CRISIS RESPONSEVOL:12 | ISSUE:4 | AUGUST 2017 WWW.CRISIS-RESPONSE.COM J O U R N A L

P R O T E C T I O N | P R E V E N T I O N | P R E P A R E D N E S S | R E S P O N S E | R E S I L I E N C E | R E C O V E R Y

Fake news; Radicalisation in Central Asia; Ransomware & cybersecurity; Lindt Café siege; Treating Afghanistan’s victims of war; Emergency management & resilience;

Artifi cial Intelligence; 3D printing technology; Drones & EENA; Computer modelling in large scale incidents; The impact of NIMS; Robotics for good

SPACE TECHNOLOGYITS ROLE IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT TODAY

News .......................................................... 4

CommentThe fickle finger of fake ............................. 8Rob Shimmin examines the phenomenon of fake news and its role in crisis creation and management – how do we quieten the echo chamber?

Vehicles as terrorist weapons .................. 12David Stewart was Silver Command during the Glasgow Airport terrorist attack ten years ago. Here, he outlines how security measures have since deterred attacks using vehicles at airports

Terrorism & SecurityDisrupting the path of least resistance .... 14Since our last edition, there have been many high-profile terrorist attacks, says Roger Gomm. How can businesses, communities and governments improve their preparedness?

Radicalisation in Central Asia .................. 16Radicalised operatives from the ex-Soviet Union regions of Central Asia and the Russian Caucasus are increasingly carrying out attacks elsewhere, says Lina Kolesnikova

Lessons from the Lindt Café siege ........... 18Editorial Advisory Panel Member Andrew Brown, who served as an expert witness into the siege inquiry in Australia, provides an insight into some of the findings of the final report on the incident, which resulted in several fatalities

Explosive threat mitigation in Iraq ........... 22Major General Jonathan Shaw describes the scale of the explosive threat (ET) problems faced in Iraq, saying that mitigation is a vital precursor to stabilisation and reconstruction

Treating Afghanistan’s victims of war ...... 26Emily Hough speaks to Dejan Panic, of the Emergency Surgical Centre, which treats victims of war and landmines for the whole of Afghanistan

The Grenfell Tower tragedy ...................... 28The Grenfell Tower fire is an indication of the fragility of the crisis management frameworks upon which we so heavily rely, acccording to David Rubens

Ransomware: The trap within the trap ..... 30Very few of us know when an attacker owns our computer with malware, and that’s the real problem, writes Todd Rosenblum

Getting to grips with cyber security ......... 32There are fairly straightforward things your business can do to help avoid being a victim of ransomware or other cyber crime, says Gary Fairley

Emergency managementWhat does resilience mean in the UK? .... 34Sarah Ponesch interviewed five UK stakeholders with the aim of identifying the UK-specificity of resilience as a ‘culture’ in an ever-changing world

Organisational resilience ......................... 40Anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery – these are the vital areas that any organisation should be looking at when considering its resilience, says Roger Gomm

Alternative community crisis paradigm ... 42Dennis Davis suggests that resilience should become more focused upon the citizen, with matters of vulnerability and consequence being considered at the planning stage

Workplace violence crises ....................... 48Richard Diston examines workplace violence, saying that it can often be an organisational crisis. But how to eliminate violent conduct and ensure a safe workplace for all employees? The starting point is leadership

Emergency management on islands ........ 50How do you undertake disaster management on one of the world’s most remote islands? Ian Johnson describes the particular challenges of protecting the island of St Helena in the South Atlantic

Editor in ChiefEmily Houghemily@crisis-response.com

Chief Scienti� c EditorIan Portelli, PhD, BCDMian@crisis-response.com

Sales & Marketing DirectorKirsty McKinlay-Stewartkirsty@crisis-response.com

Global Operations DirectorDavid Stewartdavid @crisis-response.com

Design & ProductionChris Petticanchris@crisis-response.com

Subscriptions & AdministrationThomas Morgansubs@crisis-response.com

SubscriptionsCrisis Response Journal is published quarterly; it is available by subscription in hard copy, digital and online subs@crisis-response.com

Back issuesSubscribers £25 (US$30; €30) for hard copy edition (online editions free for subscribers). Non subscribers £40 (US$51; €47)backissues@crisis-response.com

Published by Crisis Management Limited, Sondes Place Farm, Westcott Road, Dorking RH4 3EB, UKCOPYRIGHT Crisis Management Limited 2017. Articles published may not be reproduced in any form without prior written permission.Printed in England by Henry Stone, Banbury, UKISSN 1745-8633

www.crisis-response.com join the CRJ LinkedIn group

follow us on twitter @editorialcrj

Ground search and rescue ....................... 54Martin Boyle speaks to Chris Boyer of the US-based National Association for Search and Rescue (Nasar)

Artifi cial IntelligenceLeveraging AI for good ............................. 56AI has enormous potential for social good, says Houlin Zhao of the ITU, but we need paths forward for safe, trusted, ethical solutions

Shaping Artificial Intelligence’s future ..... 58How we instill ethical principles during AI’s infancy could have positive or negative repercussions for decades, if not centuries. Emily Hough talks to Sherif Elsayed-Ali of Amnesty International to find out more

Space technology We are the Space Race............................ 60Laurence Marzell says the 1950s Space Race still pays dividends today, as we rely on information from space for services to keep us safe, secure and resilient

A view from above: Earth observation ..... 64Dalia Kirschbaum and colleagues outline how NASA, working with partners, is helping to harness the scope and range of Earth observations for disaster response and risk reduction teams on the ground

Space and the Sendai Framework ........... 68Space-based technology and Earth observation help in disaster risk reduction, say Joachim Post, Juan-Carlos Villagran and Luc St Pierre. But more effort is needed to make this data usable by developing countries

Governance and ICT solutions ................. 72Davide Miozzo and Davide Poletto describe some projects that aim to embed ICT and space technology in the daily work of first responders

The threat of orbital debris ...................... 74Humanity relies on space technology, but this could stall if the issue of space junk is not addressed. Emily Hough speaks to Nobu Okada of Astroscale, which aims to secure long-term space flight safety

R&D/Technology3D printing in healthcare ......................... 763D printing has become a versatile and progressively cost-effective technology, permeating a variety of fields, say our R&D writers, led by Ian Portelli

Drones for emergencies ........................... 78Petros Kremonas of EENA says that perhaps, in a few years, having drones available within an emergency rescue organisation will be as routine as having a telephone line

Computer modelling in large incidents .... 80Friedrich Steinhäusler examines how 3D modelling of people, vehicles, weapons, explosions and the release of toxic materials can help first responders

In DepthWhat is the impact NIMS? ....................... 84Nicholas B Hambridge, Arnold M Howitt and David W Giles examine how successful the diffusion of the National Incident Command System has been across the US

Robotics for Good: Part III ....................... 86Andrew Schroeder says that social automation is an issue of what kinds of conjoined human and technological systems are most likely to produce the ethical outcomes that we are able to agree on

Firefighting in tunnels: Part IV ................. 88Christian Brauner discusses the limits of respiratory protection in underground transport systems

Early warning on small islands: Part II .... 91Marlon Clarke and Danielle Evanson examine how vulnerability and capacity assessments are such a vital part of the process to enhance understanding of risks and reducing vulnerability

RegularsEvents ...................................................... 94Looking back ........................................... 97Frontline ................................................... 98

Few places have been safe from the reach of the vicious tendrils of terrorism

in the short time since our last edition was published. We have seen attacks involving major loss of life in Pakistan, China, South Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Sweden, Russia and the UK. Sadly, this list is by no means exhaustive.

We also witnessed the truly shocking pictures of people trapped in a high-rise tower in one of the world’s wealthiest capital cities (see p28 for Grenfell Tower analysis). On pages 30 and 32 we report on other human-caused crises, those of malware and cyber crime.

Whether motivated by human malice or criminality, justified by ideological reasons, or exacerbated by poor or lackadaisical emergency planning, vulnerabilities and weaknesses are still repeatedly exposed.

As CRJ and its authors have consistently stated over the years, the challenges presented by such incidents are dwarfed in terms of the possible human loss caused by climate disruption. And we have also examined what happens when security and climate issues collide.

On the CRJ website, we noted recently how climate related issues can ripple out and trigger wider global security crises, as highlighted by a report that names 12 significant climate and security epicentres, all of which present extremely serious risks.

As we go to press, Europe is in the grip of a heatwave dubbed ‘Lucifer’, and wildfires are raging in many parts of the world, while catastrophic flooding devastates other areas.

Yet there is still profound resistance, lack of engagement or willful detachment – whether politically, economically, or institutionally – to acknowledge the potential impact of climate risks. How to embed resilience, prevention and mitigation in an effective and meaningful way, so as to engage governments, businesses, communities and individuals?

A vital first step has to be discarding some of the entrenched and unproductive institutional or organisational terminology, definitions and doctrines that many organisations seem to adhere to so doggedly. Interminable pontification about pointless semantics and pushing narrow, short-term, self-interested motivations are simply dodging pressing crisis issues. It is time to set agendas aside and truly think in global human terms, eschewing treacherous tunnel vision and joining up the dots – we need to see the whole picture for it really is. Emily Hough

August 2017 | vol:12 | issue:4

contents comment

Stabilisation & reconstruction p22 Treating the victims of war p26 Space technologies p60 3D printing p76

CRISISRESPONSE

join the CRJ LinkedIn group follow us on twitter @editorialcrj 32 Resources, links, pictures, videos and much more are available for subscribers in our digital and online editions www.crisis-response.com Crisis Response Journal 12:4 | August 2017

Cover story: Space technology for humanitarian and disaster applications

Cover illustration: Elisanth | Alamy

Optima Emergency Sergey Nivens | 123rf Boston Children’s Hospital

Grenfell Tower was exactly the sort of complex, high-impact, multi-jurisdictional event that crisis

management procedures have been developed to handle, and to give responding agencies – including local councils – a framework and a guideline to prepare for and respond to.� is article is based on information in the public sphere, and there is enough available to build a picture of what did and did not happen in the immediate aftermath of the � re, and to identify signi� cant failures in the management processes that were directly linked to the organisational failures that became a critical and central part of the disaster.

A crisis, as opposed to a major incident or routine emergency, falls outside of normal management frameworks and, because of its nature, scale and impact, goes beyond the capabilities of these frameworks to respond to it.

Just as a person can freeze when faced with a sudden and unexpected situation that is beyond their capacity to comprehend, so too can an organisation.

� ere should be a series of automated processes associated with the initial response to a crisis that allow the organisation to maintain critical functionality, even when

the situation can seem overwhelming. One aspect of a crisis that should not have been

an issue with the Grenfell Tower is whether a crisis situation existed. It should have been clear to the local council that this was a crisis that required the initiation of a strategic multi-agency crisis management framework at the highest level.

Crises are rare, so it is always likely that they are going to challenge management frameworks. It is important that organisations prepare themselves by ‘normalising’ that process through repeated practise, using real-world opportunities to trigger at least the initial stages of a crisis response capability. � is is the doctrine that has been at the heart of the success of both the UK’s national Cabinet O� ce Brie� ng Rooms (COBR), and London Resilience’s crisis management frameworks. Both organisations recognise the value of an all hazard response mechanism that can utilise frequent potential incidents and near misses to practise their moves in as realistic a setting as possible.

While the Grenfell Tower incident may have been unique, the need to respond to it was not, and an initial question would be how ready the council was to respond to such an incident with the full range of crisis management frameworks and stakeholders.

In crisis management, the � rst question that needs to be asked is not ‘What shall we do’, but rather ‘What has just happened’?

In the Grenfell Tower, that became almost immediately clear, but the implications were not. However, within the earliest stages of responding, it should have become clear that this was a signi� cant event that was going to have a long-term impact on the lives of the tower block’s residents, as well as the surrounding community.

While the scale of the tragedy may not have immediately been clear, it was evident that signi� cant levels of resources from multiple agencies, both formal and informal, would be required. It should also have been clear that as well as responding directly, the local council would be responsible for setting up a co-ordination framework to act as the central focus point of the local response operation and that this should be run as a co-ordination centre, rather than a command and control centre, the latter being more appropriate for the actual � re rather than community response.

From a classical crisis management perspective, when a crisis does occur, there will be three signi� cant shortages – manpower, resources and management capability. � ere is usually not enough manpower to manage normal operational

activities, so there is no spare capacity to manage a crisis. From a resource perspective, there is never enough spare capacity to prepare for the full range of potential crises, so there is a lack of necessary supplies, whether basic (food, bedding, accommodation), or specialist (decontamination units, search and rescue equipment, communications systems). Finally, most managers are tasked with managing the procedures and protocols associated with their roles, but have not been given the training or preparation to take an appropriate leadership role when faced with the sudden and potentially catastrophic challenges associated with a full-blown crisis.

Crises are complex and multi-dimensional, requiring a management framework that allows the myriad of teams associated with the immediate and longer-term response operations to share information, develop plans and identify needs on an ongoing and collaborative basis.

� ere is a well-established protocol for such a crisis management team (CMT), to be a central part of the crisis management capability development process covered in training, exercising and validation processes.

Each member of the CMT would be connected to their own networks, allowing speedy and e� ective collection of information and the development of a Common Operating Picture (COP). � is, in turn, would have allowed a cohesive, integrated response plan to be developed and put into play during this particular incident, taking into account that the information itself would have been partial, unveri� ed and rapidly changing, at least in the initial stages of the emergency.

Setting up a CMT at the earliest stage of the crisis would not only have allowed the highest level of e� ective management of information during the critical � rst few hours, but would also have demonstrated that the council leadership was able to assume the responsibility expected of it.

It became clear that the surrounding community had become the immediate � rst responders, o� ering comfort, shelter, food, clothing and other support services. � is could and should have been expected, but once the level of community support being o� ered became apparent, the council’s role should have been as a co-ordinating agency that would allow the most e� ective utilisation of the overwhelming level of community engagement.

� e fact that such support was not given, and the ability of the community to respond immediately and in overwhelming levels was not met with the same level of agility, adaptability and initiative by the local council, became the central story within hours.

Although crises are complex, chaotic, with no clear solutions, or even a clear understanding of the basic problems, this cannot be an excuse for systemic failures across an organisation, especially at leadership levels.

� e fact that the council as a whole, and

the leadership on an individual basis, seemed to have little or no understanding of what their role should be, nor how to manage those roles, is in an indictment of their capabilities, and their attitude to their responsibilities.

In fact, the challenges facing the leadership in the � rst few hours were exactly those that they should have expected, and should have had been able to respond to in an e� ective manner.

� ose challenges included: Time pressure; rapid escalation of the event; lack of information; the fact that the event and its consequences went beyond any plans that were currently in place; the need to make immediate decisions; and however these decisions were made, they potentially had catastrophic consequences.

An integral part of a crisis of this nature is there will be a high level of personal disruption and dislocation among survivors, as well as those who were not caught up in the initial event, but were a� ected by its impacts as they rippled across the community. � ere are also those within the wider community who are a� ected both physically and psychologically, who also require the support of formal response agencies.

It is a truism that the people who live in the community are the community, and it is the role of support teams to support them. When a breakdown of trust occurs, as often happens when the initial response is not managed e� ectively, the relationship can become de� ned through a worsening spiral of mistrust, alienation, aggression and then active opposition.

Dangers and opportunitiesAlthough such antipathy is often based upon decades of perceived injustice and alienation, if managed properly, the crisis is an opportunity for the community to come together under a unifying leadership. As stark examples of both the dangers and the opportunities associated with crisis leadership,

� e role of crisis managers is not to manage a crisis, but to ensure that all aspects of the organisation have an understanding of the challenges of crisis management and have the necessary skills and capabilities to respond e� ectively as part of a multi-agency crisis management operation on personal, team and organisational levels. Given the apparent failures of the council to respond e� ectively from the very � rst moments, it is relevant to ask what preparation had been made, what scenarios practised, and what training and exercising undertaken.

� e UK’s Civil Contingencies Act 2004 lays out seven duties that local councils have in terms of emergency preparedness. � ese include:

� To co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and e� ciency;

� Ensure information is shared with other local responders to enhance co-ordination;

� Carry out risk assessments; � Have emergency plans in place;

� Have business continuity management arrangements in place;

� Have arrangements in place to be able to warn and inform the public in the event of an emergency; and

� Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations regarding business continuity management.

� ere are also two signi� cant documents concerning multi-agency emergency response – Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) and London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP). Although both of these documents are primarily aimed at emergency services responding to emergencies, rather than local authorities acting as a support agency to the a� ected community, both would presume that appropriate council representatives, including the chief executive, would have been aware of these plans, and would have participated in training and exercising.

� e challenges created by the � re were not unique – not only were they predictable, but could be considered as fundamental to any major incident. In that sense, the apparent failures of the council to have accepted its responsibilities in preparing itself to have appropriate levels of crisis management skills and capabilities, as well as the apparent failure to respond e� ectively to the speci� c challenges of the Grenfell Tower disaster, can � t into a well-known pattern of behaviours that can come under the headings of a failure of leadership and initiative (Hurricane Katrina Congressional Report) and a failure of imagination (9/11 Congressional Report).

Whatever the speci� c details and horrors of Grenfell Tower, seen purely from an emergency management perspective, there was nothing in the hours and days following the event that could have been considered unthinkable, unexpected or unforeseeable.

In fact, the challenges associated with housing and safeguarding the wellbeing of traumatised victims, utilising the resources of the council, formal and voluntary agencies, as well as the community itself, lie at the heart of any major incident scenario.

� e ability to provide succour and support to those most a� ected by crises is a modern government’s responsibility, at all levels. � at a failure of this nature can happen in the richest borough in London, in the absence of any other challenges or distractions, is once again an indication of just how fragile the crisis management frameworks that we so heavily rely on can be.

AuthorDR DAVID RUBENS DSyRM, CSyP, FSyI Dr David Rubens DSyRM, CSyP, FSyI is MD of Deltar Training Solutions Ltd. He holds a Doctorate in

Security and Risk Management from University of Portsmouth, where he served as an associate lecturer; www.deltar-ts.com

More than 150 homes were said to have been destroyed in the tower and surrounding areas. The fire caused at least 80 deaths and more than 70 people were injured, but the final toll is, as yet, unknown, and probably never will be

Basphoto | 123rf

The Grenfell Tower tragedy: A brief review

The Grenfell Tower fi re has been described as an event unparalleled in modern London’s history in the scope and scale of its impact, says David Rubens. And it is an indication of the fragility of the crisis management frameworks upon which we so heavily rely

join the CRJ LinkedIn group follow us on twitter @editorialcrj 29Crisis Response Journal 12:4 | August 201728 Resources, links, pictures, videos and much more are available for subscribers in our digital and online editions www.crisis-response.com

incident analysisincident analysisincident analysis

SUBSCRIBE NOWAuthoritative global overage of all aspects of security, risk, crisis

management, humanitarian response, business continuity planning, resilience, management, leadership, technology and emerging trends

PRINT | ONLINE | DIGITAL |

CRISIS RESPONSEJOURNALwww.crisis-response.com

PROTECTION | PREVENTION | PREPAREDNESS | RESPONSE | RESILIENCE | RECOVERY

You know you want to!

subs.indd 3 06/08/2017 19:26

align the hostage-taker’s expectations. Misinterpretation of the restrictions not to make concessions to terrorists, imposed under the National Counter Terrorism plan, may have contributed to this decision.

Monis’s demand seeking an on air debate could have been explored through asking him to provide a written statement as to his purpose and motivation behind the incident, allowing him to express himself, while at the same time permitting negotiators to understand what had brought him to this point. Such understanding would have made negotiators better placed to enter into productive dialogue. � e refusal only increased the hostages’ frustration and sense of abandonment.

� e hostage-taker’s demand for an IS � ag was quite rightly met with refusal, but negotiators did not explore why he wanted the � ag, nor did they explain why it would not be provided. � is was counterproductive and again increased the anguish among the hostages.

Moving police and parked vehicles out of Phillip Street in response to demands by Monis was reasonable and appropriate, although it should have been used as a positive police action to pursue some reciprocation.

His demand for the lights in Martin Place to be extinguished appeared to have been mismanaged by both the negotiators and command. � is could have been granted and might have provided yet another opportunity to engage in direct dialogue with Monis. Instead, the prolonged failure not only agitated his anger, but also exacerbated the sense of frustration experienced by the hostages.

To measure the e� ectiveness of any strategy you must be able to measure your progress towards your ultimate goal. Unfortunately, no progress towards a negotiated settlement of the siege was made at any stage.

Negotiators failed to undertake robust evaluation and assessment of where they were in the negotiations and what they had not achieved in line with their strategy, nor was there a system or process in place that allowed them to do so. � is a� ected tactical negotiator advice to the various levels of command, which saw no change to the ‘contain and negotiate’ strategy.

While not de� nitive, progress in negotiations may be measured through:

� Emotional outbursts are declining and conversations are getting longer;

� Hostages are released; � Weapons are surrendered; � Absence of physical injury to hostages; � � e incident is static; and � A routine has been established.� e role of a consultant psychiatrist or psychologist

in the response to a hostage siege is bene� cial and can provide an excellent clinical insight for negotiators on how to communicate e� ectively when dealing with a hostage-taker who is su� ering from a personality disorder.

� e consultant can also assess the hostages’ behaviour, which helps advise on how best to reassure them during their captivity.

A psychiatrist or psychologist may also be used to monitor the negotiation team to assess how they are managing under the high stress of an incident, and to o� er psychological support where required.

� eir advice, while invaluable, must be taken in the context of the cultural, religious and situational factors that give in� uence to a hostage-taker’s behaviour and

actions. It is from this, based on training and experience, that negotiators make informed judgments about their strategy, its e� ectiveness and to identify ways forward in dialogue, especially if a stalemate has been reached.

In this case the consultant psychiatrist was permitted to give advice about negotiation strategy and tactics, but made erroneous and unrealistic assessments about what was occurring in the stronghold, gave ambiguous advice about the nature of Monis’s behaviour, and was allowed to go beyond his area of expertise and give advice about Islamic terrorism. � is, combined with other factors, led to an underestimation of Monis’s capability and the danger he posed to the hostages.

In addition, a total of eight calls by hostages to a number they had been told would connect them with a negotiator went unanswered – four around 20:00hrs and another four between 24:30hrs and 01:00hrs. An unknown number of calls were also diverted to other telephones within the Police Forward Command Post.

Missed callsMissing these calls highlights a signi� cant failure in a basic component of siege management. It was likely that the calls between 24:30hrs and 01:00hrs were not answered because all the negotiators were involved in a handover brie� ng in a separate room.

Handovers between teams on long running sieges are commonplace and must be handled with care and diligence to continue to provide open communication and ensure a smooth transition to a fresh team.

Negotiators had not received adequate training in dealing with terrorists. � e training of negotiators focuses on dealing with the high incidence of domestic high-risk situations, but did not adequately equip them to engage e� ectively with terrorist/s in a siege. Negotiators should have at least a basic understanding of terrorist negotiations and a cadre should be developed that mirrors the counter terrorism command to ensure capability and capacity across all of the tactical options.

� ere was no policy requiring commanders or negotiators to record negotiation positions and tactics, the demands made by a hostage-taker, or any progress or lack of it in moving a high-risk situation towards resolution.

Recording negotiators’ observations on the stage and progress of negotiations allows them to make recommendations in further negotiation tactics, or ultimately declare to commanders that negotiations are not working to allow other tactical options.

� ere is a train of thought in legal circles that if it something is not recorded then it did not happen. Recording decisions, tactical advice, progress updates and negotiator dialogue can be viewed as hard work, but advancements in technology allow it all to be captured with ease.

� ankfully incidents of this nature are rare but, when they do occur, they present a signi� cant danger to innocent people caught up as hostages and pose complex challenges to the agencies that must be prepared to respond to such events.

History has taught us that successful resolution by force from law enforcement agencies or military requires exceptional training, planning and execution.

Globally, negotiators form a small community that willingly shares the challenges of the incidents so that others can learn from their experience; they will no doubt also learn the lessons from this incident.

AuthorChief Inspector ANDREW B BROWN is Partner at A Kain &

Partners LLP, and a hostage negotiation expert. He is a Member of CRJ’s Editorial Advisory Panel

The full report is available at: www.lindtinquest.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/findings-and-recommendations.pdf

20 Resources, links, pictures, videos and much more are available for subscribers in our digital and online editions www.crisis-response.com