FALL GELB & THE GERMAN BLITZKRIEG OF 1940: OPERATIONAL ART?

A MONOGRAPH BY

Major Rick S. Richardson Field Artillery

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff

College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 98-99

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UsIm II

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Richard S. Richardson

Title of Monograph: Fall Gelb and the German Blitzkrieg of 1940: Operational Art?

Approved by:

-7 ~ i : ~ & , y , , ~ .YAW$ Monograph Director

William J. Gregor, kb) .~.

Director, School of Advanced - LTC Robin P. Swan, MMAS Military Studies

p& J &U~L.-- Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Program

Accepted this 27th Day of May 1999

Abstract

Fall Gelb & the German Blitzkrieg of 1940: Operational Art? by Major Kick S. Richardson: l1.S. Army, 51 pages.

The ohjcctive of this study is to determine isthe German "blil~krieg" and 1:alI Gclb ol' 1940 wcrc an expression ol'operational art. Despite the mythology surrounding Vall Gclb, the campaign does not constitute a major breakthrough in operational art by the Germims. Fall Gelb was not an expression of operational art. This conclusion is based upon an analysis using the approaches posed by 1J.S. Army and joint doctrine, Dr. James Schneider and Dr. Shimon Navch.

'She purpose of this study is to examine more closely what is meant by "opcrational art" and to use those contcmporary insights to reexamine German military operations in France in May 1940, Fall Gclb. I'all Gelb was choscn becausc it is a campaign that is frequently studied and ofen used and abused to illustrate various points relating to military operations. The study orthe I'all ( A h campaign on'ers a glimpse of past operations through the lens of contemporary thought. That study provides thc contemporary military professional an opportunity to improve his undcrstanding ofopcrational art through the study of a historical campaign.

I:all Gelb must be analyzed using criteria derived rrom a modern understanding of opcrational art to objectively asscss the significance ofF'iil1 Gelb. 'l'here are three distinctive approaches to opcrational art. Onc way to approach the problem is to use contcmporary doctrine as a yardstick. Contemporary doctrine approaches the issue by using simple definitions and lists to describe the essential elements of opcrdonal art. Another approach is that taken by Dr. James Schneider liom the 1J.S. Army School ol' Advanccd Military Studies. Schncider's approach seeks to dcscrihe the phenomena associnlcd with the practice of' Operation Art. Schneider breaks down opcrational art into key attributes necessary for thc practice of Operational Art. A third approach to thc issue is that used by Dr. Shimon Naveh, an Israeli military theorist. Naveh's approach l'ocuscs on describing the cognitive process he . ~ identitics as operational art. I hcsc approaches to the subjcct of' operational art olT'er thrcc different stiindards by which to mcasurc German military opcrations. 'l'hc thrcc approaches share common elements and can be used to produce a set ol'conimon critcria ibr thc analysis oSFall Gclb.

German opcrations in 1940 rcvcal little insight into thc clcmcnls ol'operational art. The Germans failed to use a unified and holistic approach in their design, execution, and sustainment orcampaigns mostly due to their lack ofpolitical-strategic cognition. Hitler's overnowerinrr inlluence in the onerational and tactical levels of war sevcrelv limited the - German military's operational vision, which is a prcrcquisitc li)r opcrational art. Also, the German planners in the OKH and OKW failed to idcntilj a clcar sequence of ttictical and operational objectives to achieve strategic goals and thus did not practice operational art. The German Olficer Corps did not have a "broad and universal" theory of'blitxkrieg. 'l'here was no consensus within the military as to the operational substance of' blitzkrieg. The German's maneuvers lacked industrious relationships betwccn strategic, opcrational, and tactical actions. The operational design was ambiguous because the planners could see no Sarther than the tactical success. The High Command hoped that unfolding events would guide thcir thought for the second phase ofFall Gelb.

Table of Contents

Chapter I -- Introduction

Emergcnce of Opcnilional Art

The lssue

Significance of ihc Study

Chapter 2 -- A 'l'heory of operational arl

I JS . Army Doctrine

U.S. Join1 1)odrine

Dr. Schneidcr's 'I'heory

Dr. Naveh's Theory

Chapter 3 -- Operation Fall Gclb

The Setting

'l'hc Action

'l'hc Aflerrnalh

Analysis

Chapter 4 -- Conclusion

Appendix A -- Dr. Schneidcr's Attributes ol'Opertllional Arl

Endnotes

Uihliography

Chapter 1

Introduction

R'urjure is /hc! greu/es/ ujfuir o/'slure, /he husis of li/l! und deu~h, /he wuy /o survivtrl or ex/inc/ion. I / musr he thoroughly pondered un d tmulyzed. '

Sun 'l'zu

Emerpcnce of Operational Art

The concept ofoperational art arose during the late 1800s. 'I'he early military thcorists

Clausewitz and Somini did not use the term. In hct, thc tcrm carricd no special significance

prior to thc twentieth century. When it was used the term refcrred to the organifidtion of'

supplies and marches.' l'he history of operational art rcvcals that it cmerged as a

consequence ofchanges in classical stratcgy that wcre brought about through the evolution of

warfive. This evolution was the product of'a series of'changcs to the hndamcntal naturc of

warfare in latter part of the nincteenth century. Advances in weapon lethality. transportation,

communications, and the raising tmd organization ol' field armies altered the conduct ofwar.

Those advances forced adaptation to both the enhanced military capabilities and the

complexity born ofthc new changcs.

In a paper titled Vulcun 's Anvil: The Americun Civil Wur and /he limergence 01'

O~~erurionul Arr, Dr. Schncider further described thc specific origins of operational art. Dr.

Schncider explained that classical stratcgy had held for hundreds of years that decisive

military action occurred whcn armies camc together in a dcnsc mass on a singlc point within a

theater of operations. During the American Civil war that pattern of military operations

changcd as a ncw rnanncr ofwarf'ic emergcd. Technological advances allowed armies to

conduct dispersed maneuvers, which in turn expanded and emptied the battlefield. 'l'hc

increased lethality o f modern weapons, such as the breech-loading ritlc, and quick-firing

artillery, caused soldiers to disperse to avoid the efkcts ol'these weapons. This dispersion

crcated thc "empty battlefield." l'he dispersion of forces combincd with idvanccd

transportation and communications mcans propelled the emergencc ol'largc lield armies that

could efi'cctivcly usc distributed ~naneuvcr.~ Because ol'thesc changcs, it gap dcvelopcd

between tactics which tended to produce concentric niancuver in search of'a battle at a

decisive point and stratcgy which tended to deline war aims divorced from tactics. l'hat gap

in classical theory reprcscnted a large intellectual void that needed to be fillcd. 'l'hc physical

changes in thc conduct of war were thc prerequisites f i r operations at a level beyond tactics,

b ~ ~ t not quite strategy, and thus the art of linking strategy to tactics was born. The 1J.S. Army

has labclcd the art of linking strategy to tactics, operational art. The following table comparcs

classical strategy lo opcrational art. 4

1,ogistics is a consideration only in initial phases of campaign. Vigorous pursuit afcr battlc.

Maneuv~r to contact.

Armies collide in decisive battle.

Campaign ends.

Rattles and engagements hegin immediately at the national borders. Several armies light indecisive battles. l'he only decisive battle is the last battle of the war 1,ogistics considerations imposc pauses upon operations 0 t h before

gursuit can be decisive. Wars consist of several campaigns: campaigns consist of several distinct operations; operations consist of' several distinct battles and maneuvers.

Cicnerally war is also terminated. ( Operational art is strategy with thc

The commander sccs the entirc battlefield.

addcd dimension ofdepih. l'he commander sccs vcry littlc of thc many simulttuneous battles

The Issue

I listorians have spilled a large amount of ink arguing the significance ol'the German

western campaign of 1940 and the notion ofwarfare labeled "blil~krieg." The fall of I'rancc

has been used and abused to illustrate various points relating to military operations. Any

study of Fall Cielb, Case Yellow, must sort out the exaggerated claims from reality in order to

makc an objective assessment of the significance ol'Gcrman operations in contemporary

terms. Given all of the intellectual passion associated with studies of I'all Gclb there needs to

be a l'ramcwork to make an ob,jcctivc assessment. '1'0 makc an oh,jective asscssmcnt criteria

must he established that are independent of previous portrayals of the 1940 campaign. Thus,

to objectively assess the importance of the "blitzkrieg," the blitzkrieg must be analyzed using

criteria derived from a modern understanding ofoperational art. There arc thrcc distinctive

approachcs to operational art. One way to approach the problem is to use contemporary

doctrine as a yardstick. Contemporary doctrine approachcs the issue by using simple

definitions and lists to describe the essential elements ol'opcrational art. Another approach is

that taken by Dr. James Schneider from thc IJ.S. Army School ol' Advanced Military Studies.

Schncider's approach seeks to dcscribc the phenomcna associated with thc pri~ctice of

Operation Art. Schneidcr breaks down operational art into key attributes necessary for the

practice ofOperational Art. A third approach to the issuc is that used by Dr. Shimon Naveh,

an Israeli military theorist. Navch's approach ibcuses o n describing the cognilivc process he

identities as operational art. These approachcs to the sub,ject of operational art ofkr three

ditr'erent standards by which to measure German military operations. 'l'hc threc approachcs

share common elements and can be used to produce a set ofcommon critcria for the analysis

ofl:all M b .

'l'hc understanding of operational art is important for today's military leaders because

without the linkage of tactical rneans to strategic ends, tactical victories may fail to achicve

the nation's strategic purpose. The 1993 edition of Field Manual 100-5 Operations warns,

"without operational art, war would be a set ol'disconnected engagements, with relative

attrition the only measure ot'succcss or failure." 'l'his means that operational art providcs a

holistic or integrated approi~ch to the military planning. This holistic approach to the problem

docs not stem liom the tactics at the lowest level as the locus ol'military planning. Instead,

instead this approach works from the highest strategic aims, hack to the tactical actions. The

irrr is the bending and flexing of military means to effect a designed linkage tiom strategy to

tactics.

'l'he reason ibr examining the western campaign of 1040 is to illuminate how historical

events can be reinterpreted. 'l'hc purpose ol' such an examination is not.just another re-look:

instead the purpose is a better understanding of contemporary doctrine and theory. Such an

examination also serves to dispel thc many myths surrounding the 1:ull Ciclb campaign that

have arisen over time. The more pcople arc fascinated with myths, the less they can focus on

the understanding thc reality of planning military opcrtions. The contemporary significance

of such an analysis of the Fall Gelb campaign can bc broken into two ptuts. First, what is the

significance of operational art'? Second, what is the value of historical study through the lens

of operationid art'?

Foremost, what is the signilicance of operational art'? Operational art is notable

bccausc of its recent incorporation into 1J.S. doctrine. Operational art is also significant

because the current intense doctrinal debate within thc [J.S. Army arises because operational

art has become morc significant to military operations. One reason for such debate is that

operational art is a relatively new concept lor the United States Army. The 1982 version of

Ficld Manual 100-5 introduced the operational level ol'war. l'he 1986 update to Field

Manual 100-5 further focused thc Army on operational art when it revised the broad divisions

of war to include military strategy, operational art, and tactics. That vcrsion defined the term

operational art as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theatcr or

thcater ofoperations through the design, organization and conduct ofcampaignss and maior

operations6. The current 1993 edition of Ficld Manual 100-5 expanded the explanation of

operational art to several pagcs that covered the concept in much morc detail than the

previous cciitions. The 1999 dralt of Field Manual 100-5 continued that trend of expanding

the width and brcadth of IJS Army doctrine concerning operational art. Opcri~tional art was a

conspicuous feature ofthat drall. That vcrsion devoted an entire chapter of tifly-six pagcs to

explaining a more holistic theory ofoperational art.

Since "operational art" was added to the IJS Army's vocabulary many soldiers have

struggled to undcrstand it. An abundance of confusion continues to surround the mcaning and

signiiicancc oi'operational art. The current dralt of Ficld Manual 100-5 remains under

significant revision; however, the concepts presentctl in this draft reveal thc ascendancc of

operational art in Army doctrine. The consternation surrounding thc draft is cvidencc that thc

IJnitcd States Army still docs not know precisely what "operational art" mcans. Tlowcver,

regardless ofwhich definition is agreed upon in the linal edition of'I:ield Manual 100-5, the

elcvated prominence ofopcrational art will surely require increased study by an expanding

number ol' soldiers.

Ciivcn the importance of operational art in IJ.S. Army doctrine, how can soldiers

further their understanding of operational art'? A soldier can improve his understanding by

testing, evaluating, and challenging thc thcory ofopcmtional art through historical study. A

historical study synthcsizes his understanding of the theory of operational art by permitting

him to reexamine historical cvents through the lens ofoperational art. l'hc soldier achievcs a

better understanding ofthe concept following historical analysis, than is possible by studying

the concept alone.

Soldiers, scholar, and private citizens havc some understanding ofthc (icrman

blitzkrieg. Scholars have debated the significance of the blitzkrieg and whether thc camptiign

of' 1940 rcprcsented a h r m ofoperational art. Many arguments havc already been madc to

provc either viewpoint of the controversy. This study takes a fiesh look at the issue by

"peeling the onion back" on the cvcnts leading up to Spring 1940 to examine thc truths of

blitzkrieg through the lens ol'current rind emerging operational art theory.

Chapter 2

A Theory of Operational Art

Miliiury theory and history serve us /he chief vehicles wi/h which /o highligh/ and sketch /he e.wence qf'cperu/ionul ur/.'

Dr. .lames J. Schneider

Introduction

As previously stated, to properly analyze Fall Cielb in the context ol'opcrational art, it

is necessary to dctcnnine lirst what is meant by "operational art." Specilically. what arc the

clenients of military perbrmancc that distinguish operational art from stratcgy and tactics. IT

operational art can be clearly separated fiom stratcgy and tactics, then it will be possible to

assess objectively thc German campaign in France in 1940. Unhrtunately thcrc is no single

interpretation of the concept dctined as "operational art." There arc, however? three

distinctivc approaches to the subject. Each approach provides a different standard but all

three sharc common clemcnts. Thus, from examining the three approaches, it will be possible

to establish specific criteria ibr judging 17all (ielb. The lirst approach and perhaps the most

obvious is current I1.S. Army and ioint doctrine on operational art. 'fhis is an obvious starting

point bccause U S . Army and joint doctrine supposedly guides IJ.S. military planning and, by

extension, should represent a mature concept ofoperational art. Field Manual 100-5 dcfincs

operational art and lists the specific aspects of' military perfornmncc that are the essential

elements ol'opcrational art in distinction to strategy and tactics. 1J.S joint doctrine also

provides a definition of operational art and lists the essential elements ofoperational art in

distinction to stratcgy and tactics. These two doctrinal documents sharc the same

fundanlental definition ofopcrtdional art. The essential elements ol'the doctrinal delinition

7

remain the same. The major difference is that joint doctrine has a distinct emphasis on the

application of operational art as part of the joint cltmpaign planning process. Ihwcver, this

difYcrcncc is not significant in terms ol'thdamcntal approach. Therefore, there is no need to

separate the two approaches ibr the purpose ol'examining IFall Gelb.

'I'he second and third approaches lo operational art do not come liom doctrine.

Instead, thc latter two approachcs stem lkom the theorctical explanations of operational art

proposed by two ofthe foremost theorists in the academic study of operational art. 'l'hcsc

theoretical models are valid criteria bccttuse each arc published by qualified academicians in

the field ol'operational art theory. As a member ol'thc founding fiiculty ofthc School of

Advanced Military Studies at Fort l.eavenworth, Dr. James J. Schneider has inlluenccd the

development ol'U.S. operational doclrine. 'The second theoretical dcfinilion proposed by Dr.

Shimon Naveh is equally valid. Naveh's recent work, in I'urs~ri~ of'Mililrrry l<xxcellence: The

Evolulion qf'Operu/ional l'heory providcd a comprehensive study of operational art. Navch's

theoretical model ofoperational art is studied at both the [J.S. Army War College and the

School of' Advanced Military Studies.

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 & Operational Art

The first ofthree approaches to the subject ofoperational art is 1J.S. doctrine. I<ven

though operational art evolvctl in the late 1800s. the notion ofoperational art is a relatively

new conccpt in the IJ.S. military. 'l'hc adolescence orthis conccpt is manifested in the limited

understanding ol'operational art at all levels of the Army and thc hilure of current doctrinc to

explain sufficiently the essential elements of military performance necessary to practice

operational art. The reason Sor this hilure can be ibund in records ol'thc dcvclopment of'

doctrinc since 1976. The 1976 version ol'1:ield Manual 100-5 0perurion.c. was largely

8

focused on dcfcnding Western Europe fiom the hrmcr-Soviet Union. At that time. Army

doctrine largely ignorcd operational art. The clear focus ol'the Army's intellectual energy

was on the tactical problems presented by the Warsaw I'act. H

Following publication of the 1976 edition, the Army ibcused inward and i~lter much

reflection introduced operational art. Much likc today's attempt to clevatc thc prominence ol'

operational art, the 1976 Army operations doctrine was not well received. Many soldiers

debated the requirement for a ncw doctrinal construct bctwccn strategy and tactics. The

dcbatc centered on changing the relationship between tactical battles and strategic endstatcs.

The operational art debate was bcncficial bccause it sparked opcn debate over how to apply

doctrine to kst del'end against the Soviet threat. As thc operational art debate progressed

during thc dcvclopment ofthe 1982 vcrsion and the subsequent 1986 vcrsion ol'Field Manual

100-5, doctrine writers and lield leaders acccptcd a paradigm shift from solely a tactical focus

to addressing the relationship between tactical activities and their larger strategic objectivc.

'l'hc paradigm shift away lrom tactics was manifested in thc 1986 vcrsion ol'T:ield

Manual 100-5. 'I'hat version explained that the "structurc ol' modern warfare'' consisted ol'

military strategy, operational art, and tactics. It labeled this structure as the "broad divisions

of activity in preparing for war.'" The 1986 version of FM 100-5 was significant because, for

the first time, operational art was defined in 1J.S. Army doctrinc. Field Manual 100-5 defined

operational art as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a thcatcr of

war or theater of opcrations, through thc design, organization, and conduct ol'campaigns and

ma,jor operations.""' This new concept signified a lundamcntal shilt in the Army's base

tloctrinc. The tloctrinal thrust ofthe basc doctrine was slowly shilting away firom a tactical

paradigm of dcstruct ion to an operational paradigm of mult i-dimensional maneuvcr with

specific linkages to strategic aims.

Dr. Richard M. Swain bcst summcd up the evolution oSlJ.S. Army doctrinc on

operational art whcn he said, "operational art fills a significant void in 1I.S. Army thought. Tt

providcs a concept to rclatc tactical events to strategic outcomes. It provided a framework

within to think, cven tentatively about large unit opcrittions."" To hcgin to understand this

doctrinal concept of opert~tional art, onc must understand thc mental fiamework doctrine

provides. l'hc current version of I M d Manual 1 O O - ~ ' ' , and Field Manual 100-7,I)e~isive

l.i)rce: 7he Army in Theater Orxwtion.s'.' providcs U.S. Army doctrinc for operational art.

These manuals lay out a mental i'ramcwork for ordering and categoriing military operations

shown in Figurc 2. This framcwork is called thc lcvcls ofwar. A lcvcl of war is a conccptuitl

fiamework in which to organkc activities, resources, purposes, and areas of responsibility and

operations in a logical structure. These lcvcls provide a mcntal pegboard within this

continuum in which to "hang" activities within an area of responsibility and helps

commanders visualize a logical {low of operations, allocate rcsources, and assign tasks. Most

important, each level is deli ned by the outcome intended-not by the level of command or the

size ofthe unit. A common misconception is that the tactical level ofwar consists of Corps

and lower units; operational level consists of Armics and Joint unified and suh-unified

commands; and strategic is cvcrything abovc that. In fact, a particular unit or rigid boundaries

do not definc the levels ofwar; instead, the outcome or ohiecrives lo he achieveddefine thc

levcls of war.

STRATEGIC f - j I

I Thssnr slralegy

I Theater Campaign Plans

Subora~nate Jolnl Fone

OPERATIONAL

Figure

M a w Oporauono 3T-5 TACTICAL

Engagernenls

Levels of w a r t 4

'The three levels orwar are strategic, operational, and tactical. The highest lcvcl of

war is thc stratcgic icvcl. At the strategic level oi'war a nation or group of nations uses

national intcrcsts to determine their stratcgic goals. Strategy involves the art t~nd science of

employing armed Forccs with othcr instruments of national powcr to achicvc stratcgic goals.

Relow the stratcgic lcvcl orwar is the operational level. 'I'hc operational level olwar

is that level at which forccs are used to attain tllcatcr-strategic objectives in a thcatcr of war

and operational ob.jectives in the thciitcrs ofopcnttions through dcsign, organimtion, and

execution of campaigns and major operations. The operational level is the vital link between

national and theatcr-strategic aims ttnd the tactical employment ol'lorces on the battlefield.

'The activities at the operational level of war ensure the logistic and administrativc support ol'

lactical lbrces. Thc activities at the operational level create conditions that place tactical

forccs at the proper location and time to cxccutc operations.

1 1

The lowest lcvel in the liamcwork is the tactical lcvcl. At this lcvel, battles atid

engagcments arc planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical

forccs. 7'hc sum of these individual victories produces opcralional rcsults. 'l'actics is the art

and science ol'employing forccs to win battles and engagcmcnts.'5

Given the fiamcwork provided by the levcls ofwar, the relationship betwcen thc

opcrational lcvel of war and opcrational art must bc clarified. The opcrational lcvcl ofwar is

the middle space in the "mental pegboard" betwccn the strategic and tactical lcvcls for

ordering and catcgorizing military operations. Operational art is the uclivily conducted at the

opcrational lcvel of war. At this point it is usefill to undcrstand why the word "art" is uscd in

the term. Art is thc cognitive thinking process ol'creating something as opposed to thc idea ol'

purely scientific or mathematical equation. In thc context of military operations, operational

art is the linchpin between mechanical aspccts ofmilitary science and the intangible essence

of military art. The analogy of a mosaic is usefill to clarify this concept of "art." Explained in

the context ol'a mosaic, operational arl takes pieces (time, spacc, capabilities, terrain, enemy,

rcquircmcnts, etc.) and arranges them in a coherent pattcrn that produces a strategic result,

just like a mosaic. This is in contrast to classical warfhre that is more like painting. In

painting, thc artist merely draws a strategic line to a point and puts the paint (armics) on that

"decisive point". Related to this concept ofoperational "art" is the notion of thc "operational

artist." The tcrnm opcrational artist suggests one who applics creativity in taking abstract

strategic goal and applies creativity to turn these abstract goals into missions and ob,iectives

for tactical action.

Field Manual 100-5 delines the concept of operational art used by the "artist" to

construct such a "mosaic:"

The skillfill employment of military lbrces to attain strategic andlor operational oh,jectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. I"

Field Manual 100-5 expands this definition by explaining that operational art is the process of

translating theater strategy and design into an operational design which links and integrates

the tactical battles and engagements that, when fought and won over space and time, achieve

the strategic aim. I'ield Manual 100-5 warns, "without operational art, war would be a set 01'

disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure."17 In

other words, the application of operational art provides that tactical engagements are directed

toward aprrrpose so the tactical engagements are not inconsequential attempts to erode cnemy

fbrces.

IField Manual 100-5 identifics specific elements of military performance as the

essential elements ofoperational art. Opcrational art requires visualization, anticipation, and

ii thorough understanding ofthc relationship of means to ends. 'fhis means that the

operational artist must possess "broad vision" to see both "up" to the strategic goals and

"down" to the tactical actions necessary to achieve thcsc goals. In doing so, Field Manual

100-5 poses three questions for the opcrational artist:

What military conditions will achieve the strategic objectives in a theater of war or theatcr of operations'!

What sequence ol' actions is most likely to producc thcsc conditions'!

I low should the commander apply military resources within cstahlished limitations to accomplish that sequence ol'actions'?"

'l'hc answers to Lhesc questions provide the operational commander and his staf' the insight

into what actions to direct and what effccts must be achieved.

O~erational Art in Joint US. Doctrine

Joint doctrinc expands the operational art concepts previously stated. The Joint

dclinition of operational art is

. . I he employment ol'military hrccs to attain strategic andlor operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct ol' strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint lbrces commander's strategy into operational design, and. ultimate1 , taclical aclion by integrating thc key activities at all lcvcls of war. z

Joint doctrine states that Joint Force Commanders employ operational art, in concert with

strategic guidance and direction received liom the National Command Authority or through

superior military commanders, when developing campaigns and opcrations. 'The key

differcncc between 1J.S. Army and Joint doctrine is the distinct joint emphasis on cnmptiign

planning at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war.

Joint doctrine l'or operations and planning lays out l'our specific military performance

standards that are thc essential elements of operational art. 17irst ihc operational artist must

possess broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and cH'cctivcJoint and multinational

cooperation. Second, scnior stalTofficcrs tind subordinate commandcrs must practice

operational art in addition to joint force commanders. Third, the operational artist must

consider not only thc employment ol' military l'orces hut also at the arrangcrnent of thcir

eiTorls in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art fi)cuses in particular on thc

fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space,

and special opcrations force^.^" Vourth, operationill artisls must answer the following

questions:

What military (or rclated political and social) conditions must be produccd in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (I'nds);

I4

What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition'? (Ways);

I low should the resources of the joint i'orcc be applied to accomplish that sequencc of actions'? (Means);

What is thc likely cost or risk to thc joint ibrcc in pcrlimning that scquence of 'a~tions'?~'

Furthermore, joint doctrine states the role ofoperational art during deliberate and crisis

planning is to link the "tactical employment of forces to strategic oh,jectives." According to

,joint doctrine, planncrs use opcrational art to determine when, where, and for what purpose

forces are employed. The application of operational art results in a campaign plan which

provides the common aim and lists major [asks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates to

achieve operational and strategic o b j c c t i v c ~ . ~ ~

Joint and U.S. doctrine on operational art is rclativcly rudimentary. 'l'hc fitcl thal

many field grade officers do not understand the concept of opcrational art shows thc doctrine

is still in its infancy. Also, the Army's keystone warfighting doctrine, Field Manual 100-5,

only mentions operational art on scvcn pages in the entire manual. 'I'hc immaturity of military

doctrine requires additional critcria by which lo assess Fall Gclb. The academic theories ol'

operational art will amplify thc limited insights provided by doctrine ttnd provide for a more

detailed analysis of Fall Gelb.

Dr. Schneider's Approach to Operational Art

In his papcr, Theorericul Paper No. 3: The 7heory of'0perafionul Arl, Dr. Schneidcr

stated "Operational art is the cmployment of military ti)rces lo attain strategic goals through

the dcsign, orgtmi/ation and execution ol'campaigns and major operations."2' Dr. Schneider

characteri~es operational ttrt as "the employment of forces in deep distributed operations.

'l'hcsc maneuvers consist ofdeep battles and cxtcnded maneuvers punctuatcd by periods of

,324 . inaction. I'hc dominant characteristic of Dr. Schneider's "modcrn war" is rli.s~rihu/ive

maneuver which some call operational art. Distributed mancuver is characterized by a series

ofdistributed battlcs leading to the dispersion ofcombat hrcc over space and timc.

Operational art is the planning, exccution, and sustainmcnt of temporally and spatially

distributed maneuvers and battles, all vicwcd in its entirety. Dr. Schneider's theory proposes

that operational art "in it's fullest expression. . . is inaniksted through scvcral key

, 325 . attributes. I'hc key attributcs arc distributed operation, distributed campaign, continuous

logistics, instantaneous command and control, operationally durable formations, operational

vision, and distributcd enemy (See Appendix A).

l'hc following attributcs are appropriate to use to cvaluatc i ; t ~ l l Gelb. Thc distributcd

operation is the dominant characteristic in Dr. Schneider's thcory ofoperational art.

Schncidcr characterized distributed operations as "an ensemble of dccp maneuvers and

distributed battlcs extendcd in space and timc but unilicd by ii common aim."2" The

distributcd operation is part o f a distributed campaign. 'I'he distributcd campaign was created

through the combination various simultaneous and successive distributed operations.27 The

distributed campaign is the controlling characteristic of Schneider's thcory.

In addition to the distrihutcd operation and campaign, Schneider's concept of

operational vision is an attribute relevant ibr judging Fall Gelb. Schneider called operational

vision "a unified and holistic approach in thc dcsign, excculion and suslainment ol'campaigns.

The gift of operational vision has often been associated with mental agility, the ability to react

to incoming information ihster than it arr i~es." '~ Napoleon and Ulysses S. (irimt had thc

ability to tirst envision the endstate of'a campaign, then to dcvelop a concept for how to

achievc the endstatc. Both Napolcon and Grmt were able to impart this vision to their

subordit~ates that produced a unified ctfort throughout their army.2' This concept ol'vision is

critical to linking simultaneous and sequenced operations that are distributed. Without

operational vision, the battlcs and engagemcnts o f a ciimpaign degeneratc into indepcndcnt

and unprofitable ventures.

'l'hc significance of these key attributes is that the attributes will provide the substance

ofthe sccond of the three approaches used in the following chapter to assess Fall Gclb in thc

context of operational art. Schneider's attributes add valuc to the doctrinal definitions already

discussed. That valuc is the illumination of the concepts alluded to in Army and Joint

doctrine. Il'Fnll (ielh meets these criteria thcn Fall Gelb is an expression of operational art in

the context provided by Schncider's theory.

Shimon Naveh's Amroach to O~crational Art

Shimon Navch's theory ofopcrational art rounds out both I1.S. doctrine and Dr.

Schneider's theory. Naveh providcs a theoretical perspective of the doctrinal concepts

already presented. In his recently published book, In l'ursuir o/'Mili /ary i~xcellence, Dr.

Naveh considcrcd thc evolution ofthe operational theory ofwarfare. Naveh seeks to

o lk r a scientific interpretation of thc intcrmcdiatc lield of military knowledge situated ktwcen strategy and tactics, better known as operational art, and to trace the evolution of operational awarcncss and its culmination in a full- llcdgcd theory.""

In doing so, Naveh provides a third approach used in this monograph to assess 1:all (iclb in

the context of operational art. l i ke Schncider, Naveh sees the dcvclopment ofoperational art

arising out o f a growing gap between tactics and strategy. Also similar to Schneider, Naveh's

thcory slatcs that the gap created a vacuum that timed the developmcnt ol'a new component

ofthe military modcl to fill the void. Specifically, Naveh wrotc:

Tactics, focusing entirely on the mechanical dimension of warfare. totally lacked the cognitivc tools needed to merge and direct the numerous engagements toward attaining the strategic aims. On the other hand, strategy, leaning primarily on abstract definitions ofaims and policies, lacked the ability to translate its intentions into mechanical terms."

Ilere Navch agrees with Schncidcr concerning thc catalyst ofthe dcvclopmcnt ol'operational

art. Navch rccognizcs that chtmges to military mcitns made the classical concept ol'"dccisivc

battle" obsolctc and that thcsc changes created a gap between convcntional taclics and

strategy. 130th agree that the creative-intellectual process is the linchpin between strategy and

tactics. Naveh and Schncider agree thc csscncc ofoperational art is the crcativc usc of

distributed operations fi)r the purposes of strategy. Naveh's thcory has a distinct flavor,

however, emphasizing the "cognitive" aspect ol'operational creativity.

Unlike Schneider, Navch develops systcms thinking as the essential foundation to

practice operational art. Naveh argues that warfiare and the military possess thc charxteristics

of open complex systcms. These characteristics arc wholeness, growth, differentiation,

hierarchical ordcr, dominancc, control, and competition. Furthermore, Navch bdievcs that,

like any othcr system, an operation is defined by its elements. thc tlature ol'thosc elements

and by the interactions between the elements. 'I'he creativity inherent to operational art must

take on a holistic, or systems approach, while tactics is largely an analytical mechanistic

approach.'2 Operational art manifests ilsclf as a system because it "constitutes the entire

whole or complex ofwarlike actions governed by an identical concept, and dircctcd towards

attainment of the stune aim."" This unifiing aim provides direction, or purpose to the

activities of the military system.

In his theory, Naveh sets the following criteria for identifying a conccpt or plan as

operational art. First, the concept must reflect the cognitive tension caused by thc polarization

bctween the oricntation towards thc strategic aim and the accomplishment ofthe tactical

m i s s i o n s . ' ~ n other words, when developing an operational conccpt, Naveh feels that there

must be a conscious act of artistic creativity to bridge the gap between the sometimes

competing requircmcnts ol'the strategic aim and the series ol'tactical missions required to

achicvc those aims. Operational planncrs must undcrstanci systems theory and possess a

doctrinc encompassing an operational thcory. Systems thcory and operational doctrine are

ccntral to manifesting operational creativity and managing competing requiremcnts. Second,

the plan or conccpt must "he bascd upon industrious maneuver, expressing the dynamic

interaction bctween the various elements within the systcm, as well as the relationship

between the general action and thc strategic aim."'"hird, the plan or conccpt should be

synergetic. In other words, the overall operation should yield a result that is greater than the

linear sum ofthe individual t~ctions that nrake up thc operation. 'l'hcse actions must bc

focused toward a unifying aim. Thc actions should reilect a synthcsis through the aspects of'

combined arms to combine the various forms ofwarfire, and integrate thc various l'orccs and

I'ormations separated by spacc and time.'" Additionally, an operational plan should be non-

linear; mcaning it should be hierarchically structured and express depth. I:inally, Naveh's

critcrion requircs a concept or plan to be related to a broad and universal theory to be regardcd

as operational."

Naveh's operational theory is more comprchcnsive thcn doctrinc or Schneider's

theory. Naveh's study penetrates the deepcst into the underlying actions that arc inherent in

the manifestation of operational art. Naveh's approach to detining operational art imparts thc

most critical examination ofthe thought process used by the Germans to develop Pall Gclb.

Conclusion

'l'hc preceding description ofthrce conccpts of operational art is not cxhaustive. 'l'hc

three criteria used provide adcquatc criteria for at~alyzing the planning of Operation Fall Gclb

to determine whether the planners applied operational art. [IS. Army and Joint doctrine arc

adequatc criteria becausc those delinitions and concepts arc required knowledge tbr senior

military officers. Ilowcvcr, given the rudinicntary naturc ol'current U.S. Army and joint

doctrinc, (he conccpts must bc expanded. 'l'he works of two prominent operational art

theorists not only support thc concepts prescntcd in 1J.S. Army and joint doctrinc; they

provide the theoretical underpinnings that the doctrinc should be based upon.

Overall, thc three conccpts sec the application ot'opcrational art as "art." Specilically,

0 .S . docfrine, Naveh und Schneidcr all agree that the essence ofoperational art is ihe creative

usc of distributed operations for the purposcs ofslrategy. 'I'hc overall diffcrcnccs are [hat

1J.S. doctrine is the most basic, relying on a simple definition and amplifying statements.

Schncidcr echocs doctrine but f~lrther dcfincs the practice ofoperational art as a scrics of

attributes that must bc manifested as part of the operational design. Naveh also cchoes

doctrine, but stresses the mandatory act of operational cognition. Thus, now that a common

understanding of the operational art concept has bccn established and the aspccts ol'military

performance that are the esscntial elements ofoperational art havc been identilicd, the stagc is

set to examinc Operation Ihll Gelb and the "blitzkrieg."

Operation Fall Gelb

"l.ooking back is the surest way of looking f o r ~ a r d , ~ " ~

J.F.C. Fullcr

Introduction

The "blitzkricg" is typically associated with Fall Gelb. This tcrm must be explaincd

because the concept is sometimes conhsed with operational art. 'l'he blitzkricg was the

'6 popular" name givcn to the German military actions during the 1939 invasion ofl'olt~nd and

subsequent ollensives. l'herc is no "ofticial" definition o f blitzkricg; instead much ofwhat is

understood about blitxkrieg is bascd upon legend, myth, and journalistic license. 'l'imc

magazine appcars to have becn the first to use the expression in September 1939. 'l'hc

magazine referred to German combat in Poland as "no war ol'occupation, but a war ofquick

penetration and oblitcration blitzkrieg -- lighting war."3" Thc conscnsus is that blitzkrieg is

tactical action using combined arms, surprisc and speed to obtain an objective. Thcsc tactics

werc a mechanimtion of the "infiltration" tactics used t~gainst France in 1918. l'he actions in

Poland and France were merely the Lactical doctrine spccilicd in Die 'l'ruppenfiihrung (the

Troop Command), which was the standard German army tactical manual. 'l'hc intent ofthese

actions was to creatc a situation through flanking, penetration, infiltration, and maneuver to

encircle and destroy the enemy."" Blitzkrieg was n set ol'taclical techniqucs and not a modcl

for identifying operational objectives and linking battle and objectives together in a

premeditated sequence that supports attainment of'a strategic aim.

Germall Supreme Command Organization -May 1940

. . - - .- . ; Supreme Commander

1.. H~ller I - I , . . . ..all ...

High Command of the Armed Forces 1 Ch~et Keitel ChiefdOperatlons Slat Jadl I

CinC: Raeder . -.

Hdorc analyzing Fall Ciclb and opcrational art it is necessary to first set the strategic

context. Knowing the strategic context is mandatory for any study ol'Fnll (iclb and

operationd art hccause by definition, opcrAonal art results from strategy. Prior to the

(icrman invasion west, vigorous German attacks had seized I'olantl and a combination ol'

naval and ground action had seized needed resources in Norway. Even belore thc invasion of

Poland in September 1939, (krnman planners began to ponder how to deleat 1:rancc and

Britain. Once the I'olish campaign was over there were threc questions to consider. Could

the war he brought to ii hvorable conclusion using defensive tactics, or could that object be

achieved only by a victorious Cicrman olknsivc in the Wcst'! If such an offensive proved

necessary, when could it be launched? I low must the offensive be conducted to achicvc the

strategic aim?42 Hitler himsclfanswercd these questions instead of his OK1 I planners. Hc

developed the theater strategy as he implemented a new policy that greatly rcduccd the

OKI-1's planning role. I litler's decision was to attack as soon as possible to eliminate the

physical threats he perceived liom his wcstcrn European neighbors.

General Stratcav: "(;ro.v.s:sJeur.sc.hlcmJ, Lehensruum, and

IVellrnachr: A 'greater Germany' with sufficient 'living space' would incvitahly . ,743 acquire 'world power .

I'urpose: . ~ I he purpose is.. .to defeat as much as possiblc the i:rench Army and ol'thc li)rccs ol'the Allies lighting on their side and at the same time win as much tcrritory as possiblc in Holland, Belgium, and Norlhern I:rancc, Lo serve as a base ibr the succcsslul prosecution ol'the air and sea war against higland and as a wide protective area l'or the economically vital r t u 1 1 r . ~ ~

Ohicctive: 'l'hc ob,jcctivc.. . is to deny Ilolland and

Iklgium to the English by swillly occupying them: to defeat, by an attack through Belgium and 1.uxcmbourg tcrritory, the largest possible forces of the Anglo-French Army, and thereby to pave the way ibr the destruction ol'thc military strengh ofthc enemy."

Ohieetivea: "To defeat the largest possible clcmcnts

of the French and ~ i i e d Armies and simultaneously to gain as much tcrritory as possible in Holland. Belgium and Northern h n c e as a basis for succcssti~l air and sea operations against Britain and as a broad protective zone of the ~uhr.""'

Hcviscd Purpose: All available tbrccs will be committed

with the intention ofbringing to battle on lorth French iund Belgian soil as many iections of the French army and it's allies 1s possiblc. This will crcatc kworahle :onditions ibr the conduct ofthe war gainst England and France on land and in he air.""

Over a four-month period. thc German I ligh Command prepared lbur malor versions

ofplan fbr the invasion of Francc and the west. The evolution ofthcsc plans is not signilicnnl

in itself, however the examination ofthe planning activity is significant. The study of the

entirc planning process and the actions of the planners is Cundamcntal to thc asscssmenl ol' the

23

planners application of operational art. In October 1939 the German OK11 produced the

initial plan, named Fall Gclb. Fall Cielb established three strategic objectives: decisively

defeat the BIT, seize air and sea bases along the English Channel for later attacks against

lingland, and seize Ilolland to provide a buffer Tor the Ruhr area.

The original I'all (ielb plan divided Gcrman forces into two Army groups. Army

Group I3 was assigned the n~slin effort in the North into Holland. That plan was scrapped

hcceusc it wits viewed as too attrition oricntcd. It was too similar to the World War I

Schlieffen plan, and the German Generals ieared that the Dutch would flood the assembly

48 areas.

As a conscqucnce. in late October 1939, the OKH published a second plan that moved

the main attack to the south into Belgium and that largely bypassed llolland. Ilitlcr and the

OKW rejcctcd another revision in January 1940 because the objectives were too limited and

the OKW was felt that the operation would not result in a decision. General von Manstcin

summarized the January 1940 plan in these words,

The operational intention of both operations orders might best bc expressed by saying th* the Anglo-French elements we expected to meet in Belgium were to bc floored by a (powerful) straight right while our (weaker) lell fist covered up. The territorial objective was the channel coastline. What would ibllow this first punch we were not told.4"

24

Cicncral von Rundstcdt and von Manstein argued that the operation would l e d to a frontal

encounter between German and cncmy forces in Belgium. 'I'hc German attack might bc able

to secure the Channel Coast, however, the allied armies would still remain intact on a line

fiom Sedan to the Sommc

Manstein and von Kunstcdt proposed changing the rnain ei'fiort from Army Group 13 in

the north to Army Group C in the south. Army Group C was positioned against the weaker

French forces in the Ardennes ibrcst region. Numerous dclays in execution due to poor

weather bought Manstein and von llunstcdt timc to sell their recommended changes to the

OKFI and I litler. In February 1940, ibllowing additional analysis in ihc form o('wargames,

OKI-l conhcnccs, and debates with Hitlcr, General von Hrauchitsch and Halder changed l d l

Gclb to generally confbrm to the southern thrust advocated by Manstcin and von Runstedt.

Army Ciroup I3 would attack Holland and s e i x western Belgium. At the same timc Army

Ciroup A would attack through eastern Belgium and the Ardennes li)rest." l'he revised plan

for I h l l Gelb ("Manstcin's Plan") stated "All available l'orccs will be committed with the

intention ol'bringing to battle on north French and Belgian soil as many sections ofthc 1:rench

army and it's allies as possible. 'l'his will create hvorable conditions for the conduct ol'thc

war against England and France on land and in the air."52 'I'his campaign direclivc was

inadequate. The operational task and purpose ofthat directive was merely attrition. 'l'here is

no evidence in Fall Cielb ofclcar operational design. 'l'hc concept sought only to achieve the

initial tactical pcnetration.5"his campaign directive amounted to blurred operdonal vision

and design to achieve an equally unli)cused strategic aim. 'l'he idca of a deficiency in

operational vision will be expanded in the analysis contained in subscqucnt paragraphs.

The" Manstein Plan:' 1940

3 AlmoWUdlvbioM

24 lnllnlry dlnllons

, . , , ,

The Action

On May 10. 1940 the German's cxccuted the Manstein Plan with air attacks and

pilratroopcr drops in I lolland, l:rance, and Belgium. Army Group I3 attacked through the

Ardennes and by the evening ol'May 12"', had reached the Mcuse River along a line lrom

south of 1)inant down to Sedan. Due to tenacious pockets oifrcnch Resistance and the

natural barrier provided by the river, the bulk ol'the river crossing did not occur until May

4 Timid and uncoordinated Vrench resistance crumbled as the bulk of the German forces

crossed the river and continued to press their attack. Seven armored divisions continucd west

despite minor allied llank attacks. llnablc to match the speed of the German movcs in terms

of physical movement, situational awareness and the control oiiorces, the French con~mand

collapsed. By May 24"' Army Group I3 li)rccs threatened Dunkirk, the only remaining port

open to the bulk ol'the allied army. Ilitler and the OKW worried ahout the German rorccs

overwhelming succcss and mounting numbers of inoperable vehicles. FIitlcr and the O K W

issued orders to stop the advance, which allowed much oi'thc d i e d army to escape. On June

5"', Army Group A, B, and C: attacked south to seize France. Paris was captured on June 14'"

and on .lunc 17'" the French leadership askcd lor an arm is tic^.^"

26

The Aftermath

Following the success of thc German invasion of l'oland, 1:rancc and the low-

countries, llitler and his Gencrals began to believe thcir own propaganda. Abandoning his

hope o f a channel crossing to invade England, I-litler turned his attention cast. It wi1s the job

ol'thc Russian Army to teach IIillcr the lcssons he had failed to learn.

Analvsis

'1'0 determine iSMl Gelb and the "blitzkrieg" were an expression ol'operational art, it

is necessary to evaluate the planning decisions and operational concept as previously outlined.

The definitions presented in U.S. Army and joint doctrine, Schneider, and Navch provide the

mcans to ohjectivcly assess the cvents of thc campaign.

1)octrinc

Thc first approach to evaluating Fall Gelb comes from lJ.S. doctrinc. 1J.S. Army and

joint doctrinc explain that operational art is the process of translating theater strategy and

dcsign into an opcrational design which links and integrates the tactical battles and

engagements that, when i'ought and won ovcr space and timc, achicve the strategic aim.

Opcrationi~l vision is one ol'thc specific elemcnts of military perlbrmance. that empowers a

planncr to m d c this trmslation. Simply stated, operational vision is the "broad vision" to see

both "up" to the strategic goals and "down" to the tactical actions necessary. Without

operational vision to adequately undcrstand and influence the strategic ends, Ilitlcr's gcncrals

werc unable to develop plans that linked and sequenced tactical missions to meet the strategic

ends in a prcmedittdcd miinner.

I litler's strategic ends were specified in a series of directives. In 'Directive No. 6 for

the Conduct of the War,' dated 9 October 1939, Hitler stated his ob.jectives for the western

front. The purpose was:

To del'eat as much as possible the French Army and ol'the ibrces of thc Allies fighting on their side and at thc same time win as much territory as possiblc in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France, to serve as a base Tor the successful prosecution ol'the air and sca war against lhgland and as a wide protective area for thc economically vital l~uhr.~. '

A later directive No. 10, publishcd in February 1940 expanded this directive:

. . I he objective ... is to dcny Ilolland and Belgium to the lhglish by swillly occupying them; to defeat, by an attack through Belgium and 1.uxembourg territory, the largest possible forces of the Anglo-French Army, and thereby to pave the way Tor the destruction ofthe military strength orthe enemy.""

These directives were m;~rginally adequate ;is strategic concepts and inadcqunte as an

expression of operational design. These broad sweeping directives required tn~nslation into

an operational design consisting of a sct of tactical missions. Unfbrtunatcly, I Iitler's generals

lacked thc operational vision that current [J.S. doctrine stales is essential to apply opcriitional

art. Ilitler's generals did not fully participate in a dialogue between the political-military

powers so they did not conlpletely understand thc underlying rcasoning behind the strategic

ends specilied in these directives. From thc time Hitler bccamc Chanccllor hc had slowly

li~rccd his stratcgic and operational planners away fiom thc strategic level of'war. The OKI-T

Chicfof Staf'F, General Franz Haldcr, bclicvcd that strict separation between the political and

military establishment had proven to bc a drawbwk since the Polish Campaign." llalder

believed the ''OK11 ought to have exact knowledge of the political line and ofits possiblc

variations. Otherwise no planned action on our own responsibility is possible. OK1 I must not

be left at the mercy of the vagaries of politics, else the Army will lose conf id~ncc."~~ Thus:

despite I litler's strategic goals, Tlitler Forccd his OK11 planners away from thinking about

strategy and toward a greater emphasis on tactics." In doing so, the plttnners lost their "broad

vision" and along with it their ability to hlly understand thc relationship of means to ends.

I litler failed to lbstcr operational art through his leadership style. Over time, hc reached

lower and lower into the levels of war and made his staff dysfunctional. Gradually Hiller took

over planning at the strategic and operittional level and lelt only tactics for his generals. A

World War I1 cartoon depicted this trend. The cartoon's caption read "In the I'uturc, thc army

will he guided by my institutions." This cartoon shows llitler wearing fivc hats - showing the

multiple leadership roles he had assumed at the cxpcnse of his dismdyed ~cnerals.""

Ficld Manual 100-5 lists another clement of military performance that is required fi)r

the practice ol'opcrational art. Ficld Manual 100-5 statcs that the operational artist should

deline what military conditions will achieve the strategic ohjcctives in a theater ofwar or

thcatcr of operations. Aftcr doing so the artist should identify what scquence of actions is

most likcly to produce these conditions. Thc German planncrs in the OK11 and OKW Iiiled

to identify a clear scqucnce of tactical and operational objectives to achieve strategic goals

and, thus, did not practice operational art according to current I J X doctrine. 'I'he evidence

shows that most of their cognitive energy was spent on developing a plan to penetrate the

allied del'enses ;md rcach the Meuse River. German objcctivcs afler crossing the Meuse llivcr

wcrc ambigu~us .~ ' This ambiguity was a planning weakness. Thcrc is ample proof of this

ambiguity. First, Gcncral Manslein recalled that "even our own operation plan would not - - a s

Moltke put it . - extend with any certainty beyond thc first encounter with the main body orthe

enemy least of all if a lack ofadequate forces brought the attack to a standstill in its

preliminary stages."62 Second, during a planning conference, Hitlcr questioned Ciudcrian on

his plans ior establishing a river crossing at the Meuse River ncar Sedan. "And thcn what are

you going to do'?" he asked. Gudcrian recalled that "he [Hitler] was the lirst person who had

thought to ask me this vital question." later, Guderian recorded in his memoirs that "I never

received any f'urthcr ordcrs as to what to do once the bridgehead over the Mcusc was

.4,.3 . captured. I'hird, events during execution clearly indicated that there was no colicrcnt

operational design in the Fall Qelb plan. The plan failed to scqucnce tactical objcctivcs

during the latter portion of the campaign. General Gudcrian noted, "from now on. the panzcr

group rcccivcd cvcry day many mutually contradictory ordcrs, some ordering a swing towi~rds

the east, others a continuation ol'thc advance southward."" Although the plan was ilcxiblc, it

lackcd clearly defined objectives and demonstrates that German planncrs were coml'ortablc

with @ling tactical 3c l i~ns &side operational obiectives. This thought process is totally

opposite ofthe process stated in [J.S. doctrine. According to U.S. doctrine the operational

artist determines the strategic cndstate and plans hnckward to determine a clear sequence of

tactical and operational ob,jectivcs that will achieve the strategic objectives.

Overall, the planning procedures of the German High Command did not mirror those

set by contemporary IJ.S. doctrinc during the planning ofral l Cjelb. While planning, German

commanders did not develop rcalistic operational victory conditions in other than vague and

often grandiose terms. l'hcsc tcrms included "total victory on the European main~and"~' and

"bringing to battle on north Vrcnch and Belgian soil as many sections of the Frcnch army and

it's allies as possible.""" This unfocused ellbrt did not follow the standards set by

contemporary doctrinc. According to Field Manual 100-5,

Operational art helps commanders understand thc conditions for victory behre seeking battle, thus avoiding unncccssary battles. Without operational art, war would ht: 21 set of disconncctcd engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or fai l~rc.~ '

In 1:all Gclb, German actions resulted in unnecessary battlcs and disconnected engagements.

In this exceptional case, howcvcr, ticrmany succeeded due to luck, tactical cxccllcncc, and

allied error. 'I'he German's succccdcd dcspitc their lack of effective operational design pcr

U.S. doctrine. However, in the prolonged campaign against Russia the Germans Ibund

themselves in the trap of executing many unfocused and disconncctcd cngagcmcnts that

doomed thcir offcnsivc.

Schneider

Dr. Schneider's approach to operational art shares the same fundamental elements ss

doctrine. I lowcvcr, Th. Schncidcr chooses to address the essence o f operational art in terms

of kcy attributes. Dr. Schneider proposes that operational art "in it's fullest expression. . . is

manifcstcd through several key attributes:" distributed operation, distributed campaign,

continuous logistics, instantaneous command tlnd control, operationally durable formations,

operational vision, and distributed cncmy.(" l'hc attributes Schneider labeled as distributed

operation, distributed campaign, and operational vision are relevant to the examination of I:aH

(iclb.

The first of Schneidcr's attributes is thc distributed operation. I h l l Gelb was indeed a

planned distributcd operation. However, this practice by itself is not suficient to plave thc

Germans applied operational art. Dr. Schncidcr statcd that "A distributcd operation is a

coherent systcm of spatially and temporally extended relational movements and distributed

battles, that scck to seizc, retain or deny frccdoni of' action.""' l 'he German operational

planners did plan a spatially and temporally extended battle. However, the lbcus ol'thc

distributed battle was on ticedom ol'action at the tactical level. 'l'he tactical actions were not

linked together as part of a clear operational dcsign to achieve the statcd strategic objcctivc.

Although thc plan was tlcxible, the lack ofclcarly defined ob,jectives demonstrates that

German planners were comfortable with letting tactical actions decide operational objectives.

Second, thc natural partner to the distributed operation is thc distributed campaign.

I k l l (ielb did consist ofvarious distributed opcrations. Ilowever, these opcrations did not

amount to a distributed campaign. Dr. Schncider called distributcd opcrations the building

blocks ol'thc distributcd campaign. l'he distributed thrusts ofthc army groups and the

1.ullwat~c were thcsc building blocks. Specilically, Army Group A and 13 conducted

distributed ground operations north and south. Simultaneously the h t lwaffe attacked to

"destroy or at least put out ol'action enemy air forces, but also primarily lo hindcr or prevent

the enemy high command from plating its decisions into ct~cct."'" The German operationi~l

planners, howcvcr, focused their campaign plan on the Schliel'Sen derived tradition of battles

ol'annihilation. The aim of their opcrations was tactical deep battle to encircle and annihilatc

their cncmy without neccssarily linking thc action to accomplishing the overall strategic

aim." 'l'his produced a scrics of distributed operations which were loosely connected in task

and purpose, but did not coalcscc into a true unified and distributed campaign bcyond the

initial oh,jectives.

Third, the German High Command did not mcct Schncider's definition oroperational

vision. The German I ligh Command was unable to use a unified and holistic approach to

translate strategic ends into campaign design because of Hiller's overwhelming influence at

the operational level. As already stated, this was because I-litlcr's micro-management and

overpowering leadership style rorced his OKI-l pltinners away from thinking about strategy

m d more toward the operational and tactical level of war.72 I litler's personality caused strict

separation hetwcen the political and military establishment that proved tm impediment to

operatiowal planning.7h~espite the limitations at the operational lcvcl, the Germans were

masters at the tactical lcvcl. During Operation t'all Gclb, heavy cmphasis on command and

control apparatus and font-line lcadcrship allowed the German tactical leadership to rcccivc

inhrmation, rapidly assimilate this information, and decide what to do. l'hc ciYcctivcncss ol'

the tactical command and control is one ofthc key factors which allowed the Gcrmnns to

rapidly overrun the allies and achicvc thcatcr-strategic ob.jectives despite shortcomings at the

operational lcvcl.

To summarizc the German perlbrmance in light of Dr. Schneider's approach to

defining operational arl, the German planners railed to manifest opcrational art "in it's fullest

expression" in several "key attributes." Thc German's planned and executed distributed

operations, however these distributed operations were not designed to achieve operational or

strategic ohjectivcs. 'The (iermans were unable to cffcctivcly link their ttlctical tlclions to the

strategic aims in a distributed campaign. They also failed to use a "unified and holistic

approach in their design, cxccution, and sustainment of cttmpaigns" mostly due to thcir lack

ofpolitical-strategic cognition or awareness.

Navch

'l'hc last criterion in this analysis is fiom the approach used by Shimon Naveh. The

German planning of Fall Cielb docs not meet Navch's criteria lbr the practicc of operational

art in four arcas. The German High Command did not use a consistent holistic, or systems

approach in thcir planning and cxccution of Fall (iclb. I3esides a lack of systems thinking, the

German planners did not mcct Naveh's second critcrion either. Fall Gelb and blitzkrieg were

based upon maneuver warfare. IIowever, thc German campaign plan dcmonstratcd thc lack

of industrious relationships between strategic, operational, and tactical actions. Navch's third

critcrion requires a concept or plan to be related to a broad and univcrsal theory to be regarded

as operational. The Cicrman Officer Corps did not have a "broad iund univcrsal" thcory of

blitzkrieg. T'hcrc was no consensus within the military as to the operational substance of

blitzkrieg. Fourth, the Cierman plan achicvcd tactical synergism, but there was a lack of

dcsigncd synergy at the operational lcvcl.

First, the German I ligh Command did not design operational concepts with a

conscious act of artistic creativity to link tactical missions to achieve strategic aims. I laving

an understanding of systems theory and a doctrine encompassing an operational thcory arc

central to manifesting this crctdivity. The Gcrman's did not use ii consistent holistic. or

systems, approach in their planning and execution ofOpcration 1:all Gelb. According to

Naveh, this holistic approach is required for the practice ol'operational art. 'l'hc basis of'

Naveh's theory argues that war1'arc and thc military posses the characteristics of open

complex systems. Naveh asserts that operational cxpcricncc conhrn~s in its principles and

34

characteristics to the univcrsal phenomena ol'systems. Hc states that operational thought

must takc a holistic or systems approach whilc tactics is largely an analytical mcchanistic

approach.'" Naveh states that opcrational art is a system because it "constitutes the entire

wholc or complex ofwarlike actions governed by an identical concept, and dircctcd towards

attainment ol'the same i~im."'~ Based upon a review of primary source documents thcrc is no

evidcncc that the Cicrman lligh Command uscd a consislcnt holistic approach in their

planning and cxccution ol'Opcration Fall Gelb. Thc German High Command never

adcquately devcloped a realistic set of stratcgic aims and the military conditions necessary to

achicvc those aims. Because ol'Hitlcr's ovcrwhclming inllucnce and visions of grandcur, the

Cicrman military strategic and opcrational planners settled fbr broad swccping military

conditions which basically amounted to destroy all of the Allied armies on the continent, take

as much land as possible, and prepare li)r a next undetermined step.'"

The German planners ol'1:all (iclb did not mcct Naveh's second criterion cithcr.

Naveh asserted that to bc operational a plan must *'be based upon industrious meneuvcr,

expressing the dynamic interaction between the various elements within thc system, as wcll as

the relationship bctween the general action and the stratcgic aim."" 'I'his is similar to tllc

criteria stated in II.S. tloctrine. The concept must link tactical maneuvers, battles, and

objectives to s~ccomplish the stratcgic aims. Naveh cmphasizcs his systems approach here by

highlighting not just a static relationship, but the dynamic interaction between tactical,

operational. and strategic actions. Fall Cielb and blitzkrieg were based upon mttncuvcr

wartiarc. I lowever, German maneuver lacked meaningful rclationships bctwecn the strategic

aim and operational and tactical actions. Manstein agrced that there was si breakdown in thcsc

rclationships when hc acknowlcdged that the opcrt~tions plan developed lackcd adequate

linkage to the broad goal ol'"total victory on the European mainl~lnd."'~ 'I'hc operational

design was inadequate. Thc operational design was ambiguous because the planners could

see no l'arlhcr than the tactical success. While planning Fall (ielb, the German planners were

unable to plan the campaign or operation completely by anticipating the dilrercnt paths the

operation could take. l'hc High Command hoped that unlblding events would guide their

thought for the second phase of Fall Cielb.

Naveh's third criterion requires a concept or plan to be related to a broad and universal

theory.'" I'hc Ciernian Olliccr Corps did not have a "broad and universal" theory of'

blitzkrieg. l'hcrc was no consensus within the military as to the operational substance of

blitzkrieg. Nor was there a conceptual liamework of a written operationttl theory. The

gradual dcclinc of intellectual thought within the senior commanders and planmrs of the

German military causcd this intellectual void. Onc cause ol'thc void was the rapid expansion

of the German armed forccs that suppressed "thc surviving islands ofoperational perception

that ~xisted."~" I-litler's promised rcmilitari;?ation, the Ciermcun rcoccupation ol'(icrman

territories and their eventual conqucst, and the rise of greater Germany undermined

operational perception. llitler stressed the military oiknsivc as the only way to nchicvc

German greatness. This siren's song of conquest and glory attracted most of Germany's

professional otficer corps. The result was a split between those ofliccrs attracted by the

ideology and material improvement otTcrcd by Hitlcr and more traditional ollicers who

advocated military principles bascd upon intcllcctual thought." I:urthermore, whcn FIitlcr

himself bcgan to personally assume the role of strategic/operationaI planner hc causcd t'urthcr

decline ofoperational thinking within the German military. Hitler's military infucnce

combined with an extremely aggressive political climate rcsulled in the manipulation of

tactical patterns to achievc strategic ends. In short, the "blitzkrieg" pushed "tactical

excellence to the cxtrenle limits ofhuman perlbrmancc" without a conscious expression of

operatiollal art.'?

Another underlying causc of the Cierman I-ligh Command's lack operational theory

was Motkc's dictum that

N o opcration plan extends with any certainty beyond thc first encountcr with the main body ofthc cncmy. It is only thc layman who as a campaign develops, thinks he sees the original plan being systematically fulfilled in cvery dctail to its preconceivcd conclusion.'-'

Motlke's legacy had a profound inllucncc o n the thinking ofthe Gcneral Stafl; tacitly

providing a reason not to link thc tactical actions into a logical series to accomplish

opcrational and strategic objcctivcs. The end result was a military without an operational

doctrinc and an officer corps who had littlc understanding of opcrational thcory.

'I'he sum of'thcsc intellectual weaknesses causcci an imbalance in what Navch called

the cognitive tcnsion causcd by the polarization betwcen thc orientation towards thc strategic

aim and the accomplishment of thc tactical missions. The Germm's wcrc overly attriiclcd to

the tactical aspects of thc overall war plans. 'l'his was duc to i litlcr's overwhelming inllucncc

at thc strategic and tactical levels, the mental models produced by thc 191 8 oll'ensive tactics

that sccmed to succeed in World War 1, and the tactical excellencc that was the hallmark ol'

German military competencc. 'l'his imbalance comhincci with unfocused strategic aims and n

fundamental lack of intellectual underpinnings caused thc Germans to fail to consciously

apply cognitive creativity as operational artists. Instcad, German planners developed tactical

operations that accomplished strategic aims because ol'the dramatic mismatch between them

and thc allies and the small arca ofopcrations. I-lalder's diary and Manstein's memoirs

provide no cvidcncc of a opcrational concept for bringing about the military conditions

3 7

necessary to meet the strategic objectives should France and England put up prolonged

resistance. 'l'here was no long-range concept for how to deal with an undefeated England.

The proposed invasion plan, Operation Scalion was never more than a rough conccpt until

well into the invasion o~~:r;incc." That oversight dcrnonstrates that Germans devoted no

cognitive ellbrt to developing scquelsn5 to the initial campaign.

I:ourth, the Cicrman's lhilcd to produce a synergisticm6 efkct at the operational levcl.

Naveh's last primary criterion is that a plan or concept should be synergetic. I n other words,

the overall operation should yield a result that is greater than thc linear sum of'the individual

actions that mctkc up the operation. The individual actions must be focuscd toward a unifying

aim. I3y pursuing a wil l ing aim, the operational planner integrate thc various lbrces and

formations separated by space and t i~nc.~ ' The combincd aspects of' blitzkrieg did producc a

synergistic effect at the tactical levcl. I n other words, the whole of'the tactical

accon~plishment was generally greater than the sum ol'individunl actions alone. [lowcvcr: at

the opcrational levcl, thc employment ol'torces was not orchestrated to build upon one

anothcr in a tactical manner. (iuderian, Manstcin, and I-laldcr's accounts show that thc entire

planning process failed to assemble the discrete tactical missions into a "coherent and

continuous occurrcncc." Most ofthe German planning elliort fbcused on the lactics and

materiel necessary for thc initial push to the Mcuse ~ ive r . "

Chapter 4

Conclusion

By looking on euch engugement us port of'a series, ut leu.st insofur us even~s are predictuhle, the commander is al~vuy.s on rhe high road to hi.v

Carl von Clauscwitz

In his memoirs Ciudcrian recognized the slim margin by which thc Germans had

succeedcd. 1 le describes his visit to the heights overlooking the Meuse River. "At this

moment, I looked at the ground we had come over, the success of our attack struck me almost

,,Oil . as a miraclc. I'he Gcrnians succcss was not the result ofthe practice ofoperational art.

Instead, the "blitzkrieg" executed during 1:all Gelb was the product of luck, myth and hyper-

ofi.nsivc tactics. Thc German campaign succeeded due to the better training, tactical

leadership, and coordination ol'the German Army relative to the Allics. 'l'hcir victory was

derived as much from French weakness as from Gcrman strengths. French doctrine was

inadequate to dcfcat the rapid mancuver and cncirclement doctrine the <;ermans used in the

invasion. 9 I

The German campaign was not the result of operational art. 'I'his aim of the campaign

could he compared to the aim of'watcr flowing liom a burst dam. 'I'hc water mcrcly rushes

the fastest to areas where there is the lcast resistance. 'l'hc water rapidly flows around the

high points without guidance, encircles them, and gradually erodes thcm away. 'l'hcre is no

coherent plan to the water's movements that provides structure and controls thc distributed

flow to the ultimate goal. 'l'hc objectives speciiicd by I litler and the IIigh Command did not

form the clear shape of a strong, obtainable operational design. Instead, Fall Gclb expressed

the operational uncertainty of a concept that sccs no further than the initial tactical success

39

and hopes that events will guide fi~rther thought as they occur. Like the wntcr, blitzkrieg was

merely the tactical expression used to achieve the Gcrmans strategic ends. 'I'actical successes

on the battlefield dictatcd the ways to achicvc the campaign ends.

In the end, the blitzkrieg tactics were sul'ficient to overrun France. Ilowever, llitlcr

was unable to accomplish his statcd aim to engage and deftxat thc strongest portion of the

Allied Armies. t3litzkricg tactics worked in this scenario given the small sctilc of Northern

I:nuncc and the easily dislocated allied armies." Without learning their lessons, I litler and his

generals tried to apply the same tactics, again without adequiltc operational art, to the vast

expanses of Russia against an army who did not ripidly collapse and kept lighting over the

long term. And, in doing so, 'Titlcr and his generals failed. Perhaps Karl Fricser summed up

the Fall (ielb campaign best when he statcd that thc campaign ultimately was "an operational

act ofdesperation to get out ol'm unlivorable strategic situation.""'

Appendix A

Dr. Schneider 's Attributes of Operational Art

L)istributed Oucration: "an ensemble ol'dccp maneuvers atid distributed battles cxtcnded in space and timc but unificd by 21 common aim. 'I'htlt

common aim is thc retention or denial of freedom ofac~ion""~ 'fhc distributed operation is the dominant characteristic in Dr. Schncider's theory ol'opcrational art.

Distributed C ' a n i ~ a i ~ "charactcri;..d by thc integration ofscvcral simultaneous and successive distributed operations in a carnpaig~l.""~ This . - attribute with its integral attribute, the dishbuted operation, is the controlling chtracteristics of Schneidcr's theory. The concept of distributed operations and campaigns is firmly rootcd in 1J.S. Army and Joint doctrine.

C:onti!luous -- I.ogistics: In ordcr for a mocicrn industrial army to maintain tt .

military effective prcsencc, its logistics system must be continuous to supply and move large li)rmations. Without continuous lo ~istics, the movcmcnt temnos and the force densitv would evanorate.9k U.S. and Joint doctrine support the notion that continuous logistics provides the resourccs to manifest the activities the operational artist designs.

Instantaneous Commnand and Control; in ordcr to conduct distributcd -- operations as part of a distributed campaign the force must have the ability lo af'fccl instantiincous communications across thc force to integrate thc efforts of multiple-separate elements towards a common aim. "The operational significance of instantaneous means ofcommunications becomes annarent when one considcrs the distributed naturc of forces . . deployed in a thcatcr ofoperations. 1Jnlike classical conditions the distributed deployment of forccs crcates a greater variety of unexpected or unanticipated tactical and operational possibilities. As a result this vtlriety gencratcs greater information. Since inhrmation is thc bias ol'decision. the operational commander is contfontcd with many more decisions thiln his classical predcccssor was faced with. The operational commandcr thus requires an instantaneous means ol'communication to ad,just his distributcd times in rapid counteraction to the unexpcctcd actions of thc cncmy."" 1J.S. and Joint Doctrine address the wed for thc comniandcr to direct actions to forccs distributed in space and time as part of battle command. Schneider's concept of instantaneous commitnd and control dovetails nicely into doctrine.

Opcratiot~ally.D.~rablc I'orrnations; 'To execute a scrics of tactical missions over spatial and tcmporal depth, the Sorcc must be "capablc of conducting

indefinitely a succession of distributed operations. The opcrationally durable formation is the primary cnginc o f 0 eralional tlcsign: it is the hammer that drives the operational chisel."" 2 Operationa!.Visic?n: is "a unified and holistic approach in their design, execution and sustainment of campaigns. The gift of operational vision has oncn k e n associated with mental agility, the ability to react to incoming information lister than it arrives."" The concept Schncider describes is essentially the samc as [J.S. Army and Joint doctrinc.

Distributed h m y : "'I'he enemy must be opcrationally minded; he must bc similarly trained, armed, equipped, structure and commttndcd as the tikndly force. Without this "self-reflection" ... tremendous ambiguity and confusion ensures because the requisite crcativc mcdium does not exist."""' IJ.S. Army and Joint doctrine do not mention the requirement tbr a distributed enemy as a "medium" in which to practice operational art.

Endnotes

.. -. .

I Son 'l'zu, Art of' War, trans. Ralph D. Si~wycr (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, Inc., 1904), 167

Jamcs J. Schncidcr, lY~eoreticul I'uper h'o. 3: 7he 7heory ~,f'Opercrrionul Arl (Fort L.cavcnworth: US. Army Command and Gcnerd Stall'Collcge, I M;ach 1088). X.

' James J. Schneidcr, Vulcun :v Anvil: 7Re Americun Civil IVur und the l~n~ergcnce r , f Operationu1 Arl (Fort 1.cavcnwortli: [J.S. Army Coninland imd General Staf'I'College, 16 .June 1991), 6-23.

Schncidcr, 7heorcticol IJuper No. 3: 7he lheorg of0percrlionul Art. 14.

A campaign is a series of related military operations designed to achicvc strategic objectives within a given time and space. Wartime campaigns are broad in scope m d usually involve the employment o f large forces. I'eacetime campaigns can be hroad in scope hut usually involve smidlcr lbrces antl, Inany times, nthcr 1J.S. Government agencies, international agencies, or llnitetl Nations 1:orces.

1, Mi jo r operations consist o f coordinated actions in i~ single phase ofa campaign and ~~sua l l y dccitlc the course ol'a c;rmp;~ign.

' Schncidcr, 7h~or~,ticuI P u p ~ r No. 3: 7he 7heory of'Operulionul Art. I.

' l l i u l t i Herbert. Ikci(1ing ivhal 17~s to he Done General Willirrm L. L)cpt!v rrndthe I976 l<dition of' I~7ddMunual100-j Operutions (I'ort Le;~venworth: U.S. Army C:ommand antl General Stall'(:ollcgc, IOXR), 9S- 07.

" 1)cpartmcnt ol'the Arniy. 1~7~:ldMunuul 100-5: Operutions (Washington, I)(:: 1J.S. (icrvcrnma~t Printing Ollicc. May 1986). 9- 1 I.

I" Ihid.. 10

'I Richard M. Swain, Filli~ig /he Void lhe Operulioncrl Arl und~he Army (I'ort Leavenworth: U.S. Army C'om~nantl and General Statf College, nndated), 44.

' I Lhtcd June 1093.

I" 1)cpartnient ofthe Army. Field Munuul 100-7: lkcisive I+,rcc: Ihc Army in lheuter ofOperurio~ls (Washington. DC: U.S. (iovernmcnt Printing Ollicc, May 1905). 4-2.

I' 1)epartmcnt of the Army. FieldMr~nurrl 100-5: Opercrtions, 0- 1 to 6-3. A baltle consists o f a series o f related engagements; it lasts longer t l i i~n an engegenient, involves larger forccs, and could affect the course o f the campaign. Ihttles occur when division, corps, or army comniimdcrs light for signilicant ohjcclivcs. I;ngagements arc small conflicts or skirrnishcs, usually hetween opposing maneuver ibrces; they are ~iormii l ly short in duriition and lialght at division and below.

16 Ihid.. 6-2

I' lbid,, 6-2

'"hid., 6-1 to 6-3

- -- -. . . . . . . . . . -. -. . .. . . - -. - -

"~oint Stall: .Joint IJ~rhlicirtion 3-0: 1)c~lrine Jiw .Joint 0~xrutif1n.s (Washington. I)(:: I I.S. Govcrnmcnt Printing Officc, Fchrunry IYYS), 11-2.

"' Summarized from Joint Staff. .Joint Puhlicotion 3-0: I)o~:rrine,p~r.Joint Orxr(~lion.s. II- I to 11-5, and 111-9.

" Joint StalT. .loin1 Publicorion 5-0: Ihctrine Jiw I'lunning .Joint 0perulion.s (Washington, I)C: U.S (iovernnient Printing Oflice, April 1905), 1-2.

" James J. Schneider, Vulcun k Anvil: The Amerieuw Civil Wur w ~ d the remergence f?fOpercrtior~ul Arr. 30.

"' Ibid., 39.

" I bid., 40

'"bid., 58

2') Epslein, Kobcrt M., NupoIeon'.s Lust Victory (Lawrcacc: University I'rcss of Kansas, IYYS), 25.

'O Shimon Naveh, In 1'ur.srrit ofMi1irrrry Excellence: The Evolulion ofOperationul Theory (I .ondon: Frank Cass, 1997), xiii.

" Ihid.. 10

" Sumtnnrized from Naveli, In I'ur,suif of Military ficellenc~.: lhe k'vdution ufOperutiond Themy, I - 10. For additional information on systems theory scc Ludwig v. I3ertanlanFFy, (;enerulS~.stems lheory (Ncw York: George nriviller Press, 1968).

'" Naveh, In Pursuit of'MiIilar)~ I<xccllenee: The Evolurion of Opcrutionul 7heory. 9

" Ibid., 13

2 1, Sulnmarizcd liwm Naveh, I n Prrr,suir of Militur)? L~cellence: 7 k Evolution ofOperi~tioncrl Theory. 13.

" Ihid., 12-14

I X J.F.C. Follcr, Quoted in John I:nglisli. OnInfirntry, (New York: I'racgcr, 1984). p. xx.

7 0 Naveh, I n I'ursuir ofMili/nry Fxellence: Ihe hL.voltrtion of'Opl,erotion~rl Theory, I 16,

"' Matthew Conpcr, Ihe C;crmunArrny (C:lielsca: Scarborough I Iousc Publishers, 1078), 1 14- 138.

' I ' J.F.C. Fuller, A Militcrry Histoiy ufrhe We.stern World: Volume Ill Mew York: Funk & Wuynalls Company, Inc., 1956). 378.

- . - . . . . . .

" Erich von Manstein, Lost Viclorit.~ (Novato: Presidio, 1982), $9.

'" Cooper. The (;ermon Army, 122.

" Manslcin, Lrm.vl Victories, 97,

.I5 Cooper, The (iertnan Armv, 195.

41, I l(~nii ld Ixwin, Hirl~,r:v Mi.vrukcs (Ncw York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1084). 107.

.I7 Cooper, The Germun Army, 195

" lhid,, 190-108.

'' Manstein, Lost Victoriev. 98,

'" Cooper, The Germnun Army, 199.

'I Sumninrized lion) Ctmpcr, 1Ac (;crmariArniy, 200-216 and Manstein, Lost Vidories, 98-126.

" Ronald I.cwin, H i t l c r :~ Mi.vrc~kc.v (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1084). 107.

" Len Deighton, Blitzhri~.g (New York: I\allantine Ilooks, 1970). 101-276. Manstein, Losl Viclories. 98- 126. I:ran~ Haltler, iVur./ournul r,f't.'runz Holder: Volume I1 (turopcatl Command, circa 1956). 18-55, R'aw I Itildcr, IVor .Iourncrl ofFrunz i-lolder: Volume 111 (liuropean Command, circa 1956), 10- 112. I:riw I laldcr, #'or .Iournul o / ' l * imz ilolder: Volunre IV(F.ur~~petin Commiuxl. circa 1956). 17-55.

5.1 Summarized fiom Cooper. ??re (iermun Army. 2 17-2513 i~nd Fuller, A Mililury iIi,slor:v c!/'lhe N'evrcrn World: Volume 1 hrw, 388-400.

'I' Ibid., 105

57 Manstein, Losl Vicloriicv. 87-88.

I V Manstin, I,o.vt Victories, 7 1

"' Peter Chrisp, Ulilzkrieg! (I low: Wayland Publishers Ltd., 1990), 43

6 1 Cooper, The Germun Army. 198-21 6

BJ Alistair I lornc, i b 1,oxe 11 11ol1le. (New York: Penguin 13cloks. 1984). 199-200.

61 Cooper. The (;ernrun Army, 242,

" Manstein. l.osr Viclori~'~, 114

"" Lewin, I1itler:v Misluke. 107

07 Ikparlmcnl of the Army. Field Munuid 100-5: Operutions. 6-2.

45

fin Schneider, V~r1cu11's Anvil: lhe Americun Civil Wur undthe I ~ , ~ ~ . r g m c c o/'Ol~erarionuI Art, 38.

"" Ihid.. 64.

7U Cooper, The (;errnun Air Force. I 12.

7 1 Deighton, Blitzkrieg, 101-2715, Manstein, I.o.~r VicIories, 98-126. Haldcr. Wor./o~rrnc~l o/'l.i.unz llcrldw: Volumc 11, 18-55. tlalder, War .lourncrl of'l.i.unz llulder: Volume 111, 30- 132. I h n z Haldcr. CVw .lournu1 o/'fifrnz Hulder: Volume IV, 17-55.

'' Manstein, Lost Vicrories, 7 1.

l3 lhid.. 87-88,

7.1 Naveh, In I'ursui~ o?/'Militcrrj~ ficellencc: The Evolution ($O~~.rurioncrl Theory. 3-5.

75 Ihid., 9.

11, Matlhew Cooper, The Germtm Army (Chlscs: Scarborough I louse I'uhlishcrs, 1978), 195

77 Naveh, In Plrrsuir ofMilitcrry LiceIIencc: The Evol~r~ion o/'Operutionul Theory, 13

" Manstein, Lost Victori~'.~. 1 15.

79 Naveh, 111 Pursuir o/ Military Iixcellence; The hevoluriot~ c?/'Oprutk~nul lh~or j? , 14,

'" Ihid., xvi-xvii.

" Ibid.. I 10- 12 I . Cooper. The (ierman Arm", 177- 194

" NIIVC~, In IJur.~uit o/'Mi/iturj' Excdlence: The Evolution ofOp~~rc~tioncrl Theory, xvii.

83 Manstein, Lost Victories, 100.

"' Deighton, Blilzkrieg, 19 1-276. Manstein, Losr Vicrorie.~. YX-126. tlaldcr, Wur.lournul e?/'Fronz Iluldi!r: Volunte 11, 18-55. I lalder, Wur .lourno/ oj'I*i.anz Haldm: Volume 111, 30-1 32. I laldw, IVur .101rrnd q/' I+unz Hulder: Volume IV. 17-55.

" Sequels arc suhscqucnt operations based on the possible outconles o f the cnrrcnt operation -victory, defeat or stalemate. Sequels are an integral component o f operational design in 1J.S. Army and Joint doctrine.

'" 'l'he action o f multiple agents whose end result is greatur thun the sun1 of lhc individual parts. This definition stcms from the biological dclinition, which is thc action o f two or more snbstances, organs, or organisms to achieve an etyect o f which each is individually incapahlu.

" S ~ ~ n i m a r i m l l iom Navch, In I'ursuil ($Military Lxcellence: 7he I~voIutiot~ o/'Operutione~l Theory, 13.

" I)eighton, I~litzkrii:~, 101-276. Manstein, I.osl Viclorirs. 98-126. Ilalder, Wrrr.lournr11 ofFranz Ilulder: Volurne 11, 18-55. 1 laltler, IVur .lournc~l efFranz Ilalder; Vohrme 111. 30- 132. Haldcr, Wur .lo~rrnul of' Frunz Hulder: Volrrrne IV, 17-55.

'"Carl von Clausewilz. On Wur (Princeton: Princeton IJniversity Press, 1976), 182.

- - -. - - . - - . - . - -. - . -. -. - - - . - . - -- - -- - - "' I-leinz Guderian trans. Constnntioe I:ilzgibbo~i, I'unzer ldudcr (New York: E.1'. Dullon & Co., 1952).

106.

'I1 . Summariwd liom Lkigliton, l~litzkricg, 19 1-276. Hornc, 7'0 IIJSC u ~rrlrle, 245-645. James S. Corum, Ilhe Hoots r!f'lllitzkri~g ((I.awrence: The ilniversity Press of Kansas. 1992), 203-205.

CJZ Summarized from Lkighton, Blitzkrieg, 275-270.

'' Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blifzkr~eg-LEgtnde: Dcr Wtr!fL;ldzu~ 1940 (Munich: It. Oldenbourg, 1095). 5-7.

'" Schneider. Vulcrrn 'k Anvil: The Americcm Civil Wur and the Emergence ofOperuti~nul Art, 39.

"5 Ibid., 40.

"" Ibid., 45-46.

'I1 Ihid, 53-54.

"n Ibid., 55-58.

061 Ibid., 58.

IIHI Ihid.. 60.

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