Achieving Peace and Order in Nepal in the Context of

Maoist Insurgency

Dwarika N Dhungel Executive Director

Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS) Kathmandu, Nepal

Submitted to: Globalization, Security and Development Seminar

Organized by: Public Service Commission, Government of Samoa

and Eastern Regional Organization of Public Administration (EROPA)

at Apia, Samoa, 5-8 October 2004

Acknowledgement In preparing this paper, a number of friends have helped me to look at relevant materials and analyse the

subject matter. I have extensively used Deepak Thapa's monograph, A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's

Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003, Arjun Karki and Binod Bhattarai's monograph, Whose War? Economic

and Socio-cultural Impacts of Nepal's Maoist-Government Conflict and Dr Meena Acharya's article, ‘The

Economic Foundation of the Current Socio-Political Crisis in Nepal’, in DB Gurung edited, Nepal

Tomorrow: Voices & Visions, and drawn on their facts and figures heavily. Therefore, I would like to

thank each of them. Aditya Man Shrestha (Coordinator, Volunteer Mediator's Group) has thoroughly

reviewed the paper and provided invaluable comments and observations. Similarly, Dr Raman Raj Misra

has reviewed the contents and provided valuable comments. Their comments subsequently helped me to

improve the subject matter. Hence, both of them deserve special thanks.

I would be failing to acknowledge professionally if I forgot the valuable contributions made by my

colleagues, Dr Vikash Raj Satyal, Shankar Aryal and Anil Shrestha, for their professional inputs in

preparing the paper and collecting relevant reference materials. Last but not the least, thanks goes to Naba

Raj Shrestha for his support in computer setting and preparation of the annexes.

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Achieving Peace and Order in Nepal in the Context of Maoist Insurgency1

D N Dhungel2 Introduction Nepal, once a peaceful country, is today badly war-torn. In less than ten years, the (People’s War) Jana Yuddha, launched by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) from the hills of the Mid-western Development Region (see maps), has spread like a wildfire, engulfing the whole nation and covering all aspects of the Nepalese life: political, social and economic. The war has dealt a severe blow to the national economy. Development activities have almost come to a halt. There is no lasting control of either the government or the rebel forces over large areas outside the district headquarters, which is held by the state security force. While going around the country it becomes difficult to distinguish whether one is in the domain of the establishment or the rebels. Thousands of people have already lost their lives. Thousands have fled their villages to Kathmandu or other urban centres within the country or to different cities and towns in India for security and jobs. The war is becoming increasingly costly to the nation. Nepal is thus in deep trouble and her identity is at stake. The main challenge before the kingdom and the warring factions—the government and the Maoists—is how to bring about a peaceful solution to this conflict. They have already had two rounds of dialogue for a negotiated settlement (Annex 13) without any success. This paper looks into its causes and possible means of solution.

Part 1

Beginning, Expansion and Costs of the War Beginning Never in her history since her emergence as a unified state in the 18th century has Nepal faced a situation more critical than she is facing today. The country is under the siege of the Jana Yuddha of the CPN-Mi. The Maoists launched the war on February 13, 1996 by making simultaneous attacks on police posts and the office of the Small Farmers’ Development Programme (SFDP), implemented by the Agriculture Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN). On this day, ‘at about 3.45 pm a group of men and women (about 300, overestimated by the mainstream media) took possession, almost without any resistance, of the office of the Small Farmers Development Programme of the state-owned Agriculture Development Bank Nepal in Chyangdi VDC (village development committee) in Gorkha district, in central Nepal. At first, masses gathered outside the office located in a small bazaar, and, while one of the youths gave a brief speech exposing the mechanism of exploitation of poor peasants by the Bank and highlighting the need

1 Prepared for Globalization, Security and Development Seminar, organized by Public Service Commission, Government of Samoa

and Eastern Regional Organization of Public Administration (EROPA) at Apia, Samoa, October 5-8, 2004. Views expressed in this paper are solely my personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institute where I am currently working. Insurgency has been defined as an 'armed revolt or insurrection aimed at overthrowing or subverting the government regime in power any duly constituted regime, including elected or non-elected powers' (www.buzzle.com). The term 'movement' is defined as a group of people with a common ideology who try together to achieve certain general goals or a series of actions advancing a principle or tending toward a particular end. Since the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) have been raising arms to bring about, what they call, changes in the socio-economic and political structures of the country, the present conflict the country is facing could be considered as a movement or insurgency. Because of this reason, both the terms have been used to discuss the subject matter.

2 Dwarika N Dhungel, PhD is Executive Director of Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS), Kathmandu, Nepal.

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for capturing it by the peasants, another group overpowered the staffs inside the office and took possession of all the official papers...The loan papers signed by the peasants and the land registration certificates (Lalpurjas) deposited by the peasants as collateral were seized...A bonfire was made of the loan papers worth several million rupees and other documents.' (Thapa 2003).

The same day in the evening (between 8 pm and 11 pm ) three police outposts, one each Rolpa, Rukumii districts in western Nepal and one in Sindhuliiii district in Eastern Nepal, were seized by armed youths shouting Marxist-Leninist-Maoist slogans. In Rolpa district, which has been in the forefornt of militant resistance struggle for several years, the police outpost at Holeri was stormed by a militant team armed with local weapons and explosives. As the policemen were ready to surrender everything except their rifles, there ensued an exchange of fire from both sides for almost two hours. Ultimately, bound by the policy of not killing any policemen at this initial stage, the militants ransacked office, seized the store and took hold of substantial amount of high explosives and other weapons and other utilities and escaped to safety. Before departure, they made their revolutionary political motives clear to the policemen and a crowd of curious villagers ... In a similar move at the Athbiskot-Rari police outpost in the neighbouring Rukum district, ... the outpost was easily captured without any resistance from the policemen. The armed raiding team took possession of a large amount of explosives and other utilities and valuables and escaped safely after making their revolutionary intentions clear ... In the third case of Sindhuli district...the police outpost at the historic Sindhuligarhi...was captured without any resistance whatsoever...The same night, thousands of leaflets and posters containing the appeal of the Party to the general masses to march along the path of people's war to smash the reactionary state and establish a New Democratic state, were distributed in major cities and headquarters of more than 60 districts (out of a total of 75 districts)' (Ibid)

Expansion The guerrilla war expanded at a much faster pace than anybody had thought of. When the first ceasefire was declared on July 21, 2001, only six districts, viz Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Pyuthan and Kalikot were seriously affected by the Maoist insurgency. Now it is no longer the case (Sharma/Gautam 2004). It has spread all over the country like a wildfire. With the intensification of the violent movement, the government started withdrawing many of its field offices from the outlying areas to the district headquarters. Police posts were also withdrawn to the district headquarters. When the government decided not to extend the term of the elected officials of the local authorities, the VDC, the municipality and the district development committee (DDC), after their term expired on July 16, 2002, there was nothing left that could represent the state at the local level.

For all practical purposes, the government withdrew from the rural areas leaving them free to be occupied by the Maoists. In other words, the government presented the rural areas virtually in a platter to the Maoists to take over and fill the power vacuum. Consequently, the out-reaching capacity of the government got limited to the perimeters of the municipal areas of the three municipalities of Kathmandu and the headquarters in the remaining districts.

The Maoists, too, have formed their Jana Sarkar (people's governments)—parallel national government, regional autonomous governments and more than 50 district-level governments. It is claimed that they have a standing army of 15,000 and a strong militia force (Ibid). They have started collecting taxes. Civil servants mainly posted in the field, according to knowledgeable persons, are forced to pay to the Maoists. In some areas civil servants pay one day's salary, while in other districts 5 or 10 per cent of their salary.

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Human and Material Costs The cost of the movement in terms of loss of lives and property is enormous and rising. It has, according to the Informal Sector Services Centre (INSEC), already taken a toll of 10,128 lives, of which 6,653 died at the hands of the security forces and 3,475 at the hands of the Maoists. The highest number of deaths (4,648) in a year was in 2002 (Annex 1).

The conflict has also caused problems in the social sector. Thousands of parents have lost their children. Thousands of children have lost their parents and hundreds of women have lost their husbands. Similarly, a large numbers of families have lost their sole breadwinners. Over 260 children (under age 18) were killed in the conflict between February 1996 and March 13, 2004 (INSEC, quoted in Karki and Bhattarai). There is tension in society. There is hatred between neighbours and among the members of different sections of society.

No reliable data are available on the actual damage to infrastructure. Yet, based on the attacks the Maoist have been launching, it is obvious that their targets are power plants, airports, government offices, including health posts, post offices, forest range posts, police posts, etc. 'They had attacked and substantially damaged 14 airstrips, mainly in remote areas, ...more than 300 government offices... the number of police posts that had been attacked and damaged stood at over 100' (Ibid). Out of the 3,915 VDC office buildings, 1,683 buildings had been destroyed by mid-July 2003 causing an estimated loss of NRs394 million for rebuilding and repair. Twenty-five of the total 58 municipalities and/or their property have also come under attack (Ibid).

According to the Department of Roads, the conflict has caused damage to bridges/culverts, buildings, heavy equipment/machines, bulldozers, graders, etc (Annex 2). The field offices of the home ministry, mainly the buildings of the district administration offices, district police offices and police posts (426) have faced attacks and suffered damage. The physical damage caused to the property of this ministry alone is to the tune of NRs2 billion (Ibid).

The telecommunications towers are the others targets of the Maoist attacks. According to the Nepal Telecommunication Corporation, as quoted by Karki and Bhattarai, 112 telephone stations and substations in 45 districts were damaged at different points of time, resulting in the disruption of services to 8,898 subscribers. Five district post offices, 174 Ilaka (area) post offices and 328 additional post offices have been completely destroyed as a result of Maoist attacks. In addition, in many places postal delivery has become a major problem for the personnel associated with the postal department.

Loss to Tourism Tourism, one of the main industries of the country, has suffered the most because of the conflict. This industry had received a blow when an Indian Airlines plane destined to New Delhi from Kathmandu was hijacked to Afghanistan on December 27, 1999, sending wrong signals to tourists. In spite of Maoists' announcement that they would not attack tourists, which they have kept, it has been reported in newspapers that tourists and trekkers are asked to pay an entry fee or trekkers' tax and donations to the Maoists in their areas of influence.

Furthermore, time and again Kathmandu-based foreign missions have been advising their nationals about the security situation in the country and asking them to avoid non-essential visits. Such tips definitely discourage tourists from visiting Nepal. Available figures indicate that there has been a decrease in the number of tourists since 2000. In other words, since the spread of the conflict in late 2000, there has been a steady decrease in the number of tourists. If 463,646 tourists visited in 2000, it was

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365,237 and 215, 922 (arrivals by air only) in the years 2001 and 2002 respectively (Nepal Tourism Board, quoted in Karki and Bhattarai). Exodus of people The conflict has led to forced displacement of thousands of people from the hills and mountains. During a visit to urban areas in the Mid-Western and Far Western Development Regions bordering Indian railheads in the second week of December 2003, I could see long rows of people—able-bodied men and women, including school-going and aged—leaving the country to various urban areas in India. From their sad faces, I could easily say that they were leaving their homes under compulsion. In addition, thousands of people are leaving as migrants in district headquarters or in major urban areas within the country. It has been estimated that from the district of Rolpa alone 'about 40-50,000 economically active youths have migrated, seeking work either within Nepal (Katmandu's brick kilns) or different cities of India (Himachal Pradesh in particular)' (Karki and Bhattarai). In addition, a large number of youths are leaving or have already left for third countries. This can be substantiated by the increased amount of remittance over time. By a central bank estimate, remittance receipts, which was NRs4.3 billion in 1996, may reach NRs70-72 billion by the end of 2004. The consequence of this is decrease in the much required agriculture labour force in the hills. For example, 'Rolpa's crop production had declined after the insurgency began. Rolpa has always been a food-deficit district, but the shortage has grown from the roughly 15 tons during normal times to about 30 tons after the conflict intensified' (Ibid). Loss to National Economy The overall loss to the national economy is enormous. According to a crude estimate, 'the loss between 1996 and 2002 is NRs219.46 billion (US$2.8 billion)' (Ibid). New Business Age, May 2002, as quoted in Thapa (2003), mentions that the cost of insurgency in insurance claims made by six agencies (viz Nepal Rastra Bank, Agriculture Development Bank, Nepal Bank Ltd, Nepal Telecommunication Corporation, Jhimruk Hydro Plant and Shah Distillery [Pvt]) comes to Rs380 million. According to some economists, mainly those working the universities, the total damage caused by the conflict is to the tune of 2 (minimum) and 15 (maximum) per cent of the GDP. The re-building cost of the damage to infrastructure alone, according to an estimate made by the National Planning Commission (NPC) in April 2003, would cost up to NRs20 billion (quoted in Karki and Bhattarai). Increase in Security and Defence Expenses The defence expense has shot up over the last few years due to armed hostilities between the rebels and the government. There have been increases in the number of security personnel and security expenditure. In order to deal with the insurgency through force, the size of the police force was increased, a new police force, the Armed Police, was created and the strength of the army was increased. In April 2003, Nepal's security forces collectively comprised 63,000 solders, 15,000 armed police personnel and 50,000 regular police force. According to recent figures, the Royal Nepal Army has a strength of 78,000 personnel (The Himalayan Times, August 7, 2004). The state has to bear Rs180,000 per year per army personnel (Sharma and Gautam 2004). There has been an increase in security expenses, too. For example, the allocation for both the security and defence purposes in the fiscal year 2002/003 was NRs13,599.7 million (Table 1).

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Table 1 Expenditures for Defence and Police from 1997 to 2004

(In million Rs) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Total Expenditure 50,723.7 56,118.2 59,579.0 66,272.5 79,835.1 80,072.2 84,006.0 Regular Exp. 24,181.1 27,174.4 31,047.7 34,523.3 42,769.2 48,590.0 54,973.0 Development Exp. 26,542.6 28,943.8 28,531.3 31,749.2 37,065.9 31,482.2 29,033.0 Defence Exp. 2,357.6 2,582.8 2,994.8 3,482.1 3,813.4 5,859.8 7,381.5 Police Exp. 2,195.8 2,487.2 2,897.8 3,267.8 5,183.0 6,044.0 6,218.2 Total Defence Exp. (including Police) 4,553.4 5,070.0 5,892.6 6,749.9 8,996.4 11,903.8 13,599.7 Share of Defence Exp. in Regular Expenditure 18.8 18.7 19.0 19.6 21.0 24.5 24.7 Share of Defence Exp. in Development Expenditure

17.2 17.5 20.7 21.3 24.3 37.8 46.8

Share of Defence Exp. in Total Expenditure 9.0 9.0 9.9 10.2 11.3 14.9 16.2 Source: Economic Survey, Fiscal Year 2003/04, Ministry of Finance, His Majesty's Government of Nepal.

Part II

Genesis of the Insurgency Nepal is known to outsiders as a country of natural beauty and smiling people. The people are considered warm and hospitable. Those who know the country well are surprised how this country has turned into a mess from all perspectives within eight years of the Maoist movement. As such, they would naturally be curious to understand the real reasons that contributed to its beginning. There is no single factor that has contributed to the beginning of the insurgency and its spread throughout the country. Rather, there are a number of factors, precipitating and historical, that have contributed to it. One has to understand all of them in relation to finding a lasting solution to the problem. Precipitating Factors Prithvi Narayan Shah, the ruler of Gorkha, now the headquarters of a district with the same name and located about 100 km west of Kathmandu, started the process of unifying the then small principalities in AD1768 to build modern Nepal. Within 235 years of its modern history, there have been two major changes in the political system from the point of view of establishment of democratic system. The political system underwent a big change as a result of the armed revolution in 1951iv and thereafter as a result of the people's movement in 1990v.

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, promulgated after the people's movement, has enunciated a polity that is based on the multiparty system with a constitutional monarch, an elected government that is headed by a person who commands majority in the House of Representatives (HoR). It guarantees basic human rights in the form of fundamental rights, including freedom of opinion and expression for citizens, and provides for a three-tier independent judiciary with an objective of 'transforming the concept of Rule of Law into reality' (Preamble to the Constitution). Since promulgation of this Constitution, the people of Nepal have already participated in three general elections, in 1991, 1994 and 1999, and two local elections, in 1992 and 1997/98. Till October 4, 2002, people's representatives governed the country. Indeed, the country has made headway in areas such as media industry and freedom of expression and speech after the restoration of the multiparty parliamentary system. There is an open society in the country. Even if the acts of the king cannot be questioned,

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practically every body and institution, including the monarchy, is subject to public criticisms and sanctions.

! Failure in Governance and Political Uncertainty But in the field of governance, the country has failed miserably and has completely failed to meet the high expectations the people had from the new political system. Among other things, they had expected that those geographical areas and people who had been marginalised and neglected in the past would be brought into the national mainstream. They had expected that there would a change in the behaviour pattern of the government, ie it would be accountable in exercising its powers and responsibilities and would be more attentive with regard to the concerns of the poorer regions and disadvantaged sections of society. But the work style of those running the country did not change at all. The backward areas and disadvantaged sections of society continued to be neglected. Corruption has become endemic. On the whole there has been deterioration in the governance situation over the yearsvi (between 1995 and 2000).

Political uncertainty has plagued the country. The country, since the restoration of the multiparty system in 1990, has already had 14 governments and six prime ministers. The average life of the government has been less than two years. With regard to the nature of government, all sorts of government—the majority government, the minority government, the coalition government and king's nominated government since October 4, 2000—have governed the country (Annex 3). The Constitution of 1990 is still in force. But its main spirit has been, clinically, in a coma for almost two years as a result of the use of Article 127vii in the appointment of the prime minister and council of ministers.

It's not only that the average life span of the government has been short, but also the political parties have played all sorts of game to stay in power. While playing the game of politics, the elected people had no compunction in misusing public resources and position to their personal benefit. In other words, especially following the beginning of the coalition culture in 1995, the country witnessed all sorts of foul play and abominable public scandals such as Dhamija, Lauda, Chase (related to leasing of aircraft and appointment of GSA for the national flag carrier), gold smuggling and medical facilities of MPs, etc. The people in general were forced to become mere spectators and helpless bystanders. They witnessed public figures amassing wealth by misusing their position as ministers with creamy portfolios in the cabinet. Above all, the people had to bear the unwanted sermons of such high-placed people and had to go to different places for days to get things done or to receive service from public institutions. In totality, 'during the last 14 years while managing to arouse popular aspirations for economic well being and social justice, the parliamentary political system utterly failed to keep its promise' (Muni 2004), thereby causing a feeling of despair, frustration, anguish and disenchantment among the people towards the system. ! Play of Negative Politics No doubt, the Nepali Congress and a united Left joined hands to overthrow the three decade-old Panchayat system and cooperated with each other in running the country during the one-year transition period (April 1990-May 1991). They also joined hands in getting the new Constitution of 1990 framed and promulgated. They also got the first general election held and formally handed over power to the new elected government. In other words, they successfully managed the transition period and there was an expectation that they would cooperate with each other in strengthening and institutionalizing the parliamentary system of government. The people, in recognition of its contributions to the people's movement, had given the mandate to the Nepali Congress (NC) to form government and to the

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Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) as the main opposition party in parliament. The UPFN, the political wing of the Maoist party that was in the making, had contested the May 1991 elections and won nine (5.5 per cent of votes cast [IIDS 1993]) of the 205 seats in the HoR. But they boycotted all other general elections thereafter.

During the last 14 years of the restored multiparty system, most of the time the Nepali Congress (NC)viii has been in power. In spite of working together for the restoration of multiparty system, the Nepali Congress and the Left, which was especially influential in the hill districts of Rolpa, Rukum and Pyuthan of the Rapti zone in the Mid Western Development Region, failed to realize the need of avoiding confrontation with each other for strengthening the newly restored democracy. The NC, heading the interim government and the first elected government, should have been more responsible and sensible in its attitude towards the members of other political parties. But, unfortunately, the first elected government decided to use the state machinery as an extended arm of the party (NC) and used it against the members of other political parties, especially the cadres of the UPFN (Thapa 2003).

As indicated in the Human Rights Yearbook 1993, there was 'a number of incidents of human rights violation by the state machinery using force. In Libang of Rolpa district, regarded as a stronghold of United Peoples' Front, an armed force of 80 men, including six inspectors and District Police Officers... launched a suppression campaign...Women were misbehaved [with], chickens and goats were slaughtered and eaten, and citizens were widely charged with false allegations'. In return, the cadres of the UPFN, too, attacked those of the NC’ (Gersony 2003).

The post-Koirala government that came to power after the second general election, the CPN-UML government and the coalition government of Sher Bahadur Deuba had the opportunity of changing the strategy from confrontational to reconciliatory towards the UPFN. But they did not. By the time Deuba formed the first coalition government in the post-1990, in September 1995, which lasted for eighteen months (ie March 1997), 'the UPFN began the 'Sija Campaign'ix in Rolpa and Rukum as part of their politico-ideological preparations. By this time, the UPFN was clashing not only with the activists of the Nepali Congress, but also with those of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and even CPN-UML (Thapa 2003).

In response to UPFN's activities, the government launched a violent police action under the code name, Operation Romeo, in the district of Rolpa, about which the then Home Minister Khum Bahdur Khadka had said, 'police teams have been dispatched to eight village development committees, 70 persons have been arrested before the security operation and 117 since then, and a number of guns and khukuris have been recovered from houses' (The Kathmandu Post: daily newspaper, November 15, 1995 quoted in Thapa 2003).

In return, Dr Bhattarai, after one month of the operation, gave his version of the operation in the following manner:

[Around 1,500 policemen, including a specially trained commando force sent from Kathmandu, have been deployed to let loose a reign of terror against the poor peasants of that rugged mountain district in western Nepal. So far, about one thousand people have been arrested, of whom about three hundred are kept in police custody or sent to jails under fictitious charges while the rest have been released on bail or after severe torture. The people arrested range from 12 to 70 years of age and most of them have been subjected to inhuman torture while in police custody... More than ten thousand rural youth, out of a population of two hundred thousand for the whole district, have been forced to flee their homes and take shelter in remote jungles. The armed police operation is still continuing and the virtual reign of white terror seems endless at the moment (The Independent, weekly newspaper, December 13-19, 1995 quoted in Thapa 2003).

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One could challenge the figures given by Dr Bhattarai, but the fact remains that excesses were committed on the local people by the state apparatuses during the said operation. This has been emphasized by the Human Rights Yearbook 1995, which reported that 'the government initiated... suppressive operations to a degree of state terror. Especially, the workers of the United People's Front were brutally suppressed.’ 'Nearly 6,000 locals left the villages due to this police operation. One hundred and thirty-two people were arrested without being served with warrants. Among the arrested some were over 75 years of age. All the detained were subjected to torture' (Thapa 2003). Thus, play of such a negative politics mainly by the ruling party and the absence of tolerance among the political actors, which played an important role in toppling the three decades old political system, ultimately became one of the precipitating factors for the beginning of the Maoist movement in the country. Historical Factors ! Social Social discrimination is one of the strongest causes of the ongoing violent rebellion. The country had a population of 18.5 million in 1991, which has gone up to 22.7 million in 2001. As per the Census Report of 2001, there are 103 groups in the country (Population Monograph of Nepal 2003). Sociologists and anthropologist have divided them into 35 groups on the basis of sociological, anthropological and economic perspectives (TP Foundation 2004 and Annex 4). However, for practical purpose, they could be divided into two: the so-called privileged groups and others. Brahmins, Chhetris/Thakuris are included in the first category while Janjatis, Dalits and Madhesis ( People for Tarai [soutern ]area ) are included in the latter category. From the point of view of linguistic groups, people have been divided into 21 groupsx. With regard to the religious composition, 80.62 per cent of the population are Hindus as per the census of 2001, and the rest are Buddhists (10.74), Muslims (4.20), Kirantis (3.60), Christians (0.45), Jains (0.02), Sikhs (0.02) and others (0.35) (Population Monograph of Nepal 2003).

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 recognises the diverse nature of the Nepalese society, ie its multiethnic and religious nature (Article 2). In addition, it recognises 'Nepali' as the official language and 'all the languages spoken as the mother tongue in the various parts of Nepal' as 'national languages of Nepal' (Article 6). As a result of such recognition, the people belonging to the different ethnic groups, speaking different languages and professing different religions had high expectations in the post-1990 days. They hoped that their expectations would be met and their concerns addressed. Further, they hoped that they would have an equitable share in the decision-making process and say in the nation-building process and that they would not be marginalised.

One of the arrangements made towards the fulfilment of these expectations was the compulsory requirement of nominating 5 per cent of the candidates to national legislature—HoR and National Assembly—from amongst the female population. The Local Self-Governance Act 1999 requiresxi nomination of persons, including at least one woman, by the respective assembly, ie village assembly, municipal assembly and district assembly, from amongst socially backward and ethnic communities as members. It is also required to nominate persons, including one woman from the said groups in the respective committees—VDC, municipality and DDC, by these committees. In addition, one woman has to be nominated by each political party for election as ward member of the village assembly and municipal assembly. Except these provisions, the issues of Janjatis, Dalits and women failed to become matters of serious concern in the post-1990 governments and political parties that were in the government.

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The members of the privileged groups, Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars, still continue to dominate the composition of the HoR in the post-1990 period. For example, the Bahuns constituted 37.6% in 1991, 42% in 1994 and 38.5% in 1999, whereas Chhettris constituted 13.7% in 1991, 14.1% in 1994 and 13.7% in 1999 and Newars 6.8% in 1991, 6.3% in 1994 and 7.3% in 1999 (Annex 5). The same is the case with the composition of council of ministers. For example, in each of the seven councils of ministers formed after 1990 there has been heavy domination of these groups in totality: the Bahuns (35.1%), Chhettris (24.1%) and Newars (7.9%), whereas the representation of the hill janajatis other than Newars and tarai janajatis has been 10.9% and 5.2% respectively. The representation of Dalits, both hill and tarai, has been only 0.5%, whereas that of Muslims 4.2% (Annex 6).

With regard to the representation in the civil service, especially in senior positions, including those of under secretary-level (administrative service), the Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars had 41.31, 14.70 and 33.16 per cent respectively in 1991. The representation of Terai people was 8.44 per cent (Dhungel 1998). The representation of women in civil service was less than 7.8 per cent of its cadres, which revolved around 100 thousand, in 1998. Their representation was only 4.64 per cent at the officer level, 3.52 per cent at the secretary rank and 3.95 per cent at the joint secretary rank (Dhungel, et al 2001). According to Manandhar (1999), the total number of civil servants at the officer level in 1999 was 11,032, of which 84.3 per cent were Bahuns, Chhetris, Thakuris, Rajputs and other ‘upper castes’, 13.4 per cent Newars and 2.3 per cent others other than Newars'. Recently (September 7, 2004) six officers had been promoted to the highest rank in civil service, ie Permanent Secretary, but none of them was from Madeshi community or a woman.

The level of education of different sections of society cannot be overlooked while considering this issue with specific reference to their representation in the public service. To address this issue, the government should have enhanced access to education for the disadvantaged sections of society or taken some other affirmative actions. Similarly, the provision of having a fixed percentage of candidates from Janjatis and Dalits in the national legislature could have been made obligatory through constitutional amendment in addition to undertaking of measures that would improve their capacity and empower them to claim their due share in the decision-making process at both national and local levels, including in the enjoyment of fruits of development. Also, the government should ensure that those who are at the bottom of the ladder from the viewpoint of socio-economic conditions within women, Janajatis, and Dalits (Annex 6a and 6b) also enjoy the measures implemented for empowering them and have a share in the decision-making process.

! Economic Economic disparity in society is correctly attributed as a reason for the birth of the rebellion in Nepal. Over the last fifty years (since 1956), Nepal has been following planned development efforts to improve the socio-economic conditions of her people. So far, nine periodic plans have been implemented and the tenth periodic plan (2002-007) is under implementation. For the allocation of resources, the country has been divided into five development regions (viz Eastern Development Region, Central Development Region, Western Development Region, Mid-Western Development Region And Far Western Development Region), with each region having its own headquarters and having areas from all geographical regions: mountains, hills and terai (southern area). In addition, the country launched the process of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment programme in mid-eighties, covering all the sectors of the economy.

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Under the programme, a two-pronged strategy has been followed: 'facilitating increased private-sector investment in economic activities and developing physical and social infrastructure to support market penetration in the subsistence economy. Investment in rural infrastructure, human development, self-employment and micro-credit have been conceptualized as the main interventions for reducing poverty (For example see the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plans, PRSP and APP)' (Acharya 2003). But poverty is still a major problem. One could challenge the official figure. According to a government figure, 38 per cent of the people are still living below the poverty line. One would come across pockets of poverty (in terms of both people and area) in affluent areas.

The structural adjustment measures, according to an eminent economist, Meena Acharya, 'were/are supposed to exert positive impact [on various frontsxii] on poverty'. But she is of the opinion that the 'general conclusion has been that all these policy packages have impacted to reduce the role of agriculture in production and increased the market penetration into the household economy, without substantial positive impact on the employment opportunities and livelihood options for the poor in general and women in particular' (Ibid).

The East-West Highway and some north-south highways helped Nepal to get physically and emotionally integrated. The Dhangadi-Dadeldhura Road in the Far Western Region, Surkhet-Nepalgunj Road and East-West Highway to Salyan in the Mid-Western Region, Bhairahawa–Baglung in the Western Region and Barbise-Jiri in the Central Region and Biratnagar-Basantapur and Charali-Taplegunj in the Eastern Region have made the country, from the point of view of movement, much smaller than it used to be. The interactions between the hills and the urban areas, including Kathmandu, have increased. The residents of the different parts have been able to compare their levels of standard with those of others. But the system of allocation of resources continued to be the same as it used to be. The Kathmandu, urban centres and terai districts continued to receive greater allocation of national resources than the hill districts, especially the hill districts from the Mid-Western and far Western Development Regions. The poorer regions did not get due attention in the allocation of national resources. As a result, one would find marked differences between the ecological and development regions in terms of the human development index (HDI). For example, from the point of view of percentage change in HDI 1996-2000 by eco-development regions, it was 11.3 in mid-western hills, 1.3 in mid-western mountains compared to 25.9 in the central mountains and 0.8 in the central hills. The national average was 15.6 (Human Development Report 2001). Similarly, human development in 2000 in Mid-Western and Far-Western Development Regions was 0.402 and 0.385 respectively, whereas the national average was 0.466. It was highest (0.493) in the Central Development Region, followed by Eastern Development Region (0.484) (Ibid) (see Chart 2 and 3).

The highways, no doubt, have opened up many areas hitherto not easily accessible. They have also promoted access to factory products at the cost of local products. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the process of penetration had started, protection was given to local producers and cottage and household industries. But with the initiation of all-round liberalization, 'the process of evaporation of the local market for locally produced products and services has accelerated significantly' (Acharya 2003). As a result, plastic utensils replaced locally-produced metal and earthen utensils, factory-produced farm equipment replaced locally-produced ones, and rubber shoes and textile replaced locally-produced shoes and homespun clothes. In the manufacturing sector, too, due to lack of protection, there has been substantial decrease in production in many areas, such as textiles, bidi, and bricks and tiles. However, there has been growth of garment and carpet industries. But Acharya raises a question 'whether the carpet and garment industries have been able to compensate for such job loss cannot be ascertained as the

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industrial production data do not even list woollen carpets, hosiery or garments in their manufacturing data.'

As a result of the liberalisation process, there has been growth of new types of industries such as food processing, paper and paper products, footwear, iron and steel, and beverage production. People can take advantage of these industries from the point of view of employment only when they are in a position to do so. This means they have to have the minimum skills or level of education. But because of the lack of required skill and education, 'most urban jobs created in the process of development are being taken over by foreigners’ (NPC 1983, quoted in Acharya 2003). A large proportion of newly created jobs is being monopolized by the imported labour, since open border with India allows for free mobility of labour between the two countries despite the fact that a large section of the Nepalese male population goes to the neighbouring and other countries for seeking employment' (Ibid).

There has been a gradual decline in livelihood system in the country over time. The grazing land is slowly disappearing, forest is no longer available for fuel and fodder. 'The middle class, instead of investing in land, is set on selling land to send their children abroad. Or they are converting land to forests, fruit orchards or some other plantation with long gestation period, eroding the food security system of the village. The poor are left with no access to resources or alternative employment. This is clearly illustrated in the case of livestock raising' (Ibid).

Nepalese agriculture has to compete with the Indian agriculture. But it cannot compete with the imported Indian produce due to the subsidy given on agricultural inputs in India. At one time, Nepal was flooded with Indian rice as it was cheap compared to the Nepalese product. This raises not only the issue of the commercial viability of agriculture but also the competitive capacity of the Nepalese farmers due to the absence of protection.

Nepal may not be in a position to reverse its policy in terms of liberalisation and economic reforms and their continuation has been reiterated by the current periodic plan (Tenth Plan: 2002-2007) due to the heavy dependence on the excessive external aid in meeting her development expenditure. But because of the above-mentioned reasons, despite some positive contribution (Pyakuryal 2004) of the liberalisation process, the people at large have not been able to benefit from it. In terms of employment and livelihood opportunities, there has been no substantive positive impact on the lives of the rural people in particular. One could also see gaps between the poor and the rich and between the urban and the rural areas (For details, see Acharya 2003). The disparity between the rural and urban areas is clearly visible. In the year 2000, the difference between the two from the point of view of human development was 0.170: 0.446 in rural areas and 0.616 in urban areas (Human Development Report 2001 and Chart 2). Because of such a situation Economist Pykaruyal writes: 'it is sad to note that the share of income or consumption of the poorest 20% is 7.6% whereas the rich 20% consume 44.8%, indicating a high degree of horizontal inequality.'

The marijuana plant (cannabis sativa) —both farmed and wild—used to be a main source of cash income for local villagers from the hills of the Mid-Western and Far-Western Development Regions, including those hill districts from where the Maoist insurgency started. Its seeds are used for preparing pickle and extracting oil and from its stems fibre is produced, which is used for clothing. Local agents used to buy hashish (marijuana) balls and sell to traders who came into this area, who 'ultimately sold them in Kathmandu and India' (Gersony 2003). The farming was declared illegal in 1976 through the enactment of the Drug Trafficking and Abuse Act, which prohibited the production, sale and distribution of hashish. It was banned without ensuring alternative sources of income. As a result, between 1976 and 1980 the standard of living of the local people rapidly deteriorated to the extent that 'food was shared among neighbours so that they could survive. Women sold their silver necklaces [valuable ornament of

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the women in the area] and gold jewellery; men migrated in greater numbers to earn the money they needed for their family survival. In their [local people's] perception, by banning hashish the government had literally taken the food out of their children's mouths' ...three written petitions by local leaders to the Palace for some type of relief or alternative development went unanswered. Although King Birendra visited Takasera...in around 1983 and 1988 and declared the zone a national development priority, almost no results were forthcoming' (Ibid).

In 1980, the government implemented a rural development programme, Rapti Zone Integrated Rural Development Programme, with the assistance of the USAID, for the...development of the people living in five districts of the zone, Dang-Deukhuri, Salyan, Rolpa, Rukum and Pyuthan. It was implemented in two phases (Phase I [1980-1988] and Phase II [1989-1994]). During the first phase, the US government invested US$33.7 million, out of which 19.5 per cent was allocated to the technical assistance component (Stiller 1989). The allocation for the second phase was US$18.8 million (Ministry of Local Development), of which 14.4 per cent was allocated for technical assistance (ibid).

During the process of implementation, the project, among other things, created infrastructure facilities in the form of office buildings, roads and bridges (especially the bridge over the Madi river built in the southern Rolpa right on the Pyuthan border) in the project area. Similarly, facilities were provided by the project in the drinking water and irrigation sectors.

But from the point of effectiveness, I feel that, first of all, the project in terms of the programme component was thinly distributed. Second, it did not work through the local community, except for the local authorities, whose areas of activity in some cases were too wide for effective supervision. As a result, either the small infrastructure projects, such as drinking water, irrigation, etc, remained incomplete for a long period or the quality of work was poor. Also, it 'failed to provide the market access to the products which the project had encouraged to grow, the apples' (Gersony 2003).

In addition, the import of and extensive use vehicles through the project funding of foreign 'jaunts' in the name of observation tours for local leaders and government employees and hiring of large numbers of advisors (both expatriates and local), helped to create a negative feeling towards the project among most of the project beneficiaries. Unless proved otherwise through study, it is difficult to deny that the burning of some buildings of the Rapti project by the Maoists was mainly due to such negative feelings.

The banning of marijuana cultivation and some other decisions of the government such as the use of force by the government against the protestors who had gathered to oppose the government's decision of transferring the district headquarters of Rukum from Rukumkot to the present site of Musikot in April 1973 and the forced closure of the Takasera water mill in Rukum in 1984 gave rise to public resentment. The delay in the construction of the airport at Musikot, selection of wrong location for airport in Rolpa and irregularities negligence in the construction of a district hospital in Rolpa made the people of Rolpa and Rukum angry with the Singha Durbar, the seat of the government of Nepal in Kathmandu (For detailed description, see Gorseny 2003).

! Political Thus, on the one hand, if the said facts, along with the continued neglect of the hardships of the people, contributed to turn public anger into an insurgency, on the other hand, the Communist Party had been active in the area since 1957. Mohan Bikram Singh, one of the leading communist leaders of the country, 'had helped to organize the local Communist Party cell, established a branch of the Farmers organization and helped the local people to 'resist the influence' of traditional tax collectors and other 'feudals'. He was embraced by the isolated and neglected Thawang Kham-Magar community, which had little direct contact

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with the government or other political parties. The Communist Party, undisputed in Thawang by other political parties, gained considerable influence over the years' (Ibid). Deepak Thapa writes: ‘Mohan Bikram Singh had painstakingly cultivated a strong organizational structure for the radical left in and around Pyuthan since 1950's. It was this solid bloc of left supporters that the Maoists were able to exploit to their advantage when the time came to begin an armed struggle.’

Nepal, after she took the present shape, abolished the then existing principalities and their rulers, turned herself into a centralized political system with all powers resting at the seat of the government in Kathmandu or to its field-level representatives, first the Badahakim (the head of the district administration), then the zonal commissioner and chief district officer (CDO) during the Panchayat period. The CDO is still the representative of the Singha Durbar at the local level. No effort was made to maintain the traditional institutions and to allow them to play a role in the affairs of the community, although one would come across the efforts made by the Rana oligarchy to establish a few village councils and a few municipalitiesxiii in different parts of the community.

The Constitution of 1962 recognized the importance of people's participation in the national development process and, for this purpose, decentralization was accepted as the means to achieve it. Its importance was duly recognized through provisions in the preamble to the Directive Principles of State Policy and a separate chapter on local authorities was included in the Constitution. Also, a countrywide network of local authorities was established in 1962 and since then they have become a part and parcel of the local life. In addition a number of measures such as the implementation of a three phased decentralisation programme, 1965 and Decentralisation Act 1979, etc. were implemented by the then government. However, the framers of the present Constitution failed to realize their importance and did not make separate provisions in the Constitution. The local authorities were constituted through a parliamentary enactment and are performing their roles and functions under the Local Self-Governance Act 1999 and rules framed under this act, Local Self-Governance Regulation 2066(1999) and Local Authorities (Financial Administration) Regulation 2056 (1999).

The associations of these bodies—National Association of Village Development Committee, Nepal (NAVIN), Municipality Association of Nepal (MUAN) and Association of District Development Committees of Nepal (ADDCN) are working as strong advocacy groups and representing the causes of the local authorities. But the state still continues to be highly centralized and the local authorities are treated as an extended arm by government agencies. They are expected to carry out what is decided in Singha Durbar. During a study on decentralization in May/June 2000, I, during an interaction with the member-in-charge of decentralization in the National Planning Commission (NPC), wanted to find out the intention of the government with regard to the implementation of the devolutionary type of decentralization. The answer was 'the local authorities do not have the capacity to take up all the development activities within their areas of jurisdiction. And they would be entrusted with the responsibility for only those activities that require simple know how to plan and manage.’

Despite five years of implementation of the LSGA, it is yet to be enforced in letter and spirit. Furthermore, since July 2002, there are no elected representatives in the local authorities since the Sher Bahadur Deuba government (Deuba Government) decided not to extend their term upon completion. Nor it could hold fresh election to these bodies. As a result, for the first time since the establishment of a countrywide network of local authorities and election to these bodies in 1962, the country is having no local authorities with elected representatives. And in the context of the ongoing insurgency, it is not sure when election to these bodies would be held.

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Part III Efforts made for resolving the insurgency

Through use of Force As already indicated in the section on the precipitating reasons, first of all, the governments that came after 1990 pursued a negative politics in relation to the members of the opposition parties, especially those of the UPFN in the hill districts of the Rapti zone, and launched, as already indicated, Operation Romeo in Rolpa district. Secondly, the successive governments formed after the second election of 1994, especially the Sher Bahadur Deuba government, did not take the 40 points demands seriously, which was submitted nine days before launching the insurgency, ie on February 4, 1996, by the chairman of the Samyukta Jana Morcha-Nepal (United People's Front-Nepal, or UPFN), Dr Baburam Bhattarai (now a member of the standing committee of the politburo of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, a successor to the UPFN), to the Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba of that time (Annex 7). While looking at these demands, one would think, or anybody would agree, that except three demands, ie drafting of a new Constitution by the representatives elected for the establishment of a people's democratic system; abolition of all special privileges of the king and the royal family; and keeping the army, the police and the bureaucracy under the complete control of the people's representatives, all other demands could be addressed by the government. Therefore, there are two schools of thought as to how the government should have addressed these demands. One, if Deuba government had taken the other issues seriously, probably the bloody conflict could have been averted. The other school thinks that on the basis of the moves of the UPFN, it becomes evident that the country was going in the direction it has taken since February 13, 1996 (Thapa 2003) since 'the January 1996 central committee meeting of the CPN-Maoist had already decided that the uprising would begin on the 13th February of 1996. So, they started attacking government installations even before the 17th February deadline expired.’ Personally, I think the UPFN should have waited the given deadline (till 17th February) before launching attacks on police stations and offices of the Small Farmers' Development Programme. The government, too, should have taken the matter seriously. But because of the fault on the part of both the parties, the country got entangled in the bloody movement and the government went on to crush the movement through the use of force without realising to what extent it could go. To crush the movement, the government launched the Kilo Sera II operation in May 1998 across all the Maoist-affected regions of the country. In addition, Silent Kilo Sierra III, jungle searches, etc were launched to subdue the Maoists (Nekapa [Moabadi] ko Chirphar 2058 [Dissection of CPN-Maoists 2001]). When Sher Bahadur Deuba came back as prime minister on July 22, 2001 after Prime Minister Koirala resigned from his post following a severe attack on police posts at Holeri in Rolpa by Maoists and, as stated, the army failed to move. The new government decided to impose a state of emergency (which lasted till August 27, 2002) and the Maoists were declared a terrorist organisation on November 26, 2001, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Bill was enacted on April 4, 2002 and the government, on April 23, 2002, announced bounties ranging from Rs1 to 5 million on heads of Maoist leaders. All these led to not only increased bloodshed and the creation of a new security force – a special paramilitary force (armed police force) of 15,000 strength, increase in the strength of the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), mobilisation of the RNA against the Maoists, initiation of a unified command under the army and with the civil police and armed police as constituent elements, but also contributed to increases in security and defence expenses (Table 1). In addition, the government has been purchasing and

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procuring arms and ammunition to deal with the insurgency and has received different sorts of support from a number of countries, such as India, the USA and the United Kingdom for its defence and security forces. Through Dialogue All the said efforts to crush the movement through force failed to bear or yield fruit. The conflict was and is getting costlier and burdensome to the country day by day. The call for peace through peaceful negotiation or dialogue was made from all quarters, including the civil society and the international community, including the United Nations. In response, the Lokendra Bahadur Chand government that came to power on March 12, 1997 as the coalition government of the RPP, the CPN-UML and the Nepal Sadhbhavana Party (NSP) in March, tried to make an effort to solve the problem politically, but it failed. However, this government formed a commission in April 1997 under the chairmanship of a CPN-UML MP, Prem Singh Dhami, to look into Maoist activities and search for solutions. The report submitted by the commission in August of the same year had, among other things, suggested bringing 'the CPN-Maoist into the constitutional process and to make a formal offer of talks to the UPFN (Bhattarai). Failing this, the report suggested, their intentions should be laid bare before the public' (Thapa 2003). All the commissions formed after the Dhami Commission, too, had accepted the Maoist problem as a political problem and suggested its political handling.xiv But after the submission of this report, there was a change of government twice between October 1997 and April 1998.

The subsequent governments continued to follow the strategy of crushing the movement through force till Sher Bahadur Deuba came back as prime minister on July 22, 2001 (after GP Koirala resigned from his post when the Maoists launched a severe attack on police posts at Holeri in Rolpa and, as stated, the army failed to move) declared the ceasefire (first ceasefire) and invited the CPN-Maoist for a talk with them to solve the problem. In this regard, the country has had already two rounds of talks: first time from July 25, 2001 to January 19, 2002 and the second time from January 29 to August 27, 2003.

The first round of talks was held from August 30 to November 13, 2001 after Prime Minister Deuba declared a ceasefire on July 22, 2001. During the first round of talks, both the sides met to sort out the issue through dialogue and met three times (first sitting on August 30, second sitting on September 14-15 and the third sitting on November 13), but each time the talks ended in failure.

The second round of dialogue started when the Lokendra Bahdur Chand government, appointed by the king under Article 127 of the Constitution after he dismissed Deuba government on October 4, 2002 and the Maoists decided for a ceasefire (the second ceasefire) on January 29, 2003. This round of talk had three sittings: the first sitting on April 27, the second on May 8 and the third on August 17-19, 2003. This round of dialogue, too, ended in failure. Before the two sides met for the first sitting of the second round of dialogue, they had agreed and signed a code of conduct for ceasefire on February 10, 2003. Although it never took off the ground, both the sides agreed on the names of monitors.

The failure of each round of talks, the reasons for which are given in subsequent portions (under Prospect for Peace), was followed by violent clashes and killings as both the parties used the ceasefire period to rearm and strengthen their respective positions. Like, after the failure of the first round of talks when the Maoists attacked a police post at Holeri in Rolpa, which led to the abduction of a large number of police personnel, following the failure of the second round of talks, the Maoist Chairman Prachanda declared the irrelevance of continuing negotiation and the end of the ceasefire on August 27, 2003. Immediately after that (end of the second ceasefire), the Maoists attacked (August 28, 2003) two senior military officers of Colonel rank in Kathmandu, one of whom succumbed to his injuries. Thereafter, there

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have been several skirmishes between the security forces and the Maoists, in which many lives have been lost. Every day one hears the news of killing of people by one or the other group.

During the second ceasefire, the country had two governments. One was that of Lokendra Bahadur Chand, which had not only arranged for a ceasefire but also had two sittings with the Maoists. When this government resigned on the ground of its inability to secure the representation of the major political parties on the council of ministers, the king appointed another government on June 4, 2003 under Surya Bahadur Thapa as prime minister. This government has had the third sitting of the second round of talks with the Maoists, held in west Nepal (first in Neplagunj and then after at Hapure, a village in the district of Dang). But, as already indicated, this also ended in failure.

Sher Bahadur Deuba was again appointed as the third prime minister on June 2, 2004 under Article 127 after Prime Minister Thapa tendered his resignation on the ground of his failure to secure the cooperation of the major political parties. Once this government was expanded on July 5, 2004 with the representatives of the CPN-UML, the RPP, the NSP and the king, it took the shape of a national government (Sarba Pakchhiya Sarkar). At its appointment, this government was given the mandate of restoring peace and starting the process of election within a year. The new government has already formed a high-level mechanism with the prime minister as the chairman and head of the coalition partners (the political parties) and king's nominated minister in the government to provide policy guidelines on peace-related matters. However, it is doubtful that it has all the executive power in relation to making the final deal with the CPN-Maoist.

The council of ministers has decided to establish a peace secretariat (The Himalayan Times, August 13, 2004) as a staff agency to support the high-level committee and the government negotiators. The establishment of this institutional mechanism is a welcome step.

Bowing to the growing pressure from the civil society, people at large and the international community for holding peace talks with the CPN-Maoist, some of the ministers claim of already having established secret contacts with the Maoists. In what manner the present government would have political parties such as the NC and other opposition parties, which are still agitating against what they call 'the October 4, 2002 regressive measure of the king' and other stakeholders on board with regard to the peace process is not clear. Similarly, it is not yet clear when and in what manner the peace process will start. Roadmaps and Interest of the International Community In the non-government sectors, too, different civil societies have been trying to contribute to the peace process through the identification of common meeting points between the stands taken by the different stakeholders—mainly the political parties, the CPN-Maoist and the king—through analysis of published documents and have offered roadmaps which, they think, the principal political actors locked in the present conflict should accept as a basis for dialogue amongst them. One of such roadmaps is that prepared by the Volunteer Mediators' Group (VMG)xv, which the group made public at a press meeting on December 25, 2003 (Annex 8). The other, National Consensus on Conflict Resolution in Nepal, prepared by the Civil Solidarity Group (Annex 9), a loose coalition of more than 100 civil societies established to pressurise the warring factions to come to a negotiated settlement, monitors the human rights abuse by the worrying parties and build public opinion for peaceful solution to the problem—a solution that is sustainable and addresses the concerns of all stakeholders.

The international community, friendly countries and the UN and European countries are getting worried of the increasing bloodshed in the country. Friendly countries such as the USA, the United Kingdom and India are following a two-pronged strategy with regard to the insurgency: one through

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military assistance to the government and second through call for a negotiated settlement. Whereas countries such as Switzerland and Norway, it is understood, are pressing for a negotiated settlement through dialogue with the Maoists. The United Kingdom has appointed a special envoy to look into and monitor the situation. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has offered his service for negotiated settlement of the problem, which is yet to be accepted by the government. Agencies such as the International Alert is also engaged in monitoring the situation, providing support to build a resource centre on conflict management and providing information on the different methods of conflict resolution mainly to the selected civil society leaders.

In spite of all these efforts, so far there has been no success in achieving a negotiated settlement. The efforts of the civil society are yet to bear fruits. The situation is getting worse day by day in terms of loss of lives and cost to the country. The CPN-Maoist are still tagged as a terrorist organization and the red corner notices issued against their leaders are very much existing. The Indian government's notice of declaring this party as a terrorist organization still continues. The US government has put the Maoists on the watch list of terrorists.

During the current fiscal year, 2004/2005, Rs15 billion has been allocated for security purpose (under defence and home ministries). Over and above this, the security forces have requested an additional allocation of Rs6.13 billion during the current fiscal year as a part of their demand for Rs11 billion under a three-year security plan, which, it is claimed, has been prepared for beefing up the security situation in the Kathmandu valley and other areas, for which the security forces want to add additional 13,500 personnel in the army, about 4,500 personnel in the armed police force and 3,700 personnel in the civil police and purchase four helicopters. The plan, among other things, envisages developing infrastructure at the entry points to the Kathmandu valley, keeping in view the security need (The Kantipur, national daily, August 31, 2004).

Part IV

Prospects for Peace There was and is, as indicated above, a public cry for peace and, in response, the government assures to provide the public with peace, but peace is getting more and more remote. The authorities concerned appeal to the public through press releases, interviews and public speeches not to panic from the insurgency, but the people cannot help panicking. The state claims to have the capacity to provide security, but no one believes it. As a result, vehicles stop plying and big businesses halt their business and the country comes to a grinding halt at a single call of the Maoists. The impact of the insurgency, as discussed above, has been grave. The country is not likely to sustain such a situation for long. Neither of the parties locked in the conflict is in a position to militarily defeat the other. From all indications, it seems, the international community will not allow the CPN-Maoist to come to power and impose a strict Maoist structure in the country.

Once again, from all quarters, the call for the establishment of peace through negotiations and early resumption of dialogue between the government and the CPN-Maoist has intensified. The recent efforts of the government to have an institutional mechanism as a staff agency for providing support for the peace process and the willingness of the CPN-Maoist to have UN's involvement can be considered as positive developments towards resolution of the ongoing conflict, although the government is yet to come out with a clear stand on the matter. Whether and when these efforts are going to bear fruits is not yet certain. But the prospect for peace in fact is dependent upon a number of factors, some of which, I feel, are as follows:

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1. Intention of the Principal Actors The country as a whole is the stakeholder of peace. But the fact remains that if external factors are discounted—which is not possible, the respective intentions of the king and the CPN-Maoist play the most important role in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. To my mind, both these forces realize this fact. After the king dismissed the elected government of Sher Bahadur Deuba on October 4, 2002 and appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand as prime minister and his own nominees as ministers, the government established contacts with the Maoists through its intermediaries. Everything has not come out in public as to what they agreed in private, but without concurrence at the highest level, the government and the CPN-Maoist would not have announced the ceasefire—the second ceasefire.

It is because of this fact that the major political parties became suspicious of the move and felt that they were being marginalized by the two forces wielding guns. But the way a long time was taken and from the lack of seriousness demonstrated in the first sitting of the second round of dialogue, one could doubt whether the King was really serious in finding a peaceful negotiation to the ongoing conflict. First, there was delay in agreeing to a code of conduct to be observed during the ceasefire and then the lukewarm attitude shown by the government during the first sitting of talks. Second, the wrangling on the limitation of army's movement within 5 km of its station and the pronouncement of the members of the Surya Bahadur Thapa cabinet that 'minutes of the earlier sittings did not exist' created misgivings. Third, the unwillingness of the king to give audience to a team of Maoists, despite their willingness for such an audience, was a clear indication that palace was not serious towards the talk.

The Maoists, in turn, adopted the strategy of re-grouping and Shakti Sanchaya (strengthening of position) during the ceasefire and did not bother to pursue the matter of issuing neither letters to facilitators about their role nor a letter to the National Human Rights Commission appointing it as the coordinator of the monitoring team. It was only in the third sitting of the second round of dialogue, held at Nepalgunj and later at Hapure, an expectation was raised since the government, on its part, presented its agenda (Annex 11) for discussion with the Maoists. The people at large had thought that there was going to be seriousness in the talk, which also, however, ended in a fiasco.

Even if another ceasefire is announced for peace talks or a strategy for behind-the-scene talks were adopted without declaring a ceasefire, the peace process is not likely to succeed unless the two principal actors involved are interested in seeking peace and are flexible in their approach towards each other. But from all indications, it seems, the king is not willing to take the initiative for conflict resolution and has been passing the buck on the Council of Ministers, who, without clear-cut directives from him, would not succeed. This issue has once again been raised by Prachanda, the CPN-Maoist supremo, in his latest statement, demanding direct negotiations with king Gyanendra (September first week, 2004). Whether the King does or does not agree to this proposal depends upon their acceptance of each other’s existence. I think it as a pre-condition for the solution to the ongoing conflict. 2. Clearing Stumbling Blocks As already indicated, two rounds of talks have already failed. Padma Ratna Tuladhar, one of the two facilitators in both the rounds of talks, was contacted to find out the facilitators' perception on why the talks failed. According to Tuladhar, the first round of talks was not a talk at all. He reasoned that, first of all, as it was the first contact between the two sides, the negotiators took their time to know each other. Second, the government negotiators neither had a clear agenda nor a strategy to follow. Third, they had not made arrangements for the logistics required for the talks, such as secretarial assistance. When the

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Maoists submitted their 11-point demands (Annex 10), the government side, in return, read out the reply and did not provide a copy of it to the Maoist side. The most important thing was that there was a 'lack of trust between the two parties'. The Maoists feared that they would be trapped in the long and protracted negotiation designed to make them tired and forced to surrender. The government, on its part, thought that the other party was using the talk as a strategy for Shakti Sanchaya (Strengthening of Position). Indeed, both sides used the ceasefire and negotiation period for this purpose. Otherwise, the Maoists would not have attacked the army barrack in Dang where the government had stored a large cache of arms.

Tuladhar feels that it was only from the second round of talks that seriousness purpose was observed as both sides started discussing the issues in substance. The government had also submitted its response to the reform agenda submitted by the CPN-Maoist during the first sitting of the second round of talks (Annex 11). But, he thinks, again due to the lack of trust in each other and of negotiation skills on the part of government representatives the talks failed. If the government had shown flexibility and skills, especially in dealing with the issue of constituent assembly, the talks would not have failed. His argument was that the Maoists had substantially toned down their original demand, ie establishing a republican system of government. They were willing to have a tacit understanding on retaining monarchy provided the monarchy was willing to remain as a mere king. What they wanted was to have a new Constitution drafted through a constituent assembly. He feels that 'if the government had the negotiation skill they would have kept the Maoists engaged in talks and would have found a solution to their demand for a constituent assembly, which the government has so far rejected.'

Narahari Acharya, one of the government negotiators during the first round of talks, over a telephone talk with me, said that this round of talks had failed due the lack of seriousness on both the sides and neither of the sides thought that the other would not be able to subdue it through use of force. As to the query if the government had forwarded its agenda in response to the 11 demands of the CPN-Maoist, Acharya said, 'yes, the government did not put forward its demands but responded to the issues raised by the Maoists' during the second sitting at Thakurdwara, west Nepal. According to him, out of the 11 demands, five were related to the creation of a favourable environment, three were related to public life (Janjiban Sambandhi Kuraharu) and the remaining three were related to political issues. He further stated that the CPN-Maoist preferred to the political issues: abrogation of the present Constitution and drafting of a new Constitution, dissolution of the HoR and formation of an interim government. They also pleaded that as the monarchy has lost its traditional legitimacy after the royal palace massacre of June 1, 2001, there was need for establishing the republican system of government.

The government gave reply to each one of the issues. As to the first issue, the government side replied that a new Constitution could be drafted through the existing provision of the Constitution, ie using the amendment provision for the incorporation of the agreed matters. With regard to the second issue, according to Acharya, the government response was that the dissolution of the HoR was possible and an interim government could be formed provided the political objective to be achieved was agreed upon or was clear to both the sides. As to the third issue, the government side said that, after the movement of 1990, the traditional notion of monarchy had died. But it would not accept the demand for establishing the republican form of government in the country.

One of the two most important elements that would cause the failure of the talks in the future was the role and position of the king in the new political set-up. From all indications so far, King Gyanendra is not satisfied with what is prescribed as the role of the king by the present Constitution. The Maoist want to decide its future through referendum. The five political parties had set eighteen points for a peace agreement (Annex 12). But they are not clear whether the CPN-UML, after joining the SB Deuba government, subscribes to these points. The parties have clearly indicated that they are not interested to

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give more power to the king; rather they want to clip the wings of the king. In such a situation, the negotiation is more likely to fail than succeed so long as this is not sorted out. This issue is directly related to the issue of the constituent assembly. The king would have no objection to the demand for a constituent assembly when he would be fully satisfied that its position and its control over the army would not be adversely affected and the role or powers of the king under the present Constitution would not be touched. He may also agree for a roundtable conference and formation of an interim government—the other major demands of the Maoists.

As the CPN-Maoist feels that it could easily have the majority in the polls for a constituent assembly, they are confident of achieving their goal of establishing republicanism in Nepal through this means. But how far this would be practicable is a subject of conjecture and challenge. Nevertheless, the Maoists have proposed to the monarchy and other political parties for going to the people with their views and beliefs and let the people decide on them. In other words, the Maoists wish to determine the king’s future through the election to the constituent assembly. This is still a serious issue without whose resolution the peace talks may not succeed nor would the ongoing conflict be solved.

This means that there is need for both the actors to accept the principle of coexistence with one another to end the present deadlock if they believe not in military solution but in peaceful means of dialogue (Annex 8).

The other issue is related to decision about the Maoist cadre in the post-conflict situation. In other words, how to integrate the Maoist army and militia in the security forces or to use them for some other purposes remains one of the stumbling blocks to the success of the negotiation. The CPN-Maoist want to create a national army by integrating their army and militia with the RNA, which the establishment is yet to accept. This is not as serious an issue as that of the king's role. But what is required is that they should not take a stand on this; instead they should remain open to all options and decide accordingly. They could also consider the suggestion of the VMG, which has suggested that those members of Maoist army and militia meeting the criteria could be integrated in the army. Others could be given skill training or could be absorbed in the para-military or other security service. 3. Need for Realizing Each Other's Importance It has already become clear that none of the political actors, including the king, can solve the problem on its own. Neither would the political parties be able to successfully negotiate with the CPN-Maoist without the involvement or the consent of the king. Similarly, the CPN-Maoist, it seems, are unlikely to defeat the establishment through force. Therefore, what is needed is that they have to talk with each other to sort out the problem.

But unfortunately, the country is locked in two conflicts. One, the conflict between the king, along with the present government of SB Deuba, and the political parties (the Nepali Congress, the Nepal Sadbhavana Party [Anandi Devi], Nepal Peasants' and Workers Party and Janmorcha), which are raising voice against the October 4, 2004 step of the king. The other is the involvement of the state/establishment with the CPN-Maoist in the bloody conflict. Against such a situation what is required is the conversion of the present tripolar situation into bipolar situation as a precondition to solve the problem.

So far, neither the king has been able to take all the political parties into confidence nor the political parties have been able to work together with the king. The political parties claim that they are faithful to the basic principles of the present Constitution and so does the king reiterate he is. The political parties have not yet formed an alliance with the Maoists against the king. Such a scenario, based on the indications so far, seems not possible.

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After October 4, 2002 incident, the relationship between the king and the major political parties not only got further strained, but the five major political parties also came up with an eighteen-point proposal to address the political, social and economic issues for which they want to amend the present Constitution (Annex 12). As already indicated, they want to clip the wings of the monarchy in Nepal. In response to it, King Gyanendra came up with the idea of constructive monarchy (Nepal, national weekly, August 18-September 1, 2003). Similarly, no party, while in power, ever raised the issue of who controls the army. But this has been raised as one of the crucial issues of their eighteen-point political agenda (Annex 12). Unless either side expresses its willingness to withdraw from its stated position or both the parties agree to maintain the existing arrangements in the present Constitution with regard to the monarchy and the army, the relationship between the two is likely to remain strained. And they would not be able to work together, which is a must for successful negotiation with the Maoists.

As no difference between these two actors has been observed on socio-economic issues, including on decentralization (Annex 8), it would be desirable for the king and the leaders of the political parties to sink their ego for the sake of the larger interest of the people and the country. Those who believe and adhere to the tenets of the present Constitution and in particular those leaders whose parties have representation in the dissolved HoR should sort out their differences within them and with the king. This is possible only when they realize the importance of each other's existence and agree to work together.

Since the Maoists are also a principal actor in relation to the solution to the problem, they, too, have to be guided by a sense of give and take for a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict. In other words, if they believe in the peaceful resolution of the conflict, each of the three actors (the political parties, the CPN-Maoist and the king) has to realise each other's importance, believe that each one of them has a role to play in the nation-building process and accordingly contribute to it for the sake of the larger interest, ie interest of the country and its people. 4. External/Geo-political factor

Nepal is strategically located between two big nations of Asia, India and People's Republic of China. As such, whatever happens in this country becomes a matter of concern to both these countries. But since the CPN-Maoist have become the de facto ruler in many parts of the country, have the support of the Rim (International Revolutionary Movement), seem to be heavily involved in the procurement of arms and ammunition from outside the country and have the increased the scale of violence, the conflict has attracted the attention of Nepal's neighbours and international community, including the superpower, the USA.

Despite the fact that the name of late Chairman Mao has been used, Peoples' Republic of China, according to knowledgeable sources, does not support it and continues to maintain good relationship with the establishment, especially its traditional ally, the palace. So long as the present insurgency does not become a headache and problem to the autonomous region of Tibet, it seems from all indications that China may not like to be involved in any manner in the ongoing conflict other than carefully keeping a watch on the developments in Nepal.

But because of historical and other factors, the relationship of Nepal with India has been different from that with the People's Republic of China. As such, India seems to be an important factor in the case of the Maoist insurgency. First of all, there is a fraternal relationship between the CPN-Maoist and the various leftist groups in India, such as the People's War Group, Maoist Coordination Committee and Naxalites. They have been successful, as reported in various media, in establishing a corridor starting from Andhra Pradesh to Jharkhand to Bihar and on to Nepal. Second, the international border between the two countries is highly porous. Third, it is a known fact that India has been a safe sanctuary for CPN-

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Maoist leaders and cadres. Fourth, New Delhi still remains a Mecca for the leaders of all major political parties. The Ambassador of India to Nepal is like a Viceroy in this country, whose views, it is generally perceived, are taken seriously in all political matters. And especially after 1990, the presence of the Indian Embassy and its ambassador in political developments is more visible than before.

Because of these factors, whether people in Nepal like it or not, India has become a big force vis-à-vis solution to the Maoist problem. In this too, she has not put all eggs in one basket. Even if they have declared the Maoists as terrorists and handed over some small (Maoist) fish to Nepalese authorities, everybody knows big fish (top leadership) are living in India. They have also provided arms and ammunition and other support to the Nepalese military and other security forces to fight the Maoist insurgency. They have provided six helicopters, army trucks and Insas rifles to the Nepalese army (Nepal, national weekly, January 30-February 12, 2004). They have also provided counter-insurgency training to army personnel on. It has been reported that, following Prime Minister Deuba's recent visit to New Delhi, India is going to provide 24 anti-landmine vehicles, 800 army trucks, bulletproof jackets, night vision equipment on concessional loans. Similarly, India has agreed to sell 20,000 Insas rifles, 15,000 7.62mm guns, 5,000 machine guns and 1,000 mortars to the government of Nepal. (Annapurna Post, September 14, 2004).

According to Dixit, 'in the last three years, New Delhi has supplied over Rs3 billion worth of rifles, trucks, uniforms, helmets, helicopters, ammunition, ordinance and mini-protected vehicles. Plus, there's been counter-insurgency training' (2004). Similarly, some of the persons close to the South Block, the name of the building where the Ministry of External Affairs of India is located, are critical of the Nepalese palace. But the Government of India (GOI) has declared multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy as two fundamental pillars of Nepalese politics. This is all India is doing just to ensure Nepal remains dependent upon her in all respects within her sphere of influence. India is not satisfied with the growing interest of the international community in Nepalese affairs, especially the Maoist problem. They expressed their displeasure and raised a couple of serious questions during a high-level track two meeting held in New Delhi on February 13-14, 2003. The questions raised by the External Affairs Secretary of the GOI, Kanwal Sibal, at that meeting, among others, were: 'Can the problems of the Maoists be resolved without India's active involvement? Is Nepal willing and ready for India's active involvement? Will greater involvement of India give propaganda ammunition to anti-Indian elements in Nepal? Will certain elements which are not negligible make an effort or support the idea of increased international involvement in Nepal so as to reduce India's weight and role?’ (Rupa Co and OR Foundation 2004) It is learnt from an authoritative source, India was given prior information about the second ceasefire. Even then, from the very wording of the said questions, it becomes clear that, she did not feel happy and issued veiled threats to Nepal (Dhungel 2003). In such a context, how India will play its role in relation to the peace process will have to be observed carefully in achieving the peace process through dialogue.

One of the post 9/11 developments in relation to Nepal was that the USA is taking interest in Nepal, especially in the insurgency she is facing. She has provided and has been providing military assistance and hardware worth US$18 million plus 10 million as support to the Nepalese army to equip and improve its firepower capacity (Source???). They have provided 5,000 pieces of M16A2 rifles (Nepal, fortnightly magazine, January 30-February 12, 2004). They have not yet withdrawn the name of the CPN-Maoist from the watch list of terrorists. From the statements of their newly-appointed Ambassador to Kathmandu, it is clear that their policy towards the Maoists remains hawkish. How far the government of Nepal is able to sustain the US interest towards her would depend upon her manoeuvrability and skill to play diplomacy and its implications for the peace talk.

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Great Britain has also been taking interest in the ongoing conflict. She has, as already stated, appointed a special emissary (Sir Jeffrey James) to keep track of what is happening in Nepal and has provided military assistance in the form of bomb disposal equipment, two MI17 helicopters, wireless sets, and two surveillance planes (Annapurna Post September 14, 2004). In addition, it has been persuading both the parties to start a dialogue for peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Due to the growing seriousness of the conflict, as stated above, the UN Secretary General has placed his service available to both the parties to help resolve the conflict and has appointed one of his senior officials as a special emissary for this purpose. Two EU members, Norway and Switzerland, have shown their interest to help resolve the conflict.

With the worsening situation attracting the attention of the major world powers, Nepal has, for the first time, remained no longer a yam between two big countries, People's Republic of China and India. In other words, Nepal has figured in the global agenda of security consideration. India, the USA and the UK are becoming more important in terms of finding the solution to the problem. How they would cooperate with each other and how the government of Nepal would deal with them and also with the People's Republic of China in relation to the peace talks would have direct bearing on the success of the peaceful resolution of the conflict. It is also incumbent on the acceptance of the good office of the UN Secretary General.

5. Civil Societies to play the role of Honest Broker

The emergence of a vibrant civil society and its efforts to assert a place in the nation-building process is one of the positive developments in the post-1990 Nepal. A number of civil societies are engaged in various manners in the peace-building process. There is a broad alliance of more than 100 civil societies in Shanti ko Lagi Eikbadtha whose main goal was to put pressure on the warring factions to come to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It has been very vocal against human rights violation by both the conflicting parties. But the fact remains that the pressure exerted by the civil societies, so far, has not been effective simply because most of them are perceived to be taking side of either of the conflicting parties.

The general perception among certain sections of society is that most of the civil societies are not neutral and have failed to maintain equi-distance from the principal political actors. Though I do not agree to this perception in totality, many people doubt whether the civil societies are really interested to bring about rapprochement between the different political actors involved in the present conflict and stakeholders associated with its resolution. They further feel that they are not helpful in closing the increasing gap among the principal political actors without whose cooperative attitude and willingness to accept the co-existence of each other peaceful negotiation of the conflict is not possible.

The VMG had developed its road map by taking these into consideration. In other words, the group, while developing its road map, was guided by the need to maintain equi-distance between the principal actors. The other considerations that were kept in mind in developing the road map were: the Nepalese are themselves capable of solving the present conflict; each of the three principal actors has to have a feeling of give and take for the sake of national interest and recognize the existence of each other and, above all, they should be guided by the notion of peaceful resolution of the conflict from the core of their heart.

Despite the group's discussions with all the major actors, its importance, unfortunately, was yet to be recognized. As a result, VMG's efforts and its voice still remain a 'feeble voice'. Similarly, the road map prepared by the civil society alliance, Eikbadtha, is yet to make a dent in the peace process. To make their voice heard in the conflict resolution and be able to put stronger pressure in this process as an honest broker between the conflicting parties, the civil societies need to come much closer, maintain equi-

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distance from the conflicting parties and develop a common agenda to put forth before the conflicting parties for a solution to the conflict that is sustainable.

6. Study Lab of Conflict Resolution Because of the strategic importance of the country and the growing intensity of the insurgency, it is natural for the donors to do an in-depth study of its causes and consequences. Similarly, one can understand the interest of researchers in this subject. But when the studies conducted, the papers produced and the number of seminars conducted on the subject matter are considered, it can safely be concluded that the subject has been over-studied or discussed. How much money has come from donors in the name of conflict resolution is anybody’s guess. Similarly, neither the government nor the civil society has a clear picture or information about who is doing what in relation to this subject.

But, according to one figure, the United States Agency for International Development, United Nation Development Programme and Swiss Development Cooperation pumped in US$14.674 million in the name of conflict resolution in 2003/2004. In addition, the British and German aid agency (GTZ) provided 3.5 million pounds and Euro 9,800,000 respectively. The cumulative annual budget of seven organizations active in the conflict-related issues, ie Centre for Victims of Torture, Nepal (CVICT), Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), Rural Reconstruction Nepal, Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre (CWIN), South Asia Partnership-Nepal (SAP/Nepal), International Solidarity Group-Nepal (GRINSO/Nepal) and National Peace Movement (NPM) comes to Rs220 million (Pathak 2004). All this has come from donor agencies.

From what is happening in the name of conflict resolution, it can be suspected whether donors or agencies are really helping to resolve the conflict or making Nepal and Nepalese more confused. In other words, because of the mushroom growth of experts and organizations and agencies on the subject matter, a question that comes to my mind is whether Nepal has not been made a laboratory for the study of the subject. We have to seek answer to this question. Also, if Nepal does not use the money and knowledge available in the form of grants and expertise for its benefit, these would cause more confusion than help in the resolution of the conflict.

7. Avoid being Swayed by the Interest of Arms Dealers Over the time, as is seen from the above table (Table 1), there has been an increase in security and defence expenditures. This means, the increase in the procurement of arms has led, it is claimed by knowledgeable persons, to a high percentage of commission paid by arms dealers to purchasers. So long as the conflict remains a milking cow between the purchaser and suppliers, there will be less interest in peace in the country. This is one of the doubts raised as to the intention of the warring factions for peaceful resolution of the conflict. I do not know how this issue can be addressed. But what is required is to ensure that arms suppliers do not play a negative role in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. For this, the civil society at large has to build coalition with the international civil societies that are keeping their eyes on the game played by arms suppliers and, through them, ensure that they do not play a villainous role.

8. Addressing the Concerns of Janjatis, Dalits and Poorer Regions No doubt, the Maoist insurgency has been very costly in terms of human lives and material loss. But it has succeeded in bringing out centuries-old social, economic and political problems to the fore. Without

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their resolution, there cannot be sustainable peace in the country. In other words, the issues of the marginalization of ethnic and disadvantaged groups, the economic disparity between the different sections and geographical regions and highly centralized nature of the state have to be addressed. Otherwise, there would be a series of conflicts even after the present conflict comes to an end.

When the political agendas of the major political actors, the political parties, the establishment (on the basis of agenda submitted by the SB Thapa government at Hapure) and the CPN-Maoist are analysed, one would not find fundamental differences between them in respect of these matters (Annex 8). Therefore, there should not be any problem in coming to a general consensus on matters of women, Janjatis, Dalits and decentralization and economic issues between the establishment, Maoists and political parties. But what is required is to take up the issues about them in any meaningful dialogues that may take place for the resolution of the conflict, resolve and duly reflect them in the fundamental law of the land. While addressing the concerns of these groups, every care should be taken to ensure that special measures or affirmative actions are not hijacked by the elites within women, Janjatis and Dalit groups. In other words, by keeping in mind the fact that within each of these groups there are both better-offs and deprived ones, every care should be taken to ensure that the better-offs and the elite within these groups alone do not hijack the benefits provided or enjoy the empowering measures. 9. Agree for Revising or Drafting a New Constitution The present Constitution, due to grudges of different sections of society and different ecological regions, has outlived its utility. The CPN-Maoist, who have been waging the Jana Yuddha for the past nine years, want it to be replaced by a new Constitution to be drafted by a constituent assembly. For this purpose, they have their own reform agenda, which they had made public at the peace talks with the government.

The major political parties, including the NC and the CPN-UML, have come out with an eighteen-point political agenda to be included in the Constitution through its amendment as per the provision in the Constitution, ie relating to the amendment of the Constitution. The king, too, in an interview to a weekly vernacular magazine (Nepal, August 18-September 1, 2003), expressed his feeling of not being satisfied with the present constitutional provisions on the role of the king. The other political parties are not satisfied with the present Constitution as it has not been able to address the said concerns.

The NSP (the faction of the party which is not in the present government), too, is not satisfied as it has, according to them, failed to address the concerns of the Madhesis (people living in the southern parts of the country) and wants to go for a constituent assembly to address their concerns. As already indicated above, ethnic and disadvantaged groups are not satisfied with the provisions of the present Constitution. They want an inclusive structure and want to see the age-old structural weaknesses addressed, for which some of them want to have a new Constitution drafted by a constituent assembly. In that, they want the representation of all sections of society and disadvantaged geographical areas. Others think that their concerns could be addressed through amendment of the present Constitution.

The Constitution and its drafting method may be only a means to reflect the moods and demands of the different sections and areas of the country. What is essential is its content and its ability to address the concerns raised by different sections of society and geographical areas. Therefore, although I am in favour of giving the right to the people to draft and approve the fundamental law that governs their destiny, what is desirable is that the principal actors locked in the present conflict should agree through dialogue not only on the major issues but also on the means to getting agreed matters reflected in the fundamental law of the land. But I want to retain the people's right to approve the rewritten Constitution

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through referendum if they agree for re-writing the Constitution through the use of the amendment provision of the present Constitution.

Conclusion Nepal is in deep trouble from every aspect—political, economic and social—and it has never faced situation a more critical than the present one since she became a politically unified country. From every indication she is moving towards becoming a failed state. Time is running out for her to solve the problem. If sense does not prevail among the actors involved in the present conflict, she may also lose her independence. The country is in need of statesmen, or rather statespersons, who can rise above personal egos and whims. But unfortunately the present leaders of the country are yet to show ‘statespersonship’.

Therefore, if the main actors locked in the present conflict want to save the national identity or existence of Nepal from possible foreign intervention and dictation (Shahin 2004, View and Counter view [Times of India], Roy, 2004, [The Sunday Statesman], The Tribune 2004 and Muni 2004), they should sink their egos and agree to the principle of give and take, recognize each other's existence and accordingly develop a political framework in which each actor would have an honourable place and the demands of all the ethnic groups and regions for an equitable share in the national resources and positions are recognized and incorporated in the fundamental law of the land either through the drafting of a new Constitution through a constituent assembly or revision or re-writing of the present Constitution through its amendment provision.

The end

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Endnotes i The Communist Party of Nepal was formally established on September 15, 1949 in Calcutta, India. Since then,

within last fifty years of its existence, the party has split many times. As a result, there are several Communist parties in Nepal, including the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist and Leninist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). How the party got split over time is shown in Chart 1: History of the Communist Party of Nepal.

ii Rolpa and Rukum are two districts located in the Mid-Western Development Region and form parts of the Rapti

Zone, which itself is a part of the region. Both these districts have been considered to be in the forefront of militant resistance for several years and stronghold of Maoist communists. Thawang, one of the villages in the district of Rolpa is considered to be the capital of the CPN Maoists.

iii Sindhuli is another district headquarters of the district called by the same name and it is one of the districts of the

Janakpur zone which forms a part of the Central Development Region. This place is located about 200km east of Kathmandu.

iv During early 1950s, the country witnessed a people's movement against the century-old Rana oligarchy. The

movement was led by the Nepali Congress and had the support of late King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Dev. As a result of this movement, the then oligarchic system was overthrown and the country was ushered in the democratic system.

v In 1989, another movement was launched by the Nepali Congress and the United Left against the Panchayat

system and it succeeded in toppling this system and the multiparty parliamentary system was restored in the country. As a result, a new Constitution, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, was drafted and promulgated, which, among other things, guarantees the basic human rights and an independent judiciary, along with making the people of Nepal the source of sovereignty. In addition, it makes an elected person the head of the executive branch of the government and king a constitutional monarch.

vi A survey was administered by the Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS) for the United Nations

University as a part of the latter's global study of the governance situation. As per the survey, the respondents were to give their views on governance situation as it was in 1995 and 2000 on the basis of a pre-coded questionnaire, on a scale of 1-5, starting from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’. The questionnaire covered six dimensions of governance: participation in the political process, interest aggregate system, government stewardship, civil service and policy planning, relationship between the state and the market, and dispute resolution system. It was administered on groups such as high-ranking civil servants, successful entrepreneurs, senior judges and lawyers, long-standing parliamentarians or equivalents, academics, etc. Based on their answers, it was found that there was deterioration in the governance situation over a period of five years. (For details see Dwarika Dhungel, Governance Situation in Nepal, Kathmandu, IIDS, July 2002).

vii Article 127 of the Constitution of the Kingdom 1990 prescribes the provision for power to remove difficulties. In accordance to which, 'if any difficulty arises in connection with the implementation of this Constitution, His Majesty may issue necessary Orders to remove such difficulty and such Orders shall be laid before the Parliament'. In May (22) 2002, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba recommended to the king for the dissolution of the House of Representatives and called for fresh election in November of the same year. But Deuba, again in October , recommended the King to postpone the election for the House of Representatives with the consent of all the major parties represented in the dissolved house on the basis of the said article (127). The King in return sacked Prime Minister Deuba and his cabinet and assumed executive power by using the same article on October 4, 2004. Since then, the King has already appointed three persons: Lokendra Bahadur Chand, Surya Bahadur Thapa and Sher Bahdur Deuba as the prime ministers of the country and under the leadership of each one of them council of ministers were appointed. Because of these reasons, the cabinet formed under Article 127 since October 4, 2002 are different from the earlier governments. viii After the restoration of the multiparty parliamentary system and the promulgation of the Constitution of the

Kingdom of Nepal 1990, except for less than two years, the Nepali Congress, including the present government headed by Sher Bahadur Deuba, the president of the Nepali Congress (Democratic), has been in power.

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ix 'During 1994, the Maoists began a long-term consciousness-raising and political mobilisation campaign in...

Rolpa. The campaign was named 'SIJA'... It was organised by one of the most senior Magars in the Maoist Movement, military commander Ram Bahadur Thapa... Dr de Sales comments that 'the Maoists have skillfully appropriated certain traditional techniques in their strategy for conquering the Kham-Magars territory for use as their insurgency base, including the use of traditional Kham-Magar symbols, sites and cultural concepts, among them the name assigned to the SIJA campaign' (Robert Gersony, Sowing the Wind... History and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt in Nepal's Rapti Hills, Report submitted to Nancy Lindborg, Vice President, Mercy Corps International, October 2003).

x As per the Census of 2001, 48.61 per cent of the population speaks Nepali. The other major languages are

Maithili (12.30 per cent), Bhojpuri (7.53 per cent), Tharu (5.86 per cent), Tamang (5.19 per cent), Newari (3.63 per cent), Magar (3.39 per cent), Awadhi (2.47 per cent), Gurung (1.49 per cent) and Limbu (1.47 per cent).

xi In each of the 3,913 village units, there is a council (Village Council) and an executive committee (Village

Development Committee, VDC). Each village unit is divided into nine wards for representation. A ward chairperson, three ward members and one ward woman member on the Village Council represent each ward. It consists of a chairperson, vice-chairperson, ward members (five: ward chairperson, woman ward member, other ward members and six persons, including one woman, nominated by the village council from amongst social workers, socially and economically backward tribes and ethnic communities, downtrodden and indigenous peoples living within VDC, belonging to the class whose representation in the village assembly does not exist and who are in possession of the required qualifications to become the member of the council (8)2(c). The VDC consists of a chairperson, vice chairperson and ward members and two members, including one woman, nominated by the VDC from amongst the members of the council as referred to in clause (c) and sub-section (2) of Section 8. Each of the municipalities (58 in number) has a council and an executive committee. A municipality is divided into a number of wards. Each ward consists of a ward chairperson and four other members (one woman member and three ward members). A municipal council consists of mayor, deputy mayor and ward members and no less than six persons and no more than 20 persons, including a woman nominated by the Municipal Council from amongst the social workers, socially and backward tribes and indigenous peoples living within the area of the municipality, belonging to the class whose representation on the municipal council does not exist and who are in possession of required qualifications to become the member of the municipal council ... provided, however, that out of the persons to be nominated, at least forty persons ... have to be women (Clause : 76(2)(c)). Each district (altogether 75) has a district council and its executive council, District Development Committee (DDC). A district council consists of a chairperson, deputy chairperson of each VDC, mayor, deputy mayor of each municipality in the district, members of the district development committee, members of the HoR and National Assembly within the district as ex-officio members and six persons, including one woman, nominated by the District Council from amongst those social workers, socially and economically backward tribes and ethnic communities, downtrodden and indigenous peoples within the district, belonging to the class, whose representation in the District Council does not exist and who are in possession of the required qualifications to become the Member of the District Council (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 172. The DDC, the executive wing of the council consists of members elected by the elected members of the village council and municipal council in each area (?? ) of the district from amongst themselves at the rate of one member from each area, president and vice-president elected by the elected members of each village council and municipal council in the district from amongst themselves, members of the HoR and the National Assembly within the district as ex-officio members and two nominated members, including one woman, by the DDC from amongst the members of the district council as referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 172 (Local Self Governance Act 1999).

xii The reasons for which liberalisation, as per Meena Acharya, was to generate positive impact on the economy

were: 'First, as the program is efficiency and growth oriented the attainment of higher economic growth rate was expected to increase per capita income and consumption. The poor were and are expected to benefit from the trickle-down effect through an expansion of employment as a secondary effect of increased consumption. Second, as sector policies are designed to increase production and employment in agriculture, where poverty is mostly clustered, improvement in this sector is supposed to address poverty directly (see APP 1995). Third, liberalization of the non-agricultural sector was/is supposed to promote industrial and business activities, creating employment opportunities and hence increased income for the urban/semi-urban poor. Since the bulk of the poor are assumed to be outside the cash economy, the negative impact of adjustment, likely to arise from the

29

withdrawal of subsidies on food, fertiliser and bank credit, retrenchment of the formal sector employees, rise in prices of publicly supplied goods and broadening of the tax base was expected to be minimum on the very poor. Women were supposed to benefit equally from this expansion in employment. Whether all these suppositions have materialized has been debated extensively (For example, see Dahal, et al 1999; Panday 1999; Khan 2000; Acharya, et al forthcoming' (Meena Acharya, ‘The Economic Foundation of the Current Socio-Political Crisis in Nepal’, in DB Gurung, Nepal Tomorrow: Voices & Visions, Kathmandu , Koselee Prakashan 2003 , pp237-256).

xiii The first effort to establish local self-government was made by the Rana Oligarchy in BS 1976 (AD1919) by

establishing a municipality at Bhotahity, one of the localities in Kathmandu. However, outside of the valley, the first effort was made in BS1983 (AD1926) by establishing a local council–Manyajan Kachahari in Dang-Deukhuri Valley in the district of Dang in Rapti Zone/Mid-Western Development Region.

xiv After the formation of the Dhami Commission, the Krishna Prashad Bhattarai government formed a nine-

member high-level committee, Maoist Problem Solution High-level Recommendation Committee, under the chairmanship of Sher Bahadur Deuba on December 1999 [?]. The committee had, in its report, among other things, recommended that for solving the problem, dialogue had to be held with the CPN-Maoist. At the party level, the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxists and Leninists) also had formed a working group under Jhala Nath Khanal on Bhadra 26, 2057 (September 11, 2002) to study the issues related to the Maoists. Based on the study report, the party has published a booklet, called Nekapa (Maobadi) ko Chirphar 2058 (Dissection of Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) 2058. The report, among other things, has recommended bringing about far-reaching changes in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres for the purpose of bringing total change in society. Also, it has recognised the Maoist problem as a political problem. In addition to Khanal, the CPN-UML had constituted a working group with five members to study the Maoist activity under the convenorship of CP Mainali in 2053 (1996) [?], which submitted its report to the party on Srawan 23, 2054 (August 7, 1997). This group also, in its report, recommended solving the problem politically and for making continuous efforts for dialogue with the party concerned.

xv The group comprised Aditya Man Shrestha, Prayag Dutta Tewari and Dwarika N Dhungel, and after the group

published its roadmap at a press meeting on December 25, 2003, Prof. Suresh Raj Chalise also joined the group. The group has declared themselves as the Volunteer Mediators' Group (VMG).

References 1. Acharya, Meena. 2003. ‘The Economic Foundation of the Current Socio-Political Crisis in Nepal’. In Nepal

Tomorrow: Voices and Visions, edited by DB Gurung. Kathmandu: Koseli Prakasan. 2. TAMF. 2004. Analysis of Caste, Ethnicity and Gender Data from 2001: Populating Census in Preparation for

Poverty Mapping and Wider PRSP Monitoring. Kathmandu: Tanka Acharya Memorial Foundation 3. CPN-UML. BS2058 (2001). Nekapa (Maobadi) ko Chirphar (Dissection of Communist Party of Nepal

(Maoist). Kathmandu: Communist Party of Nepal (United Leninist and Marxist). 4. Dixit, Kanak M. 2004. ‘Nepal: Shangri-La hurtles into chaos’. In The Times of India, May 30, 2004. 5. -- ‘Nepalis can and must solve their own problem, however dire: Nepal: Is it for India to Intervene’. In Sunday

Times of India, August 29, 2004 6. Dhungel, Dwarika N. 2003. India's Veiled Threat. In The Himalayan Times February 27, 2003 7. -- 2004. Roadmap for Peace Building in Conflict Ridden in Nepal, Commemorative Souvenir on Charter

Presentation, Rotary Club of Rudramati (RI district 3290), April 14, 2004 8. Dhungel, Dwarika N, Meena Acharya and Pradyumna Regmi. nd. Engendering Nepalese Civil Service with

Specific Reference to Promotion and Entry in Administrative Service. Kathmandu: His Majesty's Government, Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare and United Nations Development Programme.

9. Gautam, Kul C. 2004. Possible Role of UN in the Peace Process in Nepal, August 20, 2004. Kathmandu: Nepal World Affairs Council.

10. Gersony, Robert. 2003. Sowing the wind … History and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt in Nepal's Rapti Hills (Report submitted to Nancy Lindberg, Vice President Mercy Corps International), October, 2003.

11. Gurung, Harka. 2001. Nepal Social Demography and Expressions. Kathmandu: New Era. 12. IIDS. 1993. The Second Parliamentary Election: A Study of the Emerging Democratic Process in Nepal.

Kathmandu: Institute for Integrated Development Studies 13. --. 2002. Advasis/Janajatis in National Development: Major Issues, Constraints and Opportunities: A Plan of

Action Proposed for the Tenth Plan 2002-2007. Kathmandu: Institute for Integrated Development Studies 14. INSEC. 2004. Nepal Human Rights Year Book 2004. Kathmandu: Informal Sector Service Centre. 15. Karki, Arjun and Binod Bhattarai. nd. Whose War? Economic and Socio-cultural Impacts of Nepal's Maoist-

Government Conflict. Kathmandu: NGO Federation of Nepal. 16. Karki, Arjun and David Seddon. 2003. The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspective. Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 17. Manchanda, Rita. 2003. King's gambit’. In Frontline: India's national magazine from the publishers of the

Hindu, August 30 – September 12, 2003. 18. Manadhar, Shes N. BS2056 (1999). Nijamati Sewako Adhikrit Stariya Janasaktima Janajati ko Sthiti: Ek

Ptativedan (Status of Nationalities in Civil Service at the Officer Level: A Report), A Study Report submitted to the National Council for Nationalities Development.

19. Muni, SD. ‘India should work as a quiet and honest facilitator to help Nepal out of its mess: On a hot tin roof’. In The Hindustan Times, August 30, 2004.

20. ‘New Delhi must play a more assertive role’ (Counter view). In The Times of India, May 30, 2004. 21. ORF, 2004. India-Nepal Relations: The Challenge Ahead. New Delhi, Rupa. Co in Association with Observer

Research Foundation. 22. Palmer, David Scott. 2003. Nepal's Multiple Challenges in Comparative Perspective. Massachusetts: Boston

University. 23. Pathak, Tilak. ‘Dwandako Vybasaya (Conflict as an Occupation)’. In Nepal, National Weekly, Feb. 13-27,

2004. 24. Pyakuryal, Bishwambher. ‘Double Digit Growth’. In The Kathmandu Post, August 23, 2004. 25. Rana, Pashupati Shumshere and Dwarika N Dhungel. 1998. Contemporary Nepal. Delhi: Vikash Publishing

House Pvt. Ltd. 26. Rai, Chandiraj. 2056. Nepal ko Sansadma Janajatiharuko Prathinidhitwa: Ek Adhyayan (A Study on the

Representation of Nationalities in Nepal's Parliament: 1992-1999). Kathmandu. 27. Roy, Ranjan. India can't just stand by and watch, New Delhi has to engage politically: Nepal: Is it time for India

to intervene. In The Sunday Times of India, August 29, 2004. New Delhi. 28. Shahin, Shahin. 2004. India and the Nepal Quagmire. Asia Times Online Limited.

1

Annex 1

No. of Victims Killed by State and Maoist in Connection with the "People's War" (13 Feb 1996 -10 Aug 2004)

SN Districts Killed by State Killed by Maoist SN Districts Killed by State Killed by Maoist 1 Jhapa 31 28 38 Lamjung 151 60 2 Ilam 50 20 39 Syangja 39 34 3 Panchathar 63 27 40 Kaski 35 42 4 Taplejung 48 27 41 Nawalparasi 46 34 5 Morang 70 39 42 Rupandehi 24 30 6 Sunsari 33 15 43 Palpa 53 14 7 Dhankuta 12 13 44 Kapilvastu 16 52 8 Terhathum 40 12 45 Arghakhanchi 114 23 9 Bhojpur 51 48 46 Gulmi 18 23 10 Sankhuwasabha 67 32 47 Baglung 71 30 11 Saptari 18 16 48 Parvat 26 6 12 Siraha 58 49 49 Myagdi 167 43 13 Udaypur 57 21 50 Dang 403 239 14 Khotang 66 23 51 Pyuthan 21 20 15 Okhaldhunga 81 15 52 Rolpa 484 230 16 Solukhumbu 69 50 53 Salyan 229 86 17 Dhanusha 61 46 54 Rukum 651 158 18 Mahottari 17 27 55 Banke 156 105 19 Sarlahi 71 42 56 Bardiya 188 41 20 Sindhuli 100 83 57 Surkhet 200 54 21 Ramechhap 84 28 58 Jajarkot 123 73 22 Dolakha 88 73 59 Dailekh 80 67 23 Rautahat 60 55 60 Dolpa 27 24 24 Bara 53 51 61 Jumla 161 67 25 Parsa 29 35 62 Kalikot 199 55 26 Chitawan 61 37 63 Mugu 31 7 27 Makawanpur 21 49 64 Humla 16 11 28 Lalitpur 13 38 65 Kailali 155 94 29 Kavre 72 84 66 Achham 165 157 30 Bhaktapur 13 1 67 Doti 142 8 31 Kathmandu 18 41 68 Bajura 69 53 32 Dhading 122 41 69 Bajhang 62 18 33 Sindhupalchowk 84 75 70 Kanchanpur 87 48 34 Nuwakot 91 47 71 Dadeldhura 74 35 35 Rasuwa 23 3 72 Baitadi 52 10 36 Tanahu 44 27 73 Darchula 33 17 37 Gorakha 146 89 Total 6653 3475

By State

YEAR\MON JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC TOT 1996 0 9 13 3 4 5 2 10 1 0 5 7 59 1997 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 16 1998 3 5 7 3 20 77 24 21 10 50 63 51 334 1999 25 23 52 23 15 22 25 14 36 24 29 40 328 2000 34 44 11 14 13 7 5 20 9 11 6 5 179 2001 6 5 5 21 3 5 13 0 0 0 61 125 244 2002 140 247 370 484 619 305 104 168 223 293 260 84 3297 2003 80 6 4 6 3 19 4 137 232 340 227 159 1217 2004 112 191 212 115 156 67 96 30 0 0 0 0 979 Total 409 533 674 669 833 507 273 401 511 720 652 471 6653

By Maoist

YEAR\MON JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC TOT 1996 0 2 4 1 2 0 1 2 0 2 5 3 22 1997 2 7 0 3 5 5 4 0 0 3 0 3 32 1998 3 0 8 2 7 1 5 9 5 11 9 15 75 1999 11 10 25 11 21 12 9 10 16 6 5 5 141 2000 32 39 8 32 5 26 9 11 25 5 24 3 219 2001 11 26 3 80 15 14 80 1 1 4 99 56 390 2002 69 242 72 163 190 51 57 40 182 65 169 51 1351 2003 59 9 3 2 7 8 14 56 185 154 91 58 646 2004 46 57 133 58 100 93 93 19 599 Total 233 392 256 352 352 210 272 148 414 250 402 194 3475

2

Occupation by State by Maoist Total Agricultural workers 1128 540 1668 Teachers 52 70 122 Political workers 4160 345 4505 Police personnel 8 1113 1121 General people 200 251 451 Students 162 108 270 Civil servants 34 448 482 Social workers 6 6 12 Business persons 39 73 112 Workers 97 43 140 Health workers 1 3 4 Army personnel 5 354 359 Photographers 1 3 4 Journalists 2 1 3 Law professionals 0 2 2 Prisoners 1 3 4 Dacoits 0 1 1 Engineer 0 1 1 Unidentified persons 757 110 867 Total 6653 3475 10128 * Workers denote wage workers, industrial workers and transportation workers

After the Royal Takeover 13 Feb 1996 - 10 Aug 2004 (4 Oct 2002 - 10 Aug 2004) Per day Killing By State By Maoist Total 3.31 2807 1523 4330 Per day 4.21 2.29 6.50

Before Second Truce Before Royal Takeover (4 Oct 2002 - 29 Jan 2003) (13 Feb 1996 - 3 Oct 2002) By State By Maoist Total By State By Maoist Total 688 337 1025 3849 1952 5801

Per day 5.98 2.93 8.91 Per day 1.61 0.82 2.43

During Second Truce After Government's Commitment to (30 Jan - 27 Aug 2003) Respect Human Rights (26 Mar - 10 Aug 2004) By State By Maoist Total By State By Maoist Total 124 82 206 475 367 842

Per day 0.60 0.40 1.00 Per day 3.54 2.74 6.28

After the breakdown of Second Truce After the formation of Deuba government (28 Aug 2003 - 10 Aug 2004) ( 2 Jun - 10 Aug 2004 ) By State By Maoist Total By State By Maoist Total 1995 1104 3099 189 203 392

Per day 5.83 3.23 9.06 Per day 2.78 2.99 5.76 Source: Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC)

P.O.Box 2726, Kathmandu, Nepal Tel : +977-01-4278770 Fax :4270551

Source: Nepali Times, August 13-19, 2004

3

Annex 2

Inventory of DoR infrastructure/property destroyed in the conflict

S.No. Particular Nos. 1. Bridges/culverts 26 2. Buildings 15 3. Heavy equipments/machines Bulldozers,

Grader Loaders, etc. 5

4. Jeeps 4 5. Motorcycles 8 6. Tractors 3 7. Tipper 2 8. Construction and office materials Equivalent to NRs. 6 million Source: Arjun Karki and Binod Bhattarai (ed), Whose War? – Economic and Socio-Cultural Impacts

of Nepal's Maosit-Government Conflict, Kathmandu, NGO Federation of Nepal, A national federation of NGOs in Nepal.

4

Annex 3

Prime Ministers Appointed after the Restoration of Multi-party Parliamentary System

Appointment Date S. No.

Prime Ministers B.S. Date English Date

Duration in Office (Months)

1. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai 2047/1/6 May 19, 1990 2. Girija P. Koirala 2048/2/15 May 29, 1991 3. Manmohan Adikari 2051/8/14 November 30, 1994 4. Sher B. Deuba 2052/5/27 September 12, 1995 5. Lokendra B. Chand 2053/11/29 March 12, 1997 6. Surya B. Thapa 2054/6/21 October 7, 1997 7. Girija P. Koirala 2055/1/2 April 15, 1998 8. Girija P. Koirala 2055/9/10 December 25, 1999 9. Krishna P. Bhattarai 2056/2/17 May 31, 1999 10. Girija P. Koirala 4th time 2056/11/8 February 20, 2000 11. Sher B. Deuba 2058/4/11 July 26, 2001 12. HM's Direct Rule 2059/6/18 October 4, 2002 13. Lokendra B Chand 2059/6/25 October 11, 2002 14. Surya B. Thapa 2060/2/28 June 4, 2003 15. Sher B Deuba 3rd time 2061/2/28 June 2, 2004 Source: Nepal Gazette

5

Annex 4

Growth of population by caste /ethnic group and sex ratio, 1991-2001

Population, 1991 Population, 2001 S.No. Caste/Ethnic Groups

Total Percent Sex Ratio Total Percent Sex Ratio

Annual % Increase 1991-

2001 A Caste Groups: Upper and Middle Groups 6248829 33.8 97.4 7451580 32.8 98.1 1.76

a.1 Hill Upper Castes 5837736 31.6 96.5 7023220 30.9 97.3 1.85 1 Brahman (Hill) 2388455 12.9 97.7 2896477 12.7 97.1 1.93 2 Chhetri, Thakuri, Sanyasi 3449281 18.7 95.7 4126743 18.1 97.5 1.79

a.2 Terai Upper Caste 3 Terai Upper Castes - Brahman (Terai), Rajput,

Kayastha, Baniya, Marwadi, Jaine, Nurang, Bengali, 411093 2.2 110.4 428360 1.9 111.5 0.41

B Terai Middle Castes 1982817 10.7 109.5 2938827 12.9 109.5 3.93 4 Yadav 765137 4.1 111.2 895423 3.9 112.2 1.57 5 Teli, Kalwar, Sudhi, Sonar,Lohar 412778 2.2 110.3 737713 3.2 107.2 5.81 6 Koiri (Kushwha), Kurmi, Kanu, Haluwai,

Hajam/Thakur, Badhe, Bahae, Rajbhar 520999 2.8 108.4 814366 3.6 109.8 4.47 7 Kewat, Mallah, Mandal, Nuniya, Kumhar, Kahar,

Lodha, Bing/Banda, Bhediyar, Mali, Kamar, Dhunia 283903 1.5 105.9 491325 2.2 108 5.48 C Janajatis 6572265 35.5 98 8460701 37.2 98 2.53 c.1 Hill Janajatis 5119613 27.7 96.9 6484849 28.5 96.8 2.36

c1.1 Newar.Thakali 1054821 5.7 99.4 1258205 5.5 99.2 1.76 8 Newar 1041090 5.6 99.5 1245232 5.5 99.2 1.79 9 Thakali 13731 0.1 93.7 12973 0.1 92 -0.57

c1.2 Other Hill Janajatis 4064792 22 96.3 5226644 23 96.2 2.51 10 Magar 1339308 7.2 94.1 1622421 7.1 93.7 1.92 11 Tamang 1018252 5.5 100.1 1282304 5.6 100.1 2.31 12 Rai 525551 2.8 97.1 635151 2.8 96.8 1.89 13 Gurung 449189 2.4 92.4 543571 2.4 91.3 1.91 14 Limbu 297186 1.6 95.6 359379 1.6 94.7 1.9 15 Sherpa 110358 0.6 99 154622 0.7 100.5 3.37 16 Bhote, Walung, Byansi, Hyolmo 12463 0.1 94.2 23091 0.1 106.5 6.17 17 Bhujel, Kumal, Sunuwar, Baramu, Pahari, Advasi

Janajati 122955 0.7 87.8 336358 1.5 98.3 10.06 18 Yakkha, Chhantal, Jirel, Darai, Dura 10271 0.1 166.3 52161 0.2 90.9 16.25 19 Majhi, Danuwar, Thami, Lepcha 129733 0.7 97.4 152502 0.7 99 1.62 20 Bote, Raji, Hayu, Raute, Chepang, Kusunda 49526 0.3 99.4 65084 0.3 102.3 2.73 c.2 Tarai Janajatis 1452652 7.9 101.9 1975852 8.7 102.4 3.08 21 Tharu 1194224 6.5 101.2 1533879 6.7 102.1 2.5 22 Dhanuk 136944 0.7 108.3 188150 0.8 107.6 3.18

23 Rajbanshi, Tajpuriya, Gangai, Dhimal, Meche, Kisan, Munda 121484 0.7 101.7 167216 0.7 100.4 3.2

24 Santhal, Dhangad/Jhangad, Koche, Pattarkatta/ Kusbadiya - - - 86607 0.4 100.8 -

D Dalits 2201781 11.9 97.6 2675182 11.8 97.7 1.95 d.1 Hill Dalits 1619434 8.8 95.3 1615577 7.1 93.3 -0.02 25 Kami 963655 5.2 96 895954 3.9 93.5 -0.73 26 Damai 367989 2 94.1 390305 1.7 93.2 0.59 27 Sarki 276224 1.5 94.5 318989 1.4 93 1.44 28 Badi, Gaine 11566 0.1 93.1 10329 0 94.2 -1.13 d.2 Tarai Dalits: 582347 3.1 104.3 1059605 4.7 104.7 5.99 29 Chamar 203919 1.1 104.2 269661 1.2 106.2 2.79 30 Musahar 141980 0.8 101.6 172434 0.8 104.3 1.94 31 Dhusadh, Tatma, Khatway, Bantar, Dom, Chidimar 159854 0.9 105.5 367075 1.6 107 8.31 32 Dhobi, Halkhor, Dalit/Unidenified Dalit 76594 0.4 106.9 250435 1.1 100.1 11.85 E Religious Minorities: 664125 3.6 106 979003 4.3 106.9 3.88 33 Muslim, Churoute 654833 3.5 106.2 975949 4.3 106.9 3.99 34 Panjabi/Shikh 9292 0.1 95.2 3054 0 105.4 -11.13 F Others: 35 Unidenified Caste/Ethnic 821280 4.4 104.4 231641 1 101.3 -12.66

Total Population 1849109 100 99.5 22736934 100 99.8 2.07 Source: Analysis of Caste, Ethnicity and Gender Data fron 2001 Population Census in Preparation for Poverty Mapping and Wider PRSP

Monitoting, Tanka Prasad Acharya Memorial Foundation, 2004 (Draft).

6

Annex 5

Ethnic Composition of House of Representatives (Total Number is 205)

Ethnicity/Caste 1991 1994 1999 Mountain/Hill Caste Bahun 37.6 42.0 38.5 Chhetri 13.7 14.1 13.7 Thakuri 5.4 5.4 5.4 Ethnic/Hills Others 15.2 12.2 14.7 Newar 6.8 6.3 7.3 Tarai 8.3 6.3 5.4 Madhesis 10.2 11.7 14.1 Caste/Others Mushlim 2.4 2.0 - Others - - 1.0

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Harka Gurung, Nepal Social Demography and Expressions, Kathmandu, New ERA, 2001, PP 229 and 234

7

Annex 6 Ethnic Composition of Council of Ministers between 1991-2002

S.No. Caste/Ethnicity K.P.Bhattarai

govt. (May 1990)

G.P.Koirala govt. (May

1991)

M.M.Adhikari govt.

(Nov.1994)

S.B.Deuba govt.(Sept.1

995)

L.B.Chand govt.

(Oct.2002)

S.B.Thapa govt. (June

2003)

Kings Nominee

govt. (Oct.2002)

Total

A Caste Groups: Upper and Middle Groups a.1 Hill Upper Castes 1 Brahman (Hill) 54.5 46.7 60.0 23.4 41.2 25.5 36.4 35.1 2 Chhetri, Thakuri, Sanyasi 9.1 20.0 13.3 38.3 17.6 25.5 18.2 24.1

a.2 Terai Upper Caste 3 Terai Upper Castes - Brahman (Terai),

Rajput, Kayastha, Baniya, Marwadi, Jaine, Nurang, Bengali,

9.1 6.7 4.3 5.9 6.4 4.7

B Terai Middle Castes 4 Yadav 4.3 8.8 6.4 4.2 5 Teli, Kalwar, Sudhi, Sonar,Lohar 2.1 0.5 6 Koiri (Kushwha), Kurmi, Kanu, Haluwai,

Hajam/Thakur, Badhe, Bahae, Rajbhar, 2.1 4.3 1.6

7 Kewat, Mallah, Mandal, Nuniya, Kumhar, Kahar, Lodha, Bing/Banda, Bhediyar, Mali, Kamar, Dhunia,

4.5 0.5

C Janajatis c.1 Hill Janajatis c1.1 Newar.Thakali

8 Newar 27.3 13.3 6.7 4.3 8.8 2.1 13.6 7.9 9 Thakali 2.1 0.5

c1.2 Other Hill Janajatis 10 Magar 2.1 9.1 2.1 11 Tamang 4.3 2.9 2.1 2.1 12 Rai 6.7 13.3 2.1 5.9 3.1 13 Gurung 2.1 2.9 6.4 4.5 3.1 14 Limbu 2.1 0.5 15 Sherpa 16 Bhote, Walung, Byansi, Hyolmo 17 Bhujel, Kumal, Sunuwar, Baramu, Pahari,

Advasi Janajati

18 Yakkha, Chhantal, Jirel, Darai, Dura 19 Majhi, Danuwar, Thami, Lepcha 20 Bote, Raji, Hayu, Raute, Chepang, Kusunda c.2 Tarai Janajatis 21 Tharu 8.5 2.9 8.5 4.5 5.2 22 Dhanuk 23 Rajbanshi, Tajpuriya, Gangai, Dhimal, Meche,

Kisan, Munda

24 Santhal, Dhangad/Jhangad, Koche, Pattarkatta/ Kusbadiya

D Dalits d.1 Hill Dalits 25 Kami 26 Damai 4.5 0.5 27 Sarki 28 Badi, Gaine d.2 Tarai Dalits: 29 Chamar 30 Musahar 31 Dhusadh, Tatma, Khatway, Bantar, Dom,

Chidimar

32 Dhobi, Halkhor, Dalit/Unidenified Dalit E Religious Minorities: 33 Muslim, Churoute 6.7 6.7 4.3 2.9 4.3 4.5 4.2 34 Panjabi/Shikh F Others: 35 Unidenified Caste/Ethnic

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N = 11 15 15 47 34 47 22 191

Compiled by Dr. D.N.Dhungel and Shankar Aryal, IIDS, 2004 on the basis of Nepal Gazettes and Bhairab Risal and Rammani Risal, 2004, Nepal ko Mantriharu, BS 2007 to 2061 (Ministers of Nepal:1951 to 2004), Kathmandu. Note: Bold ones denote represented caste or groups.

8

Annex 6a Composite Index and Computation for Average value of Mu for Household Characteristics

9

Annex 6b Composite Index and Computation for Average value of Mu and Index for Individual Characteristics

10

Annex 7 The forty demands (The 40-point charter of demands and covering letter presented to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba by Dr Baburam Bhattarai on behalf of the United People's Front Nepal on 4 February, 1996.) 4 February, 1996 Right Honourable Prime Minister Prime Minster's Office, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu

Subject: Memorandum Sir, It has been six years since the autocratic monarchical partyless Panchayat system was ended by the 1990 People's Movement and a constitutional monarchical multiparty parliamentary system established. During this period state control has been exercised by the triparitite interim government, the single-party governmentof the Nepali Congress, the minority government of UML and the present Nepali Congress-RPP-Sadbhavana coalition. That, instead of making progress, the situation of the country and the people is going downhill is evident from the facts that Nepal has slid to being the second poorest country in the world; people living below the absolute poverty line has gone up to 71 per cent; the number of unemployed has reached more than 10 per cent while the number of people who are semi-employed or in disguised employment has crossed 60 per cent; the country is on the verge of bankruptcy due to soaring foreign loans and deficit trade; economic and cultural encroachment within the country by foreign, and especially India, expansionists is increasing by the day; the gap between the rich and the poor and between towns and villages is growing wider. On the other hand, parliamentary parties that have formed the government by various means have shown that they are more interested in remaining in power with the blessings of foreign imperialist and expansionist master than in the welfare of the country and the people. This is clear from their blindly adopting the so-called privatization and liberalisation to fulfill the interests of all imperialists and from the recent 'national consensus' reached in handing over the rights over Nepal's water resources to Indian expansionists. Since 6 April, 1992, the United People's Front has been involved in various struggles to fulfil relevant demands related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood either on its own or with others. But rather than fulfil those demands, the governments formed at different times have violently suppressed the agitators and taken the lives of hundreds; the most recent example of this is the armed police operation in Rolpa a few months back. In this context, we would like to once again present to the current coalition government the demands related to nationalism, democracy and livelihood, many of which have been raised in the past and many which have become relevant in the present context. Our demands:

Concerning nationally 1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be abrogated. 2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January 1996 should be repealed immediately, as it

is designed to conceal the disastrous Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal's water resources.

3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and systematized. All vehicles with Indian licence plates should be banned from Nepal.

4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centres should be closed. Nepali citizens should be provided dignified employment in the country.

5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A 'work permit' system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the country.

6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance should be stopped. 7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic development helps the

nation become self-reliant. 8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar Hindi films, videos and magazines

should be immediately outlawed. 9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.

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Concerning people's democracy 10. A new Constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the establishment of a people's democratic

system. 11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished. 12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under people's control. 13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed. 14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kavre,

Sindhupalchowk, Sindhuli, Dhanusa, Ramecchhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases should be immediately withdrawn.

15. The operation of armed police, repression and State-sponsored terror should be immediately stopped. 16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared in police custody at different times, namely Dilip Chaudhary,

Bhuwan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and others, should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. The families of victims should be duly compensated.

17. All those killed during the People's Movement should be declared martyrs. The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly compensated, and the murderers brought to justice.

18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation. 19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed

access to paternal property. 20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in the majority, they

should be allowed to form their own autonomous governments. 21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped. The system of untouchability

should be eliminated. 22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to education in the mother

tongue up to higher level should be guaranteed. 23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be guaranteed. The government mass

media should be completely autonomous. 24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and cultural workers should be guaranteed. 25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the tarai should be eliminated. Backward areas should be given

regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas should be treated at par. 26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped. Concerning livelihood 27. Land should belong to 'tenants'. Land under the control of the feudal system should be confiscated and

distributed to the landless and the homeless. 28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should confiscated and nationalized. Capital lying

unproductive should be invested to promote industrialization. 29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can be arranged, an unemployment

allowance should be provided. 30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed and strictly implemented. 31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be relocated until alternative infrastructure is guaranteed. 32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small farmers from the Agricultural

Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans form small farmers.

33. Fertilizer and seed should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their produce.

34. People in flood- and drought –affected areas should be provided with appropriate relief materials. 35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The commercialization of education

should be stopped. 36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to inflation. Essential goods should be

cheaply and easily available to everyone. 37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers. 38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted. 39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketeering, bribery, and the practices of middlemen and so on should be

eliminated. 40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly honoured and protected.

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We would like to request the present coalition government to immediately initiate steps to fulfil these demands which are inextricably linked with the Nepali nation and the life of the people. If there are no positive indications towards this from the government by 17 February 1996, we would like to inform you that we will be forced to adopt the path of armed struggle against the existing state power. Thank you.

Dr Baburam Bhattarai Chairman

Central Committee, United People's Front, Nepal Source: Nepalma Janayuddha (People's Ware in Nepal), Nepal Rastriya Buddhijibi Sanganthan (Nepal National

Intellectual Organization), Kathmandu, 2058 (B.S.)

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Annex 8 Volunteer Mediators Group:

Roadmap for Peace and Conflict Resolution

1. Context The people's war launched almost a decade age by the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoists (CPN-Maoists) has already taken a toll of over 10,000 lives. It has now spread to all parts of the country. It has dealt a tremendous blow to the country in terms of loss of lives, property and infrastructure. Development activities have almost come to a halt. There would be hardly a family--mainly in rural areas—that has not been affected by the bloody conflict. Thousands of people have been forced to leave their homes. Some have migrated across the border to India. Some are leading the life of refugees within their own country. Economically, the country is in ruins and politically it is in deep crisis. The announcement of ceasefire in the beginning of 2003 was welcomed by all sections of society. But unfortunately it broke down and the violence restarted. The situation in the country is getting worse day by day. There is increasing pressure from all walks of lives, including the friendly countries and international agencies, on the warring factions to come to the table and resolve the issue. But serious posture for peace is yet to come from either of the conflicting parties. 2. Political Agendas: Points of Harmony and Difference Because of the very nature of the Nepalese society, any solution to the present conflict has to be thought in the context of satisfying the aspirations and demands of the different geographical regions and sections of society. Sufficient materials are available on these matters. Against this context, extensive interactions with the major political actors other than the King was made; field visits to conflict-affected areas were made; and the positions of the major political actors--the CPN Maoist, the five political parties, the government and the King-- were analysed. Findings of the analysis are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Political Agenda of Major Political Actors

Subjects 5 Parliamentary Parties NCP-Maoists (rebel party)

Bottomline The establishment Monarchy

1. Sovereignty To be vested in the people, as well as to be clarified and strengthened.

To make the people fully sovereign and governance to be fully vested in the people.

To be vested in the people, method of use and system to be clarified in the Constitution.

2. Monarchy To be made fully constitutional and transparent: 1. Not to allow any Act to be

enacted on King’s discretion.

2. The entire management of the Royal Palace and the administration of the services of the Palace to be given to the Ministry related to the Royal Palace or through that Ministry.

3. To institute a system of regulating and making public the King’s property.

4. To restrict the title of Majesty to His Majesty, Her Majesty and the Crown Prince.

5. To disband the Royal Council.

1. The political forces to go to the public with their standpoints on the monarchical institution and to accept people’s decision.

1. To retain it as the symbol of Nepalese nationalism and unity.

2. To develop the system of monarchy in accordance with the standing and dignity defined by the 1990 Constitution.

1. To draw the attention of the authorities to the constructive views of those subscribing to different professions, religions, thoughts and cultures, if they aren’t heard by anybody. Not to remain inactive for the nation and its people.

2. One must understand that constitutional monarchy has a distinct meaning, significance and dignity.

3. May be, the problem as seen is basically due to inconsistency between tradition, dignity and ground realities; and pure theories.

3. Rule of law and fundamental rights

- 1. To protect the fundamental rights and human rights.

2. To institute rule of law. 3. To consider education,

health and employment as fundamental rights.

1. To apply the principle of rule of law to every aspect of the national life with full commitment.

2. To keep the human rights, fundamental rights and human values inviolable in all circumstances.

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4. National anthem To compose a new national anthem, reflecting national pride, unity and patriotism.

- - -

5. Religion The State not to accord special privilege to any one religion. A special policy to be adopted for the protection, promotion and development of all ethnic groups, languages and cultures.

To fully embrace secularism. 1. To protect and promote all religions, ethnicities, communities, languages and creeds.

2. To accord the freedoms of expression and association according to one’s faith and beliefs.

-

6. Parliament/ Legislature

1. If elections are not held on schedule, HoR to be automatically renewed.

2. To increase the representation of women, Dalits and backward communities and regions in Parliament.

3. To constitute the National Assembly inclusive of ethnic groups, nationalities, Dalits, women and prominent citizens.

4. To raise reservation for women to 33 per cent.

1. To constitute an elected HoR with the representation of all classes, ethnic groups, nationalities, languages, religions, regions and prominent citizens.

2. To make all State-level organs accountable to the HoR.

3. To make provision for amending any provisions of the Constitution through two-thirds majority of the HoR.

1. To constitute a Parliament based on the multiparty competitive system.

2. To introduce drastic changes in the composition of the Upper House and to make provision for proportional representation of nationalities, tribes, Dalits and well-known personalities.

3. To make the government accountable to the Parliament.

4. To enhance the efficacy of both the Houses.

5. To make at least 25 per cent representation for women in both the Houses.

7. Election system To make it impartial and free of manipulations.

To adopt an election system based on multiparty and adult franchise systems.

1. To strengthen the dignity, autonomy, authority and powers of the Election Commission.

2. To form an impartial election government three months before the election.

3. To adopt the proportional election system.

8. Referendum To hold referendum on issues of national importance through a decision of the Parliament.

To amend any provision of the Constitution through referendum.

To make provision for holding referendum on policy matters of national importance through a decision of Parliament for finding out public opinion.

-

9. Political parties To make the organizational process and economic activities of political parties democratic and transparent.

To accept the presence of political parties as competitive forces.

1. The existence and activities of political parties not to be prohibited.

2. To adopt a legal basis for making their composition programmes and financial sources continuously transparent and democratic and dignified.

-

10. Prime Minister/government/ Council of Ministers

1. To place the Prime Minister at the fourth rank in the State protocol.

2. To fully vest the power of dissolving parliament in the Prime Minister.

The government to be accountable to the HoR.

1. The ensure a system of conducting State affairs on the basis of people’s views and to make the people’s representatives accountable to the people.

2. To strengthen the prime-ministerial system during the process of reform of the State administration, maintaining the

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continuity of the dignity and power of the prime minister's post.

3. To reinforce Prime Minister's power to dissolve the HoR.

4. To make provision for appointing ministers from outside the Parliament.

11. Army 1. To impart it a national character.

2. To make it loyal towards the country and the people.

3. To keep it under the control of the elected government accountable to the Parliament.

1. To form a national army by ushering in people’s militia with appropriate structure.

2. To keep the army under the control of elected people's representatives.

- 1. The Royal Nepal Army is already under the Parliament’ control and is mobilized at the decision of the Security Council.

12. Decentralization and local self-governance

1. To make constitutional provision for equipping local bodies with resources and authority.

2. To reserve 33 per cent of the seats for representation of women in local bodies.

1. To guarantee security of ethnic and regional governance, along with the right to self-determination.

2. To implement a national plan of balanced development with a view to removing the existing imbalances between geographical regions.

1. To ensure the jurisdiction and authority of local bodies through the Constitution.

2. To change their frame, regional distribution and number, considering the ethnic composition, development status and geographical conditions.

3. To constitute new structure at regional-level in view of economic potentials, population and geographical conditions.

-

13. Women 1. To end economic, social and legal discriminations against them.

1. To end all kinds of discrimination against women.

2. To establish women’s equal right to parental property.

3. To stringently control women trafficking.

1. To end all kinds of discrimination against women.

2. To reserve 25 per cent of seats in representative bodies at all levels.

3. To make reservation in education, health, administrative service and other employment avenues.

-

14. Dalit, oppressed classes and the destitute

1. To consider untouchability as a strictly punishable offence and to introduce legal provision accordingly.

2. To accord special attention to extremely backward ethnic groups and nationalities.

1. To fully accord equal rights to Dalits by completely ending their exploitation and oppression.

2. To care for and make special provision for the disabled, the elderly and children.

1. To reserve seats in representative bodies, education, health, administrative service and other employment avenues for tribes, indigenous peoples and Dalit communities.

15. Foreign policy To conduct according to the United Nations’ Charter and Non-Alignment Policy.

1. To revoke all unequal treaties, including the 1950 Treaty with India

2. To follow an independent foreign policy for maintaining friendly relations with all countries, based on the Panchasheela and non-alignment.

3. To seal the open border with India.

4. To stop the Gorkha recruitment.

5. To employ foreigners on the basis of work permit.

1. To maintain friendly relations with all countries of the world by pursuing the overall national welfare and interest and by remaining committed to non-alignment, Panchasheela and the United Nations' Charter.

2. To institutionalise the aspirations for peace in a graduated manner.

-

16. Ratification of treaties and understandings

- To approve all treaties and understandings with two-thirds majority of the HoR.

-

17. Economic and social reforms

- 1. To establish the right of the tiller on land.

2. To distribute land in a just manner.

3. To adopt a self-reliant national industrial policy.

4. To protect the national assets, resources and heritage, and to end the

1. To end dual ownership of land. To enforce a people-centred land reform to make land available to the landless and marginal farmers and to increase productivity.

2. To implement an open

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foreign monopoly in industrial, commercial and financial sectors.

5. To free the country of the debt trap of foreign countries within a timeframe.

6. To declare the imposed international conditions unacceptable.

7. To end the invasion by NGOs and INGOs.

8. To formulate an integrated national water policy and to carry out countrywide electrification.

9. To write off the debts of the landless and poor farmers.

and market-oriented economy.

3. To implement the concept of equitable and balanced development in a practical manner to end regional imbalance.

4. Agreement on most of the social and economic issues proposed by NCP-Maoists.

18. Education and occupation

- 1. To end privatisation and commercialization2. To make provision for employment-oriented education.

3. To make education and health widely and freely available.

4. To guarantee professional and academic freedoms.

-

19. Administration To free it of political interferences.

- -

20. Citizenship 1. To resolve this problem by taking a base year and adopting all conceivable measures.

- 1. To make appropriate constitutional provision to permanently end the citizenship problem.

21. Miscellany - - 1. To clearly define the authority and jurisdiction of different organs of the State.

2. To accord added power to constitutional organs.

3. To enhance the efficacy of the judiciary.

4. To use the national languages as the second language through the decision of local bodies.

2.1 Procedure and Process for Implementing Political Agenda The different parties have their own procedures and processes for translating the perceptions into action (Table 1. 2). The five parliamentary parties seem to be eager to use the amendment provisions of the present Constitution to translate their agenda into action whereas the establishment seems to be ready to use the provisions for amendment in the present Constitution, or if necessary, to re-draft the present Constitution for the reforms proposed by it. However, it has not made the process of re-drafting clear. The NCP-Maoists, on the other hand, wants to formulate a new Constitution through a Constitution Assembly after electing it.

Table 1. 2: Procedure and Process of Implementation of Progressive Measures

5 Parliamentary Parties NCP-Maoists Establishment

1. To amend the present Constitution and incorporate progressive measures.

X - -

2. To incorporate the minimum elements of progressive solution by drafting a new Constitution. For this, to elect a Constitution Assembly.

- X -

3. To build national consensus on the proposed agenda and amend the Constitution after holding election to the HoR or harbour a positive view on re-drafting it.

- - X

Based on the above, it became clear that there are points of harmony and difference between the political agenda of the major political actors: the five major political parties, the NCP-Maoists, the King and the Government.

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Notwithstanding the differences seen in the presentation and language used by each of the five political parties, NCP-Maoists and the present government, and the King’s feelings on different subjects, similarities are found on many issues. There is almost a consensus, especially on the issues of socio-economic reforms, representation of caste and ethnic groups, women and Dalits. Similarly, similarity is found on matters such as the constitution or formation of the legislature and representation on it. The issues of strengthening the prime ministerial system guaranteeing the fundamental rights, rule of law, vesting of sovereignty in the people also find harmony between them. With regard to points of difference, although all the three parties agree on the question of vesting sovereignty in the people, the government calls for clearly stipulating the procedure and provisions for this in the Constitution. The procedure suggested by it is not clear. Another subject on which a fundamental difference is seen is that of referendum. On this the parliamentary parties and the government seem to be close to each other, although the latter has put the condition that the sacrosanct elements of the Constitution should not be subject to referendum. The NCP-Maoists, on the other hand, proposes amendment of any provision of the Constitution through referendum. Another important issue on which there is a yawning gap between the parties is that of monarchy. The parliamentary parties do not want to give it any authority. The government proposes development of the monarchical system in accordance with its status and dignity defined by the 1990 Constitution, although it has not made clear what is ‘development of the system’. What was published in the King’s interview in Nepal fortnightly magazine should be considered as the King’s views. According to that interview, the present King doesn’t wish to be a symbolic King, but wishes to be constructive and draw the attention of the authorities towards the views of those professing different professions, religions, thoughts if they are not heard by anybody. He doesn't wish to be a King that cannot do anything for the country and the people. In addition, he emphasises the fact that the constitutional monarchy has a distinct meaning, significance and dignity, and, added with multiparty democracy, there is no alternative to this. He surmises that the misperception is due to the conflict between theoretical principles and our own traditions and ground realities. At the other end of the spectrum is the NCP-Maoists, who propose political parties going to the people with their views on whether or not to retain the monarchy and to accept people's decision through referendum. In other words, the Maoists wish to determine the King’s future through referendum. Similarly, another subject of fundamental difference is the Army and control over it. The parliamentary parties wish to keep it fully under the control of a popularly elected government after giving it a national character whereas the NCP-Maoists wishes to form a national army with appropriate structure after including the people’s militia in it. They wish to keep it under the control of popularly elected people's representatives, whereas the government is silent on this subject. They claim that the Army is already under the control of the Parliament along with that of the King. Another issue on which there is a fundamental difference between the NCP-Maoists and the other two sides is that of the right to self-determination. The five parliamentary parties wish to empower local bodies by accepting the plurality existing in the country whereas the NCP-Maoists wishes to guarantee ethnic and regional good governance along with the right to self-determination. Similarly, dissimilarity is seen between the NCP-Maoists and other sides on the issue of foreign policy. NCP-Maoists wishes to close all Gorkha recruitment centres whereas others are silent on this. Further, NCP-Maoists wishes to incorporate in the Constitution the provision of approving all treaties and agreements with two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives (HOR). Another issue on which the views of the NCP-Maoists do not match with those of the other sides is that of secularism. That is to say, NCP-Maoists wants to adopt total secularism, the parliamentary parties wish to adopt the policy of ‘all religions are possible’ whereas the government wishes to make the existing provisions more liberal.

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3. Preparation of Roadmap and Declaration of Volunteer Mediators Group (VMG) From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that except few issues (mainly related to monarchy and control over army) there is no difference or disagreement among the main political actors involved in the current conflict. If this is so, why can't we put pressure on the actors involved in the conflict to start dialogue amongst them to save the country from further sliding down the hill. This means that the actors concerned—the political parties, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists and the King—should take into cognizance the existence of each other, realise the need to talk to each other and agree to the principle of give and take if they are really interested in resolving the conflict through negotiation. For this, there is a need to have a clear understanding of each other's position and find out the common meeting grounds for coming to an agreement. In order to show them the points of harmony and suggest ways to resolve the points of difference, a roadmap was prepared by a group of persons and made public on December 25, 2003. The group comprised Messrs Adityaman Shrestha, Paryag Dutta Tewari and Dwarika N Dhungel—all three dedicated to the cause of peace. They, along with one more professional, Prof. Suresh Raj Chalise, have declared themselves as the Volunteer Mediators Group (VGM). The group wants to play an effective mediation role among different actors in the conflict. The group believes that there is a need to maintain equi-distance between the principal actors. This is an effective means to facilitate the process of dialogue among the parties concerned. The road map contains 16 headings (Monarchy, Sovereignty and Referendum, National Anthem, Religion and Tradition, Legislature, Political Parties, The Army, Foreign Policy, Economic Reforms, Education and Health, Decentralization and Autonomy, Women, Dalit/Oppressed and Deprived Classes, Good Governance and Corruption Control, Citizenship and Miscellany). Under each heading various measures have been suggested for consideration of the conflicting parties. The details are given below.

Details of the Roadmap 1. Monarchy

1.1 To remain within the framework of multiparty democracy. 1.2 To remain the symbol of nationalism and national unity. 1.3 To be made fully transparent, and this provision shall be stipulated in the Constitution. 1.4 The government to be fully responsible for the security, management and expenses of the Royal

Palace. 1.5 To regularly take stock of the contemporary national political developments and governance, to take

initiative for building national consensus on matters of national importance and to express views within the perimeters of the Constitution.

2. Sovereignty and Referendum

2.1 Monarchy to abide by the principle of people’s sovereignty and this shall be stipulated in the Constitution.

2.2 To settle the issues and disputes of high national importance through referendum and to make parliament’s endorsement necessary for holding referendum on such matters. However, matters affecting independence and integrity of the nation shall remain out of bound of referendum.

3. National Anthem

3.1 To formulate a new national anthem reflecting national pride, unity and patriotism 4. Religion and Tradition

4.1 To retain monarchy as a Hindu institution by considering the traditions and reverence it holds. 4.2 To declare the State secular, thereby distinguishing between the Crown and the State. The State shall

not accord special patronage to any one religion, but it shall not permit proselytization through coercion or allurement and make such conversions heavily punishable.

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5. Legislature

5.1 To retain the multiparty parliamentary system 5.2 To constitute the lower house on the basis of territorial and proportional representation election

system. To hold direct election for the post of the prime minister and to appoint ministers from within and outside the Parliament on the recommendation of the prime minister.

5.3 To constitute the upper house with representation of different ethnic groups, indigenous peoples, Dalits, women and prominent citizens.

5.4 To make the government answerable to the Constitution, the people and the Parliament. 6. Political Parties

6.1 To make provision for making the organizational structure and financial activities of political parties democratic and transparent.

6.2 To make provision for providing government financial grant to political parties for the next election in proportion to the votes obtained by them in the last elections.

7. The Army

7.1 To give the Army a national character by opening them to all qualified citizens possessing necessary qualities for military service like discipline, good health and aptitude, and make them loyal towards the country and the people.

7.2 To mobilize the Army on the recommendation of the Security Council and to inform the Parliament on its operation at times of foreign aggression, internal rebellion and international peacekeeping. To inform about it to the State Administration Committee or any relevant committee when the Parliament is not in session.

7.3 To recruit the members of the people’s militia with necessary qualifications in the Royal Army at appropriate level and the remaining ones in other security services such as forest security, industrial security or other security services after imparting them necessary training. In addition, to give priority to engage them in various employment opportunities by imparting necessary training to them and to attract them to join developmental activities in accordance with their skills.

7.4 To make provision for imparting compulsory military training for one year to all adults in Nepal for engendering in them spirit of nationalism and national security.

8. Foreign Policy

8.1 To pursue a foreign policy that promotes friendly relations with all countries by adhering to the spirit of the United Nations’ Charter and the Panchasheela, and to steer Nepal’s foreign policy for the promotion of national interests and welfare of its people.

8.2 To make special efforts for augmenting foreign employment opportunities for the Nepalese. 8.3 To enhance the involvement of the Nepalese people in international security system and especially to

extend full support to the UN’s peacekeeping operations. 8.4 To abrogate the existing Gorkha recruitment treaty and to negotiate with different countries of the

world for recruitment of the Nepalese people in their security forces with maximum benefit to the Nepalese people.

8.5 To make the relationship with India contemporary, realistic and progressive and, to achieve that end, to replace the 1950 Treaty with a new treaty or treaties suited to changed context.

8.6 To regulate the open border and to protect and promote national interests with due regard to the security sensitivity of the neighbouring countries.

9. Economic Reforms

9.1 To establish the right of the tillers on land. 9.2 To follow an industrial policy that derives utmost benefits from globalization. 9.3 To formulate a national water policy that promotes national capital and expertise. 9.4 To encourage foreign investments for highest national benefit. 9.5 To encourage foreign residents of Nepalese origin for investing in Nepal and, for this, to provide them

certificates of permanent residence in Nepal.

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10. Education and Health

10.1 To introduce compulsory primary education all over the country. 10.2 To make primary health care facility nation-wide. 10.3 To leave the higher education and specialized health services to the private sector with provision for

powerful monitoring mechanism to prevent exploitation of the people. 11. Decentralization and Autonomy

11.1 To implement the decentralization programme by providing necessary power and resources for local bodies.

11.2 To change the structure, geographical division and number of local bodies, keeping the state of development and geographical conditions into account and to review the existing number of districts and development regions.

11.3 To formulate development plans designed to remove existing disparities between geographical regions and to establish, for this purpose, appropriate political and administrative structures at the regional level

12. Women

12.1 To abolish economic, social and legal discriminations existing against them and to provide them equal right to parental property.

12.2 To provide them reservation in education, health, administrative services and employment opportunities.

12.3 To provide 33 per cent reservation for women in all elected bodies and to launch affirmative actions in other agencies for this.

12.4 To initiate political, social and economic measures to immediately control girl trafficking. 13. Dalit/Oppressed and Deprived Classes

13.1 To carry out instant measures to abolish untouchability and other forms of exploitation and suppression and to grant equal rights to deprived classes.

13.2 To provide reservation for ethnic and dalit/oppressed communities in education, health and administrative services and other avenues of employment.

13.3 To create special facilities for the care of the handicapped, aged and children, to provide them appropriate representation and to enable them to participate in different organizations

14. Good Governance and Corruption Control

14.1 To enact stringent laws to keep the public services out of political interference and to monitor its implementation through high-level teams, also involving NGOs in the monitoring mechanism.

14.2 To consider quick and efficient delivery of services to the people as the main criterion of good governance.

14.3 The government being mainly responsible for controlling corruption, the government to take measures to make educational institutions and the public aware and seek their support for fighting corruption.

14.4 To make legal provision for debarring persons charged of corruption from holding any public office. 14.5 To strengthen the constitutional, governmental and non-governmental agencies engaged in controlling

and fighting corruption. 14.6 To consider judiciary also a focal point of good governance

15. Citizenship

15.1 To resolve the citizenship problem by adopting a definitive basis. 15.2 To grant dual citizenship to people of Nepalese origin for national benefit and to constitute a watchdog

body at the district level to curb misuse of this facility.

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16. Miscellany

16.1 To form, three months before the polls, an election government composed of persons who are not contesting the elections and are also not aligned with any political parties.

16.2 To make provision making it compulsory for treaties and agreements relating to amendment of the Constitution and utilization and distribution of national resources to be passed by a two-thirds majority of the total members of the Parliament.

4. Process of Implementation The VMG proposes the following process for the implementation of the roadmap: i. Declaration of a ceasefire, to begin with. ii. Holding of a roundtable conference under the chairmanship of the King. The representatives of political parties,

Maoists and civil societies to participate in it. iii. Formation of a small taskforce with the representation of all parties. This taskforce shall help in making the

conference a success. iv. Development of consensus on the political, social, economic and constitutional reforms envisaged in the

roadmap and to move ahead with this as the focal point through the roundtable. v. Formation of an interim government with representation of all parties participating in the roundtable. The

interim government to carry out the reform measures agreed upon at the conference. vi. Granting of general amnesty to the Maoists before they are inducted into the interim government. The Maoists

to surrender their arms and ammunition to representatives of the UN. 5. Facilitators of the Past and Present Volunteer Mediators: Differences i. The facilitators had no basic roadmap whereas the mediators have one. ii. The facilitators were the nominees of the government and the Maoists whereas the mediators are volunteers. iii. The facilitators were formally nominated for peace talks, but the mediators are individuals who voluntarily offer

their services for the peace process. iv. Most of the facilitators had political background whereas the mediators are non-political. v. The facilitators had strong political biases whereas the mediators have none. vi. The number of facilitators was fixed whereas the number of mediators is flexible. vii. There was no provision for any new person to extend facilitation services whereas anybody or any institution

can join as mediators by offering voluntary services. viii. The role of the facilitators was limited to peace talks and subject to solicitation. The role of the mediators, on

the other hand, is to mediate in the conflict situation and also to help the warring parties to receive and provide necessary assistance for conflict resolution.

Source: Volunteers' Mediator Group

c/o Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS) P.O. Box 2254, Mandikhatar, Kathmandu, Nepal Tel: 4378831/4371006 Fax: 4378809

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Annex 9 National Consensus on Conflict resolution in Nepal

1. Present situation and background Nepal is in a crisis, unparalleled in its history. The crisis, on one hand, has awakened the concern of all for a need of an overall economic and social transformation, all agreeing on the possibility of such transformation and assured brighter future of the country if the conflict is properly managed. On the other hand, it has been so serious that about nine thousand people have lost their lives from the onset of the conflict. Many more are maimed or wounded or have become victims in many ways. The incidences of 'killing and being killed' are on the rise. Too many episodes of armed actions against the unarmed civilians, abduction, unwarranted arrests, disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence, extrajudicial killings and inhumane atrocities are being staged every day by armed personnel and groups in too many places. Nepalese people are no more able to experience the rule of law and civilian governance. All are terrorized with too frequent and too serious violations of human rights. None feel secure at any place or time. The scarce and valuable resources needed to alleviate widespread poverty and backwardness are being diverted to militarization to an extent that the country is not in position to afford the burden any further. Development infrastructures are being destroyed rapidly. Industry and commerce are in a danger of total paralysis. More and more people in conflict areas are displaced, some forcefully, from the areas of their residence to foreign countries or to other cities of Nepal. All development activities are in standstill.

The civil war is becoming more severe and wide spread. The country can't bear this burden for long. The country is becoming rapidly militarized. All civil rights and democratic institutions are being demolished. Human sensitivity on violence and murder is deteriorating. Shellfishes and ambitions for personal gains have overshadowed the national interest and social progress. Vested foreign interests and covert interventions are becoming increasingly palpable in national political and decision-making processes. If these are allowed to continue any further, the country is at a risk of becoming a failed state, jeopardizing its national sovereignty and integrity. It is obvious that no conflicting party will be victorious militarily, but the country and at the same time people are forced to bear the burden and impact of the war. It is in the interest of none to let this dangerous stalemate to continue. Therefore, all concerned – political parties, NCP (Maoists) and the state party – should come out of their adamant positions and be engaged to resolve the conflict. All concerned should be open to critical review of their past deeds and mistakes, and be even ready to prepare a white-paper with a public apology. Now is the time to take difficult but the most important decision to work together for an independent, prosperous and democratic Nepal. Time is running out. Therefore, the coalition of civil societies for peace – The Civic Solidarity for Peace (Solidarity) – appeals all conflicting parties to shed their hardened stances and be committed to solve and transfer the conflict with their honest, responsible but serious and transparent engagements. The Solidarity, after the intensive interaction among its member organizations and representatives of other civil societies, has issued this proposal to fulfill the above objectives for public debate. 2. Minimum agreed agenda of national consensus The state party, political parties, the Maoists and different civil societies have presented their proposals or roadmaps for peace and conflict resolution. The elected Deuba government and the nominated governments (by the King) of Chand and Thapa had initiated dialogue with Maoist on several occasions. Because of the neglect on confidence building measures together with main issues related to the conflict the dialogues ended on failure, decentrating crisis further. By analyzing the declared views and proposals of all conflicting parties and civil societies one can find a commonality in them on several important issues. If the stands of respective parties are made a little flexible in view of such commonality and if the confidence among them is enhanced a national consensus can be built upon and expanded. In view of that commonality among the conflicting parties following points are presented as the issues for a minimum national consensus: • The status quo can't solve the present conflict. There is a need of wide ranging transformation in the political

(state), economic and social structures of the country. • The present constitution is incomplete and a new one is to be rewritten and enacted. • The provision and spirit in the present constitution that sovereignty lies on the people and the people are the

source of state-power are relevant and acceptable to all. • People should have freedom and inalienable fundamental rights to unobstructed political activities, speech,

write, publish, meet, organize, travel, livelihood and life. • The country should have a rule of law. No body should be above the law. • The competitive multi-party system and a multi-party representations in the state must be instated.

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• Directly elected parliament to be the most powerful body with a system of the parliament electing the government that is accountable to it.

• The decentralization of state-structures based on the principles of devolution autonomy and self-determination. • All forms of gender-based discrimination must be terminated. Women must be equally entitled to property

rights. All existing discrimination and inequality must be abolished. • There is a need of special program to end all forms of discrimination and social exclusion and injustices against

Dalits and deprived. • Discrimination against all religion, indigenous people, ethnic minorities, language, linguistic groups and

Madhesis should be abolished. The state structures and rights must be decentralized. At local levels, there should be local self-governance and rights to self-determination.

• Women, indigenous people, ethnic minorities, Dalits, Madhesis and backward or undeveloped areas must be protected with appropriate reservations until such times that they become equally competent as other communities in political, administrative and other all.

• To avoid a need of violent conflicts any further for any political changes, all obstructive provisions in the constitution should be changed; and a provision of referendum on major changes and important national issues is to be enshrined in the constitution.

3. Proposal for alleviating fear and confidence development among the conflicting parties The present conflict in the country is so widespread, serious and violent because the state structure based upon 2047(1991) construction could not reflect upon the country’s multiethnic, multilingual, multireligions and multicultural realities. It could not address the problems properly of poverty, unemployment, backwardness and discriminations. The power center could not bring about the economic, social and political transformations and progress as desired by the people who were also distanced from the access to decision-making processes and resources. This conflict is primarily a political problem. Therefore, it must be resolved only by political means. Military oppression cannot and would never solve it.

Recently two views are actively debated. One view prescribes a unity between the king and political parties to isolate the Maoists, while others advocate alliance or understandings between parliamentary parties and Maoists in order to isolate the king and its state-party. The two views are based upon the presumption that conflict resolution would be easier if trilateral conflict is changed to the bilateral one. However, there is a bleak possibility of a lasting resolution of the conflict by failing to recognize the existence of, and excluding any one of these.

The present conflict in Nepal has essentially three parties. Firstly, the insurgent Maoists, secondly, the political parties now agitating together against the regression and thirdly, the King and its state-party. The civil society is now emerging as a new force to be reckoned as the fourth. The four categories have their own apprehensions related to conflict resolution and political outcomes. Without allaying their apprehensions a lasting settlement of the conflict is not possible. The main apprehension of insurgent Maoists is that the palace and parliamentary parties may collude together to make their main political demands fizzled out by bogging them into the intricacies of parliamentary processes. They also fear of the possibility of undercover conspiracy and military preparations of the government to reorganize during the ceasefire and ultimately crush them. The main fear of agitating political parties is that both - the insurgent Maoist and the state party - have armies and the armaments that could make the parliamentary powers irrelevant. They also fear that unless the question of armies and armaments are settled, the both rival parties may together subvert the election process by guns and force. The main fear of the King and the state party is that the Maoists and the agitating political parties might join together to act to phase out monarchy during the peace process. They also fear that the insurgents would use the peace process to regroup and strengthen themselves to an invincible force. The main fear of civil society is that the tri-lateral conflict would push the country into an extreme condition thereby totally jeopardizing the country’s national identity, sovereignty and democracy.

The concern of civic solidarities is to recognize that the apprehension of all stakeholders is to be addressed for the success in the peace process; No attempt should be made to exclude any one stakeholder. Thus first priority during the present peace process is to address these apprehensions.

The conflicting parties should reach to a common understanding on the following points to contain their apprehensions: 1. The monarchy should be ready to become completely constitutional; the king should have no executive power

or right to exercise any self-conscious decision, the king should remain under parliament; and all stakeholders should accept such constitutional monarchy.

2. All state power to be transferred to an all-party-government formed jointly after the consensus of parties. 3. Henceforth, all conflicting parties should be involved in the peace process. A roundtable of all parties including

the Maoists - to be convened by the government so formed and the round table to be empowered to resolve all

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basic issues of the conflict thereafter. The roundtable should decide on the issues of army, arms of Maoists, interim government and interim constitution.

4. All parties should agree on the formulation of a new constitution. The new constitution is to be formed, endorsed and implemented by the directly elected representatives of the people.

5. The interim government that would include the Maoists should conduct the election of such people’s representatives. During the election the insurgents have to deactivate their arms. Armies of any conflicting parties should be demobilized during the time. Nepal’s civil society and United Nations should observe the election.

The Civil Solidarity for Peace proposes that confidence building measures are to be taken seriously and by

learning lessons from the past, both conflicting parties should restrict their armies within their barracks during the upcoming ceasefire and peace process. During such times, no attempt should be made by both state-party and Maoists to recruit new army personnel, to add armaments, to mobilize army against any, to attack any and to be engaged in any other activities that would be suspicious to the other. The Maoists and the state party should both sign formally the codes of conduct of ceasefire and Human Rights Accord. The ceasefire should be monitored, and a high-powered Ceasefire Monitoring Commission is to be formed and implemented by the agreement and involvement of both the conflicting parties. If necessary, United Nations could be invited to monitor the ceasefire. The agreed accord during the dialogue is to be implemented by letters and spirit. 4. The proposed initiatives for peace-dialogue and process for resolution of the conflict There can be three prime alternatives to end the present conflict and civil war and to initiate peace dialogue and conflict resolution/transformation. Initiative can be taken by: A. By the king himself. B. Political parties and the all-party government formed by their consensus. C. Civil society. A. If initiative is taken by the king himself:

• First the contact with the Maoist should be established and then a bilateral ceasefire should be declared. • A roundtable of all agitating political parties and the Maoists should be convened; Representatives of the

civil society are to be involved. • The roundtable should formulate by consensus the minimum basic agenda of national consensus and

principles on conflict resolution. On the basis of the consensus, an interim government is to be formed by including the Maoists. Ongoing processes are to be governed by the government so formed.

B. If initiative is taken by political parties or the government formed by their consensus:

• First a dialogue between the king and agitating political parties should be conducted that would follow the formation of an all-party government with the consensus by the agitating parties.

• The all-party government thus formed should establish contacts with the Maoists, declare a bilateral ceasefire and call them for a peace dialogue.

• An all-party roundtable should be convened after the dialogue in which all the three conflicting parties and civil society representative should participate.

• The roundtable should develop, by consensus, a minimum national agenda, issues and principles. • Based upon national consensus an interim government including the Maoists must be constituted and the

government so formed must undertake the development of interim constitution and remaining processes for peace.

C. If the Civil Society is to take initiatives:

• After a dialogue with the state party and Maoists bilateral ceasefire should be declared and maintained by both conflicting parties.

• An all-party roundtable to be convened after the consensus in the dialogue in which all the three conflicting parties – the state-party, NCP(Maoists) and agitating political parties – and civil society representative should participate.

• The roundtable should develop, by consensus, a minimum national agenda, issues and principles. • Based upon national consensus an interim government including the Maoists must be constituted and the

government so formed must undertake the development of interim constitution and remaining processes for peace.

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There is an immediate need to form a Peace Council with the agreement and participation from all three parties in the conflict. The state party should take a responsibility to assure the security of the members of Maoists in the Peace Council. The Peace Council should take initiatives to accomplish a ceasefire, facilitate and formulate commonly agreed principles, and prepare ground works to convene an all-party roundtable. 5. Proposal for conflict resolution and political outcomes The Civic Solidarity for Peace proposes following possible alternatives for conflict resolution: First alternative • The interim government that would include the Maoists should agree to make the existing constitution an

interim constitution or to develop another interim constitution followed by the election of Constitutional Assembly.

• The Assembly will develop, adopt and implement a new constitution. Second alternatives • The interim government that would include the Maoists should declare the present constitution as an interim

constitution, conduct an election of the parliament that is assured to have an adequate representation of different lingual, ethnic, gender, cast and regional groups.

• The parliament thus elected should then develop and adopt a new constitution. • The constitution so adopted should be endorsed after the 51 percent vote in the national referendum, and

implemented. Third alternatives: • The all-party roundtable should constitute a constitution drafting commission involving all conflicting parties

and experts. • The commission should produce a draft constitution within a stipulated time frame and make it public for public

discussion and comments. • Based upon the mutually agreed draft constitution an interim government should be formed that would conduct

the election of the parliament. Adequate provisions are to be made to assure adequate representation of all lingual, gender, regional, ethnic and religious groups.

• Then the elected parliament should table and adapt the constitution thus developed by the commission after political interaction.

• The constitution so adopted should be endorsed after the 51 percent vote in the national referendum, and implemented accordingly.

6. Concern related to armaments and army The Civic Solidarity for Peace presents the following alternatives to solve the questions related to arms with the Maoists and the management of the army:

During an all-party roundtable a conclusive agreement should be reached on how and when it would be assured that the Maoists would not have a separate army and armaments. These would be either integrated into the national army or managed according to other agreed arrangements. Prior to that it must be agreed in the roundtable and strictly implemented that the insurgent army along with the state's army must be inactive and remain within their barracks during ceasefire and elections. United Nations could be invited to monitor the implementation, if necessary.

(This is the translated version of the document in Nepali that was tabled and endorsed by the workshop of executive members and other civil society members held in Sato-Aki Building, Lalitpur, January 13, 2004). Source: Civic Solidarity for Peace

Buddha Nagar, Kathmandu, Nepal. Tel : 4781212, 4782908 Fax : 4780559 E-mail : csPeace@ngofederation.org

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Annex 10 Maoist agenda at second round of talks

(14-15 September 2001) Principal political questions 1. The present constitution that is acting as an obstacle to finding a solution to the problems faced by the country

and the people should be scrapped and the people given the right to frame a new constitution. 2. In order to introduce a new system the present parliament and government should be dissolved and an interim

government formed. 3. Given the context that the traditional monarchy has come to an end and people have come to believe in the birth

of a republic, steps should be taken to institutionalize the development of a republic. Contemporary issues relevant to the people 1. All unequal treaties such as the 1950 Nepal-India treaty and the Integrated Mahakali Treaty should be scrapped,

Indian troops should be removed from Kalapani and border encroachments halted. 2. The open border between Nepal and India should be controlled and regulated. 3. A system of work permit should be introduced. Proposals to create a conducive atmosphere at the talks 1. Reveal the whereabouts of Dandapani Neupane and others who have disappeared from police custody before

and after the people's war began. 2. All prisoners, including CPN (Maoist) central committee member Matrika Yadav, should be released

immediately. 3. All laws, including the Armed Police Force Act, targeted against the People's War, should be repealed. 4. The anti-people Integrated Internal Development and Security Programme that is being sought to be

implemented should be rolled back. 5. The Royal Nepal Army that is terrorizing the people on various pretexts should sent back to the barracks. Source: Kantipur (Nepal National Daily Newspaper), September 15, 2001.

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Annex 11

His Majesty’s Government of Nepal Concept of forward-looking reforms in the State System

(Concept on forward-looking agenda on the reforms of the state system presented by His Majesty’s Government, including HMG’s view on the proposal of the Nepal Communist Party (Maoists) on Baisakh 14, 2060 BS (April 27, 2003) Background 1. Gradual and continuous reform in substance, structure and values of the state authority, together with the process

of social development, is a natural phenomenon. Historical development and events in the modern Nepal after the unification of the Kingdom is also a testimony to these realities. The latest set of reforms and changes in the process were established by the People’s Movement of 2046 BS (1990). Sovereignty vested in the people, constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy are the fundamental achievements of 2046 BS.

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal was formed in the course of institutionalising the political reforms of 2046 BS. In spite of certain inconsistencies and obstacles in the implementation of some constitutional provisions, the constitution is alive and functional to date as an excellent document in view of the democratic values and norms.

2. After the change of 2046 BS, the state certainly has made important achievements in various areas. However, there has not been expected success in the process of achieving the objective of political, economic and social transformation in accordance with the expectation of the people for change. After the reestablishment of the multiparty democracy in the country, a big wave of hope and expectation had arisen among the people on the possibilities of economic and social progress. There was a belief among the people that the economic and social differences and traditions of exploitation institutionalised for centuries would fade out in the democratic environment and new aspects of progress would be open to indigenous people, ethnic groups and various cultural groups. But, these potentialities could not be converted into reality during the course of new exercise in democracy. A democratic constitution was formed. Structures were ready. General elections were held. But the fruit of democracy could not reach all the people in a manner to induce the desired change in the people’s lifestyles in real terms. Though the expectation against the exploitation, discrimination, inequalities and deprivation remaining suffocated in the society for centuries could have an opportunity to be articulated in the democratic environment, these problems could not find appropriate solution. Democracy was nearly confined to formality.

Formation of government through elections, constitutional checks and balances, and socio-economic transformation are mandatory factors for a democracy. These factors are complementary to each other. In the course of our democratic exercise, there could not be coherence and inter-relationship among the electoral democracy, constitutional checks and balances and efforts of socio-economic transformation. As a result, many distortions and anomalies were created.

3. It is well-known that there had been a recurring voicing of the need to introduce broad and forward-looking reforms in the existing constitutional system even from within the constitutional forces for the creation of an environment in which the fruit of democracy could be shared by all the Nepalese people, correcting the mistakes and weaknesses in the process of conducting the business of the state in the past thirteen years.

4. In the meantime, there has also been a fundamental change in the balance of equation between the political forces. There has been a basic change in the structure and balance of political power that had existed in 2046 BS and new political forces have been seen significantly in the national politics.

Given the above background, it is a must to bring about forward-looking changes in the state system in accordance with the popular will. Under the concept of the principle of sovereignty being vested in the people, multiparty electoral democracy, constitutional checks and balances, and forward-looking socio-economic transformation should be the mandatory factors of reforms in the state system.

Accepting the above-mentioned realities, an effort has been made to present a summary of framework of reforms in the state system, rather than focussing only on the issues raised by the Maoists.

Objectives Following should be the objectives of the forward-looking reforms in the existing state system:

a. Building a political system that can accommodate and ensure participation of all Nepalese people. b. Creating equal opportunities for self-development of all Nepalese people, c. Developing a political system on the basis of contemporary balance among the political forces. d. Creating an egalitarian society bringing an end to all kinds of inequalities, discrimination and exploitation.

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Mandatory Bases Sovereignty vested in the people, constitutional monarchy, multiparty democracy, and preservation of and promotion of the national integrity and unity shall remain the mandatory bases for the future course of development of the nation state system of Nepal. Fundamental Policies and Principles of forward-looking reforms: 1. Promoting the national pride and identity of Nepal preserving independence, national unity and territorial

integrity of the country, and preventing any divisive tendency in the country, 2. Developing Nepal as a capable and developed nation state, achieving the objective of social upliftment and

modernization, 3. Creating equal opportunity for self-development of all the Nepalese people eliminating all kinds of

discrimination on the basis of caste, gender, religion, and race, 4. Providing the benefits of the welfare state through the just and equitable system in all walks of national life, 5. Strengthening the national economy adopting open market-oriented economic policies, 6. Developing effective local autonomous governance system increasing the participation and reach of the people in

the governance system. Main aspects of the forward-looking changes Following shall be the main aspects of the forward-looking changes in the nation state system: 1. In accordance with the values that the people are the decision-makers in the conduct of the business of the state,

the sovereignty of the nation should be vested in the people. A system for conducting the business of the state in accordance with the popular will through representatives responsible to the people should be guaranteed. The Constitution should clearly define the procedure of the practice of sovereignty by the people.

2. The role and importance of the Nepalese Monarchy is irreplaceable for the continuity and preservation of the sanctity of the national independence and territorial integrity of the country uniting all Nepalese people comprising of various languages, religions, ethnic groups and cultures. Therefore, the institution of monarchy shall continue to remain as a symbol of Nepalese nationality and national unity. The changes of 2046 BS and the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (2047 BS) have already defined the position and esteem of the monarchy. The system of constitutional monarchy should be developed according to these very norms.

3. The essence of democracy is people’s rule. In other words, democracy is the system of conducting the affairs of the state by the people through their representatives. As the political parties established on the basis of various ideologies are the carriers of the popular expectation and will, there is no dispute that the system based on the competitive multi-party democracy is the best system of governance. Therefore: a. Multi-party democracy should continue to remain as the backbone of the future state system of Nepal. b. A constitutional guarantee should be put in place for making it impossible to ban the existence and activities

of the political parties. c. Appropriate legal bases should be prepared for making the structure, programs and financial sources of the

political parties continuously transparent, democratic and respectable. 4. The legitimate source of the conduct of business of the state is popular verdict expressed by people through

elections. The past experiences have proved that distortions and anomalies can arise if the elections could not be free and fair. Besides, the wider and more representative the verdict expressed through elections in the parliament, the broader will be the basis of legitimacy of the conduct of the business of state. Therefore: a. The esteem, autonomy, jurisdiction and authority of the Election Commission should be strengthened so as to

preserve the free and fair the elections. b. In view of the past experiences, a system of neutral caretaker government should be put in place three months

before the polls to ensure free and fair elections. c. Except in a few sectors, a system of proportional representation should be introduced in order to the create

basis for expression of a broader popular will in a people-oriented manner in major elections. 5. The concept of popularly elected government is the compulsory factor of the democracy. A constitutional

provision of vigilance should be maintained in order to prevent difficulties and gaps in the system of governance through the popularly elected representatives. As Prime Minister is the executive chief of the state in the parliamentary system, the prime ministerial system should be strengthened in the reform of the state system giving continuity to the respectability and effectiveness of the office of the Prime Minister.

The inconsistency and discrepancy seen in the authority of the Prime Minister in issues including the dissolution of the House of Representatives should be resolved. Besides, a provision for appointing Ministers including from outside the parliament should be made in order to improve the effectiveness of the Council of Ministers.

6. Political parties are the carriers of the peoples’ feelings and expectations and parliament is the place to reflect that. The parliament is the representative institution of the sovereign people and the people exercise the

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sovereignty vested in them through the parliament. As the effectiveness of parliament shall ensure the sovereignty of the people, following aspects should be taken care of in the course of making the parliament more effective: a. The structure and composition of the upper house should be totally reformed including the representation of

persons of high reputations in various walks of life and the representation of the ethnic groups, indigenous people and Dalits in proportion to their population.

b. The effectiveness of both the houses should be improved and the system of government becoming responsible towards the parliament should be strengthened.

c. The representation of women in at least 25% seats in both houses should be ensured. 7. In order to increase the reach of people in the system of governance and to increase their participation in it, it is

essential to strengthen the system of local self-governance. The closer the system of governance is brought to the people, the more the effectiveness of state. Keeping in view of this reality: a. The scope and authority of the local bodies should be constitutionally ensured in accordance with the concept

of local self-governance. b. There should be a complete revamping of the existing structure, regional divisions and number of the local

bodies in view of the ethnic composition, state of development and geographical conditions. c. Taking into account the economic potentials, populations and geographical conditions, new structures should

be created in accordance with the local governance in the regional levels. 8. As the popular verdict is the main basis of the conduct of the business of the state and people are the main source

of power, a provision should be kept for taking referendum by the decision of the parliament on policy issues of national importance from the people.

9. It is the responsibility of the state to create opportunities for every Nepalese for the self-development in the democratic environment. For that: a. The pluralistic society should be strengthened preserving and promoting all religions, ethnic groups,

communities, languages and their beliefs. The local bodies should be given the option to use the national languages as their second working language.

b. A constitutional guarantee should be provided for the freedom of expression and organization according to one’s faith and beliefs in an unhindered manner.

c. A situation should be created for the implementation of the rule of law with full commitment in all aspects of national life.

d. A guarantee shall be ensured for not compromising the human rights, fundamental rights and humanitarian values even in difficult circumstances.

10. It is not possible to easily end the situation of ethnic and gender discrimination, exploitation and inequalities prevailing in the Nepalese society for centuries. The treatment of an extraordinary problem can only be found in extraordinary remedies. Therefore: a. For a certain period of time a system of reservation for the indigenous, ethnic and Dalit people in the

representative institutions, education, health, administrative services and other employment sectors should be provided until they reach the national average on the basis of Human Development Index.

b. In order to remove all kinds of discrimination against women, at least 25% of seats in all representative institutions should be reserved for women, and special reservation for them should be constitutionally ensured in education, health, administration and other employment sectors.

c. An appropriate constitutional provision should be made for the lasting resolution of the problem of citizenship.

11. Democracy cannot succeed without economic development and prosperity. Therefore, in the process of achieving economic development: a. The state should adopt a policy of free and liberal market-oriented economy in order to create an environment

for equal opportunity for each Nepali to benefit from the fruit of economic development in the democratic environment, and to discourage monopolistic tendencies.

b. In order to end the dual ownership on the land and to make available land to the landless and marginal farmers and to increase the productivity of the land, a people-oriented land reforms should be implemented.

c. The state should ensure the raising of the living standard of the people living under the poverty line on a time-bound basis and should fulfil their basic needs such as education, water supply, health and housing and provide social security for all.

d. In order to end the regional disparity in development, the concept of equitable and balanced regional development should be practically implemented.

12. Separation of power and checks and balances are important characteristics of the modern state system. Taking these principles as basis:

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a. The effectiveness of the related state organs should be improved through clear delineation of the authority and scope of the various organs of the State.

b. Timely reforms should be made to improve the effectiveness of the judiciary. c. Role of the parliament should be established in the appointments for the constitutional bodies and a definite

policy and standard should be developed for such appointments. The appointment procedure should be made transparent.

d. The constitutional bodies should be given greater autonomy and authority. 13. Promotion of the ultimate national interest should be the guiding principle of the foreign policy of Nepal. The

objective of the foreign policy should be to strengthen friendly relations with all countries of the world and to gradually institutionalise Nepal’s aspiration for peace, while remaining committed to the principles of Non-alignment, Panchsheel and the United Nations Charter.

Consensus on Economic and Social Issues Apart from the issues mentioned above, His Majesty’s Government has no disagreement in principle regarding most of the social and economic issues presented by the Nepal Communist Party (Maoists), which may be useful guidelines for the future governments. Method and process for implementation of the Consensus The main objective of talks is to arrive at a consensus on the objectives, polices and works of reforms and to decide the method and process of implementation. As it will be easier to arrive at a consensus on the method and process after a consensus is reached on the issue of reforms, it will be appropriate to concentrate the discussion on the issue of reforms. The method and process of reforms proposed by His Majesty’s Government shall be implemented in the following stages:

Step A. Creating consensus between the government and the rebel side through negotiations on the objectives, polices and programs of reforms.

Step B. Organizing a Round-Table Conference with the participation including of the political parties in order to establish the agreement reached as the document of national consensus.

Step C. Formation of an interim electoral government including the rebel side as well. Step D. Holding of the election to the House of Representatives. Step E. Amending the constitution in accordance with the document of national consensus.

Objectives achievable from within the Constitution After studying and analysing the proposals and agenda presented by the NCP (Maoists) the subjects mentioned in the proposals seem to be achievable through the amendment and rewriting of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (2047 BS). However, His Majesty’s Government is ready to discuss all the subjects and alternatives with an open heart. HMG believes that broader understanding can be reached during the process of negotiations on all aspects outlined in the preliminary concept papers presented by both sides examining the merits and demerits of the issues. Revisions of the concept The issues mentioned in this concept paper on the forward-looking reforms presented by HMG can be revised, clarified and readjusted on the basis of mutual understanding. Ongoing Implementation As several issues agreed by the two can be implemented through the executive decision of the government, it will be appropriate to gradually implement such agreements by the government simultaneously. Agenda Setting and Negotiation Process

1. Considering the seriousness and sensitivity of the situation and the need to quickly resolve the existing uncertainty and confusion, HMG is of the view that the peace negotiations should be concluded as soon as possible.

2. On the basis of this concept paper presented by HMG and the proposal and agenda presented by the NCP (Maoists), the subject and agenda of the negotiations should be prepared in mutual agreement. The meetings for negotiations should be taken forward concentrating on the pre-determined agenda.

3. The discussions should be started giving priority to the political agenda as well as social, economic and humanitarian subjects. Especially, it is essential to give high priority to the works related to the rehabilitation of the victim and displaced people during the “people’s war”.

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Provision for handing over the arms HMG is fully convinced that a solution to the problem can be sought through peace negotiations if both sides are fully committed to make sincere efforts. In order to create an environment for the implementation of the outcome of the negotiations during the course of bringing the negotiations to conclusion, the issue of handing over of the arms and ammunitions lying with the Maoist side should be one of the important items of the agenda of the negotiations. Rehabilitation of victims and Reconstruction of Infrastructure HMG is of the view that a high priority should be given to the works related to the rehabilitation of the people displaced, disabled, and victimized for various reasons during the “people’s war”. The reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure because of the people’s war should also be included in the agenda of the talks. Issues to be addressed for the success of negotiations Realizing that the tendency of imposing one’s own perception and strategic interests against the other in the name of “ground reality” can create difficult situation in the negotiations, HMG believes that it will be appropriate not to indulge in that kind of dispute. Instead, it is essential that both sides should be engaged in creating the environment of mutual trust and confidence, which is a compulsory factor for the success of negotiations. In this regard, HMG wants to draw attention to the following subjects: a. Both sides should sincerely implement and observe the agreed Code of Conduct to mange the ceasefire. b. The Monitoring Committee established to monitor the Code of Conduct should be activated immediately. In

case any dispute is seen in the implementation of the Code of Conduct, the responsibility for resolving that should be given to the Monitoring Committee.

c. In case of any dispute or difficulty in the implementation of the Code of Conduct, efforts should be made to resolve the issue through mutual consultations before making it an issue of public debate.

d. An environment should be created for the unhindered activities of the political parties and that of the government in all parts of the country.

Commitment not to break the ceasefire Realizing the fact that the nation will have to bear a big loss and the serious impact it will have on the very essence of democracy and nationality if there is a relapse of the situation of killings, violence and terror in the country due to the end of ceasefire, both sides should make sincere efforts to seek resolution through peaceful negotiations. His Majesty’s Government proposed that a commitment should be made from both sides for not breaking the ceasefire and for giving continuity to the negotiations under any circumstances, respecting the desire of the Nepalese people for peace.

Shrawan 32, 2060 BS (August 17, 2003) Source: Website of Peace Commission (www.peacetalks.gov.np)

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Annex 12 Agenda for Political Solution

Five major political parties- the CPN (UML), Nepali Congress, National People's Forum, Nepal Peasant Worker's Party and Nepal Sadvawana Party (Anandidevi)- have been leading a national people's movement in the country for the last three and half months. With extensive discussions and dialogues on consensus building process, the parties have come out with 18 points agenda. The Parties have termed them as 'Forward Looking Reform Agenda' which address the current problems of the country. These 18 points were endorsed by a special session of the dissolved House of Representative in last July. According to the parties, the present impasses of the country can only be resolved through their implementation. The 18 points have been given below: 1. People's sovereignty and executive power shall be made unambiguous, effective and consolidated. A provision

of referendum shall be introduced in the constitution to take decisions on major issues of national importance including constitutional and political issues.

2. Monarchy shall be made transparent by bringing the king under complete constitutional framework. 2.1 The existing practice of allowing King to draft laws as he wishes shall be abolished. 2.2 All the administration of Royal Palace and the management of Royal Palace services shall be brought under

the Ministry of Royal Palace. 2.3 Existing provision in the constitution-allowing king to use his discretion on any issues shall be eliminated. 2.4 A system shall be developed where the king will have to make his property public on a regular basis. 2.5 The royal title shall be limited only to the king, the queen and the crown prince. The Prime Minister's

position shall be placed 4th in protocol order. 2.6 The provision of Royal Council (privy council) shall be abrogated.

3. The Royal Nepal Army shall be granted national status and mobilized as per the democratic norms and values at the same time making them responsible towards the country and people. A system shall be introduced to place the RNA under the elected parliament.

4. The present national anthem shall be replaced by an anthem, which is nationalistic, dignified and is able to reflect the sentiment of national unity and patriotism.

5. Parliament shall be made stronger and more effective to completely establish the sovereignty of the people. A provision of restoration of parliament and its continuity shall be included in the constitution if the election declared by the Prime Minister could not be held at a fixed time. An effective system shall be introduced in order to make elections freer and fairer and more impartial and to increase the representation of women, dalits and people other marginalized and socially oppressed communities in the parliament. Political parties shall be made organizationally democratic and economically transparent. With regard to constitutional appointment, a system of parliamentary hearing shall be introduced.

6. A forward looking national agenda shall be prepared on the basis of consensus to resolve the Maoists problem politically and to establish a lasting peace through a successful and result oriented dialogue. The families of the victims of the conflict will receive compensation, relief and rehabilitation from the government.

7. The National Assembly will be restructured and changed into an assembly of minority, oppressed people, women, dalits and other prominent figures of the country.

8. Foreign relations shall be conducted on the basis of UN Charter, policy of non-alignment and in the interest of the people and the county.

9. To resolve the problem of centralization, the governing system shall be gradually reformed as per the needs and constitutional arrangements shall be made to make the local governing bodies resourceful, decisive and powerful.

10. The country is in the grip of the problem of citizenship. Especially in Terai, a large number of people are kept without the citizenship certificates. This problem shall be solved on the basis of national consensus by deciding on a threshold year adopting constitutional and other possible measures.

11. All the economic, social, political and law related discrimination against women shall be eliminated. Special laws and programs shall be formulated and implemented in order to create equal opportunity for women. Women's representation in parliament and local elections shall be d gradually increased to make 33 per cent.

12. The state shall not give special treatment to any religion. The discriminatory practices on religion, language and culture shall be eliminated. Special policy shall be formulated to protect, preserve and develop all castes, race, people's religions, languages and cultures. Through the introduction of special laws and programs, the economic, social and cultural status of marginalized and oppressed people shall be uplifted and equal opportunity and equal access given to them. For this, the most marginalized and oppressed section of the society shall receive special treatment.

13. Special system shall be introduced to uplift the dalits and oppressed communities. Practice of untouchability shall be regarded as a crime and effective laws shall be introduced to punish those who practice it.

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14. All forms of discriminations based on caste, race, community, geography, language, culture and religion shall be eliminated.

15. Special programs shall be formulated in order to accelerate the development programs in backward and remote areas including Karnali area.

16. Special programs shall be introduced in a planned way to improve the situation of those people who are living under the poverty line. Special and concrete programs shall also be introduced to end unemployment, problems of landless people and to uplift the economic, social and cultural situation of Kamaiyas, agricultural and industrial laborers and other economically marginalized people.

17. Administration system shall be made clean, fair, transparent and accountable. In order to guarantee good governance, administration shall be made democratic and professional by keeping it out of political influence and intervention.

18. Corruption shall be effectively controlled. No one shall enjoy immunity from it. Corruption control laws and mechanisms shall be made more effective and active.

Implementation Mechanism for the Agenda - Appointment of the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the five political parties. The Nepali Congress,

Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist and Leninist), Nepal Sadbhavana Party, Nepal Workers and Peasants Party and Janmorcha/Nepal,

- Formation of the national government on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, - Revival of the House of Representatives on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, - Dialogue with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) by the government, and - To get the approval of the outcome of the dialogue from the House of Representatives. Source: Nepali Congress, Santipurna Sanyukta Janandolan 2060 (Peaceful Joint Peoples Movement 2004),

Kathmandu

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Annex 13

Major Milestones in relations to Maoist Insurgency 13 February 1996 'People's War' begins.

March 1997 Lokendra Bahadur Chand of RPP heads coalition government supported by CPN (UML).

October 1997 RPP splits and Surya Bahadur Thapa heads faction to form coalition government with Nepali Congress and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP).

April 1998 CPN (UML) splits into CPN (UML) and CPN (ML). Girija Prasad Koirala takes over to lead minority government.

August 1998 CPN (ML) joins Koirala government.

December 1998 CPN (UML) replaces CPN (ML) in Koirala government. Coalition joined by NSP.

May 1999 Third general elections. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai heads majority Nepali Congress government.

December 1999 Government sets up High-Level Committee to provide suggestions to Solve the Maoist Problem under Sher Bahadur Deuba.

March 2000 Krishna Prasad Bhattarai ousted by Girija Prasad Koirala.

25 September 2000 Maoist overrun Dunai, headquarters of Dolpa district; the first such attack.

27 October 2000 One-on-one contact between government and Maoist as Deputy Prime Minister Ram Chandra Poudel meets Maoist central committee member, Rabindra Shrestha.

2-7 April 2001 In separate attacks in Rukumkot, Rukum, and Naumule, Dang, Maoist kill 70 policemen.

1 June 2001 Massacre in royal palace; King Birendra and entire family wiped out.

12 July 2001 Maoist abduct 60 police from Holeri, Rolpa. Army fails to move in.

19 July 2001 Girija Prasad Koirala resigns.

22 July 2001 Sher Bahadur Deuba elected prime minister. Declares ceasefire.

30 August 2001 First sitting of first round of peace talks between government and Maoist at Godawari, Kathmandu.

2nd week of

September 2001 Second sitting of first round of peace talks at Thakurdwara, Bardiya.

13 Nov. 2001 Third sitting of first round of peace talks held at Godawari, Kathmandu.

21 Nov. 2001 Maoists signal dissatisfaction with peace talks; Deuba urges patience.

23 Nov. 2001 Four-month-long ceasefire comes to an end with resumption of Maoist attacks.

26 Nov. 2001 State of Emergency proclaimed. Fundamental rights curtailed and CPN (Maoist) declared 'terrorist organization'.

21 February 2002 Parliament ratifies emergency.

4 April 2002 Parliament passes Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Bill.

23 April 2002 Government announces bounties on heads of Maoist leaders ranging from Rs 1 million to Rs 5 million.

17 May 2002 Parliament summoned to endorse six-month extension of emergency.

22 May 2002 Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba dissolves parliament and calls for fresh elections in November.

23 May 2002 Deuba suspended from primary membership of Nepali Congress and three days later expelled.

8 July 2002 New budget announced security receives Rs. 14.81 billion – 44 percent higher than previous year.

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15 July 2002 Local bodies' term ends and government decides against extension.

5 August 2002 Supreme Court endorses dissolution of parliament.

12 August 2002 Interpol issues Red Corner Notice against top Maoists leaders.

27 August 2002 Emergency ends (??)

4 October 2002 Deuba recommends postponing elections. King Gyanendra sacks him, postpones elections indefinitely, and assumes executive authority.

11 October 2002 Lokendra Bahadur Chand appointed prime minister.

3 December 2002 Maoists announce formation of 'central dialogue team'

26 January 2003 Inspector General of the Armed Police Force, Krishna Mohan Shrestha together with wife and bodyguard shot dead in Kathmandu.

28 January 2003 The government decides to withdraw the Red Corner Notice (Interpol warrants) against the Maoists, cancels the bounty after and withdraws the "terrorist" label.

29 January 2003 Ceasefire declared.

2 February 2003 Maoists announce 'restructured' central dialogue team.

10 February 2003 Government and the Maoists agree on Code of Conduct for the ceasefire.

27 April 2003 First sitting of second round of talks held between government and Maoists.

8 May 2003 Political parties begin agitation for restoration of parliament and formation of all party government.

9 May 2003 Second sitting of second round of peace talks held.

30 May 2003 Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigns.

4 June 2003 Surya Bahadur Thapa appointed prime minister.

17 August 2003 Third sitting of second round of negotiations held at Nepalgunj.

18-19 August 2003 Continuation of negotiations at Hapure of Dang District

27 August 2003 End of ceasefire.

2 June 2004 Appointment of Sher Bahadur Deuba as the Prime Minister – government turned into a coalition government.

Source: Deepak Thapa with Bandita Sijapati (2003), A Kingdom Under Siege – Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to

2003, Kathmandu, the Print House, PP 183-186, Nepal Gazette and Arjun Karki and Binod Bhattarai (2003), Whose War? – Economic and Socio-Cultural Impacts of Nepal's Maosit-Government Conflict, Kathmandu, NGO Federation of Nepal, Pg 156.

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Chart 1

History of the Communist Party of Nepal

Source: Deepak Thapa with Bandita Sijapati, A King Under Seige: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency 1996 to 2003,

Printhouse, Kathmandu, Nepal. P. 44.

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Chart 2

Human Development Index: Difference between the Rural and Urban Areas (HDR 2001)

Source: Nepal Human Development Report, 2001: Poverty Reduction and Governance, UNDP/Nepal, 2002. P. 14.

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Chart 3

Human Development Index: Difference between the different Development Regions

Source: Nepal Human Development Report, 2001: Poverty Reduction and Governance, UNDP/Nepal, 2002. P. 14-15.

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Newspapers: Daily/Weekly/Fortnightly ! National 1. Annapurna Post, Vernacular daily newspaper 2. Himal Khabarpatrika (Vernacular weekly) 3. The Himalayan Times, Daily newspaper. 4. Nepal, National Weekly ( Vernacular) 5. The Independent Weekly 6. The Kantipur, Nepali National daily newspaper 7. The Kathmandu Post, Daily newspaper 8. People's Review, A Political and Business Weekly ! Indian 1. The Hindustan Times 2. The Statesman 3. The Times of India 4. The Tribune, Noida, India ! Other 1. Asia Pacific Media Services Limited. 2004. Nepal Struggles to Cope with Diehard Maoist Violence. Place of

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