hazid report rev-0
DESCRIPTION
HAZIDTRANSCRIPT
UNITED ENERGY PAKISTAN LTD. NAIMAT PHASE V PROJECT
HAZID REPORT
Feb 2014 Revision: A
REV DATE DESCRIPTION PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED
A 22/02/2014 Issued for Review MSA Sheraz (MSG) MSZ
0 10/02/2014 Issued for distribution MSA Sheraz (MSG) MSZ
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS 3
DEFINITIONS 4
HOLDS 6
1.0 INTRODUCTION 7
1.1 Workshop Scope 7
2.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION 8
2.1 Background 8
3.0 METHODOLOGY 9
4.0 MEETING DETAILS 10
5.0 HAZID FINDINGS 11
5.1 Recommendations: 11
5.2 HAZID Comments 13
6.0 HAZID FOLLOWUP 16
APPENDICES
NO TABLE OF CONTENTS ENTRIES FOUND.ABBREVIATIONS
BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.
BOP Blowout preventer.
CVP Capital value process.
DCS Distributed control system.
EA Engineering authority.
FEED Front end design.
HAZID Hazard identification.
HAZOP Hazard and operability (study).
HSSE Health, safety, security, and environmental.
HSSE&O Health, safety, security, environmental, and operational.
IPL Independent protection layer.
ISD Inherently safer design.
LNG Liquefied natural gas.
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas.
MOC Management of change.
OMS Operating management system.
P&ID Piping and instrumentation diagram.
PFD Process flow diagrams.
PHSSER Project HSSE review.
TOR Terms of reference.
DEFINITIONS
Cause Event, situation, or condition that results, or could result, directly or indirectly in an accident or incident.
Competent Describes an individual with knowledge and skills deemed acceptable by the engineering authority (EA) to perform a task. Appropriate knowledge and skill may be acquired through training, experience, qualifications, or some combination of these.
Consequences Direct, undesirable result of an accident sequence usually involving a fire, explosion, or release of toxic material. Consequence descriptions may be qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects of an accident in terms of factors such as health impacts, economic loss, and environmental damage.
Hazard Condition or practice with the potential to cause harm to people, the environment, property, or reputation.
Hazard identification (HAZID) Brainstorming approach used to identify possible hazards. HAZID studies are very broad in their scope. The HAZID is sometimes called a Preliminary Hazard Analysis.
Hazard and operability (HAZOP) Systematic qualitative technique to identify and evaluate process hazards and potential operating problems, using a series of guidewords to examine deviations from normal process conditions.
Independent protection layer (IPL) Device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a postulated accident sequence from proceeding to a defined, undesirable endpoint. An IPL is (1) independent of the event that initiated the accident sequence and (2) independent of any other IPLs. IPLs are normally identified during layer of protection analyses.
Initiating cause A failure, error, situation, or condition that results or may result in the propagation of a hazardous event.
Risk A measure of loss / harm to people, the environment, compliance status, Group reputation, assets or business performance in terms of the product of the probability of an event occurring and the magnitude of its impact. Throughout this Practice the term “risk” is used to describe health, safety, security, environmental, and operational (HSSE&O) undesired events.
Node A discrete area or portion of an activity, plant, or system that permits a stepwise approach towards progressing through the HAZID.
Safeguards Device, system, or action that would likely interrupt the chain of events following an initiating cause or that would mitigate loss event impacts.
What If analysis Scenario based hazard evaluation procedure using a brainstorming approach in which typically a team that includes one or more persons familiar with the subject process asks questions or voices concerns about what could go wrong, what consequences could ensue, and whether the existing safeguards are adequate.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
United Energy Pakistan commissioned HAZID study for Naimat Phase-V Gas treatment and LPG extraction project. The project is in FEED stage. Detailed design (EPCC) will be initiated soon, a Tender Document has been prepared by FEED which will form basis of design for detailed engineering. HAZID looked into generic project and process hazards associated with the project.
A two days session was conducted at UEPL head office in Bahria Complex-1 on 17th & 18th of Feb 2014.
1.1 Workshop Scope
The HAZID will look into Naimat Phase-V scope only. Existing on-going projects, Phase-IV and TAP will not be subject of this HAZID however hazards due to SIMOPSs and any interconnectivity between existing and new units will be considered in this HAZID scope. The purpose of HAZID is to:
• Identify potential hazards as defined in the TOR for the HAZID study.
• Consider consequences of the hazards.
• Identify safeguards that are in place to provide hazard prevention or mitigation.
• Propose recommendations, as needed, to eliminate, prevent, control, or mitigate hazards.
• Provide assistance to facility management in its efforts to manage risks.
• Support objectives of ISD.
2.0 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
2.1 Background
Naimat Facility is a gas treatment and LPG recovery plant which consists of four (04) phases. Each phase consists of Amine Sweetening unit and Glycol Dehydration unit along with their utilities. There is a refrigerated LPG unit and Condensate stabilization unit. Within this plant there is condensate and LPG storage and loading area.
2.1.1 New facilities (PHASE-V)
Naimat Phase-V will be adjacent to and fed from Naimat Facility which consists of Separation unit, Amine Sweetening unit, Glycol Dehydration unit, Molecular Sieve Dehydration unit, Turbo-Expander LPG Recovery Unit, Condensate Stabilization unit and Sales Gas Compression along with their utilities and off-sites.
It is decided that this phase will be a stand-alone and will process Naimat West gas whereas 40 and 85 MMSCFD additional gas from existing Naimat Phases can be processed in Glycol dehydration unit and LPG unit respectively. There is also provision given in condensate stabilization unit to process condensate from existing Naimat Phases.
Utilities for Naimat Phase-V will consist of Hot Oil system, Instrument and utility Air system, Fuel Gas system, Power Generation system, Firewater system, Warm and Cold Flare system. RO (Reverse Osmosis) system for this phase will be installed along with Naimat Phase-IV RO system.
Storage and Loading facilities will be provided for condensate and LPG. Produced water system will be installed for disposal of produced water. LP/HP drain systems will also be provided to handle drains generated during maintenance and shutdown.
Storm water pit is provided at the area where flare stack is situated and have enough capacity to handle large amount of water generated due to rain fall.
3.0 METHODOLOGY
HAZID was carried out as per industry standard practices. HAZID looked into Major Accidents as well as HSSE hazards during construction as well as commissioning and operation stage. A set of guidewords or brainstorming reference list was used during the session. HAZID team was encouraged to consider more deviations / hazards which may be missing in generic list. For each guideword team did brainstorming, identifying potential consequences and list existing safeguards and generate recommendations for further mitigation as required. A risk Matrix (8x8) was used to risk rank all the identified hazards. The purpose of risk ranking was to prioritize the findings on a scale. Risk ranking should not be interpreted as Qualitative or Quantitative risks of the project as at the FEED stage limited technical details were available to assess the risks accurately hence only relative ranking of findings was done. HAZID identified a number of actions which were categorized either as Recommendations or Comments, former being actions to be addressed at FEED to EPCC stage and later (comments) to be either incorporated in Tender Document or actions already in place but need completion or verification.
4.0 MEETING DETAILS
Workshop Attendees Name Designation 17/02/2014 18/02/2014
Muhammad Saim Ahmed Facilitator √ √
Muhammad Sheraz Goraya Process Engineer / HAZID Scribe √ √
Jamal uddin Field Production Engineer √ √
Abduallah Sheikh Muhammad Engineering Manager √ √
Syed Fraz Rizvi FOE-MKK √ √
Mansoor Ahmed Khan Mechanical Engineer √
Mansoor Ali Khan Engineering Consultant √ √
Yasir Mahdi FOE-Central & South √
Iqbal Sahto Facility Manager-MKK √
Masood Sarwar HSE √
Muhammad Hani Process Engineer (ZEL) √ √
Ahsan Nasir Project Engineer (ZEL) √
Muhammad Mudassir Mirza Sr. Electrical Engineer (ZEL) √
Irfan Khokhar Sr. Instrumentation Engineer (ZEL) √ √
5.0 HAZID FINDINGS
HAZID identified a number of actions to be addressed in Tender Document, during detailed engineering or management actions addressing issues like regulatory compliance and organization related actions.
Some actions need to be closed before issuing tender document for EPCC others require closure during detailed engineering (EPCC), some management actions need to be closed during the course of project e.g. resourcing and development of operating staff, preparation of Emergency Response Plans etc.
These actions and comments are listed below:
5.1 Recommendations:
1.2.2.1 Evaluate flare foundation design in storm water pit considering long residence time for storm water 1.2.2.2 Consider facility drain system in design for heavy rains case (no option available for storm water drainage out of facility at present)
UEP & EPCC
2.4.1 Verify that transport protocol for contractor is included in tender documents UEP
3.3.1 Verify that Tender Document clearly states that plant and equipment layout shall be based on Fire & Explosion Hazard Analysis and applicable NFPA, API Codes and standards, define basis for layout and spacing. 3.3.2 Consider QRA for entire Naimat facility to finalize the layout w.r.t to risks posed by the project to on-site and offsite population. 3.3.3/20.3 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in occupied buildings area and adjacent community residential areas does not exceed NEQS limits
UEP & EPCC
4.1.1 Include the updation of Naimat SOP incorporating Phase-V operations in project scope 4.1.2 Identify and provide communication infrastructure needed for safe and efficient plant operation.
UEP
4.2.2 Communication protocol between EPCC ERP and UEP ERP shall be defined 4.2.3 Identify and provide communication infrastructure needed during emergencies (including onsite and remote command posts etc.)
UEP
6.1.1 It is recommended to include following studies in project scope: 1) Emergency Evacuation and Response study 2) QRA 3) SIMOPS 4) Dispersion modeling 5) SCEs identification report
UEP
6.3.1 Develop and maintain project hazard and effects register during the course of project and follow project MoC system UEP & EPCC
6.4.1 Project MoC system shall be established for change control. 6.4.2 Green field construction work permit system shall be agreed with EPCC and shall be in line with UEP work permit system.
UEP & EPCC
7.1.2/7.2.2 It is recommended that provision of resources (equipment/man power) for ER such as Ambulances, trained Emergency Responders etc. as required, shall be part of Project deliverables considering major impact of project on MKK ERP
UEP
8.1.1/8.2.1/8.3.1/13.1.1 Project organogram shall include Operation tag for training need analysis and developing training program. 8.1.2/8.2.2/8.3.2/13.1.3 Staffing requirement to be identified and hiring to be completed before plant commissioning.
UEP
11.1.1 Verify that ITP (Inspection & Testing Plan) is defined in Tender Document. UEP & EPCC
13.1.2 Conduct SIMOPs study 13.1.4/4.2.1/7.1.1/7.2.1 Include the updation of Naimat ERP, incorporating Phase-V scenarios, in project scope.
14.1.1 Confirm that UEP health and Hygiene standards is included Tender Document and EPCC shall comply during the construction activities/camp. 14.1.2 Safe drinking water supply at contractor's camp and work site to be ensured.
UEP & EPCC
16.1.1 As per API-521, Rupture disc to be installed at u/s of PSVs on corrosive/choking environment especially at CO2 route. (refer 2010/11 Naimat Phase-2 over pressure incident report & MKK HAZOP recommendations related to this)
UEP & EPCC
16.12.1/17.3.1 Consider self-contained fire suppression system such as Inergen etc. for critical buildings for e.g. DCS room, switchgear room etc. as per governing NFPA
16.13.1 Tender Document defines blow down time as 25 min, this is a deviation from API-521 15 min depressurization requirement. FEHA shall determine escalation potentials due to delayed blow down. A cost-benefit analysis shall be carried out to make decision on savings on flare header size due to increasing blow down time vs. potential escalation.
UEP
17.6.1 Fire response strategy to be defined in Tender Document and EPCC should provide fire response plan as per philosophy. UEP & EPCC
20.3.1 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in occupied buildings area and adjacent community residential areas does not exceed NEQS limits
UEP & EPCC
22.1.1 Identify firewater source meeting NFPA guidelines UEP
22.7.1 Review drain system design avoiding any connection of HP/LP drains open to atmosphere UEP & EPCC
22.12.1 Identify potable water source for facility UEP
22.16.1 Communication protocol (for normal & emergencies) shall be prepared by UEP and provision of communication system /hardware for conformance to UEP protocol shall be included in tender document
UEP & EPCC
22.23.1 Flare exclusion zone shall be isolated/barricaded as per API-521 EPCC
23.2.1 Review LPG spheres location with respect to FEHA results to minimize impact of fire, dispersions and BELEVE on adjacent equipment and surrounding population (consider future population growths along the facility fence where UEP has no control). Adequate distance from plant fence to be maintained. 23.2.2 Review LPG storage drain impoundment area design considering flooding in case of fire water application
UEP & EPCC
23.9.1 Implement condensate storage tank overfilling safeguards recommended by Buncefield incident investigation report. EPCC
5.2 HAZID Comments
1.2.3.1/7.1.1 Ensure that Tender Document contains instructions related to establishment of onsite medical facilities (by EPCC during construction period) approved by UEP-HSE
UEP
1.2.5.1 Confirm Earthquake zoning given in Tender Document, is it 2A or 2B. UEP
1.2.7.1 Ensure lightning protection is being considered in Tender Document UEP
3.2.1/10.1 .1 Refer Naimat Phase-IV and TAP Lesson Learned document for Transport related and other project lessons. UEP
3.3.1 Verify that tender document contains requirement of modeling for acid gas (H2S in acid gas) release scenarios. UEP & EPCC
3.6.1/15.1.1 IEE initiated with 3rd party consultant, discussion in-progress with SEPA for study scope. Need to be closed at earliest and obtain NoC. 3.6.2/15.1.2 Address the issue of H2S emissions NEQS non-compliance with SEPA.
UEP
3.7.1 Consult Legal, PSCM, LMS, C&EA to identify and address social issues that may arise during construction UEP
7.2.1 Ensure that Tender document contains instructions that EPCC shall submit ERP for handling Major accident scenarios during construction phase for UEP approval.
UEP
10.3.2 QRA shall include LPG + Condensate bowzer movement scenario 10.3.3 Consider separate entrance for loading bowzers and normal plant entrance 10.3.4/11.1.1 Detailed shipment and inland transport plan to be developed at Detailed Engineering stage by EPCC, approved by UEP
UEP & EPCC
12.1.1 EPCC shall submit lifting plans for UEP approval UEP & EPCC
13.1.1 Ensure that Tender document contains requirement for submission of Maintenance plans by EPCC to UEP for incorporation into MAXIMO 13.1.2 Verify that tender document clearly defines independence between control and ESD systems to be verified as per required SIL levels
14.2.1 EPCC shall Follow confined space working procedures approved by UEP EPCC
16.2.1/16.7.1/18.1.1 EPCC to carry out FEHA and consider minimizing congestion to optimize the plot plan with respect to blast overpressure contours. 16.2.2/18.1.2 OPBs to be located out of blast overpressure contours or designed to withstand overpressure.
UEP & EPCC
16.3.1 EPCC to carry out FEHA and update plot plan as necessary. 16.3.2 OPBs to be located out of fire radiation contours of concern as per API-521 or design as shelter in place.
UEP & EPCC
16.7.2 Plot plan is preliminary layout. EPCC to finalize the plant boundaries based on FEHA UEP & EPCC
16.9.1 SIL study to be done by EPCC. Specifications of SIF, reliability, survivability, availability and maintenance intervals to be defined on the basis of SIL study.
EPCC
17.4.1 Location of fired heaters to be finalized based on FEHA results considering flammable gas dispersion contours and wind directions. EPCC
17.6.1 FEHA shall provide basis for fire prevention and control engineering, fire response plan shall be developed accordingly. UEP & EPCC
22.1.1/22.12.1 SEPA permission required for utilization of groundwater as potable water or fire water UEP
22.4.1 Ensure that diesel storage meets OGRA regulations UEP
22.9.1 Hazop to evaluate the requirement of ESD on IA low pressure EPCC
22.15.1 Requirement of HVAC for control room and security room to be established based on dispersion modeling EPCC
22.17.1 Evaluate R134A as a refrigerant in place of propane, compare cost and safety aspects for both options. UEP
22.22.1 Evaluate facility drain system for heavy rains case UEP
22.24.1 Ensure that sewerage and septic pit scope is included in Tender Document UEP
23.4.1 Ensure that diesel storage meets OGRA regulations UEP
23.9.1 Propane filling arrangement for refrigeration loop for black start to be kept in design EPCC
23.10.1 Provision of recycling of off-spec LPG from storage back to recovery unit to be kept in design EPCC
24.1.1 Review requirement of BTEX monitoring for heaters and incorporate provisions for monitoring BTEX in design. UEP
24.13.1 Evaluate relief requirement on heat exchangers where tube side operating pressures exceeds 1.5 times of shell side design pressure. Fast acting relief devices are required on some heat exchanger shell sides.
UEP & EPCC
6.0 HAZID FOLLOWUP
HAZID recommendations are very broad in nature covering various aspects of project from concept to commissioning and operations. Some recommendations and comments are to be addressed at FEED stage before issuing tender document, most action are to be taken during EPCC and some management action have to be taken independent of EPCC but before commissioning.
As has been recommended with HAZID a project Hazard Register shall be established and HAZID findings shall be added to it (later HAZOP and other studies’ findings to be added).
It is further recommended to re-validate HAZID at a suitable time during detailed engineering such as upon completion of process engineering and finalization of plant layout.
Annex-I HAZID Worksheet
NAIMAT PHASE-V (FEED)
HAZID WORKSHEET
Category/Node Guideword Hazard Description Consequence Safeguards R
Safety EnRe
1. Natural and Environmental Hazards
1.1 Seismic.
1.1 .1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage
1.1.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.1.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document 1.1.2 No Seismic activities (exploration) planned in area
D2=6
1.2 Weather:
1.2.1 High winds.
1.2.1.1 Damage to tall equipment/ columns
1.2.1.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.2.1.1 Plant design for 100 mph which is sufficient based on available historical data
D2=6
1.2.2 Floods. 1.2.2.1 No threat from river floods. 1.2.2.2 Heavy rains
1.2.2.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage 1.2.2.2 Facility flooding due to heavy rains and no drainage
1.2.2.1 Facility is designed for 250 mm rain in 24 hr
F3=5
1.2.5 Earthquake.
1.2.5.1 Earthquake leading to buildings/ equipment damage
1.2.5.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.2.5.1 Design for Earthquake zone 2A upper moderate as per area classification issued by Geological survey of Pakistan
D2=6
1.2.6 Hurricane. 1.2.6.1 No threat of hurricane
1.2.7 Lightning. 1.2.7.1 Lightning strike on equipment or person
1.2.7.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
E3=6
1.3 Marine life impacts on equipment.
1.3.1 Not Applicable
1.4 Subsidence. 1.4.1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage
1.4.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.4.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document
D2=6
1.5 Geological conditions for structural support.
1.5.1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage
1.5.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.5.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document
D2=6
2. Security
2.1 Assault 2.1.1 Not in UEP Experience 2.2 Sabotage 2.2.1 Not in UEP Experience 2.3 Crisis (military action, civil disturbances, terrorism)
2.3.1 Not in UEP Experience
2 4 Theft
2 4 1 Theft robberies vehicle
2 4 1 Loss of property
2.4.1 Existing UEP SOPs
3.3 Proximity to Population-during operations
3.3.1 Vapor cloud explosion and dense gas dispersion 3.3.2 High H2S conc ( >10 ppm) in Acid gas Stream 3.3.3 High noise 3.3.4 Heavy vehicle movements - see section 10
3.3.1 Injuries and fatalities to onsite/offsite population, equipment failure 3.3.2 Exposure to H2S due to acid gas dispersion at grade level, complains of odors n possible minor health effects to neighbors 3.3.3 Health n social issues due to high noise
3.3.1 Acid gas vent design to ensure less than 10 ppm grade level H2S conc.
D3=7
3.4 Adjacent Land Use 3.4.1 Flare radiations affecting crops 3.4.1 Social issues
3.4.1 Flare height to be evaluated as per API 521 not to exceed 500 BTU/hr-ft2 at facility battery limits
3.5 Proximity to Transport Corridors
3.5.1 No major issues
3.6 Environmental Issues
3.6.1 H2S at cold vent tip exceeding NEQS limits for atmospheric release.
3.6.1 Environmental damage, Non Compliance with regulations
3.6.1 Cold vent height to be such that on ground concentration of H2S does not exceed 10 ppm.
4.2 Communications for Contingency planning
4.2.1 Inefficient communication during emergency
4.2.1 Delay in emergency response and medical care, escalation of event
E4=7
4.3 Supply Support 4.3.1 No concerns
Project Implementation Issues
5. Contracting Strategy
5.1 Prevailing influence
5.2 Legislation 5.3 External Standards
5.4 External Environmental Constraints
6.1 Hazard Studies
6.1.1 Unsafe design due to unidentified hazards
6.1.1 Major accident leading to safety/ environment asset and reputation damage
6.1.1 Following studies have been listed in EPCC scope in tender Document: HAZID, Hazop, SIL, FEHA and Plant Layout Study, Hazardous Area Classification
D3=7
7. Contingency Planning
7.1 Geographical Infrastructure
7.1.1 No major medical facility for immediate medical response
7.1.1 Delay in medical treatment to critically ill or injured person
7.1.1 First aid and primary care facilities will be provided at Naimat along with qualified medical doctor and ambulance will be on standby 24/7. For secondary and tertiary treatment patient will be mobilized to Hyderabad and onwards to Karachi if needed.
7.2 Recovery Measures
7.2.1 Inadequate emergency response
7.2.1 Escalation of event E4=7
8.3 Level of Technology
8.3.1 Unavailability of competent/trained staff for DCS, no prior experience of DCS at UEP
8.3.1 Unsafe/inefficient operation leading to process upset, production loss or incident may happen
D3=7
9. Construction/ Existing Facilities
9.1 Tie-ins (shutdown requirements)
9.1.1 See comment
9.2 Concurrent Operations
9.3 Reuse of Material
9.4 Common Equipment Capacity
9.5 Interface - Shutdown/blowdown/
9.6 ESD 9.7 Skid Dimensions (weight handling/equipment (congestion)
9.8 Soil Contamination (existing facilities)
9.9 Mobilization/ demobilization
10.1 Incidents
10 1 1 E i h t
10.1.1 Injuries and
10.1.1 UEP defensive
10.4 Helicopter incidents 10.4.1 Not Applicable
11. Fabrication/installation
11.1 Complexity. 11.1.1 Complex construction process 11.1.1 Project delays
11.1.1 No complex construction activity involved, extensive experience of similar projects within company
11.2 Modularization. 11.2.1 Not Applicable
11.3 Transportation.
11.3.1 Transportation of large equipment
11.3.1 limitation at Port or inland transport of large equipment causing project delays
11.4 Overseas fabrication
12. Lifting equipment
12.1 Dropped/swinging loads.
12.1.1 Objects falling over live equipment or personnel working below
12.1.1 Loss of containment, fire hazards, injuries , fatalities, asset damage
12.1.1 No heavy lifting over live equipment involved
12.2 Collapse of lifting equipment (cranes, draw works, etc.).
12.2.1 Objects falling over live equipment or personnel working below
12.2 Loss of containment, fire hazards, injuries , fatalities, asset damage
12.1 No heavy lifting over live equipment involved
12 3 Fork lifts 12 3 Toppling over of fork lift 12.3.1 Injuries, fatalities equipment
Maintenance philosophy
13.6 Control philosophy 13.7 Manning levels 13.8 Concurrent Operations 13.9 Emergency Response
14. Health Hazards
14.1 Disease Hazards
14.1.1 Malaria, Food Poisoning and other water borne diseases
14.1.1 Health issues in camp, Project delays G5=6
14.2 Asphyxiation hazards
14.2.1 Activities inside closed equipment/ confined space
14.2.1 Injuries/Fatalities E3=6
14.3 Carcinogenic 14.3.1 No additional issues identified
14.4 Toxic 14.4.1 No additional issues identified 14.5 Physical 14.5.1 No additional issues identified 14.6 Mental 14.6.1 No additional issues identified 14.7 Working Hazards
14.7.1 Snake bite, high temperature in summer
14.7.1 Injuries, fatalities
14.7.1 Snake bite kit available at site E5=8
14.8 Transport 14.8.1 No additional issues identified
15.1.1 No major
15.5 Contaminated Ground
15.5.1 Not Applicable
15.6 Facility Impact
15.6.1 Facility to be constructed on agricultural land/ orchids.
15.6.1 Minor ecological damage
15.7 Waste Disposal Options
15.7.1 No Concern
15.8 Timing of Construction 15.8.1 No Concern
16. Inherently safer design characteristics
16.1 Sufficient equipment design pressure for all high pressure scenarios.
16.1.1 Equipment expose to pressures exceeding design pressure e.g. SIWHP is 4800 psig approx.
16.1.1 Mechanical failure, loss of containment
16.1.1 Equipment are design on 1200 psig and protected by PSVs and ESDVs.
E5=8
16.2 Maximize spacing between blast source and buildings and equipment of concern.
16.2.1 OPBs located within blast overpressure contour
16.2.1 Building damage leading to injuries/fatalities
D4=8
16.5 Minimize inventories of hazardous materials.
16.5.1 Condensate & LPG inventories
16.5.1 Major fire & BLEVE Hazard, Loss of life and asset damage
16.5.1 Spill containment and Fire protection system provided on condensate and LPG storage
16.6 Use less toxic, reactive, flammable, explosive materials, radioactive.
16.6.1 No Concerns
16.7 Reduce size of “congested volume” that can hold a vapor cloud.
16.7.1 See comment
16.8 Simplify plant design and operation.
16.8.1 No Concern
16.9 High equipment or instrumentation reliability.
16.9.1 Protective equipment failure to meet reliability specifications
16.9.1 Failure to perform upon demand leading to accidents
D3=7
16.10 Design occupied buildings to withstand a bl t
16.10.1 No additional concern
16.13 Minimize time exposed to a hazard.
16.13.1 Equipment/ structural failure due to extended exposure to fire, delayed blow down
16.13.1 Escalation of event D3=7
17. Fire
17.1 Pool. 17.1.1 LPG, Condensate, NGLs
17.1.1 Pool fire at Condensate storage, loading area and separator area, BLEVE of LPG vessels, Propane tanks Leading to asset damage, injuries and fatalities
17.1.1 LPG facility design as per API 2510/ NFPA-58 17.1.2 Condensate facility design as per NFPA-30 in line with OGRA directives 17.1.3 Fire protection on overall plant as per NFPA guidelines 17.1.4 As per Tender Document, fire protection layout and design requirements to be developed based on FEHA
E3=6
17 2 1 Jet fires leading
17.2.1 LPG facility design as per API 2510/ NFPA-58 17.2.2 Condensate facility design as per NFPA-30 in line with OGRA directives
17.4 Sources of ignition
17.4.1 Ignition of released hydrocarbon
17.4.1 Fire & explosion leading to asset damage and injuries/fatalities
17.4.1 Hazardous area classification to be done by EPCC 17.4.2 Open flames eg. Hot oil burners are located outside classified area
D3=7
17.5 Equipment layout 17.5.1 No additional concern
17.6 Fire Protection & response
17.7.1 See comment
18. Explosion
18.1 Operator protection
18.1.1 No additional concern, see comment
18.2 BLEVE 18.2.1 No additional concern, see comment
18.2.1 BLEVE of LPG Vessels to be avoided by design as per API-2510
18.3 Vapor cloud explosion
18.3.1 No additional concern, see comment
18.3.1 Control room is blast resistant as per API-752
18.4 Confined space
18.4.1 No additional concern, see comment
18.5 Dust 18.5.1 No Concern
18.6 Other (detonation, etc.)
18.6.1 No Concern
19.1 Hot process.
19.1.1 Amine, Glycol, Hot Oil, Debutanizer Waste heat recovery
19.1.1 Personnel injuries on contact with hot surfaces
19.1.1 Personal protection insulation is provided where process temp. exceeds 60 degC
H6=6
20.3 Noise 20.3.1 Noise in plant residential and adjacent population exceeding NEQS limit
20.3.1 Health issues, social unrest
20.3.1 Tender Document defines noise limits 85 dB as per NEQS. 20.3.2 Tender Document states requirement for NEQS in general (including noise level in residential areas).
H6=6
20.4 Stored energy. 20.4.1 Not Applicable
20.5 Electrical shock 20.5.1 Not Applicable
20.6 High voltage/low voltage electrical hazards.
20.6.1 No Concerns
20.7 Static electrical hazards
20.7.1 Ignition during sampling, loading bowzers
20.7.1 Ignition of hydrocarbon releases, fire, fatalities, asset loss
20.7.1 Grounding requirement for bowzer loading and sampling included in Tender Document
E3=6
20.8 Ionizing radiation 20.8.1 No Concern
21. Structural Failures
21.1 Earthquake 21.1.1 No additional concern 21.2 Foundations (subsidence, scour)
21.2.1 No additional concern
21.3 Corrosion 21.3.1 Loss of containment due to corrosion
21.3.1 Fire & explosion leading to asset damage and injuries/fatalities
21.3.1 Tender Document defines corrosion control design and management as per UEP practices
D3=7
21.4 Fatigue 21.4.1 No concerns 21.4 No cyclic load 21.5 Weight control 21.5.1 No Concerns
21.6 Primary structure (f d ti
21 6 1 N dditi l 21.6.1 Soil investigation t b i d t t
22.2 Fuel Gas 22.2.1 See comment
22.3 Heating Medium / hot oil 22.3.1 No additional Concern
22.4 Diesel Fuel 22.4.1 See comments
22.5 Power Supply 22.5.1 No Concern
22.6 Steam 22.6.1 Not Applicable
22.7 Drains 22.7.1 Open to atmosphere HP drains connection
22.7.1 Loss of containment, fire hazards
E3=6
22.8 Inert Gas / Nitrogen 22.8.1 Not Applicable
22.9 Instrument Air 22.9.1 See comment
22.10 Waste Storage and Treatment
22.10.1 Not Applicable
22.11 Chemical/fuel Storage
22.11.1 Not Applicable
22.12 Potable Water 22.12.1 See comments
22.13 Demineralized water
22.13.1 No additional concern
22.17 Refrigeration System
22.17.1 See comment
22.18 HP Drains - Amine 22.18.1 No additional concern
22.19 HP drains - Glycol 22.19.1 No additional concern
22.20 HP drains - Hydrocarbon 22.20.1 No additional concern
22.21 HP drains - LPG 22.21.1 No additional concern
22.22 Plant drains / storm drains
22.22.1 See comment
22.23 Flares 22.23.1 Personnel exposure to flare radiations within flare exclusion zone 22.23.1 Injuries, burn H5=5
22.24 Sewerage 22.24.1 See comments
23.1 Inventory 23.1.1 No additional concern
23.5 Hot Oil 23.5.1 No additional concern 23.6 Pyrophoric (pigging mud) 23.6.1 Not Applicable
23.7 Over Pressure 23.7.1 No additional concern
23.8 Over/under Temperature 23.8.1 No concerns
23.9 Excess/zero Level
23.9.1 See recommendation/comment
23.10 Wrong Composition/Phase
23.10.1 See comment
24. Loss of
24.1 Hazardous chemicals (including hydrocarbons).
24.1.1 See comment
24.2 Extremes of design operating envelopes, process, and utilities.
24.2.1 No additional concern
24.3 Potential for deviation outside design conditions.
24.3.1 No concern
24.4 Air ingress. 24.4.1 No concern
vessel failures.
24.13 Heat exchanger tube leak or rupture
24.13.1 See comment
24.14 Process line failures 24.14.1 No additional concern
Annex-II
Risk Framework – HSE Impact Levels
SEVERITY HEALTH AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL
A
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Comparable to the most catastrophic health/ safety incidents ever seen in industry. The potential for 100 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
• Future impact, e.g., unintended release, with widespread damage to any environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
• Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
B
Catastrophic health/ safety incident causing very widespread fatalities within or outside a facility. The potential for 50 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
• Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
• Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
C
Catastrophic health/ safety incident causing widespread fatalities within or outside a facility. The potential for 10 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
• Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
• Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
BP's commitment to health, safety and the environment is paramount; this is reflected in BP’s HSE goal of "No Accidents, No Harm to People, and No Damage to the Environment". No accident, injury, or loss of containment causing damage to the environment is ever “acceptable” to BP. BP is using this framework (equivalents of which are used throughout industry) to support the consistent prioritization of actions to eliminate or mitigate HSE risk and as part of BP's Performance Improvement Cycle to deliver continuous risk reduction.
D
Very major health/ safety incident The potential for 3 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level. 30 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
• Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
• Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
SEVERITY HEALTH AND SAFETY ENVIRONMENTAL
E
Major health/ safety incident 1 or 2 fatalities, acute or chronic, actual or alleged. 10 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
• Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
• Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
F
High impact health/ safety incident Permanent partial disability(ies) Several non-permanent injuries or health impacts. Days Away From Work Case (DAFWC)
• Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
• Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
• Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
• Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
G
Medium impact health/ safety incident Single or multiple recordable injury or health effects from common source/event.
• Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
• Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
• Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
H
Low impact health/ safety incident First aid Single or multiple over-exposures causing noticeable irritation but no actual health effects
• Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Risk Framework – Business Impact Levels
SEVERITY* Non-Financial Impact
Financial Impact (EQUIPMENT
DAMAGE, BUSINESS
VALUE LOST)
A Public or investor outrage on a global scale. Threat of global loss of license to operate.
>$20 billion
B
Loss of license to operate a major asset in a major market – US, EU, Russia. Intervention from major Government – US, UK, EU, Russia. Public or investor outrage in major western markets – US, EU. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Group.
$5 billion - $20 billion
C
Loss of license to operate other material asset, or severe enforcement action against a major asset in a major market. Intervention from other major Government. Public or investor outrage in other material market where we have presence or aspiration.
$1 billion - $5 billion
D
Severe enforcement action against a material asset in a non-major market, or against other assets in a major market. Interventions from non-major Governments. Public or investor outrage in a non-major market, or localised or limited “interest-group” outrage in a major market. Prolonged adverse national or international media attention. Widespread adverse social impact. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Segment.
$100 m to $1 billion
E
Other adverse enforcement action by regulators. Limited “interest-group” outrage in non major market. Short term adverse national or international media coverage. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the SPU.
$5m -$100 m
F
Regulatory compliance issue which does not lead to regulatory or other higher severity level consequence Prolonged local media coverage. Local adverse social impact. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Performance Unit (PU).
$500k-$5m
G Short term local media coverage. Some disruption to local operations (e.g., loss of single road access less than 24 hours). $50k -$500k
H Isolated and short term complaints from neighbours (e.g., complaints about specific noise episode). <$50k
The colours in the above table are for use on a Risk Management Matrix (RMM). This is a tool used by BP group leadership to report and manage SPU, segment and BP group risk. For those risk events which are included in the RMM, the following guidance applies:
Risks with Impact levels C and above are recorded on the BP group RMM.
Risks with Impact levels D and above are recorded on the segment RMM.
Risks with Impact levels H and above are recorded on the SPU RMM.
In some cases, Level D impacts may be elevated to BP group impact. For risks in category D, the segment Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Office (COO) or Strategic Performance Unit Leader (SPUL) will determine whether a particular risk should be elevated.
Risk Matrix
The numbers (1-15) in the above matrix reflect the relative levels of risk (risk rating) with 1 being the
lowest level of risk and 15 the highest. The colours in the table relate to reporting and endorsement levels for action plans (see Annex 4).
Where data exists to support a quantitative estimate of probability / frequency, or a reasonable estimate of probability / frequency can be made, use of the numerical probability / frequency criteria is preferred. If not, the qualitative descriptions can be used. However, the verbal descriptors are based on the following assumptions and if any of these are not met, this needs to be taken into consideration when estimating likelihood.
Life of a facility is around 30 years. There are around 100 facilities across the BP group where a similar event could occur. BP represents around 1-10% of the whole industry. When positioning a risk event on the matrix, it is not usually possible to precisely determine the likelihood and severity of an event in advance of it happening. Reflecting this uncertainty, the position on the matrix is therefore, only approximate.
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