serpent in the bosom: the rise and fall of slobodan · pdf filethat slobodan milosevic’s...

70 Canadian Military Journal ● Summer 2001

t is no accident”, as Comrade Stalin might say,that Slobodan Milosevic’s slow-motion arrest onApril Fool’s Day 2001 occurred as this reviewwas being written. Lenard J. Cohen’s excellent

biography explores the highly unstable dynamics ofSerbia’s ‘soft dictatorship’ that emerged from the ashesof Yugoslavia’s experiment in ‘self-management socialism’ by the 1990s.He tells the story of Milosevic’s rise asa talented and ambitious political man-ager on the coattails of his close friendIvan Stambolic; of his ‘co-dependence’on his equally ambitious wife, MiraMarkovic; of his manipulation ofSerbian nationalism and Yugoslavsocialism to become the commandingpresence in Yugoslav politics in thefinal decade of the millennium; of hismanagement of ‘Greater Serbia’ duringthe ‘Wars of Yugoslav Succession’; ofhis failure to resolve the ‘Kosovo ques-tion’ which brought him to power; andof the exhaustion of alternatives for tac-tical manipulation within the federationtowards the end of 2000. This carefuland judicious study provides abundant material forassessments for Yugoslavia’s post-Milosevic stability,governability and democratization.

Cohen astutely explores Mr. Milosevic’s tacticalabilities. He describes how Milosevic formed and brokepolitical alliances with members of the socialist innercircle. These members included Borisav Jovic and for-mer Praxis philosopher Mihajlo Markovic; author andYugoslav president Dobrica Cosic; businessman andYugoslav prime minister Milan Panic; fractious andambitious opposition leaders Vojislav Seselj, VukDraskovic, Zoran Djindjic; leaders of the army, policeand Serbian Orthodox church; Serb leaders in Bosniaand international interlocutors such as RichardHolbrooke. Milosevic employed his personal charm toconvince international interlocutors that he was the onlyreasonable and popular alternative for stewardship ofthe Serbian ship of state in the 1990s.

Unfortunately for international envoys, Milosevicwas less an enigma than a cynic who “decides first whatis expedient for him to believe and then believes it”(p.106). He was an economic reformer; a politicianwithout peer; a Yugoslav redefining Tito’s socialistlegacy; a nationalist nurturing the Serbia of Tsar Dusan;a populist inspiring ‘happenings of the people’ againstsocialist bureaucrats; an expansionist who provokedinternational sanctions; a pragmatic partner who reli-ably cooperated in ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina; a tyrant changing constitutions to expand

his power and abrogate freedom and autonomy; and anindicted war criminal incapable of making concessionsin the interest of regional peace and stability. He wasnot a man to do business with lightly.

Milosevic appeared equally comfortable with allwho were essential to his regime: party, army andpolice comrades, post-Yugoslav republican leaders,international negotiators, and shady businessmen andcriminals (such as Arkan). And no important institu-tion was spared his meddling. He stripped Serbia’stwo provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) of their auton-omy and orchestrated a comprehensive leadershipchange in neighboring Montenegro. He weakened the

army as he militarized the police appa-ratus throughout Serb-held territoriesin the former Yugoslavia. His regimealternately wooed, jailed, intimidatedand assassinated leaders of the opposi-tion. No inconvenient institution orgroup remained untouched. It is tellingthat a man who refused to ‘do business’with Milosevic — Vojislav Kostunica— beat him in the Yugoslav presiden-tial election in September 2000.

But Mr. Milosevic had tapped intodeeper patterns of Serbian political cul-ture. He played on ‘retraditionalizedvalues’ in the ‘ethnicization’ of politicallife; in the mass urge for security andconformity; in the intelligentsia’s patri-archal patriotism; in the cult of the

Serbian past as a response to the current dispersal ofSerbs throughout Yugoslavia; and in the ‘heroization’ ofmafia activity as modern brigands (hajduci) strugglingagainst the new Turks. Although hope could lie amongthe students in Otpor [Resistance], whose capacity toact freely provided a beacon throughout Serbia, Cohenprudently argues that “illiberal and collectivist authori-tarian features of Serbian political culture…will [not]quickly give way to the routine give and take of demo-cratic politics, compromise and peaceful negotia-tion…”(p. 370). It is not the least bit strange that thecurrent Yugoslav president continues to resist his prede-cessor’s extradition to the Hague.

For better or worse, Yugoslavia will move down thepath of democratization with international assistance.On this theme, Cohen does not match his genuineinsights into the conceptual blunders of the internation-al community’s high politics and errors in approach tothe Balkans with equal insights into Milosevic’s ‘lowpolitics’ of maintaining authority in ‘Greater Serbia’.He reports Milosevic’s effective use of police as aninstrument to govern ‘Greater Serbia’ (p.132), whichenabled Belgrade’s institutions to exert effective controlover all Serb territories, but does not consider some ofthe broader consequences. For example, in one case thatcontinues to impede Serbian-Croatia normalization,Yugoslav Army Major Veselin Sljivancanin, indicted forwar crimes committed in Vukovar in November 1991,was promoted within the Yugoslav Army and remainsfree in Serbia.

B O O K R E V I E W S

SERPENT IN THE BOSOM: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVICby Lenard J. CohenBoulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 496 pages, US$35.00.

Reviewed by Mark Baskin

“I

Summer 2001 ● Canadian Military Journal 71

In practice, complex governing arrangements —among regional Serb leaders, Serbian ministries andinternational organizations — ensured that foreignenvoys were forced to appeal repeatedly to Mr.Milosevic for relief from Serb misbehavior in theprovinces. Cohen writes that Milosevic took “stiff meas-ures to isolate the Bosnian Serbs”. However, ‘GreaterSerbia’ had genuine meaning in Knin, Vukovar andBanja Luka in the mid-1990s: Serb officials routinelyreminded UN officials of the need to consult Belgradebefore acting. The UN Mission in Kosovo is a complex‘protectorate’ of international and Kosovar organizationswith few prospects for a quick international exit. YetCohen’s account of post-war Kosovo does not do fulljustice to efforts at creating a joint administration or to

the genuine conflicts between Serbs and Albanians, aswell as conflicts within each group. And in this account,Balkan envoys remain well-meaning neophytes.

Cohen does not show that Milosevic employed the‘Greater Serbia card’ to win international support in themid-1990s — even as Serbia suffered under sanctions.The sanctions against the Milosevic regime had gainedhim a unique autonomy. Unlike other Balkan leaders,Milosevic never sought acceptance from the internation-al envoys who came to visit. And to a man, they enjoyeddoing business with this half-man, half-pariah whoalways acted as if he had nothing left to lose.

Mark Baskin is Head of Research at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

he two volume series, Warrior Chiefs(Dundurn Press) and Generalship and the Art

of the Admiral (Vanwell Publishing), edited byLieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. Stephen

J. Harris, presents a treasure trove of history, biographyand analysis of Canada’s military thathas far too long been absent from ourshelves.

The volume Generalship and theArt of the Admiral is a lengthy read at560 pages, but the reader will quicklybe captivated by the array of subjectscovered. The book is broken into fivesections — historical perspectives; thenature of higher command; operations;civil-military relations; and the func-tional roles of generalship. What makesthis volume of particular interest are itsauthors: the majority of the contributorsare senior military leaders, serving andretired. This marks a significant depar-ture from the past when this group ofofficers was often silent about theirvital role in shaping and giving mean-ing to Canadian military culture. Not only does thebook engage subjects of importance to today’sCanadian Forces, it also provides a valuable basis forfuture analysis.

The second volume, Warrior Chiefs, will surelybecome a staple for all officer candidates and studentsof Canadian military history. The book offers brief oper-ational biographies of seventeen senior leaders, andwhile the list is heavy with Army officers, there are

notable contributions about Navy and Air Force com-manders as well. This is perhaps the first detailedreview of Canada’s senior military leadership since thepublication of J. L. Granatstein’s, The Generals. Thosewho read this book may, however, find fault with the listof featured officers. Spanning the entire 20th century,obviously it was necessary to include well-known per-sonalities such as Sir Arthur Currie, Harry Crerar, etc.,but one wonders why Brigadier-General RaymondBrutinel was selected over other, more illustrious FirstWorld War commanders such Major-General SirArchibald Macdonell, Lieutenant-General Sir RichardTurner, or even Major-General H. C. Thacker.Likewise, the Second World War section may have ben-efited from new biographies.

The largest and perhaps best section of WarriorChiefs deals with post-war leaders.Included are sketches about Vice-Admiral Harold Grant, General CharlesFoulkes, General Jean-Victor Allard,Air Marshals Wilfred Curtis and RoySlemon, and more contemporary gener-als such as Dextraze, Mackenzie andDallaire. The section concludes with apersonal note from General John deChastelain. Many of these senior offi-cers have never been looked at serious-ly by historians. This section providesan important link between the end of theSecond World War — a period that con-tinues to fixate the majority ofCanadian military historians — and themodern day. Most literature has ignoredthe last fifty years of Canada’s militarylegacy, but this book, along withGeneralship and the Art of the Admiral,

has taken an important first step in filling the gap.Overall, the two volumes are well conceived, carefullywritten and edited, and a definite must for the library ofevery military history buff. Stephen Harris andLieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn are to be commendedfor their efforts.

Captain Andrew B. Godefroy is Commander of the CanadianForces Joint Space Support Team. He is also completing his PhDin War Studies at Royal Military College.


WARRIOR CHIEFS and GENERALSHIP AND THE ART OFTHE ADMIRALEdited by Lieutenant Colonel Bernd Horn and

Stephen J. HarrisWarrior Chiefs. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 365 pages, $25.99.

Generalship and the Art of the Admiral. St. Catherines: Vanwell

Publishing Ltd., 560 pages, $29.95.

Reviewed by Captain Andrew B. Godefroy

T


t first glance, Anthony Loyd’s book entitled MyWar Gone By, I Miss It So is not much more

than a pornography of violence. Describingchilling scenes of human barbarity, the book

immerses the reader in the horrid conflicts in Bosniaand Chechnya. A photo of an exhausted soldier, clutch-ing his Kalashnikov and weeping, leaning on a tree forsupport, adorns the front cover.Although it may seem like an escapistjaunt or about lives thriving on vio-lence, it also describes how modern waris fought. Through his chilling descrip-tions and disturbing passages, Loydpaints a vibrant picture of modern war’sgrand contradiction.

It opens with a chilling image ofAmerican soldiers securing a site for agroup of war crimes investigators. Thebrief chapter is a litmus test that will tellthe reader whether they can stomach thebook. A Yugoslav friend provides Lloydwith an explanation of “…Bosnia’skillers”. The Yugoslav states that “…inthe morning they hate themselves, in theafternoon the world” (p. 8). The powerof hate is a theme in Balkan literature. Ivo Andric’s clas-sic essay, “Letter From 1920”, reveals the hate stemmingfrom deep religious roots and a simple thirst for revengefor previous injustices. Andric’s essay explains thatBosnia is a passionate country. Holding faith, loyaltyand character so highly creates the paradox of Bosnia.Where such strong emotions exist, they generate strongopposition to other values.

Beginning in Srebrenicia in 1996, and then througha series of flashbacks over a three-year period, Loydshows that in modern war soldiers and civilians are inti-mately entangled. He describes battles that do not ragein vast, open fields, but in the close quarters of villagesand cities. When a Serb “…wanted to fight for neitherside he…escaped to Sarajevo, seeing it as a bastion ofmulti-ethnicity that no war could ever reach…” But thenature of the war quickly caught up with him. It was“…a misjudgment he still laughed over…” (p. 18). Itwas at this point that the author caught up with him andspent some time in a flat overlooking the so-called‘front lines’. Such a front line would change daily andoften run down the middle of a street in Sarajevo.Loyd’s war in Sarajevo was like Mark Bowden’sdescription of the 1993 encirclement of the AmericanRangers in Mogadishu. Streets covered by sniper fire,and mortar rounds that could fall on any part of a city atany time are the hallmarks of modern warfare.Bowden’s Black Hawk Down was a popular success;Lloyd’s advantage is that his experience is first-hand,making his account gritty and personal.

Although modern war has changed, the most impor-tant weapon is timeless. Modern technology has led torevolutionary weapons systems that rival the imagina-tions of the best science fiction writers. What has notchanged is the cruelty of torture, rape and murder. Thisis the most poignant aspect of My War Gone By, I MissIt So. Even in the waning hours of the 20th century,modern warfare relies on cruelty.

When Lloyd describes a woman raped by Serbs infront of her paralyzed father, or the soldier who collectsthe body parts of those he kills, the modern use of anancient weapon is evident. Given all the weapons at thedisposal of the various armies roving in and around

Bosnia, simple cruelty is still the mostuniversal. Loyd’s subject is not uniqueto the Balkans or the Caucasus. It is thepredominant form of controlling andultimately breaking the will of a popula-tion. From Argentina to Zimbabwe,from Bosnia to Burundi, cruelty is theweapon of choice, requiring few assets,save a ruthless imagination.

My War Gone By, I Miss It So showsthe reader the grand contradiction inmodern war. Despite the technology thatenables such politically correct conceptsas ‘surgical strikes’, warfare stillinvolves the intimate entanglement ofcivilian and soldier. Given that technolo-gy has enabled armies to bring massiveamounts of firepower onto a single target

very quickly, modern warfare has moved into the ‘centersof gravity’ that Clausewitz described. Modern warfare isurban warfare. Fighting in complex environments enablesnumerically and technologically inferior armies to fight,and often win, against superior opponents.

Loyd’s most disturbing example comes fromChechnya in 1995. A few months covering the Battle forGrozny almost shatters him. Despite the nerve-testingexperience, he learned that there is more to a war thanequipment and numbers. The will of an enemy can bethe most important factor of all. The Chechen guerrillas,numbering only a few thousand by 1996, forced one ofthe greatest military machines in history into retreat.Inhumane acts such as those described in My War GoneBy, I Miss It So are tools that break the will.

But in breaking this will, the weapon used most oftenis cruelty. This weapon, unlike the more antisepticweapons of the latest Revolution in Military Affairs,seems to perpetuate war. The armies of the United Nationsand NATO are still in the Balkans and trouble still brewsin sub-Saharan Africa. The cruelty simply begets morecruelty and the conflicts flounder on unresolved; hate per-petuating hate. Lloyd vividly illustrates this point in hiswork and it is worth the read. He forces the reader toreach a frightening conclusion; its ramifications will keepour profession busy for the foreseeable future.

Officer Cadet Christian Breede is a student at Royal MilitaryCollege.


MY WAR GONE BY, I MISS IT SOby Anthony LoydNew York: Doubleday, 321 pages, $29.95.

Reviewed by Officer Cadet Christian Breede

A


t first glance, this book is extremely deceiving. Itis a thin volume of only 100 pages of text and

29 pages of endnotes. In addition, the body ofthe book is deluged with illustrations. As a

result, a reader may get an erroneous first impressionthat the work lacks substance. However, this is certain-ly not the case.

The Skulking Way of War is a fascinating book. Thetext is authoritative and well researched. The myriad ofexceptional illustrations supports the work by providingclarity and detail. In this shortvolume, Patrick Malone studiesthe impact of Europeans and theirtechnology on the New EnglandIndians during the period 1600-1677. Quite simply, he masterful-ly weaves together the threads ofculture, technology and warfarein early North America.

Malone begins the book bysuccinctly describing the aborigi-nal military system. He detailstheir fighting technique, philoso-phy, tactics and technology. Fromthis analysis, Malone developshis central theme that resonatesthroughout the rest of his work.The author believes that theimpact of Europeans and theirtechnology quickly destroyedelements of Indian culture,specifically their way of war. Heinsists that trade between thewhite colonists and the nativesincited an increase in tribal war-fare, given inter-tribal competition for trade goods. Inturn, this created an arms race that not only enlarged theconflict between tribes but also eventually threatenedthe very security of the colonies themselves.

Specific to warfare, Malone develops the thesisthat European weapons and attitudes to war dramati-cally influenced the Indians’ approach to warfare. Hestates that the Indians adopted much of the Europeantechnology and then modified their traditional patternsof forest combat accordingly. Specifically, he arguesthat as a direct result of the European example, thenative custom of limited warfare evolved into a beliefand practice of total war. The example of the destruc-tion of a Pequot village and the subsequent massacre ofits inhabitants by colonists in 1637, is used as a graph-ic example. He describes how the colonists’ Indianallies had no experience with this type of war, namelythe wholesale destruction of villages and the death in

one single combat of approximately 400 men, womenand children. The “Indians had learned,” Malone con-cluded, “that the traditional restraints which had limit-ed deaths in aboriginal warfare were nothing more thanliabilities in any serious conflict with the Englishcolonists.” Henceforth, the natives waged war on allcolonists, not just combatants. Furthermore, they usedevery means available to defeat their enemies. Theauthor notes that even conflict between Indians becamebloodier as they adopted European technology andattitudes to war.

Interestingly, the author also demonstrates how theEuropeans too were forced to abandon some of theirattitudes and practices of war as a result of the Indianadaptation to the new form of conflict. Although theIndians adopted certain attitudes and technology from

the colonists, they still main-tained their “skulking way ofwar”. The natives rejected theEuropean insistence on mass,concentration and volley fire.Instead, they continued to placeemphasis on mobility, stealthand surprise. In addition, theyused natural cover for protectionand aimed at individual targets.This became a major concern forcolonists since the Indians hadwell developed marksmanshipskills derived from their experi-ence in hunting and survival inthe forests of North America.Much to the chagrin of thecolonists, they found that the“skulking way of war” wasincredibly effective. Moreover,it deeply shook their confidenceand spread fear. Quite simply,the Indian use of muskets wassuperior to that of the colonists.After months of war and numer-ous military defeats, the

European colonists finally acknowledged their weak-ness and slowly adopted a new doctrine that incorporat-ed the Indian way of war. Captain Benjamin Church andMajor Robert Rogers were two of the individuals thatinitiated the “Ranger tradition” that was borne from thisexperience.

The Skulking Way of War is a very informative andentertaining book. It provides an excellent overview ofthe impact of technology, culture and warfare in earlyNorth America. In fact, it is an excellent primer for theoft forgotten field of colonial warfare. It is definitely amust read for anyone interested in colonial, NativeAmerican, or military history in general.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn, PhD, teaches history at RoyalMilitary College. He is about to assume command of 1st Battalion,The Royal Canadian Regiment in Petawawa.


THE SKULKING WAY OF WARby Patrick M. MaloneNew York: Madison Books, 133 pages, US$18.95.

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn

A

his is one of the most important professionalethics treatises I have read in a number of

years. It deals with a critical element in ethicalthought which is usually ignored in most profes-

sional ethics books; namely, the place of excuses in eth-ical thought.

Banks McDowell is Professor Emeritus of Law atWashburn University School of Law in St. Louis. Hewas previously the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Lawat Boston University, and he has taught professionalethics, as well as law, for many years.

Professor McDowell begins the book by comparingthe relationship of defences in law to excuses in ethics.For any charge in law, there is an accepted defence.For example, in the case of homicide, an accepteddefence is that one acted in self-defence, i.e., in fear forone’s own life. This excuse, according to ProfessorMcDowell, performs the same function in ethics asdoes the defence in law. It provides an explanation forwhat would otherwise be unacceptable conduct on thepart of a professional.

Excuses begin early in our lives. As children, weoften resorted to an excuse to justify behaviour forwhich we would normally receive punishment. But asMcDowell points out, often our excuses were only alibis

and attempts to avoid punishment. Often our parentspaid little or no attention to our excuses and, thus,excuses became something negative rather thanexplanatory. And of course, in the military we had thetraditional response, “No excuse, sir.” But a real excuseis something much more. It enables ethical norms to fitconditions which were unthought of when the norm wasdeveloped. It is to ethics what case precedents are in thecommon law tradition, a means of not having to decideevery set of facts over again.

Why are excuses important? For one thing, they rec-ognize our human ‘imperfectness’. None of us are per-fect and without fault. Excuses also recognize that whenwe fail in a professional duty, we feel guilt which, unac-knowledged and unforgiven, can become a debilitatingfact in our lives. Although some may disagree, I believethat it is possible that at least some cases of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) may result from guiltfeelings engendered by professional decisions that havenot been resolved.

Although most of the examples in the book comefrom law or medicine, I believe that this book is a con-tribution to the study of professional ethics in the mili-tary, particularly Chapters 8 to11. I think that McDowellhas demonstrated that excuses in a professional ethic area subject that must be studied and analyzed. I would fur-ther recommend that copies of this book be a part of theprofessional libraries on bases and at schools, and thatthe techniques proposed by McDowell become a part ofethical instruction in the Canadian Forces. This bookcan be ordered by calling 1-800-225-5800.

Major (ret’d) The Rev. Arthur Gans, a noted authority on militaryethics, is a retired chaplain residing in British Columbia.

rming the Future is the product of two studygroups conducted by the Council on ForeignRelations between 1995 and1998. The book documents the

changing defence industrial base in theUnited States and abroad in the first decadefollowing the end of the Cold War, andthen discusses the challenges confrontingthe major defence industries at the begin-ning of the 21st century.

In addition to an introductory section,the book has five sections organized the-matically: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Decade, The Consequences ofDefense Industry Consolidation, The Pushto Export, Defense Industry Globalization

and An Industry for the Future. The book argues thatfour different developments have come to dominaterestructuring in the 1990s.

First, defence industry mergers have reduced thenumber of competitors to a small number of largedefence-dedicated companies. These mergers haveincreased the ‘size gap’ between American andEuropean firms; the latter fearing market dominance bytheir US counterparts. Second, as defence budgets havedecreased, the leading arms producing countries have

become more competitive for export mar-kets which, in turn, has hindered efforts atcontrolling arms proliferation. Third, with-in the context of budgeting, there has beena shift in favour of private sector procure-ment and services over public sector provi-sion. Finally, efforts aimed at securing a‘peace dividend’ have had, at best, onlymodest success. Western nations, withgrowing economies over the past decade,have had some success in absorbing thepeople, facilities and technologies releasedfrom the defence sector, but the same can-not be said for Russia and other develop-ing nations. The authors demonstrate that



ETHICS AND EXCUSES: THE CRISIS IN PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY by Banks McDowellWestport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 169 pages, US$59.95.

Reviewed by Major (ret’d) The Rev. Arthur Gans

ARMING THE FUTURE: A DEFENSE INDUSTRY FOR THE21ST CENTURYby Ann R. Markusen and Sean S. Costigan, EditorsNew York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 429 pages,

US$33.50.

Reviewed by Major J.C. Stone

T

A


B O O K R E V I E W Simportant decisions were made in the 1990s withrespect to conversion, mergers, defence budgets andarms exports. “The result has been less conversion thanwas anticipated, markedly fewer firms competing in thesystems integration end of the market, and a rise inAmerican firms’ domination of the arms export market,despite falling absolute export levels.”

Although Canada is mentioned only twice, theissues raised throughout the book are highly relevantto Canada, from both a North American and aEuropean/NATO perspective. Canada provides muchof its defence industrial output to the US market, andwe need to be cognizant of the changes occurring inthe US defence industry. European problems — smallfirms, national political issues (i.e., regional employ-ment tied to a specific defence industry), and theincreasing costs for fewer pieces of new equipment —are also problems for Canada. European initiatives toachieve economies of scale and scope, efforts toreduce costs and attempts at collaborative productionoptions also deserve Canadian attention.

The contributors to Arming the Future come fromboth sides of the Atlantic and represent both academicsand practitioners. The book is well written and well doc-umented. If there is a negative side to the book, it is thatwithout some knowledge of the structure of the US andEuropean defence industrial base before 1990, readersmay not attach much importance to the significantchanges underway in the defence industry. Although theintroductory chapter skates around some of the pre-1990issues, no effort is made to provide historical context.That is, however, a minor detraction from an otherwiseexcellent book. Arming the Future is a worthwhile readfor anyone interested in equipment and weapons acquisi-tion, the arms industry, or how Canadians can meetfuture defence requirements.

Major Craig Stone is a PhD student at Royal Military College,studying Defence Economics, Canadian Defence Policy andCanadian Military History.

n the first decade of the last century, the Militia ofCanada, as the entire army was then known, com-menced transforming itself into a modern force.Major General E.T.H. Hutton, a British officer

serving as General Officer Commanding the CanadianMilitia (British officers held this posi-tion between 1875 and 1904), provid-ed the impetus. In an 1898 report, hewrote that the Militia was “a collec-tion of military units without cohe-sion, without staff and without thosemilitary departments by which anarmy was moved, fed, or ministered toin sickness.” Totally lacking in whattoday would be called combat servicesupport units, the Militia was quitesimply a collection of combat armsunits incapable of sustained opera-tions under any conditions.

Hutton’s legacy (aside from upset-ting his Canadian superiors and beingfired) was the creation of a number ofcorps to provide the services that werelacking. One of these was The RoyalCanadian Army Service Corps (RCASC), which wasformed on 1 November 1901. Surprisingly, theRCASC and several of its sister corps were initiallycreated only in the non-permanent, or reserve Militia,with the regular component being formed years later.Depending on the outcome of the Land Force ReserveRestructure, we may see a return to this system.

Between 1901 and integration in 1968, the RCASCprovided transport, catering, butcher and supply serv-ices to the Canadian Army. The variety of roles, equip-ment and experiences make a fascinating tale. Onoperations, the RCASC supported Canadian units andformations, plus a number of Commonwealth and for-eign land and air units. In the First World War, whilemost units of the Canadian Corps were horse-drawn,the RCASC operated a number of motor transportcompanies. In the next war, aside from the normaltransport units, its order of battle included suchunique organizations as two bridging companies(amazing units where RCASC soldiers built bridges

aided by attached engineer personnel),petroleum laboratories, a mule trans-port company and mobile printing sec-tions. Its soldiers earned numerousawards, including several remarkableones for bravery. The RCASC’s serv-ice was truly remarkable and itbecame a proud corps.

This year marks the centenary ofthe Corp’s formation, an event thatinitiated the production of this mar-vellous book. This is also a compan-ion volume to Wait for the Waggon, ahistory of the RCASC from its forma-tion to the Korean conflict, which waspublished for the Corps’ DiamondJubilee in 1961. In that book, thepost-war period was treated ratherlightly, leaving some 25 years of his-

tory to be told. This was an exciting period that wit-nessed the creation of Canada’s largest peacetimearmy, the permanent assignment of a formation inEurope, the first United Nations operations, disasterrelief and assistance in Canada and, for the Militia, aperiod of frequent restructure, uncertain roles andperennial shortages.

THE LAST WAGGON: THE FINAL STORY OF THE ROYALCANADIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS By Colonel (ret’d) J. D. MurrayThe Royal Canadian Army Service Corps Fund, 670 pages, $45.00.

Reviewed by Major John R. Grodzinski

I


The Last Waggon is a detailed history. Beginningwith an overview of field force units, the author givesa comprehensive history of every transport unit, fieldand static headquarters, the RCASC School (at 76pages, probably the most detailed account of aCanadian Army school yet), career development, theApprentice Programme, miscellaneous trades such ascooks, clerks and ‘others’, plus social aspects of theCorps history. It also recounts the important role theRCASC played in army aviation, the creation of aeri-al supply doctrine and the development of short take-off and landing aircraft. During the heyday of thepost-war army, the RCASC Militia component includ-ed corps and divisional units, while the Regular ele-ment was structured for divisional level operations.Medium artillery regiments had an assigned RCASCplatoon to support ammunition requirements; unitswere organized to meet airborne and other uniquerequirements; transport companies were assigned theareas belonging to each geographical command and toArmy Headquarters in Ottawa. Overseas movementswere controlled by a number of ‘Movement ControlGroups’. There were ‘tipper’ (dump truck), watertransport, motor ambulance and a myriad of special-ized companies and platoons. With the demise of theCorps of Military Staff Clerks in 1946, the RCASCalso provided clerical personnel for the Army. Thisfascinating detail is brought to life by a host of inter-esting and humorous anecdotes and stories sprinkledthroughout the text, which help capture the characterof the Corps and of the period. There are also 26pages of photos, several maps and a three-page foldout of abbreviations.

The author has made exhaustive use of historicaland other reports, militia and army lists, interviewsand consultation with a number of historians — read-ers should note that two prominent historians, Dr. Jack

Granatstein and Dr. Des Morton, served in theRCASC. Fortunately, the sources are cited, so thisbook will also provide a valuable source to the gener-al researcher. Included are a number of tables and listsshowing personnel of the school, Corps organizationat certain periods, personnel trained as pilots, andbiographies of the most senior RCASC officers andwarrant officers.

At integration, RCASC personnel and units wereabsorbed into the Canadian Forces Logistics Branch.Several of the service battalion transport companieswe know today are successors to RCASC companies,as are some base transport sections. What has disap-peared is the fiercely proud spirit and tradition theRCASC developed. Perhaps this book may contributeto a rekindling of that spirit.

The RCASC Association is to be commended forsponsoring this project as part of its centenary cele-brations. The book was launched at the 100th anniver-sary re-union of the RCASC on 4 May 2001 at CFBBorden. The author has written a highly readable,detailed narrative that fills an important gap in Armyhistory. It is clear that the RCASC contributed notonly to many of the successes of the post-war Army,but in doing so also contributed to the very fabric ofthis country.

The book is available from the CFB BordenMilitary Museum, CFB Borden, 18 Waterloo Rd.East, PO Box. 1000 Stn Main, Borden, ON L0M 1C0.Proceeds from sales will be divided between theMuseum and the RCASC Association Fund.

Major John Grodzinski is the G3 of the Land Force Doctrine andTraining System and Managing Editor of the Army Doctrine andTraining Bulletin.


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