#1. Libel: Malice Not Presumed When Imputations Were Made Against A Public Figure, Subject of Imputations Were Matters of Public Interest And Fair CommentsSuspecting that Elizalde was behind his arrest for perjury, Ludolfo made several statements against him in several radio interviews; that Elizalde influenced the City Prosecutor of Legazpi to expedite the issuance of warrant of arrest against him; that Elizalde manipulated the result of several biddings in a dredging project; and that Elizalde receive P2Million pesos from him on condition that he will subcontract the project to Ludolfo, which Elizalde never did. Because of this, Elizalde filed libel cases against Ludolf, which were eventually filed with the RTC. However, Elizalde did not institute a separate civil action, nor reserved the right to file a separate civil action against Ludolfo arising from the alleged libellous remarks against him. In his defense, Ludoldo alleged that exposing the anomalous transactions was a public duty for him; he further alleged that Elizalde is a public figure due to his participation in government projects and prominence in business circles; that the imputations were matters of public interest, thus privileged. In the absence of actual malice, and applying the rules on privileged communication, the prosecution thus far failed to show there was malice in his declarations. The RTC, however, convicted him, and ordered him to pay P5M in damages for each count; and for legal expenses as well as cost of litigation. Ludolfo appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC ruling and acquitted him on the criminal case, declaring that the interviews were impressed with public interest thus covered by the rule on privileged communication. As a public fogure, Elizalde is subject to public criticism on his acts thaw ere imbued with public interest. Elizalde thus appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. While acknowledging that he may not appeal the acquittal of Ludolfo, he premises his appeal on the civil aspect of the case, on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which provides that extinction of the criminal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action, whether or not the civil action was instituted with the criminal action. The CA, according to him erred in declaring him as a public figure, since his community is a limited community of business associates. On the other hand, Ludolfo argues that where there was no separate civil action filed, the extinction of the criminal action carried with the civil action. There was no wrongful action to speak of, hence no justification for the award of moral damages.The Supreme Court:We do not find the petition meritorious.The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accuseds civil liability.The parties have conflicting interpretations of the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC, which states:The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Emphasis ours)Muoz claims that the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies only if the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to file it separately was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muoz acquittal of the crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because Muoz utterance of the libelous remarks remains undisputed.We reject Muoz claim. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its title When separate civil action is suspended. Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one criminal and one civil.Reflecting this policy, our procedural rules provide for two modes by which civil liability ex delicto may be enforced: (1) through a civil action that is deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action; (2) through a civil action that is filed separately, either before the criminal action or after, upon reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal action. The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action. This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not affect its nature, as may be apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC, which states:Section 2. Contents of the judgment. x x xIn case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Emphasis ours)If, as Muoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of the civil action that was instituted with the criminal action, then Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would be no need for the judgment of the acquittal to determine whether the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. The Rules precisely require the judgment to declare if there remains a basis to hold the accused civilly liable despite acquittal so that the offended party may avail of the proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil liability ex delicto.InChing v. Nicdao and CA, the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a party whether the accused or the offended party may avail with respect to the judgment:If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action. (Emphasis ours)Moreover, an appeal is favored over the institution of a separate civil action because the latter would only add to our clogged dockets.To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accuseds acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. We thus now proceed to determine if Cos claim falls under any of these three situations.The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.The CA has acquitted Muoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime. The law presumes that every imputation is malicious; this is referred to as malice in law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved that the imputation is true and published with good intention and justifiable motive.There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. InBorjal v. CA, we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. InGuingguing v. CA, we ruled that the remarks directed against a public figure are likewise privileged. In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice or malice in fact the knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. In other words, our rulings inBorjal andGuingguingshow that privileged communication has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in law and consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muoz statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of proving that Muoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.Co assails the CAs ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of the CAs factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the present petition, review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with respect to factual matters, and without violating Muoz right against double jeopardy given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on a question of fact.In light of the privileged nature of Muoz statements and the failure of the prosecution to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29355 dated January 31, 2007 is AFFIRMED.SECOND DIVISION,G.R. No. 181986, December 04, 2013,ELIZALDE S. CO, PETITIONER, VS. LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR., RESPONDENT#2 RAFAEL COSCOLLUELAS VS SB

#3 PEOPLE V DESMOND

#4 DALURAYA VS OLIVAR

#5 Warrantless Arrest: Peeking Inside Partially Opened Door Not Valid Ground For Warrantless Arrest And SearchAt around 4:45 A.M. of February 11, 2004, police officers Gregorio and Laurence while onboard a patrol car, saw two unidentified men rush out of a house in David St., Pasay City. Sensing something amiss, the police officers approached the house and peeked inside the partially opened door, where they saw George holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter, and beside him, his live-in partner, Corazon. Because of this, they entered the house, and arrested George and Corazon. A search of the immediate surroundings revealed a wooden box containing improvised tooter, scoop 10 sachets of suspected shabu, and strips of aluminium oil. Because of they, they were charged with illegal possession of drugs paraphernalia. Only George appealed the decision rendered by the RTC convicting him as charged, since Corazon jumped bail. The Court of Appeals denied his appeal, hence he elevated his case to the Supreme Court. Both lower courts justified the conviction of George, citing his arrest was a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.The Supreme Court:The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:THE COURT:Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was the door open?Was it totally open, or was it partially open?A It was partially open Your Honor.Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?A We pushed the door, Your Honor.x x x xQ Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a police officer?A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka mayQ Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the interior of the house?A Yes, Your Honor.Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior of the house?A Yes, Your Honor.Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its opening because you did not know what was happening inside?A Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.Accused acquitted.THIRD DIVISION,G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013,GEORGE ANTIQUERA Y CODES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

#6 Declaration Of Voidness Of Second Marriage Not Ground For Dismissal Of BigamyShirley filed a case for bigamy against James Walter, alleging that he contracted marriage with her on December 8, 1999 despite the subsistence of a previous and lawful marriage with one Karla. James Walter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, alleging that there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage filed by Karla before the RTC of Antipolo, which if declared void would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy. Thus, the arraignment and pre-trial of James Walter was reset. In the meantime, the RTC of Antipolo declared the second marriage between James and Shirley void. Because of this, James Walter filed a Motion to Dismiss the bigamy case, on the ground that the second marriage had been declared void. The RTC granted the motion, ruling that the declaration by the RTC of Antipolo of the voidness of the second marriage between James and Shirley meant that there was no more bigamy to speak of. On petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the latter reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Thus, James elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The main issue for consideration being that if a second marriage is declared void, will the bigamy case be dismissed?The Supreme Court:We rule in the negative.Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.InJarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.THIRD DIVISION,G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013,JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI,#7.Private Prosecutor May Participate In Criminal Case Even If No Civil Liability Exists In CrimeLee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. by virtue of a Secretarys Certificate issued by Virginia Lee, for and in behalf of CHI, filed a petition for issuance of an owners duplicate certificate of title of TCT No. 232238, covering a property owned by CHI. Despite opposition by Chua Pue Chin Lee, her sister, who alleged that as Corporate Treasurer of Chi, she has possession of important documents of the Corporation, including the duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238, the RTC of Manila granted the petition and directed the Registrar of Deeds of Manila to issue a new TCT. Chula filed an Omnibus motion to recall the order granting the petition, alleging that she has possession of TCT No. 232238; because of this the RTC recalled the order. Chua Lee also filed a case for perjury against Paul Lee because of the alleged perjurious statements made in the Petition as well as his testimony in court regarding the loss of TCT 232238, which she alleged Paul Lee did to mortgage the property to Planters Bank, even though there is an intra-corporate controversy between him and his siblings, including Chua. The Office of the City Prosecutor then filed an Information for perjury against Paul Lee before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After Atty. Augusto Macam, private prosecutor under the control of the public prosecutor, presented the first witness, Atty. Roland Viesca Jr of the Registry of Deeds, Manila, the accused thru counsel, moved in open court that Atty. Macam be excluded from participating in the case since perjury is a public offence, to which Atty. Macam vehemently objected. After allowing the parties to file their respective written memoranda in support of their positions, the MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion filed by the accused, where he principally raised his objection on the appearance of the private prosecutor on the ground that perjury is a crime against public interest; since there being no allegation of damage to private interest, hence on private prosecutor is needed. According to the MeTC, citing that the rules do not distinguish between public and private crimes when it comes to participation of private prosecutors; since the private offended party did not waive her civil action or reserved her right to institute a separate civil action, then the private prosecutor may participate, under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. His motion for reconsideration denied, Paul Lee elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which also denied it, citing such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability attaches to a crime. Hence, Paul Lee went right up to the Supreme Court to question the propriety of allowing a private prosecutor to intervene in a case for perjury, a crime against public interest.The Supreme Court:Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that [e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable. Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.x x x x (Emphasis supplied)For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, this Court rejected petitioners theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.InRamiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, we also held thatUnder Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. (Emphasis supplied.)In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHIs property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondents personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondents timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case ofLim Tek Goan v. Yatco, cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.InChua v. Court of Appeals, as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent who is also the corporations Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholders Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private respondents testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:Petitioner cites the case ofTan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, [w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioners alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.FIRST DIVISION,G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013,LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, PETITIONER, VS. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, RESPONDENT.

#8 Arraignment: Courts Should Conduct Searching Inquiry Into Voluntariness And Full Comprehension Of Plea Of Guilt By Accused.EN BANC,G.R. No. 135053, March 06, 2002,PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE VS. BENJAMIN GALVEZ, APPELLANT.Benjamin was charged with Rape by her own daughter, AAA, allegedly committed on the third week of april, 1997. During his arriagnment, where the charges for 10 counts of rape where read to him in a language he understood, assisted by Atty. Renato Mercado, he pleaded not guilty to the charges. However, during the hearing on May 14, 1998, Benjamin, this time assisted by Atty. Ruby Rosa Espino, changed his plea from not guilty to guilty, and an inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea was conducted by the trial court. Even so, the trial court proceeded to hear evidence from the offended party. Benjamin did not file evidence in his behalf, thus the trial court convicted him of Rape, thus automatic appeal was resorted to the court. In his brief, Benjamin assails the failure of the trial court in assuring the safeguards set forth under Rule 116 of the Rules off Court, particularly on his plea of guilt.The Supreme Court:The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.InPeople v. Aranzado, the Court, citing Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, set the following guidelines for receiving a plea of guilt in a case involving a capital offense:(1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea;(2) The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and(3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.Moreover, as prescribed inAranzado, the searching inquiry to be conducted by the trial court should consist of the following:(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters.(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.(3)Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.(4) Inform the acused [of] the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions.(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details of significance.Appellants re-arraignment on May 14, 1999 miserably fell short of these guidelines, as shown by the pertinent portion of the transcript of stenographic notes, which we quote hereunder:PROS. CASTILLO: By way of dialogue with the defense counsel the accused is willing to enter a plea of guilty for the ten (10) counts of rape, your Honor.COURT: Why dont you arraign him? Alright, the previous plea of not guilty is now withdrawn to give way to the plea of guilty by the accused for 10 counts of rape but as the Court had already observed we have to conduct the re-arraignment of this case. Will you please arraign him.(The accused was arraigned by reading to him the Information in Ilocano dialect which the accused speaks and understands.)INTERPRETER: The accused pleaded guilty.COURT: I would like to ask the accused if he understands from his counsel, the circumstances in this case because the victim here is his own daughter and she is below 18 years of age. In accordance with the heinous offense law, the Court will have to impose on him the penalty of death. Is this clear to the accused? At any rate we will conduct a trial to find out if there is sufficient evidence to convict you so that your rights will be protected you are given a chance to prove your innocence latter to refute the evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.It is clear from the foregoing that the trial judge did not conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants plea of guilt and full comprehension thereof. He asked no questions on the subjects mentioned in Aranzado. His purported compliance with Alicando was more like a monologue, or a warning at best, rather than a searching inquiry. He did not inquire into appellants personality profile age, socio-economic status or educational background. His Honor did not even require an answer to his question on whether appellant realized that the death penalty would result from the latters plea. No response from appellant was given or recorded.Moreover, there is no showing that the lawyer explained to appellant the consequences of the latters plea probable conviction and death sentence. Equally important, the trial judge should have asked why the plea of appellant was changed. The former obtained none of the information required in Aranzado. Hence, there is no basis to conclude that the latter voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty to the charges against him.In Bello, the Court remarked that there were cases when the accused would plead guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or because of promises from the authorities or parties that an expression of remorse would result in a lighter penalty.Where the punishment to be inflicted is death, it is not enough that the information be read to the accused or even translated into the dialect they speak. This is because the implementation of such penalty is irrevocable, and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The trial court must avoid improvident pleas of guilt, since the accused might be admitting their guilt and thus forfeiting their lives and liberties without having fully understood the meaning, significance or consequences of their pleas.What is apparent here is that appellant was not properly advised by his counsel. InPeople v. Sevilleno, the Court remanded the case for re-arraignment of the accused who had been charged with the rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl, because his counsel had declined to present evidence for his client, banking on the mitigating circumstance of the plea of guilt. This Court clarified that under no circumstance would an admission of guilt in that case affect or reduce the death sentence because it was a single indivisible penalty which is applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the crime.In the instant case, the Court also notes that guilty was not the original plea of appellant; hence, careful effort should have been exerted by the court below to inquire into why he changed his plea. In addition, he refused to present evidence in his defense. This should have again prompted the trial judge to probe more deeply, following the guidelines inAranzado.A plea of guilt is improvidently accepted where no effort is made to explain to the accused that, in a case involving a capital offense, such plea may result in the imposition of the death penalty. The same is true when the requirements in Aranzado are not satisfied. Recently, inPeople v. Bernas, the Court set aside a death sentence and remanded the case to the trial court, because the Aranzado guidelines on how to conduct a searching inquiry had not been followed.Case remanded to the trial court for re-arraignment and further proceedings.EN BANC,G.R. No. 135053, March 06, 2002,PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE VS. BENJAMIN GALVEZ, APPELLANT.

#9 Rights Of The Accused: Right To Counsel Mandatory Only In Custodial Investigation

Olivia was a teller at the Prudential Bank branch of Angeles City, the only one assigned to handle dollar deposits and withdrawals. An internal spot-audit team conducted by Virgilio inventoried the cash accountabilities of the branch. Olivia was short by $10,000.00; she only had US5,040.52, when she should have $15,040.52. When asked to explain, she averred that a withdrawal was made on December 29, 1006 after the cut-off time, evidenced by a withdrawal memo which she showed to Virgilio; this withdrawal should be treated as a withdrawal on January 2, 1996. The account belonged to Adoracion Tayag and her co-signatory, Apolinario Tayag. This withdrawal memo when shown to the branch cashier, Noel, did not contain the required signature of two officers, hence Noel asked the nature of this withdrawal. Olivia explained that Apolnario instructed her to withdraw $10,000.00 from his account thru his driver. Although the memo was supposed to be made on January 3, the memo itself was dated January 2. Noel then instructed her to post the corresponding memo in the corresponding ledger and bring the memo back to him so he and the branch manager, Edgardo. Virigilio, meanwhile checked the account ledger of Apolinario and Adoracion, where he found out that there is a hold jacket, indicating that no withdrawal should be made to the account so as not to reduce its balance below $35,000.00. The withdrawal reduced its balance to $26,077.51. The account ledger also indicated a deposit of $10,000.00 on January 2, 1996. When he compared the signatures in the withdrawal slip to the signature card, he noticed a big difference which he reported to the branch manager.

When Edgardo required her to explain, Olivia reiterated that the withdrawal was made on December 29, 1996 after the cut-off time. Another cash count conducted by Virgilio for that period revealed that Olivia should have a cash balance of $21,778.86; her actual cash count revealed she only had $11,778.86 (Olivia used the money withdrawn from the account of Apolinario, and replenished it with her cash accountability). Olivia eventually broke down and told Edgardo she will explain everything to the bank president. Apolinario denied affixing the signature on the withdrawal slip.

In a handwritten letter, Olivia explained that the $10,000.00 cash shortage, and another P2.2 Million shortage was taken by her. She gave it to a man who approached her at the counter who threatened her and her family. They allegedly approached her. She then gave the cash to the man. Despite this, she did not report the matter to the bank officers.

The bank then filed a case for Qualified Theft against Olivia. After the prosecution rested its case, Olivia filed a Demurrer To Evidence And Motion To Defer Defense Evidence, on the ground that the prosecution evidence failed to prove its case. The RTC denied the motion filed by Olivia, and proceeded to rule on the case without giving her the opportunity to present her evidence, holding that the Demurrer to Evidence was filed without leave of court, hence, she is considered to have waived her presentation of evidence.The RTC convicted her, affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals which increased the imposable penalty to reclusion perpetua.One of the issues she presented for consideration in her appeal to the Supreme court was that the handwritten letter she executed should not have been admitted in evidence, as the same was made without counsel, hence, in the nature of an extra-judicial confession made without counsel and inadmissible in evidence.The Supreme Court:The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that was admissible against her. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitters fault if the admission does not. By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter.Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein.Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by the investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.To reiterate, the rights under Section 12, supra, are available to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. The phrase does not cover all kinds of investigations, but contemplates only a situation wherein a person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty. The situation of the accused was not similar to that of a person already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if she is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty.THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

#10. Criminal Procedure: BailJose Antonio Leviste was originally charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. He was convicted of the crime of Homicide, hence he appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and minimum flight risk. The Court of Appeals denied his petiton, hence he filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In his brief, petitioner assails the denial of his application for bail, citing that none of the conditions in Section 5 (3) of Rule 114 are present in his case,; his theory is that conviction for a crime with an imposable penalty of more than 6 years, when not one of the conditions imposed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are present, entitles him to bail as a matter of right.

The Supreme Court:

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)x x xThe third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:x x x x x x x x xe. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. (emphasis supplied)In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists.This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.x x xThe development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary.Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons. In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5.Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. (emphasis supplied)As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.A Final WordSection 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

LEVISTE VS CABAIL- when it is a matter of right or a matter of discretion.

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122- March 17, 2010 Petitioner,- v e r s u s -THE COURT OF APPEALSand PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Facts:Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was deniedIssue:Whether or not bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court filed by an appellant pending appeal?RULING:NO. Absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 means that a less stringent approach in granting bail only subject to the discretion of the court to grant bail. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:(a)That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;(b)That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;(c)That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;(d)That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or(e)That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:x x x x x x x x xe.After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x[footnoteRef:1][24] (emphasis supplied) [1: ]

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating[footnoteRef:2][26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion. [2: ]

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.