Mobilization and the Mail: Voter Turnout and theExpansion of the U.S. Postal Service, 1876-1896∗

Jon C. Rogowski†Washington University in St. Louis

January 16, 2016

Abstract

Patronage politics and high voter turnout are two de�ning political characteristics of theGilded Age. To what extent were these features related? The Post O�ce Department wasthe most important source of patronage positions during this period, and anecdotal evidencesuggests local post o�ces were often used to serve the political goals of local parties. I sub-ject this account to empirical scrutiny using a new dataset on the distribution of county-levelpost o�ces from 1876 to 1896. Overall, I �nd that the provision of post o�ces yielded smallbut persistent increases in voter turnout rates, with the potential to in�uence the outcomesof substantial numbers of state and federal elections. The �ndings presented in this paperraise important questions about the relationship between the politics of state-building at thenational level and electoral politics at the local level and suggest one explanation for how thecontrol of patronage bene�tted political parties.

This is a preliminary draft prepared for presentation at the 2016 meeting of theSouthern Political Science Association. Comments and criticisms are welcome.

∗I thank Alex Bluestone, Michael Byrne, Madeline Josel, Sophie Schuit, Joe Sutherland, and especially ChrisGibson for research assistance, and the O�ce of Undergraduate Research at Washington University in St. Louis forfunding. I also thank Cameron Blevins, Dan Carpenter, Justin Fox, Sandy Gordon, Je� Grynaviski, Richard John,Sam Kernell, Andrew Reeves, Wendy Schiller, and Charles Stewart for helpful discussion and comments.

†Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Campus Box 1063, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO63130; jrogowski@wustl.edu.

The expansion of the American state during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era was one

of the most important developments in U.S. history. Scholars have argued that the transformation

of federal institutions and the development of altogether new ones during the latter half of the

nineteenth century produced a newly energized and e�cacious American state by the turn of the

twentieth century (e.g., Carpenter 2001; James 2000; Skowronek 1982). Though Congress was the

dominant American political institution during this time period (e.g., Jacobson 1987; Kernell and

McDonald 1999), these institutional transformations were largely the product of the cultivation

of reputations and expertise within the bureaucracy (Carpenter 2001; Gailmard and Patty 2012;

Skowronek 1982). As a result, political decisionmaking with respect to the arms of the American

state often re�ected the incentives of executive branch personnel (Carpenter 2001; Gailmard and

Patty 2012; Whittington and Carpenter 2003). A related, and growing, body of scholarship stud-

ies the growth of the American state during this period through the lens of distributive politics

and examines how the patterns of development re�ected the electoral incentives of members of

Congress and the president

But the story of American statebuilding does not end there. At the macro level statebuilding

and the expansion of the bureaucracy certainly led to a more muscular national political appara-

tus by the early twentieth century. A more complete understanding of American statebuilding,

however, would also include an account of the e�ects of statebuilding at a more granular level.

Thus, while scholars have presented a number of explanations for how and why the American

state was built as it was, considerably less is known about the consequences of these decision-

making processes and statebuilding e�orts.

In this paper, I address this question by examining how the expansion of the national gov-

ernment created new opportunities for state and local political parties. Studying the growing

U.S. Post O�ce department between 1876 and 1896, I argue that local post o�ce locations were

important sources of political mobilization. In addition to distributing political information and

partisan �yers through the mail that were designed to mobilize local constituents, post o�ces

1

were community gathering centers which enabled local postmasters to forment personal rela-

tionships with residents. Because postal appointments were largely made on the basis of partisan

ties, the properties of local post o�ces provided prime opportunities for increasing voting rates

among local constituents.

Data on county-level voter turnout and the distribution of post o�ces from 1876 to 1896

provides support for this account. Using a county and year �xed e�ects design, I �nd that the

provision of additional post o�ces yielded small yet persistent increases in voter turnout. In-

creasing the number of post o�ces by one per thousand residents yielded an increase in voter

turnout of approximately one percentage point. The magnitude of the e�ect also increased with

the size of post o�ce locations. These results have important implications for theories of Amer-

ican political development and suggest that national politics played an important role in helping

craft networks of local and state party organizations.

Distributive Politics and the Expansion of theAmerican State

Parochial a�airs dominated national politics during the latter half of the nineteenth century

while controversial policy debates were generally left to the states. As Lowi (1972, 301) writes,

during this period “the federal government turned out little but land disposal programs, ship-

ping subsidies, tari�s, internal improvements, and the like.” These parochial a�airs and internal

improvements, however, were central to the expansion of the federal government during this

time period. Moreover, the national emphasis on internal improvements and state expansion was

driven at least in part by constituent demand and thus in�uenced patterns of congressional be-

havior. Bryce (1995 [1888], 197) observed that “[a]n ambitious congressman is therefore forced to

think day and night of his renomination” and attempts to secure it with “grants from the Federal

treasury for local purposes.” However, while “[d]istributive decisions may have been roughly

what the American people wanted, [the] details of such policies perpetually fueled con�ict” (Mc-

2

Cormick 1979, 286). Intense partisan and regional competition over the distribution and siting

of federal resources were closely connected with debates over the nature of institutional power

and the organization of political institutions. These debates resulted in institutional reforms to

the president’s removal powers, civil service, and the location of appropriations authority within

Congress (see, e.g., Bryce 1995 [1888]; Mashaw 2012; Schickler and Sides 2000; Stewart 1989).

The American government expanded its reach dramatically as a result of constituent and con-

gressional demand for federal resources. For instance, expenditures for rivers and harbors im-

provements, generally considered the quintessential pork barrel expenditure (see Ferejohn 1974;

Wilson 1986), increased dramatically over the late nineteenth century. Aggregate appropriations

from 1870 to 1880 increased from $3,975,900 to $8,976,500, and more than doubled again by 1883

to $18,743,875.1 Similarly, the size of the post o�ce doubled between 1876 and 1896, and increased

from approximately 35,000 locations to nearly 70,000. Post o�ce expenditures likewise comprised

an increasingly large portion of the domestic budget, increasing from approximately 10 percent

in 1876 to about 18 percent by 1895. These increases in state capacity similarly characterized

other agencies whose responsibilities were not primarily distributive in nature. For instance, by

the early part of the twentieth century, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, with its newly crafted

reputation for policy innovation and reliance on social scienti�c principles, “took its place as the

central representative organ of American agriculture” (Carpenter 2001, 291).

Though the vast majority of empirical evidence on distributive politics is produced from data

that covers the last thirty year period (e.g., Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; Christenson, Kriner

and Reeves 2016; Dynes and Huber 2015; Kriner and Reeves 2015a,b; Levitt and Snyder 1995;

Mebane and Wawro 2002; Stein and Bickers 1995), scholars have increasingly used the lens of

distributive politics to study the expansion of the American state. Recent research in this area

has used this approach to study the determinants of tari� rates (Lowande, Jenkins and Clarke1See “Veto of Rivers and Harbors Act,” August 1, 1882, Chester A. Arthur; transcript available at

http://millercenter.org/president/arthur/speeches/veto-of-river-and-harbors-act (accessed December 29, 2015).

3

2015), construction of federal buildings (Finocchiaro 2015), siting of post o�ce locations (Ro-

gowski 2015, 2016), and distribution of rivers and harbors projects (Wilson 1986). This emergent

body of scholarship generally focuses on how institutional arrangements may have conferred

disproportionate advantages to some communities over others. For instance, Lowande, Jenkins

and Clarke (2015) show that presidents used unilateral authority to protect industries concen-

trated among valuable constituencies, while Rogowski (2016) shows that counties represented by

copartisans of the president were disproportionate bene�ciaries of federal post o�ces.2

Despite the emphasis on distributive approaches to understanding statebuilding activities,

however, scholars have paid less attention to the consequences of state expansion. Research in the

contemporary era emphasizes how distributive good such as federal outlays and earmarks a�ect

congressional (Stein and Bickers 1994) and presidential (Kriner and Reeves 2012) elections, con-

stituent perceptions of elected o�cials (Grimmer 2013), and state economic performance (Levitt

and Poterba 1999). The e�ects of distributive decisions in earlier periods of American history,

however, have gone largely unexplored. One notable exception is research by Folke, Hirano and

Snyder (2011), who study the e�ects of patronage authority. Though not directly linked to the

argument presented in this paper, Folke, Hirano and Snyder (2011) demonstrate that state par-

ties used patronage appointments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to secure

subsequent electoral success. These patronage appointments often accompanied the provision of

projects such as post o�ces, postal routes, and rivers and harbors projects. Given the central-

ity of statebuilding activities for the political development of the U.S., identifying the political

e�ects of these activities has important implications for theories of the expansion of the federal

government.2In related work, Skocpol (1993) shows that decisions to provide pensions to military veterans and their families

were often driven by electoral concerns.

4

Statebuilding and the Opportunities for Political Parties

The expansion of the American state near the turn of the twentieth century created new

opportunities for political parties, o�ceholders, and entrepreneurs. The distribution of federal

resources into states and local communities was accompanied by job opportunities and valuable

federal contracts. But while these opportunities resulted largely from the work of federal o�-

cials in Washington, D.C., state and local political parties likely stood to wield the largest political

gains. Local political o�cials were likely to be familiar with eligible candidates and �rms for po-

litical appointments and contracts, respectively. The in�uence of state political parties, however,

waned near the end of the twentieth century, as progressive reforms such as the secret ballot and

civil service reform were implemented around the country and decreased the hold of state parties

over political o�cials (see, e.g., Primo and Snyder 2010). The arms of the expanding federal gov-

ernment o�ered appealing resources to state parties who sought to maintain their relevance and

importance. In particular, by providing resources that enabled the construction of a nationwide

party infrastructure, statebuilding activities could have played a pivotal role in transforming the

party system from the heavily fragmented and regional system in place for much of the nine-

teenth century to a national network that took hold in the early twentieth century.

Presidents were likely to have played an important part in the development of national party

networks. The federal bureaucracy became the repository of considerable expertise during the

late nineteenth century (Carpenter 2001; Gailmard and Patty 2012), and extant research identi-

�es bureaucratic expertise as an important advantage for presidents (e.g. Howell, Jackman and

Rogowski 2013). Presidents of this era were the putative agents of their parties (Galvin 2014;

Skowronek 1982) and as such may have been likely to work to achieve party goals. During the

late nineteenth centuries, presidents began to exercise leadership over (rather than in response

to) their parties (Galvin 2014) and was part of a broader pattern in which political parties be-

came nationalized (Klinghard 2010). The leadership presidents exercised during this time period

resembled what other scholars have identi�ed as party-building e�orts by presidents in the post-

5

World War II era. While presidents in this period had few of the formal tools available to their

successors, and though Congress has been considered the dominant American political institu-

tion in the nineteenth century (Jacobson 1987; Lowi 1972; Wilson 1885), their position as head of

the executive branch enabled them to accomplish one objective that neither Congress nor state

parties could achieve on their own: build national party networks.

Political Mobilization and the Post O�ce

I use the case of the federal postal service between 1876 and 1896 to study the foregoing

account. The expansion of the post o�ce during the late nineteenth century was both a clear

indicator of American statebuilding (Carpenter 2001; John 1995) and a case in which presidential

in�uence was an important factor in its trajectory (Rogowski 2015, 2016). Moreover, post o�ces

o�ered presidents prime opportunities for engaging in party-building activities. According to

Galvin (2010, 5), presidential party-building includes e�orts “to enhance the party’s capacity to

provide campaign services; develop human capital; recruit candidates; mobilize voters; �nance

party operations; and support internal activities.” I focus here particularly on the role of post

o�ces in mobilizing voters in national elections, which also would have been an important indi-

cator of the capacity of political parties to engage in campaign services.

Post o�ce locations were likely to be important sources of voter mobilization for several rea-

sons. First, local postal locations were run by postmasters with deep partisan ties. As Carpenter

(2001, 66) describes, “Presidents and parties appointed [postmasters] far less for service than for

electoral �delity.” Historians have detailed a variety of ways in which local postmasters used their

jobs to further party goals. “Appointed through political in�uence, [local postmasters] learned

the rules of the game quickly, knew what was expected of them, and understood that their sur-

vival depended not only on how well they handled Uncle Sam’s mail but also on how well they

handled voters; and in this many of them became adept,” Fuller (1972, 294) wrote. Post o�ce

locations served as local bases of political campaigns and party operations, and postmasters were

6

likely to have used their position to encourage local residents to vote.

Second, postmasters during these era generally were copartisans of the president and under-

stood that continued employment depended upon their party’s control of the White House. As

a consequence, not only did postmasters handle the mail in ways intended to advantage their

parties, but postal workers devoted much of their time to party work, rather than to postal ac-

tivities (Fowler 1943, 146). Fuller (1972, 296) further explained that “Postmasters were largely the

chairmen of ward, township, county, or district committees. They handled the mails with a view

to party advantage.” Upon assuming the presidency in 1885, Grover Cleveland complained that

Republicans used their vast network of local postmasters for electioneering purposes. Perhaps in

validation of Cleveland’s complaint, Kernell and McDonald (1999, 796) observed that local post-

masters often inserted campaign literature into local residents’ mail. In addition, regardless of

a local postmaster’s partisan proclivities, opening a local post o�ce location meant that com-

munity residents had increased and expanded mail access. Though research in the contemporary

period generally �nds relatively small e�ects of partisan mail on voter turnout (Gerber and Green

2000; Gerber, Green and Green 2003; Gerber and Green 2008), political communication distributed

through the mail may have had an important means of voter mobilization in this earlier period.

By having regular face-to-face interaction with residents, moreover, postmasters could have also

e�ectively increased turnout by reminding constituents of the upcoming election (on the e�ects

of interpersonal interaction, see, e.g., Gerber and Green 2000; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003;

Michaelson 2003; Niven 2004).

Third, local post o�ce locations were important community centers and modes of social inter-

action. Post o�ces were gathering places for and facilitated conversation among local residents.

These conversations could have included information about upcoming elections. In addition, both

through these conversations and the communications enabled through the mail, post o�ce loca-

tions could have increased social capital. Post o�ces likely created ties both within and between

communities and facilitated information exchange and embeddedness (Evans 1995), particularly

7

for weak ties which are useful for exchanging information and resources within or across com-

munities (Granovetter 1973). These increases in social capital and increased political discussion

(Leighley 1990; Sinclair 2013) could have been another contributor to increased turnout from

postal locations.

Finally, local postmasters could have increased voter turnout in several other more nuanced

ways. For instance, by establishing relationships with local residents, postmasters could have

applied social pressure to residents who may have otherwise been reluctant to vote. Because

voting was often a public a�air, especially before the introduction of the secret ballot, postmasters

may have been able to monitor which of their constituents turned out to vote (on the e�ect of

social pressure on turnout, see, e.g., Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008). Perhaps more nefariously,

local postmasters could also have been used as informants to local party operatives about which

local residents’ votes could be bought (for a discussion of party machines and turnout-buying, see,

e.g., Nichter 2008), in turn providing a mechanisms through which parties could closely monitor

participation levels at relatively granular levels.

Data and Methods

I evaluate the mobilizing e�ect of post o�ce provision using data on county-level voter

turnout from 1876 to 1896. The dependent variable is the percentage of votes cast divided by

the number of persons eligible to vote and is collected for each congressional election year dur-

ing this time period. These data were obtained from ICPSR Study #8611.3 The use of historical

elections data may raise concerns about the reliability of the �gures. For instance, the number of

votes cast could have been in�ated by fraudulant ballots, or the number of eligible voters could

have been measured with error due to issues with Census reliability. Engstrom (2012, 378-379)

provides a detailed discussion of these and other issues associated with this historical measure3Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zindale, Electoral Data for Counties in the United States:

Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840-1972.

8

of voter turnout. So long as overall levels of fraud were relatively low and errors in the Census

counts were not correlated with the provision of post o�ces, the resulting coe�cient estimates

should be relatively free of systematic bias.

Overall, turnout levels during this period were quite high. The average county turnout rate in

presidential years was 71.0 percent (SD=19.5) compared with 61.4 percent (SD=20.6) in midterm

election. Though county turnout rates varied from state to state due to factors such as election

timing and ballot format, turnout rates also varied substantially within states. Figure 1 shows

county turnout rates in Iowa from 1876 to 1896. Counties shaded with darker colors turned out

to vote at higher rates. Not only does the �gure show that turnout generally was higher during

presidential elections years than in midterm elections, but it also shows that turnout varied widely

across the state. For instance, in the 1876 presidential election, only 36.6 percent of eligible voters

cast ballots in Ida County in west-central Iowa compared with 97.1 percent of eligible voters in

Fayette County in the northeast corner of the state.4

The key independent variable in this analysis is drawn from a dataset on the number of post

o�ces per county from 1876 to 1896. The nineteenth-century post o�ce was “the only state

organization that interacted with all citizens” (Carpenter 2001, 66) and the most visible marker

of the American state in local communities (John 1995). Data on the county-level distribution of

post o�ces were obtained from the United States O�cial Postal Guide in even years from 1876

to 1896.5 In contrast with federal grants and outlays that could be distributed to counties yet

spent on projects that are unknown to or unused by local residents, the provision of post o�ce

locations is a clear and discrete indicator of federal intervention into local communities.

Figure 2 displays the distribution of the raw number of post o�ces over the entire time period.4Turnout �gures are missing for four counties in 1876, one county in 1878, one county in 1884, and four counties

in 1896.5However, guides could not be located for the years 1884 or 1888, and thus in their place we used information

from the guides published in January 1885 and January 1889, respectively. In addition, the �rst page of the listingsof post o�ces is missing from the only Postal Guide that could be located for 1876. Thus, data are missing for abouthalf of the counties in Alabama for that year.

9

Figure 1: Voter Turnout in Iowa Counties, 1876−1896

1876

1878

1880

1882

1884

1886

1888

1890

1892

1894

1896 Less than 50%50 to 60%60 to 70%70 to 80%80 to 90%More than 90%

Voter turnout �gures were obtained from ICSPR study #8611.

The post o�ce expanded dramatically post-Reconstruction, from approximately 36,000 post o�ce

locations in 1876 to more than 69,000 by 1896. Across the entire time period, the mean number

of post o�ces per county was just over 20, and the median county had 16. The county-level

distribution is positively skewed, however, owing largely to population di�erences; while each

county had at least one post o�ce, several counties had well over 100.

To generate a measure of the distribution of post o�ces that adjusts for population di�erences,

I divided the number of post o�ces by county population in thousands. County population data

were obtained from ICPSR study #2896 and were linearly interpolated for intercensal years.6 The

mean number of post o�ces per thousand residents was 1.4 and the median was 1.1.6Michael R. Haines, Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2002.

10

Figure 2: Distribution of Post O�ces in U.S. Counties, 1876−1896

0

250

500

750

1000

0 50 100 150 200Number of post offices

Obs

erva

tions

Distribution of County−Level Post Offices

Data on the number of post o�ces were obtained from the United States O�cial Postal Guides,various years.

Empirical Strategy

Based on the panel nature of the data, I estimate linear regressions with county and year

�xed e�ects. This design allows me to isolate the e�ects of post o�ce provision on voter turnout

while accounting for other time-invariant characteristics of counties, both observed and unob-

served, that also in�uenced turnout. The coe�cient estimates for the provision of post o�ces are

thus identi�ed with within-county changes in the values of this variable. Standard errors were

clustered on county.

Of course, the distribution of post o�ces is explained by other, potentially confounding, fac-

11

tors as well. Thus, I also estimate models with a broad set of control variables. First, though

the key independent variable characterizes the number of post o�ces per thousand residents,

sheer population di�erences may also account for variation in the provision of post o�ces. Thus,

I include a measure of county population (logged) in all models. Voter turnout may also have

depended on the degree of electoral competition at the county and state levels. I include State

presidential margin and County presidential margin that describe the margin of victory in the

last presidential election at the state and county levels, respectively. I also account for di�er-

ences in state party competitiveness using the di�erence in seat shares between Democrats and

Republicans in the lower chamber of the state legislature. Larger values of this variable indicate

states that more closely approximate one-party control. If voter turnout decreases with electoral

competitiveness, I expect the estimates for these three variables to be negatively signed.

Finally, following Engstrom (2012), I also account for important di�erences in election admin-

istration and ballot format. Many states held congressional elections prior or subsequent to the

Tuesday after the �rst Monday in November, and thus I include an indicator for O�-November

election. Many states also changed their ballot formats during the latter part of the nineteenth

century, and thus I distinguish states who used Party column and O�ce bloc ballots. These data

were obtained from and are described in greater detail in Engstrom (2012).

Results

I �rst estimated a simple regression of county-level turnout on the distribution of post o�ces

and county population, along with the year and county �xed e�ects. The results are shown below

in Table 1. The estimated coe�cient for the main independent variable is positive (0.98) and sta-

tistically signi�cant, indicating that the distribution of post o�ces signi�cantly increased voter

turnout. Each additional post o�ce per thousand residents increased turnout by approximately

one percentage point. The coe�cient for county population is also positive and signi�cant, indi-

12

cating that increases in population were associated with increased turnout.

The measures of electoral competitiveness were added to the model shown in column (2).

The coe�cient for the distribution of post o�ces is again positive and statistically signi�cant

(0.88) even while controlling for the competitiveness of the electoral environment. As one would

likely expect, each of the measures of competitiveness is negative and statistically signi�cant. The

coe�cient for state presidential competitiveness increases that a ten percentage point increase

in the state margin of victory decreased turnout by about 3.8 percentage points. The e�ect of

increased margins of victory in the county results in presidential elections was about one half

as large; a ten percentage point increase in the county margin of victory decreased turnout by

about 1.7 percentage points. Increased party dominance also decreased county-level turnout. As

the di�erence between the percentage of seats held by each party in the state legislature increased

by ten percentage points, county turnout decreased by 1.1 percentage points.

The results are nearly identical when accounting for the indicators of election timing and bal-

lot format, as column (3) shows. The coe�cient for post o�ce distribution is again positive (0.76)

and statistically signi�cant at p = .052. The coe�cients for population and electoral competitive-

ness are nearly identical to those shown in column (2). The coe�cients for election timing and

ballot format are similar to those reported in Engstrom (2012). County turnout was approximately

3 percentage points higher when the elections were held outside of the traditional Election Day.

The introduction of the secret ballot, however, decreased turnout. Both party column and o�ce

bloc ballots decreased turnout by approximately 2.5 percentage points.

On the whole, therefore, the results provide consistent evidence that the provision of post

o�ces was associated with small yet systematic and persistent increases in vote share. An in-

crease of one post o�ce per thousand residents increased voter turnout by between 0.75 and 1

percentage points. The results shown above are also robust to accounting for other potential

omitted confounders. Rogowski (2016) shows that political factors−namely, the partisan align-

ment between a county’s congressional representative and the president−played a signi�cant

13

Table 1: Voter Turnout in U.S. Counties, 1876-1896

Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)Post o�ces per thousand residents 0.98 0.88 0.76

(0.30) (0.38) (0.39)

ln(Population) 6.25 4.80 4.47(1.13) (1.08) (1.08)

State presidential margin −0.38 −0.40(0.03) (0.03)

County presidential margin −0.17 −0.17(0.02) (0.02)

State party competitiveness −0.11 −0.12(0.02) (0.02)

O�-November election 3.06(0.48)

Party column ballot −2.53(0.51)

O�ce bloc ballot −2.71(0.53)

(Intercept) 55.23 37.18 39.94(2.99) (10.35) (10.39)

N (total) 24914 23401 23401N (units) 2572 2572 2572R2 (within) 0.16 0.23 0.24

Data are from the 44th through 54th Congresses. Entries are linear regression coe�cients andstandard errors, clustered on counties. The dependent variable is voter turnout in percentagepoints. County and year �xed e�ects are also included but not shown.

role in in�uencing where post o�ces were distributed. Including a set of indicators for whether

the county’s congressional representative was a presidential copartisan under uni�ed or divided

government and estimating the same model shown in column (3) produces substantively simi-

lar results, with a statistically signi�cant coe�cient estimate of 0.95 for the distribution of post

14

o�ces.7

Accounting for Varying E�ects

Not all post o�ces were alike, however, which raises the possibility that the e�ects of post

o�ces on turnout may vary with the nature of the post o�ces. The vast majority of nineteenth-

century post o�ces were rural outposts that were located in an existing structure such as a general

store. These post o�ces generally had no sta� aside from the person employed as the postmaster

and as such were classi�ed as fourth-class post o�ces. First-, second-, and third-class post o�ces,

however, were distinguished on the basis of the revenue they generated, and the stature of the

postmaster appointment increased with the post o�ce’s designation. Appointments to these

locations also required a president’s nomination and Senate con�rmation. Because appointments

to these postmasterships came with much larger salaries and thus went to the strongest party

loyalists, postmasters at these locations were likely to be more e�ective and better motivated to

mobilize local residents to vote. In addition, these presidential-class post o�ces often were sta�ed

by clerks and a variety of other employees, which could have expanded the breadth of the post

o�ce’s mobilization operation.

To examine whether the nature of the post o�ce conditioned the e�ect of the distribution

of post o�ces on voter turnout, I estimated the models shown in Table 1 but included separate

indicators for the distribution of presidential post o�ces and non-presidential (fourth-class) post

o�ces.8 The results are shown below in Table 2.

Across all three models, Table 2 plainly shows that the mobilizing e�ects of presidential post7Note: In a future version of this paper I will use data from Sam Kernell to provide some suggestive evidence

on whether the mobilizing e�ects of post o�ces are due to an interpersonal mechanism from the interaction thatoccurs between postmasters and residents, or to access to the mail itself. These data will enable me to distinguishcounties on the basis of whether they were recipients of rural free delivery routes or simply had access to a posto�ce location.

8Presidential post o�ces were relatively uncommon. The modal county had zero presidential post o�ces, thoughmore than 51 percent of counties had at least one. The distribution was positively skewed as the mean (0.8 presidentialpost o�ces) and standard deviation (1.4) indicate.

15

o�ces were substantially larger in magnitude than the e�ects of non-presidential post o�ces.

Each presidential post o�ce per thousand residents increased turnout by between 19 and 25

percentage points. Increases in non-presidential post o�ces, however, increased turnout by ap-

proximatly one percentage point. While I am reluctant to make too much of the precise estimates

associated with presidential post o�ces due to the relative paucity of counties with more than a

couple of them, the results do clearly support the hypothesis that larger post o�ces with more

prestigious postmasterships had greater mobilizing e�ects than non-presidential post o�ces.

I also obtain consistent results when using an alternative approach by estimating the models

shown in Table 1 while also including an indicator for the proportion of a county’s post o�ces that

are �rst-, second-, or third-class and interacting this indicator with the distribution of post o�ces.

The coe�cient for the constituent term for post o�ces per thousand residents is consistently

near 1.00 and statistically signi�cant, indicating that an increase of one post o�ce per thousand

residents in a county with zero presidential post o�ces increases turnout by about 1 percentage

point. The interaction between the number of post o�ces per thousand and the proportion of

presidential post o�ces is positive and statistically signi�cant, indicating that the e�ect of post

o�ces on turnout was greater in counties with larger proportions of presidential post o�ces.9

Conclusion

American state development during the decades that bracketed the turn of the twentieth cen-

tury fundamentally changed the course of the nation’s history. Scholars have made signi�cant

progress in understanding the nature of the institutional changes that occurred during this pe-

riod and its implications for the federal bureaucracy. Research has paid less attention, however,

to identifying the speci�c ways these patterns of development subsequently a�ected local com-

munities and their politics.9These results are shown in Table A.1.

16

Table 2: Voter Turnout in U.S. Counties, 1876-1896: Accounting for Presidential Post O�ces

Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)Presidential post o�ces per thousand residents 25.04 19.11 19.15

(4.63) (4.33) (4.42)

Non-Presidential post o�ces per thousand residents 1.06 0.95 0.82(0.30) (0.38) (0.39)

ln(Population) 6.32 4.80 4.46(1.16) (1.10) (1.10)

State presidential margin −0.38 −0.40(0.03) (0.03)

County presidential margin −0.17 −0.17(0.02) (0.02)

State party competitiveness −0.12 −0.12(0.01) (0.01)

O�-November election 3.05(0.47)

Party column ballot −2.58(0.50)

O�ce bloc ballot −2.72(0.53)

(Intercept) 10.69 36.67 39.49(11.00) (10.52) (10.57)

N (total) 24914 23401 23401N (units) 2678 2572 2572R2 (within) 0.17 0.24 0.24

Data are from the 44th through 54th Congresses. Entries are linear regression coe�cients andstandard errors, clustered on counties. The dependent variable is voter turnout in percentagepoints. County and year �xed e�ects are also included but not shown.

This paper takes an initial step toward tracing the impact of state building activities and un-

derstanding their larger importance. Post o�ce locations were one of the clearest symbols of the

state in the nineteeth-century U.S. and played an important role in the country’s nationalization.

17

Post o�ces also played an important political role due to the patronage appointments they af-

forded and the possibilities they o�ered for political mobilization. Using a county and year �xed

e�ects design, this paper provides evidence that increases in local post o�ces increased voter

turnout. Due to the parties’ control of local post o�ces and postmaster appointments, these

increases in voter turnout may have been especially likely to bene�t the local party in power.

The �ndings represent one way in which the federal government played an important part

in the trajectory of American political parties. Post o�ce locations helped local and state parties

mobilize their supporters and create party networks. The �ndings represent one way in which

presidents through their role as party leaders may have contributed to party building activi-

ties. The evidence presented here also suggests that though parties may have transformed from

patronage-based to service-based by the end of the nineteenth century (e.g., James 2006; Kernell

and McDonald 1999), parties did not give up opportunities to take advantage of federal resources

that bene�ted their aims. Instead, parties may have used the expanding arm of the American

state to appeal to and mobilize local communities at precisely the time when Progressive reforms

sought to disempower American political parties.

The data and �ndings presented here have some important limitations, however. Post of-

�ce locations represent a clear yet rather coarse measure of American state development. Fu-

ture research could explore more �ne-grained measures of state development using either post

o�ce-based measures or indicators of statebuilding in other domaines. Additional research is

also needed both to trace the speci�c mechanisms by which the growth of the American state

a�ected local communities and to understand its implications for American political parties. Sus-

tained attention to questions such as these will fruitfully enhance scholarly understandings of the

nature and consequences of American political development and statebuilding more generally.

18

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A Supplementary Materials

Table A.1: Voter Turnout in U.S. Counties, 1876-1896: Accounting for Presidential Post O�ces

Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)Post o�ces per thousand residents 1.09 0.99 0.87

(0.31) (0.38) (0.39)

Proportion of presidential post o�ces 7.48 8.05 8.27(7.12) (7.38) (7.33)

Post o�ces per thousand residents × 19.22 12.70 12.72Proportion of presidential post o�ces (6.41) (6.42) (6.50)

ln(Population) 6.26 4.76 4.42(1.16) (1.10) (1.10)

State presidential margin −0.38 −0.40(0.03) (0.03)

County presidential margin −0.17 −0.17(0.02) (0.02)

State party competitiveness −0.12 −0.12(0.01) (0.01)

O�-November election 3.05(0.47)

Party column ballot −2.59(0.50)

O�ce bloc ballot −2.72(0.53)

(Intercept) 11.14 36.92 39.77(11.02) (10.54) (10.58)

N (total) 24914 23401 23401N (units) 2678 2572 2572R2 (within) 0.17 0.24 0.24

Data are from the 44th through 54th Congresses. Entries are linear regression coe�cients and standard errors,clustered on counties. The dependent variable is voter turnout in percentage points. County and year �xed e�ectsare also included but not shown.

25