al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 19-138-caliphate- the state of...

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaida-45-Our Performance-41

The history of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a tale of 1,001 nights that catalogues every dimension of frustration in combatting terrorism: an impoverished failing state, a heavily armed society with a warrior subculture, persistent and resilient adversaries, corrupt and duplicitous governors, shifting tribal loyalties, sectarian divisions and foreign powers with conflicting agendas, among others.By 2003, al Qaeda in Yemen had been smashed, its leaders dead or in prison. Considering the victory final, the United States turned its attention to other fronts—most notably the invasion and occupation of Iraq. It was a mistake.

Nodirbek Soliev and Mohammed Sinan Siyech argue that the decision by a group to claim responsibility for an attack is a rational and calculated move, and that the politics of claiming an attack is by nature strategic.

It seems obvious: Killing terrorist leaders should weaken their organizations, depriving those groups of strategic direction and ideological appeal. The death of someone like Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, a senior Islamic State figure reported killed on Tuesday in Syria, should seem like a significant setback for the group.But scholars have struggled to find evidence that killing leaders is an effective way to dismantle terrorist organizations, instead finding ample evidence that it makes little difference. That research seems to apply especially to the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, whose attributes make it resilient to losing even a top figure like Mr. Adnani.Two features make a terrorist group able to withstand a senior officer’s death, according to research by Jenna Jordan, a Georgia Tech professor and a leading expert on the subject.

The first is popular support. Groups need a steady stream of recruits and a pool of potential new leaders. Support among civilians in areas in which the groups primarily operate also makes them more stable, by broadening support networks and helping them to safely retrench when needed. Leaders are usually killed in or near communities that support them, resulting in those communities rallying behind the terrorist group and against whoever did the killing.While it might be difficult to imagine that a community would support the Islamic State, the group’s continued control over parts of Syria and Iraq and the recruits flooding in from abroad demonstrate its appeal. Religious groups are even better at absorbing attacks, Professor Jordan found, because their appeal is based on a shared identity that transcends any individual leader.

The second feature is not something usually associated with groups like the Islamic State: bureaucracy. The more a terrorist group resembles a corporate organizational chart — often with administrative, payroll and logistical staff — the more stable it is, and the better able to handle a leader’s death…

Tunisian AQIM branch claims attack on troops in KasserineBY CALEB WEISS | September 1st, 2016 | [email protected] | @Weissenberg7Uqba bin Nafi Battalion fighters before an ambush on Tunisian soldiers last yearThe Uqba bin Nafi Battalion, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) branch in Tunisia, has claimed an ambush on Tunisian soldiers in the Mount Sammama area of Kasserine Governorate on Aug. 29. The ambush follows a similar claim just a month earlier.In a statement first released on its Twitter feed on Aug. 30 and subsequently confirmed by AQIM, the jihadist group said its “Sammama Brigade” exploded an improvised explosive device (IED) on one of the Tunisian military’s armored vehicles on patrol in the area. After the explosion, it says the fighters clashed with the other soldiers which resulted in the death of “a number” of troops and the capture of

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three Steyr AUG assault rifles. Local media reported that three Tunisian soldiers were killed in the ambush, while another seven were wounded. Another report indicated as many as nine troops were wounded.As a result of the ambush, the Tunisian military has launched combing operations in the area. In these operations, the Hay el Karma area of Kasserine has been the site of deadly clashes between jihadists and Tunisian security forces, leaving two jihadists and one civilian dead. One jihadist killed was reported to be Jihad Mbarki, who was believed to be a senior deputy to Lokman Abou Sakhar, the former emir of the Uqba bin Nafi Battalion. Sakhar was killed in a Tunisian security operation in March 2015.In July, the jihadist group claimed targeting the military with two landmines, killing one soldier in the Mount Sammama area. That claim marked the first attack since March.In that ambush, Tunisian border guards were targeted in Bouchebka near the border with Algeria. In a statement released online by one of AQIM’s media wings, the jihadist group says its forces “wounded a number of soldiers with differing degrees of severity and burned a military vehicle.” Tunisian authorities confirmed the attack took place, but the officials said that only one border guard was wounded in the ambush. (See Threat Matrix report, Tunisian Al Qaeda battalion claims ambush near Algerian border.)Over the past two years, the AQIM branch has claimed several other attacks on Tunisian security forces. In Dec. 2014, the jihadist group claimed two attacks on Tunisian forces in the Mount Chaambi region, posting photos from the raids days later. Just two months later, it took credit for killing four soldiers in an assault in Kasserine. In August of last year, it killed a customs agent in Bouchebka. Uqba bin Nafi’s most deadly ambush on the Tunisian military happened in the Mount Chaambi region in July 2014, an incident that left 15 soldiers dead and 20 others wounded.While Tunisia has been relatively stable, it continues to face a jihadist threat not just from AQIM, but also the Islamic State. The Islamic State claimed last year’s attacks on the Bardo Museum (which Tunisian authorities blamed on the Uqba bin Nafi Battalion), an ambush on a popular beach just three months later, and then a suicide bombing in the capital Tunis in November. In March, the Islamic State also claimed an assault on the Tunisian town of Ben Gardane near the border with Libya. All four attacks left a total of 93 people dead and over one hundred wounded.Caleb Weiss is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributor to The Long War Journal.

Did al Qaeda exchange former Pakistani army chief’s son for Zawahiri’s daughters?BY THOMAS JOSCELYN | September 2, 2016 | [email protected] | @thomasjoscelynAl Qaeda claims that two of Ayman al Zawahiri’s daughters and a third woman were released weeks ago in exchange for the son of General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s former spymaster who also served as the Chief of Army Staff until 2013.The 20th edition of Al Masra magazine, which was posted online in late August, featured the claim on its front page. Al Masra is produced by a media shop affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but it reports on news from all parts of al Qaeda’s global network.The Long War Journal cannot independently confirm the hostage exchange. There does not appear to be any reporting in the Pakistani press indicating that Kayani’s son had been kidnapped, let alone involved in a high-profile hostage swap.Al Qaeda sources announced in early August that Zawahiri’s daughters had been released. Independent accounts indicate that the global jihadist organization had been trying to secure their release in exchange for the kidnapped sons of Pakistan’s elite.

The editors of Al Masra included a box (seen on the right) highlighting the story on the front page and


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saying that “detaining” the “son of the Pakistani Army Commander” led to the release. The newsletter’s authors claimed a series of tweets posted online in mid-August provided the insider details of the story. A pdf of the tweets, with accompanying images, can be viewed here. WARNING: The tweets include graphic images of an alleged Pakistani spy beheaded by al Qaeda for supposedly leading authorities to Zawahiri’s daughters.The author of the tweets (who wrote on an account that has since been suspended, @muhager_0) blasted the “apostate” Pakistani Army for selling out high-profile al Qaeda operatives to the Americans in the past, such as Abu Firaj al Libi, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah.In another tweet, the jihadist accused the Pakistani Army of detaining Zawahiri’s daughters, as well as the daughter of Sheikh Murjan Salem al Jawhari, as part of its “infidel” war on the mujahideen. The Twitter user, who is likely an al Qaeda media operative, further claimed that al Qaeda was left with two ways to deal with the situation. First, al Qaeda needed to take “revenge” on the supposed spy. Second, Allah “enabled the mujahideen” to detain the son of the Pakistani Army commander in order to exchange him “for the sisters.” He included a picture of Kayani to emphasize that this is the Pakistani leader he meant. Al Qaeda’s account referred to Kayani as if he is active, even though he has been retired for nearly three years.The “prideful” Pakistani Army initially “refused” the proposed exchange, according to al Qaeda’s account, but eventually agreed to it after lengthy negotiations. Zawahiri’s daughters and the other woman, along with their children, were reportedly returned to Egypt.It isn’t clear if the purported exchange took place in late July or early August.As Sahab, the propaganda arm for al Qaeda’s senior leadership, released an unusual, thinly-veiled threat against the Pakistani Army in mid-July. The statement, dated June 2016, was attributed to “Al Qaeda Central” and dealt with the “treacherous” Pakistani Army’s detention of the three women and their children. Umaymah al Zawahiri and Fatimah al Zawahiri were identified, respectively, as the wives of Abu Dujana al Basha and Abu Basir al Urduni, both of whom are fallen al Qaeda commanders.Al Jawhari’s daughter, Sumaiya Murjan Salem, was listed as the widow of Adnan al Shukrijumah, who was the chief of al Qaeda’s North American operations until he was killed during a Pakistani operation in Dec. 2014. Shukrijumah had been wanted by Amerian authorities for his role in a string of plots dating back to 2002 and 2003, when he was identified as a key operative in al Qaeda’s post-9/11 plans. He was also tied to a 2009 plot against New York City’s subways. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda sleeper agent tied to 2009 NYC subway plot.]In its threatening message, Al Qaeda accused the Pakistanis of holding the three women and their children on the “orders of American intelligence” since 2014. The jihadists claimed at the time that the negotiations to free them had “failed.” Al Qaeda said it would hold the Pakistani government and its “American masters” responsible “for their criminal behavior.”Just over two weeks later, on Aug. 5, al Qaeda’s social media channels lit up with news that Zawahiri’s two daughters and Shukrijumah’s widow had been released.Did al Qaeda force the Pakistani government’s hand by kidnapping Kayani’s son? Again, The Long War Journal cannot substantiate the claim with independent evidence. But the tactic is entirely consistent with al Qaeda’s past schemes.In May, US Special Operations Forces and Afghan Commandos rescued Ali Haider Gilani, the son of Pakistan’s former prime minister, in a joint raid. Afghan officials said they didn’t even know the


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younger Gilani was being held at the location that was raided. Several al Qaeda operatives were targeted and it was apparently fortuitous that Gilani was found with them. [See LWJ report: US, Afghan forces rescue son of former Pakistani prime minister from ‘al Qaeda cell’.]Ali Haider Gilani was kidnapped in 2013. His father, Yusuf Raza Gilani, was Pakistan’s Prime Minister from 2008 to 2012. According to the Associated Press and other outlets, Yusuf Gilani claimed that the hostage-takers wanted “several al Qaeda prisoners” in exchange for his son.After his release, Ali Gilani was more specific. “They wanted the government to release some women from [the] family of al Zawahiri and also demanded hefty ransom,” press reports quoted Gilani as saying.That is, al Qaeda wanted to exchange Ali Gilani for Zawahiri’s daughters. This the same swap al Qaeda now claims it arranged for Kayani’s son. Additional kidnappings in Pakistan over the past few years may be related to the same aim.The details of how al Qaeda secured the release of the three women are important for our understanding of the group’s operations inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. If the jihadist organization is merely boasting, then that is noteworthy. But if al Qaeda did manage to kidnap Kayani’s son and force the Pakistani government’s hand, then this indicates Zawahiri’s men have a disturbingly long reach inside of Pakistan. Although retired, Kayani is one of the most powerful figures in the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment, which has long sponsored jihadis, including the al Qaeda-allied Taliban.Al Qaeda used its safe havens in Afghanistan to hold Ali Gilani. This further demonstrates the importance of al Qaeda’s Afghan redoubt as it operates in South Asia. Al Qaeda likely chose to hold Gilani in Afghanistan, as opposed to Pakistan, because it would be easier to hide him from Pakistani authorities. However, al Qaeda’s arm in Pakistan has been growing as well. For example, the Washington Post reported in early June that Pakistani counterterrorism officials “have a list of several hundred active al Qaeda members” in Karachi alone and assume “there are at least a few thousand on [Karachi’s] streets.”Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which was formally announced by Zawahiri in September 2014, is growing in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Verifying or disproving the claims surrounding Zawahiri’s daughters may shed additional light on this al Qaeda arm’s capabilities.Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism ResearchWe are pleased to release this month’s issue on ‘The Middle East’.Volume 8, Issue 8, August 2016 of the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis (CTTA) (ISSN 2382-6444) is available here.The Middle East continues to be the centre of gravity for conflict and terrorism. While airstrikes from the US-led coalition and Russia have led to significant attrition in the Islamic State (IS)’s infrastructure and hold on territories, continuing IS attacks in the Middle East underscore the insurmountable challenges facing countries in the region. Some of the more recent attacks conducted by IS include the suicide bombing on 21 August 2016 which killed 51 people and injured 69 others in the Turkish city of Gaziantep, as well as a car bomb attack targeting police in eastern Turkey by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that killed five people and injured over 200. In addition, IS has continued to stifle opposition and dissent through executions within its territories in Iraq and Syria. In Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and IS capitalised on the on-going civil war and conflict between the government, backed by the Saudi-led coalition, and the Houthi-led opposition. AQAP even managed to seize and control territory when it stormed the port city of Mukalla, which also gave the terrorist group access to the town’s financial resources. While some analysts have written off Al Qaeda in the global jihad stage, AQAP’s successes in Yemen have effectively established Al Qaeda as a continuing formidable security


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threat. Although the newly rebranded Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra) has divorced itself from Al Qaeda and its emir Ayman al-Zawahiri, it nevertheless remains dangerous and may continue to serve as Al Qaeda’s proxy in the Syrian conflict. Despite experiencing serious territorial losses on the battleground, IS has its eye on establishing its foothold in other parts of the world where governance is weak.

by Brian Michael Jenkins. The history of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a tale of 1,001 nights that catalogues every dimension of frustration in combatting terrorism: an impoverished failing state, a heavily armed society with a warrior subculture, persistent and resilient adversaries, corrupt and duplicitous governors, shifting tribal loyalties, sectarian divisions and foreign powers with conflicting agendas, among others. But despite this dark assessment, it is still possible that the United States and its Gulf allies, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are finally getting the measure of the group. But will that turn out to be another illusion?The United States views AQAP as the most dangerous of al Qaeda's affiliates, yet its pursuit of the group has been inconsistent. Today, amid the tumult, the United States is backing Saudi Arabia in its efforts to prop up the beleaguered Yemeni government. At the same time, the United Arab Emirates has made modest progress as the leading U.S. ally in the fight against AQAP.Unlike al Qaeda's other affiliates, which have generally concentrated on local contests, AQAP, while engaging its foes in Yemen, has never abandoned Osama bin Laden's line of attacking the far enemy—the United States.

It's a classic military mistake to leave a partially defeated enemy on the battlefield in one form or another -- let them survive.

AQAP has never abandoned bin Laden's line of attacking the far enemy: the United States.Al Qaeda was operating in Yemen years before Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States in 1996. In 1992, al Qaeda operatives bombed two hotels in Aden, narrowly missing the U.S. Marines who had just departed on their way to Somalia.Four years after bin Laden's notorious declaration, AQAP struck again in October 2000, killing 17 in a bombing that nearly sank the USS Cole. The bombing of the Cole brought no sharp reaction from the Clinton administration, which was in its final months.Contrastingly, the 9/11 attacks brought about an intensified global effort against jihadist groups worldwide. Under U.S. pressure, the Yemeni government cracked down hard on al Qaeda operatives in the country. By 2003, al Qaeda in Yemen had been smashed, its leaders dead or in prison. Considering the victory final, the United States turned its attention to other fronts—most notably the invasion and occupation of Iraq. It was a mistake.Given this reprieve, al Qaeda's surviving operatives in the region merely went underground and regrouped. A mass prison break in Yemen in 2006 facilitated the rebuilding of the organization. In 2009, Saudi al Qaeda operatives who had survived an intense crackdown on al Qaeda in Kingdom, crossed into Yemen and joined with the Yemenis to form AQAP. Looking to execute another spectacular attack, the new configuration launched a series of attacks on U.S. aviation targets. Between 2009 and 2012 at least three aircraft bombing attempts failed, including the so-called “underwear bomber” in 2009.Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born citizen of Yemeni descent, was a particularly persuasive communicator for AQAP and was seen as the source of inspiration for a number of homegrown terrorists and plots in the U.S., including Army Major Nidal Hasan, who in 2009 shot 43 of his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. Although it had no role in planning the attack, one of the Kouachi brothers who carried out the January 2015 attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris claimed he was fighting on behalf of


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AQAP, and the group claimed responsibility for the assault.The United States declared AQAP a terrorist organization in 2009, and in 2011 it refocused on combatting AQAP once again. Distracted by mounting anti-government protests, the Yemeni government was a weaker partner this time, and its brutal response to its domestic turmoil alienated Washington. The United States subsequently decided to support diplomatic initiatives to remove Yemen's president.This exemplifies a recurring dilemma in U.S. counterterrorist efforts—the United States seeks tough local allies willing to take on the terrorists, but these often turn out to be cruel and corrupt strongmen.In this second round, the United States went after AQAP primarily with special operations and drone strikes aimed at its leadership. By 2015, more than half of AQAP's leaders, including its commander Nasir al-Wahishi, as well as its chief international recruiter Anwar al-Awlaki, had been killed.This history illustrates recurring patterns in U.S. counterterrorist efforts. Battlefield success brings no permanent gain. When pressed on the ground, jihadist groups switch to propaganda and recruiting, and rebuild their organization for an eventual renewal of armed conflict. They are persistent and resilient.

The history of AQAP illustrates recurring patterns in U.S. counterterrorist efforts.U.S. policymakers miss this point. Once chased off the battlefield, the groups are considered defeated and are then ignored as the United States turns its attention to other pressing events. The ensuing interval allows groups to mount a comeback. As in Syria, U.S. efforts in Yemen must navigate a labyrinth of local quarrels. Yemen's conflicts are complicated, began long ago, and seem interminable. Fault lines between northerners and southerners still run deep. The current civil war, which began in 2004, pits Yemen's northern Shia tribes, called Houthis, against the southern Sunnis. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies back the government, claiming that Iran is supporting the Houthis.AQAP has benefitted from this kaleidoscope of internal quarrels, which distract central authorities who see AQAP not as enemy number one, but as a surrogate force against more existential threats. Authorities acknowledge the threat posed by AQAP, but this is often just a means of extracting resources from an alarmed West that tends to see all local conflicts solely through the lens of the war on terror.Saudi Arabia, however, historically views what happens in Yemen as a strategic concern. In response to the Houthi takeover of Yemen's capital in Sana'a, Saudi Arabia, leading a coalition of Arab states, intervened militarily in support of the government in 2015. The Saudi-led intervention has the backing of the United States and a number of European nations. This, however, meant that the United States supported military operations against the Houthis, who were the most determined and effective foe of AQAP. The intervention has been difficult. When a Saudi prince and future king commanding victorious Saudi forces in Yemen in 1935 wanted to take over the entire country, his father the king ordered the impetuous prince to withdraw, warning him that “Yemen is not a country that can be easily conquered … it is not to our benefit … to imprudently squander our forces in a war that might go on for decades.” His advice still holds.Intense Saudi bombing, which has prompted international criticism, has pushed the Houthis back, but they still hold Sana'a. The Saudi-supported government's real authority is confined to the small area of its temporary capital in Aden. The fighting elsewhere has enabled AQAP to expand the territory under its control east of the capital, creating its own little Islamic State to plunder and govern. Unlike ISIS, AQAP has avoided atrocity, which would dangerously alienate its local supporters.While the Saudis continue to concentrate on the Houthis, forces from the UAE began a military offensive against AQAP earlier this year. This news was welcome in Washington and the United States deployed a small number of forces to Yemen to help the UAE with intelligence. The United States also has kept up its own counterterrorism strikes against AQAP.


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The UAE offensive has made some progress in its mission to degrade, disrupt and destroy AQAP in Yemen, recapturing several towns and reducing the terrorist organization's territory. It has been reported that U.S. Special Forces are cooperating with the UAE in this effort. The UAE is an effective local partner and sticking to Special Forces allows modest U.S. participation.It may be too early to tell whether these most recent results will hold. If any lesson has been learned, it is that the situation will require detailed local knowledge, continued attention and an abundance of patience. Brian Michael Jenkins is a senior adviser to the president of the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and author of numerous books, reports, and articles on terrorism-related topics,

RETURN OF GADHAFI’S GENERAL: ALI SULEIMAN KANANicholas A. Heras The international coalition to combat the Islamic State (IS) has recently begun to expand and intensify its activities in the Libyan coastal city of Sirte. In July, three French Special Forces soldiers were killed in a helicopter crash while reportedly supporting an anti-IS offensive launched by the controversial and powerful Libyan commander General Khalifa Haftar (Al-Jazeera [Doha], July 21). Haftar, who supported the House of Representatives government based in the eastern Libyan coastal city of Tobruk, continues to refuse to acknowledge the authority of or to coordinate anti-IS operations with the Government of National Unity (GNA) and its leader President Fayyez Seraj (Libyan Express [Tripoli], August 18; Reuters, May 20).As international involvement grows, the global community has become increasingly focused on the anti-IS campaign and its impact on Libya’s fragile domestic politics (Reuters, August 22; Al-Araby Al-Jadid [Tripoli], May 20). Consequentially, there is growing attention to Haftar’s actions, including his decision to bring in General Ali Suleiman Kana, one of the most powerful Gadhafi-era military leaders, to advise his command council for the anti-IS campaign in Sirte (Al-Araby Al-Jadid [Tripoli], May 20; Africa Gate News [Sirte], May 6). Kana, who is in his mid-50s, is an ethnic Tuareg commander and a native of the town of Tiqrawatayn in the Murzuq district near the city of Ubari, an important oasis town and node in the trans-Sahara trade network in Libya’s southwestern Fezzan governorate (Vice News [Ubari], February 17; Al-Jazeera [Doha], June 22, 2015; Al-Watan Libya [Ubari], December 1, 2012). As a member of the Tuareg Imamghassatan tribe, which is an important component of the socio-political structure of the area in and around Ubari, Kana has a strong network that underpins his influence in this strategic area of Fezzan (African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples, November 29, 2006). He is credited with helping to mediate a conflict primarily between ethnic Tuareg and ethnic Tubu fighters in Ubari and the surrounding area, one of many achievements propping up his regional credibility (Akhbar Libya [Ubari], May 23; Paris Match [Ubari], May 23).Prior to the start of the 2011 revolution against the Gadhafi government, Kana was the commander of the Sabha Military Zone. In this capacity, he was responsible for overseeing the security of southern Libya, including the Sahara border regions with Algeria, Niger, and Mali (African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples, November 29, 2006). As a commander, Kana is considered to be highly capable in desert warfare, an important skill in the vast Sahara region. It is believed that Kana was a major recruiter of non-Libyan, ethnic Tuareg foreign fighters from Mali and Niger for Gadhafi’s forces, both before and during the February 2011 revolution (Small Arms Survey, February 1, 2014; Al-Watan Libya [Ubari], December 1, 2012). He was also the commander of an Ubari-garrisoned force, the Mughawir Brigade, which reportedly had 3,000 fighters. The Mughawir Brigade was tasked with serving primarily as a rapid reaction force to patrol the Sahara border regions, and it engaged in limited combat against anti-Gadhafi revolutionaries during the civil war (Small Arms Survey, February 1, 2014).As the Gadhafi government began to collapse in September 2011, Kana and fourteen other military commanders who remained loyal to Gadhafi during the civil war left Libya and sought asylum in Niger (Associated Press, September 13, 2011). While in exile in Niger, Kana was continually linked


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to rumors that he was working with other Gadhafi loyalists to return the Gadhafi-era government to power, utilizing the local network he built while commander of the southern region of Libya and his position as a notable member of the Tuareg community (Liberation [Paris], January 15, 2014). His opponents continue to charge that Kana remains loyal to Gadhafi (La Voix de la Libye [Ubari], August 20).In Niger, Kana was an outspoken supporter of the Fezzan governorate’s ability to create its own federal region, which could allow the governorate to maintain control over the exploitation of its significant oil resources (YouTube, May 18; YouTube, February 14, 2013). In 2013, while still in exile in Niger, he was reportedly named the commander of southern Libya forces, indicating a residual popular base in the Tuareg communities of southern Libya (Dar Al-Akhbar [Ubari], February 14, 2013). This project continues with Kana’s announcement in May of the formation of a unified military force for southern Libya based in Fezzan, and his active efforts to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate local militias in Fezzan to join this military force (Paris Match [Ubari], May 23; Akhbar Libya [Ubari], May 23). Kana’s skill as a commander, well-established understanding of the socio-politics of Fezzan, and large network of contacts in the governorate all position him to be an important area leader. As such, his forceful presence in an increasingly restive and strategic area of the country is useful to the GNA, even if Kana continues to associate with Khalifa Haftar, which is likely to be a transactional relationship for the Fezzan-based commander.Moving forward, the GNA will need to continue to consolidate and stabilize Libya’s disparate, militia-based security system. It likewise needs to support a regime for the country’s border regions that stems the flow of illicit goods, migrants, and trans-national jihadist actors that concern Libya’s neighbors in North Africa and the newly formed government’s predominately European patrons. Although Kana’s support for a Fezzan-based military force could be a pathway to the governorate’s autonomy and control over its oil resources at the expense of the national government in a future federalized Libya, Kana is more useful to the nascent GNA as a potential ally than as an enemy for the time being.

Regards Cees***Nodirbek Soliev and Mohammed Sinan Siyech argue that the decision by a group to claim responsibility for an attack is a rational and calculated move, and that the politics of claiming an attack is by nature strategic. While it benefits IS to take responsibility for the Orlando shooting and Nice attack, IS refrained from doing the same in the case of the attacks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia due to fears that authorities might intensify their attacks on the group in Iraq and Syria and move in to arrest their members and eliminate their network of cells and disrupt their operations in Turkey and Saudi Arabia.


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al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 19-138-caliphate- the state of...

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