev 2 regulated by FAA AD 2013-04-04. Boeing Service bulletin 757-54-0015 Rev 03 states that the maximum hole size for the upper holes should not exceed 0.5312” diameter. When ***** carried out an inspection in 2007, they noted that hinge replacement per SB 757-54-0015 had been previously complied with. Boeing Service bulletin 757-54-0049 Rev 02 states that the maximum hole size for the upper holes should not exceed 0.5317” diameter. This SB does not require a previously replaced fitting to be replaced, nor does it require inspection of the upper bolts, it does require an inspection of the lower bolts. This inspection was last accomplished in 2015, where **** replaced the lower bolts. **** have continued with the repeat inspection, but during the skin replacement, the hole through the lower chord common to the upper aft hole was measured at 0.5670” diameter. Review with Boeing revealed that this oversize had not been previously approved, therefore the installation is not considered compliant with AD 2013-04-04. This has been rectified through Boeing Service request SR 3-4272780294, copy of the correspondences to date attached. . ATA 78 Engine I/B translating sleeve damaged RB211.

During replacement of inboard lower actuator the ahead panel and thrust reverser sleeve were damaged due to C-duct being opened. At 20:00 hrs after printing maintenance manuals and sorting tooling out in preparation of the job, we set about routine tasks on **** on stand 203 whilst the aircraft was being unloaded. I was told by the dispatcher that the aircraft was staying on stand. While we started preparing for the actuator replacement we were informed the aircraft had arrived with an autobrake fault. Which *** was tasked with assisting the Duty Engineer to do functions on the system. We were then told the aircraft had to be moved as another

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

aircraft needed the stand which resulted in us to reverse steps that we had followed in the manual, pack up our tools and equipment before we could move the aircraft to a remote stand. We started the job again at 22:30. The Duty Engineer then reminded us that it was on a morning departure and therefore needed to start it soon to ensure we completed it on time as there were no spare aircraft. We then started to prepare for the removal again but we overlooked the removal of the ahead door. As we opened the C-duct we heard a bang and immediately stopped. When the damage was found we informed our Duty Engineer. The Duty Engineer informed Maintrol and a new translating sleeve and ahead door were ordered. The translating sleeve and ahead door were replaced. ATA 78 Damage to thrust reverser hinge panel caused RB211. Damage caused to #1 engine. Inboard thrust reverser sleeve on top forward edge. Cracked/holed - approx 1''. AMM reference was interpreted incorrectly which resulted in the damage action. When hinge access doors were referenced in the AMM - this was interpreted to mean the access doors to access either end of the actuator to be replaced - not the upper hinge access door for the C-duct/thrust reverser sleeve. This mistake resulted in the damage. Although the terms in the AMM are correct - a picture of the upper hinge door (commonly known as the ahead door) would have assisted in this case. The diagrams in the preparation section of the AMM only show the actuators - which again led to the misinterpretation. 4. Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins No SAIB’s during this period. 5. Procedures Review Due to time to print differences between this publication and current published technical matter, it has been decided to no longer reference changes to individual operators’ technical notices and procedures. This information will of course still be readily available via TechCom or the individual operators’ systems. If you are having difficulty in accessing any of this information, please contact your local supervisor or STN tech library.

- END -

These notes are for information and training use ONLY and are NOT subject to amendment or alteration.

Always use the correct and current aircraft maintenance manuals relevant to the

aircraft and operator.

These notes are not intended to be used to carry out maintenance on the aircraft.

Aviation Partners Boeing757-200 Blended Winglet System

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What are Blended Winglets?

• A more efficient way of introducing effective span

• An aerodynamic method used for lower drag and improved performance

• Blending the winglet into the wing reduces the wingtip vortex, reduces drag, and improves performance

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Proven Blended Winglets Benefits

• Lower Block Fuel

• Reduced Engine Maintenance Costs

• Improved Takeoff Performance

• Increased Payload-Range Capability

• Lower Emissions

• Reduced Airport Community Noise

• Higher Initial / Optimal Cruise Altitudes

• More Economical Dash Speed Capability

• Lower Landing and Navigation Fees

• Dramatically Different Appearance

• Higher Aircraft Residual Value

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757-200 Blended Winglet Configuration

757-200 Airplane Comparison:• 757-200 Wingspan = 124’ 10”

• With Blended Winglets = 134’ 7”

• Difference = + 9’ 9”

757-200 Winglet:• Height = 8 ft 2 in• Very similar to NG Winglet

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757-200 Blended Winglet System

Manual Supplements

• Airplane Flight Manual• Airplane Maintenance Manual• Illustrated Parts Catalog• Operations Manual• Weight and Balance Manual• Master Minimum Equipment List• Dispatch Deviation Guide• Structural Repair Manual• Maintenance Planning

Document

Winglet Installation

• Navigation and Anti-Collision Lights

• Lights Power Supply

Flight Deck

• Stabilizer Trim Light Plate

• Speedbrake Load Alleviation System

Wing Modification

• Outer Skin / Rib Replacement

• Strengthened Stringers

• Wing Extension

Stab Trim Warning Switches• Relocated

Avionics Revisions

• Flight Management Computer Database Update

(Pegasus 2005, RR engines)

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Performance:

• 5.1% Nominal Increase in Fuel Mileage

Modification Weight:

• 1,358 lbs

• MZFW will be increased by 1,358 lbs

Airplane Systems Impact:

• Load Alleviation System Required

• New Position Lighting Transformer and Anti-Collision Light Power Supply

• New # 4 and 5 Fuel Sticks

• Boeing Service Bulletin 757-57A0058 Must be Completed with (installation of vortex generators on leading edge, main flap)

757-200 Blended Winglets Design Results

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• No change to key parameters

– Takeoff and landing speeds

– Stall speeds and stall warning

– Pitot-static calibration

• Significant performance improvement with minimal operational impact

– Crew differences training no greater than level ‘A’

– Minimal maintenance requirements

– No revisions to normal operations

– Load Alleviation System (LAS) only affects abnormal operations

Performance Improvements with Minimal Changes in Operations

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Structures ModificationATA Chapter 57 - Wing

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Wing Modification Description

0.44 m

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Outboard Attachment

New winglet attach rib

New spar end attach fittings

New upper and lower skin panels

Modification Description

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Modification Description

Lower Wing Surface

L-6 STRINGER REINFORCEMENT, STEEL

L-8 STRINGER REINFORCEMENT, STEEL

New Lower Panel

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757-200 BLENDED WINGLET INSTALL

Concept: “Do as much as you can on the floor!”

•Locate on Aircraft

•Drill on Bench

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Modification Description

NEW STRINGER U-9.5, ALUMINUM

NEW STRINGER U-11.5, STEEL

STRINGER REINFORCEMENT

U-14, ALUMINUM

STRINGER REINFORCEMENT

U-11, ALUMINUM

Upper Wing Surface

New Upper Panel

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757-200 Winglet InstallationEnd-Fitting Pre-Installation

New Spar Fittings Just Prior to Loading

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757-200 Winglet InstallationUpper Skin Cut

Set Depth to cut most of

the stringers below

BE SURE TO STOP AT

THE STOPS

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757-200 Winglet InstallationUpper Skin Cut

Good Depth…it cut most

of the stringers below

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CRITICAL OPERATIONUpper Skin Cut (Across Spars)

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Wing Modification Description

New Stringers

Stringer Strap Stringer Strap

Section A-A (maximum reinforcement)

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Winglet Assembly

Aluminum leadingedge

Graphite spars

Aluminum Ribs

Titanium splice plates

Aluminum interchangeable interface joint

Aft position light

Aluminum trailing edge

Graphite with Nomex core Upr/Lwr skins• Blind fasteners upper skin attach• Huck bolts lower skin attach• No secondary bonds

Forward lightingassembly

Aluminum tip

Composite Material System – BMS8-256

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Winglet Installation Weight

Element Weight per shipset

Winglet 295 lb (134 kg)

Winglet Modification 930 lb (422 kg)

Ballast 120 lb (54 kg)

Systems 13 lb (6 kg)

Total 1,358 lb (616 kg)

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Systems Modification

Speedbrake Load Alleviation System

ATA Chapter 27 – Flight Controls

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• System Designed to Protect Wing From High Gross Weight/High Speed 2.5g Symmetrical Pitch-Up Maneuver With Speed Brakes Deployed

• System Performs Function by Stowing Speedbrakes to 50% In-flight Position Under Stated Conditions

• Pilot Annunciation in Event of Failed System

• Flight Crew Can Override System

• Dispatch Permitted with In-Op System

Speedbrake Load Alleviation System

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Speedbrake Load Alleviation System -Hardware

SPEEDBRAKE

AUTOSTOW

CONTROLLER

E1 RACK

Aisle Stand Mechanism E&E Bay Installation

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757-200 Winglet InstallationAuto Stow System Installation

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757-200 Winglet InstallationAuto Stow System Installation

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757-200 Winglet InstallationAuto Stow System Installation

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Speedbrake Load Alleviation System -Hardware

SpeedBrake Handle Light Plate

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Speedbrake Load Alleviation System -Software

LESS

LESS

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Systems Modification

Exterior Lighting System

ATA Chapter 33 – Lights

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Winglet Exterior Lighting System

Wing Tip Anti Collision Light

Forward Position Light

Aft Position Light

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Winglet Exterior Lighting System

Position Light Power Supply

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Winglet Exterior Lighting System

Strobe Light Power Supply

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Systems Modification

ATA Chapter 28 – Fuel

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• Fuel Measuring Sticks– Sticks 4 and 5 length shortened by approximately

1.5 inches– Stick revision required to provide clearance with

structural modification

Fuel Stick Revision

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Systems Modification

Removal/Refit

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ATA Chapter 57 – Wings

Removal-Refit

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ATA Chapter 57 – Wings

Regular style of Boeing 3 legged sling

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Winglet Sling Attachment

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ATA Chapter 57 – Wings

Removal-Refit

•Barrel nut torque check

•Different bolts

•Wet assembled

•Tightening sequence

•Fit and Fair

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Systems ModificationOperational considerations

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Config Deviation

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Config Deviation

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MMEL

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B757 Winglets

Any questions?

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