CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

PAKISTAN’S NEW CIVILIAN

GOVERNMENT:

MANAGING A DIFFICULT DEMOCRATIC

TRANSITION

WELCOME AND MODERATOR:

FREDERIC GRARE,

VISITING SCHOLAR, SOUTH ASIA PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

SPEAKER:

AMBASSADOR TARIQ FATEMI,

SENIOR FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR TO MR. NAWAZ; CHAIRMAN, PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 2008

Transcript by

Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

FREDERIC GRARE: May I request everybody to kindly take a seat, please. May I request

the French Embassy and the U.S. State Department – (chuckles) – well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. And welcome again to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Welcome again to this new event in the Pakistan program, although in light the Afghanistan series, we never had something called that way.

I mean, right after the election, Pakistan suddenly disappeared from the screen and, to a large extent, from the public debate in Washington. The year is the spring and everybody is new again. I mean, the weather is back, of course, the nature is being renewed and so is the political debate. Because remember two months ago, no one believed in the chance of any civilian government to come back. And there it is. No one believed – or everyone believed that Musharraf was absolutely indispensable, the military in power was the actually only reasonable solution for Pakistan. And there we are with civilian government.

And the very same question we are then asked, I’ll ask again, but although in a totally

different manner. Of course there is still some traces of the old mindset, some traces of the old way of thinking, and always a bit of suspicion vis-à-vis whoever comes in, a sense of déjà vu, a sense of those guys again with the potential disaster coming in. And actually there are perhaps some reasons of concern, but there are also perhaps some reasons for hope.

In the meantime, we do have a series of very important questions which are still being asked,

which is not just political, not just product of the circumstances (?) of the moment, but runs deeper and will have deep consequences for the future of Pakistan.

The first one is perhaps the judiciary crisis, and the lesson it reveals about coalition politics,

but also for the future of constitutional Pakistan if that would steal mean something, not only back in Islamabad, but perhaps something in Washington as well. Of course the difficulties of securing effective civilian control over the government and the state, and that’s probably a problem which is there to last.

The challenge of defeating domestic extremism and winning the war on terror, and I should

add perhaps, with or without the people, perhaps that’s the main difference between the situation before and after the election, although in both cases there are a number of questions to be answered and a lot of questions to be asked.

And finally, and perhaps more importantly for this country, the prospect for Pakistan

relation with the United States, China, and India. And obviously this was written by one of my American colleagues because I would have added Europe. And I should perhaps remind everybody that Europe is actually the number one trading partner of Pakistan, has been for quite some time and still is, and is likely to remain so for some time as well.

So to discuss all these issues, we have the privilege and the pleasure, should I say, to

welcome Ambassador Tariq Fatemi today here in Carnegie. Ambassador Fatemi is a distinguished member of the Pakistan Foreign Service, now retired. He served as a Pakistani diplomat for almost 35 years during which time he had many important diplomatic assignments, including Moscow, New York, Washington, and Beijing. He has had a number of other important assignments, but beside that everything else pales.

In Islamabad, he served as head of the foreign minister’s office for five years as additional

secretary in charge of the Americas and Europe for three years and in the prime minister’s office when he was responsible for the ministries of defense, defense production, and foreign affairs. Ambassador Fatemi was promoted to the rank of secretary, the highest rank in the civil service, in 1999. And since his retirement, Ambassador Fatemi has become a well-known political analyst in Pakistan. I’m sure that many of you read his regular column in Dawn, for example. He’s appearing also frequently on television and is currently a senior foreign policy advisor to Mr. Nawaz Sharif, who is, as you well know, not only the former prime minister, but the chairman of the Pakistan Muslim League and a key partner in the current ruling coalition in Pakistan.

So I think we have had a number of people speaking of almost the same issue from the

other side of the spectrum. Initially, we have had people coming from the former government side. We have had people close to the PPP coming here and talking about it. We have now the pleasure – and I want to underline that because Carnegie is truly a very open and very bipartisan place – the pleasure to welcome an imminent person of the PMLN. And I give the floor to Ambassador Fatemi (applause). AMBASSADOR TARIQ FATEMI: Thank you, Frederic. That was very kind of you. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for taking the trouble of coming. I found the weather truly gorgeous walking from the Dupont Circle, which has been my point of entry and exit during the many years that I spent on Massachusetts Avenue.

It’s always a pleasure coming here and seeing friends, many of them very familiar faces, some

of whom I’ve worked with and members of the Pakistan Press Corps here. A special thanks to you for coming over, sir.

Yes, it is true, we have had a fascinating winter. This spring has been a beautiful one as well.

The jacarandas are all out in Islamabad. But the jacarandas have been creating quite a bit of allergy in many people and that is because things are appearing somewhat worrying and the hopes and expectations that had arisen as a result of the February 18th election – they are still on track, but they are facing increasing problems, some of which was expected, but some of which have arisen from factors that I shall explain to you in the next few minutes.

Let me recall that March 9, 2007, when an effort was made to oust the chief justice and

thereafter the country has really, you know, been through a roller coaster. The number of ups and downs have been remarkable. Some very unexpected events have taken place. For example, the refusal of the judges to kowtow to an authoritarian regime, the emergence of a vibrant civil society, the dynamic role played by the media, the urban middle classes, teachers, students, it’s been a very fascinating experience for someone like myself because in the past, we have had the judiciary, the media, and virtually members of the civil society accepting whatever the military dictatorships had done in the past without much of an opposition. And therefore, what did take place in Pakistan after 9th March was certainly a very pleasant change as far as we are concerned and certainly a nightmarish situation for General Musharraf.

Since then, we have also seen that the two major political parties were able to work on a

common platform. And even though the tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto cast a gloom over the entire Pakistani political landscape, it goes to the credit of Mr. Zardari that he was able to pick

up the pieces and show that the People’s Party remains strong, active, resilient, and able to stand up to the challenges that had been thrown up as a result of the very shocking and tragic assassination of its leader.

Coming to more current times, there is a coalition government in power with the Pakistan

People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz’s group, together, along with the participation, a very small participation of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam of – (unintelligible) – as well of a slightly more prominent presence of the frontier nationalist political party known as ANP, Awami National Party led by Asfandyar Wali. And they command a very strong majority in the National Assembly. In fact, the vote of confidence that the prime minister, Mr. Yousaf Raza Gillani, received was unanimous and everybody endorsed his candidature.

All this have given rise to the feeling that the Pakistanis may actually be proving the

soothsayers wrong, and especially General Musharraf who, only a few months before the election on a tour in Brussels before the European Commission, Frederic, had the gall to say that democracy and human rights was an obsession with the West and that the Pakistanis had neither any experience nor did they deserve the kind of democracy that the West believes in or wishes the world to practice.

That’s the very positive development. It is also true that in the provinces, the political

parties have assumed office. In Sindh it is primarily the People’s Party in coalition with the MQM. In frontier, it is ANP with an input from the People’s Party. In Punjab, it is primarily the Muslim League, with support from the People’s Party. And in Balochistan, it is the People’ Party and others, primarily tribal representatives and others that are from the Balochistan Nationalist Party.

The prime minister has, so far, conducted himself with a great degree of responsibility and

maturity. He has amongst his first actions ordered the release of the judges. In the Balochistan province, he has taken measures to withdraw cases from some of the Balochi Nationalists. He has asked for withdrawal of the troops that were preventing people from going and offering their prayers at the tomb of the Balochi leader, Nawab Bugti (sp) and he has also committed himself to a program in which there will be a special emphasis on the lower classes, the poorer classes. Those are all very positive actions.

On the disturbing side, I have to point out very early the inability of the leadership of the

two political parties to resolve the issue of the ousted judges. Now, this is something which is very difficult for people outside to understand, but in reality, the ousted judges and their restoration have become a litmus test for the success or failure of the coalition partners, because both of them are committed not only in various party meetings, but formally in what is known as the Murree Declaration, wherein they came together, met for two days and then came out with a declaration, but also that is the expectation of the Pakistanis overwhelmingly.

A large number of Gallup polls that have taken place, other surveys that have been carried

out, indicate that the people of Pakistan, especially in the cities, especially in the urban centers, and more so in the Punjab, believe that unless the judges are restored, the major plank of the promise made by the political parties during the election campaign will go unanswered. More so, there is the feeling – and this is where the Pakistani politics becomes interesting. The restoration of the ousted judges is also an important test of whether the coalition partners want the president to become the head of state as is envisaged in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, wherein he is very much what the

Indian counterpart is – it’s usually (?) a head of state with virtually no executive powers other than those that he carries out on the advice of the prime minister.

Or does he continue to remain a very powerful, very active, and one very dominant head of

state as President Musharraf has been all these years and as he has succeeded in bringing about as a result of a number of amendments to the constitution, first of all the 17th amendment, which was carried out in 2002 and as recently as 3rd November, 2007 when he did something totally remarkable even by the Pakistani standards – (chuckles) – wherein as the army chief, he virtually carried out a coup against the government, which had a president, which had a prime minister, which had a National Assembly in session, which had a judiciary in place, and having done that, then he got the president to give him a kind of a legal cover that what you have done is the right thing and therefore as head of state I’m doing so.

Now, this whole business, this whole charade of the army chief carrying out a series of

amendments to the constitution without reference to the National Assembly, without it being endorsed or given a legal cover by the supreme court at that point in time was totally unprecedented and therefore, the feeling in Pakistan is that unless the 3rd November action of the army chief/the president of Pakistan is revoked by the National Assembly, there can be no true operation of the constitution in Pakistan or of the rule of law.

And therefore you have this very interesting situation whereby the ruling coalition wishes to

undo the actions of the 3rd November, except that they wish to do it as a result of a major constitutional package, a reform package. Whereas the Pakistan Muslim League believes that in a stroke by one single action, the first thing that needs to be done is to bring back the ousted judges, the judges who were ousted as a result of the 3rd November 2007 action, which those of you who follow Pakistan will recall that with one stroke of pen, with one announcement on the Pakistan television, 62 judges of the supreme court and the high courts of Pakistan were sent home and an overwhelming majority of them were then imprisoned in their houses.

The chief justice with a child that requires special assistance was never permitted to leave his

house; his telephone, his TV, his newspaper they cut off and he was virtually placed in a kind of isolated state, unknown in Pakistan, worse than what happens in the jails of the country. Other judges have been roughed up; their family members have been roughed up. And the whole experience of these superior judges, being put through this kind of humiliation, has been extremely degrading and demoralizing to the higher judiciary of Pakistan.

The reasons why the Pakistan Muslim League accords such high importance to this

particular issue are two. A, Mr. Nawaz Sharif believes that unless the action of the 3rd November is reversed, you could have this kind of action taking place in the future as well where the army chief could carry out this kind of an illegal action, without fear of any action being taken against him by the judiciary or the executive branch. And secondly, he feels that the major plank of his election platform contained in it the promise that he would bring the ousted judges back to their offices. And therefore he continues to lay strong store by this particular demand.

Mr. Asif Zardari, on the other hand, agrees that the judges have to be brought back, but he

is not as enthusiastic or as interested in a speedy restoration as Mr. Nawaz Sharif is. He believes that some of these judges who were ousted on 3rd November may not have as clean a record as is made out, that many of them had in the past also colluded or collaborated with the military regime, that

some of them had even agreed to be sworn into office in accordance with the changed constitutional provisions and therefore this should be part of a reform package wherein you have possibly a fresh terms of office for the judges of the supreme court, a revised age for their retirement, and possibly also a revised fixed tenure for the judges, as well as the chief justice.

Now, one of the last things that they did last week, about a week or 10 days ago, was to have

a session in Dubai (?) between Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Zardari, assisted by their close aides, and as a result of that, they decided, or at least they announced, that these judges would be restored as a result of a resolution passed in the National Assembly and that this would be done in or around 12th May, which gave rise to a lot of optimism.

But thereafter again, some disturbing developments have taken place. One is the

announcement by the law minister that 12th May is not sacrosanct and that 12th May could possibly be extended. And at the same time, a committee of experts, of legal experts that had been set up by the two parties, one of its most important members, a former chief justice, Fakhruddin Ibrahim, decided to quit yesterday on the grounds that he felt that the other members, or at least some of the members, were not as determined in their approach to the restoration of the judges as he felt was necessary.

He has all along advocated that the 3rd November action was basically illegal, so ab initio, an

illegal action does not need to be legalized or to be amended by an act of parliament or by a constitutional change. An illegal action stands wrong ab initio and therefore all that is required to be done is either a resolution of the National Assembly, or the orders by the executive branch.

Another former law minister from the People’s Party Mr. Gillani has gone on television to

say that, as a lawyer of the supreme court, he’s convinced that the 3rd November action of the president was so very wrong and so very much against the spirit and law of the constitution that all it requires is a notification by the law ministry. We don’t know exactly – I’m not well versed to speak on this. But therein lies the current state of affairs.

Now, as regards the other issues raised by Frederic, let me tell you that one of the major

fallouts of the February 18th election was the fact that it repudiated the policies of General Musharraf. It rejected the claims of General Musharraf that it was he who stood between the country being taken over by radicals and extremists and that he was the one powerful factor that was preventing the country from being captured by the Taliban.

The reason why I state it is that the religious parties were virtually wiped out in the February

18th election. From having about 68 seats, they are down to about six in the National Assembly. And the party that has won, especially in the frontier, is a very moderate, mainstream, nationalist party of the Pashtuns, the ANP, that has very little to do with the religious agenda of the religious parties. In other places also, the religious parties have not fared well at all.

And therefore, that is something that has been welcomed by the people of Pakistan.

Because A, it rejects this kind of claim by General Musharraf, and B, it also proves the point that has continued to be made by many Pakistanis that the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis are moderate people, that their belief in Islam is something very personal, but they do not wish Islam to become an instrument for the political ambitions or the political agendas of individuals or political parties.

The other thing is that the election also demonstrated the fact that General Musharraf’s domestic policies were also rejected by the people of Pakistan and that arises from the fact that the political party aligned with him, that the political party that he had nurtured and nourished for the past many years, all their leaders were ousted and ousted in a massive rejection by the electorate of people who had been winning elections for the last 20 years. They were all ousted and they were ousted primarily because they were seen as being close allies of General Musharraf.

Then we come to the point as what happens with the war on terror, something that would

interest you very much. Now, on the war on terror, I want to tell you that the prime minister of Pakistan, as well as the foreign minister, they have issued a number of statements which I’m sure you have seen. The American delegation that turned up in Islamabad immediately after the elections, led by Mr. Negroponte and Mr. Baja (ph), they met Mr. Zardari, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, Mr. Gillani and the president as well.

One of the major problems with the war on terror as had been conducted by General

Musharraf was that it had come to be perceived as America’s war on terror because the war on terror had become an instrument for General Musharraf to perpetuate his authoritarian rule. And to this, the U.S., the Bush administration, made grievous errors by making General Musharraf the symbol of its support for the war on terror. He, in the many statements, in the many communiqués that had been issued by the various testimonies given before the House and the Senate, it would appear as if it was General Musharraf alone who was conducting the war on terror, that the rest of the Pakistanis were not involved in it. And if that was the case, then obviously, the people of Pakistan felt that this was neither their war nor to their advantage.

And people like us have always believed that while the end objective was the right objective,

meaning combating the terrorists, of combating the extremists, the manner in which it was conducted was wrong, because, A, the policies of General Musharraf did not enjoy legitimacy; B, they did not enjoy credibility, and C, they had absolutely no consensus amongst the political parties in Pakistan. At no point was the war on terror ever discussed in the National Assembly or the Senate. At no point was the cabinet of Pakistan, for whatever it was worth – (unintelligible) – was ever taken into confidence.

In fact, the ministers of that time now publicly claim that they didn’t even know what was

happening. They did not even know what amounts of money were coming in from the United States for this particular operation. And therefore, there was a serious disconnect between the people of Pakistan and the authoritarian regime.

Now there is growing consensus in Pakistan that terrorism has to be fought and the war on

terror must be maintained because that is for the good of Pakistan. But the methodology that is that to be used, the tactics that have to be adopted, have to be different. First of all, the elected government must make an effort to explain to the people of Pakistan why Pakistan needs to remain committed to the war on terror, number one.

Number two, this has to be debated in parliament and parliament has to be taken into

confidence after debate and discussion so that the people of Pakistan do get the impression that their elected representatives are with them. And the policy that will thereafter emerge from the National Assembly will, A, have credibility, B, will have legitimacy, and because it will have come as

a result of discussion and debate, it will be a consensus policy. And therefore, it can be implemented with far greater effectiveness and credibility.

And at the same time, there is another major difference that will take place whereas in the

past the emphasis, the overriding concern was the desire to place all your cards on the military operations. A civilian elected government will have to take military options only as one of the options and not the first option either. The first option will have to be political dialogue, political discussions, political embracement of these people living in the frontier, in the FATA, and in the border region.

Also, the government will have to undertake major economic programs. Economic

incentives will have to be created so that more people are made aware of the advantages of Pakistan being a partner of the United States in the global war on terror.

Thirdly, the third plank has to be social reforms. By social reforms, I mean more and more

schools have to be opened, more and more measures have to be taken to bring the moderates within the fold. And only after that, the fourth leg of this program can be military operations. The military operations cannot be the first action of any elected government in a democracy. And that is what the prime minister has made it very clear.

On this policy, there is consensus. There is consensus between the People’s Party and the

Muslim League and there is also consensus between the ANP, which is not only a coalition partner in the federal government as well as the most important party in the frontier government. And you have already read that the ANP has begun its own process of reaching out to the so-called radicals, to the extremists, in those areas.

The federal government also is trying to reach out to them. The aim is to bring in all those

who are not actually committed extremists, the so-called moderates, the people who may have been pushed out of the perimeters and had, by virtue of government pressure, become extremists, and thereby isolate and reduce the number of people who may actually be terrorists or genuine hard-core extremists.

And the economic incentives and the social reforms, the political dialogues, are all meant to

make the terrorists more and more isolated from the mainstream of political life of the country. That is the expectation of the government in Islamabad and I think all the coalition partners are on board on this particular program.

As regards foreign policy, I don’t think there will be any major changes. Why? Because

both Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif are committed to maintaining our existing good relations with the United States. The United States has been Pakistan’s major friend and ally over the years; even during periods when our relations have been disturbed, Pakistan and the United States have continued to work closely. And the global war on terror is certainly an issue that is close to the heart of most Pakistanis, except as I pointed out – and this is a very major difference. A global war on terror, in which Pakistan was a partner primarily to – primarily in order that an authoritarian regime would continue to perpetuate itself and thereby deny the people of Pakistan democracy and human rights was not something that the people of Pakistan were willing to countenance.

Therefore, I think the Bush administration and the various efforts that are underway in Congress and on the Hill to increase the economic package for Pakistan, things like the Democracy Bonus Senator Kerry or Senator Biden’s proposals, they have all evoked a lot of positive reaction in Pakistan. And many Pakistanis are very happy at the fact that there is growing realization that you can make friends in Pakistan in a far more – in a stronger manner by increasing the economic package, rather than placing all the money either for defense or for what is known as coalition support funds.

As regards relations with India, I said this last year as well, that President Musharraf opening

out to India and his pursuing the normalization process with India is one of the very few positive actions taken by the military dictator, because all these years elected civilian governments in Pakistan were very hesitant to reach out to India, not knowing as to how the military establishment would react to it. Benazir tried to do it with Rajiv Ghandi. Nawaz Sharif tried to do it with Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

And therefore, the composite dialogue process that has been underway between Pakistan

and India since January 2004, the fourth round of which got somewhat suspended because of the political crisis in Pakistan – is expected to be picked up at the end of this month, third week, when the Indian foreign secretary will be visiting Islamabad. We have a new foreign secretary now and I think the two officials will be able to wrap up the fourth round and initiate the fifth round.

Also, there is – the civilian government will warn India to respond to the core political issues

between Pakistan and India and enhance the agenda of normalization, which so far has remained confined to what we refer to as confidence-building measures, which are all wonderful, they have created the right ambience. They have created peace lobbies in both countries. But there is a growing feeling amongst Pakistanis that India needs to reciprocate as regards the many initiatives and gestures made by the Pakistani leaderships over the last three years, especially on issues where a lot of progress has already taken place. And I am referring here to – (unintelligible) – on which I am told that a lot of work has taken place. I am also told, I am not privy to it, that talks in Kashmir had also made considerable progress. If so, then, of course, there is a need for them to sit together and demonstrate by the decisions that both are actually vetted to a political resolution of the Kashmir problem that meets with the aspiration of the people of that part of the world.

As regards relations with China, Frederic, I see no major change. I was in China early in

April last month, I had gone for the Boao (sp) Economic Conference, but I must clarify, I was not part of the president’s delegation. A lot of people were somewhat confused by my presence there. And I was told by the Chinese leaders that they are very satisfied with their relations with Pakistan. Relations are progressing very well. They are moving into other sectors. The Pakistan government has invited them to join the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project. And if China can be included into it, it will be a major initiative that will strengthen economic cooperation in the region. The Chinese continue to be involved in major projects in Pakistan and the Chinese continue to look at Pakistan as a major strategic partner of theirs.

So to sum up, ladies and gentlemen, I would say that Pakistan has made a lot of progress in

the last few months. We have moved away from a military dictatorship wherein the army chief was in command of the situation. We now have a genuinely elected parliament, a genuinely elected prime minister who enjoys confidence of the people of Pakistan, as represented, as enunciated by their elected representative parliament.

They have a difficult agenda ahead of them. Why? Because contrary to the glowing report

that was being given by the World Bank and the IMF all these seven years, in fact, the economic policies have been disastrous. The country faces not only energy shortages, it faces food shortages. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, there literally is no flour, bread. And unless we all go back to what Marie Antoinette said, the people of Pakistan are all going to starve unless you can get assured sources of wheat. And the Shaukat Aziz government committed the criminal act of selling wheat that the country had at low prices and thereafter buying wheat at higher prices because both in the selling and the buying process, they were able to make a cool profit of their own.

As regards energy, our oil bill has shot up from $4 billion to anywhere between $9 (billion)

and $13 billion. The trade deficit has shot up from $5 billion to something like $18 billion. And therefore, the elected government is really being given an unenviable task. Imagine immediately after coming to power, one of the first things they have had to do was to raise the oil prices on two occasions. Why? Because in the last one year, the Shaukat Aziz government did not raise the oil prices and the interim government, which was actually an extension of the Shaukat Aziz government did not do so either for electoral purposes. So they have had to do it and there has been an outcry.

The government was expecting increasing subsidy, instead – the people were expecting

increasing subsidy. The government will have to reduce the subsidy. The people were expecting greater allocation for developmental funds, for the social sector, for health education. But there is no money in the kitty at all. And I am amazing as to how any of these credible international institutions should have continued for the last seven years to say that Pakistan was an economic miracle, and suddenly after the elections their representatives are now saying, oh yes, we made a horrible mistake, in fact, the government was making many mistakes and many of their policies were wrong.

Whatever it is, I think energy is a major problem. Food is a major problem. The budget

deficit is a major problem. Growing trade deficit is a major problem. And therefore, this elected government requires massive infusion of aid and assistance, whether it comes from the United States or whether it comes from traditional friends in the Gulf or China, I don’t know. But in order to sustain a democratic elected dispensation, all those who believe that democracy is the right thing for a country like Pakistan I think need to step up and do so and I repeat in that context the initiative taken by Senator Biden is welcome. I hope the administration, too, will show its belief in a genuine democratic dispensation and also increase its budget allocation for Pakistan as regards economic aid and assistance is concerned.

There is appreciation in Pakistan for the manner in which the Bush administration had urged

the elections to take place free and fair, but at the same time, the expectation is that the Bush administration will recognize the results of the election, which amount not only to a rejection of the policies of the previous government, but also to a repudiation of the authoritarian nature of the Musharraf regime. The Bush administration should step out and come out forcefully, vigorously, and publicly in support of a democratic dispensation in Pakistan. Thank you all, ladies and gentlemen.

(Applause.)

MR. GRARE: Thank you very much, Ambassador Fatemi, for a very broad review and for also reminding us of some realities of Pakistan of today. I think that the fact that this regime has been praised for so long for its economic reform and for its good government as compared to previous civil regimes and the fact that the coffers are empty today speaks volumes of the reality of our perception of this country. With those words, we are now going to start the question and answer session. I’ll just ask you as usual to briefly introduce yourself and ask your question. Because we have a slight audio problem, Ambassador Fatemi will speak from the podium, but we’ll just move on as usual. Sir, please. Okay, just ask your question because the mike – Q: (Off mike) – sir, it was a great and educational and informative – (off mike) – my quick question is that do you feel that Mr. Zardari is some kind of under pressure from the U.S. or from General Musharraf maybe as far as the restoration of those judges? And also whatever you said about the FATA or the – (off mike) – area about the war on terrorism which U.S. is more interested in this issue, how the new government will act or react. Whatever you said on that, how the new government will be helpful to the U.S. because you have already signed agreement, I think it has already now failed or is not going anywhere. And finally, what you were saying that the message is that the Bush administration come out forcefully to help the Pakistan democracy work out. They have been there. What message that you have been taking from them? What they want from you? I mean, you know what you want, but they want from you. And finally, who are you meeting here in the administration to make the case that democracy must work out and dictatorship must go? AMB. FATEMI: Well, you have asked so many questions – (laughter) – really. But I’ll try to be very brief because so many of the other ladies and gentlemen. I don’t know the pressures on Mr. Zardari. I do know that he remains committed to the restoration of the judges. The difference is as regards the methodology for the restoration, whether they should be done separately from the issue of the reform of the judiciary or whether it should be one package. Mr. Nawaz Sharif believes that since the reform package is something that needs to be debated and discussed over weeks and months, that is something that can be done as a step two.

But in step one, the ousted judges must come back because the return of the ousted judges has become a litmus test for whether General Musharraf continues to enjoy the authoritarian powers that he had assumed as a result of the 3rd November illegal, unconstitutional – which, incidentally, let me tell you, whether it was a Freudian slip I don’t know, but in one of the TV interviews, he actually acknowledged that it was an illegal and unconstitutional measure. But I presume as an army chief, he felt that he was above the law and he could take such an action.

Now, your second question was regarding the FATA. I have told you that there is a major

difference. A democratic government cannot undertake actions that are totally divorced from the perception of the people of the country. It has to carry them along. And in any case, I believe that a policy that enjoys the support of the people of Pakistan is, A, credible and more effective and, B, it is more effective because all these years, General Musharraf used any number of gun – (unintelligible) – any number of army troops and yet they did not succeed. If anything, all the reports emanating from Washington including the national intelligence reports, indicate that the terrorists may have succeeded in regrouping, may have succeeded, in fact, in turning that area into what they describe, quote, unquote, as the epicenter of global terrorism. I don’t know if this is true or not, but that is the claim.

Now, the elected government feels that having carried out that particular policy for all these years, let us now try another set of policies in which there is an effort to isolate the hard-core terrorists and bring back people who may have been forced by circumstances or lack of education or propaganda to have gone and joined them. And once you are able to isolate those people, it may be easier to carry out the military operation. It is wrong to say that the agreement has failed. It is very much in the initial stages. Government emissaries are going out and trying to explain that this is a major shift, that in the driving seat is now the civilian elected government. And if it is going to make a promise, that promise will be kept. That’s two.

What was your third, because at my age, I tend to get lost? Q: What final message you have –

AMB. FATEMI: Yes, my final message is the same. My final message, yes. My final message is that the administration has to shift towards allocating greater sums of money for economic development in Pakistan. And I said so. What more could I say when I said that Senator Biden’s proposal is an eminently good proposal. I am no there to tell them how to go about it. But that is something that has had a good impact in Pakistan because, A, it recognizes that a country needs assistance and, B, it recognizes the fact that the democratic government will have to do more for the people if democracy is to be sustained.

And I will be meeting friends. I have friends I have been – you know, I’ve been visiting this country and coming here since 1974. So I’ll be going around and my message will be Pakistan is a country of 160 million people, it is located in an extremely critical and sensitive part of the globe, it’s not only a question of the global war on terror, Pakistan at any time is an important country, and a democratic polity can be a far better and reliable friend of the United States than an authoritarian military regime. Sir.

Q: (Off mike) – from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I wonder if I could

turn to the last part of your presentation when you talked about the series of things – the difficulties the National Assembly have to confront and I wonder if you could elaborate a bit more concretely what the plans of the government are to address these issues. You mentioned education, health, food, energy, budget deficit, inflation. You left off provincial autonomy and corruption, but you could add those to the list.

It seems that the question is quite general with respect to any of these topics. And I realize

there’s a honeymoon period for this new government, but that honeymoon period doesn’t go on indefinitely until these very basic issues have to be addressed. But there hasn’t so far, at least I haven’t seen, any concrete discussions of what government policy in any of these areas is going to be. And Senator Biden’s proposal of $1.5 billion, where do you begin to match the trade deficit that you were talking about. So the government obviously has to come up with some sort of plan for these things on its own, rather than just wait for others to come in and provide the funds for this. I wonder if you could take any of these areas and talk a bit more concretely about what you think the government approach would be in dealing with that.

AMB. FATEMI: I think you have raised very legitimate concerns. Those are concerns that

have been expressed by people like me and by so many other people in the media. Regrettably, this whole issue of the restoration of the judges has come to cloud the political and economic life of the

country. And that is why a lot of people are urging that this needs to be resolved one way or the other and for government to start actually functioning.

In fact, the Muslim League, Nawaz’s ministers continue to work under the apprehension of

fear, that if the restoration of the judges does not take place, what will actually happen to the coalition? So far Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Zardari have demonstrated tremendous political maturity by refusing to bring the situation to a state of confrontation or to the brink, yes.

But Mr. Nawaz Sharif is totally committed – I want to tell you this, there should be no

ambiguity in his position that he will not be able to continue with the coalition unless the issue of the restoration is resolved to the satisfaction of his political party. Yes, he’s already made compromises by extending the period and by agreeing to a number of modifications to the original idea. And I hinted at them when I said this concerns the age of the judges, this concerns the tenor of the judges, this concerns the manner in which they will be brought in and the old ones will be detained. Originally, they were not meant to be detained.

But this nevertheless continues to influence the functioning of the government. The

government is very much in the midst of preparing its budget. You know, in Pakistan the budgetary year starts from the 1st of July and the budget has to be presented to the National Assembly in May, this month, for them to debate and discuss and then approve it. Fortunately, we have a skillful finance minister who had this job earlier on and he knows what he’s talking about.

But the reality is that so far, they have not – and you are absolutely right – they have not

come up with details of what they intend to do on these fronts. How are they planning to meet the massive growing trade deficit. Yes, on the energy front, they are expecting some kind of easing of terms as regards Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states which have assisted us in the past well. That’s true. When the president went there, he was asked by the prime minister if he could ask the Chinese to step in with some kind of assistance and they have come in with $500 billion of loan. That is the – (unintelligible) – these are all drops in the ocean.

When Mr. Solana came and visited the prime minister and met the other leaders, all of them

asked the European Union to agree to greater market access so that Pakistan could expand its trade into the European Union, which as Fred said, is Pakistan’s largest trading partner. And so that would permit Pakistani exports to be boosted.

But yes, you are very right, and this has been a major inability of the government to

pronounce, at least publicly, how they wish to go about these issues which are major issues. But I fear that unless the judges are restored, you will not see the cabinet working with the vigor and energy that needs to be done. The energy bill, nobody expected it and with each passing day, the oil prices have been going through the roof, which means that a larger sum of money will have to be allocated by Pakistan. I think there is a possibility that the prime minister will be visiting Saudi Arabia and the other major political leaders are also going there. And if the Saudis come in with oil subsidies or oil at concessional rates, that could be one help.

But the elected government realizes that they need to give greater sums of money for

education, for health. But there really is no money in the kitty. It’s as simple as that. MR. GRARE: Please.

Q: Ambassador, good afternoon. Edward Joseph with Johns Hopkins SAIS. Sir, you

mentioned that with respect to negotiating with militants and the approach on terrorism – (off mike). I understand from someone else who’s well informed about developments in your country that, in fact, there is not consensus, that the army and ANP have quite a different approach on dealing with the militants and – (off mike) – is basically a rehash of what was going on in 2006. I wondered if you could address that consensus. Second, you know, of course, much of skepticism in Washington has to do with Afghanistan.

AMB. FATEMI: Yeah. Q: And the concern is that this kind of a deal might, in the short run, in the short term, be

beneficial for Pakistan’s internal security, but at the expense of Afghanistan security. In other words, that it will be – (off mike) – where – (off mike) – turn a blind eye – (off mike) – operation in Afghanistan. And I apologize – (off mike) – could you just dispense with the argument that one of the reasons that there’s a difference between PPP and – (off mike) – on this issue is a deal that was done with Musharraf to get Benazir back in the country that had to do with Zardari’s communities – just if you’ll address that. Is that at all related to this ambivalence in the – (off mike) – thank you.

AMB. FATEMI: Thank you. On the first issue, I am not aware of. You see, when you said

somebody who’s very well informed, I’m not well informed. I’m not part of this government, I want to tell you. I’m totally independent. (Laughter.) It is only today that Fred has bestowed on me the honor of being whatever it is, a major politic – foreign policy advisor to Nawaz Sharif. If Benazir had been alive, I would have also met her as an advisor.

You know, as a retired diplomat, our services our available. Of course, I worked with Mr.

Nawaz Sharif. I was with him when he was the prime minister and, of course, I have very good relations with him. But I am not a member of any political party nor am I associated with this government in any formal or informal way. So I cannot claim to be well informed.

Yes, I do continue to meet people, talk to them and so on. I am told that the army also

recognizes that the manner in which the war on terror was conducted by continuing to focus on military measures alone to the exclusion of dialogue, to the exclusion of economic incentives, and political enfranchisement, has not succeeded. So they are quite prepared to attempt or to at least try at another method. That’s what I’m told.

And General Kiyani, according to all accounts, is a very intelligent professional soldier. And

he knows the kind of beating that the Pakistan has received. By beating, I’m not talking of physical beating, but in terms of credibility, in terms of image, in terms of the popular acceptance. From being one of the most respected institutions, to an institution that came to be ridiculed, especially in certain parts of the country. He recognizes that a lot of damage was caused by the army’s involvement with an authoritarian regime over the last many years. And he wishes to end that kind of an association, which is all to the good.

So it may be true that your well-informed friend tells you there’s a difference. I’m told that

they have told the ANP and they have told the politicians that you have every right to pursue another policy closely, in close association with us. As to whether – what impact it will have on Afghanistan, there is no such desire in Pakistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan are tied together literally

by an umbilical cord. There is no way that you can have an operation in Pakistan without it having a fallout in Afghanistan and vice versa.

But in Afghanistan also I am told by the Afghans who I meet that the Karzai government –

they may not wish to say so – is trying to reach out, that they have been speaking to the Taliban, that not all Taliban in Afghanistan are considered as al Qaeda, that all Taliban are all al Qaeda, and not all al Qaeda are Taliban, that a lot of Taliban may be Pashtun nationalists. And therefore if you can bring about – if you can take them out of the influence of the al Qaeda, it would strengthen the Karzai government and strengthen those who want to see the al Qaeda being eliminated.

As regards the third issue that you raised, yes, a lot of people are saying that because Mr.

Zardari returned as a result of an understanding with the Musharraf regime, which incidentally was promoted, some even say nurtured, by Washington, it is possible that he is hesitant. He is hesitant. But as a leader of a mainstream political party in Pakistan, he recognizes that the issue of the return of the ousted judges has become actually a litmus test for the vitality of the politicians to the cause of democracy. And there is only so much wiggle space that they have, that they cannot continue to dilly dally on it and eventually, yes, there will be compromises, yes, there will be some give and take, but the ousted judges will have to be brought back.

MR. GRARE: Before we go to the next question, can we come back for a second on the

provincial issue. Before talking about any constitutional amendment or of the ’73 constitution or any return to the ’73 constitution regarding this issue, there is a very, very pressing problem in Balochistan. Is there a complete unanimity between the coalition members on the way the problem should be solved and, if so, what will actually be done?

AMB. FATEMI: On the issue of provincial autonomy, let me tell you that both the People’s

Party and the Muslim League are committed under the charter of democracy signed in London, in the summer of 2006, that the provinces must actually enjoy the autonomy that was envisaged to them in the ’73 constitution. And in his opening speech to parliament, Prime Minister Gillani did reiterate that commitment.

And please don’t forget that the People’s Party’s strength is in Sindh and Sindh is one of

those provinces that has been most vocal in support of provincial autonomy. Also, even in Punjab, even where the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz is primarily based, they too are supportive of this. And there is growing recognition in Pakistan that since Pakistan is a federation and since there are four federating units to this country, not only is it required because of efficiency of governance, but also because in order to ensure that the polity is one that is fair and which creates a feeling of belongingness, a stakeholders amongst the people of Pakistan.

You see, one of the most regrettable actions of the Musharraf regime was to push these

provinces, especially Balochistan to a very large extent, Sindh also to some extent, wherein there was growing impression that they did not matter as far as Pakistan is concerned. The callousness and the brutality with which people like Mr. Bugti, Sardar Bugti, and Baloch nationalists were treated by Islamabad was deeply reprehensible. And it gave succor and support and sustenance to elements that actually wished to no longer stay within the fold of Pakistan.

Now, if you want to have a country that is truly a democracy and a federal democracy, then the only recourse is to ensure that the ’73 constitution that did provide for provincial autonomy is honored, though belatedly.

MR. GRARE: Please, sir, in the back and then we’ll come back you, madam. Q: Thank you. My name is Tom Olson. Sir, if I may take advantage of your disclaimer that

you made before. Meaning absolutely no disrespect to Ms. Bhutto, I’m wondering about how long her shadow might be on the political terms. This is a coalition that has a lot of ground for working together, but it’s sort of an uncomfortable alliance. I can foresee or envision that her shadow might extend quite a ways into their deliberations and become a point of contention. Do you see that type of potential?

AMB. FATEMI: Any coalition is a difficult coalition, even when President Pompidou tried

it out, you remember, in France with Prime Minister Chirac. It’s always this co-habitation, they used to call it, is never one that is very smooth. And certainly in the case of Pakistan, this is a totally new experience, wherein you have two historic rivals joined together. But there is – at least seemingly, there is a recognition in both that either they work together or they sink together, because we have had so many military interventions that they have totally destroyed the character of the country. And that is why Benazir and Nawaz Sharif were able to sign the charter of democracy in London and that is why Mr. Asif Zardari was able to step in so very quickly into the shoes of the People’s Party leadership.

And so far, I at least cannot fault him. He has shown tremendous maturity. He has shown a

sense of responsibility and restraint that is admirable. Yes, he’s working under constraint. Yes, it is true that he has to establish his own credentials within his party. A lot of people believe that it has just fallen into his lap, that he had not – that he wasn’t deserving, that there were other people who were deserving. All those issues are there. But he remains committed to the goal of keeping the coalition going.

Benazir was a larger-than-life figure. I mean, she was absolutely one of the most fascinating

people, at least I came across. And I had the honor and a privilege of conducting her first state visit to the United States way back in ’89. And she was a media star. I mean, you know, I was told by people in the administration that they never had that kind of response to any foreign visitor that they had when Benazir came to town. There was not even standing room in Congress when she was addressing the joint session. I was present; I was a witness to it.

In Pakistan also, she was an electrifying figure. People were willing to give their lives for her.

And therefore, her shadow will continue to be there. But if that shadow can be used as a catalytic agent by forces of democracy to continue pushing towards making this coalition work, I have no problem with that shadow.

Q: If I may follow up, I guess I didn’t make myself clear. I meant sort of the opposite, that

the people using her memory to justify various things that then cause conflict.. AMB. FATEMI: I really don’t know how they will be using or misusing. I don’t know.

You see, in our part of the world, people do become larger after their death than they were alive. And that has happened in India, in Pakistan, in Bangladesh, in Sri Lanka; in all these countries, it is

true. And because she was such a magnetic figure, obviously there’ll be and there will be some effort to misuse her name and image and everything. But I do not see evidence of that so far.

MR. GRARE: Madam, please. Yes, please. Q: (Off mike) – from Bloomberg News. Have you seen any sort of shift in the Bush

administration policy in recent months and, if so, what evidence do you see? A shift from a purely sort of or primarily military focus?

AMB. FATEMI: I don’t know. I just came in over the weekend. I have been here less than

24 hours. (Chuckles.) Yeah, but – Q: (Off mike) – do you see any difference? AMB. FATEMI: Well, initially I did not and which surprised a lot of people in Pakistan, in

fact, disappointed many people in Pakistan because they expected that, you know, the Bush administration will give greater evidence, evidence that could be seen and heard, of the fact that they are recognizing the results of the February 18th election. I have not come across a more sweeping rejection through the electoral process of an authoritarian regime than that which took place on February the 18th. Giants of the Musharraf of the regime, they were toppled on that particular day. And people, you know, who had never, ever dreamt of it even in their worst moments.

And what did it represent? It represented a rejection of Musharraf. It represented a rejection

of the policies of Musharraf as regards the war on terror. And that is why I want you to note that the war on terror will have to be conducted in totally a different manner because no elected government can sustain that policy. No elected government can permit a foreign power to come and to the kinds of things that the Musharraf regime permitted the United States to do. It’s not possible. It will – it just cannot happen.

And therefore, the United States has to take the democratic government into confidence and

be a partner of it in a common objective. That common objective being the war on terror, that unilateral approach to doing things, I’m sorry, Islamabad will not find it possible to support that kind of a policy.

I’m told that Mr. Negroponte in his remarks a day or two ago, I just – in fact, I saw this

morning in the newspaper, a very brief report that he said that, in fact, whenever the Bush administration spoke of Musharraf, they really meant the people of Pakistan, which is news to me. I didn’t know of that. In fact, I didn’t know that in political science you can never consider 160 million people as dispensable or indispensable. I really don’t know. But these are things that I will have to decipher over the coming days that I’ll be in Washington when I talk to these people. But I do know that in one of his testimonies, Mr. Negroponte spoke of General Musharraf 11 times and with great deal of love and affection. (Laughter.) Which did not help either Mr. Musharraf or his cohorts in Pakistan.

MR. GRARE: Sir, over there, in the back. Q: Oh, go ahead.

MR. GRARE: Yes, please. Q: (Off mike) – with the Christian Science Monitor. I wonder if you could elaborate a bit

on two things. The U.S. still remains concerned about the idea of negotiating with militants and that, as you say, is kind of perhaps the new way forward. I wonder how you see that piece of disagreement between the two countries playing out. But also, what is the perception of the U.S. military’s current support for the frontier corps, and how is that – what is the perception – (off mike) – about that role.

AMB. FATEMI: The second part is easier because any support that the U.S. provides in

terms of military training, in terms of equipment, in terms of technology, there is no problem. The problem arose, as I stated earlier, because of the belief amongst the people of Pakistan that the American support was sustaining an authoritarian regime and the global war on terror, the cooperation on it, was the instrument to keep this regime in power.

Now, if an arrangement is entered into with an elected government, it will be a totally

different thing altogether. And a policy – I think the Bush administration will – and the Gillani government will be able to agree on the modalities of how the war on terror is to be pursued. I think Washington will gradually recognize that it is no longer possible for a single person in Pakistan to determine what the policies should be, that Islamabad should be given the space and the opportunities of discussing, debating, and finalizing an agreement, because such an agreement will be more credible and more effective.

MR. GRARE: Madam in the back and then you, sir. Q: Thank you. Paula Stern. I’d like to go back to a point that you made earlier about the

economic difficulties facing Pakistan and how you see the new coalition government dealing with this problem. I know that you answered – one of the questions at the very end said Saudi Arabia might come forward with regards to, I presume more than just fuel, but perhaps – I would like you elaborate on that. But further, I would like you to give us some indication of what you expect the new government – coalition government will provide with regard to encouraging non-government flows of funds into Pakistan, and that is private investment, private foreign investment. I understand your comments about Senator Biden’s initiative, but that is a government fund, short term and really is not sustainable. So I’m wondering if you could just give us some indication how important Western business and Western foreign investment is and how much the new government wants to attract that kind of investment.

AMB. FATEMI: First of all, I have to point out to you that in the past year, foreign

investment in Pakistan fell. Very little came to Pakistan, primarily because of the very uncertain political situation in Pakistan. So the government will have to undertake this measure afresh. Since I mentioned Saudi Arabia without concrete evidence of any such action being taken, primarily because the Saudis and the Kuwaitis and the UAE, they are Pakistan’s traditional friends. And also because the Pakistani political leadership has very good contacts with the ruling families in these countries. Benazir, Asif Zardari, Nawaz Sharif, all of them have excellent relations; Nawaz Sharif, in particular, has excellent relations with King Abdullah.

And these countries believe that having a strong, stable, prosperous Pakistan is to their good.

And that is why I expect both government funds as well as private investment to come in.

Incidentally, I may point out there has been very little historically investment from the United States going into Pakistan in the first place. This is a fact. In fact, even in the last five, six years, it is the UAE and Saudis and the Gulf states that have been the most important investors in Pakistan in the private sector and also as regards government assistance. That needs to be enhanced.

And as I was coming, I was told that more delegations of these people will be going into

these capitals in order to drum up support and possibly flow fresh funds, you know, S.R. funds and short-term bonds and such things to generate money. But I don’t want to belabor the point, but I really think that they have not focused as much on the economic issues as they should have done because they all appear to be focused on this one political issue.

MR. GRARE: Sir. Q: Ambassador, I’m – (off mike) – with Voice of America. My question I wanted to ask

you, there was a suicide bombing today in the NWFP, killing at least three people, and there seems to be some growing concerns on the ground that the ceasefire between the government and the militants in the region may be breaking down. There was also a separate attack in Swat today where police say gunmen attacked two policemen who were guarding a bank and killed them. The attack in NWFP is the second of its time since the new coalition government began talks with the militants led by the Talat Masood, who declared the ceasefire, but then said just last week that there can be no deal unless Pakistan withdraws troops, the 120,000 troops it has in the area. Are you concerned that the ceasefire may be, in fact, breaking down, and wouldn’t that make it much more difficult to negotiate a peace arrangement if the violence returns. I was in Pakistan for the month of February and that run-up to the election was an extremely difficult time for the people there and it created an environment, one would think, that would make it much more difficult to include a peace deal.

AMB. FATEMI: My view is that you will continue to see these ups and downs, that just

because the government has initiated dialogue with the militants or with the radical elements does not mean that there’ll be a return to total normalcy. But I was told by the government that the number of suicide bomb attacks, that the number of violent actions has come down sharply, as compared to the quarter of last year and the quarter of this year, and especially after the elections and the establishment of an elected government.

The insurgents have been far fewer and that is something good. Yes, it is true that the

militants, according to some people, are waiting to see what actually – what policies Islamabad will frame and how they will go about it. But if anyone can talk to them, it is the ANP people in the frontier because of their ethnicity, because of their political policies, because of the relationship that they have with many of these people and the fact that they are from that area. And they enjoy a certain degree of credibility.

I also want to tell you that it is very interesting that in Swat, one of the ANP young men was

able to defeat the leader of one of the religious parties in an area that had been considered a stronghold of the radicals. In an election, he was defeated by a young person who did not even look like a mullah, did not dress like a mullah, and did not speak the language of the mullahs. So that is the kind of support or lack of support that the religious parties have in that area and I think over a period of time, I would be quite willing to give them more time and more opportunity to pursue the dialogue process, because you have tried the other process, so what other option is left with us, other than to bring them back within the fold?

Q: Could I follow up? AMB. FATEMI: Please. Q: I believe you said that the newly elected government cannot permit the United States to

do the kinds of things it was doing under Mr. Musharraf. I think I know what you mean, but I’m not 100 percent sure, so could you tell us what you think the United States was doing that was so improper and what must be stopped by the new government?

AMB. FATEMI: I think you know the answer to that better than I do. And we shall leave it

at that. All I want to tell you is that it is not possible for any elected government to permit a foreign power to undertake actions in which there is no unanimity of views between the two sides.

MR. GRARE: Sir, please. Q: Thank you. (Off mike) – from American University and Middlebury College. One of

the interesting aspects from the past year, not only the continued U.S. support for President Musharraf, but the very different attitude toward the two opposition leaders as the crisis unfolded. An embrace of the late Benazir Bhutto, support for her return to Pakistan, support for her joining the government, whereas the attitude for Mr. Nawaz Sharif was quite different, indifference at best to his return, seeming not very enthusiastic about his involvement in Pakistani politics. Why do you think this was the case and does it have any impact today on Mr. Nawaz Sharif or the government’s attitude?

AMB. FATEMI: If given the choice to embrace, who would you embrace, Benazir or

Nawaz Sharif? (Laughter.) Q: I meant that symbolically. (Laughter.) AMB. FATEMI: I think that Nawaz Sharif – that Benazir had certain advantages that

Nawaz Sharif did not have. She was a female, educated in the United States, she had lots of friends in this country. She was very articulate, she was very – she was a very, very fascinating personality. But if the Americans were of the view that Nawaz Sharif was a radical Muslim, I think it’s a mistake. Nawaz Sharif, during his two tenures, two terms of office, had excellent relations with Washington, especially in the second term, to which I was a witness. He had extremely cordial relations with President Clinton. In fact, that relationship has continued to prosper till today.

As regards his policies on the economic front, I do remember that Mr. – (inaudible) –

actually asking Nawaz Sharif whether he could send a delegation from Delhi to be led by a gentleman by the name of Manmohan Singh to come to Islamabad and actually study Pakistan’s economic reforms, because he’s the one who opened up the economy, he’s the one who brought in foreign investment, he’s the one who introduced privatization to the country. He is, according to all accounts, a middle-of-the-road, urban, born and brought up Pakistani politician.

Those who may have feared that he is very religious would be right, but his religion is

something very personal to him. He has never tried to espouse religious policies within the country. I think he’s a moderate politician from all I know. The Bush administration may have felt more

comfortable with Benazir because they knew her better and she had more friends here, but once they get to know Nawaz Sharif better, I think their attitude will change. And Nawaz Sharif, during the last few months, has demonstrated by the manner in which he has continued to provide strength to this coalition, that he really wishes this democratic dispensation to prosper. So I think those misgivings will be removed with passage of time.

MR. GRARE: We have time for one last question. I’m sure that Mr. – (inaudible) – will be

a good one, so please, sir. (Chuckles.) Q: You know, I have tried, but I have not had any success in getting this confirmed, but, of

course, such things are never easy to confirm, but I believe there is an American dimension to the judges issue, the dimension being as follows. That when the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhary started putting a heads-up intelligence agencies and similar high officials on the – (off mike) – and saying, produce the disappeared ones, what has happened to these Pakistani citizens, there were lots of Pakistani citizens allegedly were captured and passed on, either handed over to the Americans, some sent to – (off mike) – some sent to Gitmo, others probably tortured here, nobody knows. And there was tremendous pressure from here to put an end to this because the moment these are the skeletons in the cupboard, it comes out, it hurts the administration here, it hurts the government there, it hurts the army. Have you heard any – have you heard this? Have you heard any parts of this?

AMB. FATEMI: Having known you, Halisaya (ph) for 30 years, I always knew that you

were the best informed. So what you say cannot be dismissed and there is great deal of credence to what you have just stated. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary must be a person of great strength and integrity. He was certainly not a good politician because he appeared to have stepped on every toe. You have just spoken of the American toe. He stepped on Musharraf’s toe because the uniform issue was there. He stepped on Shaukat Aziz’s toe because the millions that Shaukat Aziz had allegedly stolen or made from various scams in the country was coming up for investigation. He stepped on the toes of very influential people in Pakistan because he started investigating the housing societies.

So you know, he was one of those persons who wasn’t liked in Pakistan, except by people

like you and me who didn’t have anything to lose possibly. So I really don’t know what exactly it is, but yes a lot of people do refer to this fact that the disappearance cases, which became a highly emotional issue in Pakistan, and something that really ate into the vitals of the Pakistani psyche may have been upsetting for Washington.

But his restoration is now absolutely essential for the coalition to survive because Mr. Nawaz

Sharif is publicly and privately committed to that. He believes that if you do not bring the judges back into office, no future supreme court, no future chief justice of Pakistan will be able to stand up to a military ruler and we will continue to have the kind of actions that have been taken in the past, meaning a military takeover, which is then sanctified by a supreme court.

So one of the ways to bring an end to that is to bring the judges back. Thank you all, ladies

and gentlemen. I am most grateful. (Applause.)

MR. GRARE: Thank you, ambassador. Thank you very much for both a brilliant presentation and a superb overview. Before we part, let me just announce that on Thursday afternoon, we will have Ambassador Vendrell, the special representative of the European Union, coming to speak about the situation in Afghanistan, and next Monday, 12 May, we will have Dr. William Maley (ph), from Australian National University to also address the issue of Balochistan. With – (inaudible) – let me thank again, on behalf of all of us, Ambassador Fatemi and a good afternoon to all of you.

(END)