the mansab system 1595-1637

THE MANSAB SYSTEM 1595-1637Author(s): Irfan HabibSource: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 29, PART I (1967), pp. 221-242Published by: Indian History CongressStable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44155500Accessed: 04-01-2019 06:48 UTC

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MEDIEVAL INDIA 221

THE MANSAB SYSTEM

1595-1637

Irfan Habib (Aligarh)

In many ways Moreland's article, 'Rank (mansab) in the Mogul State Service', published a little over thirty years ago,1 marks the starting point for all recent studies of the mansab system inasmuch as it contained for the first time an almost definitive interpretation of certain essential features of the institution. Thus his explanations of the significance of zat and sawar ranks, of the principles on which payments on them were calculated and made, and of the nature of the obligation (especially, the size and composition of military contingent to be maintained) entailed by sawar rank, have been amply confirmed and corro- borated by further research. Moreland's analysis was particularly well grounded in respect of various aspects of the mansab system as it fune- tioned daring the reign of Shahjahan, for here he was able to utilise a series of imperial farmans , concerned with the satisfaction of pay-claims of mansabdars, that had been preserved at Jaipur.

From his information for Shahjahan's time, and from such evidence from the historical literature of the earlier period as he had access to, Moreland also sought to work out the leading lines of the evolution (or rather, as he supposed, of the cycles of organisation, deterioration, and reorganisation) of the mansab system during the period before the reign of Shahjahan, and to determine, in that light, the measure of change that Shahjahan introduced into the system. In this attempt he was handicapped by lack of documentary evidence for the earlier period, which he frankly admitted, and he had to proceed largely on the basis of inferences from a few scattered passages.3

On such inferences, however, he framed a short and simple formula for interpreting the entire history of military ranks in the Mughal and even Central Asian regimes. His belief was that, initially in every re- gime, each rank represented the number of cavalry a commander actnally maintained, but that, in the second stage, as administrative decay set in, the number of ranks lost their close relation to the actual number of followers the rank-holder had in service; and, that subsequently, when someone attempted a reorganisation in order to re-establish military and administrative efficiency, compromises had to be made even though the object again was to link up the numbers of ranks with the real number of men.


222 INDIAN HISTORY CONGRESS

Coming to the Mughal Empire in Iadia, Moreland held that the two categories of mansabs , zat and sawar , instituted by Akbar, represented such a compromise brought about in the 'third stage.' Under its terms the older ranks being now nominal were recognised as such, and became mere indicators of personal status and personal pay, while the new, sawar rank stood for the actual number of troopers maintained. But under Jahangir, this system too underwent the same fate as the old, and now the sawar ranks tended to become nominal as well. His successor, Shahjahan, aiming at a stricter administration and more competent army, could not now hope to restore Akbar's system, but was compelled to tread further on the path of compromise. He kept the ranks as they were, but scaled down the total pay due on the ranks, reducing sharply the pay against the zat ranks, while reducing also, though in lesser proportion, the pay against the sawar ranks. Because lie had reduced the pay due on ranks, and because of political consider- tions inhibiting too strict or excessive an insistence on the fulfilment of

obligations exactly according to the numbers of ranks, he scaled down the obligation, demanding that, under different circumstances, the commanders were to maintain one-third, one-fourth or one-fifth of the numbers of their sawar ranks.

Moreland's interpretation is certainly attractive because of its simple and plausible reasoning. But it must be stressed that it is largely speculative. Indeed, both his assumption of identity between the Mughal and the Mongol and Timurid military organisation, and his suggestion that the zat rank was pre-Akbar and the sawar alone an innovation of Akbar, have been subjected to cogent criticism.3 But on what one may regard as the still more important question of what happened after Akbar, Moreland's word has to-date remained the last, although here too he is by no means on very strong ground. The amount of actual evidence that he is able to bring forward is small, even as to elementary facts of the mansab system prior to Shahjahan; and it is by no means easy to follow him when he declares that certain institutions found under Shahjahan did not exist earlier, and were innovations introduced by him. Nor is it easy to accept his assumption, though not held by him alone, that Jahangir's reign is the surest period to which a fall from the heights, presumed to have been attained under Akbar, would be assigned. He even throws "the burden of proof on any one who should assert that (any) one of Akbar 's institutions survived in its integrity" under Jahangir and goes on to assure his readers that no evidence on this score was actually needed.4 Further- more he seems to regard such administrative disintegration und^r


MEDIEVAL INDIA 223

Jahangir as the sole factor to be considered in explaining the measures of reform and reorganisation of which he supposed Shahjahan to be the author.

In this article we propose to examine afresh the evidence from the period, with a view to checking Moreland's judgement of facts, and to considering certain alternative answers to the questions raised by him. The article, therefore, consists essentially of two parts. In the first an attempt is made to establish directly from evidence the facts of change in the system of mansab pay and obligation during the last years of Akbar and the reign of Jahangir so as to discover what exactly was new in the system as it was found existing under Shahjahan. In the second part, we shall seek to define the context in which these changes occurred and explore their relationship with other economic, political and administrative developments of the time.

To begin with, we shall consider the changes in the scales of pay against mansabs , both zat and sawar ; then, the relation of the size of the contingent to the number of sawar rank; and, finally, the promulgation of the cmonth scale', which involved both pay and obligation.

For the pay sanctioned for zat ranks, Mor eland had, on the one hand, the pay schedule given in the Ain-i-Akbari ,5 and assignable on Abul FazPs own words,6 to about 1595, and, on the other, the pay scales which he worked out from a farman of 1630. He found that the latter largely conformed to the schedules of later times and thus were substantially lower than those of the Ain s schedule . He, therefore, supposed that a substantial reduction in the zat pay must have occurred within the intervening period, and, although he believed it to have taken place upon orders issued by Shahjahan immediately after his accession in 1628, he produced no specific evidence for this, except some rather general statements in the English factory records.7 While it is not also possible for us to establish the year in which the change occurred, we can perhaps narrow the period during which it did.

A manuscript of Mu'tamad Khan's Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri , preserved in the British Museum, contains at the end of its account of Akbar's reign, additional matter which is lost in other MSS and so omitted in its printed editions. This consists of a report on the revenues of the Empire as it was submitted to Jahangir on a certain datę immediately after his accession in 1605; and tacked on to it is a schedule of pay due on various mansabs .8 Since Mutamad Khan had completed this volume only 15 years after Akbar's death,9 the schedule is probably accurate in representing the scale of pay as it was in force in 1605. A comparison with the Ain9 s .schedule shows that some small changes



had already been made with the effect of bringing down the salaries due on certain mansabs .

Both the schedules state the salaries in Rupees per month; but unlike the schedule in the Ain, the schedule reproduced by Mutamad Khan only reproduces the salary for the zat rank holders of class I (i. e. whose sawar rank was equal to their zat rank).10 Overlooking Mansabs which were not held in actual fact, but whose inclusion in both schedules was a mere matter of form, and also excluding the mansabs from 1,250 to 600, the figures for which in the Ain are corrupt,11 we tabulate below the pay due on various zat mansabs as given in Mutamad Khan's schedule, and converted into percentages of the corresponding figures in the Ain .

10,000 100 500 100 7,000 89 400 75 5,000 100 350 93 4,500 99 300 86 4,000 100 250 87 3,500 100 200 92 3,000 100 150 91 2,500 100 100 86 2,000 100 60 100 1,500 100 50 100

10 100

It is apparent from this table that although certain changes had been made in the schedules, which at least for certain ranks below 500

zat meant substantial reductions, the pay scales at the accession of Jahangir were on the whole very close to those of 1595.

For the period after 1605, we do not have any pay-schedules until we come to the reign of Shahjahan, but we have evidence to suggest that until 1618, at any rate, the scales as recorded in 1605 remained largely in force. In 1616 Sir Thomas Roe recorded a conversation with a Mughal

noble of the rank of 5,000, who explained that besides the payment he received for maintaining his cavalry, he also received as 4 'pension 1,000 rup. a day".12 In other words, Rs. 30,000 a month- the same amount as prescribed under the schedules of 1595 and 1605.

A still more reliable source of information for us consists of cer-

tain farmans. especially two, one of 1615 and the other of 1618, which are in nature very similar to those of the time of Shahjahan that More- land had studied. Their original texts are not available to us; but they were rendered into Hindi, with considerable care, by Shýamaldas in his


MEDIEVAL INDIA 225

great history of Mewar, the Vir Vinod. Salaries for four zat mans ab s in Rupees per month are stated here;13 and these are compared below with those in the schedule of 1605 (but for Class I only).

1615/1618 1606 5,000 I Class 30,000 30,000 500 II Class 2,440 2,500 400 II Class 1,440 1,500 60 III Class 275 300

Since the salaries in the right-hand column are invariably those of Class I, the slightly lower figures in the 1615/1618 column for Classes II and III are obviously on the same scale.

It would be a reasonable inference, therefore, that the great reduction in the salaries of zat ranks took place during the thirteen years or so, from 1618 to 1630. But whether Jahangir or Shahjahan was responsi- ble for it, or whether the change came not as the result of measures but of a pair or a series of measures adopted by both of these emperors can only be a matter of conjecture.

We may now pass on to consider the question of the pay on sawar ranks. This is much more complex than that of zat salaries, for the system on which payment was made on the sawar rank during the reign of Akbar and also for some time under Jahangir does not appear to have been the same as under Shahjahan. Moreland, indeed, made the contrary assumption and wrote as if right from 1595 the payment on sawar rank was made at a standard rate, and the only change that occurred was that this rate was modified, and that too only after Shajahan's accession. But he has obviously simplified, or overlooked, a large amount of evidence.

We may doubt that a standard rate existed in 1595 on the ground only that had such been the case, Abul Fazl should surely have reproduced it, in the same manner as the later schedules did, when such a rate was actually in force.15 For our own argument as to what the mode

of payment under Akbar was, we shall take a passage from Bayazid Bayat, an official of the Emperor's household, who wrote his memoirs in

1591 (AH. 999) to serve as a source of information for Abul Fazl's great work. Bayazid tells us that in AH. 992 assignments were provided to him for 100 'men' (nafar) barawardi , his own rank, and lOO(men) dughi (dagh = brand, muster), the ranks of his sons. But he complains, that a balance due to him still remained unprovided for, nor was the further

allowance due to him upon the branding of his 100 barawardi (tafawat-i- dagh'i-sad nafar-i-barawardi) sanctioned.10


220 INDIAN HISTORY CO N GRE SS

From this it appears that when once a sawar rank was given, payment was sanctioned at a rate for sawar s who were still on books, and

thus designated barawardi , from bar awards meaning estimate, accounts. When the men and horses were actually brought to muster and brand ( dagh ), the payments to be made were calculated afresh. With this in our mind a completely new interpretation must be given to the passage in the Ain, where it is stated that "the Emperor assigns pay (khwasia) for cavalry (bahr-i-sawa,ri) to a number of empty handed but deserving persons; and for that number he assigns iqta( = jagir) without the pre-requisite of dagh . Turanis and Irānis are allowed Rupees 25 (per month); Indians Rupees 20; and revenue collectors of Khalisa , Rupees 15. This type is called barawardi ." 17

In interpreting this passage Moreland appears to have confounded the commanders with the men. The "empty handed" persons, empty handed only because they did not produce the cavalry before receiving pay, were commanders, not troopers. So too were the Turanis, Iranis, Indians and the revenue-collectors (surely, the last in any case could not have been mere troopers). For their future contingents, for the moment only on books, and so barawardi, not one but different rates (presumably per unit of the sawar rank granted) were sanctioned, being, in the case of Turani and Irani /wffrtstfô-holders, the equivalent of 12,000 dams (25x12x40), and in that of Indians, 9,600 dams per annum.

In the second stage, payments were adjusted in accordance with the actual number and types of men and horses presented by the commander for muster and brand. The entire passage under the heading, {<Ain of Other 'Horsemen '( Sawar an)," 18 is obviously concerned with calculations of pay at this stage. The commander ( aqa ) arranges the number and kinds of horses to be presented; and the bakhshis inspect them. Subsequently, descriptive rolls are prepared. Camels and bullocks are counted as yak-aspas (one horse troopers), the rates allowed for them being sometimes a half and sometimes two-fifths of high-grade trooper. The rates for each 'ak-aspa varied according to the breeds of horses, ranging from 25 to 12 Rupees (per month). But the revenue collectors of the Khalisa were to receive only Rs. 15 (i.e. the same as the rate allowed to them for barawardi). The rates allowed for do-aspas and sih aspas (i.e. 2-and 3-horsed troopers), are not specified; but it is stated that a dah-bashi , holder of the rank of 10, must bring to muster 3 sih-aspas, 4 do-aspas and 3 yak-aspas. Thus the total rate per unit of sawar rank, if this composition was actually maintained at the muster, could have been much higher than the rates sanctioned for the yak-aSpa ,


MEDIEVAL INDIA 227

which even here approximated roughly to the rates sanctioned for barawardi .

It is thus obvious that complex calculations were involved in the second stage; and a commander would be entitled to claim a much higher rate of payment than the barawardi rate, if he presented his contingent in accordance with the full official requirements.

Having thus established the position as it seems to have stood at the time the writing and editing of the Aiii-i-Akbari were completed, we may now take stock of later developments.

The first known measure introducing some kind of change was taken in practically the same year, viz Akbar's 40th regnal year."During this time the monthly rates of barawardi 19 were established on a different

basis. On the 11th Mihr it was decreed that Mughals, Afghans and Indians would be allowed 1,000 dams on sihaspa , 800 on do-aspa and 600 dams on yak-aspa. Rajputs would be allowed 800 on the first (i.e. sih-aspa ) and 600 on the second.''20

From the figures in this passage, Moreland draws an average of 9,600 dams per sawar rank, by calculating on a ratio of 3:4:3 in the numbers of units of the three categories in accordance with the official formula for the composition of a contingent.2 1

Moreland's suggestion is ingenious and at first sight convincing, for there is some evidence from Jahangir's reign indicating precisely a rate of 9,600 dams per unit of sawar rank.

But our misgivings are aroused by the very fact that if the official intention was to sanction a uniform scale of 9,600 dams the mode adopted for expressing this was surely very devious. It is certainly more likely that the intention was no more than to provide the rates that would be payable if the Emperor chose to allow a commander ņre-dagh pay for do-aspas or sih-aspas as well. If so, the barawardi rate was in fact reduced from Rs. 25 and 20 to only Rs. 15. But there is the possibility that dams in the passage are wrongly put here for tankas or double- dams.

At the end of the schedule said to have been in force at the death

of Akbar in 1605, we find rates given for these three classes, but in tankas : Sih-aspa , 1,000 tankas per month; do-aspa , 800 tankas ; and yak- aspa , 400 t&nkas.22 The rates for the first two categories are exactly the same as in the Akbarnama ; the rate for yak-aspa is different, and if the dams in the earlier passage are mistakes for tankas , it is substantially lower. 400 tankas per month are the exact equivalent of 9,600 dams per year.



The change to the system as found in the reign of Shahjahan, in which the payment for sawar rank was uniform and made, so to speak, in one stage- the mansabdar being obliged to bring to muster a contingent of fixed number and composition, but entitled to no further enhancement of pay- seems to have been the product mainly of the early years of Jahangir's administration. It was, as we propose to show, a byproduct of this process that barawardi became an alternative name for sawar rank, being now distinguished from a special type of sawar rank, to which the words do-aspa and sih-ospa transferred themselves.

First, we begin to hear of a standard rate per unit of sawar rank, for which, as we have seen, there was no precedent under Akbar, but which, to begin with, was identical with the barawardi rate for yak-aspa in force at the time of his death. The first statement of such a rate comes

from Hawkins (1608-12) who declares that the commanders "are allowed twentie rupias of everie horse by the moneth, and two rupias by the moneth for everie horse, same for the maintenance of their table."23 Hawkins is obviously referring separately to the pay of sawar and z at ranks, and his words imply a uniform rate of the equivalent of 9,600 dams per annum. Since his statement with regard to the pay for zat rank is patently inaccurate, his word in respect of sawar pay would bave remained of little account, but for its confirmation by the text of the

farman issued by Jahangir setting forth the pay-claims and assignments of Kun war Karan, who was appointed to a M ansah of 5000 zat 5,000 sawar . His total pay claim was fixed at 52,00,000 dams per month of which the amount of Rs. 30,000 = 12,00,000 dams is stated to be due on his zat rank.24 The balance, being the pay for sawar rank, thus amounted to 40,00,000 dams per month, and was manifestly calculated at the rate of 9,600 dams per annum.

Unfortunately, it has not been possible to make much out of the figures for pay-claims under sawar ranks given in the texts of the other documents of Jahangir 's reign in the Vir Vinod. Apart from the intrinsic difficulties involved in interpreting documents of this nature, it has to be remembered that we have them only in translation, and errors in their decipherment and rendering, as well as misprints, cannot be exclu- ded. However, two references, one in Sir Thomas Roe and the other in

Jahangir's own memoirs, suggest that while the principle of a uniform rate for the sawar rank had now come to stay, the rate itself had been reduced.

In 1616, Roe reports a Mughal noble as telling him that "the pay of everie one ('horse' of his rank) was 200 rupias by years;"25 i.e. 8,000 dams per year - unless 200 is a misprint for 220 which would make it


MEDIEVAL INDIA 229

8,800. In 1620, Jahangir writes of Kishtwar that its revenues, "in terms of money, amount to 7,46,70,000 dams, which under 'the present regulations (zabita-i-hal) make it a place of 8,500 sawar"26 - suggesting, of course, a rate of 8,800 dams per sawar.

This evidence is significant, in that it shows that the reduced rate of 8,800 dams which Moreland found to be in force in 1630, from the evidence of his documents, was no innovation of Shahjahan but had been actually promulgated by Jahangir some time before 1620, and very possibly in 1615 or 1616.a7 (Attention may particularly be drawn to the phrase, zabita-i~hal, used by Jahangir himself).

Aother point to consider is, the emergence of the new, special sawar rank, and the pay sanctioned for it.

We may begin by presenting two statements, one relating to 1596, the other to 1613.

1. "His Majesty (Akbar) promoted Mirza Shahrukh. The pay for 5,000 zat and half of (his) sawar was assigned to him, barawardi ."28

2. "I (Jahangir) ordered that 2,000 sawar barawardi of Abdullah Khan should be paid for as sih-aspa-o-doaspď'2°

In the first passage barawardi still clearly means 'without requiring dagh before-hand'; in the second, it represents as clearly, ordinary sawar rank, whereas sih-aspa-o-do-aspa represents a special, better paid category of that rank.

The appearance of the new terminology, and of the new special rank could alike be treated as natural outgrowths of the system of payments for barawardi } sanctioned in the 40th year of Akbar, and in force, with some modification, at his death. It may be recalled that our suggestion was that the rate of yak-aspa was then the usual barawardi rate; and apparently it was in special cases alone that the rates set separately for do-aspa and sih-aspa might be sanctioned. These special cases, in course of time, and after some administrative systématisation, would have formed the nucleus of the new special rank under the very natural designation of do-aspa , sih-aspa .

The principles on which the pay for do-aspa, sih-aspa rank was calculated are suggested by the rates given in pay schedules of Shah- jahan's reign. Here on the right-hand column under heading lTabinarC (contingent), coming after the zat pay-scales, we have the rate for barawardi , the standard rate on ordinary sawar rank (now 8,000 dams). On the left-hand side is given the pay for sih-aspa-odo-aspa-o -yak-aspa, the full title, as Moreland has noted, of the special rank.90 Three rates are given under it, sih-aspa , 24,000; do-aspa , 16,000; and yak-aspa 8,000. These are respectively multiplied by 3; 4; and 3. 3 1 If these results were



totalled up, and divided by 10 (the number of troopers), the rate would be 16,000 per unit - which we know was the rate at which the special rank was paid for under Shahjahan.32

Now there seems no reason why the schedule should adopt this mode of stating a simple rate, unless it was reproducing a form which had existed in earlier days. Thus when applied to the rates given in the schedule of 1605, calculation on these lines would have yielded the equivalent of 14,800 dams , signifying a rate much less than double that of the ordinary rank (9600 dams). As we have seen the sowar rank rates underwent some alteration in 1616; but the rate of pay for special rank did not still amount to double the ordinary rate. Accordingly, when in 1617 Jahangir cancelled 1,000 sawar do-aspa-o-sih-aspa held by Abdullah Khan and decreed that this was to be treated 'at par with yak-aspa the difference amount to 70,00,000 dams 33 The payment for each unit of special rank had, therefore, involved an additional pay only of 7,000 dams above the rate of the ordinary rank whick at this time was 8,800 dams. We may infer then that at a subsequent period either during the later years of Shahjahan or the earlier years of Jahangir, there was an actual enhancement in the rates sanctioned for the do-aspa

sih-aspa rank.

Of crucial significance in Moreland's interpretation of the history of the mansab system is his view that there was a substantial scaling down of obligation against the sawar ranks after Akbar. He invokes a passage in the Ain already referred to,34 in order to establish that Akbar required a commander of 10 sawar rank to maintain 10 men and 20 horses, and the other commanders to do so in like proportion, so that the number of men in a contingent had always to equal number of the rank of the coil mander and the horses to be twice as many. He then compares this to the position revealed by Shahjahan's official chronicler, while describing the events of 1646. Under the regulations then in force, a mansab holder serving in the province of his jagir , was to keep men equal to only a third of his sawar rank; if he served in another province within Hindustan, he was to keep only a fourth; but those serving in the Balkh and Badakhshan expedition of 1646 and 1647, were required to maintain only a fifth. The number of horses was to be much larger in the standard contingents.35 On the basis of this comparison, Moreland not only inferred a scaling down of the size of the contingents in relation to the sawar rank, but also expressed the opinion that the fixation of not only the last but also the other two proportions, described

by Lahori, were the work of Shahjahan, who abolished what was by now nominal obligation to replace it by a reduced but more effective one.


MEDIEVAL INDIA 2ai

The question, however, is whether such comparison is possible at all. Moreland assumed that the contingent according to the formula in the Ain-i-Akbari passage, was to be maintained by everyone who received the uniform rate of 9,600 dams per unit of sawar rank, or, let us say, the barawardi rate. This, as we have seen was almost certainly not the case. The barawardi rate was sanctioned before dagh or brand and muster; and the payments, when the actual contingent was prepared and presented, were, on the basis not of one standard rate, but of several regulations, and must have been on a much higher scale. The size of contingents as defined by Lahori was, on the other hand, set for those who received what really corresponded to, and was in fact less than, the usual barawardi rate under Akbar.

In other words, when a mansabdar under Akbar had his pay sanctioned on the barawardi rate it was not expected that he would maintain his contingent at its full strength, with the full complement of the 3-horse, 2-horse and 1 -horse troopers permanently out of this pay. The contingent of full strength was, therefore, probably more an ideal, than fact. A 'petition' of Abul Fazl, written from the Deccan to Akbar, suggests that the actual expectations of the administration were much smaller.

Abul Fazl complains that there were mansabdars who enjoyed jagirs sufficing for the pay of 1,000 (rank), but did not have with them even a few men; and yet at the same time there were sadis (holders of 100), who had 50 good horsemen ready for service and were yet without jagirs.3* Thus Abul Fazl appears to regard it as a sufficient reason for immediate sanction of pay and an assignment to provide for it (at the barawardi rate presumably) , once a mansabdar had engaged a number of men equal to just half the number of his rank. He is, of course, presumably speaking in general terms, and detailed regulations might be assumed to have existed which would have laid down the minimum

required size of the contingent to be maintained on receipt of mansab. Such regulations would have continued in force once the barawardi

rate became iihe standard permanent rate for pay against sawar rank. Since this transformation occurred, on our showing, during the early years of Jahangir's reign, his administration would not have had any reason to demand even on paper the maintenance, upon ordinary rates of pay, of what was the ideal, highest paid contingent under Akbar.

That, therefore, something very closely similar to the rule under which the number of men was to be a third of the rank ( the so-called

'Rule of one-third ) actually prevailed under Jahangir, is indicated by Roe's report on what a Mughal noble told him about his own pay and



obligations (1616). The noble's pay was *6,000 horse* ( sawar ) for which he received Rs. 200 (=8,000 dams) on each annually; but "hee kept 1500 and was allowed the surpluse as dead pay"37. The words suggest not that what the noble did was discreditable and underhand, but that he did what in fact was "allowed". Terry, writing about the same time ( 1616-19 ), says too that "Hee which hath pay of five thousand is bound to have two thousand at command and so in like

proportion others."38 The proportion stated-two fifths-is different from that by Roe, but the principle described is the same.

In view of these two accounts alone, it would be difficult to accept Moreland's guess that the scaling down of the obligation of mansabdars , that is to say, the promulgation of the Rules of 'one-third' and 'one- fourth', was the work of Shahjahan : with proportions only slightly different (if, at all, for Roe and Terry cannot be relied upon too greatly on matters of precision), similar rules were already in force in the second decade of Jahangir's reign.

It only remains for us to point out that Moreland's guess has no sanction at all from Lahori's words. Lahori introduces his summary description of the Rules of One-third and One fourth by stating that these were "regulations of this exalted Government (in daulat-i-wala)." Moreland suggests the rendering of 'reign' for daulat; 3 8 but this would certainly be contrary to the usage of Lahori and other writers of the period, who have not otherwise used this phrase, when elsewhere they happen to speak of the reign. 'This reign,' in any case, though proper in English would not have been so in Persian court usage, particularly when the reference was to the reigning sovereign himself. Moreover, if Shahjahan was himself the author of these Rules, it would have been natural for Lahori to have been more explicit over the matter, just as he is over Shahjahan' promulgation of the Rule of One-fifth.'

On the size of contingents maintained against the do-aspa , sih- aspa rank, there is no material at all, from the time of Jahangir. We may infer, from the prevailng rule under Shahjahan, that it was double the size under ordinary rank;89 but this would be guess work, and no more.

We may mark, then, that the change in the system of maintenance of contingents effected between the times of Akbar and Shahjahan was towards scaling down of obligation not in terms of the pay sanctioned, but in relation to the sawar rank, on which itself much lower pay was in fact sanctioned, since the additional payments upon dagh ( muster ) were dispensed with. Unfortunately on the limited evidenoe that we have, it is not clear how far the obligation


MEDIEVAL INDIA 233

was reduced on average upon each sawar rank. What alone is certain is that this particular measure or process had already been completed before the middle of Jahangir's reign.

Lastly, the month-scales. On this some discussion has taken place since Moreland, from which we may pick our threads without going to very great lengths.

Moreland had noticed the month-scale in connexion with Lahori's

detailed specifications of the size of contigent under the Rule of a Fifth. He found that the lower the months, the lower was the obligation.40 He, however, did not attempt to give any reasons why the 'allowance by the months was lower for some than for others. It has now been shown that the month-scale was really a device for expressing in a small number of set ratios (with '12' representing the complete equation), the relation between the jama '( nominal standard assessment ) of a jagir , which in all cases had to equal the pay-claim of the mansabdar .41 and the hasil ( the actual revenue collected ), which formed the income of the mansabdar . In other words, it expressed the ratio of actual income to sanctioned pay.42

It can be seen that if the jama* was artificially inflated, larger amounts of pay-claims could be met out of it; but since the actual income would remain the same, the assignees would have to be placed on a lower month-scale than before and their obligations scaled down in accordance with the schedules. It can be seen further that great salary- reductions, in individual cases, as well as generally, could in fact be concealed through this device, by merely increasing the jama while leaving the pay schedules untouched.

It is then a matter of some importance to establish when the device of month-scales began to be employed, for presumably there would be reason for such systématisation only when deviations of the actual income from the nominal became very marked or frequent. Uptill now the only reference to the use of such a practice before the time of Shahjahan has been recorded for the year 1605-6, in history of Sind, but in respect only of arrangements made between a commander and his own subordinate officials.43 As a device employed by the imperial administration it begins to be referred to only during the reign of Shahjahan. The earliest reference to it I have been able to trace be- longs to 1639.44 Given the evidence as it is, the use of the month-scales seem to be the work of Shahjahan's administration.

We may now sum up our own conclusions with regard to the for- mal developments in the mansab system during the period we have been considering.



(1) The substantial reductions in the scales of pay on zat ranks occurred some time between 1618 and 1630., but there is no good authority for the supposition that they were promulgated by Shahjahan.

(2) The pay for sawar rank, being calculated under Akbar, until 1595, on a complex system, cannot be properly compared with the rates of pay in force later.

The permanent standard rate of pay on sawar rank was established in all likelihood, during the early years of Jahangir. Its reduction from 9,600 dams per annum to 8,800 took place not after Shahjahan's accession, but in 1615 or 1616. Only the reduction from 8,800 to 8,000 dams was promulgated by Shahjahan.

The additional rate allowed for do-aspa sih-aspa rank was consider- ably lower under Jahangir than under Shahjahan.

(3) No scaling down of the size of the contingents demanded can be proved, in terms of the pay sanctioned; but there appears to have been a scaling-down, in practice, in relation to the mansabs. This too occurred not during the early years of Shahjahan, but the early years of Jahangir.

(4) The month-scales, designed to adjust the size of contingents required to the difference between the nominal and actual income of the commanders began to be employed during the reign of Shahjahan.

Our understanding of the changes in the mechanism of mansab organisation is thus in certain important particulars different from Moreland's : that there were changes is admitted; and here historians owe considerable debt to More land in that he directed attention to the

possibility of such changes at all. Our difference with him is, mainly, on the kind of changes that took place, and when they occurred.

It now remains to consider the context in which the system underwent modifications. On this, as we have noted, Morelaud had nothing much to say. In what follows attention is drawn to certain accompanying developments in the political, administrative and eeonomic history of the Mughal Empire, which should have influenced in varying degrees the functioning of the mansab system.

The first is, the question of numbers of mansabdars9 or. rather more

properly, the total number of zat and sawar ranks granted. It has been a matter of common knowledge, that the number of mansads held increased phenomenally between the time of the Am , which gives a list of mansab holders, down to 200 zat> 45 and the 10th year of Shahjahan for which we have a list from Lahori.40 From the point of view of a detailed study of the period, 1595-1637, we need to know with some greater precision when the bulk of the increase to the new levels occur-


MEDIEVAL INDIA 235

red. The only intervening source used so far has been Pelsaert,47 more often as copied by De Laet.48 The list professes to belong to 1605. There is, however, little doubt that it is hopelessly corrupt; it shows no mansab- holders of above 5000 although there were three nobles (besides Prince Khusrau) who held such ranks at the time of Jahangir's accession. * 9 It also shows impossibly high figures against ranks such as 4,500 and 3,500 to which very few appointments were made.

It is, therefore, necessary to find some other means of establishing the number of ranks, zat and sawar , which were held at any particular year under Jahangir. The only way this can be done is to take all the rmnsabs recorded by Jahangir in his Tuzuk, and, removing the names of those who died or were dismissed, and then taking the mansab last mentioned for each individui before the year chosen, to list all such mansabs on the assumption that these were still held by that official at the end of that year.50 Not because of any pre- conceived notions, but because of the possibility of securing the great- est completeness and accuracy, the end of the 15th year (1621) has been chosen by us for this purpose. That the list so prepared is accurate, is suggested by the fact that the overwhelming number of persons whose mansabs are recorded iutheTuzuk during the succeeding three and a half

years already appear on this list. Two points have to be borne in mind in interpreting the result, however : Jahangir does not refer to mansabs lower than 1,000 zot except when the persons are well-connected, or for some special reasons; and only five mansabs are recorded that are below 500, so that the lower mansabs do not figure at all. In other words, the list is more or less complete only in respect of ranks of 1 ,000 zat and above. Secondly, the do-aspa sih-aspa sawar ranks have been counted as double sawar ranks.

For purposes of comparison, Lahori's own list has to be modified a littles all mansabs of those who were dead or not in service at the end

of the 10th year have to be omitted. But since Lahori has himself indicated all such cases, such modification does not offer any difficulty.

The Ain' s list is not susceptible of such easy management. Oa the face of it, it is the most complete giving the names of all persons holding ranks down to 200 zat , and giving figures for all lower ranks. But, as Abul Fazl himself acknowledges, he had included in his lists of holders of ranks of 500 and above persons who were dead at the time without marking such names in any way whatsoever. Moreover, while he says that this list was compiled in the 40th year, this is extremely doubt- ful. The author of the Tabaqat closing his work two years earlier (1593)

. refers to this list; and already the list was a little out of date, because



for many persons he notes higher mansabs than those given in the Ain. 61 On the other hand, Abul Fazl does not seem to have left the old list as it

was, but made some changes here and there, such as inserting the names of such new mansafr-holders as Muzaffar Husain Mirza.52 The only course

possible for us has, therefore, been the A in' s list as it is, delete the names of all those who were dead by 1593, 53 and count the remainder. But I have also substituted the mansabs noted in the Tabaqat whenever the Tabaqat mansabs are higher; and in three cases I have added names of persons stated in the Tabaqat to be alive and assigned mansabs, though they do not figure on the Ain's list.

Another list again has been made of mansabs held at Akbar's death, based partly on the Ain' s list, partly on the portions of the Akbarnama and the Iqbalnama, for the period 1595-1605, and partly on the Tuzuk. The information is more or less reliable down to 1,000 zat only.

Statistics based on these lists are tabulated below. They are not carried to ranks below 500.

Table

TOTAL OF MANSABS HELD

Zat Ain/Tabaqat 1605 1621 Lahori 1637 Banks Zat Zat Zat Sawar Zat Sawar

30,000 .. .. 30,000 20,000 20,000 . . . . 20,000 10,000 15,000 15,000 9,000 12,000 24,000 14,000 10,000 10,000 20,000 ....

10.000 & 10,000 20,000 50,000 30,000 39,000 23,000 above

9,000 . . . . . . . . 9,000 18,000 8,000 8,000 7,000 7,000 21,000 21,000 14,000 6,000 . . . . 6,000 6,000 24,000 28,000 5,000 45,000 40,000 80,000 62,500 70,000 75,000

5,000 & 70,000 81,000 157,000 122,500 142,000 144,000 above

4,500 4,500 7! r " !"! ~ 4,000 16,000 28,000 32,000 18,000 72,000 56,950 3,500 7,000 3,500 3,000 15,000 18,000 36,000 23,050 78,000 50,000 2,500 7,500 2,500 17,500 8,900 30,000 23.500 2,000 12,000 34,000 70,000 39,100 78,000 48,050

2,000 & 132,000 167,000 312,500 211,550 400,000 323,000 above


MEDIEVAL, INDIA 237

Zat Ain/Tabaqat 1605 1621 Lahor i 1637 Ranks Zat Zat Zat Sawar Zat Sawar

1,800 .. .. 3,6000 350 1,700 .. .. 3,400 1,500 1,500 12,000 12,000 34,500 16,800 46.500 28,450 1,250

1,200 .. .. 1,200 450 1,000 19,000 29,000 48,000 23,620 46,000 26,200 1,000 & 16;*, 000 208,000 408,200 254,270 492,000 377,650

above

900 12,600 .. 4,500 1,050 12,600 8,300 800 1,600 .. 8,000 4,260 29,600 14,650 700 9,800 . . 9,100 4,250 25,200 10,480 6,00 2,400 .. 9,000 3,830 18,000 8,830 550 . . . . 550 130

500 1,500 . . 14,000 4,820 54,500 21,935 500 & 190,900 .. 448,350 272,610 633,000 441,845 ab°ve - - A glance at the Table, particularly if attention is confined to sta-

tistics for 1,000 Zat and above (for which alone statistics for 1605 and 1621 can be assumed to be complete) shows that the real increase in mansabs occured between 1605 and 1621. Although the agregate oí Zat mansabs held in 1605 exceeded those in 1595, within the next fifteen years they almost doubled themselves. Thereafter, during a period of some seventeen years, the incrase is only by a third. Comparisons of sawar mansabs are more difficult. For 1595 and

1605 totals for zat ranks alone are available; but the cases in which the

Tqbalnama-i-Jahangiri refers to zat in addition to sawar suggest that on average these could hardly have amounted to over three-fourths of the zat ranks, and possibly only to half (the cases are not numerous enough to justify close calculation). Even if we assume a figure of 15,000 for sawar ranks accompanying zat mansabs of 1,000 and above, in 1605, the increase by 1621 was by over two- thirds, The total for sawar mansabs , accompanying zat ranks of 1,000 and above, in 1638, was higher by a half over the figure for 1621 ( which may, however, be slightly understated). Now, the fact that Jahangir adopted the policy of granting man-

sabs lavishly might be judged from his own words in the Tuzuk.&4> but the table we have given probably establishes with a little greater pre-



cisión the real scale on which the mąnsabs were raised under the new imperial policy. The grant of a mansab , however, generated a pay-claim, the sawar man s ab s accounting for a far larger share of the total salary bill than the zat .65 The need to keep the total amount of salary bill within the limits of resources, or to keep its total figure below the total jama ' must have suggested economies. To this pressure might very well be due the policy of abolishing the system of payments to holder of sawar ranks as it existed under Akbar, and enforcing what in effect was reduced military obligation against reduced pay. The subsequent reduction of the rate on sawar rank, from 9,6000 dams to 8,8000 in 1616 or 1617 could be ascribed to similar pressures. And also, ultimately, the large reduction of zat salaries, which took place some time between 1618 and 1630

Another way of reducing such pressure would have been to increase the jama ' arbitrarily, so as to provide for pay on paper, and then make adjustments ( if, at all ) in the size of contingents. If this actually happened, the jama'dami of the Empire should show a large increase. The totals of the jama'dami for the entire Empire, excluding the Deccan, such as are available for the period 1595 to 1647 are given below, being adjusted to the Ain' s total as base, = 100. 56

1595-96 100 1628-36 123 1605 110 1633-38 142

pre- 1627 119 1646-47 142

This increase shows that at least a fifth of the increase in the salary bill ( and, perhaps, more than that, if the khalisa was reduced in area, as we know it was57 ) could be absorbed by the increase in the jama ť dami, by 1627 and almost fourth more, again, by 1646-47. If this increase in the jama1 dami was purely on paper, unjustified by an increase in cultivation or prrces, the difference between sanctioned pay and actual monetary income must have widened enormously.

But it is to be doubted whether the increase in jamac was comple- tly unjustified. For extension of cultivation, it is true, we have no data; and for prices too, Moreland in his article repeats the view he had held earlier that "no general rise had occurred in silver prices during the two reigns" (of Jahangir and Shahjahan).»« But in this, he is certainly mistaken .59 The changes in the general price level cannot be calculated with precision, but the following table, giving figures of gold and copper adjusted to 1595-96 (Ain) again as base ( = 100), should roughly indicate the scale of its ascent during the period.6 0


MEDIEVAL INDIA 239

Gold Copper 1595-96 100 100

1609 111 100

1614 119 95 to 105

1621 111

1626 156 133

1628 .. 161

1633 138 161 1636 . . 149

1637 .. 133

1638 .. 138

1640 144

1641-42 156

1644-45 156

These statistics suggest indeed that at least during the reign of Jahangir the increase in the Jamď dami kept pace with the rise in prices. It was only a little before 1638 that it made up the gap, and possibly by 1646 it had exceeded the rise in the price-level. If the real revenue- income of the assignees had closely followed the increase in prices, then, in fact, in relative terms, the assignees' actual income in cash terms should have risen, on an average (with agricultural production assumed to have remained stable), rather than declined, in relation to their sanctioned pay, during the entire reign of Jahangir. A decline in their actual income should have set in, only during the first two decades of Shahjahan's reign, which is precisely the period when the month-scales were employed to adjust obligation to deviations of the actual from nominal income.

But if the prices had increased, the same monetary income (and we must remember that the rates of pay for th esawar ranks were actually reduced) would not suffice for maintaining the same size of contingent (at any rate, with the same margin of profit); nor would the same zat - salaries, and still less the reduced salaries, provide the same real income to the potentates. This has to be borne in mind when considering the effects of the phenomenal increase in mansabs . While on the one hand the pay on the zat ranks remained the same or had been reduced, on the other, those who previously would have held a substantially lower rank, now enjoyed a far higher one, so that in fact, the pay drawn by a mansabdar on average would be substantially higher. And, since the income from zat and sawar ranks went together, any gain in income from enjoying a higher zat rank may be expected to have offset any greater expenses involved in maintaining contingents against the sawar rank.


240 INDIAN HISTORY CON0KBSS

1. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London 1936, pp. 641-65. 2. JRAS. 1936, pp. 661-62, 3. Cf. M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb, p. 39; A. J. Qaisar

'A Not© on the Date of the Institution of Mansab under Akbar,' Proc. Ind .

Hist. Cong., 24th Session, Calcutta, 1963, pp. 165-57. 4. JRAS , 1936, pp. 652-53. 5. Ain-i- Akbari, ed. Blochmann, Bib. Ind., I, pp. 178-85. 6. Akbarnama , Bib. Ind., III, 671. 7. English Factories in India , ed. W. Foster, 1624.29 , p. 271; 1630-33 , p. 33. 8. Br. Mus. MS. Or. 1834, ff. 231b-233a. 9. See his own statement, Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri Nawal Kishore ed, II, p. 479.

10. The schedule does not exactly say so, but gives only one figure for each mansab , and this obviously corresponds to the Ain's fiigure for class I for that mansab . The system of classifying each Zat Mansab according to whether the sawar was (a) equal (to zat ; or (b) not less than half, or (c) lees than half, and of fixing the pay separately for each class, also prevailed when later schedules (eg. Selected Locuments of Shah Jahan's Reign, Hydera- bad, 1950, pp. 79-84) were drawn up. The differences in total amounts were in relative terms, trifling.

11. In mx>st MSS and the printed editions of the Am the mansab ot 1,^50 is omitted, while two figures are provided under 600. Br. Mus. MS. Add. 6552,. f78b. however, provides for 1,250 and places under it the figures, given in other MS. under the next lower mansab , and it does so down to 600, for which it has only one figure. This engenders the suspicion, encouraged further by a comparison wi.h Mu'tamad Khan's schedule, that between 1200 and 600, the printed text has shown under each mansab what should have belonged to the next higher mansab .

12. The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe , ed. W. Foster, pp. 210-11. 13. The pay for 5,000 is given in the f arman of 1615, and of the remaining man-

sabs in that of 1618 (Vir Vinod , II, pp, 241, 259, £01-2). The Hindi text of ten reads dam where it should obviously read 'rupee.*

14. JRAS , 1936, pp. 658-59. 15. See, for example, Selected Documents of Shahjahan's Reign , p. 84. 16. Tazkira-i Humayun-o -Akbar, ed. M. Hidayat Hosain, Bib, Ind. 1941, p. S73. 17. Ain-i Akbari , I, 176.

18. Ain-i Akbari , I, 187-8. 19. Barawardi-i-mahwara, in MS. Br. Mus. Add. 21,207. The printed text drops

the letter 'i' and reads óarawarďí-i-mahwara.

20. Akbarnama , III, 671-72; Add. 26,207 f. 204a-b. 21. JRAS , 1936, p. 668. It may be noted in passing that Moreland ignores the

lower rates sanctioned for Rajputs, on accout of Sih~aspa and do-aspa. 22. Br. Mus. Or. 1834, f. 233a. 23. Early Travels ed. Foster, 114. 24. Vir Vinod, II, 241. 25. The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe , 210. 26. Tuzuk , 299. 27. Moreland, who notices Hawkins* account seems to have overlooked Roe's

statements.


MEDIEVAL INDIA 241

28. Akbarnama , III, 717. 29. I follow here the Hyderabad (Central Record Office) MS, f. 122 b, which is

the earliest known, being transcribed at the Court and presented to Saif Khan in the 22nd year of Jahangir's reign. Sayyid Ahmad'e text, p. 117, is corrupt, reading 12,000 for 2,000, biradari for barawardi and inserting ba- zabita before the words sih-aspa etc. Moreland has missed this passage, thereby believing that the first reference to the new do-aspa sih-aspa rank occurs only in 1015 ( TuzuJc , 147).

30. JRAS , 1936, p. 664. I have not found this full phrase in the Tuzuk , but the Hyderabad MS., in a passage corresponding to Tuzuh, printed text, p. 223, reads asp do aspa o sili aspa.

31. Selected Documents from S hahjahari s Reign, 84. It may be noted that the method of calculation of the average rate from the rates given in the Akbar- nama passage (under the 40th year), as suggested by Moreland, is exactly similar to this. But if his method wag accepted, his rate would have been valid for the precursor of the special rank, and not of the ordinary, as he himself had believed.

32. Lahori, Badshahnama, Bib. Ind., I, p. 113, See also Moreland, JRAS, 1936, pp. 646-662.

33. Ain-i-Akbarit I, 188, Cf. JRAS , 1936, p. 658. 34. Lahori, Badashahnama , II, 506-7. Cf. JRAS 1936, pp. 654-5,659. 35. Ruqa'at-i Abul Fazl , litho. ed, P. 45. This is different from the standard collec-

tion of Abul Fazl's letters, in three volumes, and contains much interpolated matter.

36. The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe , P. 210. 37. Early Travels , ed. W. Foster, P. 327. 38. JiřiáS, 1936, P. 655.

39. Lahori, II, 506-7; JRAS , 1Ü36, P. 655

40. JRAS 1936, pp. 659-60- Cf. N. A. Siddiqi. 'Implication of the Month Scales in the Mansabdari System/ Proceedings of the Indian History Congress , 24th Session, Calcutta, 1963, pp. 157-162.

41. I am ignoring here the cases where the whole or part of the claim was met in cash.

42. See my Agrarian System of Mughal India , pp. 264-65 & n.; and M. Athar Ali. The Mughal Mobility under Aurangzeb , pp. 46-49 & passim .

43. Ta'rikh-i Tahiri. Or. 1685, ff. 118a-119b.

44. Selected Documents of Shah Jahan's Reign , 77. The first in Lahori is apparently in Vol. II, p. 205.

45. Ain-i-Akbari, I, 222-23.

46. Badshahnama , I, ii, pp. 292-328. 47. A Contemporary Dutch Chronicle of Mughal India, tr. Brij Narain and Sri Ram

Sharma, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 34- 3 "). 48. De Laet, Tr, J. S. Hoyland and S. N. Banerjee, The Empire of the Great Mogol

Bombay, 1928, pp. 113-14. 49. Aziz Koka ( Akbarnama , III, 483 ^ ; Man Singh (Iqbalnama-i-Jahangirit II, 510)

Mirza Shahrukh (ibid., I, 508.) 50. Rai Karan's mansab of 5, C00 zat , 5,000 sawar is by some oversight not recorded

by Jahangir. But it is included in our list on the authority of the f arman reproduced in the VirVinod.


212 INDIAN H ÍSTORY CONGRESS

51. I regret that at the moment I cannot cite De's standard edition. I have used the earliest and probably the most authentic MS of the Tabaqat , in the Azad Library, Subhanullah 954/3, written in 1595. The list of nobles, together with the introductory remarks, appears on ff. 254 b-257b.

52. No. 8 on the A in' s list : He was in fact given the mansab of 5000 zat only in the 40th year (Akbarnama ) III, 671.

53. In this the Tabaqaťs list, where the fact that an incumbent of a mansab was dead, is noted in a number of cases proved to be of invaluable help. Also much use was made of biographical information collected by Blochmann in his tr. of the Ain , Vol I.

54. Tuzuk , p. 4

55. Cf. A. J. Qaisar, 'Distribution of the Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire among the Nobility; Proc. Ind . Hist. Cong., 27th Session. Aligarh, 1967, p. 242.

56. Abstracted from a table in my Agrarian System of Mughal India , 328. 57. See Qazwini, Badshahnama , Br. Mus. Add. 20734 pp. 444-45. 58. JRAS, 1936, p. 661. 59. See my Agrarian System of Mughal India, pp. 81-89, 392-94. 60. Abstracted from ibid. p. 327.

REFORMS IN LAND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION OF DECCAN DURING MUSLIM PERIOD

L. Deshpande (Nagpur)

In this short article I have tried to deal with the reforms mainly

in land revenue administration by three eminent reformers viz : 1. Mah- mud Gawan, 2. Malik Ambar and 3. Murshid Quii Khan.

I have in the end concluded, after due criticism by me, that, Murshid Quii Khan was by far the best reformer amongst the three.

LAND AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN MEDIEVAL ANDHRADESA

K. Madhusudan Redd/ (Hyderabad)

Epigraphical records of the medieval period from different parts of Andbradesa furnish interesting information concerning the procedures then in vogue for the settlement of land and boundary disputes. While in essentials these procedures were in conformity with those laid down by the ancient law givers, there were two interesting items in these procedures which particularly deserve notice. One of them was the selec- tion of individual 'to walk* the boundary. The other was remuneration to the arbitrators and the person who 'walked the boundary.'
