Crider 1

The Constitutionality of Red Light Cameras.

by

Brandon S. Crider

The University of Texas at Arlington

POLS 5301-001

Professor Ignagni

12/09/2013

Crider 2

Abstract

This research attempts to predict if the Supreme Court would rule red light cameras to be

unconstitutional. Prima facie red light cameras are in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Fifth

Amendment and Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The method of analysis

implemented to conduct this research is based upon the Attitudinal Model of Judicial Behavior

by Harold Spaeth’s predictive paradigm. This framework introduced by Harold Spaeth of

judicial decision-making is rooted in the argument of general theory or ideas of particular

variables which allow one to understand, explain, and predict the outcome of U.S. Supreme

Court cases. This research poses two hypotheses: H1: If the constitutionality of red light cameras

were to be challenged and litigated to be heard by the US Supreme Court they would adjudicate

that red light cameras are unconstitutional per one’s right to privacy as delineated in the Fourth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; and, H2: No “compelling state interest” exists which

would preclude the application of the Fourth Amendment in respect to its Right to Privacy clause

and thereby give the states the right to violate one’s right per the U.S. Constitution. The findings

from this research support both hypotheses.

Introduction

The research question posed herein is of importance as it addresses one’s most coveted

and sacred rights which is their right to privacy. However, one’s right to privacy is a nebulous

concept that is ever evolving and must take into consideration context, constitutionality, the

ultimate societal interest of a matter, and is constantly threatened and being redefined as

technology advances. The right to privacy is not delineated in or explicitly guaranteed by the

U.S. Constitution as reiterated in Griswold v. Connecticut when it is expressed that;

Crider 3

The Court talks about a constitutional “right of privacy” as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the “privacy” of individuals. But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities. Such, for example, is the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” But I think it belittles that Amendment to talk about it as though it protects nothing but “privacy.”1

Nonetheless, heretofore the “right to privacy” has been deemed by many as an axiomatic

attribute of a general democracy, and more specifically, has been perpetuated—per an

extrapolation of the intent of the framers when effectuating the U.S. Constitution—to be a vital

cog in the American form of democracy referred to by James Madison as a “compound

republic”.2 In certain cases the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed certain invasion to one’s privacy

if a “compelling state interest” can be proven. However, when certain “fundamental rights” are

involved any legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state

interests at stake.3 This research operates under the assumption that no compelling interest of the

state exists given that red light cameras have shown to increase crashes, and based on the fact

that other solutions exist to reduce the likelihood one is to run a red light.4

The protection against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment5, and the

right to confront one’s accuser is delineated in the Sixth Amendment which states in pertinent

part; “the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him”.6 For the

purpose of this research the disenfranchisement of one’s rights effectuated by the use of red light

cameras will be in examined in respect to the Fourth Amendment and its Unreasonable Search

and Seizure provision that lends to one’s “right to privacy” which has been promulgated insofar 1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965)2 Martha Derthick, Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings

Institution Press, 2001).3 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)4 Langland-Orban, Pracht, and Large. "Red Light Running Cameras: Would Crashes, Injuries and Automobile

Insurance Rates Increase If They Are Used in Florida?." 5 The U.S. Constitution; Amendment V: (1791)6 The U.S. Constitution; Amendment VI: (1791)

Crider 4

as to be believed by many as a constitutionally guaranteed right. As aforementioned the U.S.

Constitution does not directly venerate a solidified concept of ones right to privacy, nor does it

directly delineate the guarantee of any such privacy right. An explanation of how this “right to

privacy” –unspoken of in the U.S. Constitution—came about is expounded upon by Justice

Blackmun when he conveyed the opinion of the Court concerning the matter of Roe v. Wade

which states in pertinent part;

In a line of decisions, however, the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); in the penumbras of the Bill Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut; in the Ninth Amendment, id., at 486(Goldberg, J., concurring) or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 8

Literature Review

Wherein the power of the U.S. Supreme Court to influence policy lies is within their

interpretation of statutes pursuant to such aspects as precedent and the framer’s intention at the

time a given policy was instituted. The most prominent guiding force for the U.S. Supreme Court

is the U.S. Constitution as it is recognized as “the law of the land”. The authority for the U.S.

Supreme Court to interpret questions of constitutionality was venerated in the decision of

Marbury v. Madison which was adjudicated in 1803. It set such precedents such as; “a legislative

act contrary to the Constitution is not law and it is emphatically the province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is”.9 This authority of the court is known as “judicial

review” and was effectuated when Chief Justice John Marshall ruled in Marbury v. Madison that,

7 Joseph Ignagni, Influential and Controversial Reading in American Politics, (United States of America: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2005).

8 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)9 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)

Crider 5

the Supreme Court had no power to order Madison to deliver the commission because a portion of the relevant law under which they were hearing the case was unconstitutional. Thus, there was no need to directly confront the executive branch—and a direct confrontation with the Jeffersonians (added from earlier in the quote)—, while at the same time establishing the principle of reviewing the actions and laws of other branches of government.10

In respect to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has

rendered many landmark decisions which has set precedent and influenced policy. One of the

Supreme Court’s most prominent decisions was rendered in Gitlow v. People of New York

(1925) when they interpreted the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth

Amendment to extend the rights of the majority of the Bill of Rights to the states and adjudicated

the matter accordingly.11

The Oxford English Dictionary records instances of the use of the word privacy in pre-

eighteenth and eighteenth century literature. Therefore the fact that the U.S. Constitution does

not mention privacy explicitly leads to a belief that no such “right to privacy” exists. However

certain matters were respected in the U.S. Constitution such as property, religion, and speech and

therefore mentioned specifically.12 Contemporary privacy jurisprudence has employed the

following, grim chain of reasoning:

(1) Only objectively reasonable privacy expectations are protected under the Fourth Amendment; (2) There is no need to provide a criterion for identifying these expectations because it is clear that whenever someone knowingly exposes an object or information to the public, that person cannot claim to have an objectively reasonable privacy expectation;" and (3) The terms "knowingly," "exposed," and "public" should be interpreted as broadly as possible. Whenever there is uncertainty about whether exposure was knowing or inadvertent, it should be classified as "knowing.” Even a fleeting opportunity to view an object should be interpreted as "exposure." Finally, the term

10Joseph Ignagni, Influential and Controversial Reading in American Politics, (United States of America: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2005), 137.

11 Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)12 William Heffernan, "Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 92, no.

1/2 (Autumn, 2001- Winter, 2002): 1-126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1144208 . (accessed December 1, 2013).

Crider 6

"public" should be defined expansively to include not simply randomly encountered strangers but also providers of services indispensable to life in modern society.13 14

As expounded upon in Cohen et. al. (2007; 808) the Fourth Amendment was effectuated

pursuant to two principal sources which were based upon the English and American experiences

of virtually unrestrained and judicially unsupervised searches, and the action that had already

been taken by some of the states to guard constitutionally against a recurrence of this abuse.15

The right for one to privacy has been extrapolated by the U.S. Supreme Court from the Fourth

Amendment which is delineated as follows;

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized16.

This concept was initiated by James Madison in the First Congress. Madison’s initial concept

was not exactly delineated as aforementioned due to some revising by the committee which

Madison referred his initial proposal to.17 Nonetheless it ultimately passed, was ratified by the

states, and evolved. One of the evolutions the Fourth Amendment which is pertinent to this

research is the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement which allows law enforcement

officers to search an automobile without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that

the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminality. The scope of the search may extend

to all parts of the vehicle in which contraband or evidence could be concealed, including closed

compartments and trunks. 18

13 Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)14 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)15 William Cohen, David Danelski, and David Yalof, Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and Individual Rights, (New York,

NY: Foundation Press, 2007).16 Amendment IV, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)17 William Cohen, David Danelski, and David Yalof, Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and Individual Rights, (New York,

NY: Foundation Press, 2007).18 United States v. Young, 38 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994).

Crider 7

Arizona v. Johnson (2009) was one of six cases adjudicated by the Robert’s Court which

dealt with one’s right to privacy per unreasonable search in seizures as delineated in the Fourth

Amendment. This case ultimately presented the issue of whether or not a pat down, or “Terry

Type”, search conducted by the officer on the defendant violated his rights per the Fourth

Amendment. It was deemed that “Terry Type” search is a valid exception to a warrant and

allows an officer of the law to violate the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the

Fourth Amendment as it serves to protect both the officer and the public. Moreover, this type of

exception to a warrant is justified by the fact that traffic stops by nature have a heightened risk to

the officer which can be minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of

the situation. To justify a pat down of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however,

just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must

harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.19

Ultimately this case rendered a unanimous decision to reverse the Arizona Court of

Appeals and remanded the case. The reasoning for this decision was rooted in the fact that the

officer had conducted the “Terry Type” search due to his previous encounter with the defendant

which led him to believe he was involved in gang activity, and not because the officer had

reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect was armed and dangerous in the premise which

gave rise to the immediate cause.20

A second of the six unreasonable search and seizure cases dealt with by the Robert’s

Court was Arizona v. Gant (2009). This case presented the issue of the exception to a warrant

known as search-incident-to-arrest. This exception to a warrant allows an officer of the law to

search an individual being lawfully arrested and a reasonable search of their vehicle. The

19 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, (1968)20 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694, (2009)

Crider 8

defendant in this case was arrested for the offense of driving on a suspended license. After being

detained by the officer and placed in the back seat of the officer’s patrol car a search of the

defendant’s car was then conducted. During the search of the defendant’s car the officer found

cocaine in the pocket of a jacket that was in the back seat which led to the defendant also being

charged and convicted of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug

paraphernalia.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Arizona State Supreme Court in a

5-4 decision which contained one concurrence and two dissents. It was determined by the Court

that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did

not justify the search because (1) police could not reasonably have believed that respondent

could have accessed his car at the time of the search since the five officers outnumbered the three

arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers

searched respondent's car, and (2) police could not reasonably have believed that evidence of the

offense for which respondent was arrested might have been found in the car since he was

arrested for driving with a suspended license, an offense for which police could not expect to

find evidence in the passenger compartment of his car.21

Another unreasonable search and seizure case seen by the Robert’s court was Brendlin v.

California (2007). Within this case the defendant was a passenger in a car that was pulled over

due to the officer merely wanting to check for registration and not due to any suspected violation

of the law. After it was discovered that the defendant was a parole violator he was arrested and

detained in the back seat of the officer’s car. After the defendant was formally arrested the

officer searched the car, him, and the other occupants of the vehicle. During this search

21 Arizona v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640, (2007)

Crider 9

methamphetamine paraphernalia inter alia was discovered which led to the defendant being

charged and convicted of possession and manufacture of that substance.

Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment during a traffic stop the occupants of a car are

temporarily seized. Wherefore premises considered the issue raised by this case is whether or not

the seizure of the officer per the traffic stop was unconstitutional given that there was no legal

justification for the officer to have done so. The U.S. Supreme Court voted unanimously to

vacate and remand the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the officer’s

search of his person and the car he was a passenger in. This decision was reached in part when

the state conceded the officer did not have adequate justification to perform the traffic stop.

Therefore it was rendered that a seizure of the defendant per an interpretation of the Fourth

Amendment was effectuated from the onset of the traffic stop and not at the time he was

formally arrested which constituted an unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the

aforementioned unjustified traffic stop.22

A fourth case for consideration of an unreasonable search and seizure reviewed by the

Robert’s Court was Davis v. United States (2011). The defendant was convicted of unlawful

possession of a firearm after a police search of the vehicle he was traveling in found the firearm

in the defendant’s jacket. This case presented the exception to a search warrant known as

“grabbing distance”. The concept of the “grabbing distance” exclusion to a search warrant

requirement allows officers the authority to search any adjacent area to an individual which the

individual could access without ambulation. This search is specifically to insure that no weapons

can be accessed by an individual and promote the safety of an officer.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction in a 7-2 decision which

contained one concurrence and one dissent. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, while the search

22 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132, (2007)

Crider 10

violated the Fourth Amendment under its new precedent, the exclusionary rule did not apply to

require suppression of the firearm since the police conducted the search in objectively reasonable

reliance on existing and binding judicial precedent. The sole purpose of the exclusionary rule

was to deter deliberate or reckless disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the police acted with

an objectively reasonable and good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful, and the

exclusionary rule did not require deterrence of such conduct.23

Scott v. Harris (2007) was another unreasonable search and seizure case ruled upon by

the Robert’s Court. In this case an officer chose to terminate a high speed pursuit of a suspect by

applying the push bumper of his car into the rear of the suspect’s vehicle thereby causing the

suspect’s vehicle to violently spinout. The actions of the officer caused quadriplegia of the

suspect who was the age of nineteen. There was no contestation that the officer’s decision to

terminate the high speed pursuit in such a manner constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth

Amendment.

The issue raised by this case is whether the officer’s actions was excessive force and

thereby constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The actions taken by

the pursuing deputy were deemed in violation of the Fourth Amendment which led him to appeal

based on qualified immunity. The district court denied petitioner deputy’s summary judgment

motion and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory

appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision.24

The most recent case involving an issue of unreasonable search and seizure adjudicated

by the U.S. Supreme Court is United States v. Jones (2012). In this case officers attached a

global-positioning-system (GPS) to suspected drug dealers car to attain valuable evidence which

23 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285, (2011)24 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372; 127 S. Ct. 1769; 167 L. Ed. 2d 686; (2007)

Crider 11

later led to his conviction of drug conspiracy. The GPS device was placed without a warrant on

the suspect’s car while it was parked in a public parking lot. The aforementioned is similar to the

issue presented by red light cameras. Although it was never argued, the government officials

responsible for installing the aforementioned GPS unit where confident that they had probable

cause insofar as to obtain a warrant, or meet the criteria for one of the exceptions to a search

warrant. In and of itself, this was more logically based use of an electronic device per prima

facie probable cause more so than what was exuded by any premise concerning red light

cameras.

The issue raised by this case was whether the installation of the GPS unit and its use to

monitor the suspect by the Government constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. It

was deemed to be so by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore they affirmed the decision of the

appellate court with a vote of 9-0 which contained two concurrences. “Awareness that the

Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the

Government's unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is

susceptible to abuse.”25

It seems that many state officials anticipated that the use of red light cameras being in

violation of the U.S. Constitution and took precautions such as subcontracting the operation of

red light cameras out to privately run entities.26 This is an attempt to circumvent the U.S.

Constitution and disenfranchise the citizens of their rights guaranteed to them per the U.S.

Constitution given that the Constitution was effectuated as an instrument to regulate the

government and not private entities. The employment of this means by local governments to

disenfranchise the citizens of a state for mere monetary gain is in direct contradiction to the spirit

25 United States v. Jones , 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911, (2012)26 Photographic Traffic Signal Enforcement System; “Texas Transportation Code”; Title 7, “Vehicles and Traffic”;

Subtitle I., “Enforcement of Traffic Laws”; Chapter 707.003 (1) &(2).

Crider 12

of U.S. Constitution and what it stands to protect. This is substantiated by Justice Brandeis’

dissent in Olmstead v. United States when he states in pertinent part;

The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.27

Moreover, the courts are to be an arbiter or neutral and detached magistrate between the people

and the government, and to keep the government in check when it oversteps its authority. James

Madison best encompasses the potential when an instrument of the government or a citizen

attempt to circumvent the courts when he wrote, “Judiciary is truly the only defensive armor of

the Federal Government, or rather for the Constitution and laws of the United States. Strip it of

that armor and the door is wide open for nullification, anarchy and convulsion”.28

Wilson v. Lane (1999) was a case involving an officer who allowed members of the

media to accompany him into a suspect’s home to execute a search warrant. The U.S. Supreme

Court unanimously held that the state and federal law officers violated the Fourth Amendment by

allowing the media to intrude upon the petitioners' privacy without their presence explicitly

being stated in the bounds of the warrant.29 This opened the door for what was solidified in Bills

v. Aseltine (1992) when it was promulgated that, “unless otherwise specified by the warrant,

police officers may not allow third parties to enter a home”.30 As aforementioned many local

27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.CT. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928)28 Henry Abraham, The Judicial Process, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).29 Brian Chun, "The Unclearly Established Rule against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," The Journal of

Criminal Law and Criminology, 90, no. 3 (2000), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1144277 . (accessed December 4, 2013).

30 Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).

Crider 13

governments subcontract red light camera operation and monitoring to third party private entities

to avoid the U.S. Constitution from cutting into the profits being made by the implementation of

red light cameras. That raises the question; if a live officer, who is apt in the law and has the

capacity to discern, needs authority from a warrant to introduce a third party…then should not a

warrantless electronic device at the very least be held to those same standards?

Hypothesis/ Argument

H1: If the constitutionality of red light cameras were to be challenged and litigated to be

heard by the US Supreme Court they would adjudicate that red light cameras are

unconstitutional per one’s right to privacy as delineated in the Fourth Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution.

The classic statement of purpose of the warrant requirement is that of Justice Robert Jackson in

Johnson v. United States (1948) when he asserted, “When the right of privacy must reasonably

yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a police man or

government enforcement agent.”31 32 Rudimentary logic would render one to believe that if a

police officer or government enforcement agent does not possess the right to decipher when to

infringe on one’s privacy, than neither should an electronic device such as a red light camera.

H2: No “compelling state interests” exists which would preclude the application of the

Fourth Amendment in respect to its Right to Privacy clause and thereby give the states

the right to violate one’s right per the U.S. Constitution.

The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in a manner which will conserve not only the rights of

individual citizens, but must seek to uphold public interests as well and what is best for the state

31 William Cohen, David Danelski, and David Yalof, Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and Individual Rights, (New York, NY: Foundation Press, 2007), 835.

32 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948)

Crider 14

as a whole.33 Given that individual rights are likely to be affected, a compelling state interest

must be dire and imminent to take precedent over any right guaranteed per the U.S. Constitution.

Moreover, when discussing the liberty entrenched in privacy as autonomy, John Stuart

Mill states in pertinent part;

The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent the harm to others….The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.34

Method

The method of analysis implemented to conduct this research is based upon the

Attitudinal Model of Judicial Behavior per Harold Spaeth’s predictive paradigm. This framework

introduced by Harold Spaeth of judicial decision-making is rooted in the argument of general

theory or ideas of particular variables which allow one understand, explain, and predict the

outcome of U.S. Supreme Court cases. A necessity that must be intrinsic of the aforementioned

is the compilation of accurate and pertinent information along with a competent understanding of

the three elements which comprise the framework. These three elements are goals, rules, and the

contextual situation.

This theory works under the assertion that judges or justices are predisposed to having

particular goals. It is further assumed that the ultimate goal of these judges or justices is for them

to achieve their personal policy preferences, and therefore, the judicial decisions which they

render will match up with these aforementioned personal policy preferences. Essentially when

33 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)34 William Cohen, David Danelski, and David Yalof, Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and Individual Rights, (New York,

NY: Foundation Press, 2007), 880.

Crider 15

applying this to the U.S. Supreme Court it suggests that the biggest influence on how a justice

votes is based upon what they personally believe is right. The second element is the rules or

protocol of the court which requires that these rules do not inhibit or restrict the justices from

achieving their goals and/ or implementing their personal policy preference. Although such rules

do exist, the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have more freedom to do what they desire more

so than any other decision-maker in Washington D.C. There are several facets which lends to the

broad discretion of interpretation and freedoms enjoyed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The freedom

of the justices is perpetuated due to the fact that they are appointed for life, they are not

electorally accountable, and that no justice has ever been removed from the U.S. Supreme court.

There has been one impeachment case concerning a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, however the

matter was never voted on by the Senate. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court is the court of last

resort and for this reason inter alia these Justices do not possess the ambition to seek a higher

office. The third and final element of Spaeth’s framework takes into account the situation or

context of the matter being adjudicated. Although the general population will not influence the

way a justice votes, the U.S. Supreme Court has altered its decisions over the years prima facie

due to world events and they have restricted freedom during wartime.35

Within this framework the goals of a justice are extrapolated by examining three

elements. In sequence of importance these three elements are the beliefs, attitudes, and values

intrinsic of a justice. Pursuant to Mr. Spaeth’s framework these elements are recognized as

follows;

Belief—any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, that may be inferred from what a person says or does, and that is capable of being preceded by the phrase, ‘I believe that…

35Joseph Ignagni. “Attitudes, Values, and Decision Making.” Class lecture, Political Science 5301-001: Judicial Politics and the U.S. Supreme Court, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, September 23, 2013.

Crider 16

Attitude—a relatively enduring set of interrelated beliefs that describe, evaluate, and advocate action with regard to some object or situation.Value—an interrelated set of attitudes.36

Within this framework of prediction there are six potential problems. These problems are limited

sources of information, determining the issue of the case, multiple issues within the case, how

extreme the case is, if there not a judicial track record that set a precedent, and when a justice

deviates from his past voting patterns. Nonetheless the framework implemented for this research

has a track record of predicting U.S. Supreme Court decisions at over 90%. Furthermore, it has a

track record of 85% of the time accurately predicating how each individual Supreme Court

Justice will vote. This is an admirable statistic given that the odds of accurately predicting the

nine Supreme Court Justice’s vote at random are 511 to 1.37

Results

After implementing Harold Spaeth’s Supreme Court Data Base it presented six U.S.

Supreme Court cases, out of eight thousand four hundred and eighty-six possibilities, which

addressed the issue of Fourth Amendment search and seizures in respect to automobiles. This

analysis rendered the following analysis overview;

Analysis Specifications Analysis Outcome

Unit of Analysis CitationTerm Scope 1946 - 2012Natural Court All Roberts CourtsFine Issues 1 Criminal Procedure issue

Analysis Case Count 6 (of 8,486 possible records)Relevant Scope 2006 - 2011Using Data Release SCDB_2013_01Search Reference Code

1301-TURNCOAT-7799

Case Frequency

36Harold Spaeth. Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction,( New York, NY: W.H.Freeman & Co Ltd, 1979) 119 & 125).

37 Joseph Ignagni. “Attitudes, Values, and Decision Making.” Class lecture, Political Science 5301-001: Judicial Politics and the U.S. Supreme Court, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, September 30, 2013.

Crider 17

Decision Direction

38

Per Mr. Spaeth’s extremeness scale we will decipher which case most resembles the privacy and

unreasonable search and seizure issue presented by red light cameras. For the purpose of this

research it is deemed that United States v. Jones (2012) most adequately depicts the issues raised

by red light cameras. That is, warrantless monitoring by the Government which constitutes a

“search” under the Fourth Amendment. The warrantless GPS which was placed while the car

was in a public parking lot is similar to the red light cameras that are placed on public streets.

38 Harold, Spaeth. National Science Foundation, "The Supreme Court Database." Last modified July 17, 2013. Accessed December 6, 2013. http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php.

Crider 18

Although the Government may assert access to anyone is granted in public places and therefore

have less of an expectation of privacy, Katz v. United States (1967) suggests otherwise when it

promulgates, “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places…what one seeks to preserve

as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”.39

In the six cases decided by the Robert’s Court which involved issues of unreasonable

search and seizures there is an even direction of decision amongst both conservative and liberal.

However, the decision rendered in United States v. Jones (2012) suggests that the issue of

warrantless government monitoring is an issue deemed unconstitutional by both liberal and

conservative justices. It must further be conveyed that United States v. Jones was adjudicated in

2012 which means it is indicative of the ideology of the current Robert’s Court as it was decided

after the most recent associate justice—Elena Kagan—had been appointed. She took her seat on

August 7, 2010.40 Moreover, this research exudes that the current Robert’s Court venerates the

precedent set in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) when it states in pertinent part, “there are other

spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant

presence”41, and the precedent set in Kyllo v. United States (2001) when it recognizes that, “It

would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth

Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology”.42

Wherefore premises considered there should be no known prejudice which estops the

current Robert’s court from holding true to Mr. Spaeth’s predictive paradigm and thereby it can

be deemed with a 90% level of confidence that the U.S. Supreme Court would adjudicate the

matter of red light cameras as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s Unreasonable Search and

39 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)40 The Supreme Court of the United States, "Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court." Last modified

December 09, 2013. Accessed December 09, 2013. http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx.41 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003).42 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)

Crider 19

Seizure provision and thereby unconstitutional. Moreover, the evidence presented in this

research sufficiently casts doubt that any “compelling state interest” exists which would give

authority to a local government to violate its citizen’s Fourth Amendment Rights by

implementing red light cameras. In light of this research both of the aforementioned hypotheses

are supported.

Conclusion

The fact that local governments would seek out private entities to implement and monitor

their red light programs suggest that they are unscrupulous programs by nature and it speaks

highly to the confidence, or lack thereof, that local officials can establish a legitimate

“compelling state interest” that isn’t fiscal in nature. Furthermore, a legitimate “compelling state

interest” is unlikely to be established given that “red light violations can be reduced through

engineering measures such as signal modifications.”43 Moreover, as the literature review herein

revealed was that intrinsic of every exception to a search warrant were the interests of keeping

the officer safe or ensuring the public’s safety. Since many studies reveal that red light cameras

have not caused accidents at intersections to go down and in some cases have even seen the rate

of accidents go up44, there should be no known reason beyond monetary gain which contributes

to the perpetuation of red light cameras.

Further research on this matter would greatly benefit from using Mr. Spaeth’s predictive

model introducing other U.S. Constitution violations effectuated per the implementation of red-

43 Richard A. Retting, Allan F. Williams, and Michael A. Greene. "Red-light running and sensible countermeasures: summary of research findings." Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 1640, no. 1 (1998): 23-26.

44 Langland-Orban, Pracht, and Large. "Red Light Running Cameras: Would Crashes, Injuries and Automobile Insurance Rates Increase If They Are Used in Florida?."

Crider 20

light cameras. Of most pertinence are the Fifth Amendment’s provision against self-

incrimination45 and the Sixth Amendment’s provision which allows one to confront their

accuser.46 As it stands now, upon the issuance of a red light camera citation it is automatically

assumed that the owner of the vehicle is the driver and therefore he has the burden of proving he

was not the driver if he is going to extricate himself from the red light camera citation and the

consequences thereof.

Moreover, the Sixth Amendment’s right for the accused to confront their accuser is an

interesting piece of legal maneuvering by local governments to say the least. In essence the red

light camera is the accuser. How is one going to confront a red light camera in a court of law?

The current matter of course concerning red light camera citations has the deputy who monitored

or reviewed the red light camera’s images to sign the citation as if he were the officer on the

scene to issue the citation himself. Therefore it would follow rudimentary logic that the deputy

who signed a particular red light camera citation would show up in court as the “accuser”. Surely

this would open up a whole other “can of worms” wherein it would be argued that the deputy

only knows what the red light camera conveyed to him which therefore renders the deputy’s

knowledge as hearsay, which cannot be allowed as evidence in a court of law. Nonetheless,

given that only the Government can violate one’s constitutional right all of this is for naught if an

injunction cannot be attained which orders the proscription of third party private entities to

implement, monitor, and issue citations and collect the payments effectuated by red light

cameras.

45 Amendment V, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)46 Amendment VI, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)

Crider 21

Bibliography

Amendment IV, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)

Amendment V, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)

Amendment VI, The U.S. Constitution, (1791)

Arizona v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640, (2007)

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694, (2009)

Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132, (2007)

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)

Chun, Brian. "The Unclearly Established Rule against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures." The

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. no. 3 (2000).

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1144277 . (accessed December 4, 2013).

Cohen, William, David Danelski, and David Yalof. Constitutional Law Civil Liberty and

Individual Rights. New York, NY: Foundation Press, 2007.

Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285, (2011)

Derthick, Martha. Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism.

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965)

Harold, Spaeth. National Science Foundation, "The Supreme Court Database." Last modified

July 17, 2013. Accessed December 6, 2013. http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php.

Crider 22

Heffernan, William. "Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests." The Journal of Criminal Law and

Criminology. no. 1/2 (Autumn, 2001- Winter, 2002): 1-126.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1144208 . (accessed December 1, 2013).

Henry Abraham, The Judicial Process, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Ignagni, Joseph. “Attitudes, Values, and Decision Making.” Class lecture, Political Science

5301-001: Judicial Politics and the U.S. Supreme Court, University of Texas at

Arlington, Arlington, TX, September 23 & 30, 2013.

Ignagni, Joseph. Influential and Controversial Reading in American Politics. United States of

America: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2005.

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948)

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001)

Langland-Orban, Barbara, Etienne Pracht, and John Large. "Red Light Running Cameras: Would

Crashes, Injuries and Automobile Insurance Rates Increase If They Are Used in

Florida?." Florida Public Health Review. (2008): 1-7. http://www.motorists.org/red-light-

cameras/orban-study.pdf (accessed October 22, 2013).

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003)

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)

Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. CT. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928)

Crider 23

Photographic Traffic Signal Enforcement System; “Texas Transportation Code”; Title 7,

“Vehicles and Traffic”; Subtitle I., “Enforcement of Traffic Laws”; Chapter 707.003 (1)

& (2).

Retting, Richard A., Allan F. Williams, and Michael A. Greene. "Red-light running and sensible

countermeasures: summary of research findings." Transportation Research Record:

Journal of the Transportation Research Board 1640, no. 1 (1998): 23-26.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973)

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372; 127 S. Ct. 1769; 167 L. Ed. 2d 686; (2007)

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)

Spaeth, Harold. Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction. New York, NY:

W.H.Freeman & Co Ltd, 1979.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, (1968)

The Supreme Court of the United States, "Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme

Court." Last modified December 09, 2013. Accessed December 09, 2013.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx.

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2484-85, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977)

United States v. Jones , 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911, (2012)