managing conflict in combination fire departments

VOLUME 32/ NUMBER 7 JULY 2000

MANAGING CONFLICTIN COMBINATION FIREDEPARTMENTS

Combination fire departments(CFDs) are difficult to manage

because career firefighters and volunteerfirefighters often have different institu-tional interests. Administrative changessuch as the creation of a combinationdepartment from an all-career or an all-volunteer department or the consolida-tion of several formerly separate firedepartments exacerbate the problem.The local government, which can belegally and politically responsible forresolving the conflict, is often called onfor a solution.

This report explains when and whyCFDs are efficient compared with bothall-career fire departments and all-volunteer fire departments, and it alsodescribes the principal managementproblem—the conflict or potentialconflict between career and volunteerfirefighters. Case studies are followedby a classification of CFDs into fourtypes. Guidelines help policy makersdetermine the type of CFD in theirjurisdiction, and four conflict manage-ment strategies are presented.

Table of ContentsIntroductionThe Effects of TimeEffectiveness and EfficiencyTensions among FirefightersCFDs: Five ExamplesStrategic Decision MakingLeadership Objectives

Author Contact InformationJohn BenoitProfessor and Director, Fire Management ProgramsHenson CollegeDalhousie UniversityHalifax, NS B3H 3J5CanadaPhone: 902/494-3531; fax 902/494-2598E-mail: [email protected]

Kenneth B. PerkinsProfessorLongwood CollegeFarmville, VA 23902Phone: 804/395-2243; fax: 804/395-2142E-mail: [email protected]

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Managing Conflictin Combination

Fire Departments

John Benoit, Ph.D., is director of Fire ManagementPrograms at Nova Scotia’s Dalhousie University. He hasadvised on the development and delivery of managementeducation for career and volunteer fire officers acrossCanada. Kenneth B. Perkins, Ph.D., is a professor ofsociology at Longwood College, Virginia, who has writtenand provided training in fire and emergency services issues.Professor Benoit and Professor Perkins are coauthors of TheSurvival of Volunteer Fire and Rescue Services:Taming the Dragons of Change, 1996, published by FireProtection Publications of Oklahoma State University inStillwater. Their second book, Leading the CombinationFire Department: Finding Buried Treasure with Careerand Volunteer Firefighters, is forthcoming from DalhousieUniversity.

Combination fire departments (CFDs) are fire depart-ments comprising both volunteer and career firefighters.1Types of existing CFDs range from forces made up en-tirely of firefighters who volunteer and only a driverwho is paid to departments with many paid personneland only a handful of volunteers.2 CFDs provide themost efficient organizational form of fire and emer-gency medical services (EMS) delivery for certain typesof municipalities. The CFD is both effective at fire sup-pression and inexpensive to administer owing to thereduced salary costs because of its use of volunteerpersonnel.

Unfortunately, CFDs are difficult to manage be-cause career firefighters and volunteer firefighters of-ten have different institutional interests. Careerfirefighters fear that their employers might replace theirpaid labor with volunteer labor; volunteers are thusseen as a threat to the career firefighters’ job security.Volunteers know that career firefighters often displaceentire volunteer organizations; career firefighters arethus seen as a threat to the volunteers’ sense of identity.

The individual volunteer’s sense of identity is nottrivial. Although the financial consequence of resign-ing a volunteer position is small, the psychic cost isextremely high because of the firefighter’s great per-sonal investment in the organization. Some volunteersregularly contribute 20 to 25 hours per week for de-cades. Furthermore, volunteer departments symbolizeautonomy from government and identity with commu-nity. The structural distrust the volunteer and careergroups have for each other might be more tolerable ifeach group did not have to work with the other; butthey usually do. Efficiency of CFDs is a desirable goal;however, reaching that goal is a tortuous path of man-agement anxiety arising from personnel conflict.

The volunteer–career enmity can lead to unwantedinvolvement by the local government that sees itselfas legally and often politically responsible for resolv-ing the conflict. Sometimes this interference brings vol-unteer and career firefighters together to face the

common “enemy,” the local government, causing thecombination fire chief to be pleased that one conflict ismanaged but also to recognize that the cost of manag-ing one conflict is to create another. Conflict betweenCFD fire chiefs and local government is particularlycommon in larger suburban and rural countywide fireservices.

This report explains why CFDs are efficient in com-parison with both all-career fire departments and all-volunteer fire departments. It describes the principalmanagement problem—the conflict or potential con-flict between career and volunteer firefighters. Casestudies are followed by a classification of CFDs intofour types, and guidelines are provided for policy mak-ers so they can correctly determine the type of CFD intheir jurisdiction. Four conflict management strategiesare presented.

THE EFFECTS OF TIME

An understanding of why a combination departmentis so efficient depends on an understanding of the effectof time on fire losses.3 Unchecked, the rate of growthof most structural fires is exponential. That is, growthfollowing ignition is very slow in the first minute orso; but as the fire spreads it ignites more fuel, such aswood, paint, and fabric, and produces more heat. Af-ter approximately 60 seconds, when a smoke detectorshould sound an alarm and occupants should leave andcall the fire department, the rate of growth of the fireaccelerates. During the next five minutes, the tempera-ture in the room begins to rise. Because hot gases andfire rise, the temperature is highest at the ceiling. Afterapproximately seven minutes, the fire is likely to bevisible in one corner of a room, burning the fuel at thatspot. During the next three minutes, the temperaturebuilds until the gases at the ceiling are so hot that theentire room suddenly ignites. This phenomenon isknown as flashover. Once this happens, damage has

2 Inquiry Service Report

increased considerably. Unless firewalls are built intothe structure, the fire will spread within one minute toother rooms, and the structure will likely sustain con-siderable loss.

The period from minute seven to minute ten iscritical. If the fire department can arrive and set upbefore minute seven, the knockdown of the fire is vir-tually assured; the resulting loss on a $100,000 housemight range between $5,000 and $15,000. Conversely,if arrival and setup is not achieved until after minuteten, the loss to the structure will be considerable.

Unchecked, the rate of growth of moststructural fires is exponential.

Recognizing the crucial role of time, fire services(including fire engineers) have asked: How can we getto the fire faster? Smoke detectors wake and warn oc-cupants to report the fire within a minute or two ofignition. Constant training and practice by fire compa-nies have reduced setup time to less than one minute.(For example, a few years ago firefighters donnedbreathing apparatuses on their backs at the fire scene,usually a 30- to 45-second procedure. Now, pumpersare designed with breathing apparatuses in the seatsso that each firefighter, while sitting, can slip on thebreathing apparatus within a few seconds.)

The one remaining factor is response time, the timefrom receipt of the alarm to the time when the first firedepartment apparatus arrives at the scene. Responsetime is a function of the distance from the fire stationto the fire and the availability of personnel in the firedepartment. The effect of distance is obvious. At 30miles (50 kilometers) an hour using sirens and warn-ing lights, a pumper can travel 3 miles (5 kilometers)in six minutes. Local governments therefore try to placefire stations close enough to nearly all buildings for ac-ceptable response times (usually four to four-and-a-half

minutes).Within 30 to 45 seconds of the sounding of the

alarm, an all-career department will have its firstpumper moving out of the station. An all-volunteer de-partment will require more time unless volunteers arealready at the station. Volunteer departments use oneof the following two standard response methods.

• Volunteers receive the alarm, proceed to the firestation in their own cars, park, don protectiveclothing, and get into the breathing apparatuses.Any fire attack requires at least three volunteers,and the unit will not proceed to the scene until thethird volunteer is seated and belted in the vehicle.Despite practice, all these steps may require threeor four minutes—at least two-and-a-quarter min-utes more than an all-career department needs.

• Volunteers receive a pager alarm, are given theaddress of the structural fire, and proceed in theirown vehicles to the fire scene. Designated volun-teers who live near the fire station proceed to thestation and drive the fire equipment to the firescene. At the fire scene, volunteers don protectiveclothing and their breathing apparatuses and pro-ceed to set up the fire attack. This is much fasterthan the other method; but it requires better coor-dination, greater reliability of personnel, greateroverall knowledge of addresses by all volunteers,and increased setup time.

EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

All-career departments usually have an advantage overall-volunteer departments in reducing response timeand, therefore, property loss. See Table 1 for a compari-son of response times, civilian injuries, and financialcosts associated with three types of fire departments.

Note that the response time of CFDs is only slightly

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Source: James McDavid, “Part-Time Firefighters in Canadian Municipalities: Cost and Effectiveness Comparison,” Canadian Public Administration 29 (1986): 381(Table 2), 382 (Table 3), 383 (Table 4), and 384 (Table 5). Data for civilian injuries per 100 fires are provided in the text of the article.

3Managing Conflict in Combination Fire Departments

greater than that of all-career departments. AlthoughCFDs respond with career firefighters directly from thestation, most (although certainly not all) CFDs aresingle-station departments and average travel time isslightly greater. CFDs in suburban areas, where careerfirefighters, not volunteers, respond to incidents dur-ing regular working hours when most volunteers areunavailable owing to their job responsibilities in a cen-tral city, may be just as effective as all-career depart-ments.4 For example, a 1993 study of the CFD inMontgomery County, Maryland, found that in termsof fire loss per unit of assessed value and numbers ofbuilding fires (measures of prevention) and levels ofloss per building fire (a measure of suppression) Mont-gomery County was more effective than many all-ca-reer fire departments.5

If CFDs and all-volunteer departments can beequally effective, are they also equally efficient? Howdoes the ratio of loss per fire compare with the depart-ment budget? All-career fire departments are muchmore expensive principally because the vast majorityof an all-career department’s budget is devoted to sala-ries and fringe benefits. The size of the budget of a CFD,on the other hand, is in direct proportion to the per-centage of career personnel on the roster.

Over the long run, a CFD will providefire services more efficiently.

Because citizens and local governments are de-manding increased efficiency from their departmentpersonnel and reduced expenditures, CFDs are an at-tractive alternative for local governments. One conse-quence is the increase in the number of departmentsthat change from all-career to combination depart-ments. Over the short run, a change from an all-careerdepartment is not likely to induce savings; but, overthe long run, as volunteers are recruited, a CFD willprovide fire services more efficiently.

TENSIONS AMONG FIREFIGHTERS

Although a CFD is both effective and efficient, its man-agement can be difficult for a fire chief. The principalproblems are the relationship between the careerfirefighters and the volunteers as well as the naturalhuman tendency to seek fairness. When people feel arelationship is unfair, they usually feel upset and ag-grieved if they perceive themselves as the disadvan-taged ones or (to a lesser extent) guilty if they are theadvantaged ones.

In any relationship, people weigh rewards againstcosts. For example, a volunteer firefighter’s rewardsmight be marching in the Fourth of July parade, mas-tering a skill during training, and fighting fires success-fully. The costs are the demands of training and raisingmoney for the department. If the rewards are suffi-ciently greater than the costs, the volunteer continues

to volunteer. A career firefighter might enjoy the sal-ary, the job security, and the excitement of fires but dis-like paperwork, station discipline, and directsupervision. But, again, if rewards exceed costs, thecareer employee will remain on the job.

Volunteers and career firefighters also comparethemselves with each other, of course. They inevitablyseek a fair relationship, which does not require equalrewards or equal investments but does require that theratio between the two be equal. People rarely developstandardized calculations of rewards and costs unlessall rewards and costs are expressed through a mediumof exchange such as money. Consequently, each per-son has a tendency to see the other person as some-what better off:

• Volunteers often feel they are selflessly donatingtheir time to the department, whereas careerfirefighters are in the business only for a salary.

• Career firefighters often feel they have invested agreat deal of time in training, whereas volunteersare merely playing at training.

• Volunteers believe that only they have significantfirefighting experience because they respond to allalarms, whereas career firefighters respond only toalarms during their shifts.

• Career firefighters believe that because they arriveat the fire scene first, they bear the risk and burdenof interior attack.

In making a comparison, each group (whethervolunteer or career) usually undervalues its own re-wards and overstates its own costs. Conversely, eachgroup usually overestimates the rewards of the othergroup and minimizes the other group’s costs. More-over, career personnel and volunteers don’t often in-teract informally so that status differences can beminimized.

CFDs appear to function best, however, when vol-unteers are trained simultaneously with careerfirefighters to the same standard and held accountablefor performance to the same standard.6 As a bonus, ifthe same standard is required for both career and vol-unteer firefighters, it is easier and more effective to hirecareer firefighters from the pool of volunteers.7 Volun-teer officers should be appointed by merit (they shouldnot be elected) and held to the same standard of ac-countability as career officers.8 In addition, the volun-teer coordinator must be as open as possible duringany transition in order to “sell” the change to all stake-holders.9

The transition can be problematic, however, becausevolunteer and career firefighters are sometimes moti-vated by different rewards. Consequently, a chief musttreat the two groups differently, violating the perceivedfairness of the chief’s actions. Explanation and constantcommunication can reduce perceived violations of fair-ness.10 One way to ease the transition is to ensure thatthe volunteers recognize, before the transition, the needto hire career firefighters. Volunteers should not have


this transition forced upon them.11

Aside from the bitterness and, sometimes, angerthat arise between volunteer and career firefightersover issues of fairness, other factors intensify the nega-tive relationship. Recently a number of all-career de-partments have been converted to CFDs that recruitand train volunteers. Most union locals (usually fromthe International Association of Fire Fighters [IAFF])perceive these volunteers as the thin edge of the wedgeor the factor that promises to dislodge firefighters’ jobsecurity. They reasonably fear either job loss or, at least,reduced hiring after volunteers take on a greater role.

Fire service consolidation is even morethreatening than conversion.

Fire service consolidation12 is even more threaten-ing than coversion. The consolidation of an all-careeror career-dominated department with an all-volunteeror volunteer-dominated department in an adjacent ju-risdiction is a major cause of job loss and layoffs.

Table 2 provides the statements and the mean (av-erage) responses to each statement in a questionnairegiven to both career and volunteer personnel of theSurrey Fire Department (SFD), a force that grew out ofthe consolidation of a number of suburban communi-ties into the city of Surrey (population 300,0000), a sat-ellite city of Vancouver, British Columbia. In 1992, SFDhad 13 fire stations (6 were CFDs and 7 were all-vol-unteer) and a complement of 210 career firefighters, orofficers, and 275 volunteers. Almost 50 percent (156career personnel and 76 volunteers) of the SFD re-sponded to the survey, which shows that both careerand volunteer firefighters have relatively positive atti-tudes toward their own group and relatively negativeattitudes toward the other group.

CFDS: FIVE EXAMPLES

For five years we have examined CFDs in the UnitedStates and Canada. This has involved intensive casestudies of several combination fire departments. Fourdepartments were studied over the five-year period;we interviewed chief officers and municipal officials,attended meetings, and gathered relevant documents.We studied 15 additional departments through inter-views with chief officers and the review of relevantdocuments. In one department questionnaires wereadministered to both career and volunteer firefighters.We also conducted a statistical analysis on about 250combination fire departments found at Fire/EMS Net.13

Brief descriptions of five pseudonymous cities fol-low; we supply the state, province, or region so thatthe reader will be able to place each case in context.14

Michiganburg, Midwest United States

Michiganburg (with 33 career and 36 on-callfirefighters) exemplifies a successful transition from avolunteer department into a CFD. Its suburban loca-tion has led to high growth that includes industrial andcommercial activity as well as residential housing. Thispositive economic trend has enhanced the tax base,permitting a CFD; but it has also detracted from themaintenance of a volunteer, on-call firefighting forcebecause many volunteers have moved away becauseof high land values.

In response, the city government and the fire de-partment went beyond the informal word-of-mouthapproach and actively recruited on-call firefighters,using mass mailing, Web site advertising, and mediaadvertising. To retain on-call firefighters, the trainingprogram pays its on-call personnel and uses careerfirefighters as instructors. In addition, performance cri-teria for on-call firefighters were revised upward. Uni-forms and rules were standardized. Monthly meetingswere expanded to include career as well as on-callfirefighters. Every step enhanced morale and reducedthe turnover of on-call firefighters.

Clearly Michiganburg applied best-practices tech-niques, but it had the advantage of its boomingeconomy, which reduced any perceived threat the ca-reer firefighters might have had that their job securitywas threatened by the recruitment of volunteer (on-call)firefighters.

Suburb, Atlantic Canada

Suburb is a growing satellite community with its ownlocal government within easy commuter distance of amajor city. Its 10,000 people live within a larger urbancommunity of 350,000; this economy is not booming,however. The Suburb Combination Fire Department(SCFD) has 40 volunteer members (including the vol-unteer fire chief and several chief officers) and 10 union-ized career personnel; the career firefighters report toone career chief officer who reports to the volunteerfire chief. As is common, the SCFD was once an all-volunteer department, but, because so many volunteerswere commuting to the central city on weekdays, thecity had no choice but to hire some career firefighters.Relations between the career firefighters and the vol-unteers were particularly strained because the SCFDoperated with career firefighters on weekdays, but vol-unteers responded on nights and weekends. Suburb’scareer firefighters compared their situation unfavorablywith the career firefighters of the central city who hada more favorable shift schedule that allowed for moon-lighting; in the SCFD they were at an economic disad-vantage. Attempts to rectify this by collectivebargaining failed.

The volunteer firefighters elected the fire chief and,except during the month before an election, tended toget along well with each other. Moreover, the local gov-ernment in Suburb supported the position of the vol-unteer fire chief against the union local of the career


firefighters and was also grateful for the support thatthe volunteers often gave local politicians at electiontime. The career firefighters trusted only each other;they did not trust the other groups or management.This combination of relationships is stable despite thedistrust between the career members and all other par-

ties. Only the fire chief has to deal with the distrust ona day-to-day basis.

Suburb is clearly much more ripe for conflict thanMichiganburg because the career firefighters’ liveli-hoods are threatened. Also, the volunteers’ sense iden-tity is threatened because of the conversion to a CFD.

a The value of n (the number surveyed) is at a minimum but ranges from: 140 to 156 for paid firefighters; 57 to 76 for volunteers; and 197 to 232 for the total. Thevalue of n varies depending on the amount of missing data.b These item exhibits statistically significant differences between the mean responses of career and volunteer firefighters (p < .05).


Conflict need not always be high or low; it can fluctu-ate as the next case illustrates.

Barrier Island, Atlantic United States

Barrier Island Fire Department (BIFD) was an all-vol-unteer department in a small town in southeasternUnited States, situated on a barrier island very popu-lar as a tourist destination. Over a three-year period,BIFD went from a legally incorporated, all-volunteerorganization on the brink of disbanding to a valuedunit of municipal government. This transformation wasset in motion by a scandal in which a number offirefighters routinely purchased personal items—suchas tools, tires for their trucks, and video movies—all inthe name of the department. A state-level criminal in-vestigation caused sustained embarrassment for thedepartment, a resignation by the chief, and disparage-ment from the town council.

In response, the town hired its first careerfirefighter—a new chief—to be paid out of thedepartment’s own budget generated from fundraising.This new chief, however, was not really an outsider buthad been a volunteer in the department 10 years ear-lier. The new chief began to rebuild the credibility ofthe department in the eyes of the town council and thelocal community by following four strategies thatcaused members of the department to focus not on himbut on what the organization had to do to get beyondthe scandal and garner credibility as a respected pub-lic agency.

First, he had to pull, not push, the department intothe future. (Pull factors were future conditions thatwere attractive and could motivate and integrate indi-viduals into the leadership objectives.) The chiefwanted to reconstruct the department, emphasize train-ing, and establish better relations with the town. Thechief made it known that the department would needcareer firefighters to help it ascend to the level of effec-tiveness and public support that almost everyoneagreed it needed (except the former chief, who re-mained in the organization as a firefighter).

Second, he increased the level of bureaucratization.The history of the department was one of too muchinformality and a good-old-boy network characterizedby little individual accountability. Bureaucracy in thisinstance meant establishing job descriptions for the linepositions, complete with application processes andperformance evaluation plans. With this, the chief es-tablished the value of professional standards, not fa-voritism or personality.

Third, he systematically integrated several careerfirefighters into the organizational structure. This wasdone with almost no resistance because both volunteersand career personnel could hold the same positions inthe department, with the same standards for trainingand performance. When he discussed the addition ofpaid firefighters, the new chief was careful to explainthat these individuals would not be a threat to the mis-sion of the department because paid help was neces-

sary for the department to become the best it could be.Firefighter positions were emphasized, not whetherthey were filled by career or volunteer. As a result, thenew chief managed to avoid creating a we-versus-theysituation.

Finally, and most risky, was the new chief’s effortto bring the former chief back into an officer position.The new chief felt it was necessary because the formerchief was influential among a small group of members,and it would be better to have him where he could bewatched instead of in a position to undermine the newchief. The former chief was also a good firefighterwhose skills were needed. As it happened, the formerchief did not accept the new direction of the depart-ment, and he quit.

The BIFD went from being the butt of jokes by thetown government and the public to a respected depart-ment that gave up its legal autonomy to become partof town government. Along the way, the new chief’svision, planning, diplomacy, and—as he said—luckmade the transition to combination status necessaryand positive and would promote the change neededfor future survival. He effectively managed a creativetension between local government and the volunteers.

Riverside County, Atlantic United States

Riverside County is one of the fastest growing coun-ties in the mid-Atlantic region of the United States. Thecomplex combination fire and EMS system in River-side County serves an area that was once rural but nowranges from urban to rural. The fire and EMS servicestructure consists of the following components thathave roughly equal power and authority—a situationripe for instability and conflict:

• 17 volunteer corporations, roughly half of whichhave three government-paid firefighters on a day-time shift

• A government bureau headed by a director whosemission is to aid the volunteer corporations byproviding training and placing career personnel indepartments only at their request

• An eight-member commission that represents thevolunteer corporations.

Instability and potential for high conflict cameabout when the longtime bureau director left his posi-tion. An outside successor was hired who did not un-derstand trust and power. First, he immediatelyalienated the volunteers by taking for himself the titleof chief. This violated a taboo and symbolized whatthe volunteers feared most—that the fire and rescueservices were soon going to be headed by a countywidechief who would minimize their power and influence.Second, the new director insisted that career firefighterswear their uniforms during training with the volun-teers; both career and volunteer personnel saw this asan unnecessary attempt to create a distinction betweentwo groups that had considerable respect for each other.


Taken together, these two issues made it appear to thevolunteers that they were headed for extinction as realplayers in the system. The career firefighters were notsure what was in store for them, but they did not wantto be the target of the volunteers’ wrath. Third, the newdirector immediately demanded information from thedepartments that had never before been required. Forexample, he expected to know the number of success-ful and unsuccessful attempts by EMS personnel tomake intravenous needle insertions.

The new director appeared to be unilaterally as-serting his power over the entire fire and EMS system ,and he squandered his honeymoon period and erodedtrust dramatically. The result was that the volunteers(not aided by but not hindered by the paid personnel)were able to exert pressure on the county governmentto remove the new director, which it did. The volun-teers, who were greatly relieved but anxious aboutwhat would come next, began to retreat into a bunkermentality. The paid personnel did the same, forming aclub that became an IAFF union local.

The county government, worried that the systemwas about to collapse, appointed an interim directorwho had three factors in his favor. First, he was a countyemployee like the career firefighters and thus was seenas able to understand their concerns; second, he wasan active volunteer firefighter in a nearby county, whichgave him instant credibility with the volunteers andtheir commission; and, third, he brought with him vi-sion that he called “stone soup.” (Stone soup is basedon a parable of a person coming to a village of mis-trustful and hungry people and announcing that he hasa few ingredients for good soup, which, in reality, arewater and a stone. Villagers are encouraged to contrib-ute whatever they can to the making of a successfulsoup.) Everybody in Riverside County—the govern-ment, the volunteers, and the career firefighters—wonby contributing something. Akin to the BIFD, describedearlier, the interim director was able to manage the cre-ative tension between the bureau and the commissionof volunteer fire chiefs.

Port City, East Coast Canada

Although Port City is old, the municipal governmentis new, resulting from the consolidation of four mu-nicipalities: two cities, a town, and the surroundingcounty. The county was previously served by 33 firedepartments: 16 were CFDs and 17 all-volunteer. Thetown department was a CFD and the two city depart-ments were all-career. Management after consolidationbegan to be carried out by a government bureau.

Although the director of the bureau was hired fivemonths before the date of consolidation, the bureaustaff was not in place until a few weeks before consoli-dation. Little time was available to plan, and much timewas spent reacting to myriad events that followed theconsolidation itself. Bureaucratization was resisted bymany of the fire chiefs in the rural fire departments.The rural fire chiefs’ attitudes toward the bureau were

predictable almost entirely on the basis of their geo-graphic location. Rural fire chiefs farthest from the ur-ban core (more than 40 miles) had the poorestequipment and the least training; they welcomed acommission that would subsidize their operations withusable cast-off apparatus and equipment, free training,and free management services.

The threat of loss of power, status, andidentity engendered considerableconflict.

But rural fire chiefs closest to the urban and sub-urban core managed CFDs already. Their call volumerequired a modest number of career firefighters. Con-solidation generated many problems for these rural firechiefs because they were unused to the formal labor–management relations that arose once their firefightersjoined the consolidated IAFF local. In effect, consoli-dation had increased the bargaining power of the ca-reer firefighters in CFDs over their fire chiefs. On theother hand, the bureau assisted the fire chiefs of theCFDs by establishing a chief’s committee that devel-oped job descriptions, selection criteria, and modeststipends for chiefs. Most CFD chiefs have been ambiva-lent about the wisdom of consolidation but are sup-porting and trusting the bureau itself.

Those rural fire chiefs farther from the core thanthe CFDs but within 40 miles of the urban core of PortCity were the most resentful of the effect of consolida-tion. They trusted neither the local government nor thebureau. They had resisted the bureau on various issuesever since consolidation. The issues themselves wereunimportant. What was important was the threat thatthese particular volunteer departments would becomeCFDs, a change that would alter a chief’s status to thatof a CFD chief, resulting in selection by committee in-stead of by a vote of the department membership.15 Itwould also mean altering administrative proceduresto be consistent with the collective agreement with theunion. This threat of loss of power, status, and possi-bly identity engendered considerable conflict.

In dealing with the various conflicts, the bureauworked tirelessly, responsibly, and with integrity. Nev-ertheless, the competing interests of each group aredifficult to reconcile because any agreement the bureaureaches with one group is seen as being at the expenseof another group. Jensen and Snook have addressedthe importance of trust relationships:

Ironically success has less to do with thestrength of a management team than with analliance among management, labor and policymakers. Most important, however, it has to dowith motivation, the ability to set egos aside,taking the time to build relationships basedon trust and following through on commit-ments.16


STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING

Conflict within a CFD can best be managed by diag-nosing the type of CFD it is and prescribing a set ofrecommendations based on that diagnosis. CFDs areeither simple or complex, and they are engaged in ei-ther low or high conflict.

Classifying CFDs

Most CFDs are single-department fire services that re-port directly to the local government. They may coop-erate with other fire departments by engaging inmutual aid, but that remains the extent of cooperation.Most of these CFDs had their origins as all-volunteerdepartments that are typically nonprofit corporations.However, increased demand for service coupled withan increased tax base often leads to the hiring of somecareer firefighters. In this report, this is called a simpleCFD.

A complex CFD, on the other hand, is embeddedin a system of fire departments, some of which may becombination, or all-volunteer, or even all-career. Typi-cally these departments report to a bureau that, in turn,reports to local government. Sometimes another for-malized structure, which may be called a commission,is involved. This body often represents the volunteer-firefighter organizations and can be purely advisory,but it can evolve into a quasi-policy-making body thatrepresents both career and volunteer interests.

Conflict between groups can arise whenone group feels aggrieved about theactions of the other group.

In addition to CFD classification on the basis oforganization, CFDs can be classified according to thedegree of conflict present within a CFD. That degreeof conflict may be designated high or low, but in real-ity it is a continuum. The degree of conflict is not con-stant; it rises and falls depending on manycircumstances.

There are, therefore, four possible types of CFDs:(1) simple CFD–low conflict, (2) complex CFD–low con-flict, (3) simple CFD–high conflict, and (4) complexCFD–high conflict. Proper classification of a CFD isuseful for selecting strategies for reducing conflict.

Simple CFDs. When we consider simple CFDs, wemust determine whether these CFDs are in a state oflow conflict or high conflict. To make this determina-tion, we have to understand the preconditions that leadto conflict. Conflict between any two groups can arisewhen one group feels aggrieved about the actions ofthe other group. Although such aggrieved feelings maybe necessary to induce high conflict, such feelings arenot sufficient. When aggrieved feelings arise, conflictwill not always occur. A single, paid driver in a CFD isnot likely to challenge the volunteer membership be-

cause his relative power is so low. But when a single,paid driver becomes linked with others, as did hap-pen in Port City, that driver feels more powerful. Wheneither volunteers or career firefighters feel relativelyweak, even if they feel aggrieved, they are unlikely toinitiate conflict. Thus conflict between volunteer andcareer firefighters is more likely to be intense when twoconditions exist:

• Either group (career or volunteer) feels aggrievedabout the other group

• Both groups are relatively equal in power.

If neither group feels aggrieved about the other,there is no reason to fight. Moreover, if the groups areunequal in power, the weaker group will yield to thedemands of the more powerful group.

What causes aggravation between groups?

• Career firefighters feel aggrieved toward volun-teers when career firefighters feel their livelihoodsare threatened.

• Volunteers feel aggrieved toward career firefighterswhen volunteers feel their identity is threatened.

What determines the relative power of career andvolunteer firefighters?

• Relative numbers—CFDs with fewer than 5 or 6career firefighters and 40 or more volunteers are sovolunteer dominated that conflict is unlikely nomatter how aggrieved the career firefighters feel,but a dozen career firefighters with threatenedlivelihoods confronting 40 volunteers is high con-flict.

• Union presence—when career firefighters areunionized, they have power beyond their smallnumbers, and volunteers are more likely to feelthat their identity is threatened.

Three communities in the case studies—Michiganburg, Suburb, and Barrier Island—havesimple structures: one fire department reports directlyto one local government. That department’s involve-ment with other fire departments is confined almostentirely to mutual aid. As communities grow into cit-ies with suburbs or even suburban cities adjacent to ametropolitan city, however, more complex systems offire protection evolve.

Complex CFDs. In complex CFDs the same principlesexplain the degree of conflict but the target is differ-ent. Most conflict within complex CFDs is between theCFD chiefs or volunteer chiefs and the governmentbureau. Career and volunteer firefighters may still bein conflict, but this conflict is somewhat removed fromthe attention of municipal officials. The conflict be-tween the chiefs and the bureau often involves the chiefadministrative officer, the mayor, and the council, how-ever.

The volunteer or CFD chiefs in a complex CFD canfeel their identity is threatened by the bureau (recall


Port City) and are thus aggrieved with the bureau. Also,despite the good intentions of the bureau director,many volunteer chiefs will feel that the bureau is thethin edge of the wedge that leads to bureaucratizationand that chiefs no longer act as incident commanders.Instead, chiefs now attend committee meetings, fill outforms, and call finance experts and their secretarieswhose offices are in central cities. This happened inRiverside County. The bureau may also feel aggrievedwith volunteer fire chiefs whose apparent lackadaisi-cal behaviors can expose the bureau and the local gov-ernment to liability.

Such aggrieved feelings, although necessary, areonce again not sufficient to induce high conflict be-tween the bureau and the chiefs. If either the bureauor the volunteer chiefs and CFD chiefs are relativelyweak, the weaker party will give in to the demands ofthe stronger. In complex CFDs, however, the volunteerchiefs usually need the bureau’s money and the bu-reau needs the volunteers’ labor. Thus power tends tobe fairly balanced, making conflict likely. Becausepower is so balanced, the key to reducing conflict is toaddress the aggrieved feelings of either the bureau orthe volunteer and CFD chiefs. Table 3 summarizes theseconflict situations.

For example, in Michiganburg, a simple system,the career and volunteers are relatively equal in power,making the potential for conflict high, but the careerfirefighters are not threatened because the localeconomy is booming. Thus conflict is low. In Suburb,Atlantic Canada, the power of career and volunteerfirefighters is relatively equal, but the local economy ismuch weaker than in Michiganburg. As a consequence,the career firefighters in Suburb do see the volunteersas a threat to their jobs, particularly because Suburb isseeking to cut municipal expenditures. Thus Suburb,which has a simple system, is in a high-conflict condi-tion.

Conflict, however, is not static. Its dynamic natureis demonstrated by the Barrier Island Fire Department,which is also a simple system. Initially the BIFD wasan all-volunteer department; thus conflict was low.Nevertheless the local government’s subtle threat todissolve the BIFD might have generated BIFD–localgovernment conflict because the volunteers’ sense ofidentity would have been threatened. Before the scan-dal, conflict was low; the potential for conflict roseduring the publicity surrounding the scandal but thendiminished after a new chief was able to establish aprofessional vision accepted by nearly all the members.

In complex systems, the principalconflict is between the bureau and thevolunteer or CFD chiefs.

In complex systems, the principal conflict is be-tween the bureau and the volunteer or CFD chiefs. InRiverside County, the power struggle between volun-teer chiefs and the bureau was so intense that the vol-unteer chiefs were able to replace the director of thebureau when the director threatened the identity of thevolunteer chiefs. Recently the successor director hasbeen successful at reducing conflict by facilitating ateam vision of the future and conflict has diminished.

In Port City, recent consolidation of all-career, CFD,and all-volunteer departments produced a complexCFD system. The bureau and the volunteer and CFDchiefs were relatively equal in power. The fact that thebureau threatened the identity of some volunteer chiefssuggests high conflict, but the fact that other volunteerchiefs and most CFD chiefs were not threatened sug-gests possible low conflict. Port City balances betweenlow and high conflict.

Policy makers can use four different strategies tomanage conflict in a CFD. The effectiveness of eachstrategy depends on correct typing of the CFD. Just as

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1 Note that in both simple and complex CFDs, the level of conflict is high only when the answer to both questions is “yes.”


a physician asks patients diagnostic questions, thepolicy maker asks the questions presented in Table 3to determine the level of conflict. Table 4 places fourconflict management strategies where they are mostsuccessfully used.

Simple CFD, Low Conflict—Integration Strategy

When conflict is low, a simple fire department systemcan successfully integrate its career and volunteerfirefighters on a day-to-day basis at the station as wellas at the emergency scene. Such a CFD will have a com-mon training schedule, and career and volunteerfirefighters receive the same training to the same stan-dard. Recognizing that the volume of training may wellexceed the available time or capacity of a volunteer,management must insist that volunteers specialize. Forexample, volunteers who are medically and physicallyfit to engage in interior attack will train with careerfirefighters with the same capabilities. Career officersand firefighters will then know the capability of re-sponding volunteers.

Other volunteers will have specialized orders infire prevention, fire safety education, fund raising,fireground support, apparatus and pump operation,EMS response, HAZMAT response, complex emer-gency response, water rescue, high-angle rescue, andwhatever other special function is offered. These spe-cialties should be matched at the same standard as spe-cialties of career personnel. Identical trainingrequirements avoid the charge that the volunteer is in-adequately trained. Of course, it allows for replacementof career firefighters but, as we have already estab-lished, this is either not a threat in a low-conflict com-munity or, if threatening, will not be resisted by arelatively weak career force.

Volunteer firefighters will continue to raise fundsor, if not currently doing so, will begin to establish afund-raising capacity. Such a strategy achieves twoobjectives. First, it preserves power for the volunteerforce vis-à-vis the local government. This is crucial be-cause it reduces local government’s temptation to ei-ther privatize the service or replace the volunteers with

career firefighters. Second, in communities with lowcall volume, fund-raising integrates the communitywhether or not fires are fought or a new piece of appa-ratus is needed.17

Because volunteer specialization will be necessaryand because the mandate of the fire service must bebroad rather than narrow, volunteer recruiting mustdraw on a wide spectrum of the community. Volun-teers may even be drawn from outside the responsearea because many volunteers will not be emergencyresponders.

Complex CFD, Low Conflict—Federation Strategy

Even when conflict is low, a complex fire departmentsystem requires more management skill than a simplesystem. External pressures may disrupt normally stablerelations between career and volunteer firefighters.Often volunteer fire chiefs, fearing a loss of power, willmobilize the volunteer membership against the gov-ernment bureau, as happened in Port City and River-side County. This strategy may separate the volunteerswho are loyal to their chief from the career firefighterswho support the local government that pays their sala-ries. Avoiding this requires good relations among thevarious fire chiefs and between each fire chief and thebureau.

To enhance harmonious relations and ease the taskof managing a complex CFD, policy makers shouldselect for and monitor the diplomatic skills of the bu-reau director and divide the managing powers betweenthe government bureau and each fire department.

To maintain authority and encourage group solu-tions to problems, a bureau director must first act dip-lomatically and sometimes even tolerate insult in orderto avoid an open breach with a resistant volunteer chief.Although the director may recognize a deliberateprovocation, the director almost always will have toignore it. A director who has gone through a rigorousselection process is more likely to have the strong egorequired to ignore these challenges. Ideally, that direc-tor would not be from the community because past in-volvement will be perceived as bias, whether corrector not. The director must be a team builder, which willbe more likely if the director is confident enough tonot require constant support from others. The term ofdirector probably should be limited to five years. Afterfive years, even the most diplomatic director will havetoo many enemies to be effective.

Second, an explicit division of power between thefire department and the bureau—a federated complexfire department system—reduces ambiguity by clari-fying which decisions are made by chiefs within firedepartments and which decisions are made by the gov-ernment bureau.

Fund-raising must be a fire department power. Thefire department will be motivated to raise funds itself;moreover, community integration is advanced if thefund-raising activity is local. Several departments maywish to coordinate and pool expenses to pay for mass

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Operational planning (except mutual aid) mustalso remain local with the fire department because thelocal incident commanders must be involved in theplanning process. They will know how to maximizethe strengths and minimize the weaknesses of theirpersonnel and equipment. (Few secrets can be kept ina fire station, but many can be kept from senior offi-cials.) Unlike local officers, the bureau will be largelyunaware of the weaknesses of individuals and thestrengths of old apparatus.

The government bureau must be able to enforceoperational standards even though the fire departmentis responsible for operational planning. If certain prac-tices (e.g., riding the tailgate) are unsafe, alternative safepractices must be enforced. If a master planning activ-ity conducted by the bureau involves a standard thatis not achieved by a specific fire department, that de-partment must report it.

Implementation of fire prevention activities mustbe a local fire department power. Local implementa-tion will motivate volunteers to conduct residentialinspections or engage in public fire safety education.However, the research, planning, and design of manyfire prevention activities ought to be a power of thebureau. Only the bureau will have the staff to contractfor research, arrange liaison with other jurisdictions onprevention activities, and plan a campaign. But localknowledge is necessary, and often only local volunteerscan collect sufficient data to address the local needs thatwill inevitably vary from fire department to fire depart-ment.

Recruitment of volunteers should also be a localpower subject to oversight by the bureau. Only the lo-cal fire department will command the loyalty that at-tracts volunteers, making the local department best ableto recruit. Nevertheless, the bureau ought to have vetopower over any recruit, particularly if a backgroundcheck reveals a criminal record.

Overall personnel policies, however, must residewith the bureau, particularly if career firefighters areunionized. Consistency in application of a collectiveagreement is paramount, particularly because griev-ances are often filed on the basis of inconsistency andbecause inconsistency is a criterion that arbitrators usein awarding a grievance to a union. At a practical level,this means that all senior officers will have to be ori-ented to the collective agreement and reoriented tomodifications in the agreement that arise from collec-tive bargaining.

Training is a power that must be shared betweenthe bureau and the local fire department. Basic train-ing should be conducted by the bureau, and classesshould include volunteer and career trainees to ensurethat equal standards are met and seen to be met by bothgroups. Centralized training also permits a commonindoctrination of both groups to the philosophy, poli-cies, and practices of the entire complex fire depart-ment system. After basic training, however, company

and multicompany training evolutions are within thepower of the local fire department. This permits grouppractice for the maximum quality of response in theminimum time. However, those departments involvedin mutual aid will have to train together to enhancethe quality, quantity, and speed of that response.

Apparatus purchasing should be accomplished bythe bureau, primarily to increase savings by volumepurchasing. Nevertheless, within a standard packageof vehicle specifications, options for local fire depart-ments should be permitted provided that those optionsnot deemed useful by the bureau are acquired with lo-cal funds from the fire department. Although some ofthese options—extra chrome, for example—are waste-ful if viewed narrowly, the value of the fund-raisingitself, as well as the motivation of the volunteer lead-ership and membership, makes such purchases effi-cient. The bureau is also more likely to have the expertknowledge needed to deal with apparatus manufac-turers.

A complex fire department systemrequires more management skill than asimple system.

Apparatus deployment is a difficult issue, particu-larly if it entails redeployment of existing apparatus.Such deployment usually disadvantages the rich firedepartments. Unfortunately, these same departmentsmay be the most effective. The bureau should makeapparatus purchases gradually; therefore, apparatus iseventually owned by the bureau. But bureau owner-ship requires that the bureau purchase apparatus fromthe local fire departments at fair market value. Becausesuch purchasing requires significant capital funds, thisprocess will likely require several years, during whichtime the apparatus will depreciate. Such a purchasingstrategy allows the fire departments to spend moremoney on training, prevention activities, and diversi-fication of service to EMS. The funds the fire depart-ments raise by selling their apparatus will, after all, bespent on other fire service functions. Most volunteerfire departments currently spend inadequately on thesefunctions. Above all, the bureau should not, even ifsupported by legislation, expropriate apparatus with-out paying fair market value. The volunteer member-ship and leadership would see such a tactic as legalizedtheft.

These enumerated powers over various activitiescarried out in a federated complex fire department sys-tem are summarized in Table 5 below:

Simple CFD, High Conflict—Separation Strategy

If a simple CFD undergoing high conflict, the strate-gies presented above will be insufficient or ineffective.

Often a multistation simple fire department sys-tem is easier to manage than a single-station fire de-partment system because career firefighters can be


assigned to one station and volunteers can be assignedto others. In this way, two groups that threaten eachother can be separated and overt conflict is less likely.18

Unfortunately, circumstances may prevent spatial sepa-ration. Volunteer stations that have a poor daytime re-sponse on weekdays may require career firefighters.19

If this is so, career and volunteer firefighters can beseparated in time if career firefighters are assigned toa weekday daytime schedule and volunteers respondin evenings and on weekends. This is usually not aseffective, however, because conflict arises from com-plaints from both volunteers and career firefighters andoften involves small irritants such as who is respon-sible for cleanup after evening training. Although thecomplaint seems petty, the underlying conflict is not.

The separation strategy seeks to lower the level ofconflict and build the level of trust between career andvolunteer firefighters so that separation is no longerneeded and the integration strategy, presented earlier,can be used instead. Local government can play ameaningful role in establishing trust between career

and volunteer firefighters by protecting the job secu-rity of career firefighters. This will eliminate one fac-tor that created high conflict in the first place.

For example, the local government might agree toa no-layoff clause in the collective agreement in returnfor the right to lower wages, if necessary, after the endof the contract term. For career firefighters, such a con-tract protects jobs and provides some protection forwages.

Complex CFD, High Conflict—Confederation Strategy

A complex fire department system cannot use the fed-erated model described earlier for low conflict if thelevel of conflict is high. The conflict between volun-teer chiefs, who perceive loss of power, and the gov-ernment bureau is too great. Inevitably, the contendingparties seek allies. Career firefighters will ally with thebureau because they see it as providing significantwage increases. The volunteer fire chief will mobilizevolunteers against the central authority.

The solution here is a confederation, not a federa-tion. In a confederation the central authority is much

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Best Management Practices for CFDs

Career and volunteer firefighters should be trainedto the same standard.

Career and volunteer firefighters should receivetraining together.

Career and volunteer firefighters should be held tothe same performance standards.

Career and volunteer firefighters should be subjectto the same rules and standards of conduct.

Career and volunteer firefighters should be trainedin the team approach.

Career and volunteer officers should be appointedon the basis of merit; they should not be elected.

During an administrative transition, managementshould make clear the reasons for the transition.

During an administrative transition, managementshould implement the transition slowly, being care-ful to “sell” new ideas and practices to all stake-holders.

The volunteer coordinator should possess an“open” type of personality.

Volunteer involvement should be increased.

Certain volunteers (for example, students) shouldbe offered living space in the firehouse.

Volunteers should be offered small financial incen-tives for performance improvement.

Career firefighters should be hired from the volun-teer contingent.

Local government can play ameaningful role in establishing trustbetween career and volunteerfirefighters.


weaker and powers are divided so that most of thesepowers rest with the individual fire department. In fact,in this confederated scenario, apparatus purchasing,recruit training, and standards monitoring should bethe only functions controlled by a bureau (comparewith Table 5).

Although the bureau has little formal power in aconfederation, its de facto influence is somewhatgreater. Its presence encourages effective mutual aidamong adjacent volunteer and combination fire depart-ments. Most volunteer fire chiefs realize that retainingpower is possible only if effective mutual aid can beprovided. The presence of a bureau provides the im-plied threat that, if local fire departments cannot pro-vide effective mutual aid, the heavy-handedbureaucratic approach of the government bureau maybe necessary. Port City successfully used this strategyto develop mutual aid response zones.

Also, when two parties do not trust each other,they have recourse to a binding contract if they mustwork together. For example, in the suburbs of Chicago,a confederated model operates whereby local volun-teer and small CFDs work together by adhering to therules specified in a contract. One role of the bureau,therefore, is to monitor fire department performancein meeting the terms of the contract. Thus, such crite-ria as response time, safety, and amount of joint train-ing can be prescribed and evaluated.

LEADERSHIP OBJECTIVES

Managing conflict is not resolving conflict. In a CFD,the tension among management, local government,career firefighters, and volunteer firefighters will al-ways be with us. The goal is to manage the tension so

that it will be creative instead of destructive. Tensioncan be better managed if planners determine whetherthe CFD is either simple or complex. The questions inTable 3 help determine the level of conflict. An appro-priate leadership strategy as shown in Table 4 can becan be determined and applied. It will be more diffi-cult to determine the level of conflict than it will be todetermine whether the CFD is simple or complex, butproper classification is part of this planning process.Leadership is essential for resolving the tensions in-herent in a CFD. A successful leader accomplishes atleast two objectives.

A Leader Educates

The leader must be very knowledgeable about the or-ganization itself, the audiences watching the leader, andthe power relations of the specific situation. If the leaderis not aware, the leader is doomed to fall into a trap setby people who do not like what they think the leaderplans to do. (What the leader really has in mind is un-important; the power players’ conception is important.)For example, the outsider in Riverside County had noteducated himself about the entire organization andquickly became entrapped in a power struggle he couldhave prevented.

Managing conflict is not resolvingconflict.

A leader also must educate others by passingknowledge to other members of the organization. Thisdoes not guarantee that conflicts will be avoided, butit works toward a common definition of the situationby other players. If there is a common understandingabout the organization and its players, there will be lessto argue over. Discussion can be aimed at options forsolutions instead of attempts to agree on the problems.Building a common understanding of organizationalreality is not easy, but it is necessary. Both the most re-cent chief at Barrier Island and the most recent bureaudirector in Riverside County did this.

A Leader Builds Trust

In an organization, staff that does not trust a leader willobey only the letter of the law, not the spirit; and pow-erful groups outside the leader ’s direct control that donot trust a leader will ensure that the leader has a shorttenure. Although, in theory, in a bureaucracy peopleare compelled by policy and rewarded by salary toobey, a leader of a complex CFD with a bureau and aset of semiautonomous corporations for fire and EMSvolunteers cannot ignore the role of trust. Even in asimple CFD, trust in the chief is important because it isthe glue that binds volunteers to the organization.

How does one build trust? A leader’s role as edu-cator allows the leader to communicate the realities ofthe organization to all parties. The leader can build re-

MABAS

The Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) is amulticounty (even multistate) network of fire de-partments centered on Chicago that extends asfar north as southern Wisconsin, as far south asnorthwestern Indiana, and as far west as approxi-mately 65 miles from downtown Chicago. Morethan 300 fire departments are involved, includingChicago’s. Most, however, are fully volunteer orcombination in type. Joining MABAS permits accessto apparatus, personnel, and skills in geographi-cally contiguous communities. Such access alsorequires the discipline to observe safety and opera-tional standards and to train volunteer and careerpersonnel together. Despite these requirements,there is little bureaucracy. Indeed, the involvementof three states and about a dozen counties mayprevent excessive bureaucratization. MABAS is aconfederation.*

* The authors thank Gene Carlson of Oklahoma State Universityfor bringing MABAS to their attention.

Managing Conflict inCombination Fire Departments

Volume 32 / Number 7July 2000

E-43015


lations with individuals and groups that are character-ized by openness and two-way dialogue. Interpersonalcommunication skills can build trust. If a leader learnsand practices active listening, it imparts a sense of trust.Sometimes the ego of the leader gets in the way of trustbuilding; if the ego is not kept in check, audiences willbegin to think the leader is trying to build an empireand will begin to distrust the leader.

The leader must also encourage a stakeholderplanning process—for example, the stone-soup plan inRiverside County, where the volunteers, unionized ca-reer firefighters, government, and commission werebrought to the planning table. Planning, which can bedone in a variety of ways, is one of the responsibilitiesof the leader. A top-down process in which the leader—without any messy, time-consuming consulting withothers—presents a plan for the organization mightseem most expedient, but it will not build trust. Itsunintended consequences could very well be the un-dermining of trust.

For planning, some leaders rely solely on an out-side consulting firm hired to assess the needs of thecombination organization. Alone, this strategy can beseen as a thinly veiled attempt to rubber-stamp whatthe leader already has in mind. But buying a plan froman outside consulting agency can work if it is used as astarting point for a larger planning process that in-volves stakeholders. Here an internal planning pro-cess—with use of the typology presented in this report,for example—can supplement outside recommenda-tions. Usually the outcomes of any type of strategicplanning process are much less important than the pro-cess itself. Through the process, trust can be built andplayers can turn to thinking about the future insteadof retreating to the past. People can create desirablescenarios that pull, not push, them into the future.

1 Combination fire departments are called composite fire de-partments in Canada. Although the authors’ research drawson fire departments from both the United States and Canada,we use U.S. terminology in this report.

2 Volunteer firefighters often are paid a small hourly wage fortime actually spent fighting a fire; or, instead of a wage, vol-unteers are sometimes paid a flat rate per call. In some juris-dictions, volunteers receive no reimbursement although in atleast one state in the United States they receive a pension af-ter 20 years of volunteering and in Canada they receive anincome tax deduction. The status of an on-call firefighter issimilar to that of a volunteer. Career firefighters are those whofight fires as their main occupation.

3 This section and the next two sections are revised from Chap-ter 8 of Kenneth B. Perkins and John Benoit, The Future of Vol-unteer Fire and Rescue Services: Taming the Dragons of Change(Stillwater, Okla.: Fire Protection Publications, 1996) and isreprinted with permission.

4 Harry Carter, “The Combination Fire Department: A 21st Cen-tury Solution,” Firehouse (March 1993), 60–4.

5 Don Flinn, Volunteer Incentives in the Fire and Rescue Services(Rockville, Md.: Montgomery County, 1993).

6 Carol Rose, “Paids and Volunteers: Working Together inBlooming Grove,” Firehouse (July 1979), 28–9; 64–6; John Gill,Training within a Combination Fire Department: An Ongoing Di-

lemma (Emmitsburg, Md.: Executive Fire Officer Program,National Fire Academy, 1990); Richard Marinucci, “Transitionto a Combination Department,” Fire Engineering (August1990): 8–12; Scott Baltic, “The Combination Transition,” FireChief (August 1992): 60–4; Robert Rielage, “A Winning Com-bination,” Fire Chief (January 1995), 70–3; Harry Carter, “TheCombination Fire Department.”

7 Marinucci, “Transition to a Combination Department.”8 Baltic, “The Combination Transition”; Lynn Borders, Manag-

ing the Transition from a Volunteer Fire Department to a Combi-nation Fire Department (Emmitsburg, Md.: Executive Fire Of-ficer Program, National Fire Academy, 1993); Harry Carter,“The Combination Fire Department.”

9 Marinucci, “Transition to a Combination Department”; Eliza-beth Fisher and Beth Nevel, “Team Up for a Winning Combi-nation,” NFPA Journal (May/June1991): 36, 148.

10 Richard Marinucci, “Dual Duty,” Fire Chief Executive (Janu-ary1987), 39–43; “Problem Solving in Combination Depart-ments,” International Association of Fire Chiefs (March/April1988), 27–30; “Transition to a Combination Department.”

11 Scott Baltic, “The Combination Transition.” This conclusionis consistent with the case of the Barrier Island Fire Depart-ment on page 6.

12 In Canada, consolidation is called amalgamation.13 http://www.fire-ems.net/resources/library.html.14 Our book, Leading the Combination Fire Department: Finding

Buried Treasure with Career and Volunteer Firefighters, containsappendixes that identify all those interviewed and all theirdepartments and communities.

15 The committee that selects and evaluates CFD fire chiefs in-cludes two other CFD chiefs, the bureau’s volunteer coordi-nator, and the bureau’s personnel specialist.

16 Alec Jensen and Jack Snook, “Consolidations à la Carte,” FireChief (February 2000): 102–5.

17 Kenneth B. Perkins and John Benoit, “Volunteer Fire-Fight-ing Activity in North America as Serious Leisure,” World Lei-sure and Recreation 39, no. 3 (1997): 23–9.

18 We have yet to hear of any problems when both types offirefighters are on the same fireground. The importance of theemergency seems to repress any conflict at the emergencyscene.

19 The live-in volunteer, such as a university student who re-ceives free accommodation for daytime response (except dur-ing class time) is one way to address the problem withoutusing career firefighters. Auburn, Massachusetts, uses fireengineering students from Worcester Polytechnical Institute;and College Park, Maryland, uses fire engineering studentsfrom the University of Maryland.


OTHER ICMA PUBLICATIONS

Benchmarking: A Method for Achieving SuperiorPerformance in Fire and Emergency Medical Services.Explains how fire and emergency medical services canuse benchmarking to keep pace with the rapid changesin their environment and develop an organizationalcommitment to constant improvement. 23 pages. Itemno. 40790. $14.95. MIS Report, 1993.

A Systematic Approach to Fire Service Consolidationand Merger. Describes a method of functionally con-solidating or merging fire departments; from TualatinValley, Oregon. 150 pages. Item no. 40599. $18.00. Clear-inghouse Report, 1990.

Resolving Conflict: Strategies for Local Government.Margaret S. Hermann, editor. How to deal with con-flict inside and outside the organization. Explains howstrategic planning for conflict resolution can save time,money, and energy, and improve community relations.232 pages. Item no. 40900. $24.95. Practical Manage-ment Series paperback, 1994.

To order ICMA publications, call 800/745-8780 or visithttp://bookstore.icma.org.

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