hazid worksheet

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HAZID WORKSHEET HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 1 of 32 Project : ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT Node Description : DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform Date of HAZID Study : 25 May 2012 No Type of Event Potential Hazards Consequences Initial Risk Residual Risk REC # S L R S L R 1 5 2 HR 1 1 LR 2 3 2 MR 3 1 LR 5 3 HR 3 1 LR Safeguards (Existing and Recommended Control Measures) Anchor Handling (Running Messanger Line Under the Bridge) using Work Boat Work Boat collision with the platform / AHT Boat damage / lost boat Personnel injury 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. Reliable / maintained work boat 3. Weather limit 4. Adequate illumination of work area 5. Trained work boat operation 6. Maintain good communication 7. JSA for work boat operation 8. FRC/MOB Boat ready at all time 9. Suitable PPE: include work vest Running Anchor / Anchor Wire Lost control of wire due to failure of comunication or control system Damage to redundant umbilical / subsea structure 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. DP Vessel as AHT 3. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with MWS approval) 4. Competence Vessel Captain 5. Maintain good communication between Anchor Tower and AHT AHT collision with the platform / complex Damage to vessel or complex (damage to riser) Personnel injury Schedule delay 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure 2. JSA for Anchor Handling 3. Weather limit for Anchor Handling 4. Parachute Buoy 5. DP Vessel as AHT 6. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with MWS approval) 7. Competence Vessel Captain 8. Maintain good communication between Anchor Tower and AHT 9. Weather limit 10. Briefing about the facility for all Vessel Captain including the location of risers 11. Secondary AHT standby in the

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Page 1: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 1 of 16

Project : ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT

Node Description : DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform

Date of HAZID Study : 25 May 2012

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

1 5 2 HR 1 1 LR

2 3 2 MR 3 1 LR

5 3 HR 3 1 LR

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

Anchor Handling (Running Messanger Line Under the Bridge) using Work Boat

Work Boat collision with the platform / AHT

Boat damage / lost boatPersonnel injury

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure2. Reliable / maintained work boat3. Weather limit4. Adequate illumination of work area5. Trained work boat operation6. Maintain good communication7. JSA for work boat operation8. FRC/MOB Boat ready at all time9. Suitable PPE: include work vest

Running Anchor / Anchor

Wire

Lost control of wire due to failure of comunication or control system

Damage to redundant umbilical / subsea structure

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure2. DP Vessel as AHT3. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with MWS approval)4. Competence Vessel Captain5. Maintain good communication between Anchor Tower and AHT

AHT collision with the platform / complex

Damage to vessel or complex (damage to riser)Personnel injurySchedule delay

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure2. JSA for Anchor Handling3. Weather limit for Anchor Handling4. Parachute Buoy5. DP Vessel as AHT6. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with MWS approval)7. Competence Vessel Captain8. Maintain good communication between Anchor Tower and AHT9. Weather limit10. Briefing about the facility for all Vessel Captain including the location of risers11. Secondary AHT standby in the field at all time

Page 2: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 2 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

2

5 3 HR 3 1 LR

3 5 2 HR 3 1 LR

Running Anchor / Anchor

Wire

Drop/Drag Anchor on Subsea Facility

Damage Subsea FacilityEnvironmental HC DischargePotential fire/explosionCompany reputation

1. Subsea / Seabed Survey DONE2. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure and Approved Anchor Pattern3. Anchor on Deck of AHT4. Mooring Analysis5. BMS/Survey Equipment Calibration6. Pull test the anchors7. Continue anchor wire tension monitoring by Anchor Tower8. Shut Down & Depressurize West Lobe line9. Compliance with POI Marine Procedure

DLB Approach / Final Departure of AGX

DLB colission with platform and riser

Damage to both DLB and PlatformPersonnel injury / Lost of lifeSchedule delayEnvironmental impact

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure (Step by Step DLB Approach to AGX)2. Weather limit3. Maintain good communication with all parties4. Final approach only after all anchors are installed / laid and DAY Light only.5. Shut Down the platform and Depressurize West Lobe line during Final Approach6. AGX Riser is inside the Jacket7. Responsible person on DLB monitoring the gangway tip during final approach8. Minimize personnel on AGX during DLB final approach9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist for the DLB Final Approach to AGX

10. Anchor removal for final departure is the reverse of anchor installation. (Meeting will be performed with relevant parties including MWS for removal anchors).

Page 3: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 3 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

4 5 4 HR 4 1 MR

4 3 HR 3 1 LR

3 2 MR 3 1 LR 1 Timas/POI

2 Timas

DLB Crane Operation

Dropped loads / objects on Topside of AGX / Subsea Facilities

Damage asset causing HC leakPersonnel injurySchedule delayEnvironmental delay

1. Approved Lifting Procedure2. Certified and good condition Crane (include MWS inspection/approval)3. Certified and good condition Rigging4. Certified and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel5. Maintain good communication among parties involved6. All lift within the SWL of the crane / rigging7. Weather limit8. Stay clear from load9. Suitable PPE

Crane Boom collision with the AGX Topside and/or with Other Crane

Damage asset causing HC leakPersonnel injurySchedule delay

1. All Cranes will be under the control of the Project (CTR). 2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift 3. Good illumincation4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations (SIMOPS)5. Detail planning meeting for Crane Operations6. Trained and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel7. Maintain good communication among all involved parties

Crawler Crane fall over the side due to bad weather related during lifting (overloaded / dynamic load)

Damage asset causing HC leak / Environmental impactPersonnel injurySchedule delay

1. Weather limit 2. Barge rails in place3. Certified and good condition crane4. Certified and good condition rigging equipment5. Certified and experienced Crane Operator and Rigging Personnel6. Operate cranes within the design limit

1. Risk Assessment to be performed for using the Crawler Crane for Personnel Transfer related to the visibility (ability of the Crane Operator to see the FROG)

2. Review Crawler Crane Operation Procedure

Page 4: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 4 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

5 DLB Exhaust 1 1 LR 1 1 LR

1 1 LR 1 1 LR 3 Timas

Ignition Source on DLB - Gas Release (10mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD Forward.2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation)3. F&G and ESD System on AGX4. ERP Procedures5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Electrical Equipment on DLB (Lights, Etc)

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation)2. F&G and ESD System on AGX3. ERP Procedures4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention6. Switch off the light on Crane Boom during the Day Light7. Weather proof lighting/electrical system on the barge deck and crane boom8. DLB can be pulled / winched away (winch speed approx 60m per minute)9. Construction activities around process area controlled by PTW asper integrated project plan10. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Explore the possibility to switch off the lights and other ignition source on crane

Page 5: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 5 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

5

Crawler Crane Exhaust 1 1 LR 1 1 LR

1 1 LR 1 1 LR

Ignition Source on DLB - Gas Release (10mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 meters away2. Crawler Crane Exchaust is fitted with Spark Arrestor3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation)4. F&G and ESD System on AGX5. ERP Procedures6. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated7. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Welding Machines on DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are located on DLB are 60m away from the platform.2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding leads to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB.3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation)4. F&G and ESD System on AGX5. ERP Procedures6. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated7. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention8. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Page 6: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 6 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

5

Hot Works on DLB 1 1 LR 1 1 LR

COMMENT: The probability (frequency) of having leaks will be further elaborated (POI)

Ignition Source on DLB - Gas Release (10mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered by PTW2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB.3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation)4. F&G and ESD System on AGX. ERP Procedures5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Page 7: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 7 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

6 DLB Exhaust 1 1 LR 1 1 LRIgnition Source on DLB - Gas Release (100mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

The release of HC with 100mm hole is demonstrated to unlikely because:1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process.3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would occur the severity would be less.Additional Safeguards:1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD Forward.2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is +16 elevation)3. F&G and ESD System on AGX4. ERP Procedures5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLBNOTE: based on 100mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB Exhaust.

Page 8: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 8 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

6

5 1 HR 4 1 MR 4 Timas

Ignition Source on DLB - Gas Release (100mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Electrical Equipment on STERN of DLB (Lights, Etc)

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

The release of HC with 100mm hole is demonstrated to unlikely because:1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process.3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less.

Additional Safguards are:1. F&G and ESD System on AGX2. ERP Procedures3. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated4. Close water tight doors on the crane tub5. Portable Multi Gas Detector on the Stern of DLB.6. Any lifting over the process during the SIMOPS shall be covered by PTW, Risk Assessment.

Requirement of Multi Gas Detector on the STERN of DLB to be captured in Project Procedure

Page 9: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 9 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

6

Crawler Crane Exhaust 5 1 HR 4 1 MR

Ignition Source on DLB - Gas Release (100mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release

The release of HC with 100mm hole is demonstrated to unlikely because:1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process.3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less.

Additional Safguards are:1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 meters away2. F&G and ESD System on AGX3. ERP Procedures4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention6. Crane Crawler will be shut down upon the detection of Gas Release after operation is secured.

Page 10: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 10 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

6

5 1 HR 4 1 MR

Ignition Source on DLB - Gas Release (100mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Welding Machines on DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release resulting:- Personnel injury- Asset damage

The release of HC with 100mm hole is demonstrated to unlikely because:1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process.3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less.Additional Safguards are:1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are located on DLB are 60m away from the platform.2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB.3. F&G and ESD System on AGX4. ERP Procedures5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention7. Refer to Technical Note for Control of Welding Machines Isolation8. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB.

Page 11: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 11 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

6

Hot Works on DLB 5 1 HR 4 1 MR

Ignition Source on DLB - Gas Release (100mm hole on Gas-Gas Exchanger) with 20knots wind speed toward the DLB

Increase risk of Fire/Explosion in the event of HC release resulting:- Personnel Injury- Asset Damage

The release of HC with 100mm hole is demonstrated to unlikely because:1. As per QRA 2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check and improvement are included on the GO and NO GO Process.3. No break of containment the process system during SIMOPS4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved small weights - structure lifted in around the platform edges west and south5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas Exchanger

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be less.

Additional Safguards are:1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered by PTW2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding machines on DLB.3. F&G and ESD System on AGX4 ERP Procedures5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention7. Portable Gas Detector on STERN of DLB

Page 12: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 12 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

7 2 2 LR 1 1 LR

2 2 LR 1 1 LR

3 2 LR 1 1

8 2 2 LR 1 1 LR

Emergency (Fire) on DLB

Fire as Ignition Source and its Impact to the Safety of the Platform Complex

Increase Risk of Fire on Platform (AGX) if there is concurrent HC Release

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per minute).2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on the DLB3. ERP4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB.

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Helicopter Emergency on DLB

Increase Risk of Fire on Platform (AGX) if there is concurrent HC Release

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per minute).2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on the DLB3. ERP4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the DLB.

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study, the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT reach the DLB.

Failure of Main Generator / Black Out on DLB

DLB cannot pull away in case required

1. Redundancy of Generators2. Emergency Power Generator3. Fail Safe Brake on the anchor winches4. AHT / Tow Tug standby in the field at all time5. PM System on DLB

Process Upset on AGX

Increasing Flaring Rate due to Blow Down Event

Increase Radiant Heat in the vicinity of AGX Crane

NOTE: No Effect anticipated to the DLB based on Flare Radiation Study

1. Radiant Heat Study for AGX shows that it is safe for the Crane Operator to be inside the Crane Cabin during Full Process Blow Down. 2. Proximity of DLB Crane Operator is farther from the Flare Tip therefore impact of Radiant Heat is minimal.

Page 13: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 13 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

8

2 2 LR 1 1 LR

Gas Release Anoa Riser 5 2 HR 5 1 HR

9 4 3 HR 3 1 LR

Process Upset on AGX

ESD Event Causing AGX Process Instability

Creates changes in Process System Pressure, Temperature, and Liquid Inventory which could lead to an increase potential for HC release

1. Process System is designed to fail safe2. Process is continuosly monitored from CCR3. Process System will be maintained and functional with no significant case to operate in place during SIMOPS4. Contingency Plan in place such that AGX Project Team will be asked to leave AGX until ESD event has been rectified5. COntingency Plan in place such that HOFO will communicate potential for escalation to DLB such that preparation may made for DLB withdrawl from AGX vicinity.

Fire / ExplosionPersonnel Injury

1. Mitigation as per CTO Procedure2. F&G System on AGX3. ERP Procedures4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G detection system on platform is activated5. DLB can be pulled / winched away to clear from platform (winch speed approx 60m per minute)

Helicopter Operation on DLB

Interference with Crane Operation

Helicopter collision with Cranes / CrashPersonnel injury / Lost of life

1. Crane Operations on DLB will be shut down and/or crane boom would be clear for Helicopter Operations2. Trained and experienced HLO3. Inform Crane Operators of Incoming Helicopters4. ERP

Page 14: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 14 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

10 4 3 HR 2 2 LR

11 4 3 HR 3 1 LR

12 Personnel injury / Lost of life 5 3 HR 2 1 LR

Vessel Movement / alongside on DLB

Collision with the DLB / Platform / Material Barge / Anchor Buoy / Anchor Wire

Asset damagePersonnel injury / Lost of lifeSchedule delay

1. Suitable Vessels (Include MWS inspection/approval)2. Competent Vessel Captain3. Slack Anchor Wires if required4. Good communication between paties involved5. Weather limit6. Adequate fendering on DLB and vessels7. Briefing to all Vessel Captain prior to entering 500m zone8. High Vis painted Anchor Buoys9. Comply with POI Marine Operation Procedure10. Establish communication with HOFO prior to entering 500m Zone and/or Marine Supertindent prior to approaching DLB

SIMOPS Operation Between DLB Crane and AGX Crane

DLB Crane Boom collision with the AGX Crane

Damage asset Personnel injurySchedule delay

1. All Cranes will be under the control of the Project (CTR). 2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift 3. Good illumincation4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations (SIMOPS)5. Detail planning meeting for Crane Operations

Personnel Transfer

Personnel being Transferred Fall from Height

1. Certified and good condition Crane2. Certified and good condition FROG3. Certified and good condition rigging4. Provision of safety sling5. No personnel transfer untill the Vessel will be securely moored 6. Distance of free board between DLB and vessel is small7. Provision of tag lines8. Familiarization for transfer using FROG9. Maintain good communicaton among parties involved (CO, Bunksman, and Riggers).10. Weather limit defined for personnel transferring using FROG and Crawler Crane

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HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 15 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

13 5 1 HR 5 1 HR

3 1 MR 1 1 LR

14 N2 Operation 3 3 MR 3 2 MR 5 Timas / PNS

6 Timas / PNS

N2 Spill 3 3 MR 3 2 MR

15 3 2 MR 3 1 LR

MAE on AGX/ANOA

Pool Fire on ANOA coming from ANOA 8" Riser Pipeline

Personnel injury / Lost of lifeImpair both ANOA and AGX Muster Area

1. All personnel shall muster to DLB including POI Personnel2. Corrosion Monitoring and Pigging Pipeline covered by FIMS3. PSLL on the pipeline4. Daily surface inspection5. DLB will be pull / winched away

Condensate on the sea due SKIM pile overfilled

Personnel Injury / Lost of Life

1. Level Management 2. Daily surface inspection3. DLB will be pull / winched away

Extreme Temperature (minus 160 - minus 200 C)

Personnel injuryCryogenicEmbrittlement

1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage Tanks2. Scaffold and bunded area3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

Verify the certification of the storage tank and inspection prior to mobilization offshore

Review the N2 handling and storage procedure

Personnel InjuryCryogenicEmbrittlement

1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage Tanks2. Scaffold and bunded area3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

3rd Party Vessel / Security

Collision with the Anchor Buoy / Anchor Wire

Personnel InjuryAsset DamageSchedule Delay

1. High Vis Anchor Buoy2. Standy By Vessels3. Radar Watch4. Intensity of Marine Activities would deter the 3rd Party Vessel to stay away5. Liaison Officer onboard of DLB

Page 16: HAZID Worksheet

HAZID WORKSHEET

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 16 of 16

No Type of Event Potential Hazards ConsequencesInitial Risk Residual Risk

REC # Recommendation Action Party

S L R S L R

Safeguards(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

16 Sabotage Increase risk of incident 3 2 MR 3 1 LR 7 POI

17 3 2 MR 3 1 LR 8 Timas/POI

Construction Crew tempering with Platform and DLB system

1. Socialization of work to the offshore construction team in advance2. PTW, JSA, and workpacks3. Involve operation team during work pack review and execution of the works4. Maintain positive working environment, provide motivation 5. Restriction to sensitve areas (security measures) e.g. safety / warning signs, socialize restricted areas during meeting/awareness, Access Control 6. Maintain adequate supervision / QC7. Reward program

Operation to review the existing "security measures" and improve as required

Communication between DLB and its Support Vessels and between DLB and AGX/ANOA

Clear Communication Method NOT established

Increase risk of miscommunication / interference leading to incident resulting to:- Personnel injury- Asset damage

1. ANOA HSE Induction / Awareness2. Various coordination meeting e.g. daily planning meeting 3. Provision of radio communication4. English speaking key personnel5. Permission to be obtained from HOFO prior to entering 500m zone6. Permission to be obtained from Marine Superintendent for approaching DLB or entering the Anchor Pattern7. Competent Vessel Captain8. Briefing of all support vessels include socialization of procedures9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist.

Establish radio communication channel for all parties to minimize interference