I_0.fm; str. 1

I Osnovna tema

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2001.2

I_1_Mirko Vasiljevic.fm; str. 3

Prof. dr Mirko Vasiqevi,Pravni fakultet, Beogradpredsednik Udruewa pravnika u privredi SRJ

Novi propisi i zatita investitora

1. Uvodna odreewa

U zemqi koja jo ne zna ni svoj dravni, ni svoj politiki okvir, izgleda nisamo ime (kao da smo sve druge poslove sa dravom i privredom pozavravali isamo nam je to jo ostalo da naciju i dravu zabavqamo oko imena), razumqivo dane moe biti jasan i privrednopravni okvir. Zvanino, nove dravnopolitikevlasti, to je svakako pohvalno, za razliku od ranije neodreenosti i preputa-wa nasluivawu, proglasile su primarnu dravnu strategiju - lanstvo u EU.Ovim je dat jasan putokaz za sve nae propise, posebno privrednopravne wihovput je put usklaivawa sa propisima EU. Istina, poto naa zemqa (ako doistaiko kod nas jo uvek zna ta je to uistinu) jo uvek nije formalno zakquila saEU tzv. Sporazum o asocijaciji i stabilizaciji (SAS) takva formalna obavezaza nas jo ne postoji, ali mislimo da nema sumwe da i bez toga treba se kretatiputevima zemaqa iz okruewa, koje su takoe prihvatale usklaivawe svog zako-nodavstva i pre formalnog pristupa ovom sporazumu.

Dakle, osnovna ideja vodiqa naeg prava i filozofija naeg prava trebalobi da bude uklapawe u veliku evropsku porodicu prava, kojoj mi ne samo terito-rijalno, ve i civilizacijski i vokacijski pripadamo. Uostalom, naa pravnatradicija nije u tom pogledu ba sasvim "tikva bez korena" i s pravom moe, sobzirom na dimenzije zemqe i naroda, biti ponosna na svoj doprinos toj porodiciprava i toj kulturi. Ne mogu se danas sporiti vrednosti, ne samo s obzirom navreme kad su doneti, naih vodeih spomenika pravne kulture, poput Srpskog

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.4

graanskog zakonika (sredina XIX veka), Opteg imovinskog zakonika (kraj XIXveka), kao ni Zakona o obligacionim odnosima (sredina druge polovine XX veka)i wihov doprinos evropskoj pravnoj tradiciji i kulturi.

Ideja vodiqa naeg prava, dakle, vie nije sporna. Ipak, neoekivano i utakvim uslovima, sve ostalo kod naeg prava danas je sporno. ini se da ve duevreme, za nikog kod nas nije sporno da se nae pravo ne kree rukovoeno takvomidejom vodiqom, ve da se nalazi na viestrukim razmeima.

2. Razmea naeg prava

Prvo razmee je poplava anglosaksonskog prava, posebno amerikog, u naempravu. Takav utisak odaje veina propisa koji se donose u posledwe vreme. Iakonema sumwe da se i samo anglosaksonsko pravo mewa, sa dominacijom pisanih iz-vora prava i slabqewem precedentnog uticaja, te iako nema sumwe da se sve viemeunarodnih i regionalnih, kao i autonomnih, izvora donosi sa sve snanijimuticajem ove pravne porodice, ini se da smo u ovom pogledu postali "vei kato-lici od pape". Kontinentalno evropsko pravo (civil law) nasloweno na tradicijurimskog prava i wegove recepcije jo uvek ima snanu potrebu, ne samo civili-zacijsku, da ostane svoje na svome, ime e svakako i svetska pravna batina bitibogatija. Treba li podsetiti nae zakonopisce i zakonodavce da ideja vodiqa na-eg prava nije put ka anglosaksonskom pravu, ve put ka pravu EU, a ono je jouvek i nadamo se da e i ostati, posebna pravna porodica i kultura (civil law) u od-nosu na anglosaksonsku pravnu porodicu i kulturu (common law). U protivnom isama ideja prava i pravna civilizacija bili bi osiromaeni, u svojoj unisonostii obeskorewenosti.

Drugo razmee naeg prava je poplava pragmatizma i apsolutne suverenostisamo jedne vlasti-izvrne. Iako se, naime, mora priznati da vreme privatizacijeu izvesnom smislu namee ad hoc propise, ipak se ini da smo u tom pogledu oti-li u sasvim drugu krajnost umesto zakona naom privrednom scenom sve vie sevlada raznim podzakonskim propisima, ime izvrne vlasti preuzimaju zakono-davnu vlast, to ve ozbiqno ugroava i samu ideju podele vlasti i vodi bezostatka jedinstvu vlasti (ni povrno kritikom posmatrau kod nas nee ovouverewe pokolebati formalno postojawe tzv. sudske vlasti, kao posebne vlasti,s obzirom na wenu institucionalnu, materijalnu i svaku drugu zavisnost od iz-vrne vlasti, koja jo uvek demonstrira praksu da samostalnost sudske vlastitreba ostaviti za neka druga vremena).

Tree razmee naeg prava je postojawe dva (negde i tri) paralelna pravnasistema, posebno privrednopravna: pravni sistem Srbije (u kom delom vlada ipravni sistem Jugoslavije) i pravni sistem Crne Gore (u kom uopte ne vladapravni sistem Jugoslavije, posebno ne privrednopravni). Jedinstveno tritepretpostavqa jedinstvene bar privrednopravne propise, kako bi se omoguioslobodan protok robe, qudi, kapitala, vrewa usluga (tzv. etiri "velike slo-

5M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)

bode" u pravu EU). I nedavni Sporazum o preureewu odnosa u SRJ izmeu Srbijei Crne Gore u osnovi je dao peat zateenom stawu, u kome Crna Gora ima zaokru-enu privrednopravnu regulativu, dok se Srbija ispomae saveznom regulati-vom. Stvarawe svojevrsnog dravnog provizorijuma (tzv. "Solanija") sa odvoje-nim spoqnotrgovinskim, carinskim, deviznim i monetarnim reimima i siste-mima svakako da ne znai jedinstveno trite. Otuda, na put ka usklaivawuprava sa pravom EU mora izgleda biti ne direktan, ve zaobilazan: internousklaivawe i tek nakon toga eksterno usklaivawe (da li je "preko pree, nao-kolo blie"?). Uostalom, kako bismo mi izneverili sebe vremena smo uvekimali vika na raspolagawu i taj nam resurs nije bio toliko bitan, te smo stogai vie u prolosti nego u budunosti.

etvrto razmee naeg prava je vladavina neprava i pravne nesigurnosti,umesto vladavine prava i pravne sigurnosti. Obeleja ovog razmea su svako-dnevna, sveprisutna i sveuticajna. Uverqivosti radi, ovde e biti pomenuta samokarakteristina, koja bez ikakve sumwe optereuju nau nasunu nacionalnu po-trebu stvarawa povoqne investicione klime za poverewe investitora svih bojaza investiciona ulagawa. Na terenu zakonodavstva: nezaokruena regulativa, po-sebno privrednopravna, kao i sve ee vladawe uredbama i drugim podzakon-skim propisima umesto vladawa zakonima; na terenu sudstva: brojni primeri sle-pog i po sudski sistem kompromitujueg izvravawa naloga politike vlasti,kao i razliitog postupawa sudova nie i vie instance u istovetnim stvarima(Potanska tedionica, Galenika ICN, Mobtel, Pionir, brojne banke i sl.); naterenu izvrne vlasti: primeri otvorenog stavqawa do znawa sudskoj vlasti koje istinski jedina vlast u zemqi (Telekom, Galenika ICN, Mobtel i dr.).

Peto razmee naeg prava je sukob prava i institucija koje ga primewuju.Naime, tano je da je nae zakonodavstvo jo uvek neizgraeno, posebno privred-nopravno, to je ozbiqno optereewe za sigurnost investitora i investicionopoverewe i to svakako treba u to je mogue kraem roku, ali ne na utrb kva-liteta propisa, otkloniti donoewem adekvatnih propisa. Ipak, s druge strane,iwenica je da i u uslovima prisutnosti i relativno adekvatne regulative (npr.Zakon o preduzeima) postoji netolerantan nesklad izmeu zakonskih reewa iinstituta i stepena wihove primene. Na tradicionalni sindrom povike napropise, s jedne strane, i neprimene propisa, s druge strane, ovim se na svojevr-stan nain cementira. Najmawe dvadesetak pravnih instituta iz ovog propisaima svoje adekvatno pravno utemeqewe, zasnovano na univerzalnosti ovih insti-tuta u uporednom pravu, ali se ipak u naoj praksi neadekvatno primewuju ili seuopte ne primewuju: princip odrawa osnovnog kapitala, zabrana vraawauloga akcionarima i lanovima drutva, klauzula nedozvoqene konkurencije,klauzula sukoba interesa, prava mawinskih akcionara i lanova drutva, poseb-na pravila za jednolano drutvo, odgovornost osnivaa za tetno postupawepri osnivawu drutva kapitala, zabrana prekoraewa unakrsnog sticawa akcijamatinog i zavisnog drutva i stvarawe drutava kapitala bez kapitala, zabra-

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.6

na tzv. sistema vodopada i kruewa istog kapitala u vie drutava za simula-ciju postojawa osnivakog kapitala, ulagawe preostalog obaveznog osnivakogkapitala u roku od dve godine od osnivawa drutva kapitala, dostava sudskom re-gistru bilansa poslovawa i izvetaja uprava o poslovawu i nalaza revizora kodotvorenih drutava, iskquewe prava glasa zbog sukoba interesa, dominacija in-teresa drutva kapitala nad interesom veinskog akcionara ili lana drutva,solidarna odgovornost osnivaa za uplatu ugovorenog uloga, zatita poverilacakod smawewa kapitala, zatita poverilaca kod fuzija drutava kapitala, pravoizlaska iz drutva kod zloupotrebe prava veinskog akcionara ili lana, lik-vidacija drutva kapitala po zahtevu mawinskih akcionara ili lanova u slua-ju zloupotrebe prava veinskog vlasnika itd.

I da ne nabrajamo daqe, i ovo je vaqda uverqivo da nam bar do sada pravnakultura nije bila jaa strana, te da smo umesto kulta primene prava razvijalikult svojevrsne neprimene zakona ("evegu rupa u zakonu"). I tamo gde postoje ja-sni pravni instituti, nesporno utemeqeni, univerzalno prisutni, sve institu-cije koje primewuju pravo, ukquujui i dravnu upravnu, sudsku i izvrnu sfe-ru, paradravne institucije, privredne subjekte i graane, kao da se svi trude da(ne)primeni propisa daju svoj peat i svoju relativizaciju znaewa pravnog in-stituta. Sve to pojedinano i u celosti uzev stvara jednu lou sliku stawa pravai pravne kulture kod nas, to razumqivo ima snane reperkusije na investicio-no poverewe i investicionu klimu za ulagawe kod nas. Sve ee je investitor upoziciji da strepi kako e organ primene prava primeniti pravo, budui da seinstitucije primene prava sve vie pretvaraju u institucije kreatore (ne)prava,to je samo korak do potpunog pravnog voluntarizma i bespravqa, a samim tim ido razvojnog beznaa i potpunog investicionog nepoverewa.

3. Pravni standardi zatite investitora

Strani investitori (ulagai) i investitori uopte zainteresovani su po-sebno za pravno ureewe sledeih oblasti: prvo, reim svojine (kod nas nedostajeposeban Zakon o svojini, postoji jo drutvena svojina, titular dravne svojinesu samo republike, sa neto svojine savezne drave, a u svakom sluaju nema komu-nalne svojine, po republikom Ustavu Srbije postoji monopol dravne svojinena graevinskom zemqitu i ovo zemqite je praktino izvan prometa, nejasani nedvoqno stimulativan reim sticawa svojine na zemqitu stranih lica);drugo, reim pravila o privrednim drutvima (pokriven je vaeim Zakonom opreduzeima koji je u dominantnoj meri harmonizovan sa pravom EU i sa zavret-kom postupka privatizacije treba da se "transformie", sa odreenim izmenamau Zakon o privrednim drutvima); tree, reim stranih ulagawa (pokriven ne-davno donetim relativno dobrim zakonskim aktom, mada bi zbog principa nacio-nalnog tretmana stranih lica trebalo ovaj projekt ukomponovati u Zakon o pri-vrednim drutvima); etvrto, reim steaja (predstoji donoewe novog zakona,

7M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)

koji bi posebno trebalo da uredi tzv. forme prestrukturirawa preduzea krozsteajni postupak, kako se ovo vano pitawe privrednog sistema ne bi reguli-salo uredbom kao to je to sada sluaj, to u najmawu ruku ostavqa ozbiqnu sum-wu u wenu ustavnost i zakonitost)1); peto, reim zatite poverilaca (kod nas uozbiqnoj krizi i pored u svemu uzornog zakonskog projekta Zakona o obligacio-nim odnosima, posebno zbog potrebe ozbiqnog unapreewa reima ureewa iprakse funkcionisawa sredstava obezbeewa); esto, devizni spoqnotrgovin-ski reim (oekuju se novi zakoni za liberalizovawe ovih reima u pravcu ispu-wavawa uslova za prijem u STO); sedmo, reim antimonopolskog zakonodavstva(kod nas nezadovoqavajui i na planu norme i na planu prakse); osmo, reim pri-vatizacije (kod nas nestabilan izmeu ostalog i zbog estog mewawa zakonskogmodela i nedostatka kredibiliteta institucija koje ga sprovode); deveto, reimzakona o radu i trajku (kod nas znaajno unapreen u skladu s odgovarajuimkonvencijama MOR-a i uporednopravnim tendencijama donoewem republikogZakona o radu, ali koji je delom otiao i nedozvoqivo i neprihvatqivo daqe,to jo uvek nije sluaj sa reimom trajka); deseto, reim prava industrijskesvojine (kod nas ureen relativno dobrim zakonima, ali sa izuzetno loom di-sciplinom primene); jedanaesto, reim arbitranog reavawa sporova (kod nasrelativno funkcionie i pored potrebe za donoewem posebnog zakona); dvana-esto, reim sudskog reavawa sporova i nezavisnost sudske vlasti (poznata spo-rost naih sudova, delom i zbog potrebe ozbiqne revizije procesnog zakonodav-stva i nedovoqna faktika nezavisnost i samostalnost); trinaesto, reim izvr-ewa sudskih i arbitranih odluka (poznata neefikasnost, delom i zbog neza-tite poverilaca uopte, a posebno zbog potrebe ozbiqne revizije propisa o iz-vrewu); etrnaesto, fiskalni i poreski reim (i pored estih tzv. poreskih ifiskalnih reformi i daqe relativno nejasan, nestabilan i investiciono nesti-mulativan u brojnim segmentima); petnaesto, reim socijalnih prava (neuskla-enost kreiranih prava i buxetskih mogunosti, s jedne strane, i , s druge strane,neadekvanost nekih socijalnih prava).

Ureewe ovih pravnih oblasti, koje su od prvenstvenog znaaja za stabilnuinvesticionu klimu za ulagawe kapitala u jednoj zemqi, treba da bude rukovo-eno sledeim pravnim naelima: prvo, naelo pravne sigurnosti2) (stabilnostpropisa, neretroaktivnost propisa, jasnost propisa, fleksibilnost propisa zaposlovne ideje, nedvosmislenost propisa "to svak jednako razume tome tumaane treba" rekao bi znameniti pravnik Bogii); drugo, naelo vladavine zakonakao pravilo i podzakonskih propisa kao izuzetak; tree, naelo samostalnosti,nezavisnosti i efikasnosti institucija koje primewuju propise (u mnogim slu-ajevima potrebno je propisati obavezne rokove, sa sankcijom tzv. utawa admi-nistracije, kao npr. kod registracije preduzea, izdavawa raznih dozvola i sagla-snosti i slino); etvrto, naelo ravnopravnosti stranih i domaih lica pod

1. Uredba o postupku i nainu restrukturirawa preduzea i drugih pravnih lica, "Slu-beni glasnik RS", br. 1/2002.

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.8

uslovima uzajamnosti; peto, naelo konkurentnosti propisa sa drugim relevan-tnim zemqama; esto, naelo trajnosti propisa, posebno privrednopravnih, ineuticajnost politikih promena na izmenu propisa; sedmo, naelo usklaeno-sti (harmonizacije) pravnih instituta sa relevantnim zemqama trine pri-vrede; osmo, naelo pravne edukovanosti i kulta primene prava i ponaawa popravu; deveto, naelo kredibilnosti uopte i nekorumpiranosti posebno insti-tucija koje kreiraju i primewuju pravo; deseto, naelo publiciteta i jedinstve-nih registara kao naina sticawa prava (zemqine kwige kao registri nepo-kretnosti, registri zaloga na pokretnim stvarima i udelima, registri hartija odvrednosti i prava treih lica na wima, registri privrednih subjekata i drugihpravnih lica, registri preduzetnika, registri boniteta privrednih subjekata,kreditni registri privrednih subjekata, registri koncesija, registri prava in-dustrijske svojine i dr.).

4. Zatita investitora i relevantni reformski zakoni

Zatita investitora u naoj zemqi (za trenutak se neemo osvrtati na i-wenicu da nikome izgleda i nije jasno ta je to ustvari) nastoji se znaajno po-boqati donoewem niza novih tzv. reformiskih zakona, kako bi se poboqalainvesticiona klima i podstakao investicioni talas. U tom pogledu, u posledwihgodinu dana doneto je niz relevantnih propisa i na saveznom i na republikomnivou, koji uz evidentno otvarawe nae privrede, imaju i oiglednu usmerenostka jaawu trine pravne infrastrukture i stepena pravne sigurnosti kod nas.Ipak, u tom pogledu se nije uvek dosledno, to e za potrebe ovog rada biti poka-zano na tri u dobroj meri kontroverzna pristupa.

Prvo, Zakon o stranim ulagawima.3) Iako je re o dobrom zakonskom projek-tu, koji svakako treba da doprinese dizawu nivoa investicionog poverewa stra-nih investitora kod ulagawa u nau zemqu, prvenstveno zbog datih garancija(sloboda stranog ulagawa, nacionalni tretman stranih lica, pravna sigurnost

2. Imajui u vidu na stepen pravne kulture, ini se izlinim postavqawe pitawa da li jedoprinos jaawu principa pravne sigurnosti npr. Zakon o privrednim drutvima CrneGore ("Slubeni list RCG", br. 6/2002), koji trgovako ortako drutvo svodi naklasini graanski ortakluk bez subjektiviteta i upisa u sudski registar (l. 6.), ili"sindromom liberalizma" propisuje osnivawe drutva sa ogranienom odgovornou sasimbolinih jedan evro (l. 66 - da li se moe oekivati da e stepen ozbiqnosti vlas-nika pri namernom bankrotstvu ovog drutva nakon prevare nekog poverioca biti viiod ozbiqnosti pri osnivawu ovog drutva sa takvim kapitalom?!), ili koji privrednadrutva kapitala i komanditno drutvo (preduzee) izjednaava sa automobilom i pro-pisuje im, bez obzira to se ak i pretpostavqeno osnivaju na neodreeno vreme,obavezno produewe registracije svake godine i pretwu likvidacijom ako to ne uine upropisanom roku (l. 86.-87. - eleli bismo da verujemo da to ipak nije uiweno izfiskalnih razloga, iako drava za svako godiwe produewe registracije naplauje"simbolinih" 100 evra).

3. Zakon o stranim ulagawima, "Slubeni list SRJ", br. 3/2002.

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sa steenim pravima, principijelna zabrana eksproprijacije ili drugih mera dr-ave sa jednakim dejstvom, sloboda konverzije domae u stranu valutu, slobodantransfer dobiti i slino), ipak i ovaj projekt dajui nacionalni tretman stra-nim licima i izjednaujui ih u tom pogledu sa domaim liima u poslovawu u na-oj zemqi, nije odoleo iskuewu da poveden za svojom osnovnom ciqnom fun-kcijom (privlaewe stranih investitora i stranih investicija) i ustanovqewemosnova za podsticaje za strana ulagawa (sloboda uvoza, carinske i poreske olak-ice i carinska osloboewa) u osnovi kreira sistem nacionalnog (ne)tretma-na za domaa lica. Nema pravnog ni ekonomskog opravdawa, kad je o poziciji do-maih lica re, da ista uivaju ove podsticaje ako su "domai stranci" (prekosvog preduzea osnovanog u inostranstvu ili preko svog boravita u inostran-stvu dueg od godinu dana, kada u smislu ovog zakona prestaje da bude domae li-ce), a de ne uivaju kad nisu stranci.4) Nacionalni (ne)tretman domaih lica po-jaava i Zakon o privatizaciji5) propisujui da "domae fiziko ili pravno li-ce moe biti kupac kapitala ili imovine po ovom zakonu tek poto prui doka-ze da je izmirilo obaveze prema Zakonu o jednokratnom porezu na ekstra dohodaki ekstra imovinu steene iskoriavawem posebnih pogodnosti, ili prui do-kaze da nije obveznik poreza (da li je mogue pruawe negativnog dokaza u pravu primedba M.V.) po tom zakonu,"dodajui da je ugovor o prodaji koji se zakquiprotivno ovoj odredbi nitav. Verujem da smo se ovakvim reewima legitimi-sali kao jedina zemqa u svetu koja vie "voli" strani kapital i strane graaneod domaeg kapitala i domaih graana?! Aferim!

Drugo, tzv. Zakon o jednokratnom porezu na ekstra dohodak i ekstra imovinusteene iskoriavawem posebnih pogodnosti6), koji bez obzira na motive dono-ewa, u ekonomskom smislu je naneo vie tete nego koristi, a u pravnom smi-slu ponovo je reaktivirao praksu donoewa propisa sa retroaktivnim obeleji-ma, koji se kako je i sam rekao primewuje "do dana donoewa", to je svakako rip-lijevski pravni novum koji kao takav zasluuje da bude "patentiran". U psiho-lokom smislu ovaj zakon je imao maksimalni efekat odvraawa od invesirawa unau zemqu, kako stranih investitora, tako i domaih investitora (koji bi ponaem viewu i trebalo da budu jedna od glavnih ciqnih investicionih grupa,jer kako je to zamena stranih valuta u evro pokazala raspolau svakako pawevrednom uteevinom od oko devet milijardi DEM, koja se uglavnom nalazi u"slamaricama" a ne u investicionim tokovima, u dobroj meri i zbog ovog zakon-skog projekta i svakako zbog institucije tzv. stare devizne tedwe. Sve dok uovoj zemqi kod nosilaca politike vlasti i zakonodavaca dominira komunisti-ki sindrom olien u metafori "drte lopova" (lepe reeno "utvrivawe po-rekla imovine"), sa snanim ideolokim nabojem koji mewa samo svoj predznak,

4. "Svi u strance", poruio je jedan dovitqivi novinar posle donoewa ovog zakona. Vidi:Politika, 13.02.2002. godine.

5. Zakon o privatizaciji (lan 12. st. 3.i 4.), "Slubeni glasnik RS", br. 38/2001.6. Zakon, "Slubeni glasnik RS", br. 36/2001.

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.10

nema trajnog i nepoquqanog investicionog poverewa. Ako vrioci politikevlasti, bilo ko to bio, smatraju da je mogue ustanovqewe posebne vrste porezasamo za razdobqe prethodne politike vlasti, te da time uspostave trajno in-vesticiono poverewe onda su oni u neizviwavajuoj i opasnoj zabludi. Promocijajednog takvog koncepta i recepta od strane jedne vlasti za prethodnu vlast zgodanje mamac i za neku novu vlast, koji onda dotie i same autore tog koncepta i re-cepta. Onda nema kraja. Ako su i postojali politiki razlozi za uvoewe jednetakve vrste poreza, to je strano naoj vokaciji, onda su wegovi osnovi trebalida vae, ako ih naravno bude, to se ne moe unapred iskquiti, pravno posma-trano bar u istoj ravni od momenta donoewa ovog tzv. zakona (to zakonodavacoigledno nije hteo jer bi i sam mogao ui u wegovo "vidno poqe"), ako ne i pr-venstveno to je vokacija svakog zakona, kao i do momenta donoewa ovog zakona(to je oigledno zakonodavac samo i hteo). Ako se ovom doda i evidentna praksawegove selektivne primene, onda se doista mora zakquiti da je re o svojevr-snom "pravnom monstrumu". Uz to, i navodno odluivawe Saveznog ustavnog sudao wegovoj ustavnosti (bio je toliko samostalan da je mogao da se izjasni o neustav-nosti znakova interpunkcije u ovom zakonu), te i javna uloga izvrne vlasti utom procesu (dovoqno je podsetiti na izjave vie ministara, koji se nisu libilida se javno porugaju i samoj potrebi nezavisnosti ustavnosudske vlasti u ovom do-menu), u svoj svojoj otrini i ogoqenosti pokazali su svim investitorima da smomi daleko od pravnih standarda zatite investitora.

Umesto ovakvih poruka svim investitorima, posebno domaim, koji se plaeovakvim zakonskim reewima, koji ih svakako nee uveriti u nau odlunost ukreaciju jednog stabilnog pravnog poretka, koji obezbeuje kompatibilno i kon-kurentno okruewe za trajan investicioni interes, ini se da nam treba, a posleovakvih zakonskih polureewa u to smo jo vie uvereni, jedna javna manife-stacija politike voqe da su svi investitori kod nas slobodni i sigurni da ula-u svoj novac, da im drava nee pretiti retroaktivnim propisima ili "zaviri-vawem u tawir". Jedna takva manifestacija bi bila mogua preko posebne Dekla-racije Skuptine, kojom bi se izvrila neka vrsta javne amnestije svih naihgraana koji bi svoj novac, ma gde se on nalazio, investirali u zemqi u odreenomroku (kako se projekt ne bi razvodnio), sa zapoqavawem domaih graana i uzodreeno maksimalno stimulativno poresko "razduewe" sa dravom (jediniizuzetak, pod uslovom da se ne pretvori u pravilo i da doista i ostane izuzetak,mogao bi se eventualno ostaviti za novac steen izvrewem odreenih krivi-nih dela). Samo na taj nain bi se onih devet milijardi DEM nalo u veini uinvesticionim tokovima, kao i inih milijardi (domaih graana i nae tzv. di-jaspore) verovatno van zemqe. U protivnom, ostaemo zarobqenici ideje"lova navetice" i uverewa da se tzv. donacijama (pitawe je samo za koju stranu!) moekonkurentno razvijati, to je sigurna garancija definitivnog privrednog ko-lapsa i nacionalnog samoponiewa.

11M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)

Tree, Zakon o privatizaciji (republiki). Ne sporei iwenicu da je ovajzakon promovisao trini model privatizacije, oroenost, obaveznost i jav-nost procesa, to je svakako wegov kvalitet, ini se da se i ovom projektu sa sta-novita sigurnosti i zatite investitora mogu staviti ozbiqne primedbe. Pr-vo, to je konstatacija samo iwenice a ne odbrana prevazienog Ustava, nadovim zakonom u najmawu ruku visi ozbiqna senka (ne)ustavnosti i (ne)zakonito-sti. Drugo, zakon iako je ocewen kao trian u osnovi promovie samo jedan mo-del privatizacije (model prodaje kombinovan sa elementima poklona), to je uosnovi dravni monopol, kao van ustavna kategorija. U najavama izmene Zakona opreduzeima ovaj model e biti i doista jedini, budui da e se ukinuti zajedni-ka ulagawa, dokapitalizacije, konverzije potraivawa u ulog, statusne promenei slino, preduzea sa (veinskim) drutvenim i dravnim kapitalom bez sagla-snosti vlade republike. Ovo bez sumwe, i pored potrebe jaawa odreenih oblikakontrole ovih procesa (ostaje, meutim, pitawe "ko e kontrolisati kontrolo-ra?"), nije u skladu sa trinim potrebama, sputava inicijativnost privrednihsubjekata i ukida atribut trinosti ovom zakonu. Umesto ovog ini se da je po-trebno otvarati vie prostora za nesporno i druge trine modele izmene svo-jinske i upravqake strukture preduzea, makar i ne bili direktno privatizaci-onog karaktera, kako bi se shodno osnovnoj trinoj logici otvorila mogunostizbora. Direktna preferencija dravnog interesa kroz model prodaje (puwewebuxeta) ima svoja objektivna ograniewa (mala trawa, kupovina trita krozkupovinu preduzea i zatvarawe kupqenog preduzea ovo model direktne doka-pitalizacije iskquuje, otvarawe pitawa da li treba prodavati najboqa preduze-a koja su i potencijalno najinteresantnija,7) mali broj potencijalno interesan-tnih preduzea za kupovinu, potreba dokapitalizacije preduzea i nakon kupovi-ne i slino), koja po svojoj logici trae "napade sa svih strana" i drugim mode-lima privatizacije, kako bi se proces zavrio bar veinski u zakonskom roku (sobzirom da vie nema dileme da je privatizacija svojevrsni aksiom "svakastvar svoga gospodara trai" rekao bi Bogii). Tree, ovaj zakon promoviemaksimalno centralizovan model privatizacije (centralizovana sredstva, po-stupak, model, organi, kontrola), to je pravno posmatrano opet monopol koji jeizvanustavna kategorija. U Srbiji je u svemu opti trend decentralizacije, a sa-mo se privatizacija u potpunosti centralizuje (uz to ovaj model spada i u izuzet-no skupe modele privatizacije i u izuzetno spore modele). Iako se govori o jav-nosti (transparentnosti) ovog modela, to u stvari ne moe biti wegova odlikaupravo zbog tolike centralizacije (centralizacija i tzv. transparentnost ne mo-gu biti u prevelikoj qubavi). Najboqi primer za to je privatizacija tri cemen-tare u Srbiji, gde su na tri tzv. tendera uestvovala samo etiri potencijalnakupca (da li javnost postoji u toj meri kod odnosa 4:3, kad je samo jedan potenci-jalni kupac ostao bez "kolaa"!). etvrto, ovaj zakon kao da tei da sva privati-

7. Slovenake dileme- zato strancima da prodajemo neto to ne moramo, "Politika",4. 02. 2002. godine.

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.12

zovana preduzea izvede na berzu (princip "svi na berzu i sve na berzu"), to jeopet kreirawe monopola koji je izvanustavna kategorija. Ovo je takoe i protiv-no svetskim trendovima dominacije zatvorenih drutava (koja ne idu na berzan-sko trite akcija) i izuzetka otvorenih drutava (koja idu na berzansko tr-ite). ta vie, pravilo je da se donose i posebni zakoni kojima se tite i ot-vorene kompanije od neprijateqskih preuzimawa (hostile takeover), to jo uveknije sluaj sa naom zemqom i gde su u posebnim rizicima veinski privatizo-vana preduzea po ranijim zakonima.8)

5. Zatita investitora i sredstva stvarnopravnog obezbeewa u

naem pravu

Investitori koji ne ulaze u oblike korporativnog ulagawa (trajni kapitalulozi u raznim formama privrednih drutava opteg i specijalizovanog tipa),ve ulaze u razne forme u osnovi kreditnih poslova imaju posebnu potrebu za si-gurnou svojih potraivawa, koja se postie raznim stvarnopravnim i obliga-cionopravnim sredstvima obezbeewa. Za razliku od obligacionopravnih sred-stava obezbeewa, koja u naem pravu bar normativno ne zaostaju za relevantnompravnom infrastrukturom uporednog prava, stvarnopravna sredstva obezbeewau naem pravu zahtevaju znatno unapreewe ne samo prakse ve i same regulative,koja u dobrom delu zaostaje za odgovarajuom regulativom relevantnih zemaqa uuporednom pravu. Ovo se ogleda kako na planu usavravawa nekih postojeih in-strumenata stvarnopravnog obezbeewa, tako i na potrebu kreacije nekih novihtakvih instituta u naem pravu.

Prvo, stvarno pravo na nepokretnostima (kao i brodovima i avionima) uosnovi je kod nas ureeno zadovoqavajue. Ipak, osnovni problem kod sigurnostiovog sredstva obezbeewa sastoji se u tome to zemqine kwige ne postoje na ve-em delu zemqe9), a i gde postoje nisu aurne (problem pretpostavke apsolutnetanosti javne kwige i problem sukoba kwinog i vankwinog vlasnika), i naj-zad, hipotekarni poverilac ne moe vriti prodaju zaloene nepokretnosti vemora voditi spor po hipotekarnoj tubi i tek po dobijenom izvrnom naslovumoe traiti izvrewe prodajom hipotekarnog dobra, to po pravilu traje veo-ma dugo i to je svakako za poverioca nepovoqno. Da li katastri nepokretnosti,

8. Takvo dramatino upozorewe dolo je nedavno i od Asocijacije akcionarskih preduzeaSrbije. Vidi: "Politika", 4.02. 2002. godine.

9. Zemqine kqige postoje u Srbiji na 23% teritorije, dok katastar nepokretnosti kaooblik svojinske evidencije , koji je ustanovqen tek 1992. godine postoji samo na 9% weneteritorije, dok je na ostalom podruju jedini oblik javne evidencije o zemqitukatastar zemqita, koji je auriran i osnovan je za celu republiku (u kome su podaci ozemqitu, wegovim korisnicima i o katastarskom prihodu, ali se u wega ne mogu upi-sati svojina na nepokretnosti, kao ni same sagraene nepokretnosti, iako one po vred-nosti, po pravilu, prevazilaze vrednost zemqita, a u wih se ne moe upisati samim timni hipoteka). Izvor: "Politika", 3.02.2002.

13M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)

najavqenim promenama i aurirawem u smislu ukwibe svojine zemqita i svo-jine na izgraenim nepokretnostima, pa samim tim i hipoteke, koje u osnovi vodeupravni a ne sudski organi10), mogu po svojoj sigurnosti zameniti zemqine kwi-ge, veliko je pravno pitawe, na koje izgleda nije teko dati odgovor (to se nastie, pre smo za reafirmaciju zemqinih kwiga, uz izvesnu savremenu reformui glavne zemqine kwige, kako bi se omoguila i automatska obrada podataka,kao i za sudsko voewe evidencija nepokretnosti, s obzirom da su sudovi kompe-tentniji za ove poslove i uivaju vie poverewa kod graana i investitora odupravnih organa).

Drugo, u Srbiji, za razliku od Crne Gore gde je donet poseban zakon, ne posto-ji institut fiducijarnog prenosa prava svojine kao oblik stvarnopravnog obez-beewa, uz upis u javni registar koji vodi Direkcija za nekretnine. Predmet fi-ducijarnog prenosa svojine mogu biti i pokretne (pa i robni lager) i nepokretnestvari. Ovaj oblik stvarnopravnog obezbeewa, kao oblik nedravinske zaloge,moe da bude relativno povoqan oblik zaloge i sa stanovita dunika (zadra-va stvar i moe je ekonomski za to vreme koristiti) i sa stanovita poverioca(po neplaenom dugu o roku ovako obezbeenom moe postati vlasnik predmetatakvog obezbeewa ili se moe iz prodajne cene namiriti). Ipak, ini se da po-stoje, za sada, ozbiqne ustavne smetwe za ustanovqewe ovog oblika stvarnoprav-nog obezbeewa, budui da Ustav ne poznaje pojam tzv. privremene ili deliminesvojine, to je u osnovi ovaj institut.

Tree, naa zemqa jo nije ustanovila institut bezdravinske zaloge na po-kretnim stvarima, hartijama od vrednosti, potraivawima, udelima. Za ustanov-qewem ovakvog instituta postoje ozbiqni i ekonomski i pravni razlozi, s timda se razviju mehanizmi javnih i jedinstvenih registara, koji bi naelom publi-citeta obezbeivali sigurnost investitora sa ovim sredstvom obezbeewa.11) Uzto, trebalo bi znaajno korigovati naelo oficijelnosti (sudskog izvrewa)kod ovog obezbeewa i to tako to bi se vansudsko namirewe u postupku javneprodaje (izuzetno i neposredne prodaje u skladu sa Zakonom o obligacionim odno-sima) iz ugovora u privredi proirilo i na graanskopravne ugovore.12) Ovo va-i i za naelo specijalnosti, koje striktno primeweno znai da samo odreenopotraivawe moe biti predmet obezbeewa zalonim pravom i samo odreenestvari mogu biti predmet zalonog prava i to u pravcu reewa da svako lice mo-e zaloiti svaku stvar (ili pravo) svakom poveriocu radi obezbeewa svakogpotraivawa.13) Isto se odnosi i na princip nedeqivosti zaloge i nedeqivosti

10. Vidi: Pet godina za ukwibu, "Politika", 3.02. 2002. 11. Prvi je Jednoobrazni trgovaki zakonik SAD (1962.) uveo ovakvu bezdravinsku zalogu,

l. 9109. u vezi l. 9203. Nedavno ga je uvela i Poqska (1998.) i Republika Srpska (Zakono registrovanim zalogama na pokretnim stvarima i lanskim udelima, "Slubeni glas-nik RS", 16/2000). Za pravo Poqske vidi: Medi, "Zalog kao realno sredstvo obezbjeewagraanskopravnih i privrednopravnih ugovora", mag. rad, Bawa Luka, 2001., str. 158166.

12. ZOO, l. 981983.

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.14

udela. Uz to, potrebno bi bilo odrediti i rang prioriteta izmeu ugovorne, za-konske i sudske zaloge. Najidealnije bi bilo izjednaewe po rangu i prioritetusvih vrsta zalonih prava, a zalonim pravima dati prvenstvo na osnovu momen-ta sticawa kao osnovnog kriterijuma, ali treba biti svestan iwenice da ovo popravilu nije mogue. S druge strane, registrovanoj zalozi trebalo bi obaveznodati prednost nad neregistrovanom zalogom.

Konano, kod zaloge hartija od vrednosti bilo bi neophodno korigovati re-ewe Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, po kom zaloni poverilac hartija odvrednosti moe tom hartijom raspolagati samo punomonikim indosamentom,ali ne i svojinskim, to je ozbiqna smetwa za sigurnost investitora obezbee-nog ovim sredstvom obezbeewa, budui da ne bi mogao da se namiri prodajom ovogsredstva obezbeewa (osim na osnovu svojinskog indosamenta samog zalogodavcaili na osnovu sudske odluke, to obesmiqava ovaj predmet zaloge), a ne bi mo-gao ni da konstituie podzalogu svojim zalonim indosamentom.14)

I najzad, potrebno je ozbiqno razmotriti pitawe eventualne opravdanostiuvoewa u na pravni sistem instituta engleskog prava (retko se sree kod kon-tinentalnih zemaqa) tzv. lebdee zaloge (floating charge), koji u stvari predstav-qa jedan oblik nedravinske zaloge kapitala drutva (trajnog ili obrtnog) iliwegovog dela, upisom u javni registar, doputajui zalogodavcu ak i raspola-gawe wime, s tim da na otuenim delovima kapitala zaloga prestaje, za razliku odevropskog koncepta (gde zaloga na otuenoj stvari ne prestaje do potpunog nami-rewa potraivawa obezbeenog takvom zalogom), ali s druge strane ova zaloga se,takoe za razliku od evropskog koncepta, automatski bez posebnog upisa odnosi ina svako poveawe kapitala zalogodavca. Lebdea zaloga se pretvara u pravu za-logu kad namirewe tako obezbeenog potraivawa bude ugroeno (pad u docwu saplaawem tako obezbeenog potraivawa), kada zaloni poverilac zahteva na-mirewe iz predmeta zaloge postavqajui duniku prinudnog izvriteqa (recei-ver), radi prodaje optereenog kapitala ili stvari i prava iz kojih se sastoji.

6. Zatita investitora u hartije od vrednosti

Meunarodna organizacija za komisije za hartije od vrednosti (IOSCO) nasvojoj godiwoj konferenciji u Najrobiju 1998. godine usvojila je tri ciqa regu-lative hartija od vrednosti15) i trideset principa ove regulative, grupisanih uosam kategorija.16)

Osnovni ciqevi regulative hartija od vrednosti su:

13. Ovo, na primer, predvia model Evropske banke za obnovu i razvoj zakona za obezbeewepotraivawa konstituisawem nedravinske zaloge na poketnim stvarima.

14. ZOO, l. 247. Vidi i: N. Jovanovi, Ugovorno zalagawe udela i akcija, "Privrednik", 114/2001,s. 915.

15. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, International Organization of Securities Com-missions, september, 1998.

15M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)

prvo, zatita investitora;

drugo, obezbeewe da trite hartija bude fer, efikasno i transparentno;i

tree, smawewe sistemskog rizika.

Osnovni principi regulative hartija od vrednosti koji treba da obezbedeostvarewe ovih ciqeva grupisani su u osam kategorija.

Prvu kategoriju ine principi u vezi sa regulatorom, kojih je ukupno pet(prvo, odgovornost regulatora treba da bude jasno i objektivno iskazana; drugo,regulator treba da bude operativno nezavisan i odgovoran u izvrewu svojihfunkcija i ovlaewa;tree, regulator treba da ima adekvatna ovlaewa, sop-stvena sredstva i kapacitet da izvrava svoje funkcije i svoja ovlaewa; et-vrto, regulator treba da usvoji jasne i dosledne regulatorne postupke; peto,slube regulatora treba da potuju najvie profesionalne standarde, ukquu-jui odgovarajue standarde poverqivosti).

Drugu kategoriju ine principi samoregulative, kojih je ukupno dva (pr-vo, regulatorni reim treba da obezbedi odgovarajue koriewe samoregula-tornih organizacija, koje omoguuje direktnu odgovornost za wihove nadleno-sti, u zavisnosti od obima i sloenosti trita; drugo, samoregulatorne orga-nizacije treba da budu podvrgnute kontroli regulatora i treba da potuju stan-darde potewa i poverqivosti u izvravawu ovlaewa i delegiranih odgovor-nosti).

Treu kategoriju ine principi izvrewa regulative hartija od vrednosti,kojih je ukupno tri (prvo, regulator treba da ima sveobuhvatna ovlaewa izvr-ewa; drugo, regulator treba da ima sveobuhvaatna inspekcijska, istrana i nad-zorna ovlaewa; tree, regulatorni sistem treba da obezbedi efikasno i po-verqivo koriewe inspekcije, istrage, nadzora i ovlaewa izvrewa i im-plementaciju odgovarajueg efektivnog programa).

etvrtu kategoriju ine principi saradwe u regulaciji, kojih je ukupnotri (prvo, regulator treba da ima ovlaewa za razmenu javnih i nejavnih in-formacija sa domaim i stranim istovetnim telima; drugo, regulator treba daustanovi informacioni mehanizam koji omoguuje razmenu informacija, javnih inejavnih, sa domaim i stranim istovetnim telima; tree, regulatorni sistemtreba da obezbedi stranim regulatorima, koji treba da izvre neku istragu, po-mo, oslobaawem izvrewa funkcija i ovlaewa).

Petu kategoriju ine principi u vezi emitenta, kojih je tri (prvo, emitentitreda da u potpunosti, pravovremeno i tano objave finansijske rezultate i dru-ge informacije koje su bitne za odluku investitora; drugo, akcionari kompanijetreba da budu tretirani na fer i ravnopravan nain; tree, standardi rauno-

16. Na strogost u primeni ovih principa, te rizike ulagawa u hartije od vrednosti u sluajuwihove neprimene dramatino je upozorila i uvena Komisija za hartije od vrednostiSAD (SEC) vidi: "Finacial Times", 7. 03. 2000, str. 1.

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.16

vodstva i revizije treba da budu najvii i meunarodno prihvatqivog kvalite-ta).

estu kategoriju ine principi u vezi kolektivnih investicionih ema,kojih je ukupno etiri (prvo, regulatorni sistem treba da postavi standarde zalicence i regulaciju za one koji ele da trguju ili posluju kao kolektivna inve-sticiona ema; drugo, regulatorni sistem treba da obezbedi pravila koja ureujuzakonsku formu i strukturu kolektivnih investicionih ema i podelu i zati-tu imovine klijenata; tree, regulacija treba da zahteva objavqivawe informa-cija po pravilima koja vae za emitente, koje su nune za procenu stabilnostikolektivnih investicionih ema za posebne investitore i vrednost investicio-nog interesa u toj emi; etvrto, regulacija treba da obezbedi prikladnu i tran-sparentnu bazu za procenu imovine i cene i otkupa investicionih kupona u ko-lektivnoj investicionoj emi).

Sedmu kategoriju ine principi za posrednike na tritu hartija od vred-nosti, kojih je ukupno etiri (prvo, regulacija treba da obezbedi minimum stan-darda za ulaz na trie hartija od vrednosti u svojstvu posrednika; drugo, po-trebno je obezbediti poetni i osnovni kapital i druge prudencijalne uslove zaove posrednike, koji odraavaju rizike koji oni preduzimaju; tree, od posredni-ka na tritu hartija od vrednosti treba da se zahteva da ispuwavaju standardeinterne organizacije i voewa poslova koji imaju za ciq da zatite intereseklijenata, obezbede odgovarajui rizik upravqawa koji omoguuje prihvataweprimarne odgovornosti za ova pitawa; etvrto, potrebno je utvrditi odgovara-juu proceduru postupawa u sluaju propusta posrednika na tritu hartija odvrednosti u ciqu minimizirawa tete i gubitaka investitora i kontrole si-stemskog rizika).

Osmu kategoriju ine principi u vezi sekundarnog trita, kojih je ukupnoest (prvo, ustanovqewe sistema trgovawa, ukquujui i razmenu hartija odvrednosti treba da bude podvrgnuto odobrewu i nadzoru regulatora; drugo, po-trebno je da postoji tekui regulatorni nadzor razmene i trgovine koji ima zaciq da obezbedi da se to odvija kroz fer i pravina pravila koja osiguravaju od-govarajuu ravnoteu izmeu zahteva razliitih uesnika na ovom tritu; tre-e, regulacija treba da afirmie transparentnost trgovawa; etvrto, regula-cija treba da bude postavqena tako da otkriva i spreava manipulacije i drugenefer prakse i postupke trgovawa; peto, regulacija treba da obezbedi adekvatnoregulisawe velike izloenosti rizika od docwe u izvravawu obaveza i pore-meaja na tritu; esto, sistem kliringa i saldirawa transakcija sa hartijamaod vrednosti mora biti podvrgnut regulatornom nadzoru i ureen tako da obezbe-di da je fer, efikasan i efektivan, kao i da smawuje sistemski rizik).

Osnovni ciqevi regulative hartija od vrednosti postavqeni u navede-nom dokumentu IOSCO, koji se sastoje u zatiti investitora, smawewu si-stemskog rizika i obezbeewu da wihovo trite bude transparentno, feri efikasno nisu u dosadawoj naoj regulativi realizovani. Nerazvijenost

17M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)

trita hartija od vrednosti, posebno akcija, kod nas17) nije do sada u svojsvojoj otrini otkrila to obiqe pravnih praznina i nerazvijenost zakonskeinfrastrukture, u protivnom pokazale bi se sve wene negativnosti, to bipo pravnu sigurnost potencijalnih investitora u hartije od vrednosti bilopogubno. Posebno u naoj regulativi serijskih hartija od vrednosti i wiho-vog trita nedostaju upravo razvijeni posebni oblici zatite investi-tora u ove hartije (prvo, dunost otvorenih drutava da o svom finansij-skom i pravnom poloaju, kao i poslovawu izvetavaju javnost; drugo, du-nost pojedinih uesnika na tritu hartija od vrednosti da objavquju pro-pisane podatke; tree, posebne forme zatite prava mawinskih akcionara;etvrto, zabrana iskoriavawa povlaenih informacija; peto, zabranamanipulativne prakse; esto, zabrana manipulisawa informacijama; sedmo,zabrana poslovawa motivisanog provizijom; osmo, zabrana neovlaenogobavqawa nekih poslova sa hartijama od vrednosti; deveto, postupak preuzi-mawa akcionarskih drutava sa javnim upisom akcija. Zbog fenomena tzv.evidentne informacione asimetrije na tritu hartija od vrednosti, ne po-stoji posebna potreba da se tite tzv. profesionalni (struni) ulagai uhartije od vrednosti, ve samo tzv. neuki-nestruni ulagai, koji se profe-sionalno ne bave hartijama od vrednosti.18) Brojni berzanski krahovi, u ra-nijoj i novijoj istoriji berzanskog poslovawa, trebalo bi da prodrmaju naegzakonodavca i da mu ukau na potrebu stroge i detaqne regulative najreguli-sanijeg trita u svetu trita hartija od vrednosti i na potrebu ubrzawaprocedure donoewa novog Zakona o tritu hartija od vrednosti, kao i wegovestroge primene, kako bi se predupredili takvi krahovi i u naoj praksi berzan-ske trgovine hartijama od vrednosti, posebno akcijama.

7. Zatita investitora u hartije od vrednosti i berzanski krahovi

Jedan od najpoznatijih i ujedno i prvih berzanskih krahova dogodio se na Lon-donskoj berzi 1720. godine, a poznat je pod imenom Junomorski mehur (South SeaBubble), po imenu kompanije koja ga je izazvala. Naime, 1711. godine engleski par-lament je zakonom osnovao komaniju pod imenom "Kompanija junih mora", sa ci-qem namirewa potraivawa poverilaca engleske drave, koji su je kreditiraliu nizu ratova. Ovim zakonom su ta potraivawa "sekjuritizovana", tj. pretvorenau hartije od vrednosti ove komopanije. Ova kompanija dobila je ovim zakonom

17. U ovom trenutku na Beogradskoj berzi samo 10 preduzea trguje akcijama iz privatiza-cije, prosena trina cena je oko 36% od kwigovodstvene (iako je na primer jednopreduzee iskazalo dobit od 43%, ali ipak prosena cena wegovih akcija je 39%, toukazuje da nema odgovarajueg iskustva u ovoj oblasti investirawa i da investicionaklima nije povoqna).

18. Vie o ovim razgraniewima: N. Jovanovi, "Emisija vrednosnih papira", Beograd, 2001,str. 7783.

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.18

monopol u trgovini sa engleskim kolonijama u junim morima (juni deloviAfrike, Indija, Australija, Kina). Da bi prikupila sve kapital kompanija jepoela da emituje akcije i wihova prodaja je ila veoma dobro, poto su okiva-wa kupaca (investitora) bila da e ona zahvaqujui monopolu ostvarivati veli-ki profit. Ipak, to se nije desilo i kompanija je poslovala sa sve veim gubici-ma, to je prikrivano od javnosti, a gubici su stalno pokrivani novim emisijamaakcija, za kojima je vladalo veliko interesovawe zbog zablude kupaca. Na Lon-donskoj berzi akcije ove kompanije dostizale su basnoslovnu vrednost i ve 1720.godine wihova ukupna berzanska vrednost (tzv. kapitalizacija) iznosila je petputa vie od ukupne novane mase u svim zemqama tadawe Evrope (oko 500 mi-liona funti sterlinga). Kada se saznalo za gubitke ove kompanije ovaj naduvani"mehur" je morao "pui". Cene akcija ove kompanije su naglo pale i desio se ber-zanski krah. Akcionari ove kompanije koji su bili do tada prividno bogati pre-ko noi su propali i osiromaili. Izuzetno mali broj akcionara koji je ove ak-cije preprodao pre ovog kraha, naprotiv, preko noi se obogatio. Meu ovim "do-bitnicima" naao se i Princ od Velsa i ser Robert Valpol, predsednik VladeBritanije. Ovaj berzanski krah uticao je da iste godine parlament donese tzv. Za-kon o mehurima (Bubble Act) sa motivom zatite investitora u hartije od vredno-sti od slinih prevara. Ovim zakonom uslovqeno je osnivawe akcionarskihdrutava posebnom dozvolom drave.

Slian sluaj desio se u SAD 1929. godine, u vreme kad su kursevi akcijarasli na svim berzama, posebno na najveoj od wih wujorkoj. Postojala jeprava pomama kupaca za kupovinu akcija kako bi se na taj nain obogatili.Veina ovih kupovina vrena je na kredit (on margin), to znai da je kupac umomentu zakquewa ugovora plaao samo deo cene za kupqene hartije (oko10-15%), a za ostatak cene je dobijao kredit od banke ili berzanskog trgovca,uz istovremeno zalagawe tih hartija za obezbeewe tog kredita. U vreme do-spelosti kredita, ako je cena hartija bila via od kupovne, kupac je mogao date hartije proda i vrati kredit i uz to zaradi na razlici, a ako je cena bilania, onda je preputao hartije zalogoprimcu (kreditoru) da ih proda i timenamiri svoje potraivawe. Sve ovo je uzelo toliko maha da su akcije kupova-ne po znatno viim cenama od wihove stvarne vrednosti u momentu kupovine.Ovim se stvorio pekulativni bum na berzi, zbog rasta kurseva akcija uslednerealnih oekivawa kupaca tih hartija, a ne zbog stvarnog profita kompa-nija ije su to bile akcije. Kad se ovo shvatilo nastala je prava panika meuakcionarima i desio se berzanski krah. Time je stvoren tzv. "crni oktobar"1929. godine. Skoro svi uesnici trita hartija od vrednosti, ukquujuii profesionalne (poput Xona Rokfelera) i struwake (poput Irvina Fie-ra, uvenog profesora ekonomije na Jejlu) pretrpeli su ogromne gubitke. Vr-hunac je dostignut 1933. godine, do kada su kursevi izgubili oko 85% svojevrednosti u odnosu na polaznu 1929. godinu. Sve ovo je uticalo da predsednikRuzvelt u okviru tzv. politike "Novog dogovora" inicira donoewe brojnih

19M. Vasiqevi: Novi propisi i zatita investitora (str. 3-19)

zakona u kongresu, sa preventivnom i kontrolnom funkcijom. Re je o uve-nim zakonima koji i danas vae Zakonu o hartijama od vrednosti (1933.) iZakonu o trgovini hartijama od vrednosti (1934.). Uprkos strogoj kontrolnojfunkciji amerike Komisije za hartije od vrednosti, u skladu s ovim zakoni-ma, zakonitosti trita nekada su nepredvidive, to opet raa, s vremenana vreme, berzanske krahove. Najtei berzanski slom desio se 1987. godine.Naime, od 1982. godine kursevi akcija su stalno rasli da bi do ove godine do-stigli 300% svoje vrednosti iz te godine. Iznenada, desio se slom 19. oktobra(tzv. "crni ponedeqak"), kada su akcije za samo est sati izgubile 22% svojevrednosti.19)9

I novija istorija berzanske trgovine obiluje slinim krahovima. Nedav-ni (2001. godina) krah kompanije "Enron" u SAD (sedma na listi najveihsvetskih korporacija) sa 690 miliona dolara gubitka (do kog je dolo zbog"precewenog" profita od oko 600 miliona dolara od nezavisne oditorske ku-e "Anderson"), kao i krah nemake graevinske kompanije "Holzman" zboggubitka 2.4 milijarde maraka i krah kompanije EM.TV sa 2.6 milijardi mara-ka gubitka, poquqali su ne samo poverewe investitora u berze ve i u sam si-stem modernog poslovawa otvorenih kompanija.20)

19. Vidi: Samuelson&Nordhaus, "Economics", New York, 1992, str. 518.20. Za bankrotstvo "Enrona" vidi: "Politika", 24. 02. 2002.

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2002.20

II_0.fm; str. 21

II Preduzea

Pravo i privreda br. 5-8/2001.22

II_1_Thomas Jersild.fm; str. 23

Thomas N. Jersild,

Liaison in the Republic of Macedonia in 1999-2001,

American Bar Association Central and East European

Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI)

Senior Counsel and Retired Partner, Mayer, Brown & Platt

Duties of Company Directors: the Developing

Law in Macedonia*

It is a fundamental rule of corporate governance that a company's directors must act, al-ways with the highest degrees of care, diligence and loyalty to the company and its owners.This rule expresses simple fairness but it is more than that; this rule is essential if companiesare to attract significant investment and it is an absolute requirement for public confidence inbusiness and capital markets as a whole. It has been demonstrated empirically that companiesthat are governed honestly and fairly produce more value for their investors and, by impli-cation, for their employees and other stakeholders.1)

Every company law imposes duties of these kinds in some form and to some extent, andmost or all company laws provide penalties and remedies when these duties are violated. Atthe same time, the laws on this subject should be clear and understandable and should notbe so restrictive or so punitive that they discourage qualified people from becoming direc-

* Review of Central and East European LawPublished in Cooperation with the Institute of East European Law and Russian Studies of LeidenUniversityMartinus Nijhoff Publishers27 Review of Central and East European Law 2001 No. 1, 53-69 2001 Kluwer Academic Pub-lishers. Printed in The Netherlands

Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.24

tors, or prevent honest risk taking and entrepreneurship by directors when that is in the com-pany's interest.

This article will review the legal rules governing directors' duties in one East Europeancountry, Macedonia, and will suggest ways in which they might be clarified and reformed tofurther the above objectives. These rules are now set forth in the Macedonian Law on TradeCompanies (hereafter, the "LTC"),2) a large and comprehensive statute enacted in 1996 whichis one of the "first generation" of Macedonian laws in the post-socialist era.

Macedonia can be considered representative of the countries of South-Eastern Europe,a region whose laws have been relatively neglected in current comparative research. Ofthose countries, Macedonia offers a particularly useful case study. It has adopted a relativelynew company law, but one which is largely untested. There is a scarcity of case law and le-gal precedent, which highlights the need for clear statutory provisions. At the same time,there are associations of local lawyers and judges who are actively calling for businessand company law reform. Importantly, the Macedonian Government is encouraging the pro-cess.

The activity of local groups is, in fact, reflected in many of the proposals for change put for-ward in this article. The proposals have already been voiced by Macedonian lawyers and judgesduring workshops on corporate governance and company law reform organized by CEELIsince late 1999. Moreover, the suggestions have also been made directly to the Mace-donian Government in the course of a process which the Government recently initiated torevise or replace the LTC.3)

Many of the proposals discussed in the article are derived from Western, particularlyUnited States, practice and experience. The point should be made that, while the UnitedStates' common law system differs greatly in form from the civil-law systems of Macedoniaand other European countries, many solutions to company law problems are applicable univer-sally. Indeed, while it is clear that the common law and civil law systems will retain their im-portant formal differences, they are converging in the results they produce in practice. This is es-pecially so in business and company law.

The discussion below will describe the present Macedonian law and presently-pro-posed changes in that law in four specific areas: directors' duty of care, directors' personal lia-

1. See, e.g., "Protection Money", a review of research on the relationship between corporate gover-nance and company valuations, The Economist 11 December 1999,75. See also "In Praise of Rules:A Survey of Asian Business", The Economist 1 April 2001,4, in which recent research is reportedwhich concludes that good corporate governance can raise the value of companies by 20%-30%,and in which it is further stated that "the best western companies are now moving from the 'con-formance' to the 'performance' model of governance. This means directors no longer simply complywith the rules but try to do better than that, realizing that the best practice is a competitive advan-tage. By contrast, most companies in East Asia are still a long way from even conforming".

2. Macedonian Official Gazette 1996 No. 28, amended 1997 No. 7, 1998 No. 21,1998 No. 37, 1998No. 63, 1999 No. 39, 1999 No. 81 and 2000 No. 37.

3. In January 2000 the Macedonian Government appointed a working committee to review the presentLTC and to draft suggested changes to be considered by the Government and Parliament. The com-mittee includes representatives of the Ministries of Justice, Economy and Finance and persons fromthe judiciary, the practicing bar, the Skopje University, Law faculty and CEELI.

25Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing law in Macedonia

(str. 23-37)

bility for their business mistakes, directors' duty of loyalty in personal conflict of interest sit-uations and directors' duty not to engage in business competition with the company. The dis-cussion is not an academic or theoretical analysis of the law, but rather is an attempt to describepractical issues and aspects of the current law reform process.4)

1. Directors' Duty of Care

A director's duty of care is difficult to define without citing examples but it is, essentially,the legal duty of a director to act with a very high degree of care, deliberation and diligencewhen he makes decisions for the company and when he monitors and directs the company'smanagement. In actual corporate life, this means that a director should attend all board meet-ings that he possibly can (and resign from the board if he is unable to attend a significantnumber), give full attention to all matters that come before the board including those thatmay be outside his own personal expertise, make a special effort to monitor the quality of themanagers' performance and ask them hard and uncomfortable questions when necessary andgenerally treat the shareholders' investment in the company as he would treat his own in-vestments.

The Macedonian LTC imposes the duty of care in a particularly severe form and withmuch specific detail. The LTC's statement of the duty of care for joint stock company directors(set forth in Article 320) states, very simply and straightforwardly, that

members of the board of directors must work with due care and maintain busi-ness secrets

but the article immediately continues by saying that directors

who violate their obligations toward the company shall be jointly liable for damagescaused

and, further,

shall have the burden of proving that they acted with due care (italics added).

4. A preliminary point should be made regarding terminology. This article uses the word "director" tomean a person in a company who owes the company the duties which are referred to in the firstparagraph above and are discussed in more detail in the article. In normal usage a "director" is(only) a member of a company's board of directors. Often, however, these duties are also owed tothe company by persons who are not directors (for example, by controlling shareholders or senioremployed managers), and in some circumstances the duties themselves may be different dependingon, for example, whether they are born by independent directors or by employees with a management func-tion. A well-drafted company law should define and apply those distinctions clearly, but - except tomake this point here - this article will not deal with them further.As another preliminary point, the reader should be aware that the LTC provides for two principaltypes of business companies, joint stock companies and limited liability companies. The provisions dis-cussed in this article relate sometimes to one type and sometimes to the other, but the principles of gooddirector conduct are essentially the same for both.

Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.26

Article 320 further stipulates that a director owes the duty of care not only to the compa-ny's shareholders but, in some cases, directly to the company's creditors. On this point the ar-ticle states that

if a member of the board of directors severely violates his obligation to act with due carethe company's creditors may request compensation for damages after failing to settletheir claims with the company" (italics added).

The law does not contain, however, a definition of the term "severely". Article 320 provides an exception to these liability rules, but the exception would apply

only in limited circumstances.5) It is that

members of the board of directors shall not be liable for the damages if they acted pursu-ant to a decision of the company assembly that was made despite the fact that the membersstated their opinion (presumably at the assembly meeting, although this is not stated) thatsuch a decision was contrary to this law.

An analysis of Article 320 requires several critical comments. Firstly, it does not de-fine "due care" or offer guidelines on how to recognize it.

Secondly, it provides that the directors will always be liable jointly. That is, however, incontradiction with actual corporate life where the directors' actions, and their individual cul-pability, could vary greatly from director to director. Further, it could be unfair to hold one di-rector liable for the fault of another, particularly because the LTC does not appear to provide aright of contribution among jointly liable persons.

Thirdly, the provision places the burden and presumption of violation on the directors.This, in effect, makes them guilty until proven innocent.

Fourthly, Article 320 gives an outside creditor the right to sue the directors personal-ly even though, under most company laws, the duty of care is owed only to the company and itsshareholders.

Finally, as noted above, the exception to the rule envisaged in the article is very limited. Itcan be seen from the duty-of-care situations which typically arise in corporate life (some illus-trated in the first paragraph of this section and some below). They often do not involve conductwhich is brought before a shareholder assembly.

These comments lead to the conclusion that this law is simply too strict for the realities ofbusiness and corporate life. The collection of rules in Article 320 - combining an undefinedstandard of conduct with quite stringent and highly specific possibilities of liability - coulddiscourage a good potential director from being willing to serve as a director at all. That couldcertainly be the case if this law were taken and enforced as written. The point might be madethat in an actual lawsuit a court would moderate the article's provisions, for example, by ne-gating or ignoring the presumption of guilt or the rule of joint liability. But on the other hand,Macedonian lawyers and judges have expressed the view that judges would be hesitant to

5. Article 320 has other significant and very detailed provisions which, however, can be consideredbeyond the limited point made in this article.

27Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing law in Macedonia

(str. 23-37)

"make new law" in this way, especially in the Macedonian civil law system. In any event, thispoint does not provide an argument in favor of the law as it is now drafted.

The question of how to amend Article 320 has arisen in the course of the efforts now un-derway to revise the LTC. One possibility is to eliminate Article 320 altogether and not re-place it, thus leaving the entire subject to be dealt within court litigation. That could be called an"American" solution. In the United States, many states' corporation statutes do not define oreven refer to the duty of care; it is simply left to case law. However, this is not seen as appropri-ate in a civil-law system, especially in a transition country where clear definition of legal stan-dards of conduct is much needed and where personal liability for breaches of the duty ofcare may now be an unfamiliar idea.

Furthermore, three points do seem clear as a result of the above analysis: (1) the presentlaw can be made simpler, (2) the standard of care can be defined more clearly (to the extentthat that is possible), and (3) the burden of proof should be put clearly on the complainingshareholder, as is the case with most other laws. With these points in mind, it has been pro-posed that the Article might be deleted but replaced with a short provision stating simply thata director:

has a duty to the company to perform his functions as a director in good faith, in the rea-sonable belief that he is acting in the company's best interests, and with the careand attention a prudent person in a similar position would take under the circum-stances

and possibly stating no more. If thought necessary, additional provisions could be added:(1) to clarify the burden of proof, (2) to state explicitly that the duty of care is not owed to thirdparties such as creditors, contract or tort claimants or the Government (recognizing, of course,that directors may have other duties to third parties, and that a company's claim against a di-rector is a company asset which could become the creditors' property in a bankruptcy), or(3) to make it clear that when a director exercises his duties he is entitled to rely on financialstatements and other materials which are prepared by the company's management or inde-pendent accounts or lawyers. It should be noted that the proposed language quoted above issubstantially similar to that of duty-of-care laws which have been enacted in some U.S. states.

Even the above-suggested language defining the duty of care is partially subjectiveand, therefore, still not entirely clear. However, some subjectivity is unavoidable in this area,since each case will involve unique facts on which a court must make value judgments whenev-er an actual lawsuit arises. What the above proposal hopefully does do, is provide a guide tothe factors and criteria which should be taken into account in making those judgments. Itdoes this by making specific references to good faith, to the requirement of a "reasonable" be-lief, and the reference to a "prudent person in a similar position", however subjective thoseconcepts may ultimately be.

The difficulty of defining the duty of care in actual practice is illustrated by a very contro-versial American case, Smith v. Van Gorkom.*6) The decision in that case struck fear in thehearts of many American company directors at the time but it has had the effect of raising

6. 488 Atlantic 2d 858, Delaware 1985.

Pravo i privreda br. 1-4/2002.28

the standard of care which directors, in the United States at least, are legally required to fol-low. A case with similar facts would be unlikely today in Eastern Europe, but it may be worthdescribing here because it illustrates the kinds of judgments a court must make in definingthe duty of care in a lawsuit. Thus it helps make the point that the statutory law on this subjectshould be as clear as possible.

The case involved a publicly-traded financial services company called Trans Unionwhose chief executive officer had been approached by an outside party with a proposal tobuy all of Trans Union's stock through an offer that the outside party would make to all ofTrans Union's shareholders with the Trans Union board's approval and recommendation. Theproposal was very favorable to Trans Union's shareholders; among other things, the proposedoffer price was 50% higher than the price at which Trans Union's stock was then trading onthe New York Stock Exchange. Moreover, Trans Union's independent outside law firm ad-vised Trans Union's directors that they could be sued personally by unhappy shareholders ifthe directors did not approve the offer and did not submit it to the shareholders with theboard's recommendation. In these circumstances, the directors very quickly (in a board meet-ing lasting only two hours) approved and recommended the offer, which was then submitted tothe shareholders who overwhelmingly approved and accepted it at a specially-called share-holder meeting. Following the shareholders' approval, the merger was completed and the share-holders received their money.

Then, however, despite the high price which had been obtained, a group of the formerTrans Union shareholders sued the former Trans Union directors personally, claiming thatthey had violated their duty of care. The claim was that if the directors had taken more timeand care, and been more diligent in advocating the shareholders' interests, they could - andthey would - have obtained an even higher price for the company.

In defending the lawsuit, the ten former directors demonstrated that they were very ex-perienced in financial matters and that the five of them who were independent (non-employ-ee) directors had a total of 78 years experience as chief executive officers of other majorcompanies and 53 years as Trans Union directors, and that one of them was a prominentprofessor at one of the United States' most prominent university business schools. They ar-gued that they clearly knew better than the court what their own company was worth andhow much it could be sold for. (Also, there was no claim that any of the directors had a per-sonal conflict of interest.)

To great surprise in the legal community, the court of five judges, by a three-to-twovote, agreed with the suing former shareholders and held that the directors had beengrossly negligent and had violated their duty of care when they approved the sale so quick-ly. The court held that the directors had failed in their duty in several ways, including by nothiring an outside investment banker to provide an independent opinion on the price, and fail-ing to take enough time and care in analyzing and actively negotiating the extensive agree-ments which the lawyers had prepared. The court pointed out, among other things, that theacquisition agreements which the board approved did not have a provision (which is nowcommon in company acquisition agreements) that would have permitted Trans Union to

29Thomas N. Jersild: Duties of company directors: the developing law in Macedonia

(str. 23-37)

accept a higher offer from another outside party even after the contract with the proposedbuyer was signed.

The decision was appealed but the case was privately settled before it was finally decid-ed on appeal. Under the terms of the settlement the former directors were required to paythe former shareholders more than $20 million, of which $10 million (but only that) waspaid by the board's insurance company.

Court litigation like this may lie far in the future for Eastern Europe, but it can teachthe lesson - applicable everywhere - that the standards of director conduct are evolving andgenerally becoming higher, and that severe personal consequences can be visited on direc-tors who violate those standards.

2. Personal Liability of Directors for Their Business Mistakes

An issue that is different from (but related to) the duty of care is that of when, and towhat extent, the law should hold directors personally liable in damages for their businessmistakes, i.e., for business decisions which directors have made with due care but which,later and with hindsight, turned out to be bad decisions, sometimes even to the point ofbankrupting the company and destroying the shareholders' investments. Under Ameri-can law, a doctrine called the "business judgment rule" has evolved under which directorswill normally not be held liable in that situation. The author has been involved in many cas-es where the business judgment rule was applied; typical of these are situations where acompany has overpaid (in hindsight) for the acquisition of another company and has laterhad to sell it at a loss, and situations where a company has invested heavily in a promisingnew product line which then failed on the market. Such cases are often in the newspapers - aspectacular recent one involved BMW's acquisition of Rover Cars which BMW later dis-posed of with losses and write-offs exceeding eight billion DM.

The Macedonian LTC, on its face, rejects the business judgment rule and does so in aparticularly strong way. This is done in Articles 181 and 194, which state that directors ofa limited liability company:

shall be personally and jointly liable to the company and to third parties for ac-tivities conducted contrary to law and regulations, breach of contract and mis-takes made in the management of the company (italics added).7)

Unlike Article 320, Article 181 also provides a remedy against offending directorswhich is distinctively American rather than traditionally European, namely, the remedy ofa derivative lawsuit. This is a lawsuit that is brought, not directly by and on behalf of the

7. The language quoted above is in Article 181, which as drafted applies only to managers of a company. Article194 states, however, that Article 181 (as well as Article 178, discussed later in this paper) shall applyalso to members of the board of directors. It should be pointed out that Article 181, by its terms,applies to managers and directors of limited liability companies but not to managers or directors of joint stockcompanies. The LTC provisions for directors of joint stock companies do not appear to deal with this subject atall, which leaves open the question of whether the principles of Article 181 would be applied to them by analogy.

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complaining shareholders, but rather on behalf of the company itself or in the name of allof the shareholders. Paragraph (3) of Article 181 states:

(3) Shareholders may both file complaints for compensation of damage sufferedpersonally and individually or jointly file a complaint for compensation on be-half of the company. Plaintiffs may request full compensation for damage suf-fered by the company.

This last sentence in paragraph (3) even suggests that the damages paid by the culpa-ble director in a derivative suit may be received directly by the complaining shareholders,not (as is required in American derivative litigation) to the company only.

Article 181 is also extremely inflexible in that it provides that, in any agreementamong the shareholders,

any provision that contains a waiver of the right to file a complaint shall be void

and that

no decision reached at a shareholders' assembly may affect the filing of a com-plaint to impose liability on directors for mistakes in performance of their du-ties.

These provisions would appear to deprive shareholders of the freedom to reducethe strictness of Article 181 by agreeing among themselves on other liability standards towhich they will hold their directors - for example, by granting their directors the protectionof the business judgment rule. In the author's experience such agreements - which are oftencarefully negotiated by knowledgeable shareholder-investors and their lawyers - are verycommon, particularly in limited liability companies and closely-held corporations whichare organized for specific business ventures.8)

Summing up, several observations can be made with regard to Article 181: Firstly, asalready stated, it on its face imposes strict liability regardless of whether a director's de-cision was made with due care and in good faith, and it would seem to limit or preventshareholders from agreeing among themselves on their own desired liability standard, as isdone elsewhere.

Secondly, like Article 320, Article 181 imposes joint liability on directors even thoughtheir culpability might be different and even though there will inevitably be some cases inwhich it will be unfair to hold one director liable for the fault of another.9)

8. This is the case in the United States and, in the author's experience, increasingly the case in Europeand Latin America. Such agreements among shareholders often contain some form of the businessjudgment rule, and also often contain provisions that limit the liability of the directors from liabilityfor acts that would otherwise be violations of the duty of care or the duty of loyalty (for example, toallow a director to continue pursuing other existing businesses that might be in competition with thecompany in question). In some cases, such agreements are believed by the shareholders to be neces-sary to induce a particular director to serve; typically, the shareholders in such agreements aresophisticated investors who are aware of the risks they are undertaking.

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Thirdly, another problem is that Article 181 creates direct liability of a director to thirdparties for the director's business mistakes, even though, as argued above, the duty of careshould properly be owed only to the company and the shareholders.

Finally but most importantly, it should be said that the policy of Article 181 doessomething that the law should not do: by imposing liability for all business mistakes it candiscourage or prevent directors from taking entrepreneurial risks which are for the share-holders' benefit - also the country's economy's benefit - but which could ultimately turn outbadly. It puts courts and judges, who rarely have business expertise, in a position to sec-ond-guess the business judgments of experienced boards of directors.

How, then, might Article 181 be amended? This question too has arisen in the presentefforts to revise the Macedonian company law. In answer, it has been suggested that Ar-ticle 181 should be deleted and replaced with a simple statement of the principles whichunderlie the business judgment rule, such as the following:

A director who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty ofcare, and will not be personally liable for damages or other legal sanctions aris-ing from his making the judgment, if:(a) he does not have a personal interest in the subject of the judgment,(b) he is informed regarding the subject of the judgment to the full extent that hereasonably believes is appropriate under the circumstances, and(c) he rationally believes when the judgment is made that it is in the best inter-ests of the company.

Like the suggested revision in section 1 of this article, this also resembles solutionsfollowed in some U.S. states. For purposes of clarity, it would also be advisable to definethe term "personal interest" in clause (a) as clearly as possible, and it has been suggested inMacedonia that the definition of "personal interest" which is described below in section 3of this contribution be used for that purpose. The above-quoted provision might also besupplemented by rules stating clearly and objectively when an individual director will, andwill not, be deemed to have agreed to actions which were taken by the board of which he isa member. On this, it has been suggested that the Macedonian law be expanded to state:(1) that a director who attends a board meeting at which any action is taken will bedeemed to have agreed to that action unless his dissent is recorded in the company's recordof the meeting or he files a statement of his dissent in writing with a specified company of-ficial immediately after the meeting; and (2) that a director who was absent from themeeting will be deemed to have agreed to the actions taken at the meeting unless he filessuch a dissenting statement immediately after he has notice of the action.

9. On this point it should be noted that while Article 181 states, like Article 320, that the directors' liability isjoint, Article 181 also states, unlike Article 320, that "the court shall determine the fault of each [director] if sev-eral [directors] participated in acts that cause damage". This would seem to be an effort to modify the strictnesson imposing joint liability, but the point should be made that imposition of joint liability at all is inappropriate.

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3. Directors' Duty of Loyalty in Conflict of Interest Situations

Another fundamental duty of a director is his duty of loyalty to the company. The lawshould make it clear that, simply by becoming a director, a person commits his personal alle-giance to the company and agrees that the interests of the company and its shareholders will pre-vail over any individual interest of his own when there is a conflict between them. It also meansthat a director must not use his corporate position to make a personal profit or to gain other per-sonal advantage.

The duty of loyalty can arise in very different (although sometimes overlapping)types of situations. Among them are situations in which the director: (1) has a personalinterest in a business transaction with the company, (2) may vote to determine his own sala-ry or his own directors' fees or to determine the salary or directors' fees of other directors whowill then be determining his salary or fees, (3) has the ability to use his company position or touse "inside" company information to further his personal interests in some way, (4) has theability to take for himself, personally, a business opportunity that has come to the compa-ny and which he knows of only because he is a director of the company, (5) serves as adirector of two companies and there are transactions between these two companies involved,and (6) is engaged in business competition with the company of which he is a director (dis-cussed in section 4 of this article).

This section will discuss the Macedonian law relating to the first of these- acts or transactions in which the director has a personal conflict of interest- and, as above, this article will discuss possible clarifications and revisions to the present

LTC provisions. The principal relevant provisions of the LTC are Articles 313 and 344. Theyare similar to each other except that Article 313 deals with directors of joint stock compa-nies which have a single or "one-tier" board of directors (which under the LTC must, then,have two separate types of directors, called "executive directors" and "non-executive" direc-tors), while Article 344 does the same for companies which have a German-style "two-tier" board system (with a supervisory board and a managing board). Under the LTC, alljoint stock companies have the option of choosing which of these two systems they willadopt.

Articles 313 and 344 take the approach of declaring that certain contracts in which a di-rector has an interest may be executed if they have been approved by an appropriateboard majority; specifically, Article 313 states:

Contracts in which a joint-stock company is a party and in which an executive or anon-executive member of the board has an indirect or direct interest may be executed ifthe contract is approved by at least a majority of non-executive members of the board of direc-tors.

The article then stipulates that a director shall inform the board if he knows that acontract meets the above requirements; and that the interested director "is entitled to be heard",but may not participate in the discussion or decision of the non-executive directors regarding thecontract or its approval. The article also lays down a blanket requirement that the shareholder as-sembly be informed of all approvals.10)

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Several observations might be made on Articles 313 and 344. Firstly, unlike the casewith Article 320, which states that a director has an affirmative duty of care which he is person-ally liable for violating, Articles 313 and 344 do not state that a director has an affirmative dutyof loyalty which he is liable in damages for violating.11)

Secondly, Articles 313 and 344 require that all interested-director contracts must be for-mally approved by the board. This means literally that formal approval is needed even if:(1) the contract is fair to the company, (2) similar contracts were previously approved, and(3) the contract is de minimis in value or importance: to take an extreme but practical example,it would cover a director's arrangement to use a company-owned car for one day or one week,both in the case where he paid the company for its use and the case where he did not.

Thirdly, Article 313 also requires that the board's approval be given in advance, forego-ing the possibility (not unusual in corporate life) of board approval and ratification at apoint in time after the contract has been executed. The articles, however, do not state theconsequences if an interested-director contract is not approved by the board. Is the con-tract then void? Is it voidable by the company at the company's option? Is it valid but givingrise to a damage claim by the company against the director?12)

Fourthly, they do not define the concept of a director's "indirect or direct interest". Nor dothey provide guidelines to determine when it exists: does it, for example, encompass the inter-est of a family member of the director?

Fifthly, they do not require that the board members who approve the contract mustthemselves have no interest in the contract or any related transaction; and they do not re-quire that full disclosure of the director's interest must be made to the board, or that the ap-proval will be effective only if the board has all the material fact about the director conflict.

Finally, they require that all such approvals be reported to the shareholder assembly even ifthe contract is de minimis in value or importance.

To deal with these points, a replacement of Articles 313 and 344 has been proposed inMacedonia that has three parts. First, it would impose an affirmative duty of loyalty ondirectors in all matters (not only contracts) affecting the company in which they have a per-sonal interest. It would do this by stating, simply, that:

a director who has a personal interest in a matter affecting the company has a duty toact fairly and loyally to the company with respect to that matter.

10. Articles 313 and 344 have other important, and sometimes not fully clear, provisions, and there aresignificant differences between the two articles, This, however, is beyond the limited points made inthis contribution.

11. The closest thing to an affirmative imposition of the director's duty of loyalty in the LTC appears to be the state-ment in Article 314 that directors of one-tier companies "are obliged to work in the interest of thejoint stock company and its shareholders and employees" (italics added). There does not appear to be acorresponding provision for directors of two-tier companies.

12. On these issues it should, however, be pointed out that Articles 345 and 346, which apply only totwo-tier board companies, state that contracts which have been disapproved by the supervisoryboard may be annulled "if the contracts are harmful to the company" and that "a complaint forannulment shall be filed [presumably with a court] within three months after the contract was exe-cuted". There is not a corresponding provision for one-tier board companies.

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Second, the proposed version sets forth a detailed and fairly broad definition of theterm "personal interest" in the hope of forestalling the endless arguments which could oth-erwise ensue on when and whether it is present. The suggested definition states, among otherthings, that a director has a personal interest in an "act or transaction" if: (1) either he or a fam-ily member (a term which is, in turn, specifically defined elsewhere to include immediatefamily members and their spouses and any other persons sharing the same home with the direc-tor) is a party to the act or transaction, or (2) he has a financial or family relationship to a party toit which could reasonably be expected to affect the director's judgment adversely to the com-pany, or (3) he is under the control or controlling influence of a party to the act or transac-tion which could reasonably be expected to affect his judgment adversely to the company.As in the case of the above-proposed definition of due care, this definition of "personal inter-est" requires some subjective judgment, but that appears to be unavoidable in dealing withthis value-laden issue, where each case will be different and will often require that individualjudgments be made.

The third part of the proposed amendment has the same purpose as Articles 313 and344, namely, to state specific circumstances in which a director will be protected from li-ability notwithstanding his conflict of interest. The proposal does this, however, in a way thattries to answer some of the questions raised above. It states, among other things, that a directorhas not violated the duty of loyalty, and will not be personally liable for damages or other le-gal sanctions arising from his conflict, if either (1) all material facts concerning the interestare known to the board of directors and the board authorizes the transaction in goodfaith by majority vote of disinterested directors, or (2) all such material facts are knownto the shareholders and the transaction is approved by the shareholders in good faith by ma-jority vote at a shareholder assembly, or (3) the transaction, judged under the circum-stances at the time it was entered into, is shown to be fair to the company.

It will be noted that clause (2) in the preceding sentence provides for the option ofshareholder approval, and that clause (3) assures that the company may have the benefit of acontract which is favorable to the company even if the contract was not approved - whichmight have happened through inadvertence or may even have happened through deliberateconcealment on the part of the interested director. It also allows the interested director thebenefit of such a contract if he can show that it was favorable to the company.

4. Directors' Duty Not to Compete with the Company

While a director's duty not to compete with the company is part of his duty of loyalty,many company laws including Macedonia's deal with it separately. As will be seen below,the LTC provisions on this subject are particularly restrictive and are also different for di-rectors of joint stock companies which have a single-tier board (covered in Article 312), fordirectors of joint stock companies which have a two-tier board (covered in Article 327),and for directors of limited liability companies (covered in Articles 178 and 194).

Article 312 (for directors of joint-stock companies with a one-tier board) begins with anextremely broad proscription. It states:

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Executive members of the board of directors may not perform any paid or unpaid regis-tered activity or involve themselves in any kind of paid or unpaid activities of an-other company whether on their own behalf or on behalf of a third party, withoutprior permission of the non-executive members.

The article next states that the company' s shareholder assembly "shall be notified of de-cisions of the board approving the involvement of an executive member in certain activities".While this quoted language is not completely clear, it was probably intended to mean thatthe assembly must be notified of all decisions made by the non-executive members of theboard which approve any activities of the kind described in the first part of Article 312. In athird provision Article 312 requires that, prior to the appointment of a natural person as anon-executive director, the proposer of that person shall disclose to the company's "bodyin charge" all of the activities of the proposed person of the type