G.R. No. 3181

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, defendant-appellant.

Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellant.

Rafael Palma and P. Salas, for private prosecutors.

CARSON, J.:

The complaint charges the defendant with the crime of seduction (estupro) of a woman over 12 and under 23 years of age, as defined and penalized in article 443 of the Penal Code, which is as follows:

The seduction of a virgin over 12 and under 23 years of age, committed by any public authority, priest, servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or by any person in charge of her education or guardianship, under any name whatsoever, shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional, in its minimum and medium degrees.

Whosoever shall commit incest with his sister or descendant, even though she were older than 23 years of age, shall incur the same penalty.

Seduction, when committed with fraud by any other person on a woman over 12 years of age, but under 23, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor.

Any other unchaste abuse committed by the same persons and under similar circumstances shall be punished with the same penalty.

It is alleged that the defendant seduced Teofila Sevilla under promise of marriage early in the year 1902, at which time she was less than 21 years of age. The complaint was not filed until February, 1906, when she was more than 24 though less than 25 years of age, and was signed, sworn, and submitted by one Esteban Sevilla, at whose "instance" these proceedings were had, he appearing as the private prosecutor and alleging that he is the father of the said Teofila Sevilla.

The facts as to the age of the woman were developed at the trial of the case and are not controverted.

We think that since the complaint was not filed until after the offended party had attained her majority, criminal proceedings based on the alleged seduction could only be instituted and maintained at her "instance", and she, and she alone, could file a complaint which would give the trial court jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complaint having been filed by her father, at whose instance the proceedings in the case were had, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, and its judgment of conviction should be reversed and the complaint upon which it was based dismissed. Article 448 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Criminal proceedings for seduction can only be instituted on the complaint of the offended person or her parents, grandparents, or guardian.

In order to proceed in cases of rape and in those of abduction committed with unchaste design, the denunciation of the interested party, her parents, grandparents, or guardians, shall suffice even though they do not present a formal petition to the judge.

If the person injured should, by reason of her age or mental condition, lack the requisite personality to appear in court, and should, besides, be wholly unprotected, not having parents, grandparents, brothers, or guardian of person or property to denounce the crime, the procurador sindico or the or the public prosecutor may do so, acting on the strength of public rumor.

In all the cases of this article the express or implied pardon of the offended party shall extinguish penal action or the penalty, if it should have been already imposed on the culprit.

The pardon shall never be presumed, except by the marriage of the offended party with the offender.

It is contended that these provisions authorize the institution of criminal proceedings by the father in all cases of seduction because the offense can only be committed upon a woman under age and legally incapacitated to institute criminal proceedings on her own behalf. But if the father does not institute such proceedings until after his daughter has attained full age, we are of opinion that he loses the right so to do, and that this right vests exclusively in the offended party, unless, of course, there is some legal impediment, not arising out of nonage, which prevents her from maintaining such criminal action.

The right to institute criminal proceedings in cases of seduction could not be reposed in the offended person, her parents, grandparents, and guardian, at one and the same time, without occasioning grave difficulties in the administration of justice, resulting from the attempts of some of these persons to institute criminal proceedings contrary to the wish and desire of the others; and that this was not the intention of the lawmaker becomes manifest in the light of the peculiar provisions of the above-cited article of the Penal Code, whereby the offended party is given the right to pardon the offender and thus extinguish and destroy the cause of the criminal action, or remit the penalty prescribed by law, where judgment of conviction has been actually pronounced and sentence imposed.

Hence, although these persons are mentioned disjunctively, the above provision of the Penal Code must be construed as meaning that the right to institute criminal proceedings in cases of seduction is exclusively andsuccessively reposed in these persons in the order in which they are named, so that no one of them has authority to proceed if there is any other person previously mentioned therein with legal capacity to appear and institute the action.

This construction of the law imposes upon the woman the obligation and the right to determine whether criminal proceedings shall be instituted for seduction, if it appears that she is of age, and is not otherwise legally incapacitated from appearing in court to maintain the action at the time when it is imposed to institute such proceedings.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a woman 23 years old is of age. From that period she is in the full possession of her civil rights, save only in certain exceptional cases expressly prescribed in the code. The right to appear and prosecute or defend an action in the courts is not one of these exceptions, and indeed, it is inherent to the full exercise of civil rights. (For the purpose of this decision it is not necessary to consider the effect of American legislation as modifying this provision by reducing the number of years at which woman becomes of age.)

Since the offended party in this case was over 23 but less than 25 years of age at the time when the complaint was filed, it may be well to add that article 321 of the Civil Code, which is as follows —

. . . Daughters of the family who are of full age but less than 25 years old can not abandon the paternal roof without permission of the father or of the mother in whose company they live, unless it be to marry, or when the father or mother have contracted another marriage" — does not imply a limitation to the right of a woman of full age to appear and defend an action, nor confer authority upon the father to appear for and instead of his daughter in legal proceedings, for this article, since it confers exceptional authority on the father, must be construed strictly and should not be extended beyond its own proper terms and the object and purposes indicated therein. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, October 13, 1890.)

Counsel for the prosecution insists that since no objection was made to the complaint in the court below, the appellant is not entitled to raise an objection thereto for the first time in this court, and should be held to have waived such objection by his failure to urge it in the trial court. In support of this contention, he cites the case of the United States vs. Sarabia (4 Phil. Rep., 566), wherein this court, adopting the general rule in the United States, that an objection to the complaint to be available in the appellate court must have been raised below, held "that no objection to a complaint based upon a defective statement, either in the matter of form or substance of "the acts or omissions complained of" as required by section 6, paragraph 3, of General Orders, No. 58, not made in the court below" will be available in the Supreme Court.

It is to be observed, however, that under the provisions of the above-cited article 448 of the Penal Code, jurisdiction over the crime of seduction is expressly denied the trial court unless such jurisdiction be conferred by one of certain persons specified in the law; in this case, as we have seen, by the offended person herself. The objection in this case is not, strictly speaking, to the sufficiency of the complaint, but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court over the crime with which the accused was charged. It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and, indeed, where the subject matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133;[[1]] 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. Hence, the accused in a criminal

case can not, by express waiver or otherwise, confer jurisdiction on a court over an offense as to which such jurisdiction has not been conferred upon such court by law. (Harkness vs. Hyde, 98 U.S., 476; Nazos vs. Cragin, 3 Dill (U.S.), 474; 3 Tex., 157;[[2]] 5 Mich., 331;[[3]] Ohio St., 223;[[4]] 82 Wis., 664; 91 Ill., 311.[[5]]) Counsel further contends that since the offended party appeared in court and testified, she may be said to have instituted the proceedings, as provided in article 448, although the complaint is signed and sworn to by her father. It may be sufficient answer to this contention to point out that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the proceedings were, in fact, had at the instance of the daughter rather than the father, the fact that she appeared and gave testimony not justifying such conclusion because, being duly subpoenaed, she would have been compelled so to do whether she appeared voluntarily or otherwise; but, as has been shown before, the provisions of article 448 are so explicit and so positive that even though it appears that she had, in fact, taken an active part in all the proceedings, this would not be sufficient unless the complaint was submitted and the action formally maintained by her. That this is the meaning of the provisions of the said article becomes clear upon a comparison of the language used as to proceedings for seduction and proceedings in a case of rape. In proceedings for seduction the language used expressly provides that they can only be instituted and maintained on the complaint (a instancia) of the persons therein mentioned; while in cases of rape and those of abduction committed with dishonest designs, the denunciation (la denuncia) of the interested party, or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, shall suffice, "though they do not present a formal complaint to the judge" (aunque no formalicen instancias). (U.S. vs. Santos, 4 Phil. Rep., 527.)

The judgment of conviction of the trial court should be, and is hereby, reversed and the complaint instituted in these proceedings should be, and is hereby, dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

BERCES VS. GUINGONA

Case: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.

Legal basis: Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991

Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:

All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

ISSUE: w/n the repealing clause of RA 7160 sec 530(F) is hereby repealed or modified?

HELD: NO. The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467 [1943]) We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.

The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority can provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative cases.

The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.

The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.

PCFI v. NTCG.R. No. L-63318 November 25, 1983

FACTS:Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of a revised schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised schedule which, however, was set aside by this Court on August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that "there was necessity of a hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the application of the PLDT”. On November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered the questioned decision permanently approving PLDT's new and increased SIP rates. It is the submission of petitioner that the SIP schedule presented by the PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the NTC has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 217.

HELD:There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent NTC to promulgate rules and regulations. In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that the case involves a simple problem of statutory construction - that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. The decision sustained the petitioner's contention that it is the duty of NTC to first promulgate rules and regulations. The resolution does not subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must promulgate rules and regulations because the decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is the permissive "may" and not the mandatory "shall." The non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we have the following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words). It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word "may" in a statute is permissive while the word "shall" is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention. In the case at bar

compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be construed as mandatory rather than merely directory. There is no justification for the rate increase of the revised schedule of PLDT's SIP. It is untimely, considering the present economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate defeats the purpose of the decree which is to spread ownership among the wide base of investors. Accordingly, the decision of NTC is annulled and set aside.

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

I vote to deny the second Motion for Reconsideration. I am amazed that the decision which was promulgated as recently as November 25, 1983, with no dissenting opinion to dilute its acceptability should now be reconsidered. My amazement is heightened by the fact that when the case was discussed on July 26, 1984, I had the impression that the motion was doomed so that a request to defer action on it would have met the same fate had not the request been put on a pag-bigyan basis.

The case involves a simple problem of statutory construction — that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. It reads as follows:

The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Commissions, through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose, pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated.

The issue is whether or not the National Telecommunications (NTC) must first promulgate the rules and regulations mentioned in the decree before it can approve the Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT).

The decision, without any dissenting opinion, sustained the petitioner's contention that it is the duty of NTC to first Promulgate rules and regulations.

The resolution, which is not unanimous, does not subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must promulgate rules and regulations because, it is said, the decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is the permissive "may" and not the mandatory "shall The non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no departure).

Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we have the following opposite: verba intention, non e contra, debent incservice(words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words). Sutherland explains the limits of literalism thus:

The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention The intention prevails over the letter, and the letter must if

possible be read so as to conform to the spirit of the act. 'While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. Thus words or clauses may be enlarged or restricted to harmonize with other provisions of an act. The particular inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or what they may comprehend, but in what sense were they intended to be understood or what understanding do they convey as used in the particular act. (Vol. 2A Statutory Construction, pp. 65-66 [1972].)

It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word "may" in a statute is permissive while the word "shall" is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. Thus Professor Luis J. Gonzaga states:

According to Black, 'Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language win be construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty. Thus, where the statute provided that 'the commissioners may take into consideration the enhanced value to the remaining land of an owner whose land was taken for highway purposes it was held that the word may should be given a mandatory meaning and is the same as the word 'shall', since it directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice or the public good. Similarly, a statute by which municipal corporations are 'authorized and empowered to provide for the support of indigent persons within their limits or to make public improvements as to open and repair streets, remove obstructions from highways, construct sewers and the like, are to be construed as mandatory although they only purport to grant permission or authority since the public has an interest in such matters and the grant of authority is therefore equivalent to the imposition of duty." (Statutes and their Construction, pp. 98-99 [1969].)

In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be construed as mandatory mother than merely directory. They are stated in the unanimous decision as follows:

1. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien innovative and untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility.

The SIP has never been contemplated prior to P.D. 217.

The existing law on the other hand, the Public Service Act, diametrically runs counter to the split and intention, if not the purpose of P.D. 217. It may even be gained that as long as the Optimum number of individuals may enjoy telephone service, there is no station on the profitability of such companies. Hence, while P.D. 217 encourages the profitability of public telecommunication companies, the Public Service Act limits the same.

2. In the absence of such rules and regulations, there is outright confusion among the rights of PLDT, the consumers and the government itself. As may clearly be after how can the Decision be said to have assured that most of the population will enjoy telephone facilities? Did the Decision likewise assure the

financial viability of PLDT? Was the government's duty to provide telephone service to its constituents subserved by the Decision? These questions can never be answered unless such rules and regulations are set up.

3. Finally, it should be emphasized that NTC is estopped from claiming that there is no need to promulgate such rules and regulations. In the case of PCFI vs. NTC, G.R. No. 61892, now pending resolution before this Honorable Tribunal, NTC totally refused to act on a petition filed by PLDT precisely for the promulgation of such rules and regulations.

Why then did NTC refuse to act on such petition if and when there is no need for the promulgation of such rules and regulations? After all NTC could have simply ruled that the petition in G.R. No. 618R2 is unnecessary because such rules and regulations are also unnecessary. (pp. 135-136, Rollo)

The above reasons also rebut the contention in the non-unanimous resolution that the existing substantive and procedure laws as well as the rules promulgated by the Public Service Commission are more than adequate to determine the reasonableness of the amounts of investment of telephone subscribers, etc.

The PLDT's SIP is an unreasonable imposition by a utility company on a captive public. The injury is compounded by the fact that although the company makes mega profits its service, to use a McEnroe expression, is the pits.

Today is Wednesday, August 19, 2015

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006

RENNIE DECLARADOR, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Roxas City, and FRANK BANSALES, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the portion of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. C-1419-10-2002, suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales and ordering his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.

Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a student at the Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz. At around 9:45 a.m. on July 25, 2002, Yvonne Declarador was stabbed to death. After conducting the autopsy on the cadaver, Rural Health Physician Pilar Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem Certificate indicating that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds on different parts of the body. 2

On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank Bansales with murder was filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor with the Family Court. The accusatory portion reads:

That on or about 9:45 o’clock in the morning of July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused armed with a knife and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of the said Yvonne Declarador.

The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering that the attack was made by the accused using a long knife which the latter carried along with him from his house to the school against his lady teacher who was unarmed and defenseless at that time and by inflicting upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds resulting to her death. 3

In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence presented, the RTC rendered judgment on May 20, 2003 finding Bansales guilty of murder. However, the court suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court finds CICL Frank Bansales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder being charged. Being a minor, 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating circumstance of minority, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) month of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne Declarador, a civil indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos (P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorney’s fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and unearned income of One Million Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P1,370,000.70).

The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school hours.

Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is suspended and the Child in conflict with the law (CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.

Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors, the DSWD Capiz Provincial Office, Roxas City, the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth, Concordia, Guimaras, the accused and his counsel, Atty. Ramcez John Honrado.

SO ORDERED. 4

On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the Public Prosecutor, the Social Welfare Officer of the court, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth, considering that the accused would turn 18 on June 3, 2003. 5

Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing that portion of the decision of the trial court’s decision suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation center.

Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, 6 reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Ondo, 7 petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.

In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no standing to file the petition, considering that the offense charged is a public crime brought in the name of the People of the Philippines; only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition in court assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the service of his sentence. He further avers that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of the accused.

In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to file the petition.

The OSG, for its part, posits that respondent’s sentence cannot be suspended since he was charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It insists that the entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the sentence actually imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty for the crime charged as provided for by law.

The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether petitioner has standing to file the petition; (2) whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition with this Court; and (3) whether respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.

The petition is granted.

On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, he has sufficient personality to file the instant special civil action for certiorari. 8 This is in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object. 9 Moreover, the OSG has filed its comment on the petition and has joined the petitioner in his plea for the nullification of the assailed portion of the RTC decision.

On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 10 A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of certiorari may be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 11 This is an established policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. 12

However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that considering the nature and importance of the issues raised and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it. 14 Moreover, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the interests of justice so require.

In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the application of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either evident premeditation or abuse of superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

by Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court found him guilty of murder.

Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:

Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training institution or responsible person under whose care he has been committed.

Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the Department of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over the offender and his family.

The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or government training institution as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.

The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.

The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where, except for those under paragraph 3, Section 32 of the law, the sentence of the accused is automatically suspended:

Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. – The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile: care, guidance, and supervision orders; Drug and alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling and similar activities; Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of DSWD.

The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.

The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.

Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence. "Punishable" is defined as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to punishment; liable to be punished; may be punished; liable to punishment." 15 The word "punishable" does not mean "must be punished," but "liable to be punished" as specified. 16 In U.S. v. Villalon, 17 the Court defined punishable as "deserving of, or liable for, punishment." Thus, the term refers to the possible, not to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed.

The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile. 18 Despite the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their sentences suspended.

Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted the new act with reference thereto. 19 Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy. 20

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Judge suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN