v. government response khalid shaikh mohammad, · khalid shaikh mohammad, walid muhammad salih...

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE

MILITARY COMMISSIONS TRIAL J UDICIARY GUANTANAMO BA Y, CUBA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMAD, WALID MUHAMMAD SALIH

MUBARAK BIN ATTASH, RAMZI BINALSHmH, ALI ABDUL AZIZ ALI,

MUSTAFA AHMED ADAM AL HAWSAWI

1. Timeliness

AE057A

Government Response to Motion of Mr. Mohammad, Mr. bin al

Shibh, Mr. al Baluchi , and Mr. al Hawsawi to Recogni ze that the Constitution Governs

the Mili tary Comm iss ions

30 July 20 12

This Response is time ly filed pursuant to M ili tary Commiss ions Tr ial Judiciary Rule of

Court 3.7.c( I).

2. Relief Sought

The Comm iss ion should deny the defense mot ion.

3. Overview

The Comm iss ion should not reach the merits of the defense mot ion but deny it on the

procedural ground that it is unri pe for adjudication. Defendants invite the Commiss ion to issue a

sweeping pronouncement-outside the context of any concrete di spute over a part icular

substantive or procedural issue-that const itut ional ri ghts developed in c ivilian criminal tr ials for

U.S. persons in the Uni ted States during peacet ime also apply to mili tary comm iss ion

proceedings aga inst ali en unpriv il eged enemy belligerents detained at Guantanamo Bay, unless

and until the Govern ment demonstrates that applying a part icular right is " impract icable and

anomalous" under BOlllllediene v. Blish , 553 U.S . 723 (2008). The Supreme Court has

repeatedly held , however , that U.S . tr ibunals should "never antic ipate a quest ion of const itut ional

law in advance of the necess ity of deciding it" and should "never formulate a rule of

const itut ional law broader than is required by the prec ise facts to which it is applied ." Liverpool,

Filed with T J 30 July 2012

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Appel late Exhibit 057A (KSM et al) of12


N. Y. & P.s. s. Co. v. Emigration COII/IIl'rS, 11 3 U.S . 33, 39 ( 1885); accord Wash. State Grange v.

Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S . 442, 450-5 1 (2008) . Because deciding the defense

mot ion would require the Commiss ion to contravene both these time-honored canons of

const itut ional adjudicat ion, the defense mot ion is unri pe for deci sion.

Contrary to the defense's assertions, the Supreme Court's deci sion in Boumediene

confinns that the defense motion is premature and unripe. In Boumediene, the Court considered

onl y the li mited quest ion whether "Art. I, § 9, c1. 2 of the Constitution has full effect at

Guantanamo Bay." 553 U.S. at 77 1. The Court's very log ic and approach in consider ing th is

quest ion was to assess a spec ific const itut ional provision in the context of part icular facts . In

doing so, the Court adhered to its deci sions in Livel]JOol, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S . 1 ( 1957)

(plurali ty op inion), and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 ( 1990), counseling

courts to exam ine the applicabili ty of a specific const itut ional provision in the part icu lar

c ircumstances of a part icular case. Further, the Court affirmed the ob ligat ion of U.S. tribunals to

avo id quest ions of const itutional law unless necessary. The defense argument that Boumediene

supports its mot ion is therefore misgu ided. For these reasons and others expla ined in detail

be low, the Commission should deny the defense mot ion as unri pe for adjud icat ion.

4. Burden of Proof

As the mov ing party, the defense must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence

that the requested relief is warranted . R.M.C. 905(c)( I )-(2) .

5. Facts

On II September 2001, a group of AI Qaeda operat ives hijacked four c ivilian airliners in

the Un ited States. After the hijackers killed or incapacitated the a irline pilots, a pilot-h ijacker

deliberately slammed American Airlines Flight II in to the North Tower of the World Trade

Center in New York , New York. A second pilot-h ijacker intentionally flew Uni ted Airlines

Flight 175 in to the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Both towers collapsed soon

thereafter. Hijackers also deliberately slanuned a th ird airliner, American Airlines Flight 77, in to


2 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Appel late Exhibit 057A (KSM et al) of 12


the Pentagon in Northern Virg inia. A fourth hijacked a irliner, Un ited Airlines Flight 93, crashed

in to a field in Pennsylvania after passengers and crew fought to reclaim control of the aircraft.

As a result of these attacks, 2,976 people were murdered, and numerous other c ivilians and

mili tary personnel were injured.

On 3 1 May 20 II and 25 January 20 12, charges in connect ion with the II September

200 1 attacks were sworn aga inst Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak

Bin Attash, Ramz i Binalshibh , Ali Abdu l Az iz Ali , and Mustafa Ahmed Adam a1 Hawsawi.

These charges were referred jointly to thi s capital Mili tary Commiss ion on 4 Apr il 20 12. The

five co-accused were each charged with Consp iracy, Attack ing C iv ili ans, Attacking Civ ili an

Objects, Intentionall y Causing Serious Booily Injury, Murder in Violat ion of the Law of War,

Destruction of Property in Violat ion of the Law of War, Hijack ing an Aircraft, and Terrorism.

These charges were sworn pursuant to the M ili tary Commiss ions Act of 2009 (M .C.A.) .

In the M .C.A., Congress prov ided accused persons facing trial by mili tary commiss ion with

unprecedented protect ions. Congress guaranteed unpriv il eged enemy belligerents many of the

same procedural and substantive ri ghts the Uniform Code of M ili tary Just ice affords prisoners of

war. I

Notwithstanding these unprecedented protections, Messrs. Mohammad, Binalshibh , al

Baluchi , and al Hawsawi move for a deci s ion that the const itut ional ri ghts developed in c ivili an

criminal trials for U.S . persons in the Uni ted States in peacet ime also apply to military

commission proceedings aga inst ali en unprivileged enemy be lligerents detained at the

I See, e.g., 10 U.S .c. § 949a(b)(2) (granting the accused the right to present evidence in the accused's defense; to be present at a ll appropriate sess ions of the mili tary commiss ion; to counsel, includ ing counselleamed in the applicable law relating to capital cases; to selfrepresentat ion; to suppression of ev idence that is not reliable or probat ive; and to suppress ion of evidence that is undul y prejudic ial); id. § 949c(b) (granting the accused the ri ght to counse l); id. § 949h (granting the accused the right to not be tried tw ice for the same offense); id. § 949j (granting the accused the opportuni ty to obta in witnesses and other evidence); id. § 949s (granting the accused the right against cruel or unusual puni shments); id. § 950g (granting the accused the ri ght to review by the Uni ted States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circu it); id. § 950h (granting the accused the right to appell ate counse l) .

Filed wilh T J 30 July 2012


Appel late Exhibit 057A (KSM et al) Page30f12


Guantanamo Bay Naval Stat ion, unless the Government demonstrates that applying a part icu lar

provision to the accused is " impract icable and anomalous" under BOlllllediell e v. Blish, 553 U.S.

723, 759 (2008). Th is mot ion const itutes a sweeping request for an adv isory opinion on

const itut ional1aw. Because the mot ion fa il s to cross the procedura l threshold of ripeness, th is

Commiss ion should decline to reach its merits and deny the mot ion as prudentially unripe.

6. Law and Argument

Ripeness is a quest ion of timing designed to "prevent the courts, through avoidance of

premature adjud icat ion, from entangling themselves in abstract di sagreements." Abbott Labs. v.

Gardl1er, 387 U.S. 136, 148 ( 1967). Like any other U.S .tribunal, the Commiss ion's role is

neither to issue advisory opinions nor to declare ri ghts in hypothetical situations, see Pril1ceton

UI/iv. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102 ( 1982), but to adjudicate "a just ic iable case or controversy

between adverse parties." United States v. Chisholm , 59 M.J. 15 1, 152 (C.A.A.F. 2(03) .

Ripeness is a justic iabili ty doctrine "drawn both from Art ic le III li mitat ions on jud ic ial power

and from prudential reasons for refusing to exerc ise jurisd ict ion." Reno v. Catholic Soc. SelVs.,

IIlC. , 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.1 8 (1993). Courts establi shed under Art icle 1 of the Const itut ion, like th is

Commiss ion, generally adhere to the ripeness doctrine "as a prudential matter." Chisholm, 59

MJ. at 152.

Prudential considerat ions restrain courts "from hast il y intervening into matters that may

be best viewed at another time or another setting, espec iall y when the uncertain nature of an

issue might affect a court 's abili ty to decide intelligently." Wyo. Outdoor COllllcil v. U.S Forest

SelV., 165 F.3d 43 , 50 (D.c. Cir. 1999) (i nternal quotation marks and c itat ion omitted) . To

determine whether prudential considerat ions dictate reaching the mer its of the issue presented in

the defense motion, the Commission should "evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judic ial

deci sion and the hardship to the part ies of withholding court considerat ion." Abbott Labs., 387

U.S . at 149. Both prudential considerat ions dictate denial s of the defense mot ion.


4

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Appel late Exhibit 057A (KSM et al) of 12


I. The Defense Motion Is Not Fit for Judicial Decision.

The Comm iss ion's " in terests in avo iding unnecessary adjud icat ion of constitutional

questions and deciding issues in a concrete factual sett ing" render the motion unfit for judic ial

decision. Cronill v. F.A.A ., 73 F.3d 11 26, 11 3 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and

c itat ion om itted) (deferring review of pet itioners' procedural due-process claims) . Two well -

establi shed canons of constitutional adjud icat ion constrain the Comm iss ion's review of the

defense mot ion: "one, never to antic ipate a question of const itu tional1aw in advance of the

necess ity of deciding it; the other, never to formulate a rule of const itut ional law broader than is

required by the prec ise facts to wh ich it is applied." Liverpool, N. Y. & p.s.s. Co. v. Emigratioll

Comm'rs, 11 3 U.S . 33,39 (1885) (instructing courts to "follow [these canons} closely and

carefully"); accord United States v. Ilistruments, S.A., IIl C., 807 F. Supp. 8 11 , 8 15 (D.D.C. 1992)

(concluding that courts must apply the ripeness doctrine in light of const itut ional-avoidance

canons) (c iting Ashwallder v. TVA , 297 U.S. 288, 346 ( 1936)).

First, the defense mot ion is not fit for decision because deciding the motion is

unnecessary at th is time. The defense seeks a generali zed pronouncement that the accused "hold

the same constitutional ri ghts as defendants in other American criminal just ice systems," yet fa ils

to ident ify a single ri ght it will assert in a single specific factual context. AE 057 at 2. Many

ri ghts the accused might assert are already provided by statute.2 The Commission need not

consider whether the Const itut ion guarantees the accused these same rights, or ri ghts that the

accused will never assert. Spector Motor Serv., Ill c. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 10 1, 105 (1944)

("If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of const itut ional

2 See, e.g ., 10 U.S .c. § 949(b) (granting the accused the right to counsel); id. § 948q (granting the accused the ri ght to be informed of the charges as soon as practicable after the charges and spec ificat ions are referred for tr ial); id. § 949i (granting the accused the presumpt ion of innocence); id. § 949a(b) (granting the accused the right not to testify at trial and to have the opportuni ty to present evidence and cross-exam ine witnesses for the prosecut ion); id. § 949j (granting the accused the ri ght to exculpatory and mitigat ing inFormation known to the prosecut ion or invest igators, with procedures pennitt ing some variance for nat ional security concerns) .



Appel late Exhibit 057A (KSM et al) Page50f12


adjud icat ion, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitut ionali ty ... unless such

adjudication is unavoidable.") .

The Supreme Court has routinely avoided quest ions regarding even U.S .

servicemembers' ri ghts under the Const itut ion when deciding such questions was unnecessary.

See, e.g ., Lovillg v. United States, 5 17 U.S. 748, 755 ( 1996) (assuming, w ithout deciding, that the

death-penalty standards delineated in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 ( 1972), applied to the

mili tary); Davis v. United States, 5 12 U.S . 452, 457 ( 1994) (declining to dec ide whether the Fifth

Amend ment privil ege against self-incrimination , or the attendant right to counsel during

custod ial interrogat ion, applies to servicemembers where the Uni form Code of Mili tary Just ice

provided similar ri ghts) . Deferral is part icu larly prudent here because the D. C. Circuit is

currently considering whether the M.C.A. violates the equal protect ion component of the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amend ment. See Hamdal1 v, United States, No. 11 -1257 (D.C. Cir.

filed July 11 ,20 II ). Prematurely deciding the defense mot ion would not onl y squander valuable

judicial resources and transform judic ial review into judicial preview, but it wou ld increase the

ri sk of an improvident deci sion on a constitutional quest ion.

Second, the defense mot ion is not fit for deci sion because the defense seeks a generali zed

pronouncement that all constitutional ri ghts apply in mili tary commission proceed ings without

providing the Comm iss ion any particular ized facts or context in wh ich to consider whether or

how any such const itutional provision might apply. The Commiss ion "should not be forced to

decide these constitutional quest ions in a vacuum ." W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Cla rk, 389

U.S. 309, 3 12 (1967) .3 Nor can it. Even in the case of U.S. c itizens, the quest ion is not merely

whether "these const itut ional guarantees as a totality do or do not 'apply,'" but rather "what

process is 'due' a defendant in the part icu lar c ircumstances of a part icular case." Reid v. Covert,

354 U.S . 1,75 ( 1957) (plurali ty op inion) (Harl an, J ., concurring in re su lt); accord Ul1ited States

v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S . 259, 278 ( 1990) (Kennedy, J. , concurring) . In Ex parte Quiril1 ,

3 In Clark, the Court declined to decide " important and difficult constitutional issues" that were "devoid of factual context."


6



for example, the Supreme Court held that the g rand and pet it jury clauses in the Fifth and Sixth

Amend ments, re spectively, did not apply to "offenses conunitted by enemy belligerents against

the law of war," recognizing "the trad itional pract ice of try ing those offenses without a jury."

3 17 U.S. 1, 41 (1942) . That inquiry focused on a narrow set of asserted ri ghts that were

spec ifica ll y at issue. Further, in United States v. Ali, Crim. Ap. No. 20080559, at 30 (C.A.A.F.

July 18,20 12), the court decided that an ali en tried outside the United States for a crime

committed outside the Uni ted States was not entitled to the due-process protect ions of the Fifth

and Sixth Amendments . That, too, was a narrow inquiry regarding a spec ific asserted ri ght in a

spec ific context. Thus, even if the Commission were to concl ude that certa in prov isions of the

Const itution apply to the accused, that conclusion wou ld not require that it apply in the same

way it app li es to U.S . c itizens, or even to ali ens within the Uni ted States. See Reid, 354 U.S . at

75 . These are prec isely the prudential considerat ions the ripeness doctrine safeguards.

The more prudent course is to dec ide whether the Constitution guarantees the accused a

specific, art icu lable const itutional ri ght on a case-by-case bas is, in the context of a part icu lar li ve

controversy between the part ies, as the need to decide arises .4 It may be, for example, that the

Commiss ion wou ld not need to decide the app licability of a const itut ional provision because the

M .C.A. itself affords the accused parallel ri ghts or protect ions as a matter of statutory law.

Waiting for a li ve controversy to adjudicate such issues wou ld also enable the Commiss ion to

define, to the extent necessary, the contours of any such ri ght and delineate how it applies in the

context of mili tary commiss ions. Th is approach will "provide the [Comm iss ion} the concrete

factual sett ing that sharpens the deliberative process espec iall y demanded for const itut ional

deci sion." UI/ited States v. UAW, 352 U.S . 567, 59 1 ( 1957) (emphasizing the importance ofa

detail ed factual record upon which a court may li mit, frame, and perhaps avoid constitutional

4 For example, the defense could rai se the applicabili ty of the S ixth Amend ment ri ght to confrontat ion if the prosecut ion were to in troduce test imonial statements of declarants who were not present to test ify, or it could assert a Fifth Amend ment claim if the prosecut ion sought to in troduce a statement the defense contended was not voluntary. Such claims wou ld implicate ~act-spec ific assessments concerning the applicat ion and scope of the constitutional provision at Issue.

Filad with T J 30 July 2012

7

UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Appal lala Exhibil 057A (KSM at al) Paga7of12


deci s ions); Cronil1, 73 F.3d at 11 32 (declining to consider a due-process challenge to certa in

regulat ions until the court is "faced with a concrete factual sett ing with in wh ich to evaluate the

due process requirements") . Ult imately, the Commiss ion 's appra isal will "stand on a much su rer

footing in the context ofa spec ific applicat ion" of the ri ght than with in the generali zed

framework the defense proposes. See Toilet Goods ASS'I1, Ill c. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163-64

( 1967)

BOlllllediene v. Blish does not suggest a contrary result. The defense relies on

BOlllllediene in argu ing that a ll constitutional rights apply in extraterritorial proceedings, unless

and until the Govern ment demonstrates that applying a particular ri ght is " impract icable and

anomalous." AE 057 at 2 . The defense reliance on Boulllediene is misgu ided For several

reasons.

First, Boumediene did not cast doubt on the Supreme Court's deci s ions in Reid, Verdugo-

Urquidez, and Quiril1 counseling courts to base the ir assessments of constitutional guarantees on

the process '''due' a deFendant in the particular c ircumstances of a part icu lar case." Reid, 354

U.S . at 75; accord Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S . at 278; Quiril1, 3 17 U.S. at 4 1. Rather, the very

logic and approach of Boumediene was to assess a spec ific const itut iona l prov is ion in the context

of particular facts. In doing so, the Court exp lic itly li mited its deci sion:

Our deci s ion today holds ollly that pet itioners before us are entitl ed to seek the writ ; that the [Detainee Treatment Act] review procedures are an inadequate subst itute For habeas corpus; and that pet itioners in these cases need not exhaust the review procedures in the Court of Appeals before proceeding with the ir habeas act ions in the District Court.

Boulllediene, 553 U.S. at 795 (emphasis added). The Court reached its deci s ion onl y after an

exhaust ive survey of the Great Writ's hi story, the Court's precedents o n the scope of habeas

corpus jurisdiction , and the pract ical considerat ions in extending the Writ to Guantanamo.

Further, BOlllllediene did not overru le Quirin, which recognized an except ion to the

Const itut ion's jury clauses in the Fifth and S ixth Amend ments for "ofFenses committed by

enemy belligerents against the law of war," and held that mili tary comm iss ion proceedings are





"not deemed to be with in Art icle nt, § 2 or the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendme nts

rel ating to 'crimes' and 'criminal prosecut ions.'" Quirill , 3 17 U.S . at 40-4 1.

Second , the defense argument is foreclosed by precedent binding on th is Comm iss ion. In

United States v. Hamdall , the U.S . Court of Mili tary Comm iss ion Rev iew rejected the argument

that, under BOlllllediene, all the "const itutional due process and equal protections must apply to

[h is] mili tary commiss ion." 80 I F. Supp. 2d 1247, 13 16 (C.M.C.R. 20 II ). Instead, the court

held that "read[ing] the BOlllllediene opinion to extend Fifth Amend ment equal protect ion ri ghts

to [a li en unlawful enemy combatants] tried before mili tary commiss ions wou ld be an

except ionall y broad and incaut ious expansion of constitut ional ri ghts." Id. at 13 18; see AI-

Bihani v. Ohama, 590 F.3d 866, 876 (D.C. Cir . 20 10) (Equating a ri ght to habeas corpus "w ith

all the accoutrements of ... domestic criminal defendants is highly suspect."), cert. denied, 13 1

S.O. 18 14 (2011 ).

Third, to the extent any doubt remained about the canons of constitutional avo idance,

BOlllllediell e provides the deFense no comfort. Boumedielle afFinned courts' obligat ion to "avoid

[constitutional} problems if it is fairly poss ible to do so." BOlllllediene, 553 U.S . at 787 (internal

quotation marks and c itat ion omitted; alteration in original) (applying a const itut ional-avoidance

canon in construing the Detainee Treatment Act) . The Supreme Court's precedents have long

counseled courts to adhere to the ord inary course by avo iding deci sion on such hypothetical

quest ions of const itut ional law.

n. Withholding Decision on the Merits of the Defense Motion Will Not Cause the Accused Immediate or Significant Hardship.

The deFense nonetheless urges the Comm iss ion to abandon this ordinary and prudent

course, apparently due to the asserted gravity of the constitut ional issues presented and the need

to "know how to shape" the ir legal pos itions. AE 057 at 1-2. In assess ing prudential ripeness

concerns, the second factor the Comm iss ion considers is the hardship to the part ies resulting

from withholding a deci sion on the issue presented . Ahhott Labs., 387 U.S . at 148 . To

overcome the compelling precedents requiring denial of the defense mot ion as premature, the





defense must show that the hardships it wou ld suffer are " immediate and significant." See Alii.

Petroleum Illst. v. E.P.A. , _ F.3d _. 20 12 WL 2053572, at *6 (D.C. C ir. June 8, 20 12); see also

Toilet Goods, 387 U.S. at 166 (deferring review where "no irremediab le adverse consequences

fl ow" from deferral). The defense mot ion fa ll s short of sat isfyin g th is standard for at least three

reasons.

First, in its motion, the defense fail s to identify a s ingle const itutional ri ght it will assert

at trial. See generally AE 057 . And, as explained above, many ri ghts are already provided by

statute. Until a li ve di spute has arisen , the defense's hardship is neither immediate nor

s igni f icant; it is hypothetical. See Spector Motor SelV., 323 U.S . at 105 ("Our precedents have

long counseled us to avo id dec iding such hypothetical questions of constitutional law .").

Second , mere legal uncertainty is insufficient to just ify premature review. If legal

uncerta in ty were sufficient , requests for what would amount to advi sory opinions wou ld

overwhelm the Commiss ion. Indeed, dec iding the defense mot ion now could generate more

legal uncertainty tha n it would resolve. Even if the Commission were to decide that all

const itut ional ri ghts apply in these proceedings, because the Comm iss ion lacks spec ific factual

context w ith in wh ich to consider those ri ghts, it could not decide the scope of the ri ghts or the

applicat ion of a constitut ional ri ght to a part icu lar defendant in the part icular c ircumstances of

hi s case. This uncertainty illustrates the inherent dange r in deciding constitut ional quest ions in a

vacuum. See W.E.B. DuBois Clubs, 389 U.S . at 3 12; see also Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148

(cautioning courts about "entangling themselves in abstract di sagreements") .

Third, by declining to rule on the merits of the defense mot ion, the Commiss ion does not

foreclose the defense from argu ing that a specific ri ght should apply in the part icular

c ircumstances that might be presented in the future in the case; it merely defers decision until the

defense rai ses ajust ic iable issue in a concrete context. See Toilet Goods, 387 U.S . at 166

(deferring review where " no irremediable adverse consequences flow" from deferral ) . The

defense's onl y hardship then becomes the burden of having to file another mot ion. But such a

procedura l consequence is a routine feature of the adjud icat ing process and is not a s ignificant


10



cogni zable hardship, and it cannot, in any event, outweigh the prudential considerat ions that

dictate deferring review. See Cronill , 73 F.3d at 11 33 (concl ud ing that the burden of f iling

another su it did not outweigh the court's in terests in deferring review). The defense's hardship,

if any, is neither immediate nor significant; therefore, th is Comm iss ion should deny the defense

motion.

7. Conclusion

Because the defense mot ion is unfi t for judic ial deci s ion and because deferring deci s ion

wou ld not cause the defense s ignificant or immed iate hardship outweighing the we ighty in terests

in not deciding the merits of the motion at this time, the Comm iss ion should deny the mot ion as

prudentiall y unri pe.

8. Oral Argument

The prosecut ion requests oral argument.

9. Witnesses and Evidence

No witnesses or evidence are necessary to resolve thi s mot ion.

10. Additional Information

The prosecut ion has no additional infoI111at ion.

11. Attachments

A. Cert ificate of Service, dated 30 July 20 12.

Respectfully submitted ,

Clay Tr ivett Trial Counsel

IIsll

Mark Mart ins Ch ief Prosecutor M ili tary Comm iss ions

II UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE


Appel late Exhibit 057A (KSM et al) of12


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 30th day of July 2012, 1 fil ed AE057A, the Government Response to Joint Defense Mot ion to Recognize that the Const itut ion Governs the M ilj tary Comm iss ions with the Office of Mili tary Commissions Trial Judiciary and I served a copy on counsel of record.


IIsll Clay Trivett Deputy Trial Counsel Office of the Ch ief Prosecutor Office of M ili tary Commissions


Attachment A Page 1 of 1

Appel late Exhibit 057A (KSM at al) 0f12

v. government response khalid shaikh mohammad, · khalid shaikh mohammad, walid muhammad salih...

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