"the [untold] tillman story" (version 1.1 -- december 28, 2010)

168
“THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY” President Obama & Congress‟s Bipartisan Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‟s Central Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillman‟s Friendly-Fire Death Guy Montag, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com August 14, 2010 [Updated 12-28-10] ―War is always about betrayal, betrayal of the young by the old, of idealists by cynics and of troops by politicians.‖ -- Chris Hendges (2009) It went up to the two-star level and the two-star took it right up to the four-star level. … ‗Here is the steak dinner, but we‘re giving it to you on this … garbage can cover. You know, you got it, you work it.‘‖ -- Brigadier General Howard Yellen (May 2004) ―He [Secretary of Defense] knows the administration‘s position on the matter was a cover -up. … But it worked. And they didn‘t want the president to look bad.‖ … ―[The Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught in it. … Nonetheless, they would become the government‘s official pronouncement on the day‘s action.‖ … ―And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth.‖ -- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For,‖ (1991)

Upload: guy-montag

Post on 26-Dec-2014

2.641 views

Category:

Documents


2 download

DESCRIPTION

Describes bi-partisan whitewash of Gen. McChrystal's central role in Army's cover-up of Pat Tillman's friendly-fire death. Updated since first version released August 2010.

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

“THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY”

President Obama & Congress‟s Bipartisan Whitewash of General Stanley

McChrystal‟s Central Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillman‟s Friendly-Fire Death

Guy Montag, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com

August 14, 2010 [Updated 12-28-10]

―War is always about betrayal, betrayal of the young by the old, of idealists by cynics and of

troops by politicians.‖

-- Chris Hendges (2009)

―It went up to the two-star level and the two-star took it right up to the four-star level. … ‗Here is

the steak dinner, but we‘re giving it to you on this … garbage can cover. You know, you got it,

you work it.‘‖

-- Brigadier General Howard Yellen (May 2004)

―He [Secretary of Defense] knows the administration‘s position on the matter was a cover-up. …

But it worked. And they didn‘t want the president to look bad.‖ … ―[The Secretary of Defense]

never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught in it. … Nonetheless, they would

become the government‘s official pronouncement on the day‘s action.‖ … ―And the media gave

them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if

not the truth.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For,‖ (1991)

Page 2: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page #:

Prologue: Iddo Netanyahu & Kevin Tillman‟s “Battle for the Truth” 4

. . .

Letter to “The Tillman Story” Director Amir Bar-Lev (July 26th

2010) 9

“Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?” -- Senator Webb‟s Betrayal of Pat Tillman 15

―Something to Die For‖ -- Letter to Mary Tillman (February 4th

2008) 16

A Sense of Honor‖ -- Letter to Senator James Webb (April 3rd

2008) 21

―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ – Letter to Senator Webb (May 26th

2009) 29

“The Tillman Story” Script -- Congress Fumbled the Ball 36

“The [Untold] Tillman Story” -- Congress Didn‟t Fumble, They Threw the Game: 41

Hearing: ―Misleading Information from the Battlefield‖ (April 24, 2007) 45

General Wallace‘s Review of Tillman Fratricide Investigations (July 31, 2007) 56

Hearing: ―What the Leadership of the Dept. of Defense Knew‖ (August 1, 2007) 66

Report: ―Misleading Information from the Battlefield‖ (July 17, 2008) 81

“The [Untold] Tillman Story” -- President Obama‟s Big-Time Fumble: 84

―Barely a Footnote‖ – Superbowl XLIII and the NFL‘s Betrayal of Pat Tillman 85

―The Emperor‘s General‖ – President Obama‘s Whitewash of Gen. McChrystal 87

―Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth‖ – NYT‘s Thom Shanker‘s Whitewash 94

―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ – Congress‘s Gen. McChrystal Whitewash 102

Senate Confirmation Hearing for Gen. McChrystal‘s Promotion (June 2009) 112

Senate Armed Services Committee‘s Secret McChrystal Hearing (May 2008) 123

Conclusion: “Maybe It Had Been Trash from the Get-Go, Myths to Feed the Public” 129

―A Country Such As This‖ 129

―Remember the Iconoclast, Not the Icon‖ 135

―My King a Lost King, and Lost Soldiers My Men‖ 137

Postscript: “This Story is Not Over Yet” 139

―He Who Shall Not Be Fact Checked‖ – CNAS‘s Andrew Exum 144

―Where Men Win Glory‖ – Letters to Jon Krakauer 153

. . .

Epilogue: “That‟s My Hero” – Pat Tillman, Rachel Corrie, & Yoni Netanyahu 160

Page 3: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

3

APPENDICES

A1 -- Dept. of Defense Inspector General‘s Tillman Investigation (March 26, 2007)

B1 -- House Oversight Committee‘s 1st Tillman Hearing (April 24, 2007)

C1 – Gen. McChrystal Invited to Testify Before Congress (July 13, 2007)

D1 -- Gen. Wallace‘s Review of the Tillman Investigations (July 31, 2007)

D2 – House Oversight Committee‘s 2nd

Tillman Hearing (August 1, 2007)

D3 – Gen. McChrystal Did Not Testify at 2nd

Tillman Hearing (August 1, 2007)

. . .

E1 -- Senate Armed Services Committee Secret McChrystal Hearing (May 15, 2008)

E2 -- Senator James Webb Interview - NPR Diane Rhem Show (May 27, 2008)

F1 -- House Oversight Committee‘s Report on Tillman Fratricide (July 17, 2008)

. . .

G1 – ―Did Congress Cover for McChrystal‖ - Diane Rhem Show (May 15, 2009)

H1 – ―The McChrystal Protection Act of 2009‖ (May 20, 2009)

I1 – Senate Armed Services Committee McChrystal Hearing (June 2, 2009)

J1 -- Gen. McChrystal‘s Contradictory Congressional Testimony (June 2, 2009)

Page 4: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

4

―BATTLE FOR THE TRUTH”

Iddo Netanyahu, Kevin Tillman and the Cover-up of their Brother‟s Death

February 4, 2008

Guy Montag, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com

Benjamin, Yoni (Jonathan), and Iddo Netanyahu (1966)

Richard, Pat, and Kevin Tillman (2002)

―And of him one may say in the words of David: ‗They were swifter than eagles, they were

stronger than lions… O, Jonathan, thou wast slain in thine high places. I am distressed for thee,

my brother Jonathan… Very pleasant hast thou been unto me, thy love to me was wonderful…‘

The same heroism in the man. The same lamentation in the heart of the people.‖

-- Israel Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Yoni Netanyahu funeral (July 1976)

Page 5: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

5

“BATTLE FOR THE TRUTH” [edited from February 2008 letter to Mary Tillman]

Iddo Netanyahu is the youngest of three brothers. All three brothers fought together in the same

elite Israeli army unit (Sayeret Matkal) during the 1970‘s. Now, Iddo is a radiologist. His other

brother, Benjamin Netanyahu, was Israel‘s Prime Minister from 1996 to 1999 and is the leader of

Israel‘s Likud party [now Prime Minister again]. But, Iddo‘s oldest brother, Jonathan (Yoni)

Netanyahu, has largely been forgotten in the US after his death 30 years ago leading the Rescue

at Entebbe.

Like Kevin Tillman, Iddo‘s oldest brother died in battle, became a national icon, and had the

truth covered up by his government. For the past 30 years, Iddo has been engaged in a battle for

the truth about his brother‘s death.

And, like Pat Tillman, Yoni Netanyahu was also a remarkable man. The reality of both Pat and

Yoni was much deeper than their iconic images. Both possessed a core of honesty and integrity,

led by personal example, and lived their lives intensely. Neither cared much about money or

personal comfort. Both were mavericks, intellectuals and avid readers. For example, from the

foreword to ―The Letters of Jonathan Netanyahu‖:

―Of all the aspects of his character one predominates – integrity. By this we do not mean

only honesty toward one‘s fellow man, but, above all, honesty toward oneself. An inner

wholeness marked Yoni‘s entire behavior, inspired his way of life and determined his

objectives. That wholeness resulted from a great need for absolute harmony between his

thoughts and deeds.‖

―For Yoni, unlike many of us, could not hold beliefs without living them to the full. Once

convinced of the rightness of an idea, whether in the personal or national sphere, he had to do

what he could to actualize it, regardless of the hardships or risks involved. Again and again

he asked himself whether he was working toward the realization of his life‘s aims.‖

After reading about the Rescue at Entebbe, I was struck by the many parallels between the life

and death of Pat Tillman and Yoni Netanyahu:

Yoni died July 4, 1976 at Entebbe, Pat was born November 1976.

Both were the oldest of three brothers and the ―stars‖ of their family.

Both served in the Army in ―special forces ―and in combat with a younger brother. Both

became national icons after their deaths.

Page 6: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

6

Both died from negligent mistakes made by a fellow soldier.

The truth about their deaths was covered up by their governments, and their deaths were

more ―heroic‖ than the official story.

Friendly-fire deaths during battle were covered-up by their governments.

Both Pat and Yoni‘s families have fought what Yoni‘s younger brother Iddo called a

―battle for the truth‖ about their deaths.

Perhaps you recall the Rescue at Entebbe. Thirty years ago, an airliner was hijacked by terrorists

and flown to the Entebbe airport in Uganda. On July 4, 1976, Israeli aircraft landed at Entebbe

and soldiers assaulted the terminal where the hostages were held. About 100 hostages were

rescued at Entebbe. The official story was that seven terrorists were killed and three hostages

―died in the cross-fire‖. Yoni Netanyahu was the commander of the assault force and the only

soldier killed ―…shot in the back by a Ugandan soldier from the top of an air traffic control

tower after the initial assault had been completed‖.

Yoni became a symbol of heroic sacrifice for Israel. His funeral was televised nationally and

Prime Minister Shimon Peres gave his eulogy. Several years later, Iddo discovered that the truth

about his brother‘s death had been covered up by the Israeli government. Iddo Netanyahu

published his account of his brother‘s death in ―Yoni‘s Last Battle‖ (1991 Hebrew, 2001

English).

Iddo‘s book revealed that embarrassing details of Yoni‘s death had been covered up. After

Entebbe, the Israeli government didn‘t want to admit that some hostages had been killed by

―friendly fire‖. They didn‘t want to give terrorists credit for killing Yoni Netanyahu. Or reveal

that Yoni died because his second-in-command, Muki Betser, failed to do his job of

spearheading the assault and missed his assigned doorway.

. . .

Twenty-three years ago, as a young paratrooper and student at the University of Michigan, I read

the collection of letters by Yoni Netanyahu entitled ―Self Portrait of a Hero.‖ It became one of

my treasured books.

Four years ago, I believed Pat had been an idealistic, patriotic, ―dumb jock‖. I refused to watch

any of the flag waving coverage of Pat‘s death on TV. It seemed like a sideshow distraction to

the Abu Gharib story that was breaking about the time of his death. Then, in October 2005, I

read David Zirin‘s article, ―Our Hero‖ in The Nation, which referenced Robert Collier‘s 9/25/05

SF Chronicle article.

I discovered that Pat was my kind of warrior: a fiercely independent thinker, a book reader and a

maverick. With a radical edge (like my other military heroes including Stan Goff, Donald

Page 7: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

7

Duncan, and James Webb [now VA U.S. Senator]. Pat even read Noam Chomsky! I was

angered that the truth about his death and his character had been buried by the media and the

government.

The more I read about Pat, the more he reminded me of Yoni. In October 2005, I re-read my

dog-eared paperback copy of ―Self-Portrait of a Hero.‖ Then, I discovered that Yoni‘s younger

brother Iddo had written a much more recent book, ―Yoni‘s Last Battle,‖ about the raid on

Entebbe. I was stunned to read that Yoni had been shot in the front of his chest by a terrorist as

he personally led the assault teams forward at Entebbe. What? My recollection as an 11 year

old boy watching the movie ―Raid on Entebbe‖ was that Yoni was shot in the back by a Ugandan

soldier from the control tower!

I‘ve taken the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s death a bit personally. Like Stan Goff, I feel a kinship

with Pat Tillman. When I was ―young and dumb‖ I joined an Airborne Ranger Long-Range

Recon (LRRP) unit. I was the ―college kid‖ and bookworm of my company (I recall the CO

catching me sitting against my rucksack reading ―Meditations‖ by Marcus Aurelius). I was 17

years old when I enlisted. I grew up in the Army, enjoyed being a LRRP, and being with the

guys. But, the lies of the first Gulf War were the last straw for me. I no longer wanted to be in

what Donald Duncan [Special Forces LRRP, one of the first veterans to protest Vietnam] called

―The New Legions.‖ A slave who would be told who to kill for oil or other ―national interests‖.

After eight years, I got out of the Army in March 1991, and have spent the last 17 years as a

firefighter.

. . .

In the early 1970‘s, Yoni wanted to join his brother Benjamin on the assault of a hijacked plane.

His brother Iddo argued that it was irresponsible to risk both brothers‘ lives on the same

mission. Yoni countered by saying, ―My life belongs to me, and so does my death.‖

But Yoni‘s death hasn‘t belonged to him. His brother Iddo has spent 30 years in a battle for the

truth. Nor has Pat Tillman‘s death belonged to him. The Bush administration [the Obama

administration and Democratic Congress are also culpable] has buried the truth about his death

with a series of ―latest and greatest investigations.‖ Pat can‘t even speak for himself through his

wartime journal, since the Army ―lost‖ it after his death. Now, it‘s up to his family and friends

to reclaim the truth and integrity of Pat‘s life and death.

. . .

Page 8: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

8

―My wife and I lost Abe in a tragic and senseless accident, a month or so before his fifth

birthday. If parents are fated to mourn a son, and if one can envy such bereavement, my wife

and I can envy the Netanyahus. Their son died for his people and for all men, in the full

flush of manhood, doing a famous deed. In his death he helped to save more than a hundred

lives, brought glory to Israel, and gave the world a blaze of hope in a very dark time. For our

son, we have only the tears of the scar of a senseless waste. …‖

-- Herman Wouk, Foreword to ―Self-Portrait of a Hero‖ (1980)

My boy, Nathan, is three years old. He is, to use a quaint term, ―a pistol.‖ Good-hearted, but a

bit wild, always with a mischievous glint in his eyes. I don‘t want to even imagine losing him.

(Hopefully, I can keep him from following my footsteps into the Army 15 years from now!)

What can you do with the ―tears of a senseless waste?‖ I hope that your forthcoming book will

contribute to redeeming the integrity of Pat Tillman‘s life and death.

. . .

―When we close the book, we know the man; all we have to know, and all we will know. He

inspires and ennobles us, and he gives us hope. That is enough. That is the best that art can do.‖

-- Herman Wouk, Foreword to ―Self-Portrait of a Hero‖ (1980)

Page 9: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

9

“NOBODY HAS EVER REALLY PAID A PRICE

FOR WHAT WAS DONE TO THE TILLMANS”

July 26th

2010 Letter to “The Tillman Story” Director Amir Bar-Lev

―… we have all been betrayed. It isn‘t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they

betray all of us.‖ … ―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your

heart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. … we knew they [Pat & Kevin]

could die or they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him

the way they did‖

-- Mary Tillman, Congressional testimony (April 24, 2007)

"There is another man who will not be in the room. That is Lieutenant General Stan McChrystal

... Because of his extraordinarily sensitive position with covert special forces, he is not appearing

in public. And so he will not be questioned further by the [House Oversight] committee in an

open hearing." [italics added]

-- Barbara Starr (CNN, August 1, 2007)

―… there‘s been no culpability on the second half of this tragedy, which is the higher ups trying

to cover it up. … to borrow a football metaphor, they [Tillman family] ran the ball 99 yards over

four years‘ time, they handed it off at the one-yard line to Congress and they fumbled it.‖

-- Amir Bar-Lev (July 20th

2010)

―This is an unsolved mystery; nobody has ever really paid a price for what was done to the

Tillmans,‖ he said. ―No one has taken accountability or made an admission for a deliberate

attempt to conceal the truth. This story is not over yet.‖

-- Amir Bar-Lev, (June 24th

2010)

Page 10: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

10

Letter to “The Tillman Story” Director Amir Bar-Lev

[edited from July 26, 2010 letter]

On January 29th

, shortly before the Sundance premiere of your film, ―The Tillman Story,‖ I sent

you a brief e-mail that described how ―the Democratic Congress and Obama Presidency have

protected General McChrystal.‖ You replied, ―thanks for your email -- … Have you seen the

film? I'm pretty hard on the Democratic Congress!‖

Well, a month ago, I drove 10 hours from Michigan to finally see your film at the Silver Docs

Film Festival in DC (and the following day drove a more sedate 13 hours back home). A bit

extreme, literally driving half the weekend, but I wanted to see your film before it‘s August 20th

release and possibly speak with you (and the road-trip was a good excuse to see an old college

roommate).

Thanks again for creating your beautiful film. The beginning and end of the film, with Pat just

looking at the camera was especially poignant. And it was good to see Stan Goff on the screen

again (I first saw him in 2004‘s ―Hijacking Catastrophe‖). And the Tillman family, especially

Richard dropping his F-bombs, were f----ing great (I still like your film‘s original title, ―I‘m Pat

Fucking Tillman‖, it works on several levels, although I think your final choice is most fitting).

[Postscript: WTF! What an obscenity the MPAA gave the film an ―R‖ rating. Fuck them]

During the Q & A session after your film‘s Silver Docs screening, I asked why your film ended

with Congressman Waxman‘s August 2007 hearing. I believe your film‘s account of the cover-

up ended too soon; the cover-up continued through General McChrystal‘s June 10th 2009 Senate

confirmation as the Commander of the Afghan War (and continues to this day).

Unfortunately, I never got the chance to talk with you afterwards. Just before you left the

theatre, I did hand you a binder with an outline of my ―Feral Firefighter‘s Tillman Files.‖ I

regret not pressing to speak with you further; I think we both would have enjoyed sharing our

knowledge of the Tillman story.

. . .

At the end of his April 2007 Tillman hearing, Congressman Waxman says in frustration, ―What

we have is a very clear, deliberate abuse intentionally done. Why is it so hard to find out who

did it?‖ His House Oversight Committee‘s July 2008 final report blamed a ―pervasive lack of

recollection‖ that made it impossible to assign responsibility.

After finally seeing your film, I would still argue that you weren‘t ―hard‖ enough on Congress.

True, your film does portray Congressman Waxman‘s Oversight Committee as ―fumbling‖ in

their questioning and ineptly allowing themselves to be stonewalled by a long series of ―I don‘t

recall‖ by Rumsfeld and top Army generals.

Page 11: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

11

But, it wasn‘t just stonewalling by Bush and the Army. It wasn‘t a lack of Congress‘s courage

or will. It wasn‘t Congress‘s loathing to call Rumsfeld and the Army generals out on their

bullshit. In reality, the Tillman cover-up has been a thoroughly bipartisan affair. The

Democratic Congress didn‘t just ―fumble‖ the ball, they threw the game.

The Army and Bush administration ―handed off‖ its‘ cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly-fire

death to the Democratic Congress and Obama administration. Congressman Waxman‘s House

Oversight Committee‘s 2007 ―investigation‖ was a pro-forma sham. President Obama

nominated Gen. McChrystal to be promoted to the Army‘s highest rank despite apparently

knowing of his key role in the cover-up. Then the Senate held a perfunctory confirmation

hearing for McChrystal‘s before confirming his promotion (and they had held a secret

confirmation hearing in 2008 for McChrystal‘s previous promotion).

The ―untold story‖ is that the Army made General Kensinger the scapegoat for General

McChrystal‘s key role in the cover-up, the Democratic Congress betrayed the Tillman family by

pretending to investigate while they protected McChrystal from public scrutiny, and then

President Obama and the Senate promoted McChrystal to the Army‘s highest rank despite his

complicity in the cover-up:

Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee‘s so-called ―investigation‖ (like the DoD IG

investigation) was not an honest attempt to get at the truth. Despite the concerns raised

by his Committee during their April 2007 hearing about the altered Silver Star witness

statements and falsified award citation, they never looked further into Gen. McChrystal‘s

role, who was at the very center of these actions. They failed to scrutinize General

McChrystal‘s key role in writing the fraudulent Silver Star, altering witness statements,

early knowledge of fratricide, failure to inform the family, and his deceptive P4 memo.

It appears that Waxman‘s Committee acted to shield McChrystal from public scrutiny.

Although McChrystal was ―invited‖ to testify at the August 2007 hearing, McChrystal

―declined‖ and never appeared. Yet, Waxman never explained his absence. [I recently

found a CNN quote that appears to show the Committee held a secret, closed hearing

with McChrystal].

12-28-10 UPDATE: I‘ve placed the full transcript of the CNN 8-01-07 broadcast in

Appendix D3 . Now, although a closed hearing was possibly held, I think it‘s more

probable Barbara Starr was referring to McChrystal‘s interview with the DoD IG.

During Spring 2008, after receiving my April 3rd

letter asking him to help Mary Tillman,

Senator James Webb conducted a secret ―review‖ of McChrystal‘s role in the Tillman

case. Senator James‘s Webb betrayal of the Tillman family cuts me the deepest. I‘ve

trusted his sense of honor for thirty years. If anyone in Congress should have cared, it

would have been him. Webb, as a young Marine veteran, spent 8 years to clear the name

Page 12: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

12

of a dead Marine for his mother‘s sake! I‘m hard on Webb not because I dislike the man,

but that I‘m disillusioned by him. As an old man and politician, he‘s turned into exactly

what he once reviled as a young veteran!

On May 15th 2008, while Mary Tillman was in Washington, D.C. on her book tour, the

Senate Armed Services Committee (headed by Levin and McCain) held a secret

―executive session‖ where McChrystal testified ―in detail about his actions behind closed

doors. Shortly afterwards, the Senate promoted him to Director of the Joint Staff.

The following year, on May 11th 2009, President Obama nominated McChrystal to be his

new commander of the Afghan War despite McChrystal‘s key role in the Tillman cover-

up.

On May 13th

, Obama gave the ASU commencement address at Sun Devil Stadium

without once mentioning Pat Tillman, presumably to avoid embarrassing questions about

his McChrystal nomination.

That same day, Obama back-pedaled on his previous decision to release torture photos,

presumably because some may have shown torture by JSOC forces under McChrystal‘s

command. On May 20th

, Senators Lieberman, Graham, and McCain (working with the

White House) introduced a bill (―The McChrystal Protection Act of 2009‖) to change the

FOIA law to block the release of photos showing detainee abuse. The Senate passed

it the next day.

On June 2nd

2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystal‘s

confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and Afghan war commander.

The hearing was strictly ―pro-forma.‖ Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb didn't press

McChrystal aggressively. The real hearing was held behind closed doors in 2008.

On June 10th

, the Senate confirmed General McChrystal‘s promotion by unanimous

consent after Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made an impassioned plea on the floor.

But, despite General McChrystal‘s key role in the Tillman cover-up, he was barely a

footnote in your film (only mentioned as the P4 memo‘s author, his photo appeared

briefly on a chain of command chart). However, I believe McChrystal is the thread to

pull on, to unravel what you referred to as the ―… unsolved mystery; nobody has ever

really paid a price for what was done to the Tillmans. No one has taken accountability or

made an admission for a deliberate attempt to conceal the truth. This story is not over

yet.‖

. . .

Page 13: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

13

―The Tillman Story‖ will be released on August 20th

. During your Q & A session, you urged the

audience to spread the word to friends and hurry to see the movie, warning that documentary

films don‘t usually have a long run. Hopefully, since much of the Tillman story is unknown to

the general public, your film will be compelling enough to have a decent run on its own merits.

However, as it now stands, your film won‘t create much controversy or ―news.‖ Your film tells

the story of how the Army and the Bush administration used Pat‘s death as a propaganda tool to

promote the war and take the edge off the Abu Gharaib torture scandal. Nothing that hasn‘t been

reported previously (although your film does visually pull the story together). The Republicans

have already dismissed the film as Bush-bashing propaganda and left-wing revisionism. The

Democrats will ―look backwards‖ and point to the evils of the ―past‖ perpetuated by the bad

Bush administration.

You could create controversy and ―news‘ (as a bonus more people will want to see your film and

learn more about the Pat Tillman story) by telling the ―untold story‖ of how the Democratic

Congress & President Obama betrayed the Tillman family. In addition, your film would be seen

as independently bashing both Democrats & Republicans. And, your film would piggy-back on

the recent controversy surrounding General McChrystal‘s recent firing by President Obama.

How could you tell the ―untold story‖? Well, it‘s probably far too late to reopen the film (as you

did for Richard‘s interview) but perhaps the release date could be pushed back to allow for

further edits? Possibly, you could add an ―Epilogue‖ to run at the end of your film? Perhaps

more feasible would be to release some ―extra‖ footage to the media as part of your promotional

efforts prior to the films‘ release? Or, at the very least, you could tell some the ―untold story‖

using your DVD extras.

. . .

During a Fox News interview, you said, ―nobody has ever really paid a price for what was done

to the Tillmans.‖ The release of ―The Tillman Story‖ is your chance to make these politicians

pay a political price. None of ―the higher-ups trying to cover it up‖ will ever pay a price unless

you also tell at least some of the ―untold story.‖

Just before the 2006 mid-term elections, Kevin Tillman published his eloquent letter, ―After

Pat‘s Birthday‖ at truthdig.com:

―Somehow torture is tolerated. … Somehow lying is tolerated. … Somehow faking

character, virtue and strength is tolerated. … Somehow a narrative is more important

than reality. … Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to its people

and illegally invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue and honor of

its soldiers on the ground. … Somehow the same incompetent, narcissistic, virtueless,

Page 14: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

14

vacuous, malicious criminals are still in charge of this country. Somehow this is tolerated.

Somehow nobody is accountable for this.‖

In 2006, Kevin had hoped the election of a Democratic Congress would bring accountability

back to our country. But, just as with warrantless wiretapping and torture, those responsible for

the cover-up of his brother‘s friendly-fire death have never been held accountable for their

actions. As the Obama administration is fond of saying, ―They‘re moving forward, not looking

backward.‖

It‘s not surprising that after the initial fratricide cover-up fell apart, Army officers and the Bush

administration lied to protect their careers. But the Democratic Congress, after they took control

of both Houses of Congress in 2006, could have gone after those responsible. Or at least not

promoted them!

President Obama and the Democratic Congress are responsible for continuing the Bush

administration‘s Tillman cover-up. Those most culpable (including Congressman Waxman,

Senator Webb, Senator McCain, Senator Levin, and President Obama) have not yet paid any

political price for their betrayal of the Tillman family.

But, as your film currently stands, it gives these politicians a ―pass‖ on their role in the cover-up.

. . .

Since I returned home from my DC road trip, I‘ve been working on ―The [Untold] Tillman

Story‖– President Obama & Congress‘s Bipartisan Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‘s

Key Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillman‘s Friendly-Fire Death.‖ Over the past few years,

scattered throughout my ―Tillman Files,‖ I‘ve told the story of the bipartisan Tillman cover-up.

This document attempts to update the story and pull together the story into one place:

―The Tillman Story – Congress‘s Oversight Committee Fumbled the Ball‖ is a partial

―transcript‖ of your film‘s depiction of Secretary of the Army Secretary Geren‘s briefing on the

Wallace Review and Congressman Waxman‘s hearing (obviously it‘s not totally accurate or

using precise quotes since it‘s based only on my recollection of seeing the movie).

―The [Untold] Tillman Story – Congress Didn‘t Fumble, They Threw the Game‖ is my ―script‖

that explains how the Army made General Kensinger the scapegoat for General McChrystal‘s

sins, uses McChrystal‘s own testimony to show his complicity, and describes how Congressman

Waxman‘s ―investigation‖ was a continuation of the Army‘s cover-up. I‘ve broken the script up

into sections using ―prose‖ from my other Tillman Files to give background detail.

―The [Untold] Tillman Story -- Obama‘s Big-Time Fumble‖ is an ―epilogue‖ that describes

events after ―The Tillman Story‖ ends with the August 2007 hearing. It updates the story to the

Page 15: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

15

present day, by showing how President Obama and the Senate have protected General

McChrystal from scrutiny (and promoted him twice).

And, I‘ve also posted my draft Appendices to ―The [Untold] Tillman Story‖ with my working

notes and links to source documents. These Appendices are a work in progress; some are pretty

much completely edited, while others are simply a raw collection of notes.

Page 16: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

16

DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?

Senator James Webb‟s Betrayal of Pat Tillman‟s Family

―Across the room [in my Senate office] … my mother‘s father, B.H. Hodges, stares out at me …

as he has done in every office I have occupied for more than twenty years. … Defiant he was,

and tragic too. He was a fighter, a lonely champion of lost causes who himself lost everything

because of the causes he championed.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Time to Fight‖ (2008)

―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my

pa last night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now.

Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)

―Who had I become? …. A cute-mouthed monkey boy, neither serene nor engaged, who had

simply become accepting. … And I had come to stand for nothing.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―The Emperor‘s General‖ (1999)

―If nothing ever works out all the way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and

your friends and your values, that‘s what‘s left. And your duty to them … They‘re the only

important things in life. … And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong

or right or anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the

judgment of the ages.‖

-- Senator James Webb ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)

Page 17: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

17

“SOMETHING TO DIE FOR”

February 4th 2008 Letter to Mary Tillman

Guy Montag, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com

―I was stronger then, but I am fiercer now. I was so certain of life, and of my place in it. I was

so sure of my love, and of my future. I now have none of those certainties, but at least I can

comprehend pain. I was so ready, so eager to fight and now I pay, richly pay, for having fought.

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Sense of Honor‖ (1981)

―I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was merely

that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one man

while flight could make another man king.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―The Emperor‘s General‖ (1999)

―I guess that‘s what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor and loyalty are traps

with no reward.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Sense of Honor‖ (1981)

Page 18: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

18

February 4th 2008 Letter to Mary Tillman

[Edited & abridged from ―A Sense of Honor‖]

Stan Goff mentioned that you and Narda Zacchino are working together on a memoir about Pat

Tillman. I am writing to suggest you ask Senator James Webb to review your book.

I‘ve been reading James Webb‘s novels for almost 30 years, starting before I enlisted with an

Airborne LRRP unit [SSGT 1983 -1991, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger) 425th

Infantry, MI Army National

Guard]. Webb is a self-proclaimed ―redneck‖ and can be blunt and outspoken. I haven‘t always

agreed with his opinions, especially those concerning the wisdom of the Vietnam War. But it‘s

clear to me that he is a man of integrity and honesty. And for 30 years he has written novels with

themes of betrayal, honor, integrity, and justice.

. . .

Webb's novel, "Something to Die For" (1990), is reminiscent of the cover-up of Pat Tillman's

death. The novel centers on a Marine named Fogarty who fights a mistaken battle in Africa

because of political games by the Secretary of Defense. The nature of his death is covered up.

He's posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor by the President during a nationally televised

state funeral service [see Appendix ―B‖]:

Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be

caught in it. But he was a master dissembler, … Holcomb‘s prepared speech had been

given a ―spin‖ …As a consequence, the remarks were a mix of bald truth, diplomatic

half-truths, and what Holcomb had privately called ―necessary, unconfirmable

distortions.‖ Nonetheless, they would become the government‘s official pronouncement

on the day‘s action. … And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining

beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth. …

―He [Secretary of Defense] knows the administration‘s position on the matter was a

cover-up. Eritrea was a mistake. But it worked. And they didn‘t want the president to

look bad.‖

―God save me from manipulative bureaucrats in polyester-wool suits, button down collars

and power ties, and the kiss ass officers who let them get away with it. I don‘t need to

see my men die because somebody cares more about helping the careers of their fellow

madrigal singers over in the White House or the State Department than they do about the

troops they compromise and misuse in places like Beirut and the Persian Gulf.‖

. . .

Page 19: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

19

James Webb‘s novel ―A Sense of Honor‖ (1981) is a prequel to ―Something to Die For.‖ The

novel takes place during one week at the Naval Academy in 1968. Captain Lenahan is a Marine

officer stationed at the Academy. He and Cadet Fogarty are scapegoated by the brass to cover

their ass [see Appendix ―C‖]:

―I was stronger then, but I am fiercer now. I was so certain of life, and of my place in it.

I was so sure of my love, and of my future. I now have none of those certainties, but at

least I can comprehend pain. I was so ready, so eager to fight and now I pay, richly pay,

for having fought.‖

―Poetry will sustain your emotions. It‘s the lightning rod of the soul. Don‘t be afraid to

be sensitive, just because you‘re a hard-ass.‖ … ‗Nay, whatever comes/One hour was

sunlit and the most high gods/May not make boast of any better thing/Than to have

watched that hour as it passed.‘ There‘s a poem for you. Ezra Pound‖ … He [Lenahan‘s

son] is sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long. He is, in fact,

myself in a matchbox.

. . .

―The Emperor‘s General‖ (1999) is a historical novel that dealt with General MacArthur‘s

―military commission‖ war-crimes trial of Japanese General Yamashita. Webb‘s sympathies lie

with the honorable Yamashita who displayed ―majime, the wisdom and courage to eliminate any

distinctions between his actions and inner thoughts” [see Appendix ―D‖]:

―… what he‘s [General MacArthur] doing is a sham. We‘re Americans, Captain. We‘re

supposedly bringing an accused man into the American system of justice. ... MacArthur‘s

not a lawyer, and this isn‘t a court convened a military commission! It‘s not – a – court.

It‘s his own little creation. … I reminded him that we‘re supposed to be operating under

traditional American concepts of law, such as fairness, decency, and justice. And do you

know what he told me? ―We‘re in a hurry.‖ … Do you realize what this trial – if you

can call it a trial – this illegal, judgeless commission is going to look like? It‘s going to

be nothing but! He‘s a public circus!‖

―The ―trial‖ was finally over. … It was December 6. MacArthur, with his penchant for

anniversaries, had arranged for the verdict to be read to the world during a live, fifteen-

minute radio address on Pearl Harbor Day. … [Frank Witherspoon] filed a petition to the

Supreme Court. …. ―General MacArthur has taken the law into his own hands, is

disregarding the laws of the United States and the Constitution, and has no authority from

Congress or the president.‖ …

Page 20: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

20

―Despite a scathing dissent … the Court declined to intervene in the case. ... since the war would

not be officially over until formal peace documents were signed, MacArthur still retained the

power to convene a military commission ―so long as a state of war exists.‖… ―This indictment

in effect permitted the military commission to make the crime whatever it willed. Such a

procedure is unworthy of our people.‖

. . .

Webb‘s most recent book is ―Born Fighting‖ (2004) a history of the Scots-Irish in America.

The book contains auto-biographical material and hints of Webb‘s independent, populist political

views. I find it poignant that Webb‘s own father opposed him risking his life in Vietnam as a

Marine. Today, perhaps Webb feels the same about his own son in Iraq? [see Appendix ―E‖]:

―My own father [career Air Force colonel], who had defined for me the notion of loyalty,

became disgusted with McNamara‘s ―whiz kids‖ after being assigned to the Pentagon in

1965. … he urged me more than once to go into the navy, find myself a nice ship where I

could, as he so often put it, ―sit in the wardroom and eat ice cream,‖ and not risk myself

as a Marine … my father put in his papers to retire from the air force [after Webb‘s

graduation from Annapolis], telling me he ―couldn‘t bear to watch it‖ while still wearing

a military uniform … this strategically botched war [Vietnam] was not worth my life.‖

. . .

James Webb graduated from the Naval Academy in 1968 and graduated 1st in his Officer Basic

course. He fought in Vietnam, was highly decorated and left the Marines with a bad knee. He

received his law degree from Georgetown University in 1975. Webb has worked as a lawyer,

journalist, and novelist over past 20 years. During the 1980‘s, he was an Assistant Secretary of

Defense for three years and was the Secretary of the Navy (he resigned after serving a year).

If you‘d like to learn more about James Webb, I would suggest you go to his websites:

jameswebb.com and webb.senate.gov. I would also highly recommend reading Robert

Timberg‘s book ―The Nightingale‘s Song‖ (1995). This book defies genres. It is an absorbing

biography/history/political analysis of the Reagan Iran Contra era centered on five Annapolis

graduates: John McCain, John Pointexter, Bud McFarlane, Oliver North, and James Webb.

Webb spoke out against the current Iraq War before it started (and against the first Gulf War as

well). His only son left college to enlist in the Marines is now an infantryman in the Anbar

province of Iraq. Webb has fiercely protected his son‘s privacy and refused all public comment,

even to President Bush [see Appendix ―A‖]:

Page 21: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

21

Last year, Webb narrowly won George Allen‘s Virginia Senate seat and became the Senate‘s 51st

Democratic member (I was happy to see that my paltry campaign contributions helped him to

edge out Allen by 4,000 votes!) Already, the Washington establishment has targeted Webb as a

troublesome maverick. As they well should! (But, I don‘t think the Democrats will be any

happier with him). Webb has always been outspoken and his own man..

If the ―latest and greatest investigation‖ by the Defense Department Inspector General does not

satisfy the Tillman family, I believe James Webb might be interested in assisting the Tillman

family in their battle for the truth. As a Senator on the Armed Services committee, Webb could

possibly push for Senate hearings (Perhaps they might turn out better than last years‘ House

hearings?).

P.S.

In 2004, Webb gave a lecture entitled ―Perspectives of an American Ronin‖ ―A ronin is a

Samurai warrior who has no master except the truth‖. That‘s how I‘ve felt since leaving the

Army in 1991 in disgust over the 1st Gulf War. Perhaps your son Kevin feels the same way?

Page 22: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

22

“A SENSE OF HONOR” April 3rd 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb

Marine & LT James Webb – Vietnam, 1968

Pat and Kevin Tillman – Saudi Arabia, March 2003

―If nothing ever works out all the way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and

your friends and your values, that‘s what‘s left. And your duty to them … They‘re the only

important things in life. … And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong

or right or anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the

judgment of the ages.‖

-- Senator James Webb ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)

Page 23: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

23

April 3rd 2008 Letter to Senator James Webb

[Edited & abridged from ―A Sense of Honor‖]

Four years ago Pat Tillman was killed by ―friendly fire‖ in Afghanistan. Six ―investigations‖ and

two Congressional hearings later, Pat‘s family is still struggling to learn the truth about the

circumstances of his death and those involved in the cover-up of his fratricide.

Mary Tillman, Pat‘s mother, has written a memoir, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: The Life and

Death of Pat Tillman. Her book will be released on April 29th

.

I‘ve read your books for thirty years, starting before my eight years in the Army and continued

my past seventeen years as a firefighter. After recently re-reading your novels, I noticed several

parallels between Pat Tillman‘s fratricide and your novels. I believe you might feel a sense of

kinship with Pat Tillman and his family.

I‘m writing to ask that you consider becoming an advocate in the Senate for Mary Tillman‘s

struggle for the truth. Perhaps you could arrange to meet Mary in May during the Washington

D.C. leg of her national book tour?

. . .

Last year, on April 24, 2007, Kevin and Mary Tillman testified before the House Committee

on Oversight and Reform at a hearing entitled “Hearing on Misleading Information from

the Battlefield.”

Kevin Tillman, Pat‘s brother, began his testimony with a prepared statement:

―Two days ago marked the third anniversary of the death of my older brother, Pat Tillman, in

Afghanistan. To our family and friends, it was a devastating loss. To the nation, it was a moment

of disorientation. To the military, it was a nightmare. But to others within the government, it

appears to have been an opportunity.‖

―Revealing that Pat‘s death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster ... So

the facts needed to be suppressed. … An alternative narrative had to be constructed. Crucial

evidence was destroyed including Pat‘s uniform, equipment and notebook. The autopsy was not

done according to regulation, and a field hospital report was falsified. An initial investigation

completed … before testimony could be changed … [and which hit disturbingly close to the

mark] disappeared into thin air and was conveniently replaced by another investigation with more

palatable findings.‖

―… while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never

used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. … The handling of the situation after the

firefight was described as a compilation of ‗missteps, inaccuracies and errors in judgment which

created the perception of concealment.‘‖

Page 24: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

24

―Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep.

Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an (15-6)

investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment. These are

deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is concealment.‖

Mary Tillman, Pat‟s mother, also testified at that hearing about the fratricide cover-up:

―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your heart they are your

kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. Certainly, we knew they could die or they could

come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him (Pat) the way they did.‖

[Mary wrote: ―… the Army was placed in a position to spin the narrative of Pat‘s death …

(General) Yellen stated it was like, …‘It went up to the 2-star level and the 2-star took it right to

the 4-star level … now all of a sudden, … ‗Here is the steak dinner, but we‘re giving it to you on

this … garbage can cover.‘ You know, ‗You got it. You work it.‘‖]

―And we shouldn‘t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … in every way, they

(Army CID investigators) dodged. They are dodging us, and the (Department of Defense) IG

condoned that even though they make the public believe they did such a grand job because they

pointed the finger at four generals and five other officers. That is a smokescreen. These officers

are scapegoats.‖

―It is a bit disingenuous to think that the (Bush) Administration did not know about what was

going on, something so politically sensitive. … The fact that he (Pat) would be killed by friendly

fire and no one would tell (Defense Secretary) Rumsfeld is ludicrous … … the idea that they

wouldn‘t tell Abizaid (Centcom commander) what was going on if he didn‘t already know is

ridiculous.‖

I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:

The Tillman‘s are of Scots-Irish descent. Pat‘s picture is among those of famous Americans

featured on the cover of Parade Magazine‘s October 3, 2004 issue, entitled ―Can You Guess What

They All Have in Common?‖ (adapted from Born Fighting.)

Military service was prevalent and respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncles were

at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the Korean War.

Mary wrote, ―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s pride in being a Marine.

When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents, feet digging into the soft

leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps Hymn at the top of my lungs.‖

Your own son chose to leave college to enlist with the Marines. Likewise, Pat Tillman chose to

leave a multi-million dollar NFL contract (and new wife) to enlist in the Rangers with his brother

Kevin. Pat didn‘t feel that he ought to remain privileged while others were sent to fight. As his

Page 25: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

25

mother testified, ―Pat had high ideals for the country. He did, and he thought it was imperfect.

He certainly didn‘t join for political reasons. He thought the country was in need. It didn‘t matter

who was in office. It didn‘t matter which party he voted for. That is beside the point. The

country was in need.‖

(Ironically, Pat and Kevin were later sent to fight in Iraq although they had come to believe, in

Pat‘s words, ―This war is so fucking illegal.‖)

Similarly, in Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges said, ―They were only soldiers. They had never owned or

determined the reasons for a war, and they had not asked for this one. They had merely yielded to

their honor and tradition and agreed to fight it. And they were not wrong, not wrong.‖

Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother wrote, ―Pat was

honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about the actions taken in the

aftermath of his death. … He was such a loyal person. He always wanted to do right by the

people who mattered to him.‖ Coach Dave McGinnis said at his memorial service, ―Honor,

integrity, dignity; those weren‘t just adjectives in Pat Tillman‘s life; they were his life. Pat

Tillman was the embodiment of loyalty and commitment.‖

Similarly, in A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, ―If nothing ever works out all the

way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and your friends and your values, that‘s

what‘s left. And your duty to them. … They‘re the only important things in life. … And that the

rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong or right or anything else, but you must

never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the judgment of the ages.‖

Pat Tillman lived his life intensely, led by example, and went all out every play. He was well-

read and an independent thinker. In school, he earned a 3.84 grade-point average. Pat had written

in his journal since he was sixteen years old (his wartime journal was ―lost‖ by the Army

immediately after his death).

Pat Tillman was a character much like Cpt. Lenahan and cadet Fogarty in A Sense of Honor: ―He

is sensitive and fierce, a poet and a warrior, as Irish as the day is long. He is, in fact, myself in a

matchbox.‖

. . .

Over the past thirty years I‘ve read all your books. I started with Fields of Fire as a teenager, and

continued reading your books during my eight years serving in an Airborne LRRP company

[SSGT, 1983 -1991, Co. ―F‖ (Ranger) 425th

Infantry MI Army National Guard] and my past

seventeen years as a firefighter.

After recently re-reading your books, I noticed several parallels between your novels and

Pat Tillman‟s fratricide:

Page 26: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

26

In Something to Die For, Col. Fogarty was ordered to place his Marines into a precarious fight in

Eritrea. This mistaken battle was covered-up by the Secretary of Defense and Fogarty was

posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor by the President during a nationally televised funeral

service:

―He [Secretary of Defense] knows the administration‘s position on the matter was a cover-

up. Eritrea was a mistake. But it worked. And they didn‘t want the president to look

bad.‖

―Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be

caught in it. …As a consequence, the remarks were a mix of bald truth, diplomatic half-

truths, and what Holcomb had privately called ‗necessary, unconfirmable distortions.‘

Nonetheless, they would become the government‘s official pronouncement on the day‘s

action.‖

―And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their

allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth.‖

Similarly, Pat Tillman died as a result of a dangerous order to split his platoon, was posthumously

awarded the Silver Star, and his memorial service was televised with Senator McCain among the

dignitaries offering eulogies. Tillman‘s fratricide was covered-up by Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld, Army generals and the White House.

. . .

In Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges lost three of his men because he was ordered by Lt. Kersey (at the

Battalion command post) to put them out into a dangerous LP:

―LPs on the other side of this wire are crazy as hell. … The rule I use is, would I think it

made any sense if I got sent out on it? And I wouldn‘t. So I don‘t like it.‖

―Now, if the Lieutenant believes the LP shouldn‘t be out there, I suggest he go talk with

the battalion staff.‖

―Hodges did not know how to force his point. ―Can‘t ask for more than having the Big

Six consider it, I reckon.‖

―Bullshit.‖ … ―He (1st Lt. Kersey) ain‘t gonna talk to the Colonel about this. … As long

as he‘s looking good to the Man, he couldn‘t give a rat‘s ass how many people are

bleeding.‖

―He (Lt. Hodges) had met a dozen Kerseys in the Marine Corps already. They held all

ranks, although to him they seemed to be mostly Majors.‖

Lt. Uthlaut was Pat‘s platoon leader. His platoon had been held up by a broken humvee.

Maj. Hodne at the TOC wanted ―boots on the ground by dusk‖ in the village of Manah

merely so he could mark that task accomplished on-time on his checklist. Major Hodne,

Page 27: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

27

through Cpt. Saunders, ordered Lt. Uthlaut to split his platoon. Half would go to Manah,

and half would escort the humvee to the highway for pick-up. Lt. Uthlaut thought it was

dangerous and unnecessary to split his platoon. He repeatedly argued the point with Cpt.

Saunders in the TOC.

Near the end of Fields of Fire, Lt. Hodges is ordered to secure a dangerous perimeter around a

disabled tank. During the ensuing firefight, he is shot in the face and killed:

―Hodges grunted. ―Fucking tank.‖ … Snake shifted his gaze to the treadless tank that had

anchored them in such an indefensible position. It sat like a wounded mastodon in the

middle of the exposed paddy. … The company was digging a perimeter around it, to

protect it.‖

Similarly, Tillman‘s platoon was put into danger by a disabled humvee. During the ―friendly

fire‖ that resulted from splitting his platoon Lt. Uthlaut was hit in the face, his RO shot in the leg,

and Pat Tillman killed by criminally negligent fire by the lead vehicle of the second section

(Tillman was killed by rounds fired from only 35 meters away).

. . .

In A Sense of Honor, Cpt. Lenahan and cadet Fogarty were kicked out of the Naval Academy to

protect their superiors from a ―hazing scandal‖:

―Admiral, I‘ve got a man in trouble on a plebe-indoctrination charge. … My man won‘t

stand a chance.‖

―Do you realize the implications if this gets out, Captain? You were there when these

violations were going on. … If we sided with Fogarty, we could lose the whole plebe

system. … In fact, we‘ve lost more than Fogarty. I‘m afraid you‘ve just become a

casualty yourself. … You get orders out of here before somebody decides to investigate

you.‖

Similarly, Lt. Uthlaut (First Captain, top of his West Point Class) was offered up as a low-ranking

scapegoat and kicked out of the Ranger Battalion for his ―failure‖ to control his platoon during

the ―friendly fire‖ incident. (Captain Saunders and Major Hodne later denied they ordered Lt.

Uthlaut to split his platoon).

. . .

In The Emperor‘s General, Army lawyer Frank Witherspoon railed against the injustice of

General MacArthur‘s war-crimes trial of Japanese General Yamashita:

―… what he‘s [General MacArthur] doing is a sham. We‘re Americans, Captain. We‘re

supposedly bringing an accused man into the American system of justice. … He‘s

convened a military commission! It‘s not – a – court.‖

―I reminded him that we‘re supposed to be operating under traditional American concepts

of law, such as fairness, decency, and justice. … Do you realize what this trial – if you

Page 28: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

28

can call it a trial – this illegal, judgeless commission is going to look like? It‘s going to be

nothing but a public circus! ... why are we wasting our credibility as the United States on

this man?‖

. . .

Kevin Tillman, Pat‘s younger brother, enlisted and fought with Pat in Iraq and Afghanistan. After

Pat‘s death, Kevin refused all interviews and remained silent for 2 ½ years. Just before the

November 2006 elections, Kevin finally broke his silence with a short essay ―After Pat‘s

Birthday‖ (excerpted below):

―It is Pat‘s birthday on November 6, and elections are the day after.‖

―Somehow our elected leaders were subverting international law and humanity by setting

up secret prisons around the world, secretly kidnapping people, secretly holding them

indefinitely, secretly not charging them with anything, secretly torturing them.

…Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few bad apples. Somehow

subversion of the Bill of Rights and The Constitution is tolerated. Somehow suspension

of Habeas Corpus is supposed to keep this country safe.‖

―Somehow the most reasonable, trusted and respected country in the world has become

one of the most irrational, belligerent, feared, and distrusted countries in the world. …

Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to its people and illegally

invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue and honor of its soldiers on

the ground.‖

―Luckily this country is still a democracy. People still have a voice. People still can take

action. It can start after Pat‘s birthday.‖

. . .

“Did they teach you how to lie yet?” (Senator Smith‘s father in A Country Such As This)

Note: Senator Webb‘s great-aunt Lena asked him this question in 1975 after he had finished law

school.

Last summer, on August 1, 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a second

hearing: ―The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew.‖ The

phrase, ―I don‘t recall,‖ was uttered repeatedly by witnesses.

Mary wrote, ―General Brown, retired generals Meyers and Abizaid, and Rumsfeld have great

difficulty remembering what they knew and when they knew it. Someone sitting next to me

whispers, ‗They have collective amnesia.‘ Rumsfeld was asked several times in various ways

when he learned of Pat‘s death, but he couldn‘t recall.‖

Page 29: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

29

Mary continued, ―… we were not happy with the hearing at all. We had spent weeks helping

getting questions prepared and sending information. The Republicans on the committee were at

best indifferent … Most of the Democrats disappointed us as well. They were not prepared and

they didn‘t think on their feet. We expected more from Congress.‖

The White House claimed ―executive branch confidentiality‖ when the House Committee on

Oversight and Reform requested information about their handling of the Tillman fratricide. The

White House refused to release e-mails and documents or to allow White House staff to testify

before the committee.

During the April 24, 2007 hearing, Mary said, ―… Congress is supposed to take care of their

citizens. … Pat died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had a system that

worked. It is not perfect. No one has ever said that. But there is a system in place to allow for it

to work, and your job is to find out what happened to Pat.‖

In A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith argued: ―And no, the military isn‘t just fine. The

point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with human failures.‖

But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-command

(to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense) up to

and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single institution in this

country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army leadership, Congress, White House and

the mainstream media.

Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Something to Die For, hit the nail on the head:

―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the

days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees

before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics

that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they

spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.‖

. . .

Your novels over the past thirty years have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty, and

betrayal. I believe you might feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. Perhaps

you could arrange to meet with Mary Tillman during her May book tour? And perhaps you would

consider becoming an advocate in the Senate for the Tillman family‘s struggle for the truth?

P.S. I was an early supporter of your long-shot ‘06 Senate campaign (from the fall of ‘05

through your election I made six contributions to your campaign). Most satisfying money I‘ve

ever given to a ―lost‖ cause! Perhaps only the ―lost‖ causes are worth fighting for?

Page 30: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

30

“DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?”

Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal,

and Congress‟s Betrayal of Pat Tillman

Marie Tillman (wife), Mary Tillman (mother), Richard Tillman (brother),

Kevin Tillman (brother), Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father) – May 4, 2004 Memorial Service

―… we have all been betrayed. It isn‘t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they

betray all of us.‖ … ―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your

heart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. … we knew they [Pat & Kevin]

could die or they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him the

way they did‖

-- Mary Tillman, Congressional testimony (April 24, 2007)

―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my

pa last night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now.

Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)

Page 31: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

31

Memorial Day 2009 Letter to Senator James Webb [adapted from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?]

Five years ago on Memorial Day weekend, five weeks after he was killed in Afghanistan, Pat

Tillman‘s parents were finally told their son was ―probably‖ killed by friendly fire.

This Memorial Day weekend, the Senate Armed Services Committee has scheduled General

Stanley McChrystal‘s confirmation hearing for June 2nd. Chairman Carl Levin and Senator John

McCain don‘t foresee any problem with his confirmation.

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "We feel terrible for what the Tillman family went

through, but this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by

outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing

by Gen. McChrystal."

However, Pat Tillman‘s parents believe McChrystal played a central role in the cover-up of their

son‘s fratricide. Pat Tillman Sr. said, "I do believe that guy participated in a falsified homicide

investigation.‖ Mary Tillman e-mailed AP, "It is imperative that Lt. General McChrystal be

scrutinized carefully during the Senate hearings."

In the past, Mary Tillman has harshly criticized the actions of General McChrystal. In her book

―Boots on the Ground by Dusk,‖ Mary wrote:

―Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pat‘s death, … he

is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. … His statement [P4 memo]

indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by

fratricide unless forced to do so.‖

And shortly after General Wallace‘s findings were released in July 2007, Mary said:

"That memo [P4] is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is

writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can script

the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is saying we need

to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass themselves, IF the

circumstances of Pat's death should become public‖ … ―He should be saying 'We're going

to have to put a hold to the Silver Star and we're going to have to notify the family [of

suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if he was innocent, but he is not. He is

trying to find a way that they can continue this false, elaborate story of theirs. And the fact

that he is off the hook is atrocious.‖

Page 32: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

32

I believe the Senate Armed Services Committee should postpone General McChrystal‘s

confirmation and take a closer look at McChrystal‘s central role in the Army‘s handling of Pat

Tillman‘s fratricide.

Five years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty of

justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and

handed his fourth star.

. . .

Congress and the senior leadership of the Army have shielded General McChrystal from close

scrutiny and protected him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of

Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:

Last year, you conducted a secret review of General McChrystal‘s role in the Army‘s handling of

the Tillman fratricide at the request of Chairman Levin. On May 15th 2008 the Senate Armed

Services Committee met in ―executive‖ (closed) session to consider McChrystal‘s nomination.

On May 22th 2008, General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee and

promoted to Director of the Joint Staff.

Last year, I spoke with you on the Diane Rhem NPR radio show (May 27th

2008; at 40:56). You

said,

―I went through a fairly thorough review of that process [what happened in the aftermath

of Tillman‘s death] at the request of the Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services

Committee [Senator Levin].‖ … ―the Army knew that this was a friendly fire incident

fairly quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a ceremony to go forward which

implied otherwise… I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in

terms of the chain of command, how it was handled publicly… You cannot help but still

feel angry about how his death was used.‖

I share your anger about how Pat Tillman‘s death was used. But, I don‘t understand why you

were unable to determine ―where responsibility for that decision really lies‖ to cover up Tillman‘s

fratricide. I doubt you actually conducted a ―fairly thorough review‖ of General McChrystal‘s

role. General McChrystal was the central figure in the Army‘s cover up of Tillman‘s friendly fire

death: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days, had the

responsibility to tell the family, made the decision not to tell the family about fratricide, and he

directed the writing of the ―misleading‖ Silver Star award with ―inaccurate statements‖ (and was

one of three Army officers who were in the approval chain that altered the two witness

statements).

. . .

Page 33: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

33

On July 31st 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren presented the findings of General William

Wallace‘s review of the previous Army & Dept. of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) Tillman

investigations. However, Wallace disregarded the IG‘s findings that General McChrystal was

―accountable‖ for the inaccurate Silver Star recommendation and failed to notify the Secretary of

the Army of fratricide. McChrystal received no reprimand for his role in the handling of the

Tillman fratricide. Instead, General Wallace singled out General Kensinger as the scapegoat

responsible for the public believing the Army covered up the Tillman fratricide.

However, Army Secretary Geren and General Cody‘s defense of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up

under scrutiny. General McChrystal was guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was

scapegoated! That is, General McChrystal was responsible to ―inform the family about friendly

fire,‖ failed to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner,‖ failed ―to inform the

acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide investigation,‖ and made

―false official statements.‖

. . .

During 2007, Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee conducted an

investigation and held two hearings on the Tillman fratricide. However, Congressman Waxman‘s

Committee appeared to conduct a half-hearted, pro-forma investigation. Chairman Waxman‘s

decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to only ―look up‖ the chain of command took the

focus off General McChrystal and other Army officers involved in the cover-up. Although

McChrystal was ―invited‖ to testify, he never appeared. [Note: I‘ve recently uncovered a CNN

transcript which suggests that McChrystal may have testified during a secret ―closed‖ hearing

before the Committee]. After raising questions about the Silver Star, they didn‘t look into

McChrystal‘s role in approving the Silver Star with a fraudulent citation, justification and altered

witness statements. The Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ or misleading contents of

General McChrystal‘s P4 memo.

. . .

The Senate Armed Services Committee June 2nd

confirmation of General McChrystal will be the

final layer of the Army and Congressional cover-ups of Pat Tillman‘s death.

During the April 24th 2007 Congressional hearing, Mary said,

―… Congress is supposed to take care of their citizens. … Pat died for this country, and

he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked. It is not perfect. No one

has ever said that. But there is a system in place to allow for it to work, and your job is to

find out what happened to Pat.‖

Page 34: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

34

In your 1983 novel, A Country Such As This, Congressman Judd Smith argued, ―And no, the

military isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with human failures.‖

But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-command

(to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense) up to

and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single institution in this

country has failed the Tillman family, including the Army leadership, Congress, White House and

the mainstream media.

Perhaps Senator Rowland, in your novel, Something to Die For, hit the nail on the head:

―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the

days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees

before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics

that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they

spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.‖

. . .

―Across the room … my mother‘s father, B.H. Hodges, stares out at me … as he has done in

every office I have occupied for more than twenty years. … Defiant he was, and tragic too. He

was a fighter, a lonely champion of lost causes who himself lost everything because of the causes

he championed.‖

-- James Webb, ―A Time to Fight‖ (2008)

Four decades ago, you were drawn into the Randy Herrod case. A Marine patrol was accused of

killing sixteen Vietnam Villagers. Herrod, the patrol leader and veteran of five months, had been

found not guilty. Yet Sam Green, a black eighteen year old with eleven days in Vietnam had

been convicted even though no testimony had been presented that he had actually killed anyone.

From Robert Timberg‘s ―The Nightingale‘s Song‖:

―The case continued to bedevil Webb …. He wanted to help Green, but wasn‘t sure what

he could do. … He joined forces, pro bono, … to try to get the conviction overturned in a

civilian court. … The secretary [of the Navy] declined to act. … About two weeks later, in

August 1975, Webb received a telegram …: TRAGIC CONCLUSION SAM GREEN

DESTROYED HIMSELF.‖

Page 35: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

35

―He had never met Green, spoken to him only once by phone, but he had committed

himself to clearing his name. … He felt helpless, his sense of futility laced with outrage.

Isn‘t any of this going to come out right? … Green was dead, but Webb couldn‘t let the

case go. He … filed an appeal … asking that Green‘s dishonorable discharge be upgraded

to honorable. Webb personally argued the case before the board.‖

―In December 1978, eight years after the shootings and three years after Green‘s suicide,

Webb wrote to Mrs. Green: ―At last, Sam‘s name is cleared.‖ He explained that her son‘s

discharge had been upgraded to a general discharge. … ―This is small solace, I know,‖

wrote Webb, ‗I only regret we were unable to do more for him sooner.‖

. . .

I never met Pat Tillman. I never really knew anything about him until a year and a half after his

death. But, I‘ve taken the cover-ups of his death a bit personally the last few years. Why? I feel

a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman. I‘m not in his league, but I was an Airborne Ranger and an

autodidact and a bit of maverick. And I‘ve always had outrage for injustice and rooted for the

underdog.

I‘ve been bedeviled by the Tillman case. For five years, I haven‘t been able to let the case go. I

hoped this could be one small cause I might be able to make a difference with all the other shit

going on the past few years. It would be nice if this ―letter‖ of mine would make a difference.

. . .

For thirty years your books have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty, and betrayal. Re-

reading your books, I noticed many parallels between your books and the story of Pat Tillman‘s

death. On April 3rd 2008, I sent your office a letter asking you to become an advocate in the

Senate for Mary Tillman‘s struggle for the truth about her son‘s death (I doubt my letter made it

past your Military Affairs gatekeeper Gordon Peterson).

I believed you would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family:

The Tillman‘s are of Scots-Irish descent. Military service was prevalent and respected in

the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncles were at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a

Marine, and her father was a Marine during the Korean War. Mary wrote, ―From the time

I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s pride in being a Marine. When I was three

years old … I would stand between my parents, feet digging into the soft leather of the big

front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps Hymn at the top of my lungs.‖

Page 36: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

36

―Pat Tillman was driven by a core of honesty, integrity, and loyalty. His mother wrote,

―Pat was honest and incorruptible; he would be offended and outraged about the actions

taken in the aftermath of his death. … He was such a loyal person. He always wanted to

do right by the people who mattered to him.‖ Coach Dave McGinnis said at his memorial

service, ―Honor, integrity, dignity; those weren‘t just adjectives in Pat Tillman‘s life; they

were his life. Pat Tillman was the embodiment of loyalty and commitment.‖

Similarly, in A Country Such As This, Senator Judd Smith said, ―If nothing ever works out

all the way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and your friends and your

values, that‘s what‘s left. And your duty to them. … They‘re the only important things in

life. … And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong or right or

anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the

judgment of the ages.‖

Five years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty of

justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, promoted to the

Army‘s highest rank, and handed his fourth star.

But, perhaps you were right years ago in your novel, ―A Sense of Honor,‖ when CPT Lenahan

said, ―I guess that‘s what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor and loyalty are

traps with no reward.‖

. . .

I feel you owe a duty to Pat Tillman and his family. A duty to place a ―hold‖ on General

McChrystal‘s nomination and stop his confirmation on June 2nd.

Yeah, that could be a lost cause. You‘d piss off a lot of people. But, at least you would give Mary

Tillman the small solace of knowing there is one man of integrity in the Senate willing to stand as

her advocate. Someone willing to ―be a lonely champion of lost causes…‖ Perhaps you need to

take a long look at the picture staring at you from your office wall?

You‘ve been a hero to me for three decades, since I was a teenager, through my years as an

Airborne Ranger LRRP, to the present day as a firefighter. I haven‘t always agreed with your

positions on the Vietnam War, etc. But I‘ve never before doubted your integrity. I‘ve always

trusted your sense of honor.

I‘d like to think that, after three years in Congress, you are still able to answer ―No‖ to the

question your great-aunt Lena asked of you in 1975; ―So you‘ve been to law school. Did they

teach you how to lie yet?‖

Page 37: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

37

“THE TILLMAN STORY” SCRIPT:

Congress‟s Oversight Committee Fumbled the Ball

―… there‘s been no culpability on the second half of this tragedy, which is the higher ups trying to

cover it up. … [The Tillman family] ran the ball 99 yards over four years‘ time, they handed it off

at the one-yard line to Congress and they fumbled it. ... ―

-- Amir Bar-Lev, ―The Fog of War‖ (July 20, 2010)

Page 38: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

38

Congress‟s Oversight Committee Holds Tillman Fratricide Hearing

NARRATOR: On April 24th 2007, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee

held their hearing on the ―Misleading Information from the Battlefield‖ that followed the death of

Pat Tillman. Chairman Henry Waxman began with his opening remarks.

CHAIRMAN WAXMAN: ―News of the fratricide flew up the chain of command within

days, but the Tillman family was kept in the dark for more than a month. … Evidence was

destroyed. Witness statements were doctored … The least we owe to our courageous men

and women who are fighting for our freedom is the truth, and that is what we are going to

insist on in this hearing and in our subsequent examination and investigation.‖

NARRATOR: Kevin Tillman, Pat‘s brother who served in the same Ranger platoon with Pat in

Iraq & Afghanistan, harshly criticized the March 26, 2007 DoD Inspector General report.

KEVIN TILLMAN: ―Revealing that Pat‘s death was a fratricide would have been yet

another political disaster ... So the facts needed to be suppressed. … An alternative

narrative had to be constructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pat‘s uniform,

equipment and notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field

hospital report was falsified. An initial investigation completed … before testimony could

be changed … [and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and

was conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings.‖

―… while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was

never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. … The handling of the

situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of ‗missteps, inaccuracies and

errors in judgment which created the perception of concealment.‘‖

―Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep.

Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an

(15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment.

These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is

concealment.‖

―… the fact that the Army, and what appears to be others, attempted to hijack his virtue

and his legacy is simply horrific. The least this country can do for him in return is to

uncover who is responsible for his death, who lied and covered it up, and who instigated

those lies and benefited from them. Then, ensure that justice is meted out to the

culpable.‖

Page 39: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

39

NARRATOR: Mary Tillman, Pat Tillman‘s mother, also testified:

―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your heart they are

your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. Certainly, we knew they could die or

they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him (Pat) the

way they did.‖

―And we shouldn‘t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … in every way,

they [Army CID investigators] dodged. They are dodging us, and the [Department of

Defense] IG condoned that even though they make the public believe they did such a

grand job because they pointed the finger at four generals and five other officers. That is

a smokescreen. These officers are scapegoats.‖

―It is a bit disingenuous to think that the [Bush] Administration did not know about what

was going on, something so politically sensitive. … The fact that he (Pat) would be killed

by friendly fire and no one would tell [Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld is ludicrous … … the

idea that they wouldn‘t tell [Gen.] Abizaid [Centcom commander] what was going on if he

didn‘t already know is ridiculous.‖

―… we have all been betrayed. It isn‘t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier,

they betray all of us … and that is why we are in front of Congress, because Congress is

supposed to take care of their citizens. … Pat died for this country, and he believed it was

a great country that had a system that worked. … and your job is to find out what

happened to Pat.‖

Army Made Gen. Kensinger the Scapegoat for “Perfect Storm of Mistakes”

NARRATOR: On July 31st 2007 the Army presented the findings of Gen. Wallace‘s Review of

the Tillman investigations. During a press briefing, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren laid most

of the blame for the Army‘s ―perfect storm of mistakes‖ onto Gen. Kensinger.

SEC. GEREN: ―For casualty notification, safety investigation and administrative control

of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, General Kensinger was the captain of that

ship, and his ship ran aground. It ran aground because he failed to do his duty.‖

REPORTER: ―You've described a litany of errors and mistakes going more than three

years involving a lot of people, yet all the blame falls on General Kensinger. I'm just

trying to make some sense of that‖ … ―He happens to be retired. Is there a coincidence

there? … Lots of people did lots of things wrong it seems, but he's the only one who's

really being singled out with the harshest punishment.‖

Page 40: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

40

MARY TILLMAN: ―It is disturbing to me that the Army keeps blaming Gen. Kensinger

for the fact we weren‘t notified. I think Kensinger is culpable to a point, but he is not the

ultimate bad guy. He would not have been the one to make the decision not to tell us. …

the cover-up wouldn‘t start at the three-star level‖

[Pan up chain of command organizational chart, brief glimpse of Gen. McChrystal‘s

portrait on the chart as the view moves up to President Bush at the top]

Did the Tillman Cover-Up Go All the Way Up to the White House?

NARRATOR: ―Several days after the March 26, 2007 Dept. of Defense Inspector General (DoD

IG) briefing, an AP reporter was anonymously sent a copy of a P4 memo sent by Gen.

McChrystal on April 29, 2004. His P4 memo warned top generals to inform the President about

the fratricide to avoid ―unknowing statements by our country‘s leaders which might cause public

embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman‘s death become public.‖

[Pan P4 Memo Text]

NARRATOR: ―Did the President receive this P4 message? Well, two days after the P4 memo

was sent, President Bush delivered his speech at the White House Correspondents‘ Dinner. As

the P4 advised, the President did not discuss how Corporal Tillman died.‖

[Video of President Bush delivering speech during May 1st WH Correspondents‘ Dinner]

Oversight Committee Stone-Walled by Rumsfeld & Generals

NARRATOR: ―On August 1st 2007 the House Oversight Committee ineptly questioned several

top Army generals and former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about when they received the P4

memo and what action they took after reading it.‖

CHAIRMAN WAXMAN: ―We are also grateful that General Myers and Secretary

Rumsfeld ... are here to testify. And we are pleased that you have taken this

opportunity to be with us … and certainly in the case of Secretary Rumsfeld, who went to

great pains to be here. And I appreciate the fact that he did come. …‖

[Generals and Rumsfeld using some variation of ―I don‘t recall]

Page 41: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

41

Chairman WAXMAN. ―OK. Well, let me conclude the hearing by indicating the facts that

General Myers and General Brown knew about the friendly fire issue at the end of April.

General Abizaid learned on May 6th. Secretary Rumsfeld learned on May 20th. All of

these are the senior leaders that knew before the public and the family——

Mr. RUMSFELD. ―Could I correct that? … I want to make sure this is precisely accurate.

I do not believe I testified that I learned on May 20th, … My testimony is that I do not

recall; … —I just simply do not know …‖

General ABIZAID. And, sir, if I may, I also wanted to make sure that the 6th is a logical

day. It is not ‗‗the‘‘ day; the day is somewhere between 10 and 20 days after the event. It‘s

the best that my staff and I could come to a conclusion on at this point.

Chairman WAXMAN. You were all very busy. There is no question about it.

General BROWN. Sir, one other thing, if I could interrupt also to correct. Your statement

was that I knew about the friendly fire, I knew that there was an investigation ongoing, the

potential for friendly fire.

General MYERS. That goes for me, too. General ABIZAID. And for me, as well.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, you all knew or didn‘t know within that timeframe. … The

System didn‘t work, errors were made – but that‘s too passive. Somebody should be

responsible.‖

The Tillman Family Expected Some “Oversight” from Congress

MARY TILLMAN: ―Yes, … someone should be responsible. … We have been let down.

… the Republicans on the committee were at best indifferent … most of the Democrats

disappointed us as well. Their performance is not what it was in April. They were not

prepared and they are unable to think on their feet. We expected more from Congress.‖

PATRICK TILLMAN: ―I expected ‗oversight‘ from Congress‘s Oversight Committee.‖

MARY TILLMAN: ―After more than three years of … persistent pushing to get answers,

our family has twice been heard before a congressional committee. … We‘ve done all we

can do …‖

NARRATOR: ―The Tillman family did all they could do to uncover the truth. But no one has

ever paid a price for using Pat Tillman‘s death as a propaganda tool to support the war effort.‖

[Rumsfeld leaves hearing, gets in his limo, and drives away … Capitol Building at night]

Page 42: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

42

“THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY”

Congress Didn‟t Fumble, They Threw the Game

House Oversight Committee Chairman Henry Waxman (August 1, 2007)

Army Secretary Geren & Gen. Cody (July 31, 2007) Sec. Rumsfeld, Gen. Meyers, Abizaid, and Brown (August 1, 2007)

"There is another man [besides Gen. Kensinger] who will not be in the room. That is Lieutenant

General Stan McChrystal. It should be very clear to everyone, General McChrystal is the head of

covert special forces. The so-called dark or black forces. The ones who stay undercover ...

Because of his extraordinarily sensitive position with covert special forces, he is not appearing in

public. And so he will not be questioned further by the committee in an open hearing.‖

-- Barbara Starr, CNN correspondent, (CNN, Aug. 1, 2007)

Page 43: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

43

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 24th 2007, the House Oversight and Reform Committee held the ―Hearing on

Misleading Information from the Battlefield‖. Ranger O‘Neal testified that his Silver Star

witness statement had been altered. Chairman Waxman concluded, ―It wasn‘t misleading

information. We have false information that was put out to the American people, stories that were

fabricated.‖

Pat Tillman‘s brother, Kevin, testified:

―The handling of the situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of

―missteps, inaccuracies and errors in judgment which created the perception of

concealment‖…. Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken

is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep.

… Discarding an (15-6) investigation that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an

error in judgment. These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of

concealment. This is concealment‖

However, following the hearing, instead of exercising oversight by looking ―down‖ at the Army‘s

investigations (e.g. questioning the officers involved in writing the fraudulent Silver Star

package), Chairman Waxman decided to pursue a very narrow focus and only look ―up‖ the chain

of command to determine what the top officials at the White House and the Defense Department

knew about Tillman‘s fratricide.

. . .

On July 31st 2007, Army Secretary Pete Geren presented the results of General Wallace‘s Review.

Wallace singled out General Kensinger as the primary reason many people believe the Army

covered up Tillman‘s fratricide. However, I believe General Kensinger was merely the scapegoat

for the sins of the Army and Bush administration. I would argue that General McChrystal was

just as guilty of the same charges for which Kensinger was singled out: despite having early

knowledge of fratricide he failed to tell the family, he failed to inform his change of command

(Army Secretary) about fratricide, and he made false official statements in his congressional

testimony and his Silver Star recommendation.

. . .

On August 1st 2007, the Committee held their last hearing, ―The Tillman Fratricide: What the

Leadership of the Defense Department Knew.‖ Chairman Waxman focused on a ―Personal For‖

[P4] message that MG McChrystal sent on April 29th

2004 and sought to find out how and when

Page 44: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

44

the top military leadership learned about fratricide. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and

three retired generals (Meyers, Abizaid, and Brown) testified.

Mary Tillman wrote in her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk‖:

―General Brown, retired generals Meyers and Abizaid, and Rumsfeld have great difficulty

remembering what they knew and when they knew it. Someone sitting next to me

whispers, ‗They have collective amnesia.‘‖ … ―we were not happy with the hearing at all.

We had spent weeks helping getting questions prepared and sending information. The

Republicans on the committee were at best indifferent … Most of the Democrats

disappointed us as well. They were not prepared and they didn‘t think on their feet. We

expected more from Congress.

Although McChrystal had been ―invited‖ to testify at the hearing, he never appeared. The

Committee acted to shield McChrystal from public scrutiny of his actions by either permitting

him to ―decline‖ to testify or by having him testify during a secret, closed hearing.

General Kensinger was also invited to the hearing, but evaded a subpoena. However, he was later

interviewed by the Committee. General McChrystal was invited, but never appeared. For some

reason, he was never interviewed at a later time despite his key role in directing the writing of the

fraudulent Silver Star and P4 memo.

After the hearing, despite once again raising the issue of the fraudulent Silver Star citation and

altered witness statements, the Committee never followed up by questioning those in ―the

approval chain‖ who were accountable: COL Nixon, LTC Kauzlarich, and MG McChrystal.

. . .

Almost a year after their last Tillman hearing, on July 14th

2008, Congressman Henry Waxman‘s

House Oversight & Reform Committee finally issued their report ―Misleading Information from

the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes‖ which concluded, ―The pervasive lack of

recollection and absence of specific information makes it impossible for the Committee to assign

responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal Tillman‘s and Private Lynch‘s cases…‖

. . .

Overall, it appears Waxman‘s Oversight & Reform Committee held a perfunctory ―pro forma‖

investigation into the handling of the Tillman fratricide which served to protect McChrystal (and

others) from close scrutiny of his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide:

Chairman Waxman narrowed the scope of his investigation to exclude examination of

McChrystal, permitted him to refuse to testify at the hearing, and never interviewed

McChrystal despite his central role in the handling of the Tillman fratricide.

Page 45: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

45

After raising questions about the Silver Star award during their first hearing, they didn‘t

probe further into the false narrative of the Silver Star package and altered witness

statements

Waxman‘s Committee never questioned the ―timeliness‖ of General McChrystal‘s P4

memo. Although McChrystal was informed of confirmed fratricide just two days after

Tillman‘s death, he decided not to inform the Tillman family.

The Committee never took a hard look at the contents, and forthrightness of

McChrystal‘s misleading P4 memo or McChrystal‘s role in approving the Silver Star

package containing a fraudulent citation, justification and altered witness statements.

It‘s particularly puzzling the Committee failed to interview General McChrystal and

closely scrutinize him despite his central position in the handling of Tillman‘s fratricide

between the Ranger RGT officers and the senior Army leadership.

. . .

Why did the House Oversight Committee protect General McChrystal from scrutiny? Perhaps the

Congressional leadership told them to give McChrystal a ―free pass‖ because he was a rising star

in the Army whose JSOC operations were considered indispensable to the 2007 Iraq ―Surge‖

effort? (In ―State of Denial‖ President Bush told Bob Woodward that ―JSOC is awesome!) And

as with other issues such as warrantless wiretapping and torture, the Administration is ―looking

forward, not backward.‖

Page 46: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

46

“MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE

BATTLEFIELD”

House Oversight Committee Hearing, April 24th 2007

Ranger Bryan O‘Neal testifying before Congress (April 24, 2007)

Patrick Tillman, Sr. & Kevin Tillman (April 24, 2007) Mary Tillman before Congress (April 24, 2007)

―… Pat died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had a system that

worked. … And we shouldn‘t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … it is a

betrayal, but it is not just a betrayal to us, … and that is why we are in front of Congress because

Congress is supposed to take care of their citizens.‖

-- Mary Tillman, Congressional Hearing (April 24, 2007)

Page 47: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

47

“Misleading Information from the Battlefield” House Oversight Committee Hearing, April 24th 2007

On April 24th 2007, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held a hearing on

the ―Misleading Information from the Battlefield‖ that followed the death of Pat Tillman in

Afghanistan. Among the witnesses who testified were Mary Tillman, Kevin Tillman, Dept. of

Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) Thomas Gimble, and Army Ranger Bryan O'Neal.

Note: The following summary is based upon Appendix B1 -- House Oversight Committee‘s 1st

Tillman Hearing (April 24, 2007). Go there for full quotes and commentary.

Tillman Family Says that the Army and DoD IG Threw “Smokescreens” in Their Faces:

Kevin Tillman criticized the Army and Dept. of Defense IG investigations saying, ―… while each

investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an

honest or even sensible conclusion … These are deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the

perception of concealment. This is concealment.‖

Mary Tillman said, ―And we shouldn‘t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … in

every way, they [Army CID investigators] dodged. They are dodging us, and the [Department of

Defense] IG condoned that … It is a bit disingenuous to think that the [Bush] Administration did

not know about what was going on, something so politically sensitive. …and your job is to find

out what happened to Pat.‖

Did Early Word of Tillman‟s Fratricide Reach the White House?

IG Gimble testified that word of Tillman‘s fratricide started up the chain of command ―within the

next day‖ and that COL Nixon told MG McChrystal of fratricide on April 23rd

. IG Gimble laid

the blame for the failure to notify the Tillman family upon COL Nixon for keeping the fratricide

information ―close hold.‖

On April 29th

2004, a P4 memo was sent by MG McChrystal to three high ranking generals. The

P4 warns: ‗It is highly possible that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire‘ and the

President . . . ‗might include comments about Corporal Tillman‘s heroism and his approved Silver

Star medal in speeches currently being prepared, not knowing the specifics surrounding his

death.‘ Mary Tillman said she didn‘t think ―that these generals acted on their own‖ and that

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ―would have received this information‖ about Pat‘s

fratricide from the P4 memo.

Page 48: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

48

The Committee asked IG Gimble if the P4 memo made it to the White House. Gimble replied,

―We think the P4 memo stopped with the three generals that were on it.‖ However, Gimble

mentioned that any White House response would have been through ―… the Public Affairs chain

of command, … and that wasn‘t really a part of what we were looking at.‖

IG Gimble “Unable” to Find Out Who Falsified the Silver Star Witness Statements:

Mary Tillman said, ―I think that the Silver Star has been focused on a great deal, and one reason

that has been the case is because it leaves a paper trail. It is not the most outrageous lie or cover-

up that is part of this story, but it does leave a paper trail.‖

Kevin Tillman said, ―To falsify a witness statement in a Silver Star award, fabricating it with

these kids‘ names on it, that is an example of something that it is sitting right here. Why isn‘t it

addressed in the conclusion? How come no one is held accountable for this? The whole thing is

riddled with nonsense, sir.‖

Congressman Clay pointed out that the Silver Star citation was written so that anyone reading it

would ―believe that Pat was killed in a firefighter with enemy forces‖ and ―there is nothing in

here at all about friendly fire.” Ranger O‘Neal testified that someone had altered his Silver Star

witness statement, removing his references to friendly fire and adding references to ―devastating

enemy fire‖.

When asked ―who would have been the most likely person to have made alterations,‖ IG Gimble

replied, ―We were unable to determine who in the chain of command actually did the alterations

of it. I could speculate, but I just prefer not to. It is somewhere in the approval chain that it got

edited. ‖

Predator Drone Footage of Tillman Firefight was “Lost” by the Army:

Congressman Honda asked General Johnson about the Predator footage of the Tillman firefight.

Johnson replied, ―there was no Predator records of that particular point on the battlefield.‖

However, it‘s quite interesting that CNAS‘s Andrew Exum began his Washington Post book

review of Jon Krakauer‘s book, ―Where Men Win Glory,‖ with a personal account of how he saw

the Predator feed of the Tillman firefight at Bagram AFB on the evening of April 22nd.

Ironically, Exum‘s hostile review lambasted what he called ―conspiracy theories‖ while his own

eyewitness account lends support to the notion that the Army destroyed evidence of fratricide!

Page 49: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

49

Guy Montag‟s Response to Committee‟s April 24th

2007 Hearing

Chairman Waxman concluded his April 24th

hearing by saying, ―… It wasn‘t misleading

information. We have false information that was put out to the American people … These aren‘t

things that are done by mistake. … Why is it so hard to find out who is responsible and to hold

them accountable?‖

1.) Well, the White House and the Dept. of Defense certainly bear the blame for stonewalling the

Committee. After the hearing, Chairman Waxman sent letters to the White House and Dept. of

Defense asking them for documents about the circumstances of Tillman‘s death. But, both the

White House and Dept. of Defense withheld most of the relevant documents from the Committee:

―the White House could not produce a single e-mail or document relating to any discussion about

Corporal Tillman‘s death by friendly fire.‖ And, to Chairman Waxman‘s credit, he at least asked

for Public Affairs (PA) documents, something that IG Gimble said ―wasn‘t really a part of what

we were looking at.‖

2.) However, the Committee wasn‘t sufficiently skeptical of the IG report conclusions. It‘s

important to note that the findings and evidence in the IG report don‘t always agree with their

conclusions (As Kevin Tillman said, ―the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an

honest or even sensible conclusion.‖) For example, IG Gimble‘s report blamed COL Nixon for

his failure to notify the family of fratricide. But the Committee failed to notice that MG

McChrystal also had early knowledge of fratricide, the responsibility to notify the family, and yet

failed to do so. McChrystal even admitted he ―made a conscious decision‖ not to tell. And the

IG Timeline‘s account of when Nixon told McChrystal doesn‘t match Gimble‘s testimony.

3.) The Committee failed to press IG Gimble to ―speculate‖ on who altered the Silver Star witness

statements even though Chairman Waxman concluded,‖ These things aren‘t done by mistake.‖

There were only three officers involved in the ―approval chain,‖ the same three who Gimble

found made ―inaccurate statements‖ in the Silver Star citation; LTC Kauzlarich, COL Nixon, and

MG McChrystal. Yet, the Committee never subpoenaed those three officers to testify in detail

about their falsified Silver Star recommendation package

4.) The Committee failed to question the timeliness of MG McChrystal‘s P4 memo. Athough

Gimble said MG McChrystal had been informed of fratricide on April 23rd

, McChrystal

supposedly waited six days, until the 29th

to finally send his P4 memo to ―warn‖ his chain of

command of fratricide. (In actuality, he probably just picked up the phone on the 23rd

, certainly

by the 24th

when he received verbal confirmation from the initial 15-6 investigating officer).

Page 50: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

50

Congress‟s Hearing Reveals Army Gave Out “False Information”

NARRATOR: On April 24th 2007, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee

held their hearing on the ―Misleading Information from the Battlefield‖ that followed the death of

Pat Tillman in Afghanistan. Chairman Henry Waxman began with his opening remarks.

CHAIRMAN WAXMAN: ―News of the fratricide flew up the chain of command within

days, but the Tillman family was kept in the dark for more than a month. … Evidence was

destroyed. Witness statements were doctored … The least we owe to our courageous men

and women who are fighting for our freedom is the truth, and that is what we are going to

insist on in this hearing and in our subsequent examination and investigation.‖

[p.1, HOC 4-24-07]

NARRATOR: Kevin Tillman, Pat‘s brother who served in the same Ranger platoon with Pat on

tours in Iraq & Afghanistan, criticized the March 26, 2007 DoD Inspector General report:

KEVIN TILLMAN: ―Revealing that Pat‘s death was a fratricide would have been yet

another political disaster ... So the facts needed to be suppressed. … An alternative

narrative had to be constructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pat‘s uniform,

equipment and notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field

hospital report was falsified. An initial investigation completed … before testimony could

be changed … [and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and

was conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings.‖

―… while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was

never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. … The handling of the

situation after the firefight was described as a compilation of ‗missteps, inaccuracies and

errors in judgment which created the perception of concealment.‘ … Writing a Silver Star

award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier

witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. … Discarding an (15-6) investigation

that does not fit a preordained conclusion is not an error in judgment. These are

deliberate acts of deceit. This is not the perception of concealment. This is concealment.‖

―… the fact that the Army, and what appears to be others, attempted to hijack his virtue

and his legacy is simply horrific. The least this country can do for him in return is to

uncover who is responsible for his death, who lied and covered it up, and who instigated

those lies and benefited from them. Then, ensure that justice is meted out to the

culpable.‖ [p.16, HOC 4-24-07]

Page 51: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

51

NARRATOR: Mary Tillman, Pat Tillman‘s mother, also testified about the ―smokescreens‖

thrown in her face by the Army ―investigations‖:

―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your heart they are

your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. Certainly, we knew they could die or

they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him (Pat) the

way they did.‖

―And we shouldn‘t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … in every way,

they (Army CID investigators) dodged. They are dodging us, and the (Department of

Defense) IG condoned that even though they make the public believe they did such a

grand job because they pointed the finger at four generals and five other officers. That is

a smokescreen. These officers are scapegoats.‖

―It is a bit disingenuous to think that the (Bush) Administration did not know about what

was going on, something so politically sensitive. … The fact that he (Pat) would be killed

by friendly fire and no one would tell (Defense Secretary) Rumsfeld is ludicrous … … the

idea that they wouldn‘t tell [Gen.] Abizaid [Centcom commander] what was going on if he

didn‘t already know is ridiculous.‖

―… we have all been betrayed. It isn‘t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier,

they betray all of us … and that is why we are in front of Congress, because Congress is

supposed to take care of their citizens. … Pat died for this country, and he believed it was

a great country that had a system that worked. … and your job is to find out what

happened to Pat.‖ [p.59, HOC 4-24-07]

. . .

CHAIRMAN WAXMAN: ―Our hearing today has been about two cases, the Tillman case and

the Lynch case, … It wasn‘t misleading information. We have false information that was put out

to the American people, stories that were fabricated and made up. In the case of Specialist

O‘Neal, his statement was doctored. It was actually rewritten by somebody. These aren‘t things

that are done by mistake. There had to be a conscious intent to put a story out and keep with that

story and eliminate evidence to the contrary and distort the record. … What we have is a very

clear, deliberate abuse intentionally done. Why is it so hard to find out who did it? Why is it so

hard to find out who is responsible and to hold them accountable?‖ (p.109, HOC 4-24-07)

Page 52: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

52

News of Fratricide Rapidly Went Up the Chain of Command

NARRATOR: IG Gimble said that news of Tillman‘s fratricide rapidly went up the chain of

command, within the next day, on April 23rd

.

Mr. SARBANES: ―The most interesting thing to me is we have already heard testimony

that very quickly the word of this being a friendly fire incident started going up the chain.

Is that correct?‖…

Mr. GIMBLE. ―Within the next day.‖ (p.104, HOC 4-24-07)

Chairman WAXMAN: ―Mr. Gimble, according to your report, on April 23rd, Sergeant

Fuller and Sergeant Birch told Captain William Saunders and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey

Bailey that they suspected fratricide … You also found that Colonel Bailey then told

Colonel James Nixon who in turn told Major General Stanley McCrystal, Commander of

the Joint Task Force, is that right?‖

Mr. GIMBLE. ―Right.‘ (p.94, HOC 4-24-07)

Note: But IG Gimble‘s testimony contradicts the timeline in his own report that asserts that COL

Nixon did not tell MG McChrystal about fratricide on the 23rd, only KIA. See ―General

McChrystal & General Abizaid Gave Contradictory Testimony at Congressional Hearings‖ for

more detailed evidence that McChrystal and/or Abizaid perjured themselves.

. . .

NARRATOR: IG Gimble laid the blame for the Army‘s failure to tell the Tillman family about

fratricide on COL Nixon. But MG McChrystal said he had made a ―conscious‘ decision to not

tell the family. Why wasn‘t McChrystal held accountable as well?

Mr. GIMBLE: ―With regard to the notification of CPL Tillman‘s next of kin, DoD and

Army regulations require that next of kin be advised of additional information concerning

a Service member‘s death as the information becomes available. In this case, … [his

family were not told ] until 35 days after his death. This was a result of the decision of

CPL Tillman‘s regimental commander [COL Nixon] to keep information about the

friendly fire investigation ―close hold.‖ (p.5, Gimble 4-24-07)

. Mrs. MARY TILLMAN: ―General Jones, when he interviewed General McCrystal for his

[15-6] investigation, he asked, … ‗once you became aware that this was possible

fratricide, was there a conscious decision made not to tell the family of the possibility?‘ …

Page 53: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

53

General McCrystal answers, ‗there was a conscious decision on who we told about the

potential [fratricide] because we did not know all the facts. … I believe that we did not tell

the family of the possibility because we did not want to give them some half-baked

finding.‘ But the irony is that is exactly what they did. They made up a story. … you are

supposed to tell the family right away if you suspect fratricide, period. It is not nebulous

as Colonel Nixon said. It is not nebulous at all. You simply tell the family you suspect it.

Then you can investigate. Then you can give the family your conclusions. So the idea

that they were trying to protect us by not telling us until the investigation took place is

ridiculous.‖

(p.62, HOC 4-24-07)

Note: The DoDIG Report Appendix D: Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification

Flowchart shows that McChrystal both knew about fratricide and was responsible to tell the

family. Yet the IG conclusions don‘t hold McChrystal accountable for his failure, only Nixon.

. . .

Note: It‘s important to realize the IG report Conclusions sometimes contradict their own findings

and process flowcharts! It appears that Nixon and Kensinger‘s wrongdoing was emphasized, and

McChrystal‘s role omitted by the IG, even though McChrystal was the man in the middle of the

reporting chain!

For example, the IG found that ―COL Nixon failed to initiate, through his chain of command,

timely notification to the Army Safety Center and CENTCOM of suspected friendly fire‘ (p.59)

However, the IG neglected to mention that Nixon did tell McChrystal of fratricide on the 23rd

.

McChrystal was responsible for then notifying Abizaid (CENTCOM), not Nixon

Also, ―COL Nixon was accountable for his decision to delay notification to the primary next of

kin until the completion of the friendly fire investigation.‖ (p. 60). Yet, once again, the IG report

neglected to mention that Nixon did tell McChrystal of fratricide on the 23rd

. McChrystal was

then responsible for passing the supplementary casualty report on to Kensinger at USASOC.

Further, McChrystal even testified in the Jones 15-6 that he made the decision not to notify the

family of fratricide!

After being notified of fratricide on the 23rd

, supposedly McChrystal failed to immediately notify

Abizaid (as discussed in the following section, McChrystal claims he waited a week until he tried

to notify Abizaid with the P4). Yet the IG conclusions do not fault McChrystal. Instead, they

blame Nixon and Kensinger for delaying notification to the next of kin. In actuality, McChrystal

promptly passed up probable fratricide on the 23rd

and confirmation on the 24th

to Abizaid.

Either Abizaid or McChrystal lied in Congressional testimony about when they learned about the

fratricide.

Page 54: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

54

The Silver Star Citation and Witness Statements were Falsified

NARRATOR: Congressman Clay pointed out that the Silver Star citation was written so that

anyone reading it would believe Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire:

Mr. Clay. ―Now, Mrs. Tillman, I want to turn now to Pat‘s Silver Star award. … The

certificate says that Pat Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire. It also

says that Corporal Tillman was mortally wounded while under fire that resulted in the

platoon‘s safe passage. Mrs. Tillman, there is nothing in here at all about friendly fire, is

there?‖

Mrs. MARY TILLMAN. ―No. No, there is not, sir. They are very careful to stay away

from that.‖

Mr. CLAY. ―So anyone who reads this, including you, would believe Pat was killed in a

firefight with enemy forces, isn‘t that right?‖

Mrs. MARY TILLMAN. ―Yes, sir.‖ (p.51, HOC 4-24-07)

NARRATOR: Ranger O‘Neal testified that someone had altered his witness statement that was

used to justify the Silver Star recommendation package:

Mr. BRALEY. ―… In addition to being an eyewitness to Corporal Tillman‘s death and

reporting this incident up the chain of command, you were also involved in writing a

statement that was used to award Corporal Tillman the Silver Star …‖

Mr. O‘NEAL. ―What happened, sir, was I got sat behind a computer, and I was told to

type up my recollection of what happened, and as soon as I was done typing, I was

relieved to go back to my platoon, sir, and that was the last I heard of it.‖

Mr. BRALEY. ―This version of the statement also says you ‗‗engaged the enemy very

successfully,‘‘ that the enemy moved most of their attention to your position which ‗‗drew

a lot of fire from them.‘‘ Did you write these sentences, claiming that you were engaged

with the enemy?‖

Mr. O‘NEAL. ―No, sir.‖ (p.95, HOC 4-24-07)

Page 55: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

55

NARRATOR: But, Mr. Gimble, the Dept. of Defense Acting Inspector General, preferred not to

―speculate‖ on who altered the witness statements. However, he did say that ―it was somewhere

in the approval chain that it got edited.‖

Mr. GIMBLE. ―… We were unable to determine who in the chain of command actually

did the alterations of it. So we concluded that when people approved those statements or

those citations based on those statements, being the Battalion [LTC Bailey], Regimental

[COL Nixon] and Joint Task Force [MG McChrystal] Commanders, that they were

accountable for the misstatements and inaccuracies.‖

Mr. BRALEY. ―Did you ever determine in the course of your investigation who, out of

all the possible people who had contact with that statement, would have been the most

likely person to have made alterations to the statement originally prepared by Specialist

O‘Neal?‖

Mr. GIMBLE: ―Actually, no, we could not determine that. I could speculate, but I just

prefer not to. It is somewhere in the approval chain that it got edited. So we really can‘t

pin a face to the actual, who did the keyboard changes on it. So that left us the only action

we had after that is when you sign up on something. … So when you have the signatures

on those citations and recommendations, they become accountable for it.‖

(p.98, HOC 4-24-07)

. . .

NARRATOR: The IG couldn‘t determine who made the alterations? There were only three

people in the ―approval chain‖ who could have made the alterations to the Silver Star

recommendation to remove all references to friendly fire: LTC Kauzerlich, Col Nixon, and Gen.

McChrystal. Why didn‘t the Committee press Gimble to ―speculate‖?

[DoD IG Report: Appendix E: Silver Star Award Process Flowchart showing only three officers

in that approval chain: LTC Kauzlarich, Col Nixon, and Gen McChrystal]

Page 56: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

56

Oversight Committee Decided to Look “Up” the Chain of Command

On April 27

th 2007, Chairman Waxman sent letters to the White House and Dept. of Defense

asking them to ―provide documents relating to how and when White House officials learned of

the circumstances surrounding Corporal Tillman's death‖ and to ―provide documents relating to

how and when high-ranking Defense Department officials learned of the circumstances

surrounding Corporal Tillman's death.‖

Shortly after the hearing, Chairman Henry Waxman decided the House Oversight Committee‘s

would only look ―up‖ the chain of command to ―determine when the President, senior White

House officials, the Secretary of Defense, and other top military leaders learned that Corporal

Tillman had been killed as a result of friendly fire and what they did upon learning this

information.‖

Waxman‘s decision to narrow the scope of his investigation to focus only on how and when the

top leadership knew about Tillman‘s fratricide, meant that Chairman Waxman ruled out

investigating the ―false information‖ that was put out such as Ranger O‘Neal‘s altered Silver Star

witness statement revealed at the hearing. Why didn‘t Congressman Waxman also look ―down‖

the chain of command‖ at the Ranger RGT officers involved in the cover-up?

Chairman Waxman himself said at the end of the hearing, ―It wasn‘t misleading information. We

have false information.‖ Yet, by only looking ―up,‖ Chairman Waxman effectively declined to

exercise oversight over the previous DoD and Army investigations whose adequacy and

forthrightness the Tillman‘s had criticized as being ―smokescreens‖ and whose ―mountain of

evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion.‖

. . .

On July 13th

2007, Chairman Waxman and Ranking Minority Member Davis sent a letter to the

White House and to Secretary of Defense Gates objecting to the withholding of documents related

to the death of Pat Tillman.

In addition, Waxman announced that a hearing would be held on Wednesday, August 1st 2007 to

investigate what senior officials at the Defense Department knew about Corporal Tillman‘s death.

The Committee invited former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and five generals to testify

at the hearing: Meyers, Abizaid, Brown, Kensinger, and McChrystal.

. . .

On July 31st 2007, the day before the Committee‘s 2

nd Tillman hearing, Secretary of the Army

Peter Geren held a press briefing to announce the findings of General Wallace‘s review of

the previous Army and Dept. of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) investigations.

Page 57: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

57

GENERAL WALLACE‟S REVIEW OF ARMY & IG

TILLMAN FRATRICIDE INVESTIGATIONS

Press Briefing July 31st 2007

Secretary of the Army Pete Geren & Gen. Richard Cody (July 31, 2007)

―The errors we made … created in the mind of many a perception that the Army intended to

deceive the public and the Tillman family … there was a perfect storm of mistakes,

misjudgments, and a failure of leadership that brought us where we are today… For casualty

notification, safety investigation and administrative control of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger

Regiment, General Kensinger was the captain of that ship, and his ship ran aground. It ran

aground because he failed to do his duty.‖

-- Secretary of the Army Pete Geren (July 31, 2007)

Page 58: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

58

General Wallace‟s Review of the Army & IG

Investigations of the Tillman Fratricide

July 31st, 2007

Note: the following summary is based upon Appendix C1 -- Wallace Briefing (July 31, 2007)

General Wallace reviewed the previous Army investigations, the Dept. of Defense Inspector

General (DoD IG) investigation and examined the conduct of ten officers. On July 31st 2007,

Secretary of the Army Peter Geren held a press briefing to announce the findings of Wallace‘s

review [I was unable to find a copy of ―Executive Summary, Army Action – DoDIG Report

Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick D. Tillman‖ (undated)]. Secretary Geren denied there

was a ―conspiracy … to deceive the public‖. He said, ―There was a perfect storm of mistakes,

misjudgments, and a failure of leadership …‖

General McChrystal did not receive a reprimand for his role in the handling of the Tillman

fratricide. However, General Wallace disregarded the DoD IG report which found General

McChrystal ―accountable for inaccurate and misleading assertions contained in the award

recommendation package‖ and ―accountable for not notifying the award processing channels

[Secretary of the Army] that friendly fire was suspected to ensure that the recommendation was

considered based on accurate information.‖

Instead, General Kensinger was singled out as the scapegoat. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren

said, ―General Kensinger failed in his duty to his soldiers, and the results were a calamity for the

Army …‖ He ―failed in his duty to inform the family about the friendly fire incident in a timely

manner …‖, ―failed to inform the acting Secretary of the Army of the fratricide investigation‖ and

―made false official statements.‖

During the question and answer session of the press conference, Secretary Geren and General

Cody defended General McChrystal‘s handling of the Tillman fratricide. However, their defense

of McChrystal doesn‘t hold up under examination. In fact, although Kensinger was culpable, I

believe General McChrystal was guilty of exactly those same charges for which Kensinger was

scapegoated by the Army!

General McChrystal was guilty of failing to ―inform the family about friendly fire in a timely

manner‖, failing ―to inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the

fratricide investigation,‖ and appears to have ―made false official statements‖ in his testimony and

his Silver Star package. General Wallace‘s review was merely the final layer upon of the Army‘s

continuing cover-up of the handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

Page 59: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

59

Gen. Kensinger Scapegoated for Gen. McChrystal‟s Sins

NARRATOR: On July 31st 2007 Secretary of the Army Pete Geren presented the findings of

Gen. Wallace‘s review of the DoD IG‘s Tillman investigation. During the press briefing, Geren

laid most of the blame for the Army‘s ―perfect storm of mistakes‖ onto Gen. Kensinger.

SEC. GEREN: ―For casualty notification, safety investigation and administrative control

of the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, General Kensinger was the captain of that

ship, and his ship ran aground. It ran aground because he failed to do his duty.‖

REPORTER: ―You've described a litany of errors and mistakes going more than three

years involving a lot of people, yet all the blame falls on General Kensinger. I'm just

trying to make some sense of that‖. …―He happens to be retired. Is there a coincidence

there? … Lots of people did lots of things wrong it seems, but he's the only one who's

really being singled out with the harshest punishment.‖ (DoD Briefing, 7-31-07)

. . .

NARRATOR: In 2007, General Stanley McChrystal was not yet retired, he was a rising star in

the Army. From 2003 to 2008, McChrystal was the commander of the Joint Special Operation

Command (JSOC) whose ―work … was the untold success story of the Surge and the greater war

on terror campaigns‖. President Bush said, "JSOC is awesome!"

. . .

REPORTER: ―Mr. Secretary, could you explain -- we understand that Lieutenant General Stan

McChrystal, who was singled out in the DOD IG report for inaccurate awards information -- can

you explain why he will not receive any punishment?‖

(DoD Briefing, 7-31-07)

Page 60: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

60

Gen. McChrystal Failed to “Timely” Notify His Superiors

SEC. GEREN: ―… General McChrystal, when notified of the friendly fire incident, he alerted

through his P-4, General Abizaid, General Brown and General Kensinger. So he did notify his

chain of command …‖ (DoD Briefing, 7-31-07)

[Pan P4 Memo Text]

NARRATOR: On April 29th

, one day after sending up his Silver Star recommendation, Gen.

McChrystal sent a high-priority P4 memo to top generals supposedly ―warning‖ them of the

―potential‖ friendly fire death of Pat Tillman.

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial

review before we went forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to

get some level of truth before we went up.‖ (p.17, SASC 6-02-09)

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―I also sent a [P4] message informing my chain of command

that we believed it was fratricide, and we did that when we were told there were going to

be fairly high-profile memorial services. … when I sent the message, the intent entirely

was to inform everybody up my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised.‖

(p.18, SASC 6-02-09)

GEN ABIZAID: ‗… General McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a timely

message in a timely fashion through the most secure channels.‖ (HOC 8-01-07, p.223)

NARRATOR: McChrystal said he learned of friendly-fire on April 23rd

. But, Secretary Geren

implies that McChrystal learned about potential fratricide on the 29th

, then sent the P4 to alert his

superiors.

Why did McChrystal wait six days until he sent his ―timely‖ P4 message on April 29th?

McChrystal said he wanted ―some level of truth before we went up‖?

And just two days after Pat‘s death, on April 24th

, the investigating officer CPT Scott passed

confirmation of fratricide up the chain of command.

Page 61: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

61

Gen. McChrystal Was Quickly Told of Confirmed Fratricide

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April … I arrived back into

Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd, and I was

informed, at that point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death,

and they had initiated what we call a 15–6, or an investigation of that. (p.17, SASC 6-02-09)

NARRATOR: But just two days after Pat‘s death, on April 24th

, the investigating officer CPT

Scott passed confirmation of fratricide up the chain of command.

[Narrator reads from LTC Bailey‘s testimony from the Jones 15-6 report

(section Z, p.53), view Mary Tillman‘s copy with names hand-written above redactions]

LTC BAILEY: ―Sir, within three or four hours of being out here on the ground by the

incident, I went back and I told [COL Nixon] that I was certain that we had killed him. …

In fact, I think just about everybody around knew that. And certainly, by the next day

when we did the investigations, I confirmed it. … So, after [CPT Scott] did his first five

interviews, he came back to me and said, ―Sir, I‘m certain. I‘m sure.‖ And then I called

[COL Nixon]. … I think it was the 24th

. [Jones 15-6, Section Z, p 52-53)

NARRATOR: Just above COL Nixon in the chain of command was Gen. McChrystal, followed

by Gen. Abizaid, Gen. Meyers, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Within just two days of

Tillman‘s death, confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide moved up the chain of command. … But,

the Army maintains it took five weeks to confirm fratricide!

[Chain of command chart]

―The operational chain of command for CPL Tillman‘s unit … was: (DoD IG, p.12)

1. Headquarters, Operations Team [LTC Bailey or MAJ Hodne]

2. Headquarters, 75th

Ranger Regiment [COL Nixon]

3. Headquarters, Joint Task Force [GEN McChrystal]

4. CENTCOM [GEN Abizaid]

GEN Meyers

Sec of Defense Rumsfeld

President Bush

Note: for more details, see ―General McChrystal & General Abizaid Gave Contradictory

Testimony at Congressional Hearings‖ McChrystal and/or Abizaid perjured themselves during

Congressional testimony. Also see DoD IG Timeline and Fraticide Notification Notes

Page 62: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

62

McChrystal Failed to Tell Tillman Family of Fratricide

REPORTER: ―But if McChrystal is sending a [P4] message to Abizaid saying it's highly

possible it was friendly fire, why couldn't McChrystal just have called the family?‖

GEN. CODY: ―Because in the casualty reporting business, those forces that -- under

Joint Special Operations Command are chopped to him in an operational control status or

attached, as you know. The administrative control in processing for casualty reporting,

we do not encumber the JSOC commander [McChrystal] with all of that; that's done by

the regiment and done by the Army through the United States Army Special Operations

Command [Kensinger]‖. (DoD Briefing, 7-31-07)

SEC. GEREN: ―So it was General Kensinger's responsibility.‖

NARRATOR: Yet, if you look at the casualty reporting flowchart, you‘ll see that Gen.

McChrystal‘s Chief of Staff was responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report after

learning of friendly fire. It‘s also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of

Staff knew about the fratricide by the 25th

[actually on the 23rd

] and yet they, and everyone else in

the chain of command (including the JAG lawyers) did not send the required report because they

supposedly didn‘t know about the regulations.

[DoDIG Report Appendix D: Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification Flowchart]

. . .

Note: Gen. McChrystal had early knowledge of fratricide, had the responsibility to tell the

Tillman family about fratricide, and failed to do so.

McChrystal testified in Gen. Jones 15-6 that he made a ―conscious decision‖ not to tell the family.

Furthermore, McChrystal himself told General Jones that ―there was a conscious decision on who

we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know all the facts. … I believe that we

did not tell the family of the possibility because we did not want to give them some half-baked

finding.‖ But, shortly afterwards, he contradicted himself, saying, ―I did not know there was a

decision not to tell the family. They had another [son, Kevin,] in the firefight.‖ So which is it?

During his April 2007 testimony, IG Gimble laid the blame for the failure to notify the Tillman

family upon COL Nixon for keeping the fratricide information ―close hold.‖ But how is that

possible? Since, Nixon told Gen. McChrystal, logically the IG should have held McChrystal

responsible as well for his failure to tell the family.

Page 63: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

63

Gen. McChrystal Directed Writing of Fraudulent Silver Star

SEC GEREN: ―As far as approving the Silver Star award, General McChrystal said that he was

aware of the circumstances of his death, that it was friendly fire, when he approved the Silver Star

award.‖ (DoD Briefing, 7-31-07)

NARRATOR: But if McChrystal knew it was friendly fire, why didn‘t he include that

information in the Silver Star citation? General McChrystal testified he relied on four

factors to conclude that Tillman deserved the Silver Star. Yet the DoD IG report (p.56)

states that ―CPL Tillman‘s commmanders did not directly, or clearly, state these four

factors in the award recommendation factors.‖ And if McChrystal only knew what he

read from the Silver Star package, how could he know about these four factors?

. . .

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―… in retrospect, they [P4 & Silver Star] look contradictory, because we

sent a Silver Star that was not well written— and, although I went through the process, I will tell

you now I didn‘t review the citation well enough to capture—or, I didn‘t catch that, if you read it,

you can imply that it was not friendly fire. [p.18, SASC 6-02-09]

[Pat Tillman‘s Silver Star Citation]

NARRATOR: ―Imply that it was not friendly fire‖? The Silver Star narrative justification

and citation bore little resemblance to reality and were carefully edited to imply Tillman

died by enemy fire without actually coming out and saying that. Anyone reading the

citation would think Tillman was killed by enemy fire! Both Silver Star witness statements

were altered to remove any mention of friendly fire and contained false statements.

. . .

KEVIN TILLMAN: ―Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is

not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. These are

intentional falsehoods that meet the legal definition for fraud.‖

[p.16, HOC 4-24-07

Mr. BRALEY: ―This version of the statement also says you ‗engaged the enemy very

successfully,‘ that the enemy moved most of their attention to your position which ‗drew a

lot of fire from them.‘ Did you write these sentences, claiming that you were engaged with

the enemy?‖

Mr. O‘NEAL: ―No, sir.‖ [p.95, HOC 4-24-07 ]

Page 64: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

64

Note: ―in the case of the statement attributed to SGT Weeks certain assertions could not be true

because he was on the other side of a ridge from CPL Tillman and could not see what had

happened to him‖ (DoD IG Report p. 55).

. . .

Mr. BRALEY: ―Did you ever determine in the course of your investigation who, out of people

who had contact with that statement, would have been the most likely person to have made

alterations to the statement originally prepared by Specialist O‘Neal?‖

[p.98, HOC 4-24-07]

Mr. GIMBLE: ―Actually, no, we could not determine that. I could speculate, but I just

prefer not to. It is somewhere in the approval chain that it got edited. …‖

[p.98, HOC 4-24-07]

NARRATOR: The IG couldn‘t determine who made the alterations? There were only three

people in the ―approval chain‖ who could have made the alterations to the Silver Star

recommendation to remove all references to friendly fire: LTC Kauzerlich, Col Nixon, and Gen.

McChrystal.

[DoD IG Report: Appendix E: Silver Star Award Process Flowchart showing only three officers

in that approval chain: LTC Kauzlarich, Col Nixon, and Gen McChrystal]

. . .

SEC GEREN: ―General Wallace concluded and I agree that he [McChrystal] reasonably based

his conclusions on the recommendations that came from the field and had no reasonable basis to

call into question the recommendation that came up endorsed by the commanders in the field who

were there and had first- hand knowledge of the circumstances of his death and his heroic

actions.‖ (DoD Briefing, 7-31-07)

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―In the case of Corporal Tillman, a Silver Star was

recommended. I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who recommended

it [Silver Star]. … and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the geometry of the

battlefield, and I queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his actions

warranted that, even though there was a potential that the actual circumstances of death

had been friendly fire.‖ [p. 18, SASC 6-02-09]

Page 65: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

65

NARRATOR: But, Gen. McChrystal didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that landed on his

desk. He was one of the ―commanders in the field‖ and personally led the writing of the Silver

Star package on the ground in Afghanistan working with the Ranger Regimental commanders Col

Nixon and LTC Kauzerlich.

. . .

Note: In failing to reprimand Gen. McChrystal, Secretary Geren disregarded the DoD IG report

findings that General McChrystal was ―accountable for inaccurate and misleading assertions

contained in the award recommendation package‖ and ―accountable for not notifying the award

processing channels [Secretary of the Army] that friendly fire was suspected to ensure that the

recommendation was considered based on accurate information.‖

As noted above, upon examination, none of Secretary Geren‘s assertions defending McChrystal‘s

approval of the fraudulent Silver Star hold up under examination. More importantly, Geren never

even tried to explain how the witness statements were somehow altered by some ―perfect storm of

mistakes.‖ How do you argue that away? You can‘t, so the Army didn‘t even try.

Wouldn‘t General McChrystal have a ―reasonable basis‖ to question a Silver Star package

containing no mention of friendly fire after he had been informed of confirmed fratricide? The

Silver Star narrative justification and citation bore little resemblance to reality and were carefully

edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire.

Page 66: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

66

When Did the White House Learn of the Tillman Fratricide?

MARY TILLMAN: ―It is disturbing to me that the Army keeps blaming Gen. Kensinger for the

fact we weren‘t notified. I think Kensinger is culpable to a point, but he is not the ultimate bad

guy. He would not have been the one to make the decision not to tell us. … the cover-up

wouldn‘t start at the three-star level‖

[Pan up chain of command organizational chart to President Bush at the top. See a brief

glimpse of Gen. McChrystal‘s portrait on the chart as the view moves up.]

MR. SCAHILL: ―I've talked to former Bush administration officials that have described

an incredibly cozy relationship between former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,

former Vice President Dick Cheney and General McChrystal, where General McChrystal

was essentially reporting directly to Rumsfeld and Cheney on operations, and they were

effectively carving JSOC out of the broader military chain of command. …

MR. SCAHILL: I've also heard from people that Cheney helped coordinate the testimony

of General McChrystal about the death of Pat Tillman in Afghanistan, which was

determined to be a friendly-fire incident, and that Cheney actually colluded with General

McChrystal to attempt to cover up that death.‖

[NPR Terry Gross radio interview with Jeremy Scahill 12-16-09]

. . .

NARRATOR: Did news of Tillman‘s fratricide reach the White House? Several days after the

March 26, 2007 Inspector General briefing, an AP reporter was anonymously sent a copy of a P4

memo written on April 29, 2004 by Gen. McChrystal. McChrystal sent the high-priority memo

to top generals warning them to inform the president to avoid ―unknowing statements by our

country‘s leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal

Tillman‘s death become public.‖

[Pan P4 Memo Text]

NARRATOR: Did President Bush receive the P4 message? Well, two days after the P4 memo

was sent, President Bush delivered his speech at the White House Correspondents‘ Dinner. As

the P4 advised, the President did not discuss how Corporal Tillman died.

[Video of President Bush delivering speech during May 1st WH Correspondents‘ Dinner]

Page 67: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

67

“THE TILLMAN FRATRICIDE: WHAT THE

LEADERSHIP OF THE DEPT. OF DEFENSE KNEW” House Oversight Committee Hearing, August 1st 2007

House Oversight Committee Chairman Henry Waxman (August 1, 2007)

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Gen. Meyers, Gen. Abizaid, Gen. Brown (August 1, 2007)

"There is another man [besides Gen. Kensinger] who will not be in the room. That is Lieutenant

General Stan McChrystal. It should be very clear to everyone, General McChrystal is the head of

covert special forces. The so-called dark or black forces. The ones who stay undercover ...

Because of his extraordinarily sensitive position with covert special forces, he is not appearing in

public. And so he will not be questioned further by the committee in an open hearing.‖

-- Barbara Starr, CNN correspondent, (CNN, Aug. 1, 2007)

Page 68: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

68

“The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the

Defense Department Knew.” House Oversight Committee Hearing, August 1st 2007

Note: the following summary is based upon Appendix D2 -- House Oversight Committee‘s 2nd

Tillman Hearing (August 1, 2007). Go there for full quotes and commentary.

Chairman Henry Waxman presided over the House Oversight Committee‘s August 1st 2007

hearing to ―examine what senior Defense Department officials knew about U.S. Army Corporal

Patrick Tillman‘s death by fratricide.‖ Chairman Waxman said, ―Our focus has been to look up

the chain of command, … Today we will be examining the actions of the senior leadership at the

Department of Defense. … ―what did the senior military leadership know about Corporal

Tillman‘s death, when did they know it, and what did they do after they learned it?‖

Chairman Waxman said, ―One possible explanation is that a series of counterintuitive, illogical

blunders unfolded, accidentally and haphazardly.‖… ―The other possible explanation is that

someone or some group of officials acted deliberately and repeatedly to conceal the truth.‖ …

―Well, that was the view of Kevin Tillman.‖

Chairman Waxman commended Army Secretary Geren for ―the forthright approach he is taking

its [Army‘s] continued investigation‖ … ―Progress has been made, but we still don‘t know who

was responsible for the false information‖ and as ―the Army noted yesterday [Army Secretary

Geren‘s Briefing], in seven investigations into this tragedy, not one has found evidence of a

conspiracy.‖

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld denied the existence of a cover-up, ― in no

instance has any evidence of a cover-up, to use the phrase you use, been presented or put

forward.‖

Chairman Waxman said he was ―grateful that General Myers and Secretary Rumsfeld, who

rearranged his schedule so that he could be here today, are here to testify.‖ … ―and certainly in

the case of Secretary Rumsfeld, who went to great pains to be here. And I appreciate the fact that

he did come.‖

Page 69: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

69

P4 Message Recipients Say They Didn‟t Pass It Up the Chain of Command:

Chairman Waxman said much of the Committee‘s ―focus will be on a ‗‗Personal For‘‘ message,

also known as a P–4, that Major General Stanley McChrystal sent on April 29, 2004.‖ … to Gen.

Abizaid, Gen. Brown, and General Kensinger. ―For today‘s hearing, we invited all of the

recipients of the P–4 to determine how they responded. Did they, in fact, alert the White House?

Did they alert the Army Secretary, the Secretary of Defense? Did they pass it up the chain of

command?‖ Congressman Cummings asked the panel, ―I want to ask how is it possible that you

didn‘t know before May 20th that Corporal Tillman died by friendly fire?‖

General Brown said, ―…When I got the P–4, I made the assumption—and probably a bad

assumption, since I was an ‗info‘ addressee and not the ‗to,‘ that flow of information

would flow through the chain of command.‖

General Myers asserted ―I can‘t recall specifically‖ but he ―knew right at the end of April

that there was a possibility of fratricide …‖ and Secretary Rumsfeld said, ―I just don‘t

have any recollection‖ … ―I simply do not know‘ … ―I don‘t remember precisely how I

learned that he was killed.‖

General Abiziad testified that the high-priority P4 somehow ―went astray‖ for some

nebulous reason, ―It wasn‘t the first P–4 that went astray and it wasn‘t the last one. But it

happened, and that is all I can say about that.‖ … ―… It is very difficult to come to grips

with how we screwed this thing up, but we screwed this thing up.‖

Abizaid‟s Account of When He Learned of Fratricide Contradicts McChrystal‟s:

General Abiziad testified that General McChrystal only told him that Pat Tillman was KIA, and

never told him about the potential fratricide: ―On the 22nd, the incident occurred. I believe on

about the 23rd, General McChrystal called me and told me that Corporal Tillman had been killed

in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his death were heroic. I called the chairman

and discussed that with the chairman…‖ But during his June 2nd

2009 confirmation hearing,

McChrystal testified that he was told of fratricide on the 23rd

.

Supposedly, Abizaid first received word of ―potential‖ fratricide when he finally ―found‖ the P4

after a week‘s delay: ―On the 29th, General McChrystal sent his message, … it is my recollection

… probably the 6th, it is a guess, … But it is clear that all along fratricide was called as early as

April 29th, [actually 23rd

] and that on May 28th, we conclusively stated it was fratricide.‖

Page 70: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

70

Rumsfeld & Generals Were Not Involved in the Silver Star Award Process:

Representative Clay said, ―… on April 30, 2004, the Army … announced that Corporal Tillman

has been posthumously awarded the Silver Star. … It was rushed through so it would be ready in

time for the memorial service for Corporal Tillman on May 3, 2004.‖ Clay noted, ―… the Silver

Star citation was false. … the Defense Department Inspector General [Gimble] concluded that the

Silver Star citation and supporting documents had materially inaccurate statements and

erroneously implied that Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire. …‖

Rumsfeld and the generals all testified that they weren‘t involved with the Silver Star award

process. General Myers replied, ―My response is essentially like Secretary Rumsfeld‘s. The

chairman‘s office, the Joint Staff is not involved in these awards. This is an Army responsibility.‖

Committee Still Doesn‟t Know Who Altered Silver Star Witness Statements:

Representative Issa asked, ―Can anybody on this panel give me an answer, how that happened,

that the specialist, on-the-ground eyewitness [Ranger O‘Neal] right beside Corporal Tillman, …

wrote an accurate description of what happened indicating friendly fire; and yet downstream we

follow that time line, we in the Congress and the American people got a different story?‖

General Abizaid said, ―Sir, in General McChrystal‘s personal forward he said the

potential that he might have been killed by friendly fire in no way detracts from his

witnessed heroism‖ … ―I believe that the Army has looked at the award on several

different occasions. They have upheld it on every occasion.‖

General Brown agreed with Abizaid, ―I have talked to General McChrystal several times

and the actions of Corporal Tillman, based on the discussion I had with General

McChrystal, certainly would warrant a Silver Star.‖

Chairman Waxman also noted, ―At our last hearing, … Specialist O‘Neal told us something else.

After he submitted his statement, someone else rewrote it. This unnamed person made significant

changes that transformed O‘Neal‘s account into an enemy attack. We still don‘t know who did

that and why he did it.‖

Page 71: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

71

Why Didn‟t Gen. McChrystal Appear at the Hearing? Did He Testify at Closed Hearing?

During his opening statement, Chairman Waxman noted, ―General Kensinger refused to appear

today. … The committee did issue a subpoena to General Kensinger earlier this week, but U.S.

Marshals have been unable to locate or serve him‖

CNN reporter Barbara Starr said, ―There is another man who will not be in the room. That is

Lieutenant General Stan McChrystal.‖ On July 13th

2007, General McChrystal was ―invited‘ by

the Committee to testify at the hearing. However, McChrystal never appeared. Unlike with

General Kensinger, Chairman Waxman has never explained McChrystal‘s absence.

Barbara Starr continued, ―Because of his extraordinarily sensitive position with covert special

forces, he is not appearing in public. And so he will not be questioned further by the committee

in an open hearing.‖ (Perhaps I‘m reading too much into that quote, but it sure sounds as though

the Committee had just questioned McChrystal in a secret closed hearing. Not so far-fetched

considering that in May 2008, the Senate Armed Services committee held just such a secret

hearing for McChrystal‘s promotion to Director of the Joint Staff).

12-28-10 UPDATE: I found the full transcript using a Lexus-Nexis search. I‘ve placed it in

Appendix D3

Generals Praised Gen. McChrystal‟s Actions Saying “He Did Exactly the Right Thing”:

Although General McChrystal did not appear at the hearing, his fellow generals lavished praise

upon him during the hearing:

General Myers said, ―…When I learned that General McChrystal had initiated an

investigation, that was—that was good for me. … I knew his integrity. … We will learn

the truth.‖

General Abizaid said, ―General McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and in a

timely fashion.‖ … and so again General McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a

timely message in a timely fashion through the most secure channels.‖

Chairman Waxman Ends Hearing Inconclusively “Somebody Should Be Responsible”:

Chairman Waxman attempted to conclude the hearing by summing up when each witness learned

about ―the friendly fire issue‖ leading to a series of corrections. Finally, Waxman concluded with

Page 72: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

72

―Well, you all knew or didn‘t know within that timeframe. But it appears that all of you had some

indication before the ceremony [memorial service] where the world was being told that Corporal

Tillman was killed in the line of duty.‖

Chairman Waxman ended the hearing with, ―And you have all admitted that the system failed. So

I just think that the public should have known, the family should have known earlier who was

responsible. But—none of you feel that you personally are responsible, but the system itself

didn‘t work.‖ … We are obviously trying to find out what went on and who had responsibility,

who dropped the ball. … The system didn‘t work. Errors were made. That‘s too passive.

Somebody should be responsible …‖

. . .

Guy Montag‟s Comments on Committee‟s August 2007 Hearing

1.) Waxman‘s equivocal remarks such as, ―Well, that was the view of Kevin Tillman‖ and ―what

roles, if any, the Defense Department and the White House had in the deceptions‖ and ―errors

were made‖ were in marked contrast to his scathing April 24th

concluding remarks: ―It wasn‘t

misleading information. We have false information … These aren‘t things that are done by

mistake.‖ … ―What we have is a very clear, deliberate abuse intentionally done. …‖ Waxman

had a change of heart since the first hearing. Why the backpedaling?

2.) The Army‘s approach to investigating the Tillman fratricide was hardly ―forthright.‖ For

example, Geren disregarded the DoD IG‘s findings that McChrystal was accountable for

―inaccurate information‖ that included falsified Silver Star witness statements. And what was

the ―continued investigation‖ to which Waxman referred? The Wallace Review was the end,

except that Geren slapped some officers on the wrist.

3.) Although Rumsfeld asserted, ―I would not engage in a cover-up,‖ given the ―incredibly cozy

relationship between former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former Vice President Dick

Cheney and General McChrystal‖ (with McChrystal reporting directly to Rumsfeld), it‘s

impossible to believe Rumsfeld wasn‘t told of fratricide on April 23rd

by McChrystal.

4.) Gen Abizaid and Gen McChrystal‘s testimony about when they were told of Tillman‘s

fratricide are contradictory. McChrystal said he learned of fratricide on April 23rd

, yet Abizaid

said on the 23rd

McChrystal told him only that Tillman was killed in action. Someone didn‘t

testify truthfully before Congress.

Page 73: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

73

5.) Within just two days of Tillman‘s death, confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide moved up the

chain of command. … But, Gen. Abizaid claims he wasn‘t told until weeks later, and that it took

the Army five weeks to confirm fratricide! All the General‘s talk about ―potential‖ knowledge of

fratricide was so much bullshit.

6.) Although Chairman Waxman said ―Much of our focus will be on a ―Personal For‖ message

… that MG McChrystal sent on April 29th

2004,‖ his Committee never took a hard look at the

contents, and forthrightness of McChrystal‘s P4 memo. If you carefully read it, the memo was

anything but ―forthright‖. As Mary Tillman said in an interview (8-10-07) with Mike Fish:

"That memo is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is writing

fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can script the Silver

Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is saying we need to keep our

leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass themselves, IF the circumstances of

Pat's death should become public … He should be saying 'We're going to have to put a

hold to the silver star and we're going to have to notify the family [of suspected friendly

fire].' That is what he would say if he was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a

way that they can continue this false, elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off

the hook is atrocious."

John R. Reed does a hilarious job of tearing apart the P4 memo point-by-point in his article

―Lessons to Be Learned from Pat Tillman‘s Death‖. For example,

―McChrystal is absolutely certain about Tillman deserving the Silver Star, which normally

requires a highly subjective assessment. However, he has to await the outcome of an

investigation to determine whether Tillman was killed by friendly fire, which was a no

brainer in this case. Apparently, public-relations efforts like awarding dubious medals

require virtually no investigation or thought, but revealing unattractive truth, well, we

gotta do a whole formal ―15-16 investigation‖ before such an unnatural act.‖

7.) General Brown mentioned that General McChrystal had called him (an presumably other

generals including Abizaid) on April 23rd

to tell him of ―potential‘ fratricide. Then, why didn‘t

Gen. Brown (and the other Generals) pass this information up the chain of command? They

didn‘t need to wait 6 days for a P4! General Brown himself said, ―It would have been simple for

me to pick up the phone and call the General.‖ The Committee‘s effort to trace the P4‘s journey

up the chain of command is a red herring; the fratricide information flowed via phone or face-to-

face, without leaving a written trail.

Page 74: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

74

8.) I don‘t understand how Tillman being killed by friendly fire ―in no way detracts‖ from his

witnessed heroism.‖ The only true statement on the Silver Star citation was Tillman‘s name. The

―heroism‖ was all based on the false narrative of devastating enemy fire.

9.) I‘m puzzled that the House Oversight & Reform Committee never followed up on the

revelations of altered witness statements in their first hearing. The failed to further investigate

who falsified the Silver Star witness statements, after raising this question during both of their

hearings. Why didn‘t the Committee expand the focus of their investigation to look ―down‘ the

chain of command and interview MG McChrystal, COL Nixon, or LTC Kauzlerich about the

writing of the fraudulent Silver Star recommendation and the misleading P4 memo, both issues

that were central to the Committee‘s investigation?

10.) On July 13th

2007, the Oversight Committee ―invited‖ Gen. McChrystal to testify at their

August hearing. However, like Gen. Kensinger, McChrystal did not testify. Chairman Waxman

explained that Kensinger evaded a subpoena, but Waxman never explained why McChrystal

didn‘t appear at the hearing. Did McChrystal refuse to testify? Or did Chairman Waxman decide

to drop McChrystal from the witness list? (Was Waxman‘s excuse that, on the previous day,

Secretary Geren had officially ―exonerated‖ McChrystal of all wrong-doing ?)

12-28-10 UPDATE: An 8-04-07 AP article said that McChrystal ―declined‖ to appear. See

Appendix D3 And McChrystal was still on the ―invited‖ list as of 7-28-07.

Later, in 2008, Kensinger testified in a closed hearing with the Committee. If for whatever reason

McChrystal wasn‘t able to appear in August, why didn‘t the Committee follow up and interview

him sometime during the following year until their report was issued

But McChrystal never testified (except possibly in a closed hearing). It appears Chairman

Waxman shielded McChrystal from public scrutiny of his central role in the Tillman cover-up.

Why? Perhaps because McChrystal was not yet retired, was a rising star in the Army, and his

JSOC special forces were playing an important role in the Iraq ―Surge.‖ It appears the

Committee‘s ―investigation‖ yet another ―smokescreen‖ thrown in the face of the Tillman family

in their battle for the truth.

11.) Chairman Waxman closed his hearing by saying, ―We are obviously trying to find out what

went on and who had responsibility.‖ But, it‘s not obvious that the Committee was making a

good faith effort to uncover the truth. As previously discussed, by defining the scope of the

investigation only to look ―up‖ the chain of command, the Committee failed to provide oversight

over the Army‘s actions and investigations. They failed to further investigate the altered Silver

Star statements. Most importantly, they either chose not to have Gen. McChrystal testify or he

testified during a secret hearing. If the Committee was ―obviously trying to find out what went

Page 75: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

75

on‖ they would have looked into McChrystal‘s key role in the cover-up. Instead, it appears the

Committee chose to shield McChrystal from public scrutiny.

Page 76: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

76

Committee Focused on Gen. McChrystal‟s P4 Message

CHAIRMAN WAXMAN: ―Much of our focus will be on a ‗‗Personal For‘‘ message, also

known as a P–4, … This memo was sent on April 28, 2004, by Major General Stanley

McChrystal, the Commander of the Joint Task Force in Afghanistan, where Corporal Tillman was

killed in 2004.‖… General McChrystal explained why this P–4 message was so important. He

stated, ‗I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order

to preclude any unknowing statements by our country‘s leaders which might cause

embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman‘s death became public.‖

(p. 29, HOC 8-01-07

. . .

Although the Committee questioned Sec. Rumsfeld and the generals about when they received the

P4 memo, the Committee never took a hard look at the contents, and forthrightness of

McChrystal‘s P4 memo. If you carefully read it, the memo was anything but ―forthright‖:

―It is anticipated that a 15-6 investigation nearing completion will find that it is highly possible

that CPL Tillman was killed by friendly fire‖:

How is it ―nearing completion‖ when Scott‘s 15-6 was a ―Final Report‖? (And how was it

―nearing completion‖ when Nixon ―officially‖ started the 15-6 on the 29th

?) Scott‘s report

concluded friendly fire; ―highly possible‖ means ―definitely.‖ Of course, in reality,

General McChrystal was told of probable friendly fire on the 23rd

and confirmed fratricide

on the 24th

! And, if McChrystal is waiting for the completion of the 15-6 investigation,

wouldn‘t it make sense to wait until it is complete to forward the Silver Star package?

―I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order to

preclude any unknowing statements by our country‘s leaders which might cause public

embarrassment if the circumstances of CPL Tillman‘s death becomes public‖:

Note the ―if‖. Not when! And McChrystal‘s concern is for embarrassment of his bosses,

not to ensure his family knows or that the Secretary of the Army knows before approving

the Silver Star!

Page 77: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

77

Why did McChrystal send the P4 memo on April 29th

?:

Well, on the 29th

CPT Scott submitted his 15-6 ―Final Report‖ concluding friendly fire.

It‘s interesting to note that COL Nixon ―officially‖ appointed Scott on the 29th

(even

though Scott began work on the 23rd

). Perhaps Nixon & McChrystal were creating a

paper trail to show friendly fire wasn‘t suspected and an investigation begun until after he

approved the Silver Star package on the 28th

?

I believe McChrystal only sent the P4 memo to provide a paper trail he could use later, if

necessary, to cover his butt. The P4 provides a paper trail that he told his superiors about

fratricide, it allows him to argue that he thought Tillman deserved the Silver Star even if it was

from friendly fire. And he could argue that he had approved the Silver Star before he was

informed about possible friendly fire.

Page 78: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

78

Gen. Abizaid‟s Testimony Contradicts that of Gen. McChrystal

NARRATOR: But it appears that Gen Abizaid and Gen McChrystal were less than ―forthright‖

when they testified before Congress about when they first heard of Tillman‘s fratricide.

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd

of April … I arrived

back into Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd

,

and I was informed, at that point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the

cause of death, and that they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that.‖

(p.18, SASC 6-02-09)

GEN ABIZAID: ―I believe about the 23rd

, GEN McChrystal called me and told me that

Corporal Tillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his

death were heroic. I called the Chairman and discussed that with the Chairman.‖

(p. 23, HOC 8-01-07)

. . .

NARRATOR: So, McChrystal says he learned of fratricide on the 23rd

, yet Abizaid says

McChrystal told him only that Tillman was killed in action. Someone was not telling the truth.

And, as discussed previously, on April 24th

McChrystal was given verbal confirmation of

fratricide, making all the talk by the generals about ―potential‖ fratricide sheer nonsense!

Note: See ―General McChrystal & General Abizaid Gave Contradictory Testimony at

Congressional Hearings‖ for more detailed evidence that McChrystal and/or Abizaid perjured

themselves during Congressional testimony. Also see DoD IG Timeline and Fraticide

Notification notes.

On April 24th

, the investigating officer CPT Scott passed confirmation of fratricide up the chain of

command to COL Nixon. Just above COL Nixon in the chain of command was Gen.

McChrystal, followed by Gen. Abizaid, Gen. Meyers, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.

Within just two days of Tillman‘s death, confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide moved up the chain

of command. … But, Gen. Abizaid claims he wasn‘t told until weeks later and that it took five

weeks to confirm fratricide!

Page 79: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

79

We Still Don‟t Know Who Altered Silver Star Witness Statements:

Mr. CLAY: ―… the Silver Star citation was false. And here is what it says: Corporal Tillman put

himself in the line of devastating enemy fire as he maneuvered his fire team to a covered position

from which they could effectively employ their weapons at known enemy positions. In his March

26, 2007, report, the Defense Department Inspector General concluded that the Silver Star citation

and supporting documents had materially inaccurate statements and erroneously implied that

Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire.‘‖ (p.192, HOC 8-01-07)

Mr. BRALEY: ―This version of the statement also says you ‗engaged the enemy very

successfully,‘ that the enemy moved most of their attention to your position which ‗drew a

lot of fire from them.‘ Did you write these sentences, claiming that you were engaged with

the enemy?‖

Mr. O‘NEAL: ―No, sir.‖ [p.95, HOC 4-24-07 ]

CHAIRMAN WAXMAN: ―At our last hearing … Specialist O‘Neal told us something

else. After he submitted his statement, someone else rewrote it. This unnamed person

made significant changes that transformed O‘Neal‘s account into an enemy attack. We

still don‘t know who did that and why he did it.‖ (p.2, HOC 8-01-07)

Mr. ISSA: ―… Specialist O‘Neal … wrote a witness statement in the immediate aftermath

of Corporal Tillman‘s death that made it quite clear that this was a case of friendly fire.

But then something happened. Someone rewrote that statement … Can anybody on this

panel give me an answer, how that happened, … [how] we in the Congress and the

American people got a different story?‖ (p.216, HOC 8-01-07)

General ABIZAID: ―Sir, in General McChrystal‘s personal forward he said the potential

that he might have been killed by friendly fire in no way detracts from his witnessed

heroism or the recommended personal decoration for valor in the face of the enemy. I

believe that the Army has looked at the award on several different occasions. They have

upheld it on every occasion. Whether or not the wording was correct or not in the initial

stage, I do believe that the Corporal Tillman deserved the award that he received.‖

(p.193, HOC 8-01-07)

NARRATOR: None of the witnesses knew anything about who altered the witness statements.

Then why didn‘t the Committee interview MG McChrystal, COL Nixon, or LTC Kauzlerich who

were in ―the approval chain‖ which altered those statements? It‘s especially puzzling the

Committee never questioned McChrystal. McChrystal would have been the logical person to

question about both the P4 memo and the Silver Star

Page 80: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

80

Did Committee Shield General McChrystal from Public Scrutiny?

HEIDI COLLINS: ―Well, Barbara, is there anything that any of them [Rumsfeld, other

top Generals] are expected to say that could actually change the investigation or the way

possibly the family, who we understand will be in the room, will feel about how things

happened?

BARBARA STARR: ―I don't think that is likely from any of these very top officials. But

let's be clear, there's a couple of people who will not be in the room today. So what is not

being said may be equally interesting‖

―Lieutenant General Phillip Kensinger, censured yesterday. A three star retired general.

Likely to lose one of his stars. He was subpoenaed by all accounts. He is traveling away

from home. They cannot find him. Apparently the marshals unable to serve a subpoena.

He will not appear today. He has already filed papers objecting to his punishment, saying

he was not deceptive to investigators when he was questioned. That he simply said what

he knew to the best of his recollection.‖

(CNN Newsroom, 8-01-07)

NARRATOR: But another general was also missing from the hearing. On July 13th

2007,

General McChrystal was ―invited‖ to testify at the hearing. However, McChrystal did not appear.

Chairman Waxman never explained McChrystal‘s absence.

[screen print from Oversight Committee hearing announcement dated 7-20-07

listing McChrystal as ―invited‖ to testify]

NARRATOR: Why didn‘t McChrystal appear at the hearing? Apparently Chairman Waxman

dropped him from his witness list after McChrystal ―declined‖ to appear before the Committee.

BARBARA STARR: "There is another man who will not be in the room. That is

Lieutenant General Stan McChrystal. It should be very clear to everyone, General

McChrystal is the head of covert special forces. The so-called dark or black forces. The

ones who stay undercover. General McChrystal also was somewhat implicated in the case

for knowing some of the details. But he was cleared of any wrongdoing in that

investigation [Gen. Wallace] that was made public yesterday [7-31-07]. Because of his

extraordinarily sensitive position with covert special forces, he is not appearing in public.

And so he will not be questioned further by the committee in an open hearing.‖

(CNN Newsroom, 8-01-07)

Page 81: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

81

Note: I could not locate the original transcript for this quote at the CNN website [quote taken

from ―Stan McChrystal: The New U.S. Commander in Afghanistan‖ (Time, 5-12-09)].

12-28-10 UPDATE: See Appendix D3 for full transcript. With the full text, it appears less likely

a closed hearing was held.

NARRATOR: ―Questioned further‖? ―… in an open hearing‖? It appears that the Committee

had already questioned McChrystal in a closed hearing prior to the public August 1st hearing!

[the following year, the Senate Armed Services committee held just such a secret hearing for

McChrystal‘s promotion to Director of the Joint Staff].

It‘s puzzling the Committee never questioned McChrystal. McChrystal was the author of the P4

message and would have been the logical person to question about the altered the Silver Star

witness statements. It appears the Committee was shielding McChrystal from public scrutiny of

his central role in the Tillman cover-up. Was the Committee‘s ―investigation‖ just another

smokescreen thrown in the face of the Tillman family.

Page 82: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

82

Rumsfeld & Generals Repeatedly Say, “I Don‟t Recall”

NARRATOR: The House Oversight Committee‘s second hearing on the Tillman fratricide ended

inconclusively. The committee ineptly questioned former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and

retired Army generals Meyers, Abizaid, and Brown about when they received the P4 memo and

what action they took after reading it.

Chairman WAXMAN. ―… I want to begin the questioning by framing the issue for us.

The basic point that we want to learn is what did the senior military leadership know

about Corporal Tillman‘s death, when did they know it, and what did they do after they

learned it?‖ (HOC 8-01-07, p.29)

[Generals and Rumsfeld using some variation of ―I don‘t recall‖ about eighty times.]

. . .

NARRATOR: The witnesses before the Oversight Committee couldn‘t ―recall‖ when they

learned of Tillman‘s fratricide, but they were certain that McChrystal did the right thing.

GEN MYERS: ―…When I learned that General McChrystal had initiated an

investigation, that was—that was good for me. I know he had worked for me before. I

knew his integrity. I said, this is good, and they are going to do an investigation. We will

learn the truth.‖ (HOC 8-01-07, p.33)

GEN ABIZAID: ―Again, no excuses can be offered, but I can tell you a couple of

facts. General McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and in a timely fashion.

(HOC 8-01-07, p.218)

. . .

Chairman WAXMAN. ―OK. Well, let me conclude the hearing by indicating the facts that

General Myers and General Brown knew about the friendly fire issue at the end of April.

General Abizaid learned on May 6th. Secretary Rumsfeld learned on May 20th. All of

these are the senior leaders that knew before the public and the family——

Mr. RUMSFELD. ―Could I correct that? … I want to make sure this is precisely accurate.

I do not believe I testified that I learned on May 20th, … My testimony is that I do not

recall; … —I just simply do not know when I first learned of the possibility of fratricide.‖

General ABIZAID. And, sir, if I may, I also wanted to make sure that the 6th is a logical

day. It is not ‗‗the‘‘ day; the day is somewhere between 10 and 20 days after the event. It‘s

the best that my staff and I could come to a conclusion on at this point.

Page 83: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

83

Chairman WAXMAN. You were all very busy. There is no question about it.

General BROWN. Sir, one other thing, if I could interrupt also to correct. Your statement

was that I knew about the friendly fire, I knew that there was an investigation ongoing, the

potential for friendly fire.

General MYERS. That goes for me, too.

General ABIZAID. And for me, as well.

. . .

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, you all knew or didn‘t know within that timeframe. …

―And you have all admitted that the system failed. So I just think that the public should

have known, the family should have known earlier who was responsible. But—none of you

feel that you personally are responsible, but the system itself didn‘t work.‖ … We are

obviously trying to find out what went on and who had responsibility, who dropped the

ball. … The system didn‘t work. Errors were made. That‘s too passive. Somebody should

be responsible …‖

Page 84: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

84

“Misleading Information from the Battlefield” Oversight Committee Report, July 17, 2008

Note: the following summary is based upon Appendix F1 -- House Oversight Committee‘s

Report (July 17, 2007). Go there for full quotes and commentary.

Following the August 2007 hearing, the Committee conducted non-transcribed interviews in

closed session several senior officials at the White House, including Communications Director

Dan Bartlett, Press Secretary Scott McClellan, and chief speechwriter Michael Gerson. Not a

single one could recall when he learned about the fratricide or what he did in response.

The Committee reviewed over 31,000 documents produced by the Department of Defense and

interviewed six additional general officers, including General Kensinger who, after avoiding a

subpoena for the August 1st 2007 hearing, was finally interviewed by Committee staff on

February 29, 2008.

But, it‘s puzzling the Committee never questioned General McChrystal or General Nixon despite

their central role in writing both the fraudulent Silver Star recommendation and the misleading P4

memo (both issues that were central to the Committee‘s investigation).

. . .

Almost a year after their last Tillman hearing, on July 14th

2008, Congressman Henry Waxman‘s

House Oversight & Reform Committee finally issued their report ―Misleading Information from

the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes.‖

The Committee said they had sought to ―determine what the top officials at the White House and

the Defense Department knew about Corporal Tillman‘s fratricide, when they knew this, and what

they did with their knowledge.‖

But the Committee‘s ―investigation‖ ended inconclusively. The Committee blamed White House

and Dept. of Defense stonewalling for their inability to determine accountability for the

misinformation in the Tilllman case:

In Corporal Tillman‘s case, even after seven Defense Department investigations, no one

has been able to identify the person who created the false information about enemy fire.

At the top of the chain of command, where the Committee focused its attention, pertinent

questions also remain unanswered. … the White House could not produce a single e-mail

Page 85: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

85

or document relating to any discussion about Corporal Tillman‘s death by friendly fire.

… Despite receiving information from all the top military leaders in Corporal Tillman

chain of command — including Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and General Abizaid

— the Committee could not determine if any of the officials had communicated with

President Bush or White House officials about fratricide in Corporal Tillman‘s case.

… The pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes it

impossible for the Committee to assign responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal

Tillman‘s and Private Lynch‘s cases.

After reviewing the report, I realized the Committee‘s perfunctory investigation had served to

protect General McChrystal from close scrutiny and was just another layer upon the previous

investigative cover-ups of the Tillman fratricide (see my previous discussion of the Committee‘s

4-24-07 and 8-01-07 hearings].

For example, why the hell didn‘t the Committee try to identify those involved in the

―misinformation‖ of the false Silver Star since they were not satisfied by the seven investigations?

They could have questioned those apparently involved (i.e. COL Nixon, LTC Kauzlarich, LG

McChrystal). Why did the Committee focus their attention ―up the chain of command‖ instead of

exercising oversight over the Army!

. . .

On July 26th

2008, I sent an email to Mike Fish (investigative reporter who did the great ESPN E-

Ticket series ―An Un American Tragedy‖ on Pat in 2006):

―After reading your article, ―House Calls Out Government in Tillman Friendly Fire

Death‖ (ESPN 7-14-08), I wasn‘t particularly surprised at the White House‘s ―lack of

recall‖ about Pat Tillman‘s fratricide (although I did find myself wishing that Scott

McClellan had been put on the spot during his book tour circuit!).

However, after reading Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee‘s report, I was surprised

to learn the Committee never interviewed General McChrystal! McChrystal was the key

link in the chain of command between Col. Nixon (Ranger Regiment) and Abizaid

(CENTCOM), he wrote the P4 memo, and he approved the false narrative of the Silver

Star citation. Initially, McChrystal was scheduled to appear before the Committee, but he

―declined‖ to appear at their August 2007 hearing. Why didn‘t the Committee follow up?

Were they (and the Army) protecting McChrystal? Was the Waxman report just the final

layer upon the cover-up of the Tillman fratricide?

―Last August, General Kensinger was singled out as the primary reason many people

believe the Army covered up Tillman‘s fratricide … However, I believe General

Kensinger was merely the scapegoat for the sins of the Army and Bush administration. I

would argue that General McChrystal, COL Nixon, and GEN Abiziad were just as guilty

of the same charges for which Kensinger was singled out.‖

Page 86: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

86

Tillman Family Expected “Oversight” from Oversight Committee

Chairman WAXMAN: ―Well, you all knew or didn‘t know within that timeframe. …

So I just think … the family should have known earlier who was responsible. But—none of

you feel that you personally are responsible, but the system itself didn‘t work.‖ … We are

obviously trying to find out what went on and who had responsibility, who dropped the

ball. … The system didn‘t work. Errors were made. That‘s too passive. Somebody should

be responsible …‖

MARY TILLMAN: ―Yes, … someone should be responsible. … We have been let down.

… the Republicans on the committee were at best indifferent … most of the Democrats

disappointed us as well. Their performance is not what it was in April. They were not

prepared and they are unable to think on their feet. We expected more from Congress.‖

PATRICK TILLMAN: ―I expected some ―oversight‖ from the Oversight Committee.‖

. . .

NARRATOR: The Tillman family did everything they could do to learn the truth about Pat

Tillman‘s death. But no one has ever paid a price for using Pat Tillman‘s death as a propaganda

tool to support the war effort.

MARY TILLMAN: ―After more than three years of … persistent pushing to get answers,

our family has twice been heard before a congressional committee. … We‘ve done all we

can do …‖

. . .

[Rumsfeld leaves the hearing, gets in his limo, and drives away]

[Shot of the Capitol building at night.]

. . .

NARRATOR: Congressman Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee didn‘t fumble at the one-

yard line, they threw the game. Waxman gave General McChrystal a pass on his central role in

the cover-up of Pat Tillman fratricide. His ―investigation‖ was just another ―smokescreen‖

thrown into the face of the Tillman family.

Page 87: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

87

“THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY” SCRIPT

President Obama‟s Big-Time Fumble

President Obama salutes ROTC graduates at Arizona State University (May 13, 2009)

President Obama nominates Gen. McChrystal (May 11, 2009) Senator James Webb (Senate Armed Service Committee, June 2009)

―Obama had a wide-open opportunity to remind us that Tillman could be the best example in our

lifetimes of someone who eschewed popularity and personal advancement to devote himself to a

bigger purpose. For some reason, the president passed.‖

-- Bob Young, ―Obama‘s Big-Time Fumble at ASU‖ (Arizona Republic, May 17, 2009)

―This is an unsolved mystery; nobody has ever really paid a price for what was done to the

Tillmans. No one has taken accountability or made an admission for a deliberate attempt to

conceal the truth. This story is not over yet.‖

-- Amir Bar-Lev (―The Fog of War,‖ July 20, 2009)

Page 88: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

88

“Barely a Footnote” Superbowl XLIII and the NFL‟s Betrayal of Pat Tillman

Guy Montag (feralfirefighter.blogspot.com)

June 20, 2010

Unveiling of Pat Tillman statue at Univesity of Phoenix Stadium General Petraeus performs coin toss at Super Bowl XLIII

―Pat Tillman played for the Arizona Cardinals from 1998 through 2001, yet, as you watch the Cardinals

play the Pittsburgh Steelers on Sunday, you might never know it. …The NFL loves to wrap itself in the

flag, yet the league has no plans to remember him. The Cardinals have a statue and reflecting pool

dedicated to Tillman outside their stadium, but nothing on their jerseys.‖

-- Bill Plaschke, LA Times (1-25-09)

―You couldn't help but notice in the days before tonight's Super Bowl that the memory of Pat Tillman

feels like barely a footnote. In fact, the NFL sent out a news release a couple of days ago, with the

trumpeting headline: "NFL salutes service, courage and bravery in Super Bowl XLIII." But it had

nothing to do with Tillman. … the NFL picked a beautiful theme for the Super Bowl … It's difficult to

think of better words to describe the most important Cardinal any of us will ever know.‖

-- Rick Maese, Baltimore Sun (2-01-09)

―I think they [NFL] haven't gone out of their way to help; they've exploited Pat, just like the military. …

they have a beautiful statue to him at Cardinal Stadium. I don't know if that's more for us or him; I feel

like it's more for them. … They haven't really helped to try to find out what happened to Pat. …It's like,

"Okay, we had the jersey dedication, we did this, let's move on." …

-- Mary Tilllman, (6-02-08)

… He [Pat Tillman] might have been the most celebrated story of this year's Super Bowl between his

old Arizona team and the Pittsburgh Steelers. Instead, he's the saddest. And also the most awkward …

… what should have been the dream story that cemented the marriage between the NFL and the US

Army, turned into a terrible tragedy and a mortifying embarrassment. … when the Stealth Bomber roars

overhead before the game on Sunday … maybe people will remember that American sport's connection

with its armed forces is not all about glory. It's about secrets, lies and death, too.

-- Oliver Holt, The Mirror (1-28-09)

Page 89: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

89

Superbowl XLIII: Pat Tillman was “Barely a Footnote”

[Replay ―The Tillman Story‖ footage showing Pat Tillman‘s #40 jersey retirement at 2004

Cardinals game. Bush on jumbotron. Fighter jet fly-over stadium. ―we will never forget you‖]

. . .

[Tillman statue at University of Phoenix Stadium]

MARY TILLMAN: ―I think they [NFL] haven't gone out of their way to help; they've

exploited Pat, just like the military. … they have a beautiful statue to him at Cardinal

Stadium. I don't know if that's more for us or him; I feel like it's more for them. … They

haven't really helped to try to find out what happened to Pat. …It's like, "Okay, we had

the jersey dedication, we did this, let's move on." … (Dave Zirin interview, 6-02-08)

. . .

NARRATOR: During 2009‘s Superbowl XLIII, only five years later, Pat Tillman was barely a

footnote. ―The NFL sent out a news release with the trumpeting headline: ‗NFL salutes service,

courage and bravery in Super Bowl XLIII.‘ ―It's difficult to think of better words to describe the

most important Cardinal any of us will ever know. But it had nothing to do with Pat Tillman.‖

(Rick Maese)

[Footage from 2009 Superbowl XLIII: (I remember watching pregame footage that showed

Congressman Raul Grijalva -AZ giving President Obama a Tillman #40 jersey at White House

superbowl party.) Gen Petreaus doing the coin toss. Faith Hill sings national anthem.

Army SOCOM honor guard. B1 bomber fly-over].

Note: To my knowledge, this ESPN clip was the extent of the Superbowl Tillman ―tribute‖.

. . .

NARRATOR: ―Pat Tillman might have been the most celebrated story of this year's Super Bowl

between his old Arizona team and the Pittsburgh Steelers. Instead, he's the saddest. And also

the most awkward. … what should have been the dream story that cemented the marriage

between the NFL and the US Army, turned into a terrible tragedy and a mortifying

embarrassment. … American sport‘s connection with its armed forces is not all about glory. It's

about secrets, lies and death, too.‖ (Oliver Holt)

Page 90: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

90

“THE EMPEROR‟S GENERAL”

President Barack Obama and the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystal‟s

Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillman‟s Friendly-Fire Death

Guy Montag (feralfirefighter.blogspot.com)

June 22, 2010

Patrick Tillman, Sr. at Pat Tillman‘s Memorial Service, May 2004

President Obama at Arizona State University, May 13th 2009 President Obama meets with Gen. McChrystal, May 2009.

―… nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family … while I have nothing but respect for

the Tillman Family… their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [General McChrystal]

the president, the Secretary of Defense, and General Petraeus all feel gives the United States … the best chance of

victory in Afghanistan … These are serious questions and are more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or

the alleged abuse of detainees.‖

-- CNAS Fellow Andrew Exum, (Abu Muqawama, June 2, 2009)

―I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was merely that I was young. I

had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one man while flight could make another man king.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―The Emperor‘s General‖ (1999)

Page 91: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

91

“THE EMPEROR‟S GENERAL”

President Obama‟s Whitewash of General McChrystal [Adapted from ―The Emperor‘s General‖]

On Wednesday, May 13th

2009, President Obama delivered his commencement speech to

Arizona State University's graduating class inside Sun Devil Stadium. But, in his speech that

focused heavily on serving a larger good and ―placing character over celebrity and substance

over appearance,‖ Obama did not mention Pat Tillman. Why not? As Bob Young speculated in

his May 17th

column, ―Obama‘s Big-time Fumble‖:

―Maybe it simply was an oversight that Obama forgot Tillman, although we were told

Sunday that Obama was staged inside the Arizona State football locker room before his

speech - where there is a photo of Tillman. And he walked right up and out of Tillman

Tunnel to reach the stage. … Perhaps Obama was sensitive to the fact that the speech

came shortly after the announcement that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would become the

top American commander in Afghanistan. McChrystal was deemed by a Pentagon

investigation to be responsible for inaccurate information from the Army about Tillman's

death, and the Tillman family has been critical of what it believes was his role in a cover-

up of the real events that took place.‖

. . .

On Monday May 11th

2009, President Obama had fired Gen. McKiernan and nominated Gen.

McChrystal to replace him as the new Afghanistan war commander.

In response, Mary Tillman wrote the President to express her concerns about his nomination. In

the foreword to the paperback edition of her book, ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk,‖ she wrote,

―McChrystal‘s actions should have been grounds for firing. That is why it was so disturbing to

us when President Obama instead promoted McChrystal to the position of top commander in

Afghanistan last year. [On May 12th

,] I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding

him of McChrystal‘s involvement in the cover-up of Pat‘s death.‖

. . .

Esquire Magazine asked, ―Who the hell is General McChrystal?‖

During the Bush administration, General Stanley McChrystal was a rising star in the Army.

Because he had become a close friend of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General

McChrystal spent an unusual five years from 2003 to 2008 as commander of Joint Special

Operations Command (JSOC). During the Bush era, JSOC turned into a virtual stand-alone

operation that acted outside the military chain of command ―doing things the executive branch --

Page 92: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

92

read: Cheney and Rumsfeld -- wanted it to do.‖ From his new command in Afghanistan, General

McChrystal reports directly to his longtime colleague and friend General David Petraeus.

As commander of JSOC Gen. McChrystal commanded special forces that targeted and killed

insurgents around the world. Andrew Exum wrote, ―Many policy-makers and journalists think

that McChrystal's work … [at JSOC] was the untold success story of the Surge and the greater

war on terror campaigns."

However, a 2006 report, "No Blood, No Foul," revealed that McChrystal‘s elite forces

conducting interrogations at Camp Nama committed systematic abuse of prisoners leading to at

least three deaths (an Army interrogator said he was getting his orders from McChrystal whom

he saw there ―a couple of times.‖) McChrystal‘s 2008 nomination to become Director of the

Joint Staff was held up while the Senate Armed Services Committee investigated abuse of

detainees by military personnel under McChrystal‘s command. However, McChrystal was never

held accountable for abuse of detainees.

In 2007, a Pentagon investigation into the friendly-fire death in 2004 of Pat Tillman held General

McChrystal accountable for ‖inaccurate information‖ recommending Tillman for a Silver Star.

The Tillman family believes McChrystal played a central role in the Army‘s cover-up of

Tillman‘s friendly-fire death.

. . .

On April 23rd

2009, the Obama administration announced that the Pentagon would turn over to

the ACLU photographs showing detainee abuse of prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq. The court

announced its mandate that the photos be released by May 28th

.

However, just a few weeks later, President Obama decided to block the court-ordered release of

photos. President Obama said the abrupt reversal of his April 23rd

decision, came out of concern

that the pictures would ―endanger U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.‖ The President

announced on May 13th

that release of the photos ―would pose an unacceptable risk of danger to

U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq ―after meeting with Gen Petreaus and other military leaders

on May 12th

. Obama said the ―photos had already served their purpose in investigations of ―a

small number of individuals‖ and ―the individuals who were involved have been identified, and

appropriate actions have been taken.‖

President Obama‘s effort to keep the photos from becoming public represented a sharp reversal

from his repeated pledges for open government, and in particular from his promise to be

forthcoming with information that courts have ruled should be publicly available. In light of

Gen. McChrystal‘s ties to torture, it is worth noting the dates of McChrystal's nomination and

President Obama's decision not to release more photos of prisoner abuse in Iraq: May 11th and

12th, respectively. Perhaps Gen. Petraeus‘s ―deep concern about fresh damage the photos might

Page 93: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

93

do‖ actually also referred to the nomination of his friend Gen. McChrystal? (or possibly

Petraeus‘s own involvement with torture while he was a commander in Iraq?).

. . .

On May 13th

, obviously anticipating that the Government was likely to lose its court appeal,

Obama asked Congress to change FOIA by retroactively narrowing its disclosure requirements to

prevent a legal ruling by the courts. Senator Graham said the White House ―helped them draft

the bill.‖

On May 20th

, U.S. Senators Lindsey Graham, Joe Lieberman, and Senator John McCain

introduced the ―Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act‖ to block the release of the

detainee photos. The very next day, on May 21st, the act was offered as an amendment to the

Supplemental Appropriations bill and the U.S. Senate unanimously passed it.

On June 1st 2009, Glenn Greenwald posted his entry, Obama's support for the new Graham-

Lieberman secrecy law, at salon.com where he wrote:

―To argue that the photos will harm how we are perceived is, necessarily, to acknowledge

that they reveal new information that is not already widely known [McChrystal‘s role in

torture at Camp Nama?]. Apparently, the proper reaction to heinous acts by our political

leaders is not to hold them accountable but, instead, to hide evidence of what they did.

What makes all of this even worse is that it is part of a broader trend whereby

the Government simply retroactively changes the law whenever it decides it does not

want to abide by it.‖

. . .

The act was stripped out of the supplemental appropriations bill. However, it was later added as

an amendment to a Homeland Security Appropriations Bill HR 2892. On October 20, 2009,

Senator McCain praised the passage of the bill,

―I am also pleased this conference report does contain a provision that will allow the

Secretary of Defense to prohibit the disclosure of detainee photographs under the

Freedom of Information Act if he certifies that release of the photos would endanger U.S.

citizens, members of the Armed Forces, or U.S. Government employees deployed outside

the United States.‖

. . .

On October 28, 2009, President Obama finally signed the bill into law.

Page 94: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

94

President Obama‟s “Big-Time Fumble” at Sun Devil Stadium

NARRATOR: On Wednesday May 13th

2009, President Obama delivered his commencement

speech to Arizona State University's graduating class inside Sun Devil Stadium. His speech

focused heavily on ―placing character over celebrity and substance over appearance.‖

[Footage of President Obama delivering speech]

PRESIDENT OBAMA: ―You're taught to chase after all the usual brass rings … you

chase after the big money… you worry about whether you have a fancy enough title or a

fancy enough car. … that's how you will measure success. … the elevation of appearance

over substance, of celebrity over character, of short-term gain over lasting achievement

is precisely what your generation needs to help end … We need your daring, we need

your enthusiasm and your energy, we need your imagination. … I'm talking about an

approach to life -- a quality of mind and quality of heart; a willingness to follow your

passions, regardless of whether they lead to fortune and fame; a willingness to question

conventional wisdom and rethink old dogmas; a lack of regard for all the traditional

markers of status and prestige -- and a commitment instead to doing what's meaningful to

you, what helps others, what makes a difference in this world. … That's the great

American story: young people just like you, following their passions, determined to meet

the times on their own terms. They weren't doing it for the money. … No one thought a

former football player stocking shelves at the local supermarket would return to the game

he loved, become a Super Bowl MVP, and then come here to Arizona and lead your

Cardinals to their first Super Bowl. … Your body of work is never done.‖ (NYT 5-14-09)

NARRATOR: Although the President gave a nod to Arizona Cardinals quarterback Kurt

Warner, he never mentioned Pat Tillman, ―who exemplified character over celebrity and

substance over appearance, the guy who made his name in the very stadium where Obama stood.

Maybe it simply was an oversight that Obama forgot Tillman, although … Obama was staged

inside the Arizona State football locker room before his speech - where there is a photo of

Tillman. And he walked right up and out of Tillman Tunnel to reach the stage.‖ (―Obama's Big-

Time Fumble at ASU‖)

[Walk thru Sun Devil Stadium: photo in locker room, Tillman Tunnel, etc.]

. . .

NARRATOR: So just why did President Obama pass on his ―wide-open opportunity to remind

us that Tillman could be the best example in our lifetimes of someone who eschewed popularity

and personal advancement to devote himself to a bigger purpose?‖ Why did Obama make his

―big-time‖ fumble at Sun Devil Stadium?

Page 95: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

95

“The Emperor‟s General”

NARRATOR: On May 11th

2009, just two days before his ASU commencement speech,

President Obama fired the Afghan war commander, Gen. David McKiernan, and nominated Lt.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal as his replacement. The president praised General McKiernan's

leadership, but said it was time for a ''change of direction in Afghanistan.‖

[President & General McChrystal]

NARRATOR: From 2003 to 2008, General McChrystal was the commander of the Joint Special

Operations Command (JSOC). During the Bush era, JSOC acted outside the military chain of

command ―doing things the executive branch -- read: Cheney and Rumsfeld -- wanted it to do.‖

Gen. McChrystal commanded the special forces that targeted and killed insurgent leaders.

Andrew Exum wrote, ―Many policy-makers and journalists think that McChrystal's work … [at

JSOC] was the untold success story of the Surge and the greater war on terror campaigns."

A 2006 report, "No Blood, No Foul," revealed that McChrystal‘s elite forces conducting

interrogations at Camp Nama committed systematic abuse of prisoners leading to the death of at

least three prisoners. However, McChrystal was never held accountable.

The Pentagon investigation into the Army‘s handling of Tillman‘s death did hold General

McChrystal accountable for ‖inaccurate information‖ (e.g. altered witness statements) in his

Silver Star recommendation. However, General Wallace disregarded those findings and declared

McChrystal cleared of all wrong-doing.

However, Gen. McChrystal actually played a central role in the White House‘s cover-up of

Tillman‘s friendly-fire death.

MR. SCAHILL: I've also heard from people that Cheney helped coordinate the

testimony of General McChrystal about the death of Pat Tillman in Afghanistan, which

was determined to be a friendly-fire incident, and that Cheney actually colluded with

General McChrystal to attempt to cover up that death.‖ (NPR 12-16-09)

. . .

NARRATOR: So, why did President Obama make his ―big-time fumble‖ at Sun Devil stadium?

Why didn‘t he mention Pat Tillman during his commencement speech? Perhaps he was sensitive

to the fact that his speech came just two days after his nomination of Gen. McChrystal?

Mentioning Tillman would risk opening the door to questions about McChrystal‘s central role in

the Tillman cover-up and involvement with torture in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Page 96: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

96

„The McChrystal Protection Act of 2009”

NARRATOR: On May 13th

2009, the same day as his ASU commencement speech, President

Obama announced the reversal of his April 23rd

decision not to appeal the court-ordered release

of photos showing detainee abuse. On May 20th

, U.S. Senators Lindsey Graham, Joe Lieberman

and Senator John McCain introduced the ―Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act.‖

LIEBERMAN: ―As you know, President Obama overturned a decision of some of the

attorneys in the Justice Department not to appeal from a lower court decision in an

ACLU lawsuit that would have compelled the release of these photos. President Obama

did the right thing. He did the right thing because he knows that the release of these

photos will achieve no good and will do great harm. That's why Senator Graham and I

introduced the Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act, to back up President

Obama's commander in chief decision not to release these photos.‖

SENATOR GRAHAM: ―And our goal is to make sure that Congress speaks in a way

that these photos never see the light of day. I think everyone agrees the most effective

way to stop the photos from being released is congressional enactment of a law telling

the courts we do not want these photos released.‖

GRAHAM: ―… Initially, the administration was not going to appeal the 2nd Circuit's

court decision to require release of the photos. We wrote a letter to the president asking

him to reconsider. But, more importantly, our commanders called the president -- they

didn't call him, he called the commanders. He sat down with Secretary Gates. He

listened to General Odierno. …‖

LIEBERMAN: ―… we certainly drafted the amendment together with people in the

White House. … because the president does not want these photos to see the light of

day.‖

GRAHAM: ―We've been pretty low key about this. We passed this thing without a voice

vote. The administration helped write the bill. We compromised in the Senate. And we've

been very quiet, thinking this thing was put to bed. The last thing I wanted to do is make a

big issue about this. I didn't ask for a recorded vote, and we could have.‖

(Weekly Standard, 6-09-09)

NARRATOR: It‘s worth noting the dates of McChrystal's nomination and President Obama's

decision not to release photos of prisoner abuse in Iraq; May 11th and 12th, respectively.

Presumably, some of the photos showed abuse by JSOC forces under under McChrystal‘s

command? The photo release could have led to media controversy and led to difficulties with

McChrystal‘s Senate confirmation.

Page 97: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

97

THOM SHANKER, THE NEW YORK TIMES, AND THE

WHITEWASH OF GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL‟S ROLE IN

THE AFTERMATH OF PAT TILLMAN‟S DEATH

Thom Shanker, New York Times Pentagon Reporter

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, unknown, NYT‘s Thom Shanker

―Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught

in it. …As a consequence, his remarks were a mix of bald truth, diplomatic half-truths, and what

Holcomb had privately called ‗necessary, unconfirmable distortions.‘ Nonetheless, they would

become the government‘s official pronouncement on the day‘s action.‖

―Allegations, lies, denials, dissembling, distortions … And all the while they secretly whispered

to the media … And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their

allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth.‖

--- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

Page 98: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

98

The New York Times “Exonerates” General McChrystal

[Adapted from September 11, 2009 Letter to NYT Public Editor Clark Hoyt]

I‘m writing to express my concerns about The New York Times coverage of General Stanley

McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s death.

In my letter (and attached supporting documents) I argue that Washington Pentagon Reporter

Thom Shanker, and his New York Times editors, whitewashed General McChrystal‘s central

role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s 2004 friendly fire death.

Thom Shanker wrote his May 26th

2009 article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander

Revives Questions in Tillman Case,‖ ―exonerating‖ General McChrystal of wrongdoing in the

Army‘s handling of Tillman‘s fratricide. However, although Shanker‘s article was full of

official government ―facts,‖ my own review showed that his none of his substantive assertions

were truthful.

Thom Shanker failed to further investigate the Tillman case or write a follow-up article

correcting his mistakes, even after he (and the NYT editors) received my 100 page document

(that Shanker said was ―impressive,‖ ―exhaustive‖ and ―well-researched‖). Thom Shanker‘s

articles covering the confirmation hearing did not incorporate my new disclosures, but merely

recycled his ―facts‖ clearing McChrystal of wrongdoing.

I believe you should question Thom Shanker and his NYT editors about their coverage of

General McChrystal‘s Senate confirmation hearing and his handling of the Pat Tillman fratricide.

They should be held accountable for their actions in whitewashing General McChrystal‘s role in

the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death.

. . .

On May 12th

2009, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal for promotion to

four-star general and to become his new Commander of the Afghanistan War.

On May 14th

, The New York Times expressed their concerns about McChrystal‘s nomination in

their editorial, ―New Commander for Afghanistan‖:

―And it was General McChrystal who approved the falsified report that covered up the

2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in Afghanistan. … Before confirming him in

his new command, senators must assure themselves that he …will insist on lawful

treatment of detainees and candid military reporting.‖

Five years prior to McChrystal‘s nomination, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished

Silver Star. I felt it would be a travesty of justice if McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate,

promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and handed his fourth star. So, I once again took out my

Page 99: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

99

box of Tillman documents, and closely reviewed General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath

of Tillman‘s death.

. . .

Senator James Webb had been a hero of mine for three decades. I hadn‘t always agreed with his

positions, but I had never before doubted his integrity or his sense of honor. I‘d read his novels

that dealt with themes of honor, loyalty, integrity, and betrayal for thirty 30 years; long before he

became a U.S. Senator from Virginia in 2006. With Webb‘s background as a decorated Vietnam

Marine, I believed he would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family.

On May 27th,

I was finishing my letter to Senator Webb that asked him to place a ―hold‖ on

McChrystal‘s confirmation. In my 100 page document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?

– Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman,‖ I argued

Congress and the senior leadership of the Army had acted with a long series of ―investigations‖

to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close scrutiny and to protect him from punishment

for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

That evening, I read the NYT article, ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives

Questions in Tillman Case.‖ (5-26-09), written by Thom Shanker (NYT Washington Pentagon

Reporter).

Thom Shanker wrote that General McChrystal had been cleared of wrongdoing in the Army‘s

handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide: McChrystal was not responsible for investigating the

fratricide and notifying the family, had sent a ―timely‖ P4 memo to warn his superiors, and had

merely signed off on Tillman‘s misleading Silver Star citation without firsthand knowledge.

However, my analysis (of the same investigative reports Thom Shanker reviewed) found

General McChrystal had played a central role in the Army‘s cover up of Tillman‘s friendly fire

death; none of Thom Shanker‘s assertions clearing McChrystal of wrongdoing held up under

scrutiny!: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide within two days yet didn‘t

send his ―timely‖ P4 memo until a week later, had the responsibility to notify the family and

chose not to (the family wasn‘t told until 35 days later), and personally led the packaging of the

Silver Star recommendation (with a false narrative and fabricated witness statements).

Note: For a very detailed, point-by-point refutation of Shanker‘s assertions, see

―Rebuttal of Thom Shanker‘s Pre-Hearing Article: ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan

Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case‖

I e-mailed Thom Shanker that evening. I wrote that my document discussed in detail every point

raised in his article and I described the highlights of my new information about the Tillman case

not addressed in his article. Shortly afterwards, Thom Shanker replied: ―Please feel free to send

me your material, as I would be eager to review it.‖

Page 100: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

100

The following morning, on the 28th, I sent Shanker an email containing the Word documents

from ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet‖ and an email with much of the Appendices

material. That afternoon, I sent a hard-copy of my document by Federal Express to both Thom

Shanker and Senator James Webb. Thom Shanker received my document on Friday the 29th

at

9:38 AM. That afternoon, he replied to my follow-up email: ―Yes, it arrived. I will review your

documents this weekend. Thanks.‖ But, I was concerned that Shanker hadn‘t contacted me with

questions about my document. And why was he waiting so long to review my materials? Was

he sitting on the story?

. . .

On Monday June 1st, I awoke to read the NYT Editorial ―Questions for General McChrystal.‖

The editors wrote that General McChrystal ―needs to be rigorously questioned‖ and ―The Senate

owes the American people more than a pro forma confirmation of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal.‖

But, why didn‘t the editors mention General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Pat

Tillman‘s death? (In their May 14th

editorial, they had raised concerns about McChrystal‘s

―falsified report‖ and his less-than ―candid military reporting‖). Was this omission due to Thom

Shanker‘s May 26th

review that had ―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any wrongdoing?

I immediately emailed Thom Shanker, ―Why isn't there any mention of McChrystal's role in the

handling of the Tillman case? … Will the NYT be publishing a follow up to your May 26th

article before the confirmation hearing?‖

Shanker replied: ―… any question about an editorial should be directed to The Times editorial

board, and not to a newsroom reporter.‖ … ―Do you have any sense at all that Senators will be

pressing on the Tillman case?‖ … Again, thanks for the very detailed and voluminous file you

sent. It was very well researched and quite thorough.‖

Well, it‘s always nice to receive praise, but why wasn‘t Thom Shanker ―pressing‖ the Senators

on the Tillman case? Why wasn‘t Shanker questioning his Congressional sources? Why wasn‘t

he doing anything to follow up on the revelations in my document?

Later that morning, I tried again: ―Could you please answer my question? Are you going to

publish a follow-up to your May 26th piece based on my document or any other information

you've received? If not, why not? Why did you even bother to raise questions about McChrystal

and Tillman in your May 26th article?‖

Thom Shanker replied: ―At this point there will not be a follow-on story on the Tillman

investigation prior to the hearing, although we will see what the hearing brings up tomorrow.‖

Page 101: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

101

―See what the hearing brings up‖? Couldn‘t Shanker play a more active role? He was very

familiar with the Tillman case after writing his May 26th

article (which I had discredited). Why

wasn‘t he doing further investigation?

. . .

I decided to take Thom Shanker‘s advice that ―any question about an editorial should be directed

to The Times editorial board, and not to a newsroom reporter.‖ On Monday afternoon, June 1st,

I sent the following email to the NYT editors (Letters to the Editor, Editorial Page Editor, News

Dept., the Executive Editor, the Managing Editor, News-Tips, National Newsroom, and the

Washington Newsroom. Unfortunately I neglected to email the Public Editor):

I was surprised that your editorial today, ―Questions for General McChrystal,‖ did not

mention General McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide.

I‘ve been corresponding with Thom Shanker, your NYT Pentagon correspondent, since

last Wednesday in reference to his May 26th article ―Nomination of US Afghan

Commander Revives Questions in Tillman‘s Case.‖ Last Thursday, I FedExed my 100

page document to him detailing new disclosures of General McChrystal‘s central role in

the whitewash of Tillman‘s death.

However, it doesn‘t appear that Thom Shanker is following up with another article. I

think the NYT editorial board would find it useful to speak with him and get a copy of

this document before tomorrow‘s June 2nd

confirmation hearing of General McChrystal

before the Senate Armed Services Committee (or read my letters below and attachments).

Below, you can read my May 27th

letter to Thom Shanker and my letter to Senator Webb.

If you would like more information, I‘ve also ―attached‖ many of the documents in the

package I sent to Thom Shanker.

I never received a response to my email from any of the editors at The New York Times (At the

time, I hoped that an editor might prod Shanker into a follow-up story on the Tillman case).

. . .

On June 2nd

2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystal‘s

confirmation hearing. However, the hearing was just a ―pro forma confirmation‖ and the

Senators did not ―rigorously question― McChrystal. David Corn commented on PBS‘s News

Hour: ―And so the Pat Tillman questioning … I thought, seemed very orchestrated and didn't

give a full airing … a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and

Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan‖

Shortly after the hearing ended, Thom Shanker‘s article covering the hearing, ―Nominee to

Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety,‖ [see p. 61] appeared on the NYT‘s website.

However, Shanker failed to incorporate any of my new information about General McChrystal‘s

Page 102: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

102

central role in the Army‘s cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide into his article. Instead, Shanker

merely recycled his same rebutted assertions (from his 5-26-09 article) that McChrystal was

―cleared of any wrongdoing.‖

In addition, Thom Shanker failed to note three new revelations from McChrystal‘s testimony:

1. McChrystal‘s new account of when and where he first learned of Tillman‘s fratricide

contradicted his previous testimony and the testimony of General Abizaid and COL

Nixon. Their accounts over the course of several investigations simply didn‘t match up.

McChrystal, Abizaid, and/or Nixon gave false testimony before the investigators and/or

Congress.

2. General Wallace cleared McChrystal since he only ―signed off‖ on the Silver Star

recommendation and ―had no reasonable basis to question the recommendation.‖ But,

McChrystal testified he was in Afghanistan and led the Ranger officers during the Silver

Star recommendation process! He didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that just

dropped onto his desk!

3. General McChrystal publicly confirmed the existence of last year‘s secret review prior

to his 2008 confirmation hearing: ―You gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail one

of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed session with this committee a year ago,

in advance of my confirmation as Director of the Joint Staff …‖

Obviously, the real confirmation hearing took place last year behind closed doors. Why didn‘t

Thom Shanker (or any other reporter) follow-up and ask the Senators what the Senators learned

during last year‘s ―executive session‖ when McChrystal‘s actions were ―discussed in detail‖?

. . .

But later that evening, I was unable to find Thom Shanker‘s article. It had disappeared from the

NYT website sometime after 4 PM! (Luckily, I was able to find a copy of the original version

that had fortuitously been posted onto the Internet).

―Nominee to Command Afghanistan Stresses Civilian Safety‖ that provided coverage of the

hearing had been replaced by a drastically different article, ―U.S. Report Finds Errors in Afghan

Airstrikes.‖ This article focused on mistaken U.S. airstrikes in Afghanistan and included

literally only a couple of token lines about McChrystal‘s hearing at the very end of the article:

Why did Thom Shanker‘s original article disappear? Perhaps one of my emails sent to the NYT

editors had been read by someone in the editorial food chain who made the decision to

―disappear‖ Thom Shanker‘s article?

. . .

Page 103: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

103

After cooling off for a few days, on June 5th

, I emailed Thom Shanker and asked why he never

did a follow up on the Tillman case using my new information:

… I still don‘t understand why you didn't write a follow-up to your article last week

―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions in Tillman Case.‖ You

wrote that ―Unless new information on General McChrystal‘s role in the episode emerges

between now and his confirmation hearing, set for June 2nd

, the question is not expected

to figure heavily in the Senate debate." …

Could you please explain to me why my document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to

write a follow-up article? Or at least include some of my information in your June 2nd

article about the hearing? I would welcome any criticism from you of my arguments or

facts contained in my document.

Thom Shanker replied:

Thank you for your note. Your research is exhaustive and impressive. My question back

to you would be:

Why are even senators who were most outspoken in criticism of the handling of the

Tillman case -- in particular Senator Webb, who has figured extensively in your research

and in comments by the Tillman family -- now expressing satisfaction with the public

resolution of the inquiries and now, apparently, ready to confirm General McChrystal

next week? Remember, as I know you do, that the legislative branch is a key check and

balance not only of the executive, but of the military. It controls funding and

confirmation to senior general officer jobs.

Again, thanks for sharing your impressive work with me.

On June 6th

, I once again tried to get an answer from Thom Shanker as to why he didn‘t follow-

up on my disclosures:

… I would guess that Webb, and the other senators, think McChrystal is the best man to

lead the Afghan escalation and are willing to forgive his central role in the cover-up of

Tillman's fratricide. And they all know that McChrystal was just obeying orders from

Rumsfeld and the White House to get out good PR at a bad time (Abu Gharib, etc.).

Besides, now the senators are stuck with the "hot potato." They're the last link in the

chain of "investigations" into the handling of the Tillman case. They've got to cover their

own ass now.

But my question for you still remains unanswered. Despite your praise for my document

as "exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched" none of my findings appeared in

your following articles concerning the Tillman case. Wouldn't my 100 page document

qualify as "new information"? (or are only official government leaks considered

authoritative enough to appear in print?) Could you please explain to me why my

Page 104: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

104

document wasn‘t sufficient to prompt you to write a follow-up to your May 26th article?

Or at least include some of my findings in your June 2nd article about the hearing as a

counterpoint to the official government position?

I never received a response from Thom Shanker. Perhaps I shouldn‘t have needled him a little

with my with my ―government leaks‖ remark (referring to Thom Shanker‘s NYT coverage of the

Jessica Lynch coverage in 2004).

. . .

Despite Thom Shanker‘s praise for my document, ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ as

"exhaustive", "impressive", and "well researched", he never used it‘s revelations to follow-up on

his deeply flawed May 26th

review ―Nomination of U.S. Afghan Commander Revives Questions

in Tillman Case‖ that supposedly ―cleared‖ General McChrystal of any wrongdoing. Why not?

I‘m still puzzled as to who was responsible for posing the ―questions [that] have surfaced again

after General McChrystal‘s nomination to be the top American commander in Afghanistan.‖?

Who at the NYT prompted Thom Shanker to write his May 26th

article? Who decided to

―disappear‖ Shanker‘s June 2nd

article about the hearing?

[Note: Mary Tillman sent an email and letter to President Obama on May 12th

criticizing

McChrystal‘s nomination. Did the NYT editorial ―questions have surfaced again‖ refer to her

letter? I now believe that Thom Shanker wrote his May 26th

specifically to ―exonerate‖

McChrystal of all wrong-doing for the Obama administration. Afterwards, the politicians could

all point to his article as proof that McChrystal had been cleared of all wrong-doing by the Gray

Lady, the ―paper of record.‖]

I think Shanker‘s post-hearing article was ―disappeared‖ after some NYT editor got my letter and

got a bit nervous that someone might cast a critical eye at Shanker‘s hearing coverage given my

revelations. ‗Better safe, than sorry; pull the piece‘.

. . .

In the Tillman case, Thom Shanker and The New York Times bear the dishonor of playing the

final role in the Tillman cover-up story. The New York Times laid the topmost layer upon the

tall stack of Army and Congressional cover-ups (‗investigations‖) of the Tillman fratricide.

Once again, as in the Jessica Lynch case, The New York Times has provided coverage (or lack

thereof) that brings into question the integrity of its journalism and its ability to use what Kevin

Tillman called a ―mountain of evidence to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion‖.

Instead of an objective search for the truth of General McChrystal actions in the aftermath of Pat

Tillman‘s death, The New York Times has displayed its stenographical abilities to parrot the

official government position ―borne out by facts, if not the truth‖.

Note: I never received a response from the NYT Public Editor Clark Hoyt.

Page 105: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

105

“DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?”

Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal,

and Congress‟s Betrayal of Pat Tillman

Marie Tillman (wife), Mary Tillman (mother), Richard Tillman (brother),

Kevin Tillman (brother), Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father) – May 4, 2004 Memorial Service

―… we have all been betrayed. It isn‘t just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they

betray all of us.‖ … ―We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. … in your

heart they are your kids and you turn them over, and we trusted. … we knew they [Pat & Kevin]

could die or they could come back wounded … But we never thought that they would use him

the way they did‖

-- Mary Tillman, Congressional testimony (April 24, 2007)

―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my

pa last night and he says, Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now.

Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)

Page 106: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

106

SENATOR JAMES WEBB AND THE WHITEWASH OF

GENERAL STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL‟S ROLE IN THE

AFTERMATH OF PAT TILLMAN‟S DEATH [Adapted from “Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth”]

April 3rd

2008 Letter to Senator James Webb

Military service was prevalent and respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillman‘s uncles were

at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the Korean War.

As Mary Tillman wrote in her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk: The Life & Death of Pat

Tillman‖:

―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s pride in being a Marine.

When I was three years old … I would stand between my parents, feet digging into the

soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps Hymn at the top of my

lungs.‖

I‘ve read the novels of James Webb over the past thirty 30 years, long before he became a U.S.

Senator from Virginia in 2006. His novels have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty

and betrayal. With Senator Webb‘s background as a decorated Vietnam Marine, I believed he

would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family.

On April 3rd 2008, I sent a letter to Senator Webb asking him to become a Senate advocate for

Mary Tillman‘s struggle to learn the truth about her son‘s death. I asked Webb to meet Mary

during the Washington stop of her May book tour.

On April 29th 2008, Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Affairs Assistant Gordon Peterson

replied to my follow-up email: ―I have alerted the senator‘s scheduling director to the

information on the Washington leg of her tour and provided her with your letter to the senator.‖ I

figured I was getting blown off by Peterson.

Senator Webb didn‘t meet Mary Tillman when she was in Washington on May 12th

at Olsson's -

Penn Quarter bookstore.

Timeline of Pat Tillman Fratricide Notification Up the Chain of Command

On May 8th

2008, after speaking with Mary Tillman during her book signing in Detroit, I decided

to take a more detailed look through the voluminous Tillman investigative documents. On May

Page 107: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

107

20th

2008, I finished my review and constructed a detailed timeline showing when the Army

chain of command learned about Tillman‘s fratricide. On May 25th

2008, I sent a copy of my

findings to Scott Laidlaw at The Associated Press:

―A couple of weeks ago, while reading your article, ―Pat Tillman‘s Mother Recalls

Journey for Facts‖ (5-13-08), you mentioned AP had obtained new documents under

FOIA … Do your FOIA documents also include testimony from GEN McChrystal and

General Abizaid? Why? Well, I plowed through the GEN Jones 15-6 report, the DoD

IG Report, and transcripts from the Waxman hearings to put together a ―Timeline of

Tillman Fratricide Notification‖. I spotted testimony that suggest Gen. Abizaid gave

false testimony to the IG and Congress, that Tillman‘s fratricide was confirmed only two

days after his death (not five weeks), and that Gen. McChrystal‘s P4 message wasn‘t very

―timely.‖ … Perhaps you could resolve (or confirm) these apparent contradictions using

the documents you obtained under FOIA? ―

I received no response from Scott Laidlaw.

Senator Webb Mentions Senate Tillman “Review” on the Diane Rhem Show

Just a couple of days later, on May 27th

2008, I spoke briefly with Senator Webb on NPR radio

during the call-in portion of ―The Diane Rhem Show‖ (40:56). During his response, Webb

mentioned a recent Senate review of the Tillman fratricide:

―I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request of the

Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] … What we do

know … is that the Army knew that this was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, they

did not tell the family, they allowed a ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise

… I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of

command, how it was handled publicly, but it was really wrong. … You cannot help but

still feel angry about how his death was used.‖

I‘d followed the Tillman case very closely during the past four years. Although I was familiar

with Congressman Henry Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee‘s Tillman

investigation, I was surprised to hear about Senator Webb‘s ―review‖. I hadn‘t read anything at

all in the news about a Senate investigation.

And I shared Senator Webb‘s anger about how Pat Tillman‘s death was used. But I didn‘t

understand why Webb was ―not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies‖! I doubted

that Senator Webb actually conducted a ―fairly thorough review‖ of how the Army handled

Tillman‘s fratricide. My own review of the investigative documents, completed just before I

spoke with Senator Webb, revealed that General McChrystal had played a key role in the Army‘s

Page 108: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

108

cover-up of Tillman‘s friendly fire death: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillman‘s

fratricide within two days from the investigating officer (―I‘m certain, I‘m sure), had the

responsibility to tell Tillman‘s family about the fratricide but made the decision not to tell the

family, and he personally led the Ranger officers as they assembled a ―misleading‖ Silver Star

package (with a false citation and tampered witness statements), and then he waited a week

before sending his ―timely‖ P4 memo to supposedly warn his superiors of ―potential fratricide‖!

On May 30th

2008, I emailed Gordon Peterson to try to learn more about Webb‘s Senate review:

―As Senator Webb‘s Military Affairs Legislative Assistant, I assume you took the lead in

in conducting that review process. What is the status of that process? What were your

findings? Could send me a copy of your findings?‖ …―… I believe that responsibility

ultimately lies at the top of the chain of command, with Rumsfeld and/or the White

House (It would be interesting to hear Scott McClellan‘s take on his role in the Tillman

case). But, I haven‘t seen a paper trail to directly support my belief.

However, there is a paper trail that indicates false testimony by either COL Nixon, GEN

McChrystal, or GEN. Abizaid … I‘ve appended my supporting timeline and notes at the

end of this letter. Hopefully, this information may be useful for you during your review

of how the Tillman fratricide was handled by the Bush administration.‖

However, Gordon Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the Senate review.

Later that day, he replied:

―Regarding your questions about the radio interview, I‘m not in a position to elaborate. I

did not participate in the review that Senator Webb mentioned and have no information to

provide to you. The senator‘s involvement occurred in his capacity as a member of the

Senate Committee on Armed Services. I checked with Senator Webb, and he has nothing

more to add to what he said last week. If you have any additional questions you should

contact a representative for the Committee -- Gary Leeling [Lead Counsel for the

Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee], 202 224-9339. He

is out of the office until next week.‖

I didn‘t immediately follow up with Gary Leeling (Legal Counsel for Senator Carl Levin). I was

very busy with life (and had just spent far too much time on the Tillman case) and figured I was

just getting blown off again by Gordon Peterson (I didn‘t call Leeling until the following year,

just before the June 2nd

confirmation hearing).

Note: Although Senator Webb has spoken with Pat Tillman, Sr., he has never spoken with Mary

Tillman. Mary Tillman wasn‘t able to get past Gordon Peterson to speak directly with the

Senator.

Page 109: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

109

House Oversight Committee Shielded Gen. McChrystal from Public Scrutiny

On July 14th

2008, Congressman Henry Waxman‘s House Oversight & Reform Committee

finally issued their report ―Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch

Episodes.‖ The Committee concluded:

―the pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes it

impossible for the Committee to assign responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal

Tillman‘s and Private Lynch‘s cases…‖

But after reviewing the Committee‘s report, I realized their perfunctory investigation had served

to protect General McChrystal from close scrutiny and was just another layer upon the previous

investigative cover-ups of the Tillman fratricide. On July 26th

2008, I sent an email to Mike Fish

(investigative reporter for ESPN):

―After reading your article, ―House Calls Out Government in Tillman Friendly Fire

Death‖ (ESPN 7-14-08), I wasn‘t particularly surprised at the White House‘s ―lack of

recall‖ about Pat Tillman‘s fratricide (although I did find myself wishing that Scott

McClellan had been put on the spot during his book tour circuit!).

However, after reading Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee‘s report, I was surprised

to learn the Committee never interviewed General McChrystal! McChrystal was the key

link in the chain of command between Col. Nixon (Ranger Regiment) and Abizaid

(CENTCOM), he wrote the P4 memo, and he approved the false narrative of the Silver

Star citation. Initially, McChrystal was scheduled to appear before the Committee, but he

―declined‖ to appear at their August 2007 hearing. Why didn‘t the Committee follow up?

Were they (and the Army) protecting McChrystal? Was the Waxman report just the final

layer upon the cover-up of the Tillman fratricide?

―Last August, General Kensinger was singled out as the primary reason many people

believe the Army covered up Tillman‘s fratricide … However, I believe General

Kensinger was merely the scapegoat for the sins of the Army and Bush administration. I

would argue that General McChrystal, COL Nixon, and GEN Abiziad were just as guilty

of the same charges for which Kensinger was singled out.‖

. . .

After the House Oversight Committee issued their report, the Tillman story was pretty much laid

to rest. Tillman‘s name was rarely mentioned, even when Tillman‘s NFL football team, the

Arizona Cardinals, played at the Superbowl.

Page 110: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

110

Obama Nominates General McChrystal to Become Afghan Commander

On May 12th

2009, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal for promotion to

four-star general and commander of the Afghanistan War.

The following day, on May 13th

, President Obama gave the commencement address for Arizona

State University inside Sun Devil Stadium without once mentioning Pat Tillman‘s name! (in the

very stadium in which he played college football!) Why the omission?

In his May 17th

column, ―Obama‘s Big-Time Fumble,‖ Bob Young (The Arizona Republic)

speculated that Obama was sensitive to the fact that his speech was the day after his nomination

of General McChrystal.

―Maybe it simply was an oversight that Obama forgot Tillman, although we were told

Sunday that Obama was staged inside the Arizona State football locker room before his

speech - where there is a photo of Tillman. And he walked right up and out of Tillman

Tunnel to reach the stage. … Perhaps Obama was sensitive to the fact that the speech

came shortly after the announcement that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would become the

top American commander in Afghanistan. McChrystal was deemed by a Pentagon

investigation to be responsible for inaccurate information from the Army about Tillman's

death, and the Tillman family has been critical of what it believes was his role in a cover-

up of the real events that took place. … Obama had a wide-open opportunity to remind

us that Tillman could be the best example in our lifetimes of someone who eschewed

popularity and personal advancement to devote himself to a bigger purpose. For some

reason, the president passed.‖

I think Bob Young hit the nail on the head. President Obama didn‘t want to risk once again

raising the issue of McChrystal‘s handling of Pat Tillman‘s fratricide by even mentioning

Tillman‘s name!

. . .

Five years prior to McChrystal‘s nomination, Pat Tillman‘s family were handed a tarnished

Silver Star. I felt it would be a travesty of justice if McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate,

promoted to the Army‘s highest rank, and handed his fourth star. So, I once again took out my

box of Tillman documents, and closely reviewed General McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath

of Tillman‘s death.

On May 15th

2009, I managed to (once again) call into the NPR Diane Rhem radio show during

her Friday News Round-up program. General McChrystal‘s recent nomination was a topic of

conversation for her guest panelists.

Page 111: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

111

“Has Congress Been Protecting General McChrystal?”

On May 15

th 2009, I managed to (once again) call into the NPR Diane Rhem radio show during

her Friday News Round-up program. General McChrystal‘s recent nomination was a topic of

conversation for her guest panelists:

―Good morning Diane, I‘d like to raise the following question for your guests: has

Congress been protecting General McChrystal from hard scrutiny into his central role in

the Army‘s cover up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death?

Senators Levin and McCain don‘t foresee any problem with General McChrystal‘s

confirmation as the new commander of the Afghanistan War. But, in her book, Mary

Tillman strongly criticized McChrystal: ―Not only is he lying about the circumstances

surrounding Pat‘s death, … he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative.

… His statement indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that

Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so.‖

Last May, McChrystal‘s role in the handling of Tillman‘s fratricide was reviewed by the

Senate Armed Services Committee. Shortly afterward, about a year ago, I spoke to

Senator Jim Webb here on The Diane Rhem Show: Webb said, ―… the Army knew that

this was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, [but] they did not tell the family, … I‘m

not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of

command … You cannot help but still feel angry about how his death was used.

‖I share Senator Webb‘s anger. But, I don‘t understand why Webb was unable to

determine ―where responsibility … really lies.‖ [Diane Rhem Show, 5-15-097]:

Note: unfortunately, Diane Rhem cut Guy Montag off; the following was not read on the air

―General McChrystal was the central figure in the Tillman cover up and made the

decision to withhold knowledge of Tillman‘s fratricide from his family. And I don‘t

understand why Congressman Henry Waxman allowed McChrystal to refuse to testify at

the House Oversight Committee‘s 2007 Tillman Fratricide Hearing.

Five years ago, Pat Tillman was awarded a tarnished Silver Star. I believe it will be a

travesty if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate, awarded his fourth star, and promoted

to the Army‘s highest-rank.‖

NARRATOR: Diane Rhem‘s guests didn‘t respond to the caller‘s question if Congress had been

protecting McChrystal. Barbara Slavis said the Silver Star narrative and P4 memo was

―troubling.‖ Diane Rhem said we need to ―clear up‖ when the Silver Star is awarded. At the

end of the program, Diane Rhem said they had received a lot of emails on the fact that the

―Silver Star is an award for valor, but it does not require that the recipient be receiving enemy

fire.‖

Page 112: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

112

NYT Editorial Reveals Secret 2008 Confirmation Hearing

On May 14th

, The New York Times published their editorial, ―New Commander for

Afghanistan‖:

―Less impressively, some of his commando units were implicated in abusive

interrogations of Iraqi prisoners. And it was General McChrystal who approved the

falsified report that covered up the 2004 friendly-fire death of Cpl. Pat Tillman in

Afghanistan. These issues came at the time of his confirmation last year for his present

job as director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before confirming him in his new command,

senators must assure themselves that he has learned the hard lessons from these mistakes

and will insist on lawful treatment of detainees and candid military reporting.‖

―These issues came at the time of his confirmation last year‖! After reading this editorial on

about May 16th, I finally realized the ―review‖ Senator Webb‘s mentioned last year on the Diane

Rhem Show was part of General McChrystal‘s previous Senate confirmation process.

Sure enough, when I checked the Senate Armed Services Committee‘s website, I found the full

committee had met on May 15th

2008 to consider ―pending military nominations‖ in ―executive

session‖ (―executive session‖: secret, closed hearing with no transcript). The following week,

on May 22nd

, General McChrystal was unanimously confirmed by the Committee. Shortly

thereafter, General McChrystal was promoted by the full Senate to Director of the Joint Staff.

[Note: My speculation was confirmed by McChrystal‘s June 2nd

2009 testimony: ‖You gave me

the opportunity to discuss in detail, one of those failures, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed session

with this committee a year ago, in advance of my confirmation as Director of the Joint Staff …‖]

So, shortly after I asked Senator Webb in April 2008 to become Mary Tillman‘s Senate

advocate, and while Mary Tillman was in Washington DC on May 12th

on her book tour, Senator

Webb participated in a secret Senate review that shielded General McChrystal‘s role in the

cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide from public scrutiny! And instead of punishing McChrystal for

his actions, the Senate promoted him!

So, I got motivated to take out my box of Tillman documents, and take a closer look at General

McChrystal‘s actions in the aftermath of Tillman‘s death. I reviewed General Jones‘s 2004 15-6

report, the 2007 Dept. of Defense Inspector General report (IG report), transcripts from the two

2007 House Oversight & Reform Committee‘s Tillman hearings, the 2008 House Oversight

Committee‘s final report, the 2007 General Wallace report press conference transcript, and other

newspaper accounts about the Tillman case.

Page 113: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

113

May 25th

2009 Letter to Senator James Webb

After completing my review, I concluded that Congress, the Dept. of Defense Inspector General,

and the top leadership of the Army had acted to shield General McChrystal from close scrutiny

and to protect him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat

Tillman‘s fratricide.

During the final two weeks of May, I wrote another long letter to Senator Webb. I asked the

Senator to place a ―hold‖ on General McChrystal‘s confirmation and to take a closer look at

McChrystal‘s role in the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide.

James Webb had been a hero to me for three decades. I hadn‘t always agreed with his positions,

but I had never before doubted his integrity or his sense of honor. At the time, I thought perhaps

Senator Webb was unaware of McChrystal‘s actions (perhaps he had been given incomplete

information from Congressional staffers such as Gerald Leeling and Gordon Peterson?) Or,

perhaps I thought I could shame him into finally doing the right thing for the Tillman family:

―I‘d like to think that after three years in Congress you haven‘t yet learned the lesson your great

aunt Lena asked of you after graduating from law school in 1976, ‗Did they teach you how to lie

yet?‖‘‖

My letter to Senator Webb became the introduction to my document, ―Did They Teach You How

to Lie Yet?‖ – Senator James Webb, General Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat

Tillman‖ (with fifty pages of text and 50 pages of supporting investigative documents).

―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ laid out my argument that Congress and the senior

leadership of the Army had acted to shield General McChrystal‘s actions from close scrutiny and

protect him from punishment for his central role in orchestrating the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s

fratricide.

On May 27th

, I sent Senator Webb a copy of ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ His office

didn‘t receive this document until probably couple of weeks later (I was sleep deprived and had

forgotten about security delays in mail delivery to the Senate. I should have just faxed it!)

However, I did send his office an email version of the introductory letter on May 28th

.

. . .

On June 1st, just prior to McChrystal‘s confirmation hearing, I called Senator Webb‘s

Washington office to follow-up and told the phone staffer it was important for Webb to read my

email prior to the next day‘s confirmation hearing. Another staffer found my email and said he

would print it and give it to Senator Webb.

Page 114: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

114

Note: In the foreword to her paperback edition of ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk,‖ Mary

Tillman wrote, ―I also contacted the staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb

and expressed my concerns. I had several conversations with members of the staffs [including

Gordon Peterson] of both senators, but it was clear that neither senator wanted to get involved.‖

. . .

On June 1st, I finally called Gerald Leeling (legal counsel for Chairman Senator Carl Levin) to

whom Gordon Peterson (Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Affairs Assistant) had referred me

to a year previously. I had a brief discussion with Gary Leeling. Although he confirmed the

existence of the hearing, in response to my questions, he only said ―it was in executive session‖

and the Tillman case had ―been thoroughly reviewed with the information available to us at the

time.‖

Page 115: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

115

GEN. MCCHRYSTAL CONFIRMATION HEARING Senate Armed Services Committee, June 2nd 2009

Gen. McChrystal testifying before Senate (June 2, 2009)

Chairman Senator Carl Levin Senator James Webb Ranking Member Senator John McCain

―Okay. General, you and I talked about another issue, … I assume you would agree … that the

definition of ‗‗leadership‘‘ goes well beyond battlefield competence, it goes to stewardship

toward the people who have served under us. … there was a period where I believe the Army

failed the [Tillman] family, when the knowledge was going up through the chain of command

that this was a friendly-fire incident. And I‘ve been contacted by their family again … You have

not, to my knowledge, been on record in terms of how you personally feel about this incident,

and I would like to give you the opportunity to do that.‖

-- Senator James Webb (June 2, 2009)

Page 116: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

116

General McChrystal‟s June 2nd

2009 Senate Confirmation Hearing

On June 2nd

2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystal‘s

confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and commander of the Afghanistan

War. However, the hearing was strictly pro forma and the Senators didn't press McChrystal

aggressively during the nearly three-hour hearing.

As David Corn commented on PBS‘s News Hour: ―And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the

questioning about detainee abuse, I thought, seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full

airing to these very, I think, hot-button issues‖. … ―You know, he came up with what sounded to

be a plausible explanation, but, again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that

Democrats and Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan‖

Only Senator McCain and Senator Webb asked General McChrystal a couple of softball

questions on his handling of the Tillman fratricide. Senator McCain asked McChrystal ―why he

[McChrystal] forwarded the Silver Star recommendation in the form that it was in.‖ Senator

Webb said ―You have not … been on the record in terms of how you personally feel about this

incident, and I would like to give you the opportunity to do that.‖ Neither Senator asked

McChrystal any follow-up questions.

General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more sinister

than "mistakes" made to honor Tillman. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive," he said.

"We failed the family. And I was a part of that." He earlier expressed his "deepest condolences"

to Tillman's family and fellow rangers. Mary Tillman said she neither accepts nor believes

McChrystal's apology. "McChrystal was lying," she said.

Mary Tillman said, "I think more effort should have been made on the part of the committee to

find out more about his true nature, his true character and his true actions in terms of the detainee

abuse and Pat's situation.‖ She criticized Sen. John McCain for "playing dumb" by not following

up on McChrystal's explanations.

. . .

During the June 2nd

Senate Armed Services Committee‘s confirmation hearing, I found it curious

that both Chairmen Senator Levin and General McChrystal, at the beginning of their opening

remarks, specifically mentioned the previously secret 2008 confirmation hearing.

Why did they both mention the 2008 hearing? Well, the night before the June 2nd hearing, I

spoke briefly with Gary Leeling (legal counsel for Levin). Leeling confirmed the existence of

the hearing, but would say nothing further in response to my questions except ―it was in

executive session‖ and the Tillman case had ―been thoroughly reviewed with the information

available to us at the time.‖ Perhaps Levin and McChrystal mentioned the closed hearing to

avoid the possible allegation they had kept the existence of the 2008 hearing a secret?

Page 117: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

117

General McChrystal‟s Pro-Forma Senate Confirmation Hearing

NARRATOR: On June 2

nd 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing for

General McChrystal‘s confirmation of his promotion to four-star general and commander of the

Afghanistan War. But the Senators didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly three-

hour hearing with only Senator Levin, Senator McCain and Senator Webb tossing McChrystal a

few soft-ball questions about detainee torture and his handling of Tillman‘s fratricide.

MARGARET WARNER: ―… there was a lot of anticipation about the questioning

today, and that had to do with the Pat Tillman incident. Now, you heard him apologize,

say they mishandled it. Has that been put to rest?‖

DAVID CORN: ―You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible

explanation, but, again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats

and Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan," maybe because

General David Petraeus highly recommended him and, if he wants him, they think it's a

good idea.

And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I thought

seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think, hot-button

issues.‖ (PBS Newshour, 6-02-09)

NARRATOR: Mary Tillman said, "I think more effort should have been made on the part of the

committee to find out more about his true nature, his true character and his true actions in terms

of the detainee abuse and Pat's situation‖

. . .

Note: Shortly before the hearing, Guy Montag sent a letter ―Did They Teach You How to Lie

Yet?‖ to Senator Webb asking him to put a hold on McChrystal‘s nomination.

In the foreword to the paperback edition of her book, ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk,‖ Mary

Tillman wrote, ―I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystal‘s

involvement in the cover-up of Pat‘s death. In the letter, I suggested McChrystal should be

―scrutinized very carefully‖ by the Senate Armed Services Committee. I also contacted the

staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb and expressed my concerns. I had

several conversations with members of the staffs of both senators, but it was clear that neither

senator wanted to get involved. … I had always believed Pat‘s case was politically awkward for

him [Senator McCain] and so he‘d chosen to distance himself from the entire affair. … I was

willing to do that [give him questions for McChrystal] until I learned that McCain was already

publicly endorsing the McChrystal appointment before the hearing even began. … Sadly,

McChrystal‘s promotion had been sanctioned long before the hearing.‖

Page 118: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

118

McChrystal Says Treatment of Detainees “Acceptable and Legal”

SENATOR LEVIN: ―General McChrystal, I also invite you this morning to clarify your

understanding of U.S. standards for the treatment of detainees and to comment on allegations of

detainee mistreatment by units under your command during your tenure as commander of the

Joint Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008.‖ (p.3, SASC 6-02-09)

Chairman LEVIN: ―All right. Now, what was your understanding, your awareness of the

treatment of detainees when you were the overall commander? … And, in terms of the treatment

of detainees—when you got there, tell us what you were aware of, what you did, relative to that

subject.‖ (p.14, SASC 6-02-09)

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―As this committee knows, since 9/11 our forces have

learned valuable lessons regarding the treatment of detainees, and made mistakes along

the way. When I took command in 2003, I found our treatment of detainees followed

existing guidance but needed improvement. Our facilities were limited, our expertise in

specialties like interrogation was insignificant—or, insufficient—and we lacked

organizational experience at every level. In the months and years that followed, we

invested considerable energy, developed expertise and experience, and improved

continuously. If confirmed, I will strictly enforce the highest standards of detainee

treatment consistent with international and U.S. law.‖ (p.12, SASC 6-02-09)

. . .

Chairman LEVIN: ―Now, relative to the events that occurred, I want to just clarify your

understanding and your awareness and knowledge of what occurred when you were the

commander of special operations. How many special-mission unit task forces were there when

you were the commander?‖

General MCCHRYSTAL. ―Sir, they were multiple. We had a task force at Afghanistan,

which then had subordinate task forces, and sometimes it was as few as two, sometimes it

was as many as four. In Iraq, similarly, we had a major task force, then later went to two

major task forces, and each of those had subordinate task forces. … —at times it was as

many as eight to ten task forces, all under my command.‖

Chairman LEVIN: ―But, in terms of those special-mission unit task forces, you were not

the commander of those task forces.‖

General MCCHRYSTAL: ― Sir, they were—those task forces made up my joint task

force——―

Page 119: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

119

Chairman LEVIN: ―Did each of those task forces, those special-mission unit task forces,

have a commander?‖

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―Yes, sir.‖ (p.14, SASC 6-02-09)

. . .

Chairman LEVIN: ―All right. Now, what was your understanding, your awareness of the

treatment of detainees when you were the overall commander? … a memorandum of the

Secretary of Defense … authorized the use of things like stress positions, sleep deprivation, and

the use of dogs. … And, in terms of the treatment of detainees—when you got there, tell us what

you were aware of, what you did, relative to that subject.‖ (p.15, SASC 6-02-09)

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―Yes, Mr. Chairman. I took over in October 2003, … I do not,

and never have, condoned mistreatment of detainees, and never will. When we found

cases where we thought there was an allegation of mistreatment, we investigated every

one, and we punished, if, in fact, it was substantiated. And that was from the beginning.

That said, when I took command, I found the detainee facilities really insufficient for

need. They were physically not prepared for that. We didn‘t have the right number of

interrogators. We didn‘t have the right experience in the force, either. None of us had

ever done this with the level of precision that we needed to, so we learned.‖

―We stayed within all of the established and authorized guidelines. … it also was

something that I believe continuously improved. … One, our experience got better. Two,

the procedures got, just, constantly looked at and so that they were improved. So, I think

the constant improvement is the thing that took us from what I think was acceptable and

legal to something that I became much more proud of over time, in terms of the quality of

the operation.‖ (p.15, SASC 6-02-09)

Chairman LEVIN: ―When you say ‗‗acceptable and legal,‘‘ you mean that they were within the

guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense.‖

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―Sir, they were within legally prescribed guidelines, that‘s

right, the policy we were given. … Some of them were used when I took over, sir, and

then, as—we immediately began to reduce that.‖

Chairman LEVIN: ―All right. Now, were you uncomfortable with some of the techniques

that you saw there?‖

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―When I took over, I was, Mr. Chairman.‖

Page 120: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

120

Chairman LEVIN: ―All right. And the direction of reduction of the use of those

techniques, even though they had been authorized by the Secretary, nonetheless was

something that you felt was appropriate and necessary.‖

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―That‘s correct, Mr. Chairman.‖

Chairman LEVIN: ―All right. Thank you.‖ (p.16, SASC 6-02-09)

. . .

12-28-10 UPDATE: Just over a week after the hearing, Senator Feingold expressed his

concerns over the truthfulness of McChrystal‘s testimony concerning the use of ‗interrogation

techniques‖ used by JSOC forces under his command:

SENATOR FEINGOLD: ―At his public confirmation hearing [6-02-09], General

McChrystal responded to a question from Chairman LEVIN regarding interrogation

policies … by stating that ‗[s]ome of them were in use when I took over, sir, and then, as

we immediately began to reduce that.‘ When asked whether he was ‗uncomfortable with

some of the techniques‘ in use, he replied ‗[w]hen I took over, I was.‘

―Asked to square his public testimony with this record, General McChrystal responded

that, when he took command in 2003, he reviewed the interrogation program and, in

March 2004, ‗reduc[ed] the frequency of use of several of the techniques‘ by requiring

high-level approval. … General McChrystal then acknowledged that he personally

requested approval from General Abizaid [3 weeks after their suspension] to continue

using several of the techniques that had just been suspended [on May 6, 2004], including

‗control positions.‘ …‖

―… I am thus dismayed by General McChrystal‘s personal support for the use of some of

these techniques, particularly the so-called control positions, and by his efforts to

continue the techniques after they had been suspended. … I am troubled by his failure to

express any regret for his previous positions.‖

―Finally, I am concerned about General McChrystal‘s public testimony, which sought to

convey that he was ‗‗uncomfortable‘‘ with various interrogation techniques and sought to

‗‗reduce‘‘ their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this

testimony appears to be incomplete, at best.‖

Congressional Record, 6-11-09 (S6537 – S6538)

In other words, Feingold said that McChrystal was lying, or at least prevaricating, in his public

testimony before the Senate on 6-02-09.

Page 121: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

121

. . .

Senator MCCAIN: ―Given your experience in Afghanistan, do you believe that the interrogation

techniques that are provided in the Army Field Manual are sufficient to get the information to

fight the battle that you need?‖

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―Yes, sir, I do.‖

Senator MCCAIN: ―Do you believe any additional techniques are necessary?‖

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―No, sir.‖ (p.18, SASC 6-02-09)

. . .

NARRATOR: In 2006, Human Rights Watch released a major report based on dozens of

interviews with soldiers who had witnessed the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq. "No Blood, No

Foul" revealed that the elite forces conducting the interrogations at Camp Nama and two other

locations, known (among other names) as Task Force 121, committed systematic abuse of

prisoners at other facilities across Iraq, leading to at least three deaths. Whether or not he was

present during the actual abuse — as commander of JSOC, Stanley McChrystal oversaw them.

In his article, ―Acts of Conscience‖ (August 2006 Esquire), John Richardson wrote about

McChrystal‘s role as commander of Task Force 121 at Camp Nama:

―… Garlasco had briefed Stanley McChrystal once. He remembers him as a tall Irishman

with a gentle manner. He was head of the Joint Special Operations Command, the logical

person to oversee Task Force 121 … Within the unit, the interrogators got the feeling

they were reporting to the highest levels. The colonel would tell an interrogator that his

report "is on Rumsfeld's desk this morning" or that it was "read by SecDef. …‘ ‗Do you

know where the colonel was getting his orders from?‘ he asks. Jeff answers quickly,

perhaps a little defiantly. ‗I believe it was a two-star general. I believe his name was

General McChrystal. I saw him there a couple of times‘. … It was a point of pride that

the Red Cross would never be allowed in the door … 'Will they ever be allowed in here?'

And he said absolutely not. He had this directly from General McChrystal …This facility

was completely closed off to anybody investigating, even Army investigators."

Page 122: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

122

Gen. McChrystal “Sent a Silver Star that Was Not Well Written”

SENATOR MCCAIN: ―Can you describe what happened in April with respect to the

information about the circumstances of Corporal Tillman‘s death, and why you forwarded the

Silver Star recommendation in the form that it was in?‖ (p.17, SASC 6-02-09)

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April … I arrived

back into Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd,

and I was informed, at that point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been

the cause of death, and they had initiated what we call a 15–6, or an investigation of that.

And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review before we went

forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some level of truth

before we went up.

NARRATOR: It appears that Gen Abizaid and/or Gen McChrystal lied when they testified

before Congress about when they first heard of Tillman‘s fratricide. McChrystal says he learned

of fratricide on the 23rd

, yet Abizaid said McChrystal told him only that Tillman was killed in

action.

Note: see ―General McChrystal & General Abizaid Gave Contradictory Testimony at

Congressional Hearings‖ for more detailed evidence that McChrystal and/or Abizaid perjured

themselves during Congressional testimony. Also see DoD IG Timeline and Fraticide

Notification notes.

. . .

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: … ―I also sent a [P4] message informing my chain of command

that we believed it was fratricide, and we did that when we were told there were going to

be fairly high-profile memorial services. … when I sent the message, the intent entirely

was to inform everybody up my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised.‖

(p.18, SASC 6-02-09)

NARRATOR: On April 29th

, one day after sending up his Silver Star recommendation, Gen.

McChrystal sent a high-priority P4 memo to top generals supposedly ―warning‖ them of the

―potential‖ friendly fire death of Pat Tillman. McChrystal said he learned of friendly-fire on

April 23rd

. Then why did he wait six days until he sent his ―timely‖ P4 message? McChrystal

said he waited for ―some level of truth‖? But just two days after Pat‘s death, on April 24th

, the

investigating officer CPT Scott passed confirmation of fratricide up the chain of command.

Page 123: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

123

[Narrator reads from LTC Bailey‘s testimony from the Jones 15-6 report (section Z,

p.53), view Mary Tillman‘s copy with names hand-written above redactions]

LTC BAILEY: ―Sir, within three or four hours of being out here on the ground by the

incident, I went back and I told [COL Nixon] that I was certain that we had killed him. …

In fact, I think just about everybody around knew that. And certainly, by the next day

when we did the investigations, I confirmed it. … So, after [CPT Scott] did his first five

interviews, he came back to me and said, ―Sir, I‘m certain. I‘m sure.‖ And then I called

[COL Nixon]. … I think it was the 24th [of April]. [Jones 15-6, Section Z, p 52-53)

NARRATOR: Just above COL Nixon in the chain of command was Gen. McChrystal, followed

by Gen. Abizaid, Gen. Meyers, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Within just two days of

Tillman‘s death, confirmation of Tillman‘s fratricide moved up the chain of command. … But,

the Army maintains it took five weeks to confirm fratricide.

[Chain of command chart]

. . .

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―… in retrospect, they [P4 & Silver Star] look contradictory,

because we sent a Silver Star that was not well written— and, although I went through

the process, I will tell you now I didn‘t review the citation well enough to capture—or, I

didn‘t catch that, if you read it, you can imply that it was not friendly fire.

… my own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star citation well enough and making

sure that I compared it to the message that I sent …‖ [p.18, SASC 6-02-09]

―…What we have learned since is, it is better to take your time, make sure you get

everything right with the award, and not rush it. So, I say that, in the two things which I

believe were entirely well intentioned on my part and, in my view, everyone forward that

I saw was trying to do the right thing. It still produced confusion at a tragic time. And I‘m

very sorry for that …‖ (p.17, SASC 6-02-09)

NARRATOR: "If you read it, you could imply it was not friendly fire"? Anyone reading the

citation would think Tillman was KIA. The citation reads, ―for gallantry in action …. against an

armed enemy … enemy fire … Cpl. Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire …

known enemy positions … enemy's withdrawal and his platoon's safe passage from the ambush

kill zone.‖ Only, there was no enemy fire, no enemy withdrawal and no ambush kill zone!

[Tillman Silver Star Citation]

Page 124: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

124

NARRATOR: McChrystal said the Silver Star ―was not well written.‖ He (and the Army) never

explained just how the two Silver Star witness statement were somehow altered by mistake? to

remove all mention of friendly fire. Since COL Nixon testified he put a ―close hold‖ on the

fratricide information, there appear to be only three people in the ―approval chain‖ who could

have made the alterations to the Silver Star recommendation to remove all references to friendly

fire: LTC Kauzlarich, Col Nixon, and Gen. McChrystal.

Mr. BRALEY: ―Did you ever determine in the course of your investigation who, out of

people who had contact with that statement, would have been the most likely person to

have made alterations to the statement originally prepared by Specialist O‘Neal?‖

[p.98, HOC 4-24-07]

Mr. GIMBLE: ―Actually, no, we could not determine that. I could speculate, but I just

prefer not to. It is somewhere in the approval chain that it got edited. …‖

[p.98, HOC 4-24-07]

[DoD IG Report: Appendix E: Silver Star Award Process Flowchart showing only three officers

in that approval chain: LTC Kauzerlich, Col Nixon, and Gen McChrystal]

. . .

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: ―In the case of Corporal Tillman, a Silver Star was

recommended. I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] who

recommended it [Silver Star]. … and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at the

geometry of the battlefield, and I queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that his

actions warranted that, even though there was a potential that the actual circumstances

of death had been friendly fire.‖ [p. 18, SASC 6-02-09]

NARRATOR: Gen. McChrystal didn‘t just sign off on a piece of paper that landed on his desk.

He personally led the writing of the Silver Star recommendation package on the ground in

Afghanistan working with the Ranger Regimental leaders Col Nixon and LTC Kauzlarich.

. . .

Senator MCCAIN: ―And you believe that Corporal Tillman earned the Silver Star by his actions

before he died.‖ (p.18, SASC 6-02-09)

General MCCHRYSTAL: ―Sir, I absolutely do. I did then, I do now.‖

NARRATOR: But exactly how did Tillman ―earn‖ the Silver Star ―by his actions before he

died‖? Waving his arms for cease fire, hiding from devastating friendly fire behind a boulder,

popping a smoke grenade, and/or shouting ―Cease fire, I‘m Pat fucking Tillman‖?

Page 125: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

125

Gen. McChrystal Says “We Didn‟t Get It Right, We Failed the

Family and I Apologize, But the Mistakes Were Well-Intentioned”

SENATOR WEBB: ―Okay. General, you and I talked about another issue [May 15, 2008?],

and I want to address it here. It relates to Corporal Tillman‘s situation, and his family‘s situation.

I assume you would agree—I know you would agree, with your background, that the definition

of ‗‗leadership‘‘ goes well beyond battlefield competence, it goes to stewardship toward the

people who have served under us. You would agree with that, would you not?‖

General MCCHRYSTAL. ―Absolutely, sir.‖

Senator WEBB. ―And to their families.‖

General MCCHRYSTAL. ―Absolutely.‖

SENATOR WEBB. ―We have a situation here that I think is highly, highly unusual in our

history. … this is a situation where a very special American, with a unique intellectual and

athletic background, forewent millions of dollars in order to serve his country, and there was a

period where I believe the Army failed the family, when the knowledge was going up through

the chain of command that this was a friendly-fire incident. And I‘ve been contacted by their

family again, once your name was forwarded.

I‘m going to read from … a 2005 letter from Pat Tillman‘s father, who is an attorney. He is very

learned in these matters. He had been briefed by the Army in ‘05. He said,

‗No investigator worth a damn would have made the presentation I sat through unless

they had an agenda different from the truth. The initial investigation was changed.

Conflicting testimony was disregarded. Key evidence was destroyed and/or omitted.

Witnesses, probably with supervision of superiors, changed their testimony. No one has

been confronted with their conduct. The issue of importance is the integrity of the

military‘‘—this is from Pat Tillman‘s father, not from me, although I would agree—

‘‘from the lieutenant colonel on the ground all the way up and past General Jones.‘

His brother [Kevin Tillman], who, as you know, also served our country with great sacrifice,

testified, after this finding, saying that, ‘The deception surrounding this case was an insult to the

family, but, more importantly, its primary purpose was to deceive a nation. We say these things

with disappointment and sadness. We have been used as props in a public-relations exercise.‘

Page 126: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

126

Secretary Geren [Secretary of the Army] apologized. He said, ‗‗We, as an Army, failed in our

duty to the Tillman family and the duty we owe to all families of our fallen soldiers.‘‘

(p.47, SASC 6-02-09)

SENATOR WEBB: ―You have not, to my knowledge, been on record in terms of how you

personally feel about this incident, and I would like to give you the opportunity to do that.‖

(p.47, SASC 6-02-09)

GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL: ―I would say up front, I agree with Secretary Geren, we

failed the family. And I was a part of that, and I apologize for it. And I would say that

there is nothing we can do to automatically restore the trust, which was the second

casualty of 22nd April.

The first was the loss of a great American, the second was the lost of trust with a family,

and, wider than that, with some additional people. I will say that it was not intentional,

with the people that I saw. I didn‘t see any activities by anyone to deceive.

That said, I do believe that the confluence of mistakes, either because they didn‘t know

the policy or people just didn‘t line things up right—my own mistakes in not reviewing

the Silver Star citation well enough and making sure that I compared it to the message

that I sent—were mistakes. They were well intentioned, but they created—they added to

the doubt and the sense of mistrust, and we didn‘t get it right.‖ (p.47, SASC 6-02-09)

Senator WEBB: ―Well, … I regretfully say I think that the Army really failed the Tillman family.

And I appreciate your speaking about this today.‖ (p.47, SASC 6-02-09)

. . .

NARRATOR: Mary Tillman said she neither accepts nor believes McChrystal's apology.

"McChrystal was lying," she said of his comments Tuesday. "He said he didn't know for certain

Pat was killed by fratricide. That isn't true in and of itself, but the fact is, it doesn't matter

whether he knew it for certain." Army protocol at the time required families to be told of

possible fratricide, whether or not it had been confirmed, she said.

And I don‘t understand how ―well-intentioned mistakes‖ can explain the fabrication of two

Silver Star witness statements, etc.

Page 127: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

127

SECRET 2008 CONFIRMATION HEARING Senate Armed Services Committee, May 15th 2008

________________________________________________

There will be a meeting of the Committee on

ARMED SERVICES

Thursday, May 15, 2008

2:30 PM

SR-222 Russell Senate Office Building

EXECUTIVE*

To consider pending military nominations.

*Staff attendance will be restricted.

________________________________________________

Chairman Senator Carl Levin Senator James Webb Ranking Member Senator John McCain

When I asked Gerald Leeling [legal counsel for Chairman Carl Levin] questions about the

Committee‘s May 15th

hearing, he only repeatedly replied, ―It was in executive session‖ and the

Tillman case had ―been thoroughly reviewed with the information available to us at the time.‖

-- Guy Montag (June 1, 2009)

―You gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail one of those fallen, Corporal Pat Tillman, in

closed session with this committee a year ago [2008], in advance of my confirmation as Director

of the Joint Staff, which I appreciated. I stand ready to answer any additional questions you may

have.‖

-- Gen. Stanley McChrystal (June 2, 2009)

Page 128: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

128

Armed Services Committee Holds Secret Gen. McChrystal Hearing

NARRATOR: Interestingly, both Chairman Levin and General McChrystal both began their

June 2nd

opening statements by referring to an ―executive session‖ held by the Committee the

previous year:

SENATOR LEVIN: ―General McChrystal… Both subjects [Camp Nama torture &

Tillman matter] were discussed in executive session of the Armed Services Committee

last year [2008] in connection with your nomination to your current position as director

of the Joint Staff‖. (p. 3, SASC 6-02-09)

General MCCHRYSTAL: …―You gave me the opportunity to discuss in detail one of

those fallen, Corporal Pat Tillman, in closed session with this committee a year ago

[2008], in advance of my confirmation as Director of the Joint Staff, which I appreciated.

I stand ready to answer any additional questions you may have.‖ (p. 9, SASC 6-02-09)

[Screen print 5-15-08 ―executive session‖]

Note: from Wikipedia: The term "executive session" is employed by the Senate to refer to

closed-door committee meetings. More generally, an executive session is a term for any block

within an otherwise public meeting in which minutes are not taken, outsiders are not present, and

the contents of the discussion are treated as confidential.

Senator Levin and General McChrystal‘s remarks were probably prompted by a phone call the

previous evening by Guy Montag to Gerald Leeling (legal counsel for Senator Levin). Although

Leeling confirmed the existence of the hearing, in response to his questions, Leeling would only

say ―it was in executive session‖ and that the Tillman case had ―been thoroughly reviewed with

the information available to us at the time.‖

. . .

NARRATOR: Senator Levin and General McChrystal‘s June 2, 2009 remarks were the first

public acknowledgement of the Committee‘s secret 2008 confirmation hearing. However, the

previous year, on May 27th

2008, Senator Webb had inadvertently let slip a mention of the secret

hearing during the NPR Diane Rhem radio show.

SENATOR WEBB: ―I think what happened in the aftermath of Pat Tillman‘s death was

really tragic. I just went through a fairly thorough review of that process at the request

of the Chairman of the [Senate] Armed Services Committee [Senator Levin] ... I talked to

his father years ago when my book ‗Born-Fighting‘ came out.‖

Page 129: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

129

―What we do know, this is what I think is so disturbing, is that the Army knew that this

was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly, they did not tell the family, they allowed a

ceremony to go forward which implied otherwise, and his own brother, which had served

with him, it was kept from him until the ceremony took place.‖

―I‘m not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms of the chain of

command, how it was handled publicly, but it was really wrong. Someone like me has to

have a tremendous amount of respect for what Pat Tillman did in terms of stepping

forward among other things. You cannot help but still feel angry about how his death

was used.‖ [5-27-08 NPR ―Diane Rhem Show‖

NARRATOR: During the closed executive session McChrystal‘s actions were ―discussed in

detail‖ (nothing is publicly available about the meeting, not even who was present). It‘s

difficult to believe that Senator Webb couldn‘t figure out that General McChrystal ―knew that

this was a friendly fire incident fairly quickly‖ and that he bore ―responsibility for that decision‖

not to notify the Tillman family. McChrystal played the key role in the Army‘s cover-up,

between the Ranger RGT officers and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.

. . .

NARRATOR: Ironically, on May 12th

, just a few days before the senators met behind closed

doors with General McChrystal, Mary Tillman was in Washington DC at Olsson's bookstore to

discuss her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk‖. Despite Senator Webb having received an

April 3rd

letter from Guy Montag urging him to meet with Mary Tillman and help in her battle

for the truth, Senator Webb never met or spoke with Mary in DC (or at any other time).

[Mary Tillman at book signing]

Note: With Senator Webb‘s background as a decorated Vietnam Marine, Guy Montag felt

Webb would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. On April 3rd 2008, I sent a

letter to Senator Webb asking him to become a Senate advocate for Mary Tillman‘s struggle to

learn the truth about her son‘s death. I asked Webb to meet Mary during the Washington stop of

her May book tour.

On April 29th 2008, Senator Webb‘s Military Legislative Affairs Assistant Gordon Peterson

replied to my follow-up email: ―I have alerted the senator‘s scheduling director to the

information on the Washington leg of her tour and provided her with your letter to the senator.‖

However, Senator Webb didn‘t meet Mary Tillman when she was in Washington on May 12th

at

Olsson's - Penn Quarter bookstore (or any other time).

Page 130: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

130

Armed Services Committee Confirms McChrystal‟s 2008 Promotion

NARRATOR: One week later after McChrystal‘s secret hearing, on May 22nd

2008, the Senate

Armed Services Committee held a confirmation hearing for General Petreaus. During the

hearing, Chairman Levin recessed briefly to hold a voice vote to confirm 144 military

nominations, including that of General McChrystal‘s promotion to Director of the Joint Staff.

[Screen print 5-22-08 Petreaus & Ordierno confirmation hearing.]

Chairman LEVIN: Excuse this slight delay here. We‘re trying to schedule a vote of the

committee on nominations. And if we can get a quorum, we will interrupt our questions in

order to act on those nominations this morning. … (p.11, SASC 5-22-08)

Senator WARNER: Mr. Chairman, if I could just say, we‘ve discussed— those are the

nominations of General McChrystal and Admiral McRaven to—

Chairman LEVIN. There‘s a number of other nominations. The— they‘re included with

that this—

Chairman LEVIN: If you‘ll—excuse me for interrupting you, General. We have a

quorum here, and we‘ve got to take advantage of it, as I indicated. [Recessed.]

(p.20, SASC 5-22-08)

NARRATOR: ―Chairman Levin … paused the hearing momentarily for a voice vote approving

144 pending military nominations, including those of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal as director of

operations for the Joint Staff, and of Rear Adm. William McRaven to take McChrystal‘s place at

the head of the Joint Special Operations Command.‖ (Army Times 5-22-08)

. . .

NARRATOR: The Senate Armed Services Committee June 2nd

confirmation hearing was

strictly ―pro forma‖. Obviously, the real Senate confirmation hearing took place during the

secret 2008 ―executive session‖ behind closed doors. It appears the Senators were protecting

McChrystal from public scrutiny of his role in the Tillman cover-up.

And how was Senator Webb ―not sure where responsibility for that decision really lies, in terms

of the chain of command‖ for the Tillman cover-up? Did the Senators not bother to ask

McChrystal that question in closed session where he ―discussed in detail‖ his actions in the

aftermath of pat Tillman‘s death?

Page 131: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

131

Senate Unanimously Approves Gen. McChrystal‟s 2009 Promotion [Adapted from ―The Emperor‘s General‖]

Army General David McKiernan was dismissed by President Obama in May 2009 as the

commander in Afghanistan and McChrystal was picked to replace him. On Wednesday June 10th

2009, Gen. McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate as an Army four-star general and the new

Afghan war commander.

General McChrystal‘s confirmation came only after the Senate majority leader, Harry Reid of

Nevada, went to the floor to make an impassioned plea for Republicans to allow the action to

proceed. Reid complained McChrystal was among 20 nominees who had been stalled by

Republicans, one dating back to mid-March. Speaking on the Senate floor, Reid said he had

received a telephone call from Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

asking for prompt action on McChrystal, who was approved by the Senate Armed Services

committee on June 2nd

2009.

The Senate approved President Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal on a voice vote by

unanimous consent. From his new command in Afghanistan, General McChrystal reported

directly to another longtime colleague, General Petraeus.

. . .

John T. Reed‘s has offered wonderful commentary about the Tillman case over the past few years.

Here‘s his take on McChrystal‘s promotion, ―The General Who Lied About Pat Tillman Gets

Promoted to the Highest Rank and Made Head of Afghanistan‖ (June 2009):

―Commander in Chief Barack Obama. This piece of ―change we can believe in‖ is to see the

Bush Administration‘s cover-up and raise them one. ‗Hell, George! You merely refused to

punish McChrystal. Wuss! Namby pamby! We‘re promoting the son of a bitch to four stars and

head of Afghanistan—where Tillman was killed no less! That was always your problem, George.

You never had the guts to spit in the faces of the gold star mothers.‘‖

―As far as the wonderfulness of the military and congressional investigations, Senator John

McCain said, [the Army‘s actions were] ‗inexcusable and unconscionable.‘ Nevertheless,

McCain supports the promotion of McChrystal. McCain was career military. He knows that

lying by officers is standard procedure in the U.S. military. That‘s why he has no problem with

McChrystal‘s lying in the Tillman case.‖

―McChrystal‘s promotion turns out to be an integrity litmus test. Those opposed to the promotion

(the Tillman family) have integrity; those in favor of promoting McChrystal (Petraeus, the U.S.

Army, Secretary of Defense, Senator McCain, and Obama), do not.‖

Page 132: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

132

Senate Promotes Gen. McChrystal to Army‟s Highest Rank

NARRATOR: Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid went to the floor on June 10th

2009 to make

an impassioned plea for Republicans to allow a vote to confirm General McChrystal‘s 2009

promotion to the Army‘s highest rank and as commander of the Afghan war:

SENATOR REID: ―… In the few short months since President Obama took office,

Republicans held up many of his nominees for crucial positions … They are holding up

LTG Stanley McChrystal, an eminently qualified soldier, whom President Obama and

Secretary Gates chose to be our new commander in Afghanistan. I met him in my office

the other day.‖ (S6423) …

―Mr. President, in my office a few minutes ago, I received a call from Admiral Mullen,

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I wrote down what he asked and what he said.

He said: ‗Senator, there is a sense of urgency that General McChrystal be able to go to

Afghanistan tonight. There is no commander in Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen said—and I

wrote it down: Admiral McChrystal is literally waiting by an airplane.‘ It is 2 o‘clock in

the morning Thursday in Afghanistan. Dawn will soon be breaking and our troops will

not have a commander there. Is this what the minority wants? Why can‘t they come and

approve this man to go defend us in Afghanistan? I am without words to try to explain my

consternation at the fact that General McChrystal, one of our most eminent, prominent,

outstanding, qualified soldiers, a man whose father won five Silver Stars, a man whose

record is one of being the leading person in our military to do counterinsurgency—that is

what he is an expert in doing. Let‘s get the man approved tonight so he can leave in an

airplane and get over there and take care of his men and women.‖ (S6430)

NARRATOR: Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President Obama‘s nomination of

General McChrystal by unanimous consent:

Mr. MCCONNELL: ―Mr. President, I understand the majority leader was asking about

clearing some military promotions earlier today. I wanted to indicate … we are clear

with those and never had an issue with these particular promotions. … Unless there is

an objection from the other side, and having notified the other side, I ask unanimous

consent that the Senate proceed to executive session to consider the following military

promotions …‖ (S6432)

PRESIDING OFFICER. ―Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. The

nominations considered and confirmed are as follows:… The following named officer for

appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position

of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601: To be general Lt.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal‖ (Congressional Record, S6432, 6-10-09)

Page 133: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

133

. . .

NARRATOR: On June 11th

, the day following Gen. McChrystal‘s confirmation by the full

Senate by unanimous consent, Senator Feingold said he ―opposed‖ McChrystal‘s nomination.

SENATOR FEINGOLD: ―Mr. President, I oppose the nomination of LTG Stanley

McChrystal to command U.S. forces in Afghanistan for two reasons. The first relates to a

classified matter about which I have serious concerns. I have conveyed those concerns

in a letter to the President.‖

―The second issue is interrogation. … I am concerned about General McChrystal‘s

public testimony, which sought to convey that he was ‗‗uncomfortable‘‘ with various

interrogation techniques and sought to ‗‗reduce‘‘ their use. Given the full history of his

approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best.

Congressional Record, 6-11-09 (S6537 – S6538)

NARRATOR: But, where was Feingold‘s opposition when it would have mattered? Why did

he not raise his objection the previous day when the confirmation came to a vote? If Feingold,

truly opposed McChrystal‘s nomination, he merely to place a ―hold‖ as other Senators had

previously done to stop his confirmation!

What was the ―classified matter about which I have serious concerns.‖? It‘s possible Feingold

was referring to the Tillman cover-up, although it‘s more probable it was something to do with

JSOC‘s covert operations (perhaps assassination programs?).

Page 134: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

134

“A COUNTRY SUCH AS THIS”

“Maybe It Had Been Trash from the Get-Go, Myths to Feed the Public”

Guy Montag, and his children in front of the Capitol Building (Washington DC, August 2007)

―At the corner of south Capitol Street and Independence Avenue … [Senator Judd Smith] found his favorite tree …

and sat down, leaning against the tree trunk as though it was a lounging chair. … His public cloister allowed

contemplation … Congress was a dog and pony show. He was doing vital things, at least part of the time, but it

would end someday… And the gnarled base of his favorite old tree was itself a throne, from which he could peer

out on the Capitol, a few hundred feet away, … The Capitol building was a wonderfully dramatic background.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Country Such As This,‖ (1981)

―… Pat died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked. … And we

shouldn‘t be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. … it is a betrayal, but it is not just a betrayal to us,

… and that is why we are in front of Congress because Congress is supposed to take care of their citizens.‖

-- Mary Tillman, (August 24, 2007)

―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the days of multi-million

dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees before the monied temple of the contributors.

Before the time of computerized politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters

before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―Something to Die For‖ (1991)

Page 135: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

135

“No One Has Paid a Price for What Was Done”

Jon Krakauer‘s book, ―Where Men Win Glory,‖ ends with Congressman Henry Waxman unable

to determine who was responsible for the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly-fire death.

Congressman Waxman states in frustration, ―What we have is a very clear, deliberate abuse

intentionally done. Why is it so hard to find out who did it?‖ Both Waxman and Krakauer

blamed obstruction and stonewalling by the Army and Bush White House.

Mary Tillman, wrote in her book ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk,‖ ―I think of Representative

Waxman‘s words at the close of the hearing … it occurs to me that it‘s hard to find out …

because no one in a position of authority has the will or courage to do so.‖

Stan Goff, in his ―Fog of Fame,‖ wrote, ―The House Oversight and Government Reform

Committee ought to be renamed: The House Groveling and Gratitude Committee. ... Congress

doesn't want to ask the questions. … There is a one-word method for stating the obvious in these

cases: bullshit. But Congress is so busy spreading the same substance that its members are

generally loathe to call anyone out on it.‖

In his interview with Jason Guerrasio, Amir Bar-Lev said, ―… there‘s been no culpability on the

second half of this tragedy, which is the higher ups trying to cover it up. … to borrow a football

metaphor, they [the Tillman family] ran the ball 99 yards over four years‘ time, they handed it

off at the one-yard line to Congress and they fumbled it...."

. . .

Shortly after the Sundance premiere of his documentary, ―The Tillman Story,‖ Amir Bar-Lev

replied to my email, ―Have you seen the film? I'm pretty hard on the Democratic Congress!‖

True, his film does portray Congressman Waxman‘s Oversight Committee as ―fumbling‖ and

ineptly failing to get answers from the top military leadership.

However, General McChrystal, who played the key role in the cover-up, was barely a footnote in

his film. And, Amir (and everyone else) missed the ‖untold story‖ that both the Democratic

Congress and the Obama Presidency have intentionally protected General Stanley McChrystal

from punishment for his key role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s friendly-fire death

Blaming the Bush administration and the Army for the cover-up is too simple. In reality, the

cover-up has been a thoroughly bipartisan affair, with the Democratic Congress and the Obama

Presidency continuing to protect General McChrystal. It wasn‘t just a case of the White House

stonewalling the Congress. It wasn‘t a lack of courage or will. It wasn‘t a loathing to call them

out on their bullshit. In actuality, Congress didn‘t just ―fumble‖ the ball, they threw the game.

. . .

Page 136: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

136

Amir Bar-Lev‘s account of the Tillman cover-up ended far too soon, with Congressman

Waxman‘s August 2007 hearing. The Congressional cover-up actually continued to the June 2,

2009 confirmation hearing of General McChrystal as the Commander of the Afghan War (and

continues to this day):

At the end of his April 2007 hearing, Congressman Waxman stated in frustration, ―What we

have is a very clear, deliberate abuse intentionally done. Why is it so hard to find out who did

it?‖ Well, it looks like Waxman himself was part of the cover-up to protect those ―who did it.‖

Congressman Waxman‘s so-called ―investigation‖ was not an honest attempt to get at the truth.

The Committee blamed its‘ failure to uncover those responsible on stone-walling by the Bush

Administration. However, it‘s investigation‖ was perfunctory and failed to question Gen.

McChrystal about his key role in writing the fraudulent Silver Star, altered witness statements,

early knowledge of fratricide, failure to inform the family, and his deceptive P4 memo.

Waxman has never explained why McChrystal was dropped from the hearing witness list (and I

just discovered that McChrystal probably testified during a secret closed hearing before the

Committee).

During Spring 2008, Senator James Webb conducted a secret ―review‖ of McChrystal‘s role.

Senator James‘s Webb betrayal of the Tillman family cuts me the deepest. I‘ve trusted his sense

of honor for thirty years. If anyone in Congress should have cared, it would have been him.

Webb, as a young Marine veteran, spent 8 years to clear the name of a dead Marine for his

mother‘s sake! I‘m hard on Webb not because I dislike the man, but that I‘m disappointed in

him. As an old man and politician, he‘s turned into exactly what he once reviled as a young

veteran!

On May 15th 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee (headed by Senator Levin and

McCain) held a secret ―executive session‖ where McChrystal testified behind closed doors about

his actions after Tillman‘s fratricide ―in detail.‖ Shortly afterwards, the Senate promoted him to

Director of the Joint Staff.

The following year, on May 11th 2009, President Obama nominated McChrystal to be his new

commander of the Afghan War despite McChrystal‘s key role in the Tillman cover-up. Two

days later, Obama gave the ASU commencement address at Sun Devil Stadium without once

mentioning Pat Tillman to avoid embarrassing questions.

On May 20th

, Senators Lieberman, Graham, and McCain (working with the White House)

introduced a bill to change the FOIA law to block the release of photos showing detainee abuse

by JSOC forces under McChrystal‘s command. The Senate unanimously passed it the next day.

Page 137: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

137

On June 2nd

2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystal‘s

confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and Afghan war commander. The

hearing was strictly ―pro-forma.‖ Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb didn't press McChrystal

aggressively. The real hearing had been conducted the previous year, behind closed doors.

General McChrystal‘s confirmation came only after the Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid

made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President

Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal by unanimous consent.

. . .

It‘s not surprising that after the initial fratricide cover-up fell apart, Army officers and the Bush

administration lied to protect their careers. But the Democratic Congress, after they took control

of both Houses in 2006, could have gone after those responsible. Or at least not promoted them!

Just before the 2006 mid-term elections, Kevin Tillman published his eloquent letter, ―After

Pat‘s Birthday‖:

―Somehow our elected leaders were subverting international law and humanity by setting up

secret prisons around the world, secretly kidnapping people, secretly holding them

indefinitely, secretly not charging them with anything, secretly torturing them. Somehow

that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few ―bad apples‖ in the military.‖

―Somehow torture is tolerated. … Somehow lying is tolerated. … Somehow faking

character, virtue and strength is tolerated. … Somehow a narrative is more important than

reality.‖

―Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to its people and illegally

invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue and honor of its soldiers on

the ground. … Somehow the same incompetent, narcissistic, virtueless, vacuous, malicious

criminals are still in charge of this country. Somehow this is tolerated. Somehow nobody is

accountable for this.‖

Kevin had hoped a Democratic Congress would bring accountability back to our country. But,

just as with warrantless wiretapping and torture, those responsible for the cover-up of his

brother‘s friendly-fire death have never been held accountable for their actions. As the Obama

administration is fond of saying, ―They‘re moving forward, not looking backward.‖

President Obama and the Democratically controlled Congress are responsible for continuing the

Bush administration‘s Pat Tillman cover-up. Those most culpable (including Congressman

Waxman, Senator Webb, Senator McCain, Senator Levin, Senator Reid, and President Obama)

have not yet paid any political price. They‘ve all been given ―pass‖ on their betrayal of the

Tillman family.

Page 138: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

138

“Maybe It Had Been Trash from the Get-Go,

Myths to Feed the Public”

During the House Oversight Committee‘s April 24th 2007 hearing, Mary Tillman told Congress:

―Pat died for this country, and he believed it was a great country … It is not perfect. No

one has ever said that. But there is a system in place to allow for it to work, and your job

is to find out what happened to Pat. … And we shouldn‘t be allowed to have

smokescreens thrown in our face. … it is a betrayal, but it is not just a betrayal to us, and

that is why we are in front of Congress because Congress is supposed to take care of their

citizens.‖

During General McChrystal‘s June 2009 Senate confirmation hearing, Senator James Webb read

from a 2005 letter from Patrick Tillman, Sr:

―No investigator worth a damn would have made the presentation I sat through unless

they had an agenda different from the truth. … No one has been confronted with their

conduct. The issue of importance is the integrity of the military from the lieutenant

colonel on the ground all the way up and past General Jones [3rd investigator].‖

General McChrystal said during his June 2nd

2009 confirmation hearing,

―I would say up front, I agree with Secretary Geren, we failed the family. And I was a

part of that, and I apologize for it. And I would say that there is nothing we can do to

automatically restore the trust, which was the second casualty of 22nd April. The first

was the loss of a great American, the second was the lost of trust with a family…‖

―I will say that it was not intentional … I didn‘t see any activities by anyone to deceive.

… the confluence of mistakes, … my own mistakes in not reviewing the Silver Star

citation well enough… were mistakes. They were well intentioned, but they … added to

the doubt and the sense of mistrust, and we didn‘t get it right.‖

Senator James Webb wrote in his 1983 novel, ―A Country Such As This, ―And no, the military

isn‘t just fine. The point is, it isn‘t corrupt. It‘s a system with human failures.‖

. . .

Page 139: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

139

But when ―human failures‖ systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-command

(to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense) up

to and including the White House, how is this not a corrupt country? Every single institution in

this country has failed the Tillman‘s, including the Army, Congress, White House, and Media.

Perhaps Senator Rowland, in Senator James Webb's 1991 novel, ―Something to Die For,‖ hit the

nail on the head [Silver Star on cover of novel]:

―How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the

days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees

before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics

that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they

spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public.‖

. . .

I left the Army in 1991, after eight years, partly because of all the bullshit around the first Gulf

War. I didn‘t feel like being a slave in uniform being told who to kill for cheap oil. In Jon

Krakauer‘s ―Where Men Win Glory,‖ SGT Mel Ward described why he was ―done‖:

―From the moment you first join the Ranger Battalion, it‘s ingrained in you that you will

always do the right thing. … Then you see something like what they‘re doing to Pat –

what officers in the Ranger Regiment are doing – and you stop being so naïve. The only

two times where I personally was in a position to see where the Army had the choice to

do the right thing or the wrong thing, both times they chose to do the wrong thing. One

of those times was what they did to Pat. It made me realize that the Army does what suits

the Army. That‘s why I won‘t put that uniform back on. I‘m done.‖

And John T. Reed, in ―The General Who Lied About Pat Tillman Gets Promoted to the Highest

Rank and Made Head of Afghanistan,‖ points out that ―McChrystal‘s promotion turns out to be

an integrity litmus test. Those opposed to the promotion (the Tillman family) have integrity;

those in favor of promoting McChrystal (Petraeus, the U.S. Army, Secretary of Defense, Senator

McCain, and Obama), do not‖ [I would more names to his list: Senator Webb, Senator Levin,

Representative Waxman, Senator Reid, New York Time‘s Thom Shanker, and CNAS‘s Andrew

Exum]. But none of them have ever paid a price for what they‘ve done to the Tillman family.

Six years ago, Pat Tillman‘s family was handed a tarnished Silver Star. It was a travesty of

justice that President Obama and Congress shielded Gen. McChrystal from public scrutiny of his

key role in the cover-up of Tillman‘s friendly fire death and then promoted him to the Army‘s

highest rank, and handed him his fourth star.

Page 140: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

140

REMEMBER THE ICONOCLAST, NOT THE ICON

Pat Tillman 1976 – 2004

Patrick Tillman, Sr.-- Memorial Service (May 2004)

Richard Tillman -- Memorial Service (May 4, 2004)

―I didn‘t write shit because I‘m not a writer. … I‘m not just going to sit here and break down on you. But thanks for

coming. Pat‘s a fucking champion and always will be. Just make no mistake, he‘d want me to say this, He‘s not

with God; He‘s fucking dead. He‘s not religious. So, thanks for your thoughts, but he‘s fucking dead.‖

Page 141: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

141

REMEMBER THE ICONOCLAST, NOT THE ICON [adapted from October 2005 ―Letter to the Editor‖ (in ‖A Sense of Honor,‖ Appendix ―F‖)]

Note: I handed this editorial to Stan Goff after one of his presentations in March 2006. Just a

couple of weeks later Stan published his first Tillman article, ―Telling Transformative Tales: The

Strange Post Ranger Saga of Pat Tillman‖ on April 5th

2006.

Six years ago, I believed Pat Tillman was a patriotic ―dumb jock‖. I refused to watch any of the

flag waving coverage of his memorial service. It seemed like a sideshow distraction to the

breaking Abu Gharib story.

. . .

But the reality of Pat was much deeper than his iconic image. In October 2005, I read David

Zirin‘s article, ―Our Hero.‖ I discovered a side of Pat Tillman not widely known –a fiercely

independent thinker, avid reader (a favorite author was Noam Chomsky), and critic of the Bush

administration and the Iraq war (―…this war is so fucking illegal‖). Pat was a remarkable man

who was driven by a core of honesty and integrity, led by personal example, and lived his life

intensely.

I‘ve taken the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s death a bit personally. Like Stan Goff, I feel a sense of

kinship with Pat Tillman. In 1983, when I was ―young and dumb,‖ I enlisted with an Airborne

Ranger Long-Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) company. I grew up in the Army, enjoyed the

camaraderie and the challenges. But, the lies of the first Gulf War were the last straw. After

eight years, I finally left the Army in March 1991, and have been a firefighter the past 19 years.

I was angered that the truth about Pat‘s life and death had been buried by the media and

government. Tillman was enshrined as an icon while the man fell by the wayside, his parents

used as props at his funeral. Pat‘s family still don‘t have the meager consolation of knowing the

truth about his death. ―The truth may be painful, but it‘s the truth,‖ his mother said. ―If you feel

you‘re being lied to, you can never put it to rest.‖

. . .

Let us honor Pat Tillman‘s memory by honoring the man, not the myth. The iconoclast, not the

icon. As his mother said, ―Pat would have wanted to be remembered as an individual, not as a

stock figure or political prop. Pat was a real hero, not what they used him as.‖

Pat Tillman, never at a loss for words himself, is now silent. Of the many tragic aspects

surrounding his death, one is that he cannot define his own legacy. Now, it‘s up to his family

and friends to reclaim the truth and integrity of Pat‘s life and death.

Page 142: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

142

“MY KING A LOST KING AND LOST

SOLDIERS MY MEN”

PATRICK TILLMAN

November 6, 1976 – April 22, 2004

Pat lived in New Alamaden for most of his life. He came to love it for it‘s history and

community spirit. He roamed the hills with his brothers as a kid,

then hiked and trained in them as an athlete and soldier.

Pat was a loved son, brother, husband and faithful friend. He was a voracious reader, inquisitive

scholar, civic volunteer, aggressive athlete and a patriotic and selfless soldier.

New Alamaden and the nation lost Patrick Tillman in Afghanistan

on April 22, 2004 in service to his country.

-- New Alamaden Bulmore Park Memorial Plaque

Page 143: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

143

What Was Lost

I sing what was lost and dread what was won,

I walk in a battle fought over again,

My king a lost king, and lost soldiers my men;

Feet to the Rising and Setting may run,

They always beat on the same small stone.

-- William Butler Yeats

. . .

―I was stronger then, but I am fiercer now. I was so certain of life, and of my place in it. I was

so sure of my love, and of my future. I now have none of those certainties, but at least I can

comprehend pain. I was so ready, so eager to fight and now I pay, richly pay, for having fought.

―I guess that‘s what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor and loyalty are traps

with no reward.‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Sense of Honor‖ (1981)

. . .

―I found myself awash with a sense of injustice that I could not define. Or perhaps it was

merely that I was young. I had never seen with such clarity that … courage could destroy one

man while flight could make another man king.‖

―I knew it was fruitless at this point but still I felt a call for justice, an anger that life does not

always reward the right intentions, that the cycles of days and years and seasons lull us into

thinking that in all things there will be second chances, and even thirds, when in some things we

have only one. And sometimes we never know we had that single chance until it disappears.‖

―‘Waray, waray.‘ You remember, even after all these years! Yes, that is the way of our people.

To the last drop of blood. To the last breath of air. To the last beating of the heart. That is how

we fight. That is how we pray. That is how we love.‖

-- Senator James Webb ―The Emperor‘s General‖ (1999)

. . .

―If nothing ever works out all the way, and if all things change, what‘s left? Your family and

your friends and your values, that‘s what‘s left. And your duty to them … They‘re the only

important things in life. … And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong

or right or anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the

judgment of the ages.

-- Senator James Webb ―A Country Such As This‖ (1981)

Page 144: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

144

POSTSCRIPT:

“This Story is Not Over Yet”

Andrew Exum, Center for a New American Security Jon Krakauer, author of ―Where Men Win Glory‖

―The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family …

And while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family…, their personal grief should not be

a veto on the nomination of the man [General McChrystal] the president, the Secretary of

Defense, and General Petraeus all feel gives the United States and its allies the best chance of

victory in Afghanistan … These are serious questions and are more important than either the

death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees.‖

-- Andrew Exum, ―Confirm Him‖ (June 2, 2009)

―A few months ago, I was asked to review Jon Krakauer's new book by the Washington Post ...

the book was awful. Krakauer wrote a crappy book, and now he has to market it. And how is he

doing that? By going after Stan McChrystal, who is probably the least culpable guy in Tillman's

chain of command ... Stan McChrystal is one of the finest men I have ever known, and I hope I

have sons who serve under men like him. Jon Krakauer is going after him now because he has

written a crappy book and now has to sell it. ―

-- Andrew Exum, ―On Martial Virtue …‖ (November 2, 2009)

―This is an unsolved mystery; nobody has ever really paid a price for what was done to the

Tillmans. No one has taken accountability or made an admission for a deliberate attempt to

conceal the truth. This story is not over yet.‖

-- Amir Bar-Lev (―The Fog of War,‖ July 20, 2010)

Page 145: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

145

Postscript: “This Story is Not Over Yet”

September 13th

2009: CNAS‘s Andrew Exum reviewed Jon Krakauer‘s book ―Where Men Win

Glory – The Odyssey of Pat Tillman.‖ Exum portrayed Krakauer as a nut-job conspiracy theorist

and criticized Krakauer‘s ―visceral hatred of the Bush administration.‖ But, Exum neglected to

disclose his close personal and professional ties with General McChrystal and the Ranger RGT

officers involved in the cover-up (Exum was a Ranger officer in 2002 and 2004). Exum's

failure to disclose his relationship with General McChrystal appeared to be a calculated effort on

Exum's part to undermine Krakauer's credibility and undermine his valid criticisms of

McChrystal. Exum wasn't merely "an unpaid adviser to McChrystal" -- Exum was one of

McChrystal's biggest cheerleaders.

. . .

October 20th

2009: The Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act (i.e. ―The McChrystal

Protection Act‖) was added to a Homeland Security Appropriations Bill. On October 28th

,

President Obama finally signed the bill into law blocking the court-ordered release of photos that

(presumably) showed detainee abuse by JSOC forces under General McChrystal‘s command.

Mr. McCAIN; … ―I am also pleased this conference report does contain a provision

that will allow the Secretary of Defense to prohibit the disclosure of detainee

photographs under the Freedom of Information Act if he certifies that release of the

photos would endanger U.S. citizens, members of the Armed Forces, or U.S. Government

employees deployed outside the United States.‖

[Congressional Record: October 20, 2009 (Senate), p. S10544-S10559]

. . .

November 1st 2009: On Meet the Press (11-01-09), Jon Krakauer accused General McChrystal

of lying about his role in the cover-up of the Tillman fratricide.

KRAKAUER: ―… after Tillman died, the most important thing to know is that …within

24 hours certainly, everybody on the ground, everyone intimately involved knew it was

friendly fire. There's never any doubt it was friendly fire. McChrystal was told within 24

hours it was friendly fire.

Also, immediately they started this paperwork to give Tillman a Silver Star. And the

Silver Star ended up being at the center of the cover-up. … Tillman faced this devastating

fire from his own guys, and he tried to protect a young private by exposing himself to

this, this fire. That's why he was killed and the private wasn't. Without friendly fire there's

no valor, there's no Silver Star. There was no enemy fire, yet McChrystal authored, he

Page 146: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

146

closely supervised over a number of days this fraudulent medal recommendation that

talked about devastating enemy fire.‖

MR. GREGORY: ―Even those who were critical of him and the Army say they don't

think he willfully deceived anyone.‖

[video clip of General McChrystal testifying at June 2nd

2009 Senate hearing]

MR. KRAKAUER: ―That's correct. He, he just said now he didn't read this hugely

important document about the most famous soldier in the military. He didn't read it

carefully enough to notice that it talked about enemy fire instead of friendly fire? That's

preposterous. That, that's not believable.‖

MR. GREGORY: ―All right, part of this debate. Thank you all very much.‖

Note: Jon Krakauer based his Daily Beast article and his Meet the Press remarks on Guy

Montag‘s binders ―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth‖ and ―Did They Teach You

How to Lie Yet?‖ that were given to Krakauer at a September 17, 2009 book signing (Guy

Montag fed-exed them to his Estes Park Aunt who hand-delivered the binders. Thanks again,

Aunt Candy!)

. . .

November 2nd

2009: The following day, Andrew Exum posted an entry at his CNAS‘s Abu

Muqawama blog blasting Krakauer, ―On Martial Virtue … and Selling Jon Krakauer‘s Crappy

New Book‖:

―A few months ago, I was asked to review Jon Krakauer's new book by the Washington

Post ... the book was awful. I mean, it was really bad. ... Krakauer wrote a crappy book,

and now he has to market it. And how is he doing that? By going after Stan McChrystal,

who is probably the least culpable guy in Tillman's chain of command ... who sent a

memorandum up through the chain of command at the time of Tillman‘s death warning

his commanders … Stan McChrystal stands out as one of the guys who made mistakes

but ultimately did the right thing. ... Stan McChrystal is one of the finest men I have

ever known, and I hope I have sons who serve under men like him. Jon Krakauer is going

after him now because he has written a crappy book and now has to sell it. ―

Well, as one blogger wrote, ―Phew, talk about a man crush. … the normally witty and sarcastic

Abu Muqawama has turned into a walking billboard for Gen. McChrystal …‖

. . .

Page 147: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

147

November 2009: Thom Shanker, NYT‘s Pentagon reporter, became a ―writer-in-residence‖ at

CNAS to “work on his book entitled "Counterstrike” and “working closely with CNAS scholars

and leadership, Writers in Residence can take advantage of the full spectrum of the Center’s

resources and expertise.” CNAS has a close relationship with both General Petreaus and

General McChrystal (Isn’t this incestuous relationship between the media, think-tanks, and

military rather cozy!?) Thom Shanker wrote the May 26th

2009 NYT article that ―exonerated‘

General McChrystal of all wrong-doing in the Tillman case. Since then, Thom, and other NYT

reporters, have enjoyed favorable access to McChrystal (so much for the NYT‘s coverage

―without fear or favor‖!)

. . .

November 15th

2009: The Washington Post‘s Ombudsman Andrew Alexander wrote about

Andrew Exum‘s failure to disclose his close personal and professional ties with McChrystal (e.g.

Exum spent a month working closely with McChrystal in Afghanistan after being asked by

McChrystal to join his Afghan war assessment team) prior to writing his book review of

Krakauer‘s book: ―Krakauer is angry. He told me that because Exum is ‗enthralled‘ with

McChrystal, he wrote a "willfully deceptive" review that protected him. … I also think Exum

deserves blame. The contract language is explicit. Despite media coverage of his role in

Afghanistan, the contract puts the onus on the reviewer to notify The Post if there is an

"appearance of a conflict of interest." (―Blame to Spare on a Book Review‖ (11-15-09).

. . .

June 23rd

2010: General McChrystal was fired by President Obama. Not for his central role in

the cover-up of Pat Tillman‘s death or his complicity in torture at Camp Nama, but for an

embarrassing Rolling Stone profile, ―The Runaway General‖. Apparently, McChrystal‘s role in

torture at Camp Nama and his key role in the Tillman cover-up was OK, but embarrassing

President Obama was an unforgiveable sin.

It‘s troubling that Obama shows no loyalty (e.g. Rev. Wright or Shirley Sherrod) to anyone who

causes him any political pain whatsoever: "Well, Shirley, they want you to pull over to the side

of the road and do it because you're going to be on Glenn Beck tonight" (CNN Newsroom). A

telling remark from Obama on Good Morning America, ―…we‘re focusing on doing the right

thing instead of what looks to be politically necessary at the moment.‖

. . .

July 23rd

2009: General McChrystal retires from the Army, with all four of his stars, and is

awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Page 148: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

148

. . .

July 27th

2010: Jon Krakauer releases revised paperback edition of his book, ―Where Men Win

Glory‖. He has added more material describing Gen. McChrystal‘s culpability in the cover-up.

However, for some reason, Krakauer still hasn‘t described the ―untold story‖ (outlined in my 9-

17-09 letter to Krakauer) of the role of President Obama and the Democratically-controlled

Congress in the cover-up.

Note: I just bought Krakauer‘s book today (8-09-10). I‘ll post a review when I get the chance to

read it. It appears Jon Krakauer took the credit for my work. In the Preface of his paperback

edition of ―Where Men Win Glory,‖ he wrote, ―Following publication of the first edition in

September 2009, I discovered additional evidence of deceit by high-ranking Army officers.‖

―Discovered‖? Hell, much of his ―discovery‖ consisted in having my two binders laying it all

out placed directly into his hands by my aunt on September 17th

at a book signing in Boulder,

CO! I don‘t care (much) about the credit. But, it would have been nice to have at least received

a call or email saying ―Thanks‖. More importantly, I would have liked the chance to discuss my

Tillman Files material with him and be able to pass on updates.

And it‘s not just me. When Richard Tillman was asked about Krakauer‘s book at the Sundance

premiere of ―The Tillman Story‖ he replied, ―that guy‘s a piece of ----!‖ And, this past June

Calabashe wrote a comment on my blog, ―I was interviewed in a 20 min phone call about 2

weeks before Krakauer pulled the original book. Don't know if there was cause and effect.

Found Krakauer easy enough to talk to, at least until he got what he wanted. There was also an

air of arrogance just below the surface. I asked Krakauer to let me see a couple of journal

entries that I know concerned me. Gave him specific dates but never heard from him again…”

Still, to Krakauer’s credit, from what I’ve read so far, he’s done a decent job in his revised edition

of describing the Army’s cover-up and McChrystal’s role.

. . .

July 31st 2010: Mary Tillman releases paperback edition of her book ―Boots on the Ground by

Dusk‖ with a new foreword (available at blurb.com).

. . .

August 20th

2010: Theatrical release of Amir Bar-Lev‘s ―The Tillman Story‖

. . .

AMIR BAR-LEV: ―This is an unsolved mystery; nobody has ever really paid a price for what

was done to the Tillmans. No one has taken accountability or made an admission for a

deliberate attempt to conceal the truth. This story is not over yet.‖ (―The Fog of War,‖ 7-20-10)

Page 149: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

149

“HE WHO SHALL NOT BE FACT CHECKED”

Andrew Exum, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Whitewash of

Gen. McChrystal‟s Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillman‟s Friendly-Fire Death

October 31st 2009 [Revised 1-27-10]

By GuyMontag, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com

Nathaniel Fick, CEO CNAS General Stanley McChrystal Andrew Exum, CNAS Fellow

―The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family … And while I have

nothing but respect for the Tillman Family…, their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man

[General McChrystal] the president, the Secretary of Defense, and General Petraeus all feel gives the United States

and its allies the best chance of victory in Afghanistan … These are serious questions and are more important than

either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees.‖

- - Andrew Exum, ―Confirm Him‖ (6-02-09)

―When reporting as a ―journalist‘ for the army, you quickly learn there is no news but good news. … I put my Ivy

League English degree to use writing shallow propaganda. … I made it a game to see just how falsely positive I

could be. … the Dept of Public Affairs in Washington DC named me one of the army‘s ―Outstanding Journalists.‖

… I had earned my first medal from the army for writing in a newspaper.‖

-- Andrew Exum, ―This Man‘s Army‖ (2004)

―They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington.‖ ―Yeah, I called my pa last night and he

says, ―Judd boy, you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how to lie yet?‖

-- Senator James Webb, ―A Country Such As This‖ (1983)

Page 150: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

150

“HE WHO SHALL NOT BE FACT CHECKED” [Adapted from ―He Who Shall Not Be Fact Checked‖]

―From the time I was very little, I was aware of my father‘s pride in being a Marine. When I was three years old …

I would stand between my parents, feet digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine

Corps Hymn at the top of my lungs.‖

-- Mary Tillman, ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk‖ (2008)

Nathaniel Fick,

Andrew Exum is a Fellow at your Washington think-tank Center for a New American Security

(CNAS) which has been called "Washington's go-to think tank on military affairs." CNAS has

spearheaded the advocacy of the Afghan war "surge" and has close ties with both General

McChrystal and his mentor General Petraeus. During your GQ interview, you said: ―We've sent

one of our fellows, Andrew Exum, to serve on General McChrystal's assessment team, and we

meet with General McChrystal via videoconference once a week to talk about strategy there.‖

In 2002, Andrew Exum served as an infantry LT in Afghanistan (described in his book ―This

Man‘s Army‖) and again with the Ranger RGT in 2004. Last year, you were ―named one of

GQ's 50 most powerful people in Washington.‖ During 2003, you led a Marine Recon platoon

during the invasion of Iraq (as described in your fine book ―One Bullet Away,‖ in Evan Wright‘s

―Generation Kill, ‖ and HBO‘s excellent ―Generation Kill‖ mini-series). You both appeared to

be excellent LTs ―back in the day.‖

In his September 13th 2009 Washington Post review of Jon Krakauer‘s book, ―Where Men Win

Glory – The Odyssey of Pat Tillman,‖ Andrew Exum dismissed the notion of a ―conspiracy‖ to

cover-up Pat Tillman‘s friendly fire death and excused the actions by his fellow Ranger officers

as a ―gross error of judgment‖ (General McChrystal was not mentioned at all). However, Exum

failed to disclose his close personal and professional ties with McChrystal which created a

serious conflict of interest.

On November 1st 2009 "Meet the Press,‖ (and his October 14

th 2009 ―Daily Beast‖ article) Jon

Krakauer accused General McChrystal of lying about his central role in the Army‘s cover-up of

Pat Tillman‘s friendly-fire death. In response, Andrew Exum posted, ―On Martial Virtue … and

Selling Jon Krakauer‘s Crappy New Book,‖ writing, ―Stan McChrystal stands out as … probably

the least culpable guy in Tillman‘s chain of command … Stan McChrystal is one of the finest

men I have ever known, and I hope I have sons who serve under men like him.‖

I had believed that Andrew Exum and CNAS were part of the bipartisan ―conspiracy‖ that has

protected General McChrystal and that Exum wrote his book review to whitewash General

McChrystal‘s role. Now, I believe Andrew Exum is either awfully good at feigning self-

Page 151: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

151

righteous outrage or is woefully (and willfully) ignorant of the most basic facts of the Tillman

case. It‘s possible Exum believes his own bullshit about General McChrystal. As the saying

goes, "It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not

understanding it."

Regardless, both Exum and CNAS obviously had personal and professional conflicts of interests

with Exum writing a book review favorable to the Army and General McChrystal. Clearly,

despite (or because of) his background as an Army Ranger officer in Afghanistan, he was a poor

choice to review Jon Krakauer‘s book. Apparently Exum hasn‘t forgotten lessons learned from

his stint as an Army journalist. In ―This Man‘s Army‖ he wrote,

―When reporting as a ―journalist‘ for the army, you quickly learn there is no news but

good news. … I put my Ivy League English degree to use writing shallow propaganda.

… I made it a game to see just how falsely positive I could be. … At the end of the

summer, the Dept of Public Affairs in Washington DC named me one of the army‘s

―Outstanding Journalists.‖ … I had earned my first medal from the army for writing in a

newspaper.‖

I‘m disappointed by the lack of integrity displayed by Exum‘s involvement in the Tillman cover-

up. Perhaps that‘s to be expected once you leave your uniform behind, become a ―suit‖ and

become part of the politics of Washington. As Exum wrote in his book, ―… officers are often

looking out for their own futures rather than for the safety and good of their men.‖

So much for your Marines Corp‘s motto of ―semper fidelis‖ and Exum‘s Ranger Creed, ―Never

shall I fail my comrades‖! Neither you nor Exum have had the back of the Tillman family.

. . .

The New York Times also played a role in whitewashing McChrystal. Last May, their Pentagon

Reporter Thom Shanker wrote a May 26th

2009 NYT article that ―exonerated‖ McChrystal of all

wrongdoing in the Tillman case despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Just before

McChrystal's Senate confirmation hearing, I corresponded with Shanker and pointed out how his

article was full of "lies ... borne out by facts, if not the truth‖ (Thom Shanker also participated in

the 2003 Jessica Lynch misinformation).

Thom Shanker (and the NYTs) appear to have enjoyed exceptionally good access to McChyrstal

and other top military leaders. Ironically, this past November, Thom Shanker became a "writer

in residence" at your own CNAS to “work on his book entitled "Counterstrike” and by “working

closely with CNAS scholars and leadership, Writers in Residence can take advantage of the full

spectrum of the Center’s resources and expertise.” Isn't the Washington establishment so

cozy? What's the difference between the media, the government, and the "independent" think-

tanks such as your CNAS? They appear to be all part of one big incestous establishment blob!

Page 152: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

152

Andrew Exum‟s Book Review of “Where Men Win Glory”

Last September, Andrew Exum reviewed Jon Krakauer‘s book, ―Where Men Win Glory – The

Odyssey of Pat Tillman,‖ for the Washington Post. Exum brushed aside the abundance of

damning evidence Krakauer presented about the Army's cover-up (and never mentioned

McChrystal‘s role). Exum tried to portray Krakauer as a nut-job conspiracy theorist with a

―visceral hatred of the Bush administration.‖ However, Exum failed to disclose to the paper the

conflict of interest that his close personal and professional ties with Gen. Chrystal created.

. . .

Instead of addressing Krakauer‘s evidence that pointed to a conspiracy by the Army to cover-up

the Pat Tillman fratricide (and McChrystal's central role in the cover-up), Andrew Exum asserted

that Krakauer, since he is not a combat veteran, cannot have the perspective to make any valid

commentary on the actions of men in combat and that ―in the eyes of Krakauer … soldiers are

either victims of circumstance or war criminals in waiting.‖:

―Krakauer does not appear to understand light infantry combat as well as he does

mountaineering … there is nothing in Krakauer's life or experience that inspires similar

confidence in his criticism of experienced combat officers ....‖

―Whenever one seeks to understand an epic failure of our nation's military, one must first

draw a line on a sheet of paper and write "conspiracy" at one end and "buffoonery" on the

other. Those who have spent time in the military and have seen it struggle not just with

war but with everyday barracks life tend to err on the side of incompetence, while those

who never have -- such as Krakauer -- tend to suspect conspiracy.‖

Apparently, Andrew Exum was unaware that Jon Krakauer spent seven months embedded in

Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007, ―I accompanied troops from the U.S. Army‘s Tenth Mountain

Division, Eighty-second Airborne Division, and Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha

773 … on numerous combat missions along the Pakistan border.‖ Perhaps Krakauer even spent

more time than Exum during his tours with the Tenth and his Ranger Battalion in 2002 and

2004? Surely Krakauer‘s experience would give him some standing?

Exum‘s bashing Krakauer for his lack of respect for the military is an absurd personal attack:

Krakauer donated proceeds from his book tour to veteran organizations and dedicated his book to

a soldier he spent time with in Afghanistan, SFC Jared Monti who died winning the Medal of

Honor.

. . .

Page 153: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

153

In his book review, Andrew Exum ignored the abundance of damning evidence Krakauer

presented in his book about the Army's cover-up of the Tillman fratricide. Instead, Exum tried to

portray Krakauer as a nut-job conspiracy theorist:

―By now, the story of Pat Tillman is widely known … and how the cause of his death --

friendly fire -- was kept from his family and the public for weeks in what, depending on

your point of view, was either a gross error of judgment or a conspiracy engineered by

the U.S. military and the Bush administration. … ―

However, the opening lines of Exum‘s book review actually provide eyewitness testimony to

support just such a ―conspiracy‖ theory! Exum began with his personal account of the night Pat

Tillman was killed:

―On April 22, 2004, I was standing in an operations center in Bagram, Afghanistan,

watching two firefights on the monitors and screens in front of me. A platoon of U.S.

Army Rangers and a special operations reconnaissance force were both under fire and in

possible need of assistance. As the leader of a 40-man quick-reaction force of Rangers, I

asked my squad leaders to gather our men while I awaited orders. My platoon was

dropped onto a 12,000-foot mountain at night to reinforce the small reconnaissance team

that had been battling men they believed to be al-Qaeda fighters, killing two combatants.

On the way south from Bagram, I listened on the radio to the U.S. casualty report from

the other firefight: One killed in action, two wounded. After a truly miserable night spent

at high altitude near the Pakistan border, I arrived back in Bagram to learn the name of

that Ranger killed in action: Spec. Patrick Daniel Tillman.‖

Andrew Exum had watched the video feed from a Predator drone of the Tillman firefight. Yet,

the Army denies the existence of the video that Exum saw with his own eyes. Krakauer wrote,

The forward observer assigned to Serial One, Specialist Donald Lee … heard an airplane

flying overhead … ―As I listened closer I knew it was a Predator drone‖ … Several other

Rangers also said they heard the drone. … headquarters later confirmed that a Predator

was overhead during the firefight, and a civilian contractor at Bagram said he

remembered seeing the Predator‘s video feed. During the numerous investigations that

would be undertaken over the next three years, the Army and the CIA nevertheless

asserted that no such video existed.‖

So … Andrew Exum must have been hallucinating when he says he was watching Predator

footage of the Tillman firefight, since the Army says no such video exists. I guess that footage

just happened to―disappear,‖ just like all copies of the CPT Scott‘s first 15-6 report just

happened to vanish! It must have just been another one of the Army‘s ―blunders.‖

Page 154: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

154

. . .

Andrew Exum ridiculed Krakauer‘s assertion that the order to get ―boots on the ground by dusk‖

was driven by ―Rumsfeld‘s insistence on strict timelines.‖

"Incredibly, [Krakauer] tries to claim that [the cascade of blunders that culminated in

Tillman's death] was driven not by poor and independent decision-making by field-grade

officers but rather by Donald Rumsfeld's insistence on strict timelines. '[The] sense of

urgency attached to the mission,' Krakauer writes, 'came from little more than a

bureaucratic fixation on meeting arbitrary deadlines so missions could be checked off a

list and tallied as 'accomplished.' Ranger units are not ordered to meet deadlines

arbitrarily. They meet deadlines because the missions they execute--like airfield seizures

or hostage rescues--are extraordinarily complex operations."

Contrary to Exum's assertion above, however, the mission on which Tillman was killed wasn't an

airfield seizure or a hostage rescue, and Exum's review conveniently omits most of what

Krakauer actually wrote in the passage excerpted above:

―After making his case that the mission could be accomplished just as effectively and just

as quickly without splitting the platoon, Uthlaut was baffled by headquarters‘ stubborn

insistence on dividing it. He [Lt Uthlaut] asked Dennis [EO Alpha CO], ―So the only

reason that you want me to split my platoon is to have boots on the ground in the sector

before dark?‖ ‗Yes‘, Dennis replied. …‖

"During an investigation of Tillman‘s death seven months later, Brigadier General Gary

Jones asked Alpha Company first sergeant Thomas Fuller, 'I mean, what necessitated in

this mission right here that they had to get down there so quickly?' ―I don‘t think there

was anything,‖ Fuller testified under oath. ―I think that a lot of times at higher

[headquarters] – maybe even, you know, higher than battalion [headquarters] – they may

make a timeline, and then we just feel like we have to stick to that timeline. There‘s no –

there‘s no ‗intel‘ driving it. There‘s no – you know, there‘s no events driving it. It‘s just

a timeline, and we fell like we have to stick with it; and that‘s what drives that kind of

stuff.‖

―In other words, the sense of urgency attached to the mission came from little more than

a bureaucratic fixation on meeting arbitrary deadlines so missions could be checked off a

list and tallied as 'accomplished.' This emphasis on quantification has always been a

hallmark of the military, but it was carried to new heights of fatuity during Donald

Rumsfeld‘s tenure at the Pentagon."

. . .

Page 155: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

155

Andrew Exum failed to disclose to the Washington Post the conflict of interest that his close

personal and professional ties with Gen. Chrystal created for his book review. At the end of his

review is a brief biographical blurb stating, ―Andrew Exum is a fellow at the Center for a New

American Security and served in Afghanistan as an Army officer in 2002 and 2004 and as a

civilian adviser in 2009‖

Although Exum did disclose one conflict of interest, ―As a former officer in the 75th Ranger

Regiment -- an elite unit whose leadership Krakauer skewers -- I might be expected to rise to the

defense of the officers ….with respect to the Tillman Affair (full disclosure: I was in

Afghanistan, with the Rangers, at the time, so I am hardly objective here)‖

[Note: So if Exum is ―hardly objective‖ why is he writing the review?]

However, Andrew Exum neglected to explain his conflicts of interest with General McChrystal.

As a ―civilian advisor‖, Exum worked closely with General McChrystal as a member of his 60-

day Afghan war assessment team. In a blog post, Exum wrote, ‗This [Afghan War Assessment]

was written with about a dozen talented and good-natured co-authors (and the world's most

intense lead author [General McChrystal]) who put up with my smart-assery -- often in enclosed

spaces -- for a whole month‘.‖

Andrew Exum is a self-professed ―fan‖ of McChrystal who has lavished praise on General

McChrystal during media appearances, ―… you really need a silver bullet …You have one

chance to get this right, and you'd better get your A-team on the field." … ―I do know that Stan

McChrystal is an automatic starter in anyone's line-up‖. And Exum said that ―many policy-

makers and journalists think that McChrystal's work as the head of the super-secret Joint Special

Operations Command was the untold success story of the Surge and the greater war on terror

campaigns."

And on the eve of McChrystal‘s June 2nd

2009 Senate confirmation hearing, Exum wrote

―Confirm Him‖ voicing his support for McChrystal‘s confirmation and dismissing the Tillman

family‘s ―personal grief‖:

―… with respect to the Tillman Affair (full disclosure: I was in Afghanistan, with the

Rangers, at the time, so I am hardly objective here), McChrystal was by all accounts not

one of the officers in the chain of command who made really egregious errors or

misjudgments -- he even warned off his high command from turning Ranger Tillman into

some great hero before all the facts were in. Those who did make mistakes have by now

been properly censured.‖

Page 156: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

156

―The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman

Family … And while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family…, their personal

grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man the president, the Secretary of

Defense, and General Petraeus all feel gives the United States and its allies the best

chance of victory in Afghanistan‖ … These are serious questions and are more important

than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees.‖

Exum‘s claimed that McChrystal ―was by all accounts not one of the officers in the chain of

command who made really egregious errors or misjudgments -- he even warned off his high

command from turning Ranger Tillman into some great hero before all the facts were in.‖

However, the evidence is overwhelming that McChrystal played a key role in the cover-up of

Tillman‘s fratricide. And McChrystal led the writing of the false Silver Star that turned Tillman

into a ―great hero.‖

. . .

On November 15th

2009, the Washington Post published a brief correction alluding to Exum‘s

conflict of interest with Gen. McChrystal. The Washington Post‘s Ombudsman Andrew

Alexander wrote in his column ―Blame to Spare on a Book Review‖ :

―Krakauer is angry. He told me that because Exum is ‗enthralled‘ with McChrystal, he

wrote a "willfully deceptive" review that protected him. … I also think Exum deserves

blame. The contract language is explicit. Despite media coverage of his role in

Afghanistan, the contract puts the onus on the reviewer to notify The Post if there is an

"appearance of a conflict of interest."

But, as I pointed out in my lengthy comments to Exum's November 2nd post, ―On Martial

Virtue ... and Selling Jon Krakauer's Crappy New Book‖ (and his November 9th Post, ―He Who

Shall Not Be Fact Checked‖) Exum has more than merely the ―appearance of a conflict of

interest‖ when it comes to General McChrystal.

Exum's failure to disclose his conflict of interest was a serious breach of ethics, not so much

because it may have hurt Krakauer's book sales, but because it appears to be a calculated effort

on Exum's part to undermine Krakauer's credibility and undermine his valid criticisms of

McChrystal. Exum wasn't merely "an unpaid adviser to McChrystal" -- Exum was one of

McChrystal's biggest cheerleaders.

Page 157: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

157

"On Martial Virtue ... and Selling Jon Krakauer's Crappy New Book"

Jon Krakauer published an article in The Daily Beast in October 2009, titled "Gen. McChrystal's

Credibility Problem".

On November 1st 2009 Meet the Press, Jon Krakauer accused General McChrystal of lying about

his role in the cover-up of the Tillman fratricide. In response, Andrew Exum posted an entry on

his CNAS ―Abu Muqawama‖ blog blasting Krakauer, ―On Martial Virtue … and Selling Jon

Krakauer‘s Crappy New Book‖:

―A few months ago, I was asked to review Jon Krakauer's new book by the

Washington Post ... the book was awful. I mean, it was really bad. ... Krakauer wrote

a crappy book, and now he has to market it. And how is he doing that? By going

after Stan McChrystal, who is probably the least culpable guy in Tillman's chain of

command ... who sent a memorandum up through the chain of command at the time

of Tillman‘s death warning his commanders … Stan McChrystal stands out as one of

the guys who made mistakes but ultimately did the right thing. ... Stan McChrystal is

one of the finest men I have ever known, and I hope I have sons who serve under men

like him. Jon Krakauer is going after him now because he has written a crappy book

and now has to sell it. ―

Well, as one blogger wrote, ―Phew, talk about a man crush. … the normally witty and sarcastic

Abu Muqawama has turned into a walking billboard for Gen. McChrystal …‖

Despite Exum‘s assertion that McChrystal was ―probably the least culpable guy in Tillman's

chain of command‖ the evidence is overwhelming that McChrystal played a key role in the

cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide. Unlike Exum, I know what I‘m talking about. I‘ve closely

followed the Tillman case the past four years and have examined the reports from the various

Army, IG and Congressional ―investigations.‖ The evidence shows that McChrystal was

probably the most culpable General officer involved in the Tillman case.

I believe Andrew Exum is either awfully good at feigning self-righteous outrage or is woefully

(and willfully) ignorant of the most basic facts of the Tillman case. Quite possibly, Exum

believes his own bullshit about General McChrystal. As the saying goes, "It is difficult to get a

man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it."

Page 158: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

“WHERE MEN WIN GLORY” Guy Montag‟s Letters to Jon Krakauer

Guy Montag, MFLF Local #451 Jon Krakauer, author of ―Where Men Win Glory‖

―This substantially revised edition of Where Men Win Glory included new material that …

leaves little doubt who directed the cover-up of his fratricide. …Following publication of the

first edition in September 2009, I discovered additional evidence of deceit by high-ranking Army

officers. Some of these previously undisclosed facts were unearthed through multiple Freedom

of Information Act requests; other pieces of the puzzle were inadvertently divulged when

General Stanley McChrystal was obligated to testify before the Senate Armed Services

Committee in June 2009, following his nomination by President Obama ….‖

-- Jon Krakauer, preface to paperback edition ―Where Men Win Glory‖ (2010)

―I was interviewed in a 20 min phone call about 2 weeks before Krakauer pulled the original

book. Don't know if there was cause and effect. Found Krakauer easy enough to talk to, at least

until he got what he wanted. There was also an air of arrogance just below the surface. I asked

Krakauer to let me see a couple of journal entries that I know concerned me. Gave him specific

dates but never heard from him again …‖

-- Calabashe (June 2009)

―That guy‘s a piece of ----!‖

-- Richard Tillman, Sundance premiere of ―The Tillman Story‖ (January 2009)

Page 159: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

159

September 12, 2009 Letter to Jon Krakauer [Adapted for publication here]

I‘ve closely followed the Pat Tillman story over the past four years. Like Stan Goff, I‘ve felt a

certain kinship with Pat (I‘ve also been an avid reader and independent thinker). In 1983, as a

―young and dumb‖ seventeen year old, I enlisted into an Airborne Ranger LRRP Company in the

MI Army Guard. But the lies of the first Gulf War were the last straw for me. In 1991, I finally

quit after eight years. Since then, I‘ve been a firefighter for eighteen years.

I‘m looking forward to reading your new book ―Where Men When Glory.‖ I‘m especially

interested in learning what you were able to uncover about General McChrystal. After

McChrystal was nominated as the new Commander of the Afghan War, I took a closer look at

his role in the Army‘s cover-up of Pat‘s fratricide.

In your recent interviews, you‘ve cast blame on the Bush administration for the cover-up (and

they bear guilt!) However, I believe the on-going series of cover-up by ―investigations‖ was a

thoroughly bi-partisan affair involving the Democratic Congress (both House and Senate), and

the Obama presidency.

Accompanying this letter are two binders laying out my detailed arguments:

At the end of May, I wrote the binder, ―Did They Teach You to Lie Yet? – Senator James Webb,

General Stanley McChrystal, and the Betrayal of Pat Tillman.‖ I argue that the top leadership of

the Army, Waxman‘s House Oversight Committee, and Senator Carl Levin‘s Senate Armed

Services Committee acted to shield McChrystal from scrutiny and protect him from punishment

for his actions. I especially focus on Senator Webb‘s role in a secret ―review‖ prior to

McChrystal‘s 2008 confirmation (I‘ve updated this binder to include the 2009 Senate

confirmation hearing and three new revelations from McChrystal‘s testimony).

Today, I just finished the binder ―Lies … Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth‖ – Senator James

Webb, Thom Shanker & The New York Times, and the Whitewash of General Stanley

McChrystal.‖ This binder explores the role of NYT Washington Pentagon reporter Thom

Shanker in ―clearing‖ McChrystal of any wrongdoing. In addition, I describe my interactions

with Senator Webb‘s office and speculate at President Obama‘s role in the Tillman case.

Thanks for spending your time and effort on writing your book. Please feel free to contact me

for follow-up with any questions or comments on my work.

P.S. If possible, could you send me your contact information? I‘ve got some additional

information that might be of interest to you (e.g. the parallels between Yoni Netanyahu and Pat

Tillman).

Page 160: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

160

September 17, 2009 Letter to Jon Krakauer [Adapted for publication here]

This letter is a ―postscript‖ to be added to the binders my Aunt Candy will hand you at the book

signing in Boulder tonight.

I haven‘t yet had the time to finish reading ―Where Men Win Glory.‖ After a quick skim, I‘ve

only read the last part of your book that describes Pat‘s fratricide and the cover-up of his death.

I‘ve attached a few comments about specific items at the end of this letter.

. . .

At his April 24, 2007 hearing, Congressman Henry Waxman observed, ―… but our government

failed them … The least we owe to courageous men and women who are fighting for our

freedom is the truth.‖

Your book ends with Waxman‘s House committee being unable to find out who was responsible

for the cover-up, largely because of stonewalling by the Bush White House. Congressman

Waxman stated in frustration, ―What we have is a very clear, deliberate abuse intentionally done.

Why is it so hard to find out who did it?‖ You properly cast blame on the top leadership of the

Army and the White House that ―… used every means at its disposal to obstruct the

congressional investigation into Tillman‘s death and its aftermath…‖

But, I believe your account of the cover-up ends far too soon with Bush‘s press conference

August 9, 2007. The cover-up continued up through the June 2, 2009 confirmation hearing of

General McChrystal as the Commander of the Afghan War. Perhaps the end was the unanimous

voice vote by the Senate begged for by Senate Majority Leader Reid on June 10th

2009.

Blaming Bush and the Army for the cover-up, with the Democratic Congress as the champions in

pursuit of the truth is too simple. In reality, the cover-up has been a thoroughly bipartisan affair,

with Congress and the Obama Presidency continuing to protect especially General McChrystal

from punishment and to shield his actions from scrutiny. Just as with warrantless wiretapping

and torture, those responsible have not been held accountable. ―They‘re moving forward, not

looking back.‖

Note: I am not a Republican. Nor a Democrat. I‘m an independent, disgusted with the

corruption of both parties. Hell, I even voted for Nader in 2008!

Page 161: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

161

Perhaps you were a bit credulous taking Waxman‘s rhetoric at face value. Congressman

Waxman‘s so-called investigation (like the IG report) was not an honest attempt to get at the

truth. Arguably, it may have started out that way with the April 2007 hearing. I‘d suggest you

review the Waxman documents again (Note: I was surprised to find that the August 1, 2007

hearing transcript is not listed in the bibliography or your chapter notes. It contains crucial

testimony). When I did so in May 2009, it became clear that a principal role of Waxman‘s

investigation, as with the IG investigation and the Army investigation, was to protect those

involved, particularly McChrystal from scrutiny and protect them from punishment (McChrystal

is one of the few generals involved that is not yet retired).

I believe that sometime after the April 2007 hearing, Waxman got the word the ―fix‖ was in, to

lay off McChrystal. Perhaps because of McChrystal‘s important covert contribution to the

―surge‖ in Iraq? Waxman dropped him from the list of witnesses for the August 1, 2007 hearing

and the testimony during that hearing was a praise-fest for McChrystal. Despite the concerns

raised by the Committee during the April 2007 hearing about the falsified Silver Star, P4

document, etc. they never looked at McChrystal, who was at the center of these actions.

It‘s not surprising that after the initial fratricide cover-up fell apart, that Army officers and the

Bush administration lied to protect their careers. Reprehensible, but understandable. But the

Democratic Congress, after they took control of both Houses in 2006, could have gone after

those responsible. Or at least not promoted them! Their hands are dirty as well with the betrayal

of Pat Tillman.

. . .

I‘ve enclosed, inside one of the binders, a copy of ―The Nightingale‘s Song‖ that provides a

biography of James Webb (it‘s a gripping account and well worth your time). Like Pat Tillman,

Webb‘s been a maverick and a fascinating character. I‘ve read his novels for thirty years.

Senator James‘s Webb betrayal of the Tillman family cuts me the deepest. I‘ve trusted his sense

of honor for thirty years. If anyone in Congress should have cared, it would have been him (see

especially my 4-03-08 letter and notes from his novels). For example, Webb, as a young Marine

veteran spent 8 years to clear the name of a dead Marine for his mother‘s sake!

Yet, during the same time in April – May 2008, after he received my letter imploring him to help

Mary Tillman, he was conducting the secret ―review‖ of McChrystal‘s actions in the Tillman

cover-up. Shortly afterwards, while Mary Tillman was in DC on her book tour, the Senate

Armed Services Committee (headed by Levin and McCain) held their secret ―executive session‖

to hear McChrystal testify. Shortly thereafter, the Senate promoted him to Director of the Joint

Staff.

Page 162: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

162

I‘m hard on Webb not because I dislike the man, but that I‘m disappointed by him. As an old

man and politician, he‘s turned into exactly what he once reviled as a young soldier! I find it

tragic to see Webb compromising his sense of honor (perhaps even Pat Tillman would have done

so as well, if he had lived long enough?). I even believe Webb‘s doing it with the best of

intentions, that he believes McChrystal is indispensable to the Afghan war. But I still don‘t

forgive him for it. Or like it.

And I‘m certainly not casting all the blame for the sins of Congress onto him. Henry Waxman,

Chairman Carl Levin, Senator McCain, Nancy Pelosi, and Harry Reid and others in Congress

bear greater responsible than Webb. It just happens I know more about Webb and his role and

have had personal interactions with his office.

. . .

In the binder, ―Lies‘s … Borne Out by Lies If Not the Truth,‖ I discuss The New York Times

role in whitewashing McChrystal‘s role in the cover-up of the Tillman fratricide. I pretty much

lay it all out in the binder, starting with an overview and going into more detail. I didn‘t come

away from my personal experience with Thom Shanker and ―The Gray Lady‖ with any

confidence in our ―watchdog‖ media.

I‘d like to point out that Thom Shanker also participated in the Jessica Lynch story in 2003. I

haven‘t dug into that side of the story much, although I included an article in the binder by Gregg

Mitchell about it.

And, please note that I haven‘t yet sent out my letter to Clark Hoyt at the NYT‘s yet. I wanted to

wait a bit, revise my introductory letter. It‘ll be interesting to see what response I get from him.

. . .

Inside one of the binder‘s I‘ve enclosed a document ―Battle for the Truth.‖ Jonathan (Yoni)

Netanayahu was another character cast from the same mold as Pat Tillman. When I first learned

of Pat the iconoclast (vs the media icon), I was immediately reminded of Yoni. Although they

were separated by 27 years, both were charismatic individuals driven who lived and died with

intensity and integrity. Both Achilles-like and ―slain in the high places.‖ The similarities,

despite the obvious differences, between their stories is eerie. Ironically, Yoni truly died

heroically, killed while saving hostages at Entebbe. But it would have been embarrassing to

mention that he died because the mission went FUBAR and that there were friendly fire deaths,

so the IDF told the story he was shot in the back by a stray burst of fire.

Afterwards, Max Hastings wrote a book ―Yoni - Hero of Entebbe‖ similar to your ―Where Men

Win Glory‖ in that it provided a bibliography of Yoni, described the battle at Entebbe, and used

Page 163: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

163

interviews with family members and his own words from his letters. Later, Yoni‘s brothers

edited Yoni‘s letters and published them as ―Self Portrait of a Hero.‖ A powerful book.

. . .

I believe that President Obama was certainly aware of General McChrystal‘s involvement in the

cover-up of Tillman‘s fratricide. I cannot imagine that his staff did not thoroughly vet

McChrystal before his nomination on May 12th. Yet Obama chose to give him a pass, and

promote him to the Army‘s highest rank and make him the new commander of the Afghan War.

It‘s ironic that the previous general was fired to make way for McChrystal.

However, it‘s even more ironic that the following day Obama gave a commencement address at

Arizona State University inside Sun Devil Stadium without once mentioning Pat Tillman! I‘m

sure that he didn‘t want to bring up Tillman‘s name to avoid anyone pointing out the connection

to McChrystal‘s nomination. (Note: see ―Text: Obama‘s Commencement Address at Arizona

State University‖ (May 13, 2009 NYT) and Bob Young‘s ―Obama‘s Big-Time Fumble‖

(Arizona Republic 5-17-09).

. . .

Finally, I bear a bit of blame myself for not getting this information out sooner to you. After the

craziness of May and early June I was burnt out. I spoke briefly with Mary Tillman and sent her

a copy of ―Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?‖ then laid all this stuff aside, back into my

Tillman box. I now realize it‘s perfectly obvious that I should have tried to get at least some of

my material out to you months ago. Perhaps you could have made some changes to your book

before it went to print. Or, you could have at least used this material during your media

interviews. I did email Mary Tillman on June 13th

and asked her to forward this material to you.

I hope that you can use my material to start your own investigation into this untold story.

Perhaps this story can be told in the next edition of your book or in magazine publications or

interviews.

Page 164: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

164

Release of Paperback Edition of “Where Men Win Glory”

Jon Krakauer just released his revised paperback edition of his book, ―Where Men Win Glory‖

on July 27th

2010. He has added about 50 pages to the book, more fully describing the Army‘s

cover-up and Gen. McChrystal‘s culpability in the cover-up. However, Krakauer still hasn‘t told

what I call the ―untold story‖ of the bipartisan Congressional cover-up (although he did make

some of the corrections I pointed out to him last year in my letters).

I just bought his revised book a few days ago (August 9th

) I‘ll post a review when I get the

chance to read it; I‘m far too busy finishing up ―The [Untold] Tillman Story.‖ However, upon

cursory review, it appears that Jon Krakauer took the credit for discovering ―additional

evidence.‖ In the Preface of his paperback edition of ―Where Men Win Glory,‖ he wrote,

―This substantially revised edition of Where Men Win Glory included new material that

… leaves little doubt who directed the cover-up of his fratricide. …Following

publication of the first edition in September 2009, I discovered additional evidence of

deceit by high-ranking Army officers. Some of these previously undisclosed facts were

unearthed through multiple Freedom of Information Act requests; other pieces of the

puzzle were inadvertently divulged when General Stanley McChrystal was obligated to

testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2009, following his

nomination by President Obama ….‖ [italics added]

―I discovered‖? Hell, my two binders pointing to this ―evidence‖ were placed directly into his

hands by my aunt on September 17th

at his book signing in Boulder, CO! I don‘t care (much)

about the credit. But, it would have been nice to have at least received a call or email saying

―Thanks‖. More importantly, if Krakauer would have at least sent his contact info, I would have

been able to pass on updates and had the chance to discuss my Tillman Files material with him.

But I am glad that my material prompted him to more fully describe the Army‘s cover-up.

And it‘s not just me. This past June, Calabashe wrote a comment on my blog,

―I was interviewed in a 20 min phone call about 2 weeks before Krakauer pulled the

original book. Don't know if there was cause and effect. Found Krakauer easy enough

to talk to, at least until he got what he wanted. There was also an air of arrogance just

below the surface. I asked Krakauer to let me see a couple of journal entries that I know

concerned me. Gave him specific dates but never heard from him again…”

When Richard Tillman was asked about Krakauer‘s book at the Sundance premiere of ―The

Tillman Story‖ he replied, ―that guy‘s a piece of ----!‖

Page 165: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

165

“That‟s My Hero”

Pat Tillman, Rachel Corrie and Yoni Netanyahu

Guy Montag, feralfirefighter.blogspot.com

June 21, 2010

―Everywhere I look in this house, I‘m staggered by memories. … I stay in the house to look at

Pat‘s books on the shelves and appreciate his special keepsakes displayed in the dining room

hutch. As I‘m looking at the mementos, I find a small newspaper clipping I‘ve seen before. The

article is about Rachel Corrie, the 23-year-old peace activist from Olympia, Washington, who

was crushed to death by an Israeli bulldozer on March 16, 2003, trying to protect the home of a

Palestinian doctor and his family. I remember picking up the article from the same spot more

than a year ago [2003] and asking Pat, ―Who‘s this?‖ ―That‘s my hero,‖ Pat said. ―She was a

stud; she had a lot of guts.‖ I read the article with tears in my eyes then; now, I quietly cry.‖

- - Mary Tillman, ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk‖ (2008)

. . .

"… there is an inherent incompatibility in the joining together, in one evening, of a play [―To

Pay the Price‖] based on my brother [Jonathan ―Yoni‖ Netanyahu, killed during the 1976 Raid

on Entebbe] Yoni's letters with the play 'My Name Is Rachel Corrie.‖

-- Iddo Netanyahu (May 2007)

Page 166: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

166

“That‟s My Hero” [edited from January 30, 2009 letter to Joe Bageant]

In your [Joe Bageant] November 20, 2008 essay, ―The Sucker Bait Called Hope,‖ you wrote that

the US media all but ignored the death of Rachel Corrie under an Israel bulldozer and that the

few who knew of her death largely deemed it a bizarre and senseless act; ―Moral conviction

scares the hell out of us. Hope is effortless.‖

Rachel Corrie lived her life with integrity. As you wrote in your essay, she had ―… Conviction.

The real stuff. … Accepting the truth and acting on it. … ‗taking personal responsibility‘, but

doing it for real. …‖

Last year, Rachel‘s family edited her journal entries and letters in the book, ―Let Me Stand

Alone.‖ From her journal: ―My values. … Responsibility for myself – accountability …

Independence /Autonomy. … Honesty. Humor. Integrity. Courage. Loyalty. Critical thinking.

Curiosity. … Family.‖

I think you might be interested to learn that Rachel Corrie was Pat Tillman‘s hero. Pat shared

many of Rachel‘s values. He was driven by a core of honesty and integrity, led by personal

example, and lived his life intensely.

In her book, ―Boots on the Ground by Dusk,‖ [paperback edition with new foreword just

published 7-31-10 at blurb.com] his mother Mary Tillman wrote about Pat‘s admiration for

Rachel:

―I feel dread mount in my stomach as we turn the corner to the charming house [near

Tacoma, WA] where Pat lived with Marie [wife] and Kevin [brother]. Pat had loved that

house, situated on a hill overlooking the Tacoma Narrows, with a majestic view of the

Olympic Mountains. I immediately glance at the spot where I last saw Pat standing, less than

three months.‖

―Everywhere I look in this house, I‘m staggered by memories. I see Pat in every corner and

doorway. … I stay in the house to look at Pat‘s books on the shelves and appreciate his

special keepsakes displayed in the dining room hutch.‖

―As I‘m looking at the mementos, I find a small newspaper clipping I‘ve seen before. The

article is about Rachel Corrie, the 23-year-old peace activist from Olympia, Washington,

Page 167: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

167

who was crushed to death by an Israeli bulldozer on March 16, 2003, trying to protect the

home of a Palestinian doctor and his family.‖

―I remember picking up the article from the same spot more than a year ago [in 2003] and

asking Pat, ―Who‘s this?‖ ―That‘s my hero,‖ Pat said. ―She was a stud; she had a lot of

guts.‖ I read the article with tears in my eyes then; now, I quietly cry.‖

. . .

Finally, I‘d like to point out a connection between Rachel Corrie, Pat Tillman, and Jonathan

―Yoni‖ Netanyahu [his ―younger‖ brother is Benjamin Netanyahu, head of the Likud party and

former Prime Minister of Israel]. This seems timely coming on the tail of the invasion of the

Gaza Ghetto this past month.

Yoni has been a hero of mine for decades (Yoni was shot and killed while leading the rescue of

Israeli hostages at the Entebbe airport in 1976.). After his death, his family published a book of

his letters ―Self-Portrait of a Hero‖ (comparable to ―Let Me Stand Alone: The Journals of

Rachel Corrie‖). I bought the book a quarter century ago when I was a ―young and dumb‖

paratrooper.

But, like Pat Tillman‘s friendly-fire death, the nature of Yoni‘s death has been covered up the

IDF for the past four decades [―Battle for the Truth‖].

Yoni and Pat Tillman were eerily similar characters, both driven by a sense of integrity, honesty

and conviction. As was Rachel Corrie. The following passage from ―Self Portrait of a Hero‖

could be said about all three of them:

―Of all the aspects of his character one predominates – integrity. By this we do not mean

only honesty toward one‘s fellow man, but, above all, honesty toward oneself. An inner

wholeness marked Yoni‘s entire behavior, inspired his way of life and determined his

objectives. That wholeness resulted from a great need for absolute harmony between his

thoughts and deeds.‖

―For Yoni, unlike many of us, could not hold beliefs without living them to the full. Once

convinced of the rightness of an idea, whether in the personal or national sphere, he had to do

what he could to actualize it, regardless of the hardships or risks involved. Again and again

he asked himself whether he was working toward the realization of his life‘s aims.‖

. . .

Page 168: "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.1 -- December 28, 2010)

THE [UNTOLD TILLMAN STORY

168

The play "My Name Is Rachel Corrie" is based on her e-mails, letters, and journals.

Another play, "To Pay the Price," draws on letters and interviews with family and friends of

Jonathan ―Yoni‖ Netanyahu.

Two years ago, the Netanyahu family forced the Watertown‘s Repertory theatre to cancel a

planned run of ―To Pay the Price‖ because it was to have been paired with ―My Name is Rachel

Corrie.‖ Iddo Netanyahu, Yoni‘s youngest brother, said that he feels, "that there is an inherent

incompatibility in the joining together, in one evening, of a play based on my brother Yoni's

letters with the play 'My Name Is Rachel Corrie.‖

. . .

It‘s ironic (and a bit sad to me) that while Rachel was a hero to Pat Tillman, she is viewed with

contempt by Yoni‘s family. I consider all three (Rachel, Pat, and Yoni) to be ―heroes.‖

. . .

Postscript:

The ship MV ―Rachel Corrie‖ was seized by Israel on June 5th

2010 as it tried to sail to Gaza.

The Corrie family‘s civil lawsuit against the IDF for Rachel‘s death is currently proceeding in

Israel But, I‘m not holding my breath to see justice served there.

. . .

As with Pat Tillman, and Yoni Netanayahu, the cover-up of Rachel Corrie‘s death continues…