Commercial Pressures on Land

NO MAN’S LANDS? Extractive activity, territory, and social unrest in the Peruvian Amazon: The Cenepa River

This report is part of a wider initiative on Commercial Pressures on Land (CPL). If you would like further information on the initiative and on the collaborating partners, please contact the Secretariat of the International Land Coalition or visit www.landcoalition.org/cpl

International Land CoalitionSecretariat

fax: +39 06 5459 3628info@landcoalition.orgwww.landcoalition.org

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Cover illustration: © Aldo di Domenico 2011

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author, and can in no way be taken to reflect the offcial views of the International Land Coalition, its members or donors.

ISBN 978-92-95093-47-8

© 2011 the International Land Coalition

The Center for Sociological, Economic, Political and Anthropological Research (CISEPA) was founded in 1966, aimed at carrying out both basic and applied research. It was an initiative of the Academic Departments of Social Sciences and Economics and the School of Social Sciences of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru.

SER is a private non-profit institution with national outreach, created in 1980. SER is made up of professionals and specialists committed to promote development and full citizenship. SER is working in partnership with citizens, local governments, social organizations, NGOs and other public and private institutions at local, regional and national level.

Our MissionA global alliance of civil society and intergovernmental organisations working together to promote secure and equitable access to and control over land for poor women and men through advocacy, dialogue, knowledge sharing and capacity building.

Our VisionSecure and equitable access to and control over land reduces poverty and contributes to identity, dignity and inclusion.

CIRAD works with the whole range of developing countries to generate and pass on new knowledge, support agricultural development and fuel the debate on the main global issues concerning agriculture.

CIRAD is a targeted research organization, and bases its operations on development needs, from field to laboratory and from a local to a global scale.

NO MAN’S LANDS? Extractive activity, territory, and social unrest in the Peruvian Amazon: The Cenepa River

Prepared by: Anahí Durand, Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales January 2011

Acknowledgements The research project of the Commercial Pressures on Land Initiative was coordinated in

the ILC secretariat by Michael Taylor, with the support of Andrea Fiorenza. Ward Anseeuw

of CIRAD provided technical support to all studies and the project was based on a

conceptual framework developed by Michel Merlet and Clara Jamart of Agter. A large

number of members and partners of ILC and independent specialists have contributed to

the research, analysis and documentation of the project.

ILC wishes to thank the following donors, whose support made possible the research

under the Commercial Pressures on Land Initiative:

The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of these

donors. ILC Secretariat would appreciate receiving copies of any publication using this

study as a source at info@landcoalition.org.

Foreword The International Land Coalition (ILC) was established by civil society and multilateral

organisations who were convinced that secure access to land and natural resources is

central to the ability of women and men to get out of, and stay out of, hunger and

poverty.

In 2008, at the same time as the food price crisis pushed the number of hungry over the

one billion mark, members of ILC launched a global research project to better understand

the implications of the growing wave of international large-scale investments in land.

Small-scale producers have always faced competition for the land on which their

livelihoods depend. It is evident, however, that changes in demand for food, energy and

natural resources, alongside liberalisation of trade regimes, are making the competition

for land increasingly global and increasingly unequal.

Starting with a scoping study by ILC member Agter, the Commercial Pressures on Land

research project has brought together more than 30 partners, ranging from NGOs in

affected regions whose perspectives and voices are closest to most affected land users, to

international research institutes whose contribution provides a global analysis on

selected key themes. The study process enabled organisations with little previous

experience in undertaking such research projects, but with much to contribute, to

participate in the global study and have their voices heard. Support to the planning and

writing of each study was provided by ILC member CIRAD.

ILC believes that in an era of increasingly globalised land use and governance, it is more

important than ever that the voices and interests of all stakeholders – and in particular

local land users - are represented in the search for solutions to achieve equitable and

secure access to land.

This report is one of the 28 being published as a part of the global study. The full list of

studies, and information on other initiatives by ILC relating to Commercial Pressures on

Land, is available for download on the International Land Coalition website at

www.landcoalition.org/cplstudies.

I extend my thanks to all organisations that have been a part of this unique research

project. We will continue to work for opportunities for these studies, and the diverse

perspectives they represent, to contribute to informed decision-making. The implications

of choices on how land and natural resources should be used, and for whom, are stark. In

an increasingly resource-constrained and polarised world, choices made today on land

tenure and ownership will shape the economies, societies and opportunities of tomor-

row’s generations, and thus need to be carefully considered.

Madiodio Niasse

Director, International Land Coalition Secretariat

Table of contents Acknowledgements Foreword Table of contents Acronyms Executive summary

Introduction 1

1 Territory, population, and extractive pressure on Amazonian lands 4

2 State policy, regulations, and government agenda 13

3 Social unrest: problems and perspectives 20

4 Conclusions 31 Annex: map of mining claims in Bagua 34 Bibliography 35

Acronyms AIDESEP Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Forest

APRA Popular American Revolution Alliance

BCRP Central Reserve Bank of Peru

CAH Aguaruna Huambisa Council

CISEPA Center for Sociological, Economic, Political, and Anthropological Research

COFOPRI Commission for the Formalization of Informal Property

FEMAM Federation of Women of the Upper Marañón

FTA Free Trade Agreement

HDI Human Development Index

IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

ILC International Land Coalition

ILO International Labor Organization

ILV Summer Linguistic Institute

INDEPA National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-

Peruvian Peoples

INEI National Institute of Statistics and Information

INGEMMET Geological, Mining, and Metallurgic Institute

INRENA National Institute of Natural Resources

MEM Ministry of Energy and Mines

MINAG Ministry of Agriculture

NGO Non-governmental organization

ODECOAC Organization for the Development of the Communities of the Upper

Comaina

ODECOFROC Organization for the Development of the Border Communities of the

Cenepa Watershed

ORPIAN Indigenous Peoples of the Northern Peruvian Amazon

OSINERGMIN Office of Supervision of Investment in Energy and Mining

PCM Presidency of the Council of Ministers

PEA Economically active population

POS Political opportunity structures

PUCP Pontificia Catholic University of Peru

SAIPE Agricultural Service for Economic Research and Promotion

SERNANP National Service of Natural Areas Protected by the State

UN United Nations

Executive summary In Latin America, one of the most typical manifestations of the global phenomenon of

land concentration is the occupation by extractive companies of the Amazonian ecosys-

tem, which not only has negative environmental consequences but also affects the

indigenous communities who have held the land since time immemorial.

In this context, the objective of this report is to study an illustrative case of how extractive

activities have been established in the environs of the Cenepa River and land held by the

Awajun community in the northern forests of Peru. The study reconstructs the cycle that

has already become common in countries of the Amazon Basin: mining concessions,

state permissiveness, and social conflict.

From this perspective, the first part describes encounters between a large mining

company, Minera Afrodita, which is protected by its economic capacity and national legal

status, and the indigenous community, which lacks land title. Nonetheless, the Awajun

people have rapidly adopted modern means of defense, requesting first that, for conser-

vation reasons, their territory be declared a reserved zone and, later, a national park.

The second part of the report analyzes Peru’s national legal and institutional framework,

which adheres, albeit only formally, to international standards of environmental protec-

tion and defense of indigenous human rights. In practice, motivated by a conviction that

the Amazon is an “empty” territory and that its “occupation” will inevitably bring progress,

successive governments since the 1990s have applied the legal framework in a biased

fashion, allowing the mining company to establish itself in the national park area in order

to explore gold and copper deposits.

The emergence of conflict was an all but obvious consequence of the situation, and the

third part of this document deals with this. It explains how the indigenous communities

embarked on a gradual course of action that began by allying with other entities (such as

local municipalities, regional political organizations, or environmental NGOs). It continues

with their rigorous compliance with legal proceedings as regards public agencies;

however, when these turned out to be ineffectual in safeguarding their territory, they

resorted to violence. Only then were three-way State–company–community negotiations

established, which began discussing the environment and economic compensation for

the affected parties, and paying attention to multiculturalism.

However, the author notes in her conclusions that the temporary equilibrium achieved is

unstable and could be disrupted if the actors involved do not recognize that, far from

being lands belonging to no one, they belong to everyone.

1

Introduction “Each year, as forest rivers shrink, beaches or sandbars appear, a no man’s

land, but with moisture and fertilizers brought by forest rivers. The State

should grant, through sale or rent, these large parcels of land …. We are

talking about millions of hectares of idle land for wood, because the com-

munities did not cultivate nor will cultivate anything, mineral deposits that

are not being worked, oil in the subsoil that is being wasted.” (García 2007)1

With these words, referring to the Amazonian sandbars as “a no man’s land”, and using

the image of a “dog in the manger” to describe Amazonian natives who demand their

rights to these territories, President Alan García of Peru set out a vision of the forest as an

open zone for exploitation. By doing this, he affirmed a neoliberal doctrine supporting

the promotion of private investment in the exploitation of raw materials, basically oil and

minerals found in the subsoil of national territory, which today are supposedly being

“wasted” by the “obstinacy and incompetence” of the indigenous and campesino

communities living there.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, under the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori,

structural adjustment policies undertaken in Peru meant, among other things, the

enactment of new laws favorable to private investment in extractive activities and the

reform of land use legislation. The application of these reforms during the Fujimori

regime, which has been continued and indeed strengthened by successive governments,

had differing effects according to the country’s territorial and ethnic diversity, but the

reforms have reconfigured the investment environment and uses of land both in coastal

valleys in the Andes and in the Amazon forest. Such reforms have brought with them

new flashpoints of social unrest, as they directly influence the ways of life and organiza-

tion of peoples who demand their right to make decisions regarding the territories they

live in.

In particular, the continuing desire to encourage extractive activities has led to modifica-

tions to a series of regulations and decrees. This happened with the legislative decrees

enacted by the Executive Branch in June 2008, in the framework of the extraordinary

powers granted by Congress to legislate on issues dealing with the introduction of the

Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. Several of these decrees, such as

numbers 1015 and 1073, sought to promote private investment in the lands of indigen-

ous and campesino communities. In parallel, Bill 840 was introduced, which sought to

modify the Law on the Promotion of Private Investment in Reforestation and Agroforestry

1 The emphasis is added by the case study author.

2

and to change the model for granting concessions to “uncultivated” Amazonian territo-

ries. This contradicts Article 66 of the Peruvian Constitution, which stipulates that lands

that are suitable for forestry are the nation’s patrimony. It also encourages deforestation,

as many agents can encourage this by requesting land under the pretext of reforesting it.

The development of this government policy, openly biased towards the development of

extractive activities, puts great pressure on the territories of communities and indigenous

peoples, whose existence and collective rights have been widely recognized in Peruvian

law, including by the Constitution and the Agrarian Reform Law, and under international

instruments such as International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 on Indigen-

ous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. This situation has led to increased

conflict in such territories, with companies confronting communities who see their

subsistence resources and lifestyle endangered by government attitudes that tend to put

in opposition the interests of these “archaic peoples” with those of the country, which

needs to exploit resources for its development needs.

During the past few years, there have been a series of conflicts between indigenous

peoples and extractive companies in the Amazon, as well as more generalized protests. In

March 2008, for example, members of the indigenous Achuar people occupied an airport

belonging to the Pluspetrol oil company in the district of Andoas. In July 2008, the

Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Forest (AIDESEP) called a

mass strike that mobilized most of the ethnic groups in the Amazon. After almost a

month of protests, the protestors halted the strike after succeeding in having the

legislative decrees in question rendered null and void. Nonetheless, other decrees

continued in force, and consequently the strike resumed in May 2009. The conflict

became more acute with the blocking of roads in June of that year, and culminated in

the deplorable deaths of 31 people when police tried to remove protestors occupying a

national road in the province of Bagua.

A case representative of conflicts between extractive companies and Amazonian com-

munities over the ownership and use of land is one that occurred in the province of

Condorcanqui, in the Cóndor mountain range near the Peru–Ecuador border. In this area,

Minera Afrodita, a subsidiary of the Canadian company Dorato Resources, was granted

5,100 hectares in concession for mining exploration, with to the intention of extracting

gold, copper, and uranium resources. The Awajum and Wampis peoples, who have

ancestral ties to that area, have systematically opposed mining activities in a variety of

ways, as they fear that the Cenepa and Marañón rivers will be contaminated with mercury

and cyanide, which will in turn affect the entire ecosystem.2 Their unease at the advance

of mining, despite repeated requests by indigenous organizations supporting opposition

to it, led the Awajum people to detain five company workers in order to demand that the

State intervene and regulate polluting activities in a zone that had already been desig-

nated an ecological reserve.

2 “El Cenepa tras la guerra” [The Cenepa River After the War]. La República [Lima]. January 29, 2009.

3

The expansion of extractive activities in Amazonian territories has been little studied,

especially in comparison with the current expansion of mining in the Andes and on the

coast, which has been documented and analyzed to a far greater extent. For this reason,

it is important to analyze how land in the Peruvian Amazon is used and exploited and the

social unrest that exists there; this is the purpose of the present study.3

The present research analyzes the current dynamic of extractive concessions and

exploitation in the Cenepa River area and the pressure exerted on the Awajum people’s

territories. It focuses on the social unrest generated and the positions taken by the main

actors involved: the mining company, the State, and indigenous organizations. The first

section offers an overview of the current situation affecting the territory of the Cenepa

River zone. The situation of the indigenous population and existing pressures on land are

reviewed; a distinction is made between the hectares granted in mining concessions and

the ecological reserve zone. In the second section, a brief assessment is made of the

regulations in force regarding property, land concessions, and collective rights under the

framework of a government agenda that is clearly inclined towards favoring extractive

activities. In the third section, we analyze the social unrest that originated in Cenepa as a

result of these activities, in particular the main strategies utilized by indigenous organiza-

tions and the responses employed by the State and the company. In the conclusion, we

bring together the key findings of the investigation.

We hope that this case study will illuminate what is happening in other areas of the

Amazon that are experiencing or have passed through similar processes. Given its

exploratory nature, its purpose is to serve as a step towards new and deeper research that

might be carried out in the future.

3 To prepare this report, we have utilized a qualitative methodology that combines the collection of secondary

information from State institutions and private companies operating in the Cenepa River zone as well as from local and national indigenous organizations; the review of public sources of information – newspapers, webpages, statistics, books, and magazines; and an analysis of regulations related to indigenous rights and extractive activities. In addition, the principal protagonists in the conflict were interviewed in Amazonas as well as in Lima in 15 semi-structured interviews with local authorities, indigenous leaders, professionals, and officials. Some of these are cited in the text.

4

1 Territory, population, and extractive pressure on Amazonian lands

In recent years, the issue of recognizing and defending “collective rights” has occupied a

prominent position in Peru’s public debates, with emphasis above all on the need to

respect the rights of indigenous peoples settled in the Amazon. Theoretically, the

concept of “collective rights” defines the ways in which a group can exercise and demand

protection and enjoy certain powers. Two variants of collective rights can be identified:

those that can be demanded and exercised only by the group and those that can be

demanded by each member of the group individually (McKay 1999). Most important

among the rights that can be exercised only by the group is the right to self-

determination, which refers to the right to exercise, enjoy, and ensure cultural integrity

and survival. This is a common-law regulation in international law that seeks to guarantee

that indigenous peoples have autonomy within each country, without affecting national

unity. It includes fundamental aspects such as the right to territory.

Ensuring the right to territory implies accepting that a people and its culture are insepar-

ably united with the environment in which they live; for that reason, land is considered to

be an indivisible space that includes the forest, its soils, and resources which indigenous

peoples utilize as a livelihood resource in order to ensure their subsistence and survival.

Complementary to the right to self-identification and to land is the right to consent,

consultation, and agreement. This refers to the legal authority of ethnic/cultural groups to

intervene in government decisions that concern and directly affect them. The right to

consent implies explicit acceptance of the degree of political maneuver that the State

possesses, but goes hand-in-hand with agreement, since there can only be consent if

there is consensus with respect to particular policies. This makes it effective to exercise

the right to consultation.

We should note that if indigenous peoples are dispossessed of their territories, their right

to self-identification is threatened, as it includes much more than the right to property;

this is why international law seeks to guarantee this right. In its September 2007 declara-

tion on the rights of indigenous peoples, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly

established that, in reference to land, such people should be granted a higher degree of

protection, considering the particular connection they have with the land and its

resources. This implies significant limitations on the exercise of State powers in utilizing

areas in which indigenous peoples live. On a related note, Convention 169, cited above,

clearly affirms that “territory” comprises the totality of the habitat that indigenous peoples

occupy or utilize, in either a permanent or sporadic fashion. “Habitat” refers to a place that

5

combines the appropriate conditions for the life of a community, respecting diverse

forms of relating to nature; as such, respecting indigenous and tribal rights to land and its

resources guarantees their rights to cultural integrity and to life. As the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) points out: “… for indigenous communities, the

relationship with the land is not merely a question of possession and production, but

rather a material and spiritual element which they should fully enjoy, including for

preservation of their cultural legacy and transmittal to future generations” (2001). The

recognition of this all-encompassing idea of land, which connects property, develop-

ment, and cultural identity, is what indigenous Amazonian organizations demand:

“We refer to indigenous peoples’ territory as mother territory, because from

it we as indigenous people live; it is all of the geography we inhabit, from

there we get the earth, each day’s nourishment, we also take wood for the

construction of our homes, all that is needed for local use by the popula-

tion of the land where we work. …. Well, the land is the mother for the

indigenous movement, it is what makes us live a healthy life, the forest is

not contaminated, we do not live, we do not use a contaminated river, air,

it is the essence of the indigenous world, the basis of our existence.”4

In this study, the territory in question is the Cenepa River watershed, located in Cenepa

district of Condorcanqui province, in the Amazonas region. The ethnic groups that

predominate in this zone are the Awajum and Wampis. Both peoples belong to the

Jíbaro ethno-linguistic family, which is found on both sides of the Peru–Ecuador border.

Other groups in this family are the Shiwar and Achuar in Peru and the Shuar and Achuar

in Ecuador; in total they comprise close to 150,000 individuals, a figure that makes them

one of the most numerous ethno-linguistic families in the Amazon. In Peru, according to

the National Population Census of 2002, the approximate population of the Awajum is

45,528 men and women in 247 communities, while the Wampis number 12,000. The

Awajum constitute 16.6% of the country’s indigenous Amazonian population, the second

largest after the Asháninka, who represent 26%. The Awajum and Wampis inhabit forest

zones within the northeastern Marañón River watershed, in the regions of Cajamarca, San

Martín, and, principally, Amazonas.

This area was difficult to colonize, and settlers were able to establish themselves in the

Upper Marañón between the Santiago, Cenepa, and Nieva rivers only in the first half of

the 20th century. The process of colonization was encouraged by the State after the

border conflict with Ecuador in 1941, which intensified the occupation of Awajum and

Wampis territories. The presence of cultural and religious institutions also increased, such

as the faith-based Summer Institute of Linguistics (ILV) – today known as SIL International

– which entered the zone in 1947, and the first Jesuit missions, which were established in

1949, practically alongside the evangelical groups.

4 Interview with Professor Elías Mayan, founder and president of the Organization for the Development of the

Communities of the Upper Comaina (ODECOAC), October 16, 2009 in Santa María de Nieva.

6

The State, for its part, continued its commitment to “peopling” the area and, in 1968,

inaugurated the Colonization Project of the Upper Marañón, with the granting of lands to

impoverished campesino families, most of whom had come from Cajamarca, Lambaye-

que, Piura, and Amazonas. While this project failed to achieve the promises of State

financing or investment, the families stayed in the zone, which generated land conflicts

with the ethnic groups. This was the context in which the first regional organizations of

the Awajum were formed, among which the Aguaruna Huambisa Council (CAH) stands

out. This was founded in 1978 as the first Amazonian indigenous organization in the

country, and was a key element in the creation of AIDESEP (Calderón 2008).

In Cenepa district, the population of Awajum and Wampis is estimated at 9,626 inhabi-

tants; it is one of the few predominantly indigenous districts, as it has no settlements of

tenant farmers. In socio-economic terms, the Awajum population is experiencing a

difficult situation of exclusion and poverty. For example, Amazonas is the region in which

poverty figures have increased the most, with an inverse trend to that of the country as a

whole.5

On top of this difficult scenario of exclusion and disrespect for their socio-economic

rights, the Awajum people have had to face constant infringements on their territory, not

only due to the advance of settlers but also to the current pressure on the soil and subsoil

for purposes of mining, oil, and forestry exploitation. In the case of timber, the main

activity is illegal tree-felling by small and medium contractors, who cut down trees in an

unplanned fashion and endanger the survival of valuable species for lack of rational

management of the resource. With regards to mineral and oil exploration, the Peruvian

State has an open commitment to promote a policy of concessions in Condorcanqui

province. For now this is limited to exploration activities, but in the future it could devolve

to exploitation activities.

It should be mentioned that, since the beginning of 2000, extractive activities in the

Peruvian Amazon have intensified to a considerable degree. Of its 75 million hectares,

more than 53 million hectares are covered by hydrocarbon and mineral lots. This means

that nearly 70% of the region has been divided into lots, including natural protected

areas, territories reserved for uncontacted indigenous peoples, and territories titled to

indigenous communities. In the Cenepa watershed, the Geological, Mining, and Metal-

lurgic Institute (INGEMMET) of the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) has registered

5 According to the National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI), while poverty in Peru diminished in

2008 from 39.3% to 36.2% of the population, in Amazonas it grew from 55% in 2007 to 58% in 2008. In Condorcanqui province, the rate of extreme poverty is 45.2%, while the rate of chronic malnutrition is 73.2% and the economically active population (PEA) with no profession amounts to 90% of the population. Likewise, the poorest districts in Condorcanqui are those where the Awajum and Wampis indigenous peoples predominate, such as Cenepa, where 84.3% of inhabitants live in a state of poverty, Río Santiago with 80.7%, and Santa María de Nieva with 70.7%. On the Human Development Index (HDI), Cenepa district scores 0.4906, which places it as a district of medium-low development i.e. on the penultimate rung of the scale. Illiteracy in the area reaches 28% and is one of the highest figures in the country. The maternal mortality rate is high – 1.8 out of every 1,000 live births – as is the infant mortality rate, at 14.33 of every 1,000 children younger than one year of age.

7

approximately 150 mining exploration claims, none of which has complied with the

requirement of prior consultation established in Convention 169, which was signed and

ratified by Peru.

Cenepa is a zone rich in gold and uranium. Exploitation began most recently in 1981

when, after the Falso Paquisha conflict in the border zone with Ecuador known as

Chinchipe-Nambija, surveys were initiated of the ancient gold veins. In 1987, during the

first government of Alan García, the discovery was announced of an area with extraordi-

nary gold-bearing potential in the Cóndor Mountain Range. However, given its border

location and the still recent conflict with Ecuador, the government decided that no

mining claims would be admitted while control of the mountain range remained in the

hands of the army. During the government of Alberto Fujimori, in 1993, after the new

General Mining Law had been enacted,6 private companies began to register claims on

the border. While potential investments appear to have been curbed by the Cenepa war

in 1995, three months after hostilities ended the Metalfin company announced its plans

for mineral exploitation. Shortly thereafter, the company became Minera Afrodita.

Currently, gold and uranium exploration projects have been authorized in the Cóndor

Mountain Range after the territory was granted in concession to the transnational capital

company Grupo Cardero. The company is the owner of Dorato Resources and has

investments in Ecuador and Peru via Dorato Perú, which in turn is the owner of Minera

Afrodita.7 Concession lots have also been granted to the Hocol company for oil explora-

tion.

With the aim of protecting their territory, the Awajum communities of the Cenepa

watershed began a process of land titling in 1977, which unfortunately they were not

able to complete. Currently, indigenous organizations continue to request the legal

expansion, demarcation, and titling of their lands, especially the nine indigenous Awajum

communities who fear that they will be affected by the advance of extractive activities.

When they requested their land titling once more in 2008, the Commission for the

Formalization of Informal Property (COFOPRI) asked them for a payment of 385,588.74

nuevos soles. This was an extremely onerous amount compared with market prices, where

monthly rent for one hectare of land does not exceed 500 nuevos soles, and, in any case,

was impossible for the communities to pay. As a result, the large sum demanded is

perceived by local people as a measure intended to favor mining investment.

In order to curb the advance of extractive activities, and tired of the State’s slowness in

regularizing the titling of communities in the Cenepa watershed, the indigenous organi-

zations chose to request that part of their territory adjacent to Ecuador be considered a

6 Decree number 014-92-MEM, Unique Agreed Text of the General Mining Law of June 1992.

7 In a press article in 2008, Dorato Resources said that it had sold all of its shares in the Peruvian mining company Dorato Perú. The transaction was carried out by means of front companies, however, because by law foreign companies cannot engage in mining exploitation in the zone, which is located less than 50 kilometers from the border with Ecuador.

8

natural protected area, which would guarantee care of its ecosystem and biodiversity.

This strategy of territorial protection is based on solid precedents, such as a 1996 report

by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Conservation International that identified

the zone as a “priority for national biodiversity conservation.” Likewise, in 1998 the peace

accord between Peru and Ecuador covered among its binding points the establishment

of ecological protection zones each side of the border. Following this mandate, in 1999

Ecuador created the El Cóndor Binational Park and decreed the creation of the Cóndor

Mountain Range Protected Forest, El Sarza Wildlife Refuge, and El Quimi Biological

Reserve. In 1999, the State identified the zone as representative of the eco-region of

montane forest of the Eastern Andean Mountain Range and included it for priority

protection within the National Strategy for Natural Protected Areas. In this context, by

means of Supreme Decree 005-99-AG, the Santiago Comaina Reserve Zone was created,

with a total area of 863,277 hectares, later increased to 1,642,567 hectares.

With the goal of establishing the reserve zone, the National Institute of Natural Resources

(INRENA) charged the National Service of Natural Areas Protected by the State (SERNANP)

with executing the Binational Peace and Conservation Project in the Ecuador–Peru

Cóndor Mountain Range. Thus initiated a broad process of citizen participation, with the

purpose of developing a technical dossier that would scientifically justify the creation of

the future Ichigkat Muja–El Cóndor Mountain Range National Park8 within the Santiago

Comaina Reserve Zone.

Additionally, this process was legitimized by the indigenous peoples represented by the

Organization for the Development of the Border Communities of the Cenepa Watershed

(ODECOFROC) and by the Organization for the Development of the Communities of the

Upper Comaina (ODECOAC), both affiliates of the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of

the Northern Peruvian Amazon (ORPIAN), which in turn is affiliated with AIDESEP. This was

a “pragmatic” solution to preserve this important cultural space for the Awajum; because

it is located in the Sabintza stream in which the apus (traditional communal leaders)

submerge themselves in order to see visions, they chose to accept the creation of a

national park:

“We worked with INRENA and with Conservation International. We worked

with the same population, then, in a process of dialogue, of consultation.

Notwithstanding it being a cultural space, the populace chose to create a

national park to be at the disposal of the entire national population; and

why not say at the international level, as it is the lungs of the world. The

ecology that we conserve is what is fundamental, because it is all we have

left in Peru.”9

8 Ichikgat muja means “mountain tree” in the Awajum language.

9 Interview with Professor Zebelio Káyap, president of ODECOFROC, on October 2, 2009 in Lima.

9

During this participatory process, it was also agreed that the national park would border

land of indigenous communities that had already been titled, the areas requested for

expansion, and the boundaries of new communities yet to be titled. Finally, after work

directed by INRENA that lasted nearly two-and-a-half years, at the end of 2004 the

proposal was made to partially classify the Santiago-Comaina Reserve Zone as the

Ichigkat Muja–El Cóndor Mountain Range National Park with an area of 152,873 hectares.

Additionally, the indigenous communities’ decision on the boundaries of the park and its

compatibility with communal territories was accepted. It should not be forgotten that the

indigenous people’s acceptance of the national park was a strategy to protect the

territory in the face of the threat posed by extractive activities, and that is how the

communal authorities have explicitly declared it. Nonetheless, the problem was that,

within the area designated for the park, there were four pre-existing mining concessions

that belonged to Minera Afrodita, which since 1995 had had concessions in the zone. The

company felt that the national park should respect its acquired rights but it forgot that,

when it came to prior acquired rights, the indigenous people were there much earlier.

During the following years, pressure exerted by mining companies on the territory

continued to intensify considerably. In 2005, shortly after the Santiago-Comaina Reserve

Zone had been estabished, a considerable number of exploration claims for gold

exploitation that overlapped totally or partially with the reserve zone were filed with the

MEM Directorate of Mining Concessions. The owners of these exploration claims were

linked to the Canadian company Dorato Resources, by means of Minera Afrodita. They

needed a favorable opinion from INRENA in order for their claims to be approved, but

met with refusal on two occasions. Faced with this situation, MEM decided to suspend

the process for mining exploration claims until the definitive area of the national park was

approved. In November 2005, as part of a pressure campaign by mining interests, INRENA

was called on to reform its initial proposal when a multi-sectoral government commis-

sion “urged” it to declare the “immediate compatibility of mining with a protected zone”,

a step necessary to reduce the area that had initially been destined for the national park.10

In this case, because a border zone was involved, the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs was needed, which this time also favored mining.

The pronouncements of the multi-sectoral commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

demonstrate the strong pressure that exists on the Cenepa watershed territory and the

interests of transnational companies, in particular Minera Afrodita. Finally, INRENA gave in

and issued a second proposal for the creation of the park, without consulting the

indigenous communities or contributing any new technical argument. According to this

new proposal, the Ichigkat Muja–El Cóndor Mountain Range National Park would be

reduced from 152,873 hectares to only 88,477 hectares, little more than half the original

proposal, which left a considerable part of the Awajum and Wampis territory for mining

10 Minutes of the multi-sectoral commission meeting, held at the Ministry of Defense on November 8, 2005,

attended by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, INRENA, and the legal manager of Minera Afrodita.

10

use. This reduction in the size of the park was made official through Supreme Decree 023-

2007-AG of August 9, 2007. That same week, a series of mining exploration claims was

approved in the zone that had been left free, ignoring the previous reports issued by

INRENA itself:

“It is as if from one day to the next, by virtue of the documents, a zone

ceases to be ecologically vulnerable. Now this zone, in ecological terms, is

considered to be a highly vulnerable zone, with a very high degree of bio-

logical biodiversity, with a very high concentration of endemic species, and

very vulnerable due to climatic conditions. First, because it is the headwa-

ters of watersheds. Here is a map that indicates all of the watersheds that

begin in the Cóndor Mountain Range, which feed, for example, the Santi-

ago River, the Cangaza, the Cenepa, large rivers that are fed by the

watersheds that are born in the Cóndor Mountain Range, which is where

the project of mining concessions has been approved, and that the na-

tional park attempted to protect as an intangible zone.”11

With this measure, hailed by MEM, the State failed to recognize the indigenous peoples’

ownership of the land and showed how little interest it has in creating protected areas. It

also failed to recognize the process of participation and consultation with indigenous

communities carried out by INRENA to define the zone that would contain the national

park. It is clear that the State’s choice of extractive activities weakens the protection of

natural resources and the rights of indigenous peoples. The incompatibility of extractive

activities and indigenous peoples is evident, given the ecological and geographic

characteristics that make the territory comprised by the park a highly vulnerable place –

so much so that INRENA itself recognizes that the park is a “hot spot”12 of worldwide

importance due to the diversity of flora and fauna that it contains and that, consequently,

any activity that is developed there will inevitably alter the water regimen of the Cenepa

watershed by affecting the volumes of the rivers.

Additionally, the dossier notes that the Halcón 1 exploratory mining claim overlaps with a

complicated system of streams that forms part of the headwaters of the Cenepa River,

and for that reason it recommends not initiating the development of mining activities. By

issuing its second national park proposal, in which the size of the protected area has been

reduced by 40%, INRENA itself clearly affirms that mining activity will have significant

impacts on the ecosystems of the border region. Nonetheless, it does not provide any

argument against this and ends by resolving to reduce the protected area.

11 Interview with the lawyer Marco Huaco, counsel to Racimos de Ungurahui, legal representative of ODE-

COFROC, on August 27, 2009 in Lima.

12 “Hot spot” is the term used to refer to critical eco-regions that concentrate very high levels of biodiversity and are in a state of environmental emergency. The tropical Andes “hot spot,” where the El Cóndor Moun-tain Range is located, has been designated “epicenter of worldwide biodiversity”.

11

Minera Afrodita is already working in the Cenepa watershed. In documents dated May

2009, the company announced its intention to continue its exploration work under the

protection of mining law, not recognizing the right to consultation protected by Conven-

tion 169. The territories where the mining company plans to carry out its activities

comprise the Cenepa district and the El Tambo and Ciro Alegría military operation posts.

Specifically, according to INGEMMET, Minera Afrodita is the owner of the following

mining concessions located in the Cenepa district: Apu, comprising 8.7 hectares; Campa-

na 1, with 1,000 hectares; Campana 2, with 900 hectares; Comaina 1, with 1,000 hectares;

Comaina 2, with 1,000 hectares; Comaina 3, with 1,000 hectares; and Hito, with 110

hectares. This totals a little over 5,000 hectares granted in concession for mining activities,

much of which is located on indigenous communities’ land titled in natural protected

areas and located less than 50 kilometers from the Ecuador border.

According to Minera Afrodita, it has not yet carried out any mineral extraction work in the

zone and has limited its activities to exploration of the land by means of helicopter

reconnaissance flights, topographical surveying, and walking tours by teams of geolo-

gists. However, it is known that gold deposits exist both on the Peruvian and Ecuadoran

sides of the border and that the company plans to explore these in the short term. One of

the most significant is located in the Kumpanan hill, in the Awajum community of

Huampami, right in the middle of the Cóndor Mountain Range. It is important to remem-

ber that the peace treaty with Ecuador not only includes the creation of ecological zones

adjacent to the border, but also the signing of a mining and energy agreement to exploit

gold here, which is known to be of very high quality. This agreement has not yet been

signed, but it is already arousing the expectations of many mining companies in both

countries, such as Aurelian in Ecuador and Dorato Resources in Peru.

The presence of mining in the zone is perceived as a threat to the ecological and cultural

stability of the populace, and is already causing social unrest between communities, the

company, and the State. There is also some uncertainty about the nature of the mining

activities: while MEM claims that neither Dorato nor Afrodita are working in the Cenepa

watershed, indigenous leaders maintain that the companies are in fact carrying out

exploratory activities and the municipality of Condorcanqui is unaware of the real

situation regarding work in the zone. Héctor Requejo, the provincial mayor, declared

when he was consulted:

“Last year, we intervened at Minera Afrodita with all the authorities and the

apus of Cenepa. We did all the follow-up, including speaking with the Vice

Minister of Energy and Mines in Huampami, and he, using documents we

have right here, informed us that Minera Afrodita was not authorized, and

even less so Dorato; they were not authorized to carry out the intervention

in the zone and as such were illegal, they were in bidding in the sector. We

said that was the way it is, that the sector should intervene and remove it.

That’s how it’s stayed. Now I know that they have been working, I can’t

12

deny it, there are comments made that they continue to work, but I do not

know if they are entering with greater force.”13

No authorization from MEM exists for the company to initiate operations in either

exploration or exploitation, but the commitment that the State has demonstrated

towards mining means that this could change at any moment. This State partiality was

reflected, for example, in the attendance of Afrodita representatives at meetings of the

multi-sectoral commission at which the reduction in scale of the national park was

discussed. Likewise, it is known that mineworkers tend to stay at a border military post

during the prospecting and exploration work. These facts provide the indigenous people

with reason to suppose that, upon initiating mining exploitation, the State will be on the

side of the companies and will fail to recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples.

Increasing the pressure on Awajum territory, the Colombian oil company Hocol, recently

acquired by French capital, has in recent months obtained a concession to Lot 116 in the

Nieva district, which also comprises part of the Cenepa and Santiago rivers. The oil

company’s intention is to drill two wells in the area of the Domingusa River, a tributary of

the Nieva River, which would harm the drainage area of the Marañón River.

All of this pressure on the territory directly affects the population and has led indigenous

organizations to reject mining activities; they have manifested on many occasions and in

different ways their dissatisfaction with the State policy of mining promotion that leads to

the failure to recognize even regulations that are in force. By appealing to national and

international regulations, the indigenous peoples are confronted with an agenda that is

obstinately committed to extractive activities, as will be seen in the following section.

13 Interview with nursing technician Héctor Requejo, provincial mayor of Condorcanqui, on October 16, 2009

in Santa María de Nieva.

13

2 State policy, regulations, and government agenda From around the beginning of the 1990s, with the establishment of the neoliberal

economic model under the Fujimori government, a series of reforms was initiated that

led to the opening of markets, privatization of public enterprises, modification of labor

laws, and enactment of new laws favorable to private investment, particularly by the

extractive industry. The General Mining Law declared mining activities to be of public

utility and the promotion of mining investments to be in the “national interest.” By means

of the concession system, Peru granted rights to third parties – individuals or companies

– to carry out activities involving the use of subsoil natural resources in concession areas

ranging from 100 hectares to a maximum of 10,000 hectares.14

This policy encouraged accelerated sales of public assets, exploration claims, and

concessions, with broad State support. Under the Fujimori regime as well as during the

subsequent governments of Alejandro Toledo and Alan García, priority tasks on the

political agenda included the promotion of investment in mining and oil activities.

The pressure created by this process on Amazonian territories is in conflict with the

national and international agreements and regulations signed by Peru. The rights of

indigenous peoples have been discussed in depth in international law, and this has

resulted in some important points of consensus regarding their sovereignty and rights to

their territory (Orellana 2009). A first consensus reached by international regulations refers

to the right of indigenous peoples to exist: the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved by the UN, recognizes that the cultures

of all peoples form part of a common patrimony and, as such, should be preserved and

their integrity protected, which also means that indigenous peoples cannot be deprived

of their means of subsistence or of protection of their rivers, forests, and other sources of

sustenance. A second consensus reached refers to the right to self-determination, which

is recognized by the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and

by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In their common Article I,

these hold that all peoples have the right to self-determination, are free to determine

their own political status, and to aspire to their own economic, social, and cultural

development. A third consensus revolves around the right to live free from discrimination

and condemns racism in all its forms. The World Conference against Racism, Racial

14 A summary procedure was also stipulated. In response to a request for an exploration claim, the State grants

free areas to investors, but business people must pay differing sums according to a ‘grid’ system if large- or medium-scale mining is involved. However, these concession grids have not been demarcated on the basis of land studies and often they contain national reserves, campesino communities, and indigenous Amazo-nian peoples, who by law are the owners of the soil but not of the subsoil resources, which belong to the State.

14

Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Other Forms of Intolerance, held in Durban in 2001,

recognized that indigenous peoples have been the victims of discrimination for centuries

and that, as such, states should be responsible for their full spiritual, physical, and cultural

existence (Orellana 2009).

With the binding nature of these rights recognized by the international community,

Convention 169 was approved on June 7, 1989. This document begins from a recognition

of the right of indigenous peoples to assume control over their institutions, ways of life,

and development, maintaining their cultural identity within the framework of states.

Likewise, international law establishes their right to enjoy these powers to the same

degree as the rest of the population, in order to give legal security to peoples who face

situations of discrimination or exclusion. In 1993, Peru ratified Convention 169 by means

of Legislative Resolution 26253. More recently, in September 2007, it signed the UN

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which, among other things, affirms that

territory entails not only a right to property but is linked to the very existence of an

indigenous group as a collective subject. Both Convention 169 and the Declaration grant

a higher standard of protection to indigenous peoples, considering the unique and

special connection they have to their lands and resources. This superior standard brings

with it very clear limitations regarding the exercise of State powers in terms of the

productive utilization of indigenous territories (Racimos de Ungurahui 2009).

When mineral or hydrocarbon resources are found in territories inhabited by indigenous

peoples, a situation of incompatibility results, on which international law has already

passed judgment. For example, in the case of Canada, the United Nations Human Rights

Committee, a body charged with supervising compliance with the International Cove-

nant on Civil and Political Rights, concluded that the government of the province of

Alberta violated Article 27 of this covenant when it granted indigenous territories for oil

exploration and timber production. In the same sense, in the inter-American sphere, the

IACHR, since its creation in 1959, has also promulgated important legislation regarding

indigenous peoples, which has contributed to the protection and promotion of their

rights by means of site visits, amicable settlements, etc. It has also drafted several reports

referencing the state of indigenous peoples’ human rights in member countries; for

example, in a report on Ecuador in 1997, it declared that control over land includes the

capacity to generate resources that sustain life, and that territory is necessary for the

social and cultural reproduction of indigenous peoples. Additionally, the IACHR has been

clear in signaling the need to obtain communities’ authorization, by means of the

consultation mechanism, in order to exploit subsoil resources on indigenous territory.

All of this transnational legislation, ratified by the Peruvian State, shapes a first scenario of

incompatibility between the policy of mining promotion developed by the government

and the rights of indigenous peoples. On successive occasions, of which the conflict at

Cenepa is just one instance, the State has ignored signed commitments, prioritizing

sector regulations and giving preference to its own interests as a promoter of investment

in extractive industries. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Fujimori government decided

15

to split the environmental management and control of mining and hydrocarbon activi-

ties, by giving MEM the responsibility of creating environmental regulations. This

measure, given the pro-mining agenda of recent governments, has been harmful to

indigenous communities settled on land containing mineral resources. Likewise, with an

eye to facilitating mining activity, the State has delegated the function of environmental

oversight and control to companies hired by MEM and the Office of Supervision of

Investment in Energy and Mining (OSINERGMIN). This has outsourced a critical function

that should be assumed by the State itself: the oversight and care of the environment.

Similarly, according to the General Mining Law, State permission or authorization is not

needed to carry out prospecting activities. The law establishes only a few restrictions

related to prospecting in locations adjacent to urban zones or national defense reserve

zones, archaeological sites, or public-use goods, unless with public authorization from the

authorities (Racimos de Ungurahui 2009).

A second scenario of incompatibility is that which exists between the State commitment

to extractive activities and the regulation of natural protected areas.15 In this regard, the

law is clear in affirming that under no circumstances can requests for the use of mineral

and hydrocarbon resources be admitted in natural protected zones. Nor is it permitted to

extract natural resources or to modify the environment in reserves, national parks, or

ecological sanctuaries, according to Article 21 of the same law. Likewise, activities cannot

be carried out in buffer zones or in zones adjacent to a natural protected area if they put

the ecosystem at risk, which should be determined by an environmental impact evalua-

tion. All of these approaches relating to the use of space in natural protected areas

should have demonstrated the impossibility of developing mining and oil activities in the

Santiago-Comaina Reserve Zone and the Ichigkat Muja–Cóndor Mountain Range

National Park.

Thirdly, the State’s commitment to extractive activities also contravenes property rights.

Assuming that the owners of the surface of the land where mining exploration activities

are being carried out are indigenous peoples, there must be prior consultation before

granting the lands in concession, as established by Convention 169:

“In the case that the State has ownership over the minerals or subsoil re-

sources, or has rights to other existing resources in the land, the

governments must establish or maintain procedures with an eye to con-

sulting the interested peoples, in order to determine if the interests of

those peoples would be harmed and if so, to what degree, prior to under-

taking or authorizing any program of prospecting or exploitation of

existing resources on their lands. The interested peoples must participate,

whenever possible, in the benefits that such activities yield, and receive

equitable compensation for any harm that they may suffer as a result of

these activities.” (Convention 169, Article 15, Section 2)

15 Law 26834, Natural Protected Areas Law.

16

This right is one of the points that indigenous organizations, especially those in the

Peruvian Amazon, have demanded with the greatest emphasis by means of various

advocacy and sensitization actions directed towards civil and political society. Their

insistence led a number of members of Congress to introduce three bills oriented

towards enshrining it in law (Bills 413/2006-CR, 427/2006-CR, and 2016/2006-CR). Other

organs such as the Human Rights Ombudsman and the National Coordinating Body of

Human Rights declared themselves in favor of regulation, which produced greater

political attention to the demands. On November 11, 2008, the Congress’s Commission

on Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples, Environment and Ecology approved

a ruling on the right of prior consultation. Apparently, however, this ruling was itself

made without sufficient consultation with the interested peoples, which led to it being

rejected by some of the organizations and social movements involved. Finally, the law

was approved, but the Executive Branch returned it to be revised. To date, definitive

legislation has yet to be approved.

Convention 169 clearly affirms that consultation with indigenous peoples must be carried

out prior to undertaking or authorizing extractive activities. This has not happened in the

case of Cenepa, where Minera Afrodita began its exploration work without consulting the

Awajum communities dwelling in the zone. On repeated occasions, local and national

indigenous organizations asked the government to implement prior consultation,

emphasizing that at issue were titled territories, ceded by the community for the creation

of the national park and not for the purpose of exploiting the subsoil resources. However,

these requests were ignored; indigenous leaders suggest that when the State knows that

a consultation will be unfavorable to extractive industries, it does not implement it.

Leandro Calvo, president of ORPIAN, describes it this way:

“This typical government has not raised the awareness of the indigenous

population, and less so with ORPIAN and AIDESEP, to consult us regarding

in what fashion they will exploit the mining activity, putting commitments

of support on the communities. We do not have a dialogue with this typi-

cal government. I know the work I have been doing with the people, and

at no time has there been any consultation regarding the mineral and oil

companies.”16

Fourthly, the extractive activities in the Cenepa watershed, located less than 50 kilometers

from the Ecuador border, are incompatible with what is stated by the Constitution:

“… [F]oreigners, be they individuals or corporate entities, cannot acquire

nor possess through any title, directly or indirectly, individually or in a

group, among other goods, mines and lands, under penalty of losing, for

the benefit of the State, the right acquired, except in the case of public

16 Interview with Professor Leandro Calvo on October 15, 2009 in Santa María de Nieva.

17

necessity expressly declared by a supreme decree approved by the Council

of Ministers.” (Article 71)

This regulation, instead of curbing the activities of Minera Afrodita, has produced a series

of legal maneuvers that raise even more questions about its presence . First, the company

has sought to erase its links to Dorato Resources – but this is a crude maneuver, as Carlos

Ballón,17 the manager of Minera Afrodita, is also vice president South America of Grupo

Cardero, the transnational capital company that owns Dorato Resources and is legally

established in Canada. Second, Minera Afrodita and its concessions have been sold 100%

to Dorato Perú to make it look like a Peruvian company, but it has not cut its links with its

parent company. Thus, by means of front companies, the true owners have sought to

avoid the constitutional impediment to international companies carrying out, directly or

indirectly, extractive activities near the border. Minera Afrodita’s maneuvers, as much in

getting around the legislation regarding extractive exploration on the border as in

achieving the reduction in size of the park, clearly demonstrate how little respect the

company has for the law and its unconditional support by the Peruvian government. As

Frederica Barclay points out:

“In the legal sphere, we have that figure that buys, sells shares to make it

appear to be a Peruvian company and be able to operate on the border,

avoiding what is stipulated by the Constitution and evading legality. The

other thing is that the decision to reduce the park is a decision directly

influenced by the company, because the whole process is documented

whereby the company convinced Foreign Affairs and Defense that it was a

good idea, that it was necessary to have mining on the border. This dem-

onstrates the margin of maneuvers of companies operating in Peru and

how permissive the State is....”18

Lastly, Peruvian law clearly declares that before initiating exploratory mining activities,

companies should have conducted an approved environmental impact study, save for

exploratory activities related to prospecting and surveying, which are free throughout

national territory provided they do not result in any alteration of the land surface. Such

incompatibilities in the exploratory stage relate to drilling, the use of dynamite, and the

excavation of ditches and, in general, to studies related to open-pit mining, the type of

work that would be undertaken in Cenepa. Environmental legislation also stipulates the

carrying out of prior consultation as a mechanism for citizens’ participation before any

political decision or project is implemented that might harm the environment, although

this is done in a generic fashion and is systematically ignored by extractive companies.

While the original intention was to unify existing regulations by enacting the Law of the

17 It should also be noted that Carlos Ballón drafted the mining chapter of the government plan of the Popular

American Revolution Alliance (APRA) and is an associate of Abel Salinas, ex-minister of the first government of Alan García and current director of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP).

18 Interview with anthropologist Frederica Barclay, professor at PUCP, on September 11, 2009 in Lima.

18

National System of Environmental Impact Evaluation, MEM has continued to create ad

hoc industry-wide regulations to facilitate mining and oil investment.

Nor has this ministry sought to adapt its industry-wide regulations to international law on

indigenous peoples, avoiding its responsibility to consult and legislate in accordance with

international standards to which Peru is a signatory. It has insisted on establishing its own

regulations for participation and consultation, such as when it approved the Regulation

on Citizen Participation in the Mining Subsector. In this document, the right to consulta-

tion is mentioned vaguely, as a participatory process of meetings “with civil society”,

without using the terms “indigenous peoples” or “campesino communities” or “natives”

but rather a generic one – “involved populations”. Nor does the text refer to significant

participation, only responsible; additionally, it clearly states that “consultation does not

grant the involved populations the right to veto mining activities or decisions taken by

the authorities”, which makes this mechanism a mere opinion survey with no binding

force. This contradicts Article 6 of Convention 169, which stipulates that the objective of

consultation is to reach agreement or consent on proposed measures related to the

exploitation of soil and subsoil resources.

Another problem exists regarding timing. MEM seeks citizens’ participation in the phase

after a mining concession has been granted, once again conflicting with Convention 169,

which stipulates that consultation must occur before any soil or subsoil resource explora-

tion or exploitation activities are approved. This contradiction with and failure to

recognize international law is seen by indigenous leaders as clear proof of the govern-

ment’s biased position in favor of extractive activities and its support for a model of

development that affects them:

“The problem that affects us is that the State, without prior consultation,

enacted laws that violated our rights; it continues to not consult the in-

digenous people and without development in accordance with the

historic cosmovision, that is what the people need. The government wants

transnationals to enter without consultation; that would affect the indige-

nous peoples, development, the environment, of which we serve as an

example. The miners with financial resources, the managers, accept and

contaminate their lands and they are dying of illness; we don’t want that

because we want development that accords with the history of the in-

digenous peoples.”19

As can be deduced from the discussion thus far, what is happening in the Cenepa

watershed is the implementation of a policy of promoting mining and oil investment,

unconditional support for which invariably fails to recognize the regulations in force, if

19 Interview with nursing technician Fernando Flores, president of the Santiago River local office of the

Aguaruna Huambisa Council (CAH), on October 13, 2009 in Yutupis.

19

they endanger the development of such activities. This position delegitimizes the action

of the State itself, and ends up generating conflicts that set the population against

various authorities and institutions. As discussed below, social unrest in the zone has

increased considerably and the government does not appear to have the political will to

reach consensus solutions.

20

3 Social unrest: problems and perspectives The Awajum have historically been a warlike people and very jealous of their territorial

integrity, and for that reason the colonization of the zone in previous centuries proved to

be difficult. Currently, they are a peaceful and hospitable people when respected; but

they can also resort to armed defense when acts are committed which they consider to

be attacks and injustices. For example, in 2002 eight settlers who had invaded their

communal territories were executed by Awajum natives in the village of Flor de la

Frontera; more recently, 23 police officers were killed after confrontations in Bagua, in the

context of the Amazonian strike that took place between May and June 2009.

According to anthropologist Frederica Barclay, the Awajum have a strong sense of

territorial belonging, which has been amplified in the case of Cenepa by the fact that

young Awajum rallied in defense of the border and provided valuable services during the

war with Ecuador. That is why they feel betrayed now, as they were allies of the State in

times of war but today their territories are being given to mining interests without taking

into consideration the cultural significance of their lands or consulting them on the type

of development model they expect.20

It is important to consider the dense social fabric that the Awajum people have devel-

oped over recent decades, which has produced representative organizations in different

territorial spheres. The most important, due to its territorial coverage, is ORPIAN, a

regional affiliate of AIDESEP that brings together native groups mainly from the Amazo-

nas and San Martín regions. In second place is CAH, created in 1977, in which the Awajum

and Wampis apus from the various communities participate. In the local arena there is

ODECOAC and ODECOFROC, which is active in Cenepa district and is the organization

that has had the greatest leadership role in the mining conflict. All of these organizations

are proof of a dynamic and active social and cultural life that serves the diverse needs and

interests of the population.21

The level of political participation achieved by indigenous peoples also stands out, since

in Condorcanqui province as well as in the Imaza, Imacita, Río Santiado, and Cenepa

districts, most of the mayors and aldermen are natives who have reached representative

positions in alliance with parties such as Fuerza Democrática (Democratic Force) and

20 Interview with anthropologist Frederica Barclay, professor at PUCP, on September 11, 2009 in Lima.

21 For example, ODECOFROC is in charge of the Women’s Program, focusing on reproductive health; the Agricultural Program, providing technical assistance to community members; and the Handicrafts and Ancestral Music Program, which seeks to preserve and encourage cultural activities related to the develop-ment of handicrafts and the dissemination of the Awajum’s own music.

21

Amazonenses Unidos al Cambio (Amazonians United for Change). The indigenous

authorities who today occupy representative posts and the leaders of these social

organizations have a relatively high level of education: 80% have had a university

education. This has been achieved as a result of personal and communal effort, valuing

the fact that these professionals work in their places of origin. While an absence of

women can be seen in leadership and political posts, significant efforts are being made to

place more women in leadership roles – for example, the work done by the Federation of

Women of the Upper Marañón (FEMAM), which is active in Bagua and Condorcanqui

provinces, principally defending women against domestic violence, providing human

rights training, and encouraging citizen participation, in order to consolidate female

leadership and to overcome marginalization and exclusion of women.

This dense social fabric and the degree of political legitimacy that has been attained are

demonstrated by the diverse means that the indigenous Awajum are trying out to

preserve their territories. They are dynamic actors open to utilizing various strategies, very

far removed from the static image of the easily manipulated “savage” that some biased

media outlets have sought to portray. Such strategies go hand-in-hand with a shared

reading of the context, as both the national and local contexts influence the dynamic of

organizations operating as political opportunity structures (POS) or “consistent signals

from the political arena that favor or limit the action of social movements, impacting their

resources and capacity” (Tarrow 1997). These structures are an indicator for actors of the

probability of them effectively achieving their demands. The indigenous movement in

Cenepa, which has employed various strategies in line with a joint evaluation of the

political situation, is intervening in the conflict with the mining companies with identity

as a fundamental unifying force.

Beyond rational strategic calculations, the Awajum organizations have a strong commit-

ment to identity, based on the claim of common ethnic and cultural features that give

shape to their demands. Actors display varying degrees of interaction, recognizing

common histories, negotiating leadership, and shaping organizations. The “collective”

takes shape in the same process of action, because meanings are incorporated and

consensus is achieved regarding the movement’s needs and the most appropriate

strategies for achieving them. In the words of Melucci: “… [W]ithout the capacity for

identification, the movement would not be able to perceive injustice as such, and would

not be able to calculate the exchanges in the political arena” (Melucci 1999: 339).

The first strategy tested by the Awajum movement in the Cenepa zone to defend their

territory from extractive companies was land titling, i.e. asserting their property rights.

From the beginning of the 1970s, in the context of agrarian reform under the military

government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, indigenous peoples began an intense

effort to title their lands and received a good reception from the State, which accepted

requests to title lands in the name of native communities. However, this process was

interrupted in 1977 after changes within the government and a swing to the right during

the presidency of General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, which left the issue of titling new

22

communities unresolved. Although indigenous organizations have repeatedly requested

titling for their lands ever since, the lack of State will, along with the slowness of its

procedures, has prevented the process from being concluded. Currently, requests for

demarcation, expansion, and titling remain outstanding and have not been attended to,

and this is perceived by the Awajum as a decision to favor mining exploitation in the

Cóndor Mountain Range. The indigenous people view the lack of State interest as a clear

violation of their rights, although it does not invalidate the ownership they exercise over

the territory.

The second strategy developed by the Awajum movement is related to the process,

already mentioned, of creating a reserve zone first and a national park afterwards. As has

been explained, one of the points of the Friendship and Borders Treaty signed in 1998

with Ecuador was the need to create natural protected zones on both sides of the border.

With the goal of demarcating the reserve area and making the creation of the park a

reality, INRENA initiated a process of consultation with the Awajum communities settled

in the zone. From the outset, the consultation had the support of the indigenous

organizations, which requested as the only exception that the boundaries of the national

park should correspond to the boundaries of the communities already titled in the areas

requested for expansion and to the new communities yet to be titled. After nearly three

years of consultations and meetings, agreement was reached in 2004 on the Ichigkat

Muja–El Cóndor Mountain Range National Park, measuring 152,873.76 hectares. This

measure was very well received by the ODECOAC, ODECOFROC, CAH, and AIDESEP

indigenous organizations, whose representatives had participated in the consultations

supporting the process, which they thought would lead to protection of the intangible

nature of their territories.

However, shortly thereafter in 2005 a conflict of interests developed between Minera

Afrodita, supported by MEM and demanding a reduction in the size of the park in order

to initiate mining activities, and INRENA, backed by the native communities who de-

manded that the area originally approved be respected. Finally, after a series of verbal

confrontations, a multi-sectoral commission was created; in 2007 this imposed the pro-

mining government position by decreeing a reduction of the national park by 40%. This

measure, clearly arbitrary, provided evidence of the State’s inclination to favor mining

companies and to contravene its own processes and resolutions. The indigenous people

felt deceived by having been encouraged by the government to participate in a process

that the State itself failed to recognize:

“The problem is that the reserve park has been reduced; it was 150,000

hectares and has been reduced to 86,000. The State has deceived us so

that the mining concessions can enter; so there has not been an explana-

tion given as to why the area was reduced. We participated for years with

INRENA in the consultation, time was required to attend the meetings, and

later they say that more than half has been cut, without asking, without

consulting at all; everything was decided behind our backs. The initiative

23

was to conserve nature as a national park, because we feel threatened; you

see, the miners never do good things, they make offers and do not deliver.

There are other places such as Madre de Dios, Cajamarca, Majaz. The Awa-

jum people complain because pollution is the biggest problem.”22

Predictably, the failure of both these strategies to protect their territory generated a

sensation of indignation and defenselessness on the part of the populace in the face of

the advance of mining, and a third strategy was chosen which considered direct confron-

tation. In November 2008, indigenous people met in the Cenepa district and decided to

send an observation team to the Minera Afrodita camp. After ascertaining the harm

caused by tree felling, they requested a meeting with the company, but this was never

accepted. After this attempt at dialogue failed, the indigenous people, through a series of

official letters and requests, demanded that the company remove its exploration bases,

which also never came to pass.

At this point, a new assembly was held at the ODECOFROC headquarters in the commu-

nity of Mamayaque, in Cenepa, in which it was decided to send a second delegation to

remove the camp. As a precaution, AIDESEP, in Lima, through its secretary Saúl Puerta,

announced that the communities of Cenepa would give Dorato Perú a period of 48 hours

in which to abandon its mining exploration. Neither the company nor the government

responded and a few days after the time period was up, approximately 2,000 Awajum

and Wampis men and women, with their faces painted and carrying spears, dismantled

the camp, which was located within the El Tambo border military post. After carrying out

this action, ODECOFROC once again sent letters to the Presidency of the Council of

Ministers (PCM) and to the Ministers of Environment, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and

Energy and Mines requesting a meeting – though again this never happened.

Faced by this escalation of the conflict, MEM limited itself to stating in a public declara-

tion that the concern of the indigenous organizations was baseless, insomuch as the

company did not yet even have permits to operate. When consulted, the director-general

of mining at MEM, Alfredo Rodríguez, denied having received any letter or document

from the indigenous organizations. He pointed out, additionally, that Minera Afrodita was

backed by Peruvian capital and was in the exploration phase; he hinted that the indigen-

ous people were misinformed and were being manipulated by outside interests.23 These

public declarations, which failed to recognize the numerous official documents and

letters sent by the indigenous organizations, increased the indignation in Cenepa, where

the population had declared itself to be in the fight. Even so, and without properly

gauging the seriousness of the problem, on January 14, 2009 Minera Afrodita sent a

delegation of six workers to continue the exploration work, who entered the community

of Huampami without prior consultation. The communal authorities reacted by detaining

22 Interview with Professor Jesús Manaces, president of CAH, on October 9, 2009 in Urakusa.

23 See El Comercio [Lima]. December 28, 2008.

24

the mineworkers and demanding an immediate dialogue with a high-level State com-

mission as a prior condition to freeing them. They also confiscated their tools and

credentials, which identified them as Dorato Perú personnel.

With the detention of these six workers, the conflict between the populace and Minera

Afrodita attained a national dimension and filled the front pages of various Lima-based

print media. As was explained by the indigenous people, the mine workers were sur-

prised in their exploration work without a permit from the community, measuring land

and taking photographs of the flora and fauna with the goal of carrying out a geological

reconnaissance in order to later transfer heavy machinery. The information issued by the

mining company was once again confusing; while its managers declared to La República

newspaper that they were in the Cóndor Mountain Range legally and that the Dorato

company was not operating in the zone, the Canadian mining company Dorato Re-

sources was reported in an article as saying that it had successfully concluded its

exploration activities by finding the mineral it had been seeking.24

After a week of negotiations, the mining company personnel were freed by the commu-

nity, prior to accepting a document signed by the president of the Council of Ministers in

which he committed to sending a high-level governmental commission to the commu-

nity of Huampami – another promise that was never kept. In March, with passions less

heated, a group of Congress members visited the Cenepa district to dialogue with local

people and was informed by their leaders that they were on maximum alert against the

presence of mining activities and were in a phase prior to a “declaration of war” (Racimos

de Ungurahui 2009). When they returned to Lima the Congress members raised the

alarm about this, but again, faced with company pressure, activities in the zone resumed.

On March 19, there was another confrontation when two government officials, a MEM

engineer and a Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) sociologist, entered the community of

Huampami, supposedly to give a training seminar on hydrocarbons and additionally to

describe to the population the benefits to be derived from extractive activities. These

officials were also detained by the community; they were permitted to leave a few hours

later, but not without reiterating to the authorities that the community was awaiting

dialogue in order to find a definitive solution to the issue of mining. The State’s continu-

ing silence in the face of this new indigenous request only served to increase the sense of

injustice and frustration among the community:

“When we realize that once again personnel have entered, we again show

that we want to dialogue; that, notwithstanding everything, we are here

dialoguing with the government so that an equitable solution can be

reached; but it’s not like that, that is to say, we are here while they are tak-

24 See La República [Lima]. January 20, 2009.

25

ing advantage of our good spirit to dialogue and they never respond to

our documents, our letters. That is not fair to us.”25

Far from taking notice of the indigenous people’s demands, the government persisted in

its refusal to undertake a dialogue. Moreover, it moved toward a policy of criminalization;

in March 2009, the Public Prosecutor’s office began legal proceedings against indigenous

leader Zebelio Káyap, president of ODECOFROC, for the alleged crime of kidnapping, due

to the detention of the company workers. The Judicial Branch admitted the formal

complaint, even though Káyap had not been present in the zone when the delegation

sent by the company had been detained by the collective decision of the community. In

April, in response to these charges, the indigenous organizations, with legal counsel

provided by the NGO Racimos de Ungurahui, filed three administrative complaints with

MEM, stating that the mining concessions should be revoked because they belonged to a

Canadian company, contradicting the stipulations contained in the Constitution and in

Convention 169.

The following month, the Awajum and Wampis of Cenepa joined the Amazonian strike

called by AIDESEP during May and June 2009, placing their specific demands against

Minera Afrodita within the larger context of a rejection of the series of laws that sup-

ported the advance of extractive activities throughout the Amazon. The importance of

the strike and its bloody denouement in the confrontations in Bagua represented a

turning point in the indigenous people’s struggle, not only due to the levels of mobiliza-

tion displayed throughout the forest region, but mainly because they managed to make

visible to the entire country and to the world a struggle that had existed for many years.

The fact that the people were able to mobilize entire districts within six weeks, denounc-

ing the urgent decrees promulgated by the Executive in the context of approving the

FTA with the United States, is valued as a success of the indigenous movement. Although

the people’s indignation continues and is manifested in the latent threat to undertake

new strikes if their demands are not met, the peaceful nature of their protests and their

commitment to dialogue stand out:

“This government of Alan García has not consulted with AIDESEP or with

ORPIAN or with the grassroots organizations. Some laws were decreed that

violated some rights against the existence of native communities. For that

reason, the people went out to protest peacefully, democratically; I de-

scribe it like that because we have been on a 54-day Amazonian strike,

because if we had wanted to harm ourselves as Peruvians, in five or seven

days we would have turned to violence. The country and the world be-

came aware that the culprits have been Alan García Pérez, First Minister

Yehude Simón, Dr. Mercedes Cabanillas. At no time have AIDESEP or OR-

PIAN urged us to confront each other, those of us who were there, the

defenseless indigenous people, the brother police officers with weapons.

25 Interview with Eloy Anhui, president of ODECOAC, October 16, 2009 in Santa María de Nieva.

26

The strike for us will continue if the government does not respond to us,

does not respect the existence of the Amazonian peoples. We will continue

the strike.”26

Several months after starting the strike, in August 2009, ODECOFROC and Racimos de

Ungurahui submitted a request to the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial

Discrimination in Geneva under its Urgent Action proceedings, with the goal of prevent-

ing imminent and irreparable harm to the Awajum and Wampis peoples living in Cenepa

district. While this request continues to move through formal channels, in September of

that same year the Awajum and Wampis peoples in the five northern Amazonian

watersheds met in Imacita, issued a new ultimatum to the Dorato mining company to

leave the zone, and asked the government and the company not to provoke them by

sending in more mineworkers.

As already mentioned in this brief chronology of the conflict, the collective action of the

indigenous people of Cenepa against the advance of mining activity developed various

strategies with the goal of safeguarding their territory, which, despite their levels of

organization, were blocked at the end of the day by the State’s indifference and the

interests of mining capital. In this context, the decisions to dismantle the camp and

detain the company personnel were pressure-exerting resources that sought to break the

isolation of the protests in the face of the failure of the administrative and legal channels.

In Cenepa, the relationship between the State and the communities has become tense

and is marked by a profound distrust of the government and its officials – persistent

problems that do not appear to have been overcome, mainly due to two factors. First,

there is an obvious communication problem, as the government does not attend

meetings convened by community members, nor does it respond to their written

requests; until the Amazonian strike, neither did it receive indigenous delegates when

they visited Lima, instead steering them towards lower-level officials. Second, there is the

explicit State commitment to the mining sector, evidenced, for example, by the meetings

of the multi-sectoral commission to discuss the reduction in size of the national park, to

which Minera Afrodita executives were invited, while indigenous leaders were denied

participation, even though they had repeatedly requested it.

Currently, there is stalemate. The work of the company has not been paralyzed; it has

limited itself to lowering its profile to prevent fresh confrontations. However, this does

not concern only the work of Minera Afrodita, but also the advance of oil companies such

as Hocol, which already has a concession for Lot 116 and is headquartered in the Nieva

district, and whose work would affect the Cenepa watershed, as well as the watersheds of

the Santiago and Nieva rivers. The work of mining and oil exploration increases pressure

on the territory and puts at risk conservation of the ecosystem and the ways of life of the

populace. The Awajum people’s rejection of extractive activities has been put across in

26 Interview with Professor Leandro Calvo, president of ORPIAN, October 15, 2009 in Santa María de Nieva.

27

various interviews, in which they emphasize in their arguments the experience of the

peoples nearby who have suffered the consequences of this growth model. Among the

most frequently mentioned is the case of the Ashuar people in Ecuador, who were

affected by the action of Pluspetrol, resulting in irreparable ecological damage and

negative impacts on the life of communities. Also mentioned is the case of Cajamarca

and the environmental problems caused by the presence of the Yanacocha mining

company, including a mercury spill and contamination of water. The indigenous Awajum

are conscious that the growth of mining will alter both the environment and their

cultural rhythm, as it affects their customs and has a serious impact on their means of

subsistence.27

What course might the conflict take in the near future? It is difficult to predict a clear path;

what is certain is that the problems will persist due as much to the interests of transna-

tional capital in play and the bias of the government as to the empowerment of the

indigenous peoples, who will not easily give up their determination to preserve their

territory. In this regard, it should be noted that, firstly, the Dorato company, today openly

ex-Minera Afrodita, has not ceased in its attempts to exploit the gold reserves on the

border, as to date it has not withdrawn its exploration claims nor removed its work

materiel. Moreover, new mining companies appear to be interested in the zone, such as

Sierra Dorada SAC, which has begun exploratory mining activities in the MSD 4 project

area in the community of Nueva Vida, in Cenepa district. This has been viewed by the

indigenous organizations as an open provocation since, notwithstanding the different

legal procedures set in train, mechanisms of pressure employed, and ongoing dialogue

roundtables, the State has persisted in its pro-mining stance. It has already given the

green light not only to Dorato but also to a new project in the zone, once more overlook-

ing the mechanism of prior consultation.

When analyzing the position taken by the State in this conflict, it is important to differen-

tiate between the attitudes taken by local governments, above all by the provincial and

district mayors, who have supported the indigenous people’s demands. This can be

explained by the Awajum origins of these officials and by the government platforms they

hold that bring together the majority opinion of the populace. We must not forget that,

at district level, candidates for mayor are first chosen by consensus within the communi-

ties and only later, once the candidate has been agreed upon, does he/she make

alliances with political parties. The mayor of Cenepa district, Manuel Días Nashap of the

Acción Popular (Popular Action) party, for example, has maintained the backing of the

indigenous organizations. For his part, the mayor of Condorcanqui at one point at-

tempted to assume the role of mediator when the mining workers were detained, but

the central government paid no attention to him. The regional government under

Ramiro Altamirano of the Partido Fuerza Demócratica (Democratic Force Party) has kept

to the edges of the problem, managing not to become an enemy of the authorities of

27 Interview with Professor Zebelio Káyap, president of ODECOFROC, on October 2, 2009 in Lima.

28

the Executive Branch. In any case, the role of the regional governors vis-a-vis extractive

activities is still very vague, as a consequence of the unfinished process of decentraliza-

tion.

From the central government, the attitude that has prevailed in the face of the conflict

has been the policy of criminalization already demonstrated and stigmatization of the

indigenous organizations, as evidenced by the criminal accusations made against the

leaders of AIDESEP and the local offices of ODECOFROC and ORPIAN. On many occasions

judgments and cases overlap; for example, Zebelio Káyap stands accused of involvement

in the events in Bagua, but also in the particular case of Cenepa. There is no political will

on the part of the Executive Branch to resolve this issue or to give guarantees to the

population that mining activity will pass through legal channels or will respect mechan-

isms such as prior consultation.

On a related note, the central government, having a number of allies within the media,

has insisted on disparaging the native organizations and not recognizing them as valid

interlocutors. This became more acute after the Amazonian strike, when the order was

issued to dissolve AIDESEP. Later, in a very crude maneuver that had the support of the

National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples

(INDEPA) and of a minority section of indigenous people, the government recognized

another organization that took that same name. Nor have real efforts been made to

clarify what happened in Bagua beyond the dialogue roundtable, which has yet to

achieve significant results, and which was established by the arrogance of the govern-

ment including in its discussions the body that the indigenous people call the “false

AIDESEP”. These practices, of creating parallel organizations and trying to disparage local

leaders, aggravates the climate of polarization, which makes the possibility of a solution

even more remote.

In general, prospects are vague for the resolution of the conflict in Cenepa. While the

strong alliance between mining and/or oil companies and the State continues, the

indigenous Awajum and Wampis peoples will continue to see their territories threatened.

Today, the indigenous movement has important allies in local governments and in NGOs

such as Racimos de Ungurahui (for legal counsel) and the Agricultural Service for Eco-

nomic Research and Promotion (SAIPE), for support of agricultural development projects.

At the international level, the capacity of indigenous organizations to mobilize networks

and to generate solidarity has been demonstrated through the positive impact on public

opinion.

Nonetheless, it is worrying that the strategy that has managed to be most evident is that

of confrontation and direct action against the mining company, as this obstructs solu-

tions based on dialogue. What is most likely is that the government will continue to

postpone a definitive solution, employing a strategy of delays (popularly known as “the

rocking chair”). During the past five years, this has been a permanent characteristic of the

government’s relationship with the indigenous people. It was the catalyst that sparked

29

the Amazonian strike, since after the 2008 protests there were many points that remained

unresolved, a delay that strengthened the reasons for the 2009 protest.

Regarding the indigenous peoples and their organizations in the zone, while they are not

a homogenous group without their discrepancies, in the face of the advance of extractive

activities, they share a criticism of the development model promoted by the government,

which is based on the extraction of subsoil resources, be it gold or oil as is the case in

Cenepa. In a virtually unanimous fashion, the populace, including local authorities and

leaders, has shown support for a different development model that preserves biodiversi-

ty, exploits forest resources in a rational manner, and optimizes sustainable activities such

as fish farming and the cultivation of organic products. For that reason, it has been

suggested that other alternatives be tested, which otherwise have never had sufficient

State support; with such support, the lives of the people could be improved. Until now,

the path chosen by successive governments has not translated into better indices of

human development, and also the damage done to the ecosystem has been irreparable

on many occasions. Defining the development model to come must include, in addition,

the opinions of the inhabitants themselves, which makes it all the more urgent to

legislate on the right to consultation established by Convention 169.

Finally, it is important to mention that the political management of the Amazonian strike

by the government and the Lima media has suggested a limited intercultural focus that

on occasions has bordered on racism. This has been evidenced in arguments describing

the indigenous peoples as separatists, opposed to Peru’s development, and even

participants in an international conspiracy sponsored by Ecuador and/or Venezuela. In

the face of these accusations, the indigenous people, beginning with the Cenepa mayor,

made it clear that this was not about a separatist fight nor about opposition to the

democratic system, and that they viewed those declarations as unjust as a people who,

like the Awajum, had been leaders in the armed conflict on the Ecuador border and had

always defended national interests. In a similar fashion they now demand respect for their

rights:

“We are Peruvian, we are the ones who control the border, we are the ones

who defended the border in that conflict of ’95. Our brothers have become

invalids, our indigenous brothers have defended territorial sovereignty and

even so, the State does not consider us. We do not ask for separatisms, we

want our rights to be respected just like all other Peruvians, that is what we

demand.”28

Finding solutions to the El Cenepa conflict requires, from the State, a new approach to

the relationships it has with both mining companies and with the indigenous peoples,

which is what will happen when a policy is adopted that is truly inclusive and which

views the native Awajum and Wampis peoples as citizens with the right to decide about

28 Interview with leader Fernando Flores, October 13, 2009 in Yutupis.

30

the lands they inhabit. This also implies regulating extractive activities in a rational and

democratic manner that is agreed to consensually by local populations, bearing in mind

the particular ecological and cultural characteristics of the area.

31

4 Conclusions The Peruvian Amazon is being strongly affected by the growth of extractive activities,

which are reconfiguring the dynamics of the use and transference of land. Thus, areas

that at one point were titled as native communities and later as reserves such as a

national park are today incorporated into the policy of concessions promoted by the

State, to the point that, from 2004 to 2006, the percentage of land granted in concessions

to oil and mining companies grew from 16% to 68%. In the Cenepa watershed, the

presence of Minera Afrodita, which is already carrying out exploration work, and the entry

of the Hocol oil company and the Sierra Dorada mining company, are proof of this

imminent advance.

In the short term, the activities of these companies, which are associated with transna-

tional capital, will substantially change the nature of exploitation of the Amazonian

forests, which contain great biodiversity as well as being hunting and fishing sanctuaries

for the Awajum and Wampis peoples. It will also alter the land market, as these are parcels

of land that the Amazonian peoples had not put up for sale but which today, by being

granted in concession, are subject to a market dynamic that puts in play profits that will

benefit above all the companies exploiting the subsoil resources.

This growing advance of companies in the Amazon is closely related to the policy

adopted by the State and its national development agenda. The APRA government has

chosen to extend the neoliberal economic model and this, in its current stage of expan-

sion, means facilitating large capital investments; therefore, in Peru, this means more

pressure on natural resources. The principal policy adopted during recent years has been

and remains the promotion of private investment by providing opportunities for the

entrance of transnational capital throughout the country. Related to this objective, those

who traditionally govern have had no qualms about changing laws and procedures

supported by the State itself. This is evidenced by the case of the Ichigkat Muja–El Cóndor

Mountain Range National Park, whose creation was agreed to after a participatory

process with the Awajum communities but which was scandalously reduced in size in

order to permit mining activity. It is also evidenced by a lack of recognition of the laws in

force. Although extractive activity is incompatible with regulations on the environment,

indigenous rights, and investment in border zones, it is permitted and its development is

even encouraged.

The strong pressure on Amazonian lands in general, and on Cenepa in particular,

principally affects the indigenous peoples living in the area and considerably increases

the possibility of social unrest developing. With the goal of curbing the advance of

extractive companies, the Awajum and Wampis peoples have tested several strategies by

first appealing to negotiating solutions through institutional channels. Land titling was

sought first as a form of safeguarding the territory; secondly, they accepted the creation

32

of a national park within communal borders, thinking to thus save it from mining. The

failure of both of these strategies and the clear State bias in favor of the companies

resulted in the adoption of a third strategy favoring direct action, which reached its

maximum expression with the dismantling of the Minera Afrodita camp and the deten-

tion of the workers. This is the strategy that achieved the greatest resonance, arousing

the attention of the national media and a quick response from the Executive, which

promised to initiate a process of dialogue. However, its failure to keep this and other

promises generated significant discontent and served as a catalyst for the people of the

zone to join the Amazonian strike, which began in August 2008 and was renewed in May

and June 2009.

The growing number of conflicts in the Amazon region reveals that the State does not

have, nor does it appear to be interested in developing, an intercultural policy that

respects indigenous rights, nor the regulations to support it. Legal instruments such as

Convention 169, which Peru signed more than 15 years ago, are still not enforced, despite

the insistence of indigenous organizations. Likewise, the right to prior consultation, which

has become relevant in the context of expanding mining activity, has been systematically

ignored, with mining and oil activities starting up without the backing of the peoples

living in the territories where the companies operate. The central government has given

precedence to a policy of polarization and, in its pursuit of a pro-mining and oil agenda,

has insisted on repressive mechanisms, ignored repeated requests for dialogue, and

criminalized the action of indigenous leaders. Additionally, it is evident that its centralist

and exclusionary slant is committed to one development model alone and violates the

possibility of the Amazonian peoples to fully exercise their rights.

For the indigenous peoples, the social unrest caused by the advance of the extractive

companies has permitted the Peruvian public to learn of their struggle to preserve their

territories. In addition, it has made clear the hard conditions of poverty and exclusion in

which the Awajum and Wampis live, marginalized from the supposed period of econom-

ic growth that the country is experiencing. On a related note, the indigenous

organizations have demonstrated a high degree of representativeness and convening

capacity, displaying a rich communal dynamic in which the leaders and authorities are

constantly interacting with the grassroots. This intense mobilization to reject extractive

companies finds real arguments in the experience of other indigenous peoples who have

already been affected by the pollution of rivers and by deforestation; for this reason, they

are demanding the implementation of a development model that combines well-being

with respect for nature.

It should be mentioned that the research to draft the present document was begun in

April 2009, before the resumption of the Amazonian strike and without being able to

imagine the bloody denouement that it would have. Without a doubt, what happened in

Bagua and the general paralysis represent turning points in indigenous protests, and

have opened a new cycle of visibility for the Amazon. On one hand, multiple points of

solidarity have been generated nationally and internationally. On the other, the economic

33

development model that the country is following has been put up for debate, as well as

that model’s limited capacity to include the indigenous peoples such as the Awajum,

who are protective of their culture and their way of life. Additionally, the violence

displayed here leads us to reflect on the course that so-called “socio-environmental

conflicts” will take, placing before us social movements capable of generating violent

responses that include deaths, something that had not been seen since before the

internal armed conflict. Nonetheless, we must not forget that the indigenous movement

is principally committed to dialogue, which it has repeatedly demonstrated, including

after the strike, and that it has the will to participate in and contribute to the solutions for

its people and for the country. We are not talking about separatist groups guided by a

violent ethnic fundamentalism, but rather citizens’ demands for inclusion in a country

whose leadership elites have not done enough to recognize them.

The Amazonian territory cannot continue to be seen as a “no man’s land” that is unpopu-

lated and infertile as a result of the action of various “dogs in the manger”, who impede

progress supported by extractive activities. There is an urgent need to design compre-

hensive development policies for the Amazon, for both the high rainforest and the low

rainforest and for their distinctive actors, be they indigenous peoples, local coca farmers,

or mountain settlers, among others. In the case of the Awajum and Wampis peoples, their

abandonment and the constant pressure they experience – not only through the actions

of the State and big capital, but also due to the population of settlers who have moved to

the forest because of the scarcity of opportunities in the mountains – cannot continue.

Above all, it is a matter of evaluating the complexity of the problem, taking into account

the different facets: begin by guaranteeing compliance with the law and regulating and

executing mechanisms such as the right to prior consultation. Guaranteeing respect for

legality, prioritizing consensual solutions, and choosing the path of dialogue are some of

the elements to bear in mind for long-term solutions to the conflicts resulting from the

use and exploitation of the territory. If this is not done, we will distance ourselves from the

possibility of creating a democratic society in which the majority benefits from economic

growth and our country’s diverse ways of life are respected.

34

Annex: map of mining claims in Bagua

35

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Cover illustration: © Aldo di Domenico 2011

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author, and can in no way be taken to reflect the offcial views of the International Land Coalition, its members or donors.

ISBN 978-92-95093-47-8

© 2011 the International Land Coalition

The Center for Sociological, Economic, Political and Anthropological Research (CISEPA) was founded in 1966, aimed at carrying out both basic and applied research. It was an initiative of the Academic Departments of Social Sciences and Economics and the School of Social Sciences of the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru.

SER is a private non-profit institution with national outreach, created in 1980. SER is made up of professionals and specialists committed to promote development and full citizenship. SER is working in partnership with citizens, local governments, social organizations, NGOs and other public and private institutions at local, regional and national level.

Our MissionA global alliance of civil society and intergovernmental organisations working together to promote secure and equitable access to and control over land for poor women and men through advocacy, dialogue, knowledge sharing and capacity building.

Our VisionSecure and equitable access to and control over land reduces poverty and contributes to identity, dignity and inclusion.

CIRAD works with the whole range of developing countries to generate and pass on new knowledge, support agricultural development and fuel the debate on the main global issues concerning agriculture.

CIRAD is a targeted research organization, and bases its operations on development needs, from field to laboratory and from a local to a global scale.

Commercial Pressures on Land

NO MAN’S LANDS? Extractive activity, territory, and social unrest in the Peruvian Amazon: The Cenepa River

This report is part of a wider initiative on Commercial Pressures on Land (CPL). If you would like further information on the initiative and on the collaborating partners, please contact the Secretariat of the International Land Coalition or visit www.landcoalition.org/cpl

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