hemp hazid

Shell Exploration & Production

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HEMP and HAZID

HEMP (Hazard and Effects Management Process) and it’s associated tools


HEMP (Hazard & Effects Management Process)

• HEMP = four steps:–Identify - what hazards are present in our activities. Are people, environment, assets or reputation exposed to potential harm? Produce a list of these hazards

–Assess - we need to know how the hazard can be released, how likely is loss of control, what are the potential consequences, and thus how important each hazard is to us. In this way we can prioritise. We also ask the question “can we remove the hazard?” - is the hazard an inherent part of our business or can we remove it and still function.

–Control - for all identified hazards we ask the questions: “Can we eliminate the causes which release the hazard?” and “What controls are needed to prevent the release?” “How effective are these controls?”

–Recover - “Can the potential consequences or effects be mitigated? “What recovery measures are needed? “Are recovery capabilities suitable and sufficient?

• In Identify & Assess, use the Bow Tie model

• HAZID – a structured brainstorming to identify potential hazards early in the project

• EP2005-0300 HEMP Process (full set of procedures, specifications, standards, guidelines)

• HEMP (WIKI)

TopEvent

THREAT

BARRIERS OR CONTROLS

RECOVERYMEASURES

CONSEQUENCE

SCENARIO

Control (keep within control limits) Prepare for emergencies

reduce likelihood (proactive)

mitigate consequences and re-instate (reactive)

HAZARD

CONSEQUENCE

CONSEQUENCE

TopEvent

THREAT

BARRIERS OR CONTROLS

RECOVERYMEASURES

CONSEQUENCE

SCENARIO

Control (keep within control limits) Prepare for emergencies

reduce likelihood (proactive)

mitigate consequences and re-instate (reactive)

HAZARD

CONSEQUENCE

CONSEQUENCE

Accountability – DCAF states that this is with the HSSEDiscipline – in EPE it is with Safety Engineering

• Bow Tie Model

• HAZID

http://sww.shell.com/ep/corporate_support/eps_hsse/HSE%20Framework/structure_ep2005-0300_HEMP.html

http://sww.wiki.shell.com/wiki/index.php/HEMP

http://sww.wiki.shell.com/wiki/index.php/HEMP

http://sww.wiki.shell.com/wiki/index.php/Hazard_Identification


Inspection CorrosionAllowance

DetectionProcess

Shutdown

DetectionESD

PlantSeparation

Detectionand

Deluge

Leak !

First Hazardous Eventor

Top Event

HazardousEvent

Fire

Fire

THREATS ESCALATION

Hazard :Hydrocarbon gasunder pressure

Examples: Corrosion Erosion Impact

CAUSATION

Threat Barriers Recovery Preparedness Measuresand Mitigation Measures

CONSEQUENCE

Rupture and Leak

Pressure Vessel


Example 1


Hazardous Event

EVENT TREE (Consequences)

FAULT TREE (Causes)

CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM (BOW TIE)

e.g.loss of gas

containment

ESCALAT ION

sequence of faults and causesleading to a hazardous event

e.g. explosion(release of hazard)

HAZARD

e.g.ESD bypassed

e.g.maloperation

e.g.detector failure

e.g.deluge failure

sequence of events and failures leading to the escalation of a hazardous event

e.g. overpressure


Threats• Loss of Hydrostatic head• Swabbing

Hazard:HC under pressure

Event:Well Kick

Blowout

Escalation

Well kickFirst Hazardous Event

OrTop event

Kick detection

MudWeight Control

Welldesign

BOP’s EmergencyPlan

Blowout

Threat BarriersRecovery Preparedness Measures

And Mitigation Measures

Causation Consequences

AccuratePressure

info


Example 2


Hazardous Event

EVENT TREE (Consequences)

FAULT TREE (Causes)

CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM (BOW TIE)

Well Kick

ESCALAT ION

sequence of faults and causesleading to a hazardous event

(release of hazard)

HAZARD

Mud Pit levelalarm by passed

Mud weight too low

BOP leaking

Bad casing design

sequence of events and failures leading to the escalation of a hazardous event

Losses

Rig floor equipment not X-proof


What is ALARP? When is safe, safe enough….

• ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) is the level of risk (tolerability) below which the money, time and trouble involved in reducing the risk further would become unreasonably (grossly) disproportionate.

Risk reduction options

ALARP0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1 2 3 4 5 6

Ris

k

Risk to stakeholders

Sacrifice (cost)

LegalRequirements,Standards


HEMP cont. - tools

• Tools and (structured) techniques to identify hazards and/or assess the consequences and/or the level of risk

• Examples:

– HAZID

– Job Hazard Analysis/TRA

– Explosion study

– HAZOP

– Pollution study

– Fire modelling (and FirePran)

– Escape and evacuation analysis

– RIE (Health Risk Assessment)

– Sustainable development assessment

– Ergonomic layout study

– QRA

• Technical studies:• IPF/SIL-classification

• FMECA

• Structural analysis


HEMP Tools cont. - 1: HAZID (Hazard Identification Study)

• Team session

• Involving all disciplines

• Independent chairman/facilitator (qualified)

• EP200712228168,

– HAZID procedure EPE

• Be creative!

• Addresses environmental and project risks

• Identify Hazard

• Determine threats/barriers

• Assess (risk ranking)

• Action?

IDENTIFY

THREATS & CAUSES

BRAINSTORM

NO

The HAZIDProcess

ASSESS

HAZARDIS IT POSSIBLEIS IT LIKELY ?

CONTROLSWHAT BARRIERS OR CONTROLS ARE REQUIRED TO PREVENT OR

CONTROL THE EFFECT?

GUIDE WORD

YES

Select Plant AREA or NODE & Section,Select CATEGORY, Discuss and agree INTENT

• http://sww.shell.com/ep/epe/engineering_maintenance/safety_engineering/safety_engineering_hazop_intro.html

http://sww.shell.com/ep/epe/engineering_maintenance/safety_engineering/safety_engineering_hazop_intro.html


HEMP Tool 2: HAZOP-technique

• Identification of hazards and operability issues

• Team session

• Multi-disciplinary

• Separate chairman (qualified)

• Very rigorous

• Relevant for process changes eg. UBD, tie-in to vent system, flaring.

• Decision not to HAZOP to be signed off by a Process TA2

• Ref. EP200712228168

– HAZOPprocedure EPE

• http://sww.shell.com/ep/epe/engineering_maintenance/safety_engineering/safety_engineering_hazop_intro.html

http://sww.shell.com/ep/epe/engineering_maintenance/safety_engineering/safety_engineering_hazop_intro.html


HEMP Tool 3. QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessments)

• Complex situations (process hazards)

• Comparison between options (helicopter vs basket)

• Statistics may help but have limitations

• Caution about the absolute level of risk

INTOLERABLEFundamental improvements needed

TOO HIGHSignificant effort required to improve

HIGHInvestigate alternatives

LOWConsider cost effective alternatives

NEGLIGABLEMaintain normal precautions

Daily commuting by helicopter

Mining E&P contractors

Average all industries Traffic accident

Workers in safestindustries

Living near nuclearinstallationsFire or explosionfrom gas at home

Lightning (UK)

10-2

10-3

10-4

10-5

10-6

10-7

10-8

Individual risk


Exercise 1: Gas detectionGas detection system out of service

- cup of coffee fell into the control panel:

- unmanned onshore location

- Unmanned offshore location

- manned installation

1. What is/are the hazards?

2. What is the source of energy?

3. Barriers - preventive (any additional?)

- mitigative (any additional?)

4. What is the consequence?

5. What is the probability and (level of )Risk?

(with and without additional measures)

Structural Integrity

Process Containment

Ignition Control Protection

Systems Detection Systems Shutdown

Systems Emergency Response Lifesaving

Major AccidentHazardEscalating Consequences


Exercise 2: Tank level calibration

• Condensate storage tank (750 m3)

• Level alarm (to control room) @ 70%

• Automated shutdown @ 90%

• Instrument has been calibrated for water tank iso stabilised condensate s.g. = 0,85

• Tank does contain a pressure relief valve and a local level indicator









Exercise 3: Gas leak

- flange-leak (natural gas) x-mas tree (approx. 7 mm)

- Ignited

- Pressure 80 bar

- Well spacing 20 meters









Exercise 4: Valve in wrong position

- Locked open in stead of locked closed (due to drawing error or maloperation – reading error)

- 4”Valve is connected to a 2-phase separator (150 bar)

- In use as a manual drain connection for annual maintenance

- Drain system has design rating of 10 bar

- Drain tank is located on the lowest deck

1. What is/are the hazards (gevaren)?







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