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RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG11(T)

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WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: GOTTS, ANGIE

Age if under 18: Over 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: CONTROL STAFF

This statement (consisting of page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and beliefand I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfullystated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: Date: 11/10/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded 0 (supply witness details on rear)

This statement relates to the night of the fire at Grenfell Tower on 13th-14th June 2017.

I am a Control Room Officer for the London Fire Brigade and have performed my role since 1981.

I have performed the same role the whole time and have been based across London, including Croydon,

Lambeth, the Docklands and Merton. I still enjoy my role and I work with a great bunch of people.

To date, I think I am the 13th longest serving member of the Control Room.

Throughout the statement I shall introduce various people who also worked that night and the roles they

undertook. I shall briefly explain the training that was undertaken to perform my role and explain various

pieces of terminology, whether it be related to equipment or relating to policy and procedure, before

explaining the events that took place that night.

Signature:2017

Signature witnessed by:

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RESTRICTEDStatement of: GOTTS, ANGIE Form MG1 1(T)

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Throughout the statement I will refer to 'appliances' and 'pumps' These are our terms for fire engines

and are interchangeable.

My role as a CRO is primarily concerned with the receiving of calls from members of the public,

obtaining specific details and then dispatching appliances to best assist them. The training I undertook in

1981 was a 7-8 week course that covered the basics of understanding terminology, call handling, radio

procedure and rank structure. Once we had passed the course we went to work in the Control Room.

Since that training we have not really had much refresher training and there is nothing that would be

understood to be mandatory training. I have received training regarding Fire Survival Guidance (F'SG)

which I will expand upon. However the premise and basics of call handling have not changed in the time

I have been a CRO.

The role of a CRO is based around computer systems and I will explain the process of taking a basic call.

When a phone number is inputted in to our system an address can be displayed, especially in the case of a

landline. If a mobile number is used, the screen will show a large red circle which indicates the vicinity in

which the call is being made. We are required to get the specific address and input it so the computer can

acknowledge it. This can be a slow process because the system often does not recognise it or is simply

working slowly on that day. We would ask what is on fire; a house, small block of flats or a high rise.

This is important because it will determine what appliances are sent to the scene, for example if the

building is over six floors the system will automatically dispatch a bigger attendance. Once we know

what the building and fire is we would normally clear the line and assign the relevant appliances. Through

the system we can locate the nearest appliances with the required equipment and allocate the call to them.

We would send the allocation via a printer of the Mobile Dispatch Terminal (MDT). The allocation of

appliances is dictated by Incident Type Codes (ITaC) and the Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA),

however I can remember all the codes so do not need to use the system for this. For example, a standard

fire would be allocated an 'Al' attendance. This means a minimum of two appliances to attend the scene.

An ̀A2' code is a fire that involves rubbish or garbage that is on fire and only requires one pump. An

ITaC can be overridden manually however, if it is deemed necessary. This could occur when a greater

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of 9attendance is required based on the information that is being received or perhaps local knowledge of an

area or a second call comes in relating to the same incident.

A CRO also performs other roles. A radio operator also forms part of our responsibilities and would be

undertaken for the duration of a shift unless called upon to take calls. The radio operator would receive

and send messages and updates to the appliances at the scene and if necessary make contact with either

the LAS or police if their attendance is required, however the overall decision as to the attendance of

another emergency service has to be made by a supervisor. A standard message that could be received as

a radio operator would be 'make pumps 4' — in the event of an 'Al' call the standard response is two

pumps, so a further 2 would be required. This would be typed out as a message and be referred to as an

'Incident Upgrade' or 'IUP'. In the event that this occurs, the radio operator could shout out "IUP" for

another member of the Control Room to assist with the amending of the incident type and update the

system so that the appliances can be upgraded.

Further responsibilities of a CRO are to monitor the 'Standby Module' if they have been trained. The

Standby Module organises all of the stations across London to make sure they have the right skills and

numbers in the right areas. This is usually completed the shift before the following so that the numbers

can be equally distributed in plenty of time. This is managed through the Staff Attendance Register

(STAR) system and shows what fire fighters are on duty for the following shift and the skills they have.

The role is normally managed by civilian staff, however they often finish at 11 pm which means that the

CROs will perform the role throughout the night shift.

CROs are supervised by Assistant Operations Managers (AOMS) and there is usually one AOM to four

or five CROs. An Operations Manager has overall control of the Control Room every shift, or 'Watch' as

it is referred to in the LFB. I am a member of 2 Watch. Our shifts are divided into three — a day shift is

Sam-8pm, followed by a 'short shift' of either Sam-4pm or 2pm-10pm and then finally a night shift which

is 8pm-Sam. At the completion of our night shifts we will then have three days off before we start the

pattern again

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of 9A FSG is a call in which a caller has said that they are trapped and cannot get out. In the event of a FSG

there are certain things that we have to do. For example, we have to inform a supervisor immediately,

usually by waving our hand, so that they can listen to the call as well. On nights however this is not

always possible because our team numbers can be smaller. The first thing I do is to make sure that an

ambulance will be in attendance if the caller is sure they cannot get out. We would give certain advice

such as making sure they block the doors with towels, have a way of getting fresh air and to make sure we

know where they are in the property so that the fire fighters can get to them. Whilst getting the

information as fast as possible I would also be typing messages for the radio operator so that the

information is passed to the fire crews. It is also very important that we get how many people are reported

to be inside and have that information passed over. The collection of names is not something that would

be routinely done. In such calls, speed is of the essence and what we really need to know is the address,

where they are and how many people are inside. Sometimes people giving their names is not clear which

will slow down the process and it is not something we really need. In the many years I have been a CRO,

I have not known the advice regarding FSGs to change. We are supposed to use a 'Reference Index File'

(RJF) in the event of an FSG. This is a step by step guide of what to do in the event of a FSG, but the

most important thing is to get the fire engines running as quickly as possible. When you are dealing with

a FSG it can be difficult to do all the tasks at once, so owing to my experience I may not use the RIF as it

is yet another thing for the computer to do.

In my experience I have dealt with a few FSGs but not many. Perhaps only four of five. I was present

during the Lakanal fire in 2009 and had others relating to a woman trapped in a skylight unable to get out

and a man trapped in flats in Paddington who could not speak English very well. The night of the Grenfell

fire there were just too many FSGs to deal with. So much so it was impossible to stay on the line with the

callers

Normal advice for calls to high rise buildings has always been to stay. This is based upon the

understanding that the construction of the building should allow about one hour's grace in which the fire

is contained and should allow plenty of time for the caller to be rescued once the fire fighters have

attended which usually takes between 4-5 minutes

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of 9I had never heard of Grenfell Tower before that night.

On the night of the 14th June we were working the night shift. I think there were eleven CROs working

along with three supervisors — AOMs Debbie REAL and Pete MAY and the Operations Manager, Alex

NORMAN. No one above the rank of OM was present. We were working from our Stratford 'fall back'

centre because of routine maintenance at Merton. This happens a few times throughout the year. The

Control Room is much smaller than Merton.

The night began like any other. I was tasked to update the Standby Module with Christine HOWSON,

another CRO. We had been having a lot of issues with the system that night which could have become a

big problem in terms of managing resources for the next day but thankfully we got the systems resolved

by about midnight and could return to call handling.

I also assisted with operating the radio (channel 4) to relieve people for their breaks. 1 did this between

midnight and lam for Sharon DARBY and then my break was between lam-2am.

I remember, whilst walking out for my break, the initial call for Grenfell Tower. I was aware of Pete

MAY discussing the attendance required. I think he said a few days before there was a fire alarm at

another high (rise) and the attendance was incorrect because the flat number was inputted and the system

did not pick it up as a high rise. I remember on the night the call was to flat 16 on the 4th floor. I was not

aware of any other calls at that point.

Shortly afterwards I heard a bang on the door from Pete MAY. He stated that there was a '10 pump fire'

and 'Persons Reported' and we needed to make our way back to the Control Room due to the influx of

calls. A 'Persons Reported' call means that there are people trapped inside. I made my way back to the

Control Room and immediately started taking calls. Between lam and 5am the Control Room was

completely manic. Just constant calls.

It all turned into a blur. I think I took a call from a man on the 8th floor and told him the fire was on the

4th and that he would be safe where he was. He seemed to be happy with that information at the time. I

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of 9think at some point there was an incident upgrade; I cannot remember if it was then a fifteen or twenty

pump fire but I remember thinking, "Oh my God, this is worse than Lakanal".

The Lakanal fire in 2009 and the fallout from it has had a profound effect on me. A friend of mine was

blamed for the advice she gave to a resident and the advice she gave her was exactly what she was

supposed to have done. She was hounded by the press because the advice she gave was for the resident to

stay in the flat and the resident sadly died. The blame was all put on her. Since then I have not been

comfortable with telling people to stay put in their flats. I will tell the caller what I can and I will certainly

pass all of their details (flat number, floor number, number of people and location) to the fire fighters but

I will not tell them to stay. I would assure the caller that the fire fighters know exactly where they were

but it was to be their own personal decision as to whether they decided to stay or go. It was not a decision

I would make for them.

Over the course of the night I think I took something in the region of about 80 calls, I was later told. I do

not really remember them. I remember one man I spoke to, a father of five, say that the fire was coming

through the walls of his flat. I felt totally useless as there was nothing I could do to help these people. I

told him there was nothing I could do and that he was better off with his family. I ended the call by saying

I would make absolutely sure the crews knew where he was — it was just horrible.

At some point, Jason OLIFFE, the Officer of the Day, was in the Control Room. He is a Station Manager

and his presence in the Control Room is not normal. An Officer of the Day is responsible for overseeing

jobs that are above a certain level — from a six to eight pump fire and above. He was with other senior

officers and I remember them writing names and addresses on white boards at the back of the room. I

remember first noticing them when I came back in from my break. They were constantly being updated

and messages passed to the Command Unit on the ground. It was quicker to write the messages by hand

on pieces of paper than it was to type them and wait for the system to send so I would write them and take

it straight to the white boards. In the end I think everyone was doing it that way.

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of 9The information we passed on was then mirrored on the ground by the Command Unit who wrote it on a

Initially the advice to give residents was to remain. I remember at some point in the night someone shouts

that the advice was to get out. I do not know what time this was said.

I constantly made sure that I had the flat numbers to pass over to the Command Unit. Normally you

would know if the people you spoke to had got out, but on this occasion there were so many it was

impossible to check. I would not normally have called them back and had no chance to do so on that

night. By that point in the night FSG advice was pointless.

It was too late. I know that some people got rescued and I know that every name and flat number I got

went straight to the white board. I simply went from one to call to another.

A blur. There were just so many that eventually we could not help. I went in to complete auto pilot;

perhaps as a way of shutting out what was happening. Luckily across London there were not many other

calls regarding other matters. I also remember that there was a red phone that rang incessantly. I think it

was BT advising us that there were calls outstanding.

After the last call, I think it was about Sam, there was a lull. That was horrible. You could not help but

think that they had all gone. Then relatives started calling and asking about family members. They feared

the worst and that was why they were ringing. The lack of calls made it eerie in the Control Room.

Someone said, "What does this mean?" but we all know what it meant. Someone looked it up on their

computer on the news and it was horrific. I could not look at it. At some point I remember Alex, the OM,

tell us to turn it off. It may have been shown on the TV in the Control Room but I cannot remember. I was

not aware of the TV being on throughout the night. I think she wanted to save us from seeing it because

she knew it would be upsetting. The first time I looked at it I wondered if anyone had managed to get out.

I remember thinking it reminded me of 9/11 and all the people who were above where the planes hit and

could not get out.

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of 9The atmosphere was one of stunned silence. I remember at some point trying to call Kensington and

Chelsea council regarding their building surveyor coming out to assess the damage. I tried three times and

could not get connected. I tried the 'out of hours' mobile number which did not work. Eventually I

managed to get through after putting a '9' at the start of the original numbers and was advised that they

could not give an ETA for the surveyor. I stressed the importance of someone needing to attend but was

again told they could not tell me when someone would be there. We even said that they could be collected

and driven on blue lights to the scene but still they would not assist nor let me call them directly. Alex

advised me to page the London Resilience Group and update them on the problems I had which I did. By

the time I left I was still unsure if they had attended or not.

The day shift had been contacted to come in early and I remember I left before Sam. The on call

counsellor had been contacted to come in and I know a number of CROs went and spoke to them. I just

wanted to leave. I wish I could have done more to help those people. All we could do was pass on the

information. A few days later we did a scene visit of the tower which completely shocked me — the

height of the building and the damage was overwhelming. I had been due to do some overtime a couple of

days after but I did not go in. I needed some time. When I came back for my normal shift I was ok. I got

straight back on with things and I think I needed to answer normal calls — that helped with dealing with

it.

There has been support for us at work if we needed it but I have been ok. Since the fire there has been a

slight change to policy with regards to high rise buildings. In the event of a call to a high rise, the

minimum attendance is now five pumps and an aerial ladder — even if it is just a fire alarm call. That is

as a direct result of Grenfell.

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