Google-China 2010 DisputeFinal Paper for MORS 474 Fall 2015 Course

Marek Skomorowski, Ankur Saxena

ABSTRACTThis paper chronicles Google’s presence in China during 2005-2010, analyzes Google’s dispute with the Chinese government over China’s Internet censorship requirements in 2010 and discusses how a better outcome could have been achieved for Google.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1Parties Involved........................................................................................................................1Google’s Rough Journey In China During 2006-2009...............................................................2Dispute With The Chinese Government In 2010......................................................................3Analysis Of The 2010 Dispute...................................................................................................4From Dispute To Negotiation...................................................................................................5What Did Google Do Well In The Dispute Resolution...............................................................5What Could Have Google Done Better.....................................................................................6Lessons..................................................................................................................................... 8

INTRODUCTION

On 29th June 2010, Google announced that it will stop redirecting its Chinese users from Google China website to Google Hong Kong website, which was seen as a compromise to appease the Chinese government that was about to decide on the renewal of Google license to operate in mainland China. Just six months earlier, Google had been subject to sophisticated cyber attacks, allegedly coordinated by the Chinese government, in which its information security was compromised and intellectual property was stolen. Google threatened to exit China and started redirecting its Chinese website users to its Hong Kong website on 22nd March 2010. This paper traces Google’s ups and downs during these six months and discusses how Google could have achieved a better outcome.

PARTIES INVOLVED1. Google in China

Google saw potential in the Chinese market early on - in 2000 it introduced a Chinese translated version of the US website, which however was not very useful as the search results appeared after a long delay. This was due to the fact that the website was not hosted on servers inside China, which made the response time for any query very long. In 2005, Google made a decision to launch a local version of its site. The company found the Chinese market very interesting due to its business potential. Based on China Internet Network Information Center1:

● There were 103 million Internet users in China (roughly 10% of the world’s users)2

● Roughly 38% used Internet for getting information

● Roughly 65% used search engines

That accounts for 25 million people potentially interested in Google’s services. Moreover, due to the fast economical development of China, the growth rate of the Internet usage was promising and the company could expect high initial revenues from its advertising services as well as a dynamic growth of the business.

After agreeing to filter its Internet searches in conformity with the Chinese censorship laws, Google acquired a license to operate Google.cn in 2006. At this time, Google operated two domains in China: Google.com, which was subject to China’s “Great Firewall” (described below), and Google.cn, which complied with Chinese legislation through self-censoring.

2. Chinese Government

China’s political system, built on the ideology of socialism and communism, valued the collective interests of the entire society over the rights of individuals.3 Thus, the authorities strictly controlled access to information. The development of World Wide Web and Internet

1 16th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (July 2005)2 Statista, “Number of worldwide internet users from 2000 to 2015”3 J. Brett, L. Pilcher, L-Ch. Sell; “A New Approach to China: Google and Censorship in the Chinese Market”

1

services in China resulted in several initiatives to introduce means to control what information was available to the citizens:

● The Great Firewall - a set of policies to regulate the internet in Mainland China, including “criminalizing certain online speech and activities, blocking from view selected websites, and filtering key words out of searches initiated from computers located in Mainland China.”4

● Teams of internet commentators from propaganda and the police, equipped with knowledge of communism ideology and propaganda techniques employed "strictly to gather and analyze public opinions on micro-blog sites and compile reports for decision-makers." In 2013, the number of such employees was around 2 million.5

The laws controlling the flow of information required any Internet Service Provider (ISP) to obtain permission from the authorities to offer any services in Mainland China. As a result, the ISP would have to control any information available to the Chinese citizens through its service. Also, it was still monitored towards any attempts not to follow the law, which could result in withdrawing the permission to offer internet services in China. The monitoring sometimes involved breaching the security policies of the service to reveal any private information of the users of the service.

Although the government was very strict about granting access to information for Chinese citizens, it also had a goal of achieving technological parity with the western world. One of the avenues to accomplish this was through allowing a major Internet company, Google, to have a local domain name and set up a research and support facility in China. This would give Chinese IT specialists and engineers access to Google’s proprietary research technology, generate local jobs, and help retain Chinese technical talent in the country.

China had another option as well. It could deny Google the license and continue to rely on local search engine alternatives to provide Chinese consumers with internet search services. Baidu was quite similar to Google in search capability and had been steadily gaining market share. It was a known entity and the Chinese government was already monitoring its compliance with the Chinese law. Though failure to bring a globally renowned high-tech company such as Google to China would damage the country’s international reputation, it would likely produce fewer repercussions at home.

4 China on Wikipedia5 BBC, “China employs two million microblog monitors state media say,” October 4, 2013

2

GOOGLE’S ROUGH JOURNEY IN CHINA DURING 2006-2009 The rules that Google would have to comply with in China were in contradiction to company’s core values, famously codified by its motto “Don’t be evil,” which implied that no political or business issues would affect the information presented by Google in its search results. Yet, the Chinese market seemed attractive enough to justify Google compromising with its core values in 2006. Google executives argued, “Filtering our search results clearly compromises our mission. Failing to offer Google search at all to a fifth of the world’s population, however, does so far more severely.”6

In 2006, Google successfully applied for permission to offer the local site, which required the company to follow the local rules. The company also established an R&D office in Beijing, hiring roughly 700 IT specialists.7 The company faced a backlash from the press and human rights activists globally, pointing out that the company broke its promise to value providing unfettered access to information above profit-making.8

Google grew its business in China to become the second largest search engine, with 36% market share and growing faster than its main competitor, Baidu (58% market share).9 It was still behind Baidu, however, offering services lacking entertainment and social components as well as being perceived as an international entity, with little Chinese pedigree.10 Google was not able to offer e-mail (Gmail) and blogging services (Blogger) to Chinese internet users, for fear of being asked to hand over users’ private information to the Chinese government. Its various services were disrupted on several occasions due to intervention by the Chinese government. The company also faced several cyber attacks that were especially intense in 2009, a year before the initial ISP license’s renewal date (in June 2010).11

DISPUTE WITH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN 2010On January 12th 2010, Google announced that its technology infrastructure had been the target of a series of China-led cyber attacks and blamed the Chinese government for its role in attempting to limit free speech on the web. On March 22nd, 2010 Google said it would end censorship of its Chinese-language search engine, Google.cn. Users trying to access the site were redirected to Google.com.hk (based in Hong Kong), where the company said it would offer uncensored search results in simplified Chinese. These incidents (detailed in Exhibit 1) led to a public conflict and private negotiations between Google and the Chinese government that culminated with the Chinese government renewing the Google.cn license in July 2010.

6 Kristof, N.D. “China’s Cyberdissidents and the Yahoos at Yahoo,” The New York Times, February 19, 20067 J. Brett, L. Pilcher, L-Ch. Sell, “A New Approach to China: Google and Censorship in the Chinese Market”8 NBC News, “Google’s threat to China traces back to founders,” January 14, 20109 Ibid. 10 A. Lawrence, “Google, Inc. Figuring out how to deal with China,” 2009 11 Google Official Blog, “A new approach to China,” January 12, 2010

3

In the course of the dispute, a number of other parties were involved, including the U.S. and Chinese public and media, the U.S. Congress and politicians, and Google’s biggest competitor in China, Baidu. Although these parties were not present at the negotiation table, they raised the stakes in the negotiation manifold and transformed a business transaction in to a political dispute. This pushed the Chinese government away from making any political concessions.

ANALYSIS OF THE 2010 DISPUTEThe 2010 dispute can be analyzed using the Power, Rights, and Interests Dispute Resolution Framework. Google’s interest was to display uncensored search results and preserve the privacy of its users; the Chinese government’s interest was to prevent, what it considered as, inflammatory political or social content from being distributed over Internet. Google went public about the cyber attacks in a successful strategic move to bring the Chinese government to the negotiating table in a position of weakness. The Chinese government responded with a mix of power-based and rights-based tactics.

Power-based Struggle

Google initiated the power struggle by threatening to shut down its Chinese-based operations (Exhibit 1) if China continued to require Google to censor its search results. This threat was followed by a series of actions meant to convey the seriousness of the threat. First, Google delayed the launch of its new android smartphone in the Chinese market, arguing “launching the phones in the current climate would not be a good experience for consumers.”12 Second, it automatically redirected visitors on its China-based search engine, Google.cn, to its Hong Kong-based search engine, Google.com.hk, which was not self-censored.13 Lastly, it also began incorporating real-time Twitter results in to its Hong Kong-based search engine, in a move clearly aimed at angering the Chinese government, which had banned Twitter in Mainland China.

The Chinese government responded with its own actions to demonstrate power – it created pressure on Google through a series of coordinated media coverage of the conflict that ensured that Chinese citizens were angered by Google’s actions. In response to Google’s smartphone launch delay, a state-owned Chinese cell phone company, China Unicom, with 200 million subscribers removed Google search capabilities from its Android phones. This was a warning to Google before the largest telecom company in the world, China Mobile, with 500 million subscribers would remove Google’s services from its smartphones.14

Rights-based Argumentation

Upon being pressured by the Chinese media, Google made a rights-based argument that its actions were legal. The government, in turn, made a rights-based argument that any foreign company operating in China must abide by Chinese laws. The government promised to

12 Digital Trends, “Google postpones android phone launches in China,” January 19, 201013 Google Official Blog, “A new approach to China,” January 12, 201014 Daily Finance, “Google’s Chinese Mobile Ambitions At Risk Amid Search Censorship Spat,” March 24, 2010

4

assess the hacking incident in accordance with Chinese law and emphasized that Google’s web traffic re-routing tactic was illegal.

Parties’ Interests Finally Come Out

The parties soon realized that they had a lot to lose in an impasse and it was fair to consider the other party’s interests. For Google, the Chinese market was one of its largest target markets; an exit could cost up to $500 million and impact other Chinese operations such as its smartphone launch.15 However, Google could not overlook the potential Chinese government involvement in the hacking incident and was forced to respond in order to preserve its global image and commitment to not “be evil.”

China had become more emboldened and self-confident as a result of its increasing economic significance in the global economy, and knew that the Chinese market was too attractive for any major international company to ignore. However, Google’s exit from China would be detrimental for China’s image as foreign direct investment destination and might also lead to other foreign companies fleeing China citing the difficulties of abiding with the Chinese law. Furthermore, China wanted foreign investment in technology research and development from Google and other technology companies. On the other hand, protecting the collective social good was a deeply ingrained value in the Chinese culture and the government believed that censorship was a legitimate means of building cohesion and maintaining social order.

FROM DISPUTE TO NEGOTIATIONThe parties’ vested interest brought them to the negotiation table. There were four major issues to be negotiated: censorship of Google search results, Google’s direct presence in China, the China-led cyber attacks on Google’s services, and privacy for Google products such as Gmail (detailed in Exhibit 2). Google was in a weaker position than the Chinese government because of the importance (potential size and rate of growth of Internet use) of the Chinese market and the competition for Chinese Internet users by Baidu. Unless the Chinese government changed its regulations prohibiting foreign companies from owning a majority interest in some industries, Google could not acquire a controlling interest in Baidu. It could continue to try to provide access to Chinese customers from offshore, but such searches were slow (because they had to go through the Chinese Firewall) and filtered. Hence, its BATNA was weak.

WHAT DID GOOGLE DO WELL IN THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION In the light of the aforementioned points weakening Google’s negotiating position, the experts expected Google to lose in the dispute. Google, however, succeeded by getting its license renewed and continued to do business in China. This enabled Google to participate in the attractive Chinese market, if only partially, and positioned it to participate fully when

15 Sam Gustin, “Google’s China Exit Could Cost $500 Million This Year,” Daily Finance, March 15, 2010

5

and if there is a change in Chinese policies. The company did a couple of things well regarding the dispute resolution.

First, by going public about the cyber attacks of late 2009 and presenting its case in the court of public opinion, Google brought the Chinese government to the negotiating table quickly. If the company had conducted quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiations with Chinese bureaucrats it would have bargained away all its advantages before the first meeting even started, with little hope of improving either its position in China or its tarnished image globally. Chinese negotiators can be masters of the "wear down" – alternating between promises and threats to keep the other party at the table so long that sheer exhaustion turns the tide against the other party.16 Through making a public announcement once, Google demonstrated to the Chinese government that the company could always go public about its dispute and ensured that the government moved forward quickly and reasonably with the dispute resolution. Google also won back some of the credibility that it lost in the public when it agreed to China’s censorship requirement in 2006, and had at least one positive takeaway even before the negotiations started.

Second, Google respected the status-conscious Chinese and sent a constructive signal with regards to the negotiations. It sent its CEO, Eric Schmidt, to key negotiation talks, thus exhibiting the importance of its relationship with the Chinese government. Respecting the “face” culture in China, the company also moved swiftly from using power and rights-based tactics in the public to privately held interests-based dispute resolution to avoid embarrassing the Chinese government further.

Third, Google did not burn the bridges with the Chinese government. It always kept the window of negotiation open. The censorship issue was probably a face-saving cover for hacking and security issues. The Chinese government did much the same – treating Google's exit as a purely business decision and did not politicize the issue. This way, Google was able to maintain some presence in China with the potential to grow further.

Lastly, the dispute between Google and the Chinese government seemed to focus on censorship in a distributive way, which limited the potential outcomes to win/lose. The negotiation eventually turned integrative after Google publicly accused the Chinese government of involvement in the cyber attacks and utilized the power tactic of redirecting its services to its Hong Kong website. However, Google failed to develop and derive valuable takeaways from the integrative negotiation, and the next section talks about this.

WHAT COULD HAVE GOOGLE DONE BETTERThere were several ways in which Google could have defended its business in China and derived more value during the dispute resolution. First, Google acted precipitously without giving due consideration to the impact of the public announcement of cyber attacks on its various stakeholders, including its Chinese employees, consumers, and business partners.

16 Andrew Hupert, New York University in Shanghai, “Negotiating lessons we can learn from Google,” March 19, 2010

6

The public announcement angered the Chinese citizens, including Google’s 700 employees in China, the best of whom started preparing to leave Google immediately following the public announcement, and most of them ended up working for Google’s competitor Baidu. Attracting talented Chinese to work for Google also became more difficult going forward. Google's announcement also disrupted the plans of a number of important business partners such as Samsung and Motorola, who were all set to launch Android-platform handsets in China. Both Google’s employees and business partners should have been notified ahead of time. Their support could have been leveraged to take a more concerted action during the dispute.

Second, Google stuck with the issue of censorship in the negotiations and did not make a multi-issue offer to the Chinese government to help foster an integrative agreement. For getting assurance from the Chinese government about no future cyber attacks and maintaining the sanctity of users’ privacy, Google could have made a few proposals to the government. Baidu and other Chinese companies were offering competent web search services but were behind Google in the social and productivity domains, including email, finance, maps, image storage, and blogging (Exhibit 3 lists dozens of products in Google’s portfolio in 2010). Google could have looked to grow its non-search business in China as the way forward. This way it would have met China’s censorship requirements, while continuing to strengthen its presence in the attractive Chinese market and offering the users these services not provided by the local companies. Another way was by Google signaling its long-term commitment to China by proposing to make investments in China beyond the R&D facility, including a structured plan for training and hiring talent from Chinese universities, know-how and tools support for the Chinese technology and entrepreneurship ecosystem, and co-investments in building the internet infrastructure in tier 2 and 3 cities in China.

Third, a very important Chinese business practice for Google to adopt is Guanxi – a core concept that is rooted in thousands of years of Chinese ethics and business.17 Guanxi plays a pivotal role in the shaping and advancement of daily business operations, and occurs through individual interactions first before being applied on a corporate level. For example, one member of a business may perform a favor for a member of another business or government because they have interpersonal ties, which helps to facilitate the relationship between the two businesses or government involved in this interaction. In the past, Google did not allow its Chinese managers to grant personal favors to the Chinese government officials, but this policy should have been changed going forward, and Google should have taken the first step towards this while negotiating with the government.

Fourth, like Yahoo supplementing its direct presence in China with a 40% stake in a major local Internet company Alibaba, Google should have increased its minority stake in Baidu (up to the maximum allowed limit in China), instead of divesting it. By 2010, Baidu had 73% share of the search market in China and had a market capitalization of $38 billion18, and

17 Guanxi on Wikipedia18 Greg Sterling, “How Google Could Have Bought Baidu And Other Fascinating Details About China’s Largest Search Engine,” November 12, 2010

7

would have been a valuable business partner for Google. As earlier suggested, Google could have then focused on non-search products in China.

Lastly, the dispute and subsequent negotiations were primarily conducted according to American cultural norms, even though the dispute setting was in a culturally different market, thereby straining the relationship between the two parties and threatening their ability to reach an agreement. Using the American style of direct confrontation through the public announcement was effective in bringing the Chinese government to the negotiating table faster, but Google should have switched to an indirect style appropriate for the Chinese culture. A culturally appropriate next step would have been to utilize a mediator. By showing the two parties’ linked BATNAs, the mediator could have brought both parties to the negotiating table. The mediator would have helped set ground rules and flesh out different interests in the negotiation process, and would have also helped do reality testing.

LESSONSThis cross-cultural negotiation involving a multinational and a national government has several lessons for corporate managers.

First, a company should not sacrifice its core values for empty promises. Compromising a company policy or methodology for huge profits is one thing, but abandoning its vision for a vague promise of possible profits at some undetermined later date is quite another. For a lot of multinational corporations managers, this means that you have to do your most serious negotiating within your own company. You cannot negotiate with your Chinese counter-parties and your own HQ at the same time. Get it right with your own organization first (which Google should have done in 2006), and then be ready to walk away if you cannot meet your minimum requirements.

Second, establishing and cultivating relationships in emerging markets is critical to the success of any dispute. By having well connected friends at both the local and national level, companies are better positioned to establish relationships with politicians who may be able to assist them in understanding the government’s interests and positions. This is particularly important while negotiating with a government given that a government’s interests are typically complex and varied. Investigating and uncovering those underlying interests will require a skilled insider. As such, local relationships can also assist businesses with the often-tricky task of navigating the intricacies of a national bureaucracy.

Third, one has to establish an internal timetable and bottom line for negotiating with the government and stick to it. As discussed earlier in this paper, government negotiators can be masters of the "wear down" – alternating between promises and threats to keep you at the table so long that sheer exhaustion turns the tide against you. Furthermore, companies are answerable to capital markets, employees, and other stakeholders more frequently than governments are to their stakeholders, so companies have to move faster.

Lastly, negotiations with a government are typically never conclusive, and as Google successfully did, a company should walk away from a dispute slowly (by moving services

8

from Google.cn to Google.com.hk) and leave the door open to come back later. Additionally, government policies change over time, and this might mean that an economic climate of a country might become attractive in the future. So, a company should try to never burn the bridges with a government.

9

Exhibit 1: Timeline of Google's dispute with China in 2010

Source: Daily Finance

The Threat

Jan. 12, 2010 -- Google threatened to close its operations in China, home to the world's largest Internet user base, after disclosing details of a

massive cyber attack that "resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google." The Web giant also vowed to end its Chinese language

search censorship, in a defiant rebuke aimed at China's communist regime.

Jan. 13, 2010 -- Chinese officials offered their first reaction to Google's decision to reject Chinese censorship -- and potentially quit the country

altogether -- declaring, "China's Internet is open and the Chinese government encourages development of the Internet." An official added:

"Chinese law proscribes any form of hacking activity."

Jan. 15, 2010 -- The White House offered its support for Google's position, as new details emerged about the cyber-attack that prompted

Google to threaten to quit the world's largest country. Cyber-security experts at Verisign iDefense labs said their analysis showed that "the

attack is the work of actors operating on behalf of or in the direct employ of official intelligence entities of the People's Republic of China."

Jan. 16, 2010 -- Yahoo was drawn into the growing international dispute between Google and the Chinese government after it said it was

"aligned with Google." Yahoo said it, too, had been targeted by hackers and condemned "any attempts to infiltrate company networks to

obtain user information."

Jan. 18, 2010 -- Foreign reporters based in China were targeted by hackers who infiltrated their Google email accounts, a Chinese-based

journalism group said, as Google explored the possibility that "one or more" of its own employees helped carry out the attack.

Jan. 19, 2010 -- Google postponed the launch of its first mobile phones in China, a further sign of the widening consequences of its decision to

challenge the Chinese government over cyber-attacks, cyber-security and Internet freedom. Google said it would be "irresponsible" to launch

the phones given the controversy.

1

The Build-Up

Jan. 21, 2010 -- U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned Web censorship and cyber-attacks and offered her support for Google in its

row with China over cyber-security and online censorship. "American companies need to take a proactive role in challenging censorship,"

Clinton said. "They need to consider what's right, not simply what makes a quick profit."

Jan. 23, 2010 -- China said it "doesn't need any lessons from the United States on what to do or how" on the Internet. A government

spokesperson called Clinton "disrespectful" and said Internet companies like Google have to follow the law if they want to do business in

China.

March 10, 2010 -- Google said its dispute with China over censorship will be resolved "soon" -- one way or another -- with Nicole Wong, the

company's vice president and deputy general counsel, saying "Google is firm in its decision that it will stop censoring our search results for

China.”

March 13, 2010 -- Google was reported to be "99.9% certain" to shutter Google.cn, in light of the Chinese government's refusal to relax its

Web filtering, two months after challenging China over Web censorship. The two sides appeared to have reached a stalemate.

March 15, 2010 -- Banking giant UBS said Google could lose $500 million this year if it closes its China-based search engine. Analysts pointed

out that this only amounts to slightly over 2% of Google's annual revenue. Meanwhile, the Chinese government tried with some success to

censor news about its censorship dispute with Google.

March 19, 2010 -- Google was said to be readying an announcement shutting its Chinese language search engine, according to Chinese media

reports. Sources said the company would issue a statement Monday, March 22.

March 20, 2010 -- Chinese media organs lashed out at Google in an apparently coordinated assault, with one paper suggesting Google is linked

to the U.S. intelligence agencies. "It is ridiculous and arrogant for an American company to attempt to change China's laws. The country

doesn't need a politicized Google or Google's politics," one outlet said.

2

The Event

March 22, 2010 -- Google said it would end its censorship of its Chinese-language search engine, Google.cn. Users trying to access that site

were redirected to Google.com.hk, where the company said it would offer uncensored search results in simplified Chinese.

March 22, 2010 -- Google drew praise from human rights activists for its decision to shutter its China-based search engine and redirect users to

its Hong Kong-based site, but China almost immediately began blocking politically sensitive searches on the Hong Kong site, one expert said.

3

Exhibit 2: Positions and Interests of Google and the Chinese government during the dispute in 2010

ISSUE Google Chinese GovernmentCensorship of Google’s services in China

Operate without censorship restrictions Have Google comply with the Chinese self-censor legislation

1 Stay true to its mission of providing access to “the world’s information” by giving Chinese citizens the same access to information as everyone else in the world

Comply with its motto of “don’t be evil” in its code of conduct

3 Demonstrate China’s power and sovereignty to other governments and international Internet companies

Keep control over Internet content available in China

Google’s direct presence in China

Get Google.cn license renewed and stay in China Keep Google in China

2 The Chinese internet market is poised to become one of the largest and most lucrative markets for Google’s overall growth and it needs to keep a foot in the market

A slow Google.com service in China would lead to Google losing market share, revenue and staff to its strongest local competitor Baidu

1 Benefit Chinese citizens from Google’s globally renowned search and other internet services technologies

Fear of job losses (Google employed 700 people in China)

International image of China as foreign direct investment destination

Cyber attacks Get assurance from Chinese government about no China-led cyber attacks on Google service in the future

Stop negative press, reject any blame regarding China-led cyber attacks on Google

4

3 Prevent loss of reputation and thus customers worldwide due to lack of security; security of user information is of utmost importance to win and retain customer trust and loyalty

Be a secular platform, offering the value of “free speech,” and protect users’ data on Google services

2 Prevent tarnishing of China’s image in the eyes of potential foreign direct investors due to lack of safety and transparency in China

At the same time, prevent human rights activists from becoming active over the Internet by using Google’s unrestricted/ “free speech” services

User privacy for Gmail and other Google services in China

Preserve privacy at all costs Restrict privacy if it threatens state order

4 Failure by Google to protect users’ privacy could result in a loss of user confidence and trust in services and ultimately a loss of users

4 China’s political system, built on the ideology of socialism and communism, values the collective interests of the entire society over the rights of individuals.

Maintain state order through controlled surveillance while not scaring off international companies

BATNARetain or expand ownership stake in Baidu and continue to push Chinese users to the slower and less reliable Google.com site

Prevent Google from obtaining the Google.cn license and continue to rely on local and other search engines to provide Chinese consumers with Internet services

Reservation Price

Offer services to Chinese users through Google.com Google self-censors its searches and also takes back its public allegations of government-led cyber attacks

Target

Get a Google.cn license with: No censorship restrictions and privacy of users

preserved for Gmail and other services Assurance of no China-led cyber attacks

Get Google to stay in China with: Google complying with all censorship restrictions Google withdrawing cyber attacks allegations

5

Exhibt 3: Google’s list of products in 2010

Source: http://www.google.com/intl/en/options/ (accessed in 2010)