Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994

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Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Miyu Nishimura Hiroaki Murao Paul Bacon Zemi. Republic of Rwanda. Rwanda is in the middle of Arican continent. Capital: Kigali Hutsu: 85% Tutsi: 14% Independence: 1962. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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  • Global Bystander to Genocide:International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994Miyu NishimuraHiroaki Murao

    Paul Bacon Zemi

  • Rwanda is in the middle of Arican continent.Capital: Kigali

    Hutsu: 85%Tutsi: 14%

    Independence: 1962Main industry: Agriculture (Coffee etc)

  • Tutsi and Hutu were not divided ethnically, but Belgium authority politicized the difference, and used it to control Rwanda.1959 uprisingThe overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in 1961.Hutu came to power and Tutsi fled to neighboring countries, such as Uganda.

    1962 Habyarimana came to power in a coup.His political power base is among the military and the northern Hutu, who have few contacts with Tutsi. Hutu extremist seized political and militaristic power.1990 Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invasionRPF supported by Uganda invaded Rwanda, which was repelled by Rwandan army supported by France, Belgium and Zaire. Hutu extremist came to believed physical extermination is final solution.

  • DateEvent1st Oct, 90RPF invaded from Uganda10th June, 91New Constitution (multi-party system introduced)July, 92Arusha process begun8th Feb, 93RPF violated the truce agreement, and invaded (cease-fire on 21st)4th Aug, 93Arusha peace agreement concluded.6th Apr, 94Shooting down of Habyarimanas plane, the beginning of the genocide.21st Apr, 94UNSCR 912 adopted, which reduce number of troops from 2548 to 270.

    22nd Jun, 94Operation Turquoise 18th Jul, 94RPF declared the end of the civil war.

  • In order to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire and the movement to transitional government, the SC agreed in UNSCR 872 to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Oct 1993.The 1458 troops in phase 1 and 2548 in phase 2.

    The implementation of Arusha accords depended upon compromise of the extremists in Habyarimana faction.

    Arusha Accords is impossible.

  • Dallaire warned

    Hutu extremist is planing to destroy the Arusha peach process- hate propaganda by radio station- killing Belgian soldiers and Tutsi in Kigali

    UNAMIR should neutralize the Hutu extremists by disarming, and then it is possible for UNAMIR to conduct the peace keeping mandate.

    Dallaire asked to seize the weapons, but it was not approved by DPKO.No one wantes to cross Mogadishu-line.

  • UNSCR 909 set the schedule to withdraw.

    The UN would pull out in six weeks unless the transitional government was created, because the US was reluctant to support the UN activities in Rwanda.

    As a Result UNSCR 909 sent the signal which the UN would not intervene decisively to prevent the genocide.

  • Secretary General issued report on UNAMIR to deal with the problems.no mention in the report about Dallaires informationno request reinforcing to protect human rights

    His report included three options 1, a massive deployment of troops and change the mandate2, scaling down UNAMIR to a force size of around 2703, the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.

    Based on the report, the SC unanimously agreed in UNSCR 912, which reduce UNAMIR to 270.

    No member challenged the interpretation of the cause of killing in the report and challenged the mandate of the Resolution.

  • In the Report, Secretary General described the situation as tribal war.

    However, describing the situation in Rwanda as genocide had a special meaning.

    Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide makes it possible for some members of the Security Council to prevent and stop genocide.

    In fact, Clinton Administration was carefully issued secret directive for its officials not to use genocide to explain Rwandan situation.

  • Because of media coverage and many reports from NGO such as MSF, Presidential Statement citing the provisions from Genocide Convention had been issued, so the SC discussed new UNSCR.

    The SC adopted Resolution 918, which authorized to increase in UNAMIR to 5500 troops with mandate to provide humanitarian assistance.

    However, the US disagreed to quick deploy.In addition, Western countries were still reluctant to deploy their military, so the alternative was to ask African states to do.

  • Secretary General criticized the slow actions.In response to it, the Council adopted the UNSCR 925 to authorize to deploy 5500 troops (UNAMIR II).In the meeting, several countries named Rwanda a genocide.

    France offered to lead a multinational rescue mission that would serve as an interim measure until UNAMIR ll was fully deployed.

  • France publicly stated intervention was to save lives and bring humanitarian aids.France discussed the issue in WEU meeting, but no countries supported.

    France set up five preconditions

    UNSC authorization All operation should be limited as humanitarian actions.Troops should remain near the border with Zaire.Troops should not enter into the heart of Rwanda and fight against RPF.Mission should be limited to a maximum two months.

    The Council adopted UNSCR 929

  • France set up safe humanitarian zone (SHZ). At that time, RPF was wining and controlling so many parts of Rwanda, so SHZ actually helped Hutu.In fact, RPF would not be allowed to enter the zone while it provided sanctuary for retreating Rwandan government and army.

    In addition, France changed the schedule for the withdrawal of French troops from 21 August to the end of July, which escalating the refugee crisis.

  • Failures of the International Community*

  • Obviously failed to protect Rwandan people from the massacre.

    The UN was preoccupied with operations in Bosnia and Somalia. Not Somalia Again

    African states insisted that it was the UNs moral duty to assist Rwanda in its transition to democracy, but UN did not respond fully.

  • The Security Council did not consider changing the mandate of UNAMIR from peacekeeping to preventative humanitarian intervention.

    UN could have done it by determining that the threat of massive human rights violations constituted a threat to peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter.

  • Since African states did not have enough power to stop the genocide, responsibility passed to the Western states. BUT the West were reluctant to intervene after the incident of Somalia.

    Took too much time discussing about who would take the responsibility, who would shoulder the cost, etc.

  • Non-humanitarian motives behind the French intervention led to means being employed that conflicted with its humanitarian purposes.

    The Security Council was afraid to loose its credibility and to damage its reputation. Did not want to recognize the killing as genocide

  • The Security Council should have listened to requests for reinforcement from people such as Dallaire.

    Deployment of additional force in the first few weeks of the genocide could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

    Change of mandate and the deployment of an effective fighting force might have led to different outcome.

  • USs participation would have been essential. US forces, under effective command and control, and backed by air power, could have protected Rwandan civilians with little or no risk to US soldiers.

    Frances Operation Turquoise could have been conducted differently.

  • Evaluation of Wheelers Criteria*

  • The Arusha peace process did not go well from the beginningResponse of the extremists was to begin a campaign of killing Tutsis

    Dallaire cabled the UNDPKO with the warning that the extremists is planning to kill Belgian soldiers and Tutsi in Kigali at an estimated rate of 1,000 every 20 mins using militia units (credibility confirmed)

  • Since peaceful negotiations such as Arusha peace agreement did not work and the killings were getting worse, Rwanda needed military intervention

    Time frame of 7-21 April was importantDeploying the force any later would have required massive amounts of force because the situation had expanded to the countryside

  • Too late to deploy force, too much casualties

    There werent enough forces, equipments, and funds to help the Rwandans

  • NOT AT ALL. The international community failed to prevent the massacre, failed to protect the Rwandan citizens.

    Estimated 800,000 people was killed overall as much as 20% of the country's total population

    Over the course of approximately 100 days (from the assassination of Habyarimana on April 6) through mid-July, over 500,000 people were killed, according to the Human Rights Watch estimate

  • Most of the international community member did not respond to the killings.

    US: President said that the USA had no vital interests in Rwanda and that US military personnel could not be sent to every trouble spot where Americans were offended by human misery.

    France: to save lives!!to demonstrate to Africa and the rest of the world that France could still rapidly project military power!!

  • UN Resolutions

    UNAMIR II

    French government justified its intervention as to save lives of Rwandan peopleBut the means used by the French cannot be justified as humanitarian

  • UNAMIR acted under UN authorization

    However, France went against Resolution 929, which says it should not support interposition force between government and the RPF.Safe Humanitarian Zone(SHZ)

  • France made the Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) which did not allow RPF to enterThey actually sheltered Hutu

    Most of the states were selective because of prudential concerns

  • ThresholdsHow was it?Supreme Humanitarian EmergencyLast ResortProportionalityPositive Humanitarian OutcomeHumanitarian MotivesHumanitarian JustificationsLegality(UN)(France)Selectivity

  • After the victory of the RPF, the size of UNAMIR was increased to its full strength, remaining in Rwanda until March 8, 1996.About 2 million people (Hutus, participants in the genocide, etc) with anticipation of Tutsi retaliation, fled from Rwanda to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and for the most part, Zaire. Thousands of them died in epidemics of diseases such as cholera at the refugee camps. The US staged the Operation Support Hope airlift from July to September 1994 to stabilize the situation in the camps..*

  • Rwandan genocide was the final factor which triggered the First Congo War. Number of prison population increasing.Social isolation caused by the problem of war rapeThe Special Rapporteur on Rwanda estimated that between 2,000 and 5,000 pregnancies resulted from war rape (between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandan women and girls had been raped)

    *

  • After its military victory in July 1994, RPF organized a coalition government similar to that established by President Habyarimana in 1994 (The Broad Based Government of National Unity).

    Its fundamental law is based on a combination of the constitution, the Arusha accords, and political declarations by the parties.

    The first post-war presidential and legislative elections were held on August 25, and on September 29, 2003.*

  • Economy is recovering rapidlyTourism is now the countrys leading foreign exchange earnerRwanda is one of only two countries in which mountain gorillas can be visited safely and visitors pay high prices for gorilla tracking permits.*