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PEOPLE V NAZARIO

The defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in information filed by the provincial Fiscal. It was alleged that in the years 1964, 1965, and 1966, in the Municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, Nazario, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, refused and failed to pay municipal taxes amounting to P362.62.

The Municipal ordinances violated by the Nazario are M.O No.4 series of 1955, as amended by M.O. No. 15 series 1965, and finally amended by M.O No. 12 series of 1966.

In his defense, Nazario declared the following facts: He has lived in Sta. Mesa Manila since 1949 and he bought his

Residence Certificates at Manila or at San Juan. In 1964-66, he was living in manila, and his business was in Manila He never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon and do not own a house there. He, however, have a lease agreement with the Philippine Fisheries

Commissions, and during those times (1964-1966), the contract of lease was still existing and enforceable

The accused tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. (Under Sec.2309 of the RAC, municipal taxes lapse). Furthermore, they tried to show that as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally Nazario should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected.

Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain.Issue:Whether or not the said municipal ordinances are ambiguous and uncertain.

Held:

Sec. 1 of the M.O No. 4, 15, and 12

Sec. 1 Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax i nhte amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof perannum

Sec. 1(a). For convenience of those who have or owners of managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries

Sec 1. (No.12) Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.

The petitioner (case was appealed in CA) contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of “owner or manager.” He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: (*)

As a rule, a statue or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: 1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid, and 2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.“perfectly vague” (Coates) – act whose obscurity is evident on its faceVS

1. Legislation couched in imprecise language – may be “saved”by proper construction

2. Statues that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statues may not be challenged whenever directed against such activities.

In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. He falls within the coverage. As the actual operator of hte fishponds, he comes within the term of manager. (Financed the construction of fishponds,

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introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed labourers to maintain them). While it appears that it is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.

The ordinances are in the character of revenue measures designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, (Govt), whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that the Governmetn is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the Governmetn that had been making money from the venture.

Dates: no ambuiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates – as far as his liability years 1964-1966 is concerned – presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinance vague. The amendatory act (No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother ordinances (No. 4 and 15). For new operators – 15

Ex post facto law: No. 12 passed on Sept 19, 1966 (penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964); NO; No. 4 was passed 1955. Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment is being made to apply retroactively since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment)

Taxing public forest land: under RA No. 2264, prohibited as held in golden ribbon lumber co v city of butuan. Also RA 2264 prohibited municipalits from imposing percentage taxes on sales

Court: tax in question is not a tax on property. They are privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are classified as fixed annual taxes. Fishponds are not forest lands although we held them to be agricultural lands

Forest – large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; large wood

Notes:

If there is “enumeration of acts deemd included in the term” made by law the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at rest

Balancing-of-interests tests balance achieved in favour of State authority at the expense of individual liberties

Less restrictive alternatives doctrine – the court searches for alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory limits, or for “less drastic means” open to the State, that would render the statute unnecessary

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC.vs.HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961

FACST: The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate,

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sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.

The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."

ISSUE: whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof

HELD: The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or food products because they are used in the farming and poultry industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as matter of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those listed preceding the term in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those for breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not

always refer to food for human consumption, was added among the items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.

Notes: (incasse itanong niya) Section 2 of RA 601 states:

SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board of Textbooks and/or established public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers; book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."

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Hidalgo v Hidalgo

Respondent-vende: Policarpio Hidalgo Owner of the 22,876 square meter and 7638 square meter agricultural

parcel of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas until the execution of deed of sale was made in favour of the seven private-co-respondents (respondent-vendees) in this case.

This actually involves two cases which are jointly decided because the same issue of law is involved and the original landowner and vendees in both cases are the same.

Case L25326, respondent sold the 22876sqm parcel of land for P4000. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1500, “taking into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots”, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1500 by respondent-vendees in their favour.

Case L-25327, reponsdnet sold the &,638sqm parcel of land for P750, and petitioners spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo, as tenats thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750 by respondent-vendees in their faovr.

Facts:

Petitioners-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by sec 11 of Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by respondent vendor was registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the record of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-exuction by respondent-vendor of affidavit required by sec 13 of the Land Reform Code. The actions for redemption were timely filed by petitioners-tenants within the two-year prescriptive period from registration of the sale, prescribed by sec 12 of the said Code.

Sec. 13. No deed of sale of agricultural land under cultivation by an agricultural lessees or lessees shall be recorded in the Registry of Property unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given the written notice required in Sec 11 of this Chapter or that the land is not worked by an agricultural lessee.

Sec. 12. In case the landholding is sold to a third person without hte knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.

The agricultural court dismissed the two petitions for redemption and focused on the issue that, under the system of agricultural tenancy, the recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy, and that Sec 12 of RA 3844 applies to leasehold tenant and not to share tenant because said provision of law clearly, definitely, and unequivocally grants said right to teh agricultural lessess, and to nobody else.. A share tenant is altogether different

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from a leasehold tenant and their respective rights and obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal

Issue: WON, the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of RA No. 3844 applicable to share tenants?

Held:

The very essence of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy as proclaimed in its title. However, based on the transitory provision in the first proviso of sec 34 of the Code, that existing share tenancy contracts are allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect, notwithstanding their express abolition, until whichever of the following events occur earlier:

a. The end of the agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council makes the proclamation declaring the region or locality a land reform area

b. The shorter period provided in the share tenancy contracts expiresc. The share tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold

system

It is an essential and indispensable mandate of the Code to implement State’s policy of establish owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified and self-reliant existence for the small farmers that would make them a pillar strength of our Republic.

The agrarian court facilely let itself fall into the error of concluding that the right ore redemption imposed by he Coe is available to leasehold tenants only and excludes share tenants for the literal reason that the Code grants said rights only to the “agricultural lessee” and to nobody else. Chapter I of the Code extensively deals with the establishment of “agricultural leasehold relation,” defines the parties thereto and the rights and obligations of the “agricultural lessor” and of the “agricultural lessee” (without the slightest mention of leasehold tenants) and the statutory consideration or rental for the leasehold to be paid by the lessee. There is a studied omission in the Code of the use of the term tenant in deference to the “abolition of tenancy” as proclaimed in the very title of the Code, and the elevation of the tenant’s status to that of lessee.

Then, the terms “agricultural lessor” and “agricultural lessees” are consistently used throughout the Chapter. The agrarian court’s literal construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and announced legislative intent and policy of the State of establishing owner-cultivatorship for

the farmers, who invariably were all share tenants before the enactment of the Code and whom the Code would uplift to the status of lessees.

Such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

The agrarian court’s dismissal of the cases at bar should therefore be reversed and petitioners-tenants right to redeem the landholding recognized section 12 of the Code.

Case L25326 – remanded to the agrarian court

Why?

The deed of sale executed by respondent vender in favour of respondent vendees for the price of P4000 covers three parcel of land.

Petitioners sought to redeem only the first parcel of land and were alleging that the proportionate worth of said parcel of land is P1500.

Respondents answer: the said land is fairly worth P20,000

While vendor would be bound by, and cannot claim more than the price stated in the deed, and the code precisely provides that the farmer shall have the preferential right to buy the (landholding) under reasonable terms and conditions or redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration, the court note that the deed of sale itself acknowledged that the selling price of P4000 therein stated was not the fair price since an additional consideration herein stated was that the vendees would support the vendor during his lifetime and take care of him, should he fall ill and even assumed expenses of his burial upon his death.

Case was remanded solely for the purpose of determining the reasonable price and consideration to be paid by petitioners for redeeming the landholding.

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AMATAN VS AUJERIO

FACTS:A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" of the

crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed by the Philippine National Police Station Commander in Bato, Leyte for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip who in turn died because of the vital shots his body received.

Meon pleaded guilty on the lesser offense of attempted homicide rather than homicide. Respondent Judge Aujerio found Meon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted homicide.

Amatan, brother-in-law of the decease accused respondent gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

Respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individual — with the consent of the offended party — to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction.

Issue:

Held:The respondent judge GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law for which

he is hereby REPRIMANDED and FINED ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS. Let this decision appear in respondent's record of service.

Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co., G.R. No. L-27489, April 30,1970Objects and Methods of Construction: Mens Legislatoris/Mischief Rule

It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.

Facts: Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. Although some sort of quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to commute (the Company furnishes their transportation), and the deceased in particular went home about three times a week.

At the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow, Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta, was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past three months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized in the hospital where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta. The Workmen's Compensation Commission awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney's fees.

Issue:

Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

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Held:

Yes. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents.

Ratio:

It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. Our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the mother's womb.

Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.

Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail.

To quote from the Lingad case anew: “For it is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its conformity with what the fundamental law requires need arise.”

SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY, vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and VICENTE GELLA, in his capacity as Treasurer of the PhilippinesG.R. No. L-8888 November 29, 1957

FACTS: During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. The suit was filed in the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein defendants submitted in due time a motion to dismiss on the grounds: first, the complaint stated no cause of action because cocoa beans were not "chocolate"; and second, it was a suit against the Government without the latter's consent.

ISSUE: WON cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

HELD: SEC. 2 of the aforesaid Act 601 provides that "the tax collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of costs transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour ..soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup .. shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation . . ."

Cocoa beans do not become chocolate unless and until they have undergone the manufacturing processes above described. The first is raw material, the other finished product.

The courts regard "chocolate" as a preparation of roasted cacao beans without the abstraction of the butter and always contains sugar and added cacao butter.

Chocolate is a cocoa bean roasted, cracked, shelled, crushed, ground, and molded in cakes. It contains no sugar, and is in general use in families.

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Sweetened chocolate is manufactured in the same way but the paste is mixed wit sugar, and is used by confectioners in making chocolate confections.

In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation,3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.

However, we cannot stop here, because in August 1954 — suit was brought in May 1954 — Congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate." This shows, maintains the appellant, the Legislature's intention to include cocoa beans in the word "chocolate."Other parts of the Congressional record quoted in the briefs would seem to show that in approving House Bill No. 2576, the Congress agreed to exempt "cocoa beans" instead of chocolate with a view to favoring local manufacturers of chocolate products.6 A change of legislative policy, as appellees contend7 — not a declaration or clarification of previous Congressional purpose. In fact, as indicating, the Government's new policy of exempting for the first time importations of "cocoa beans," there is the President's proclamation No. 62 of September 2, 1954 issued in accordance with Republic Act No. 1197 specifying that said exemption (of cocoa beans) shall operate from and after September 3, 1954 — not before. As a general rule, it may be added, statutes operate prospectively.

Observe that appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January-October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree.

After the foregoing discussion, it is hardly necessary to express our approval of the lower court's opinion about plaintiff's cause of action, or the lack of it. And it becomes unnecessary to consider the other contention of defendants that this is a suit against the Government without its consent

TAN V People

In denying this petition, the Court reiterates that the gatherhing, collection and/or possession, without license, of lumber, which is considered timber or forest product, are prohibited and penalized under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.

Facts:

On Oct 26, 1989, about 6:30pm, in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 pm, on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus the pieces of lumber were confiscated.

Charges/Information:

1. Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo (caretaker and timekeeper of A & E Construction) were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix Rocero with violation of Sec 68 PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277.

2. Tan and Ramilo, together with Crispin Cabudol, were charged for the same violation in connection with Oct 30 incident.

Petitioners contend that possession of manufactured lumber is not punishable under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended. As explicitly provided in Sec 68 of both PD 705 and EO 277 (the law that amended the former), only the cutting, gathering, collecting and or possession, without license, of “timber and other forest products” are prohibited. As expressly defined under Sec 3 of PD 705, lumber is not timber or a forest product. It is only in se c79 of the same law where the sale of lumber, without compliance with established grading rules and standards, is prohibited. Petitioners submit that the forest laws and regulations sufficiently differentiate between timber and lumber; therefore, courts should not construe lumber as timber.

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ISSUE:

WON, Lumber is considered timber or forest product?

HELD:

The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of sec 68 of PD 705 as amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber Inc v CA, in which this court expressly ruled that lumber is included in the term timber. We quote at length the Court’s discussion:

“The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Sec 3, the latter if found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant, which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the require d legal documents is concerned, Sec 68 of PD no. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.

Notes:1. Constitutionality

The accused questions the constitutionality of Sec 68 of EO 277. Petitioners avers that sec 68 is violative of substantive due process, because it requires the possession of certain legal documents to justify “mere possession” of forest products which, under Sec3 of PD 705, includes, among others, “firewood, bark, honey, beeswax and even grass, shrub, flowering plant, the associated water, or fish” and penalizes failure to present such required

One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy

involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. The petitioners were not “charged wit hte unlawful possession of firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, “the associated water” or “fish”; thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 “is absolutely of no conern” to the petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which htey are entitled to a judicial determination at this time. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it

2. Retroactive Application of EO 277

Petitioners insist that EO 277 is not applicable to them, because the seized lumber had been lawfully possessed of Cajidiocan Trading since March 1987, while the amendatory law was issued only July 25, 1987, and took effect fifteen days after publication.

At no time during the apprehensions did petitioners claim that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan Trading

The supposed sale of the subject lumber by Matzhou to Cajidiocan Trading, as evidenced by the auxiliary invice occurred more than 2 ½ years prior to the apprehension and seizure that gave rise to the case. It is highly doubtful if the lumber bought at the earlier date was the very same lumber confiscated in 1989.

Even if no. 2 is true, none of the following required documents were presented: a. Certificate of lumber origin b. Sales invoice c. Delivery receipt d. Tally sheet, and e. Certificate of transport agreement

Prisco Marin (OIC of Bureau of Forest Development of Sibuyan) testified the that the seized pieces of lumber were bought by Tan’s Cajidiocan Trading (one of the ilcensed lumber dealers in the island) from Matzhou Development Corp which thus delivered to the former Auxilliary Invoice dated March 1987 issued by BIR office in Romblon. According to Marin, the director of forestry had granted Matzhou a Tree Recovery Permit covering the entire island of Sibuyan. He added that he had inspected the lumber in question in the compound of A & E Cosntruction or Cajidiocan Trading, where he was shown the auxiliary invoice covering the subject.

BERNARDO VS BERNARDO

FACTS:Republic of the Philippines purchased from Roman Catholic Church the

estate known as the "Capelania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under the

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provisions of section 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes the expropriation or purchase of private lands and that lands acquired there under should be subdivided into lots, for resale at reasonable prices to "their bona fide tenants or occupants." Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent herein, applied to the Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners Enrique Bernardo, et al ., contested the application and claimed preferential right to such purchase, and on January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration resolved to recognize the petitioners as entitled to preference. The respondents then appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter upheld their claim, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals likewise found and declared in its decision Bernardo required the petitioner to vacate the premises. Finally, we understand that in Case No. 6734-R, the Court of Appeals declared valid the sale of the house on the lot in question made in 1944 by petitioner Enrique Bernardo in favor of the respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo, and that the aforesaid judgment is now final.

The petitioners seeks to justify his stand by claiming that the policy of the government, ever since the start of the American sovereignty, had been to acquire the landed estates for the benefit of their "actual occupants," as allegedly exemplified in Acts 1170 and 1933 (friar Lands' Acts), and Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20, 260, 378, and 539 (Homesite Acts); that the words "bona fide occupants" employed in the Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to "actual" occupants. Two powerful REASONS nullify this contention. The first is that section 7 of Act 1170 of the old Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate tenure. The second reason is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that the term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to cloak and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of trust.

ISSUE:Whether or not the situation would be different if the occupant were sublessee of the lot, need not be decided in this case, the issue not being involved.

HELD:A person who, at the time of the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and who does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth Act. No. 539. Decision of Court of Appeals affirmed.

MANLAYAON VS LISING

FACTS:The late Mayor Pontanal was one of the accused in a criminal case for

violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices. After filing the case against him, he was suspended during his incumbency and died. The criminal case charged was dismissed due to his death.

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Petitioner contends that any disbursement of funds by municipal treasurer Goleta, in favour of the late mayor’s heirs for the salaries corresponding the period he was under suspension and other benefits were illegal and contrary to Section 13 of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act because said mayor was not acquitted of the charge against him.

Petitioner Manlayaon filed an action to declare illegal the disbursements made to Venancia Pontanal, widow. However, respondent judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against the late mayor due to his death amounted to his acquittal.

**acquitted means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.

Respondents invoked Art. 81 of RPC –death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liability.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of the case of the late mayor amounted

to his acquittal?

HELD:Court ruled that the relevance of the provision of Art 81 in the case at

bar was not meritorious. The case against the late mayor was not an appeal but on trial. The claim for back salaries was neither a criminal or civil liability. It was a right provided the conditions of the law were present.

Court declared the payment of the municipal funds for the salaries of the late mayor during his suspension from office ILLEGAL and ordered respondent treasurer to retrieve payments so far disbursed.

US v Gabino Soliman

Facts:

The evidence of record conclusively discloses that defendant Gabino Soliman testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extra-judicial confession of his guilt, had

not been executed voluntarily, and that its execution had been procured by fore or by the of force; intimidation and prolonged torture.

There can be no doubt that the accused was guilty of the crime of perjury as defined and penalized in Sec 3 of Act no. 1697 and that the sentence of 6 months imprisonment and P300 fine imposed by the trial judge was correctly imposed under the provisions of the statute.

It appears however that since judgment was extended in this case on November 23, 1915, Sec 3 of Act No. 1697 has been expressly repealed by the enactment of the administrative code, which became effective on July 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgment convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of the statute should not be sustained, and that the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing the criminal responsibility of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the admin code.

Issue:

WON the repealing statute has the effect of providing new penalties for the commission of the acts penalized under the repealed statute.

Held:

Sec 12 of the Administrative Code provides that “when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided,” but this provision does not change or modify the rule which prescribes that when a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly, but by implication, is itself repealed, the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.

The express repeal of Sec 3 of Act No. 16977 by the enactment of the Admin Code (act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the penal code (Act No. 2142) touching perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act no. 2142.

The provisions of Act No. 2142 discloses that the penalty prescribed therein is less than that imposed upon the appellant under the provisions of Sec 3 of Act No. 1697, the penalty imposed by the court below should be revoked and that in lieu thereof the penalty prescribed in hte penal code should be imposed upon the convict which is 4 mos and 1 day of A. Mayor and a fine of &5 with subsidiary imprisonment prescribed by law.

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Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc v Hon Jose Feliciano

Facts:

On December 1964, Jose Feliciano chairman and general manager of the rice and corn administration, wrote the president of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595 400 metric tons of rice thru a government agency which the president may designate pursuant to the recommendation of the national economic council as embodied in its resolution no. 70 series of 1964.

Considering that said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association Inc., together with Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as tax payer, filed the instant case petition before the court seeking to restrain the Feliciano from conducting the bid scheduled on February 1965 and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of the court.

Sec 2 of RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency and is certified by the national economic council, the president of the Philippines may authorize such importation through any government agency that he may designate.

Issue:

WON Sec 2 of Ra 2207 is expressly repealed by Ra 3452.

Held:

Failure to add a specific repealing caluse indicates that the intent ws not to repeal any existing law unless an irreconciliable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no inconsistency. The two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. The point of reconciliation, the normalcy of the tiem underlying both laws.

On the matter of importation, RA 2207 covers 3 different situations: 1. When the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption 2. When the local products falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitue a national emergency and 3. When the shortage on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency.

RA 3452 deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not 3.

In short, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency we have to turn to RA 2207. The two laws therefore are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole

Facts:Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Alfredo

Ouano,Vice-Mayor Paterno Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, allpublic officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson andGaudiosa O. Bercede by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O.Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A No. 3019, as amended; Articles 170 and 171RPC; and R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7Mwithout authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.

Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 LGC, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. Dionson and Bercede argued that the LGC could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman.

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A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the RTC. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued a restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.Issue: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the present caseHeld: Yes. The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section13(1,) Article X1, of the 1987 Constitution, while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it.Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under Section 60 thereof, on various offices In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highlyurbanized cities.

Thus, respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . ."

There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the

inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpret are et concord are leqibus esf optimus interpretendi, i e, every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.

Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom."Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old code.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.

Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-daypreventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a)

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there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records.

The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum incompliance with the directive of petitioner Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence.

Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier,that the evidence of guilt was strong.

Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General that respondent officials' petition for prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September .1992 order, should not have been entertained.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. EismaGR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)

En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

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People v. Mapa [GR L-22301, 30 August 1967]

En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur

Facts: Accused was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammmunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. Appeal involves a question of law, as that it was taken to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

1. Law explicit, no provision made for secret agentThe law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, it shall be unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition. Firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the AFP, the PC, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails, are not covered when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. No provision is made for a secret agent.

2. Duty of the court to apply the law; Construction if application is impossible or inadequateThe first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision.

3. People v. Macarandang modifiedIn People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment “of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order

campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879. The Court ruled however that such reliance is misplaced in the present case and that the decision in People v. Macarandang no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with.