watching war crimes: the srebrenica video and the serbian attitudes to the 1995 srebrenica massacre
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Watching War Crimes: The SrebrenicaVideo and the Serbian Attitudes to the1995 Srebrenica MassacreIvan ZveržhanovskiPublished online: 05 Sep 2007.
To cite this article: Ivan Zveržhanovski (2007) Watching War Crimes: The Srebrenica Video and theSerbian Attitudes to the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 7:3,417-430, DOI: 10.1080/14683850701566377
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Southeast European and Black Sea StudiesVol. 7, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 417–430
ISSN 1468–3857 (print)/ISSN 1743–9639 (online) © 2007 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/14683850701566377
Watching War Crimes: The Srebrenica Video and the Serbian Attitudes to the 1995 Srebrenica MassacreIvan Zver[zcaron] hanovski
Taylor and Francis LtdFBSS_A_256494.sgm10.1080/14683850701566377Southeast European and Black Sea Studies1468-3857 (print)/1743-9639 (online)Original Article2007Taylor & Francis73000000September 2007IvanZver[zcaron][email protected]
Reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia is an important element in the re-establishment oflasting peace and security in the region and is mainly facilitated by the InternationalTribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In June 2005, this process was affected signif-icantly by the broadcasting of a video of Serbian police forces executing a group of youngMuslim men following the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. The video, made public during theMilo[scaron] evi[cacute] trial, affected public opinion in Serbia, forcing it to acknowledge the event andSerbia’s role in it. It also influenced Serbia’s political elite and provided a stimulus for amore open debate about war crimes committed during the Yugoslav war. The episodeshows the power of moving images and their potential role in the work of the ICTY and thereconciliation process as a whole.
The commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity on a scale unseen inEurope since the end of the Second World War represents one of the defining elementsof the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The most lasting legacy of the Yugoslav war iswithout doubt the grave violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). The warcrimes legacy has proved to be a significant hurdle in the process of reconciliation andreconstruction in the region, threatening sustainable peace and slowing down progresstowards Euro-Atlantic integration (see Gow 2005; Kerr 2005). At the same time, thislegacy provided the impetus for rapid developments in the application of IHL throughthe establishment of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) andits influence on the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
One of the most striking examples of the violation of IHL during the Yugoslavconflict is the massacre in Srebrenica. On 11 July 1995, Serbian forces, under the directcommand of General Ratko Mladi[cacute] , perpetrated the worst atrocity on European soilsince the end of the Second World War. Occupying the town and its surroundings,
Correspondence to: Ivan Zver hanovski, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, Strand, LondonWC2R 2LS, UK. E-mail: [email protected]
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which had been declared a safe area by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),Vojska Republike Srpske (VRS, the Bosnian Serb military) units, backed up by paramil-itaries and police forces, proceeded to expel women, while separating men and boysfrom their families. What followed was the planned and organized mass killing of over7,000 Muslim men and boys (Honig & Booth 1997).
Almost ten years later, the majority of Serbs on both sides of the River Drinaremained, overwhelmingly, in denial about the nature of this event. The genocideperpetrated in Srebrenica was widely being brushed aside as a fabrication by many poli-ticians, while the massacre itself was presented as propaganda designed to make theSerbs look evil. However, on 1 June 2005, a short video, played on Serbian television,helped challenge this attitude, and contributed towards the reconciliation process inthe former Yugoslavia by challenging the perceptions of the Yugoslav war among thepopulation in Serbia. The video provided an example of the power of moving imagesand the influence of the media in general, and television in particular, on publicperception and the political process.
The broadcasting of the video and its impact in Serbia is the subject of this article. Ithas been chosen as it provides the clearest example of the importance of media as awhole, and television in particular, for the fulfilment of one of the key missions of adhoc international tribunals in general, and the ICTY in particular—namely the restora-tion of international peace and security through justice and reconciliation. This articleanalyzes the importance of the Srebrenica video for the overall mission of the ICTY, forthe process of prosecuting war crimes and, by extension, for the process of post-conflictreconciliation. It does so by looking at the role of the ICTY and then discussing theimportance of war crimes prosecutions, particularly their mission in fostering peacethrough justice and reconciliation. To this end, the Milo evi[cacute] trial and the circum-stances in which the video became public are analyzed. Finally, the article looks at theeffect of the Srebrenica video on Serbia’s politicians and public opinion and its influ-ence on the subsequent changes in Serbia’s views of the Yugoslav war and the warcrimes legacy.
War Crimes and the Yugoslav War: The Serbian Strategy andInternational Response
The Yugoslav war was a clash of state-making projects. Chief among these was theSerbian project aimed at re-drawing the territorial boundaries left by the dissolvingSocialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in order to create an almost ethni-cally pure territorial whole for the Serbs. Hence, according to James Gow (2003: 118),‘the Serbian new state project meant war … a war against civilians’. The aim was controlof large swathes of territory through ensuring the loyalty of the population. As Gow(2003: 119) notes, ‘the scale, range and consistency of the methods used to terrorize thenon-Serb populations of many different areas in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo did notand could not have resulted from a spontaneous eruption of local resentment … thepurpose of this terror was to ensure that the population remaining in the secured areaswould be “reliable”’. This strategy of terror was based on the use of ethnic cleansing,
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which can be defined as the ‘use of excessive violence against the civilian populationcentres, demonstrative atrocity and mass murder in order to remove that population’(Gow 2003: 118). The objective was removal of all prospect for opposition through useof terror applied for strategic purpose, whose ‘principle elements at the tactical levelcomprised preparation and provocation, takeover and the use of force, mass detentionin brutal and sometimes murderous prison camps, and elimination through expulsionand execution’ (Gow 2003: 144).
As an example of the extent of the crimes committed, Sabrina Ramet (2002: 218)noted that a particular ‘feature of the Bosnian war has been the incidence of organisedsystematic rape—or rather, forced impregnation, since pregnancy was a conscious goalof the Serbs’. According to Dorothy Thomas and Regan Ralph, rape was neither inci-dental nor private, but served a strategic purpose, acting as a tool for the achievementof a particular military purpose. In the former Yugoslavia, ‘rape and other grave abusescommitted by Serbian forces [were] intended to drive the non-Serbian population intoflight’ (Thomas & Regan 1999: 213–214).
In Kosovo, the Serbian strategy involved the mass expulsion of the non-Serb popu-lation, together with attempts to wipe out their identities by confiscating documentsand destroying records (see Judah 2002; Independent International Commission onKosovo 2000). Although a debate persists over the existence of the infamous ‘OperationHorseshoe’ (an alleged Serbian plan to expel the population of Kosovo through a horse-shoe-shaped attack on the province) (see, e.g., House of Commons Select Committeeon Foreign Affairs 2000), it is nevertheless ‘very clear that there was a deliberate orga-nized effort to expel a huge part of the Kosovar Albanian population and such massiveoperation cannot be implemented without planning or preparation’ (IndependentInternational Commission on Kosovo 2000: 88).
Milo evi[cacute] ’s strategy relied on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia appearing not tobe taking part in hostilities in Bosnia and Croatia. This imperative, combined withMilo evi[cacute] ’s distrust of the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije, VJ), led to the creationof a complicated web of security actors and forces. The application of terror for strate-gic purpose meant that all these elements had a role to play in the different stages of thecampaign. Regular army artillery would normally shell non-Serb neighborhoods oftowns under siege, while the paramilitaries and irregulars would engage in street fight-ing, and would systematically identify, collect and segregate the non-Serb populationonce a town was taken (Gow 2003: 134).
The commission of war crimes was a product of joint planning and implementa-tion by the political leadership, the Security Service, the regular army and the para-militaries of an ‘armed campaign in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo that involvedsystematic use of terror to establish the borders of a new Yugoslavia’ (Gow 2003: 144).Therefore, the security sector as a whole was tainted by its wholehearted participationin the commission of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. The scale of the crimescommitted, combined with a disregard for international norms and internationalpublic opinion, provoked an outcry in the international community and damaged thereputation of the country and the armed forces. It led Serbia and Montenegro downthe path of confrontation with NATO and the 78-day bombing campaign in 1999. It
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also led to an innovative form of international intervention: international judicialintervention.
The scale of violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict in theformer Yugoslavia prompted the establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal todeal with such abuses by punishing the perpetrators and bringing justice to thevictims.1 From the early stages of the conflict, the international community was underpressure from numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarianorganisations and public opinion to act on what was seen as the worst atrocitiescommitted in Europe since the Second World War (Beigbeder 1999). As early as May1991, there were calls for a Nuremberg-type tribunal (Klarin 1991), and a year laterserious talk began among diplomats, with the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel,calling for the establishment of a tribunal and Acting American Secretary of StateLawrence Eagleburger calling for the prosecution of Milo evi[cacute] , Karad[zcaron] i[cacute] and Mladi[cacute]
among others.The United Nations Security Council, monitoring the situation in the former
Yugoslavia, and after numerous reports from NGOs and the media, as well as UN agen-cies in the field, decided to investigate the claims of grave breaches of internationalhumanitarian law in the conflict (Kerr 2004: 32–40). In July 1992, the Security Councildeclared that the persons responsible for commission or ordering of crimes would beheld individually responsible.2 In August of the same year, the Security Council calledupon all states to submit evidence of atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia.3
In October, it set up a special Commission of Experts to investigate.4 The commissionfound substantial evidence of crimes against humanity as well as violations of laws orcustoms of war and Geneva Conventions (Kerr 2004: 34). Under mounting pressurefrom public opinion, humanitarian organizations and the media, the Security Counciladopted Resolution 827 on 25 May 1993, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter andestablishing the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution ofPersons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian LawCommitted on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.5 This was the firstcase of international judicial intervention and the first instance of an internationaltribunal set up to prosecute individuals since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after theSecond World War.
The ICTY was an important innovation as it was created by a UN Security CouncilResolution and not by treaty. It represented a landmark in international law as it clearlyestablished the individual as a subject of international law and confirmed that graveviolations of international humanitarian law represents a threat to the security of inter-national society. The Security Council, having established that the violations ofhumanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peaceand security, took action under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to Peace,Breaches of Peace and Acts of Aggression) in order to restore and maintain interna-tional peace and security (Kerr 2004). This was reiterated in the first paragraph of theICTY statute, and caused a lot of controversy and contention regarding the jurisdictionof the ICTY.6 Such a use of Chapter VII powers by the UN Security Council, accordingto Gow (2003: 5), ‘turning on the nexus of international security and international law,
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represented a new step regarding the position of the state and its qualification of sover-eignty’. To others, the UN Security Council had abused its powers, and many arguedthat it had no basis upon which to create a judicial organ (Fati[cacute] 2000).
Officially, the reasons for the establishment of an international tribunal were four-fold: to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for violations of internationalhumanitarian law; to render justice to the victims; to deter further crimes; and tocontribute to the restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in the formerYugoslavia. This was the result of number of developments in international relations.First the complementarity of peace and justice came to be accepted by most UNMember States. Second, establishing a war crimes tribunal was seen as a good publicrelations exercise for the Security Council, demonstrating that it was ‘doing some-thing’. It was, for some members of the Council, a substitute for real action (Bass 2000).
Following the establishment of the ICTY, there was a division between those whobelieved that the Tribunal would be an impediment to peace in the Balkans and thosewho believed it to be a necessary ingredient. For many, it was clear that ‘the pursuit ofjustice for yesterday’s victims should not be pursued in such a manner that it makestoday’s living the dead of tomorrow’ (Anon. 1996: 258). It was widely held that indict-ing those such as Kard[zcaron] i[cacute] and Mladi[cacute] would damage prospects for a negotiated peacein Bosnia (Colson 2000: 53–56).
The key to a balanced solution is the concept of catharsis—‘a process that dischargesemotions thus decreasing tension, clarifying thoughts and enabling the subject to reacha harmonious state’ (Colson 2000). In the ‘peace versus justice’ debate it is importantto note that ‘international justice is a process which in itself has significance’ and thatalthough the proof of any international tribunal will be the numbers of people it hassuccessfully tried, the focus should be on the impact of the process of seeking justicethrough telling the stories—testifying—and indicting alleged war criminals rather thanthe quantitative results (Colson 2000).
As an enforcement measure of the UN Security Council, the ICTY was given thepolitical purpose of restoring and maintaining international peace and security. Assuch, it was also a judicial body, which depended on preserving due and proper processin order to be successful in its task. Judicial process was seen as the road to a politicalgoal and, therefore, had to be ‘purer than pure’ (Kerr 2004: 11). Finally, althoughjudicially independent, ICTY acted in a political arena and depended on a number ofpolitical tools such as diplomacy and cooperation with international bodies (e.g.,IFOR, KFOR, UNMIK) in order to carry out its mandate successfully. This delicatebalance between the political and judicial aspects of the Tribunal is crucial to thesuccess of the ICTY both in its daily work and in its ultimate aim of restoration andmaintenance of international peace and security (Kerr 2004).
The Milo[scaron] evi[cacute] Trial and Srebrenica: Publicizing the Video
The prosecution of war crimes is the central part of the peace through justice approach.At its core, a trial is a quest for truth, both judicial and historical. Its mission is to havea case proven beyond reasonable doubt, while at the same time building an historical
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record based on facts. In this way, trials are supposed to contribute to the restorationof international peace and security (Gow & Zver[zcaron] hanovski 2004). At the ICTY, forobvious reasons, the trial of Slobodan Milo evi[cacute] received more attention than anyother. Milo evi[cacute] was the first former head of state to be put on trial in front of an inter-national court, a man many saw as the mastermind of the Yugoslav tragedy, the person-ification of the strategy of war crimes. By the time the trial began, Milo evi[cacute] had beencharged with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide—both personally andunder command responsibility.7 The case against him was built on two assumptions:that the war was part of an overall Serbian strategy coordinated from Belgrade andthat he was both a leader of a joint criminal enterprise and, by virtue of his function asPresident of Serbia and later President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, responsi-ble for crimes committed by Serbian and Yugoslav forces. The prosecution’s case restedon the ability to prove this link between Serbia’s strongman and the forces responsiblefor the violation of IHL during the different phases of the Yugoslav war (Gow &Zver[zcaron] hanovski 2004).
The Milo evi[cacute] trial came to an end in March 2006 when the defendant died. Itwill therefore never be possible to put the prosecution’s case to the judicial test.Nevertheless, the usefulness of the Milo evi[cacute] trial for the historical record is beyonddoubt. Slobodan Milo evi[cacute] was originally indicted on charges of violations of laws andcustoms of war and crimes against humanity in the final stages of Operation AlliedForce. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) had decided that it had enough evidence togain a conviction based on Milo evi[cacute] ’s status as commander-in-chief of all forces inYugoslavia. The then prosecutor, Louise Arbour, opted for a narrower and morestraightforward indictment and Milo evi[cacute] was charged together with Serbian PresidentMilan Milutinovi[cacute] , Deputy Federal Prime Minister Nikola [Scaron] ainovi[cacute] , Minister ofDefence Dragoljub Ojdani[cacute] and Interior Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovi[cacute] of participatingin a joint criminal enterprise aimed at forcibly removing the ethnic Albanian popula-tion from Kosovo.8 However, the case became more complex as the OTP decided, inNovember 2001, to indict Milo evi[cacute] for crimes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,extending the charges to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and genocide (inthe Bosnia indictment) in addition to the original Kosovo indictment.9 The OTPsubsequently argued successfully (on appeal) that, since the war was part of singlecriminal enterprise, it would make sense to merge the three indictments and have onetrial. Thus Milo evi[cacute] ’s case was separated from the other co-defendants in the Kosovopart of the trial.
The trial began by considering the Kosovo case first. Command responsibility inthe Kosovo part of the case seemed straightforward and was based on the fact thatMilo evi[cacute] , as President of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, had overall commandover all forces, military and police. The prosecutor needed to prove that the crimes tookplace, and that the accused knew about them and either failed to prevent or failed toinvestigate the forces responsible. The personal responsibility was more complex as theOTP needed to show that Milo evi[cacute] personally planned, instigated, ordered or other-wise aided and abetted the commission of crimes and was thus part of a ‘joint criminalenterprise’ whose purpose ‘was, inter alia, the expulsion of a substantial portion of the
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Kosovo Albanian population from the territory of the province of Kosovo in an effortto ensure continued Serbian control over the province’.10
The complexity and increased difficulty of the case became more evident in theCroatia and Bosnia parts of the trial where the prosecution struggled to prove a directlink between Milo evi[cacute] and the crimes committed in Bosnia. On the level of individualresponsibility, the OTP failed to find a ‘smoking gun’ proving Milo evi[cacute] ordered,planned, organized, committed or in other ways sanctioned the crimes. In addition, ashe had no official command position (he was President of Serbia, and the military wasofficially beyond his control), the prosecutor concentrated on showing that Milo evi[cacute]
was de facto in charge of all Yugoslav policy, that he was the instigator and main orga-nizer of the policy based on violations of international humanitarian law.
Proving this link was particularly difficult in relation to the genocide charge.Genocide had already proven to be a serious test at the ICTY and was confined to theevents in Srebrenica in July 1995 when Serbian forces under the command of RatkoMladi[cacute] killed over 7,000 Muslim men and boys. Hence the OTP’s case on genocidedepended on the ability to prove that forces from Serbia proper were involved in theSrebrenica massacre or that Milo evi[cacute] had been part of the planning and organizing orthat he had in some way aided and abetted the commission of genocide. As the onlyproven case of genocide (see, e.g., The Prosecutor v. General Radoslav Krsti[cacute] , Case No.IT-98-33), Srebrenica was central to convicting Milo evi[cacute] of the most serious ofcrimes. It is safe to say that the Prosecutors failed to prove this link during their part ofthe trial. Milo evi[cacute] seems to have known that Mladi[cacute] ’s forces were planning a majoroperation in the area, but there was no indication that he either knew of or agreed tothe subsequent massacre.
The Prosecution faced a number of problems throughout its part of the trial (Gow& Zver[zcaron] hanovski 2004). Friction with judges over the merging of the indictmentsresulted in the trial hearing the case in reverse order, starting with the latest charges(Kosovo). At the same time, the merging of the indictments complicated the picturesignificantly. Finally, the OTP failed to produce the ‘smoking gun’ linking Milo evi[cacute] tothe Srebrenica massacre during its part of the trial. It managed, nevertheless, to buildan impressive historical record of the developments in the former Yugoslavia, but theimpression remained of a weakened case, with the relatively simple and straightforwardcharges in the Kosovo part being weakened by the lack of direct evidence and thecomplexity of the charges in the Croatia and Bosnia parts. In the event, the ChiefProsecutor abruptly concluded the case two days prior to the end of the allocated timein a move representative of the often-confused approach taken by the Prosecution.
A key failure of the Prosecution’s case was its impact in Serbia. While nationalistsentiment in Serbia remained strong even after the overthrow of Slobodan Milo evi[cacute] ,the ICTY’s mission as a transitional justice mechanism is to contribute to the removalof those elements that sparked conflict in the first place. The Prosecution’s case in theMilo evi[cacute] trial had the opposite effect. Within weeks of the trial starting, Milo evi[cacute] ’spopularity in Serbia rose as many in the country treated the trial as a football match inwhich they could support one team. The Prosecution’s decision to concentrate onpolitical questions in the early stages guaranteed the hostility of the Serbian audience,
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unimpressed by the history lesson and glaring mistakes (Gow & Zver[zcaron] hanovski 2004;Dimitrijevi[cacute] 2002). The evidence presented in court failed to move Serbia towardsself-examination, while politically it contributed to the strengthening of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party, whose leader, Vojislav [Scaron] e elj is standing trial at theICTY. Hence the Prosecution failed to capture Serbia’s public opinion and force it tobegin a process of recognizing that terrible crimes were indeed committed by Serbianforces during the Yugoslav war, and that this was not part of an anti-Serbian propa-ganda campaign, as argued by Milo evi[cacute] .
However, the Prosecution managed to change some of this in June 2005 as it madepublic a video showing the execution of six young men in the aftermath of theSrebrenica massacre. The Srebrenica footage surfaced almost by accident and as a sideissue in the trial. On 1 June 2005, while cross-examining a defense witness, policeGeneral Obrad Stevanovi[cacute] , the Prosecutor introduced a videotape showing the murderof six young Bosnian Muslim men at the hands of what it claimed were special forcesof the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MUP. The idea was to re-enforce theProsecutor’s case that Serbia was an active participant in the war in Bosnia, rather thanjust a supporter of the Bosnian Serbs, thus challenging the witness’s statement that noSerbian MUP units and no members of the State Security (DB, Dr[zcaron] avna Bezbednost)were present in the vicinity of Srebrenica during the massacre (B92, 1 June 2005).
The tape was made by members of the ‘Scorpions’ paramilitary unit, which wasattached to the MUP and initially active in Eastern Slavonia. The tape was allegedlycopied and distributed among unit members as a souvenir from the frontline (TheObserver, 5 June 2005). The video was originally obtained by Nata a Kandi[cacute] , a humanrights activist from Belgrade and founder of an NGO, the Humanitarian Law Centre.She tracked down one of the unit members who had the tape and persuaded him tohand it over to her in exchange for assistance in leaving Serbia. Kandi[cacute] then passed thetape on to the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes in Belgrade as well as the OTP in TheHague (RFE/RL, 27 June 2005). On the same day the video was played in court,excerpts were played on a number of Belgrade television channels, including the publicservice broadcaster, RTS. It was the first time that Serbia’s population would see acrime committed by its forces in Bosnia. They had come face to face with the involve-ment of Serbian forces in the commission of war crimes. It was to prove a shock formany and have wide-reaching consequences. The video can be credited with destroy-ing, in the eyes of many, the myths of the heroic Serbian warriors fighting with honorin Bosnia (Vreme, 9 June 2005).
The video is said to be some 26 minutes long (although there were rumors of it beingas long as 2 hours), and shows the ‘Scorpions’ cold-bloodedly executing six young men.The video starts with a Serbian Orthodox priest blessing the unit members before theygo off on their mission. Then, young men, probably in their teens, showing evidence ofsevere beatings, are unloaded from a truck and made to lie on the ground, their handstided behind their back. After a while, the men are made to walk up a hill, where theyare shot in the back, point blank, from automatic weapons. The last two are made tocarry the others to a pit, before being executed themselves. All of this is happening to abackground of banter and insults while the cameraman complains about the battery
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being almost empty, but urges his colleagues to ‘continue working’. It is known that thevideo was shot near the village of Trnovo, some 30 kilometers from Sarajevo, while itlater transpired that the ‘Scorpions’, whose primary mission was guarding oilfields inEastern Slavonia, were asked to take part in the removal and killing of the male popu-lation of Srebrenica (NIN, 9 June 2005).
It is worth noting that none of the Serbian television stations showed the entirevideo, although there was a huge discrepancy between B92, which showed some eightminutes, and others. RTS only showed some 20 seconds of edited film, promptingaccusations that they were refusing to show the audience the crimes committed bySerbian units in Bosnia (see NIN, 9 June 2005). RTS management justified their deci-sion on the grounds of ethical considerations, maintaining that their edited versionshowed enough to let the viewers understand the horrific nature of the event (NIN,9 June 2005). Nevertheless, the fact that this video was shown throughout Serbia indi-cated a change in attitude towards the Srebrenica massacre.
The importance of the evidence shown in the video is twofold. First, it shows a unit,which is known to have been under the command of the Serbian MUP, taking part inthe Srebrenica massacre. It should be viewed as another piece in the puzzle in the caseagainst Milo evi[cacute] , and another piece of the common narrative of the history of theYugoslav war. In terms of the trial itself, the video footage proved of no value to the caseas the trial chamber refused the request of the prosecution to admit it as evidence(IWPR Tribunal Update, TU No. 434, 17 December 2005). The judges argued that theprosecution had its opportunity to introduce evidence during its part of the proceed-ings and, in a move designed to speedup the lengthy trial, denied both the Prosecutorand the defendant the requests for extra time. Ultimately, Milo evi[cacute] died before thetrial was completed, denying the world the benefit of a full verdict on the charges.However, the evidence against him would serve to piece together a narrative of theconflict, and in particular of his role in it. ‘The Scorpions tape’ is an important part ofthis narrative, providing incontrovertible evidence of crimes committed.
Second, the video provides a very visual indication of the approach of the Serbianforces to the massacre in Srebrenica and the length to which they went to cover up thekillings. The victims were taken away from Srebrenica and killed in a forest nearSarajevo—a pattern that investigators would find familiar in their quest to resolve theSrebrenica events. It is the most direct visual evidence of the killings taking place, andinvolving Serbian forces. The video puts the viewer into close proximity with the crime,making any denial impossible. It became difficult to deny the gruesome crimes werecommitted by Serbian forces, and that some had participated in the Srebrenica massa-cre. It also provides a reminder of the role of some members of the Serbian OrthodoxChurch priesthood in the war.
The Impact of the Video in Serbia
While the video had no real impact on the course of the trial both due to its inadmissi-bility as evidence and, more importantly, due to the death of the defendant withinhours of the showing of the footage, it became clear that the Prosecution managed to
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achieve more with this short clip than with most of the rest of its case. In particular, theshort-term impact in Serbia was one of shock and condemnation, with many express-ing open revulsion and disbelief at what they saw on television. However, following theinitial reactions, Serbia’s political elite took a more ambiguous approach, while anationalist core remained strong in the population. Nevertheless, in the long term, thevideo has contributed towards an acceptance of Serbia’s role and the need to addresscrimes by prosecuting them in Serbia’s courts and cooperating with the ICTY.
The video had a huge immediate impact in several ways. As the video was broad-cast, the immediate reaction from most quarters of Serbian society was one of rudeawakening. Boris Tadi[cacute] , the President of Serbia, condemned the crimes, saying thatSerbia was deeply shocked. He stated that he planned to go to Srebrenica topay respect to the victims on the tenth anniversary of the massacre (The New YorkTimes, 3 June 2005). Even more tellingly, Serbia’s Prime Minister, Vojislav Ko tunica,a moderate nationalist, publicly condemned the crimes and promised increased coop-eration with the ICTY, while announcing a swift action to apprehend those seen inthe video (Transitions Online, 13 June 2005). Ko tunica announced that some of theunit members had been arrested and that others were being sought by the authorities(RFE/RL, 9 June 2005). According to Ko tunica, the important thing is that Serbianauthorities acted rapidly and decisively to apprehend those responsible for the crime(RFE/RL, 27 June 2005). All political parties, including Milo evi[cacute] ’s Socialist Partyof Serbia (SPS) and [Scaron] e elj’s Serbian Radical Party (SRS), condemned the killings(Transitions Online, 23 June 2005). The Speaker of the Parliament hurriedly conveneda meeting of all parliamentary parties to discuss a parliamentary resolution that wouldcondemn the genocide in Srebrenica (IWPR, 23 June 2005). An official apology wasmooted. Finally, the Serbian Orthodox Church, one of whose priests is seen blessingthe ‘Scorpions’ at the beginning of the video, expressed its condemnation of the cold-blooded killings (RFE/RL, 27 June 2005).
It is important to recognize here the limitations of the impact of the images of thekillings. While attitudes in Serbia began to change, and the debate on the war crimeslegacy shifted, there were other, political realities that prevented a more open debate.The political elite in Serbia quickly moved away from the proclamations of indignationand shock, taking a more realist approach to the issue. The SRS and the SPS quicklysought to regain their nationalist credentials by claiming that the video was not asaccurate as it seemed. They refused to vote for a parliamentary resolution explicitlynaming Srebrenica without also mentioning the crimes committed against Serbs(IWPR, 23 June 2005). They were joined by Ko tunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia(Demokratska Stranka Srbije, DSS), which, mindful of its reliance on the votes of theSPS to stay in power, sided with the SRS and SPS in opposing the proposed resolution,voting instead for a watered-down version condemning all crimes (Transitions Online,30 June 2005).
Second, the Bosnia-Herzegovina lawsuit against Serbia and Montenegro at theInternational Court of Justice made it ultimately unthinkable for the SerbianParliament to pass a resolution admitting forces under Belgrade’s command commit-ted genocide and condemning it. The main fear was that official admission of Belgade’s
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participation in the massacre could lead to a conviction of genocide and subsequentrisk of demands for high reparations from Bosnia (Transitions Online, 30 June 2005).Third, some argued that efforts to introduce a resolution condemning crimes commit-ted in the former Yugoslavia had already taken place before the video was made public.In response to a well-publicised meeting of right-wing student groups at the Universityof Belgrade, which claimed that Srebrenica had been liberated and that casualty figureshad been inflated by the Bosnian Muslims, Nata a Mi[cacute] i[cacute] and [Zcaron] arko Kora[cacute] , two pro-reform deputies, introduced a motion in May 2005 calling on Parliament to condemnthe massacre in Srebrenica (Transitions Online, 6 June 2005). The motion was preparedby a coalition of NGOs and although it was finally discussed in Parliament in the wakeof the video being shown, only a watered-down version was eventually adopted. Thisshowed that the political elite was not yet ready to take full responsibility for past abusesby Belgrade’s forces.
Most significantly, doubts persisted over the true extent of the change in mindsetamong the Serbian population. A week after the video was shown one opinionpoll showed that up to a third of the population in Serbia believed it to be fake (TheChristian Science Monitor, 15 June 2005), which demonstrates the depth of the denialthat still existed in Serbia. At the same time, rumor circulated that the video was shotbefore the Srebrenica massacre, while Interior Minister Dragan Jo[ccaron] i[cacute] claimed that the‘Scorpions’ were never a reserve unit of the MUP as claimed by the OTP, castingfurther doubts on the involvement of Belgrade in the Srebrenica tragedy (TransitionsOnline, 30 June 2005).
The question of Ratko Mladi[cacute] remained unresolved despite the showing of thevideo. Less than a week after the video was broadcast, rumors appeared in all majornewspapers in Serbia that the government was negotiating with Mladi[cacute] and that he wasthinking of surrendering. The Ko tunica government, faithful to its policy of convinc-ing indictees to surrender using any means available, seemed on the brink of the biggestcoup of all—the transfer of Mladi[cacute] to the ICTY. In the event, the imminent surrenderdid not materialize and, as the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre was beingcommemorated in July 2005, Mladi[cacute] was still a free man. Nevertheless, it became clearthat were Mladi[cacute] to be transferred to the ICTY, the public outcry would not have beenas large as previously thought.11 The sight of the killings on the Srebrenica video mademany Serbs willing to see the back of Mladi[cacute] —especially if it meant quicker progressfor Serbia towards European Union accession. These were signs that attitudes werechanging and that the previously untouchable Mladi[cacute] could find himself in the custodyof the ICTY.
The changing attitudes with regards to the transfer of Ratko Mladi[cacute] were part of awider change in acceptance of war crimes trials. Following the arrest in June 2005 ofmembers of the ‘Scorpions’ unit, the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of theBelgrade District Court War Crimes Chamber began an investigation into the killings.On 7 October 2005, five members of the ‘Scorpions’ were indicted. Slobodan Medi[cacute] ,Branislav Medi[cacute] and Pero Petra evi[cacute] were charged with war crimes, while AleksandarMedi[cacute] and Aleksandar Vukov were charged with aiding the commission of warcrimes.12 Following a lengthy trial, Slobodan Medi[cacute] and Branislav Medi[cacute] were
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convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison; Pero Petra evi[cacute] , who admitted commit-ting the crime, received a 13-year prison sentence, while Aleksandar Medi[cacute] received a5-year sentence. Aleksandar Vukov was acquitted (B92, 10 April 2007). Explaining theverdict, the presiding judge stated that the ‘Scorpions’ were not part of the state appa-ratus of the Republic of Serbia, and that they were a private, paramilitary outfit. Thetrial chamber also ruled, controversially, that the war in Bosnia was a civil war and notan international conflict (Vreme, 12 April 2007).
While there was significant dissatisfaction with the verdict, and the Special Prosecu-tor announced that they would appeal (B92, 10 April 2007), the trial itself shows thatthere is a growing maturity in the Serbian polity. The ability to conduct successfully awar crimes trial involving a unit whose members were alleged to have been part of thestate apparatus shows an improved sense of responsibility as well as a capacity to dealwith the war crimes legacy locally. The efficiency of the proceedings in particulardemonstrated that Serbia would be able to tackle future cases in a fair and transparentmanner, ensuring that due and proper process was followed. The fact that the trialchamber ruled that the unit was not part of Belgrade’s forces in Bosnia diminishes thepositive effects of this trial. Nevertheless, it is also clear that Belgrade’s insistence that itdid not take part in the conflict in Bosnia has lost credibility even in Serbia.
Hence, the showing of the Srebrenica video has the potential for long-term impacton the majority in Serbia, transforming attitudes towards the war in Bosnia and chang-ing the dominant discourse on the war crimes legacy. The fact that a video showing theexecution of six men had more impact than all the evidence of the killings in Srebrenicapresented before that testifies to the power of moving images in today’s world. At thesame time, it shows the value that the media can have in extending the impact of theICTY and helping it achieve its core mission—the restoration of international peaceand security by prosecuting those responsible for the most serious crimes.
Conclusion: Television News and International Judicial Intervention
The broadcasting of the video to a large audience was undoubtedly a major coup forthe ICTY. With a short video, it managed to advance its mission further than the yearsof investigations and trials had done. The images shown on television stations through-out Serbia did more to change perceptions than all the careful collating of evidence inbuilding the Milo evi[cacute] case. They led to arrests, a trial and convictions in a domesticcourt, thus contributing to local capacity-building for war crimes prosecutions. At thesame time, it damaged the much-publicized ultra-nationalist myths of righteousSerbian warriors liberating Srebrenica, revealing to a shocked Serbian population thetype of atrocities committed by Serbs in Bosnia.
The Srebrenica video and subsequent events also demonstrate the role movingimages can play in facilitating the achievement of the mission of international tribunalsin restoring international peace and security by removing the underlying myths thatfuelled conflict in the first place and exposing the true nature of the war. Internationaljustice relies on the media to report trials, thus contributing to the process of catharsisfor the victims as well as the building of a common narrative of events. In particular,
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footage depicting the killing of six young men by Serb paramilitaries in 1995 has alteredthe debate on the war crimes legacy in Serbia, while at the same time showing theinvolvement of Serbian forces in the war and the type of atrocities committed by theseforces yet vehemently denied by nationalists and reformers alike.
The showing of the Srebrenica video on Serbian television has helped the ICTY’smission in a number of ways. First, it forced the Serbian political elite, for the first time,to condemn the crimes and tacitly admit to Serbian forces’ participation in thecommission of atrocities. Second, it has contributed to a change of attitudes in a largesegment of Serbia’s population regarding the Srebrenica massacre and the war inBosnia. Finally, it has advanced the process of reconciliation by creating the conditionsfor the President of Serbia to take part in the tenth anniversary commemoration eventsin Srebrenica with the backing of Serbian public opinion. While elements of all thesewere present prior to the showing of the video, it was the sight of the images thatprompted the changes.
The video and its impact demonstrated the power of moving images in changingpolicy and attitudes. Years of careful and painstaking investigations into the Srebrenicamassacre had failed to move Serbia’s elites and population into the state of shock theyfound themselves in on 1 June 2005. Serbia’s population could not claim that they didnot have enough information about the Srebrenica event; nevertheless, the effect ofthe video was more powerful than all the documents and testimonies presented atthe Milo evi[cacute] trial and in other cases. The limits of the impact are also clear. While themembers of the ‘Scorpions’ unit were put on trial and convicted for their role in thekillings, Serbia’s authorities still failed to arrest and transfer Ratko Mladi[cacute] to the ICTY.The change in attitudes towards the role of Serbian forces in the Yugoslav war, and inparticular their role in violating international humanitarian law on a large scale, wereimportant, but there remains a lot of room for improvement.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this article were presented to the War Crimes Research Group andthe International Peace and Security Seminar at King’s College London in November2006. The author would like to thank Professors James Gow and Marie Gillespie, aswell as Drs Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin—all colleagues on the collabora-tive research project, ‘Shifting Securities: Television News Cultures Before and AfterIraq 2003’, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council’s New SecurityChallenges Programme (ESRC Award RES-223-25-0063), which enabled the researchfor this article.
Notes1. [1] UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/827, 25 May 2003.2. [2] UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/764, 13 July 1992.3. [3] UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/771, 13 August 1992.4. [4] UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/780, 6 October 1992.5. [5] UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/827, 25 May 2003.
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430 I. Zver hanovskiz6. [6] See The Prosecutor v. Tadi[cacute] , Case No IT-94-1-I.7. [7] The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milo[scaron] evi[cacute] , Case No. IT-02-54 (Kosovo Indictment).8. [8] The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milo[scaron] evi[cacute] , Case No. IT-02-54 (Kosovo Indictment).9. [9] The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milo[scaron] evi[cacute] , Case No. IT-01-50-I (Croatia Indictment) and The
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milo[scaron] evi[cacute] , Case No. IT-01-51-I (Bosnia indictment).10.[10] The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milo[scaron] evi[cacute] et al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT (Second Amended indict-
ment for Kosovo).11.[11] Serbian Government officials often explained the lack of arrests of indictees as a fear of desta-
bilizing the security of the country.12.[12] Indictment against Slobodan Medi[cacute] , Branislav Medi[cacute] , Pero Petra[scaron] evi[cacute] Aleksandar Medi[cacute] and
Aleksandar Vukov, Belgrade District Court, War Crimes Chamber. Available online at: http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.yu/html_eng/optuznice/optuznica%20skorpioni.htm.
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