October, 2015

SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

Global actors and governance in crisis situations: Syrian refugees in Lebanon

The combination of the collapse of the highly authoritarian Assad regime, the rise of

Islamic Salafist entities (i.e. al Nusra and ISIS) and the competition for dominance being re-

created on the historic canvas of Shiite-Sunni conflict has created a present-day humanitarian

crisis of immense proportions.

Millions are currently internally displaced in Syria. Four million more have fled to UN

refugee camps in neighboring countries. Millions have fled the region completely, and many

more would seek to follow them. This year alone, 400,000 Syrian refugees have trekked to

Europe.1

Others have sought refuge in Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon has steadfastly

refused to host United Nation High Commission on Refugee (UNHCR) camps. Rather than

living in vast tent compounds, 1.2 million refugees live in towns and villages and cities across

the country, often in highly unsatisfactory dwellings. Lebanon has the highest per capita ratio of

refugees than any other country.

What is the impact of this refugee inflow into Lebanon? What international actors and

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), local or otherwise, engage these victims of the Syrian

conflict? What role does the Lebanese state play in managing the intra-state tensions created by

the influx of refugees?

Weiss (2000) framed the question concerning the role of the broader global society in

governance where states are incapable of providing the level of care required to prevent and

mitigate human security disasters: “Is there a way to structure a reasonable measure of co-

1 Data to September 2015 found here: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9617

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ordination and co-operation among governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-

governmental organizations and the private sector that would constitute meaningful, or at least

improved, patterns of global governance?” (p. 809). This short paper would suggest an

affirmative answer to that question.

Background

Lebanon did not enter the Syrian refugee story without a prior history of serious stress

and conflict.

Lebanon is home to 450,000 Palestinian refugees- and has been for 65 years. The

presence of Palestinians living in 12 United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA)

refugee camps2, and the consequent instability this presence contributes to the already fragile

Lebanese socio-political mix, was one important reason why the Lebanese government did not

want UNHCR refugee camps established for Syrian refugees. Once ensconced, refugee

populations often do not leave, and a large share of the burden of care ultimately falls on the host

government. 1.2 million Syrian refugees3 now reside in Lebanon. In 2014, an average of 53,000

people arrived every month from the Syrian conflict. One quarter of the Lebanese population are

now stateless refugees. Among the refugee populations entering Lebanon is a further 40,000

Palestinians fleeing Syria.

Before this crisis, the Lebanese political landscape was already fractured. There has been

a power distribution framework which is predominantly based on sectarian (religious) division of

authorities4. Prominent among these is Hezbollah, a Shiite militia organization backed by Iran

2 For info on the work of UNRWA, see here: http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees

3 Number of those registered with the UNHCR. Others reside in Lebanon as unregistered refugees- that number is estimated as high as 300,000.4 For example, the President comes from the Christian community, the speaker of the National Assembly is Shiite, and the Prime Minister is Sunni.

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and supportive of the Assad regime. The refugees arriving are largely displaced by that very

regime, and are mostly Sunni. There is great danger that the conflict in Syria thus spills over into

Lebanon in ways that will deepen the sectarian divide and plunge the country into further chaos,

perhaps civil war. Thibos (2014), writing for the Migration Policy Centre, states: “Factions that

not only oppose each other over Syria, but often fight each other within Syria, have now opened

up Lebanon as a second theatre of war” (p. 6). The internal political divisions already present in

the country are being exacerbated by the influx of these refugees. The UNHCR (March, 2015)

calls the situation “tense, volatile and highly unpredictable”.

The Syrian refugee crisis has also

created economic instability and social

insecurity. Because refugees do not live

in camps, they move to cities and towns

scattered across the country (see figure to

the right for a graphic representation of

refugee distribution).  As a consequence,

the cost of accommodation and food has

risen as supply exceeds demand. This has

caused great difficulty for the poor of Lebanon.  Furthermore, Syrians looking for work have

depressed wages nationally. The Food and Agricultural Organization (2013) reported that parts

of Lebanon have seen a wage reduction for agricultural and other labour roles of 60%. The

World Bank (2013) writes that “by the end of 2014, 170,000 additional Lebanese will be pushed

into poverty [&] an additional 220,000 – 324,000 Lebanese are expected to become

unemployed” (p. 3). Youth unemployment has reached 35% (Schenker, 2015).  The Lebanese

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SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

government, which is already saddled with an unsustainable debt-to-GDP ratio of 126% (one of

the highest in the world), will have a further deterioration in economic capacity: this ratio is

projected to increase as Lebanon runs a 2015 deficit of 33%. (Schenker, 2015).

Local governments bear the brunt of the extra burden placed on them by this influx.

“Local municipalities, which are responsible for many aspects of service delivery, are not able to

keep up with the increased demand for such basics as water and sanitation” (Thibos, 2013, p. 4).

The increasing stress placed upon all levels of Lebanese society has created a social and

political backlash against Syrian refugees. The government has recently taken steps to make

residency requirements stiffer, attempting to discourage a further influx- perhaps little more than

wishful thinking given the continued and deepening crisis in Syria. The UN recently reported

(Sept 2015):

In Lebanon, new regulations for Syrian refugees have made it harder for Syrians to

access asylum, and increasingly Syrians transit through Lebanon to Turkey. Refugees

already in the country must pay US$200 per year to renew their stay. They are required to

sign a pledge not to work and they must present a certified lease agreement. Many

refugees are fearful of arrest or detention and feel vulnerable because of lapsed residency

visas (para 9).

An already weakened Lebanese state cannot cope with this added stress. As noted,

competition for housing, food and employment has impoverished the host community and

drained the financial resources of the Lebanese Government. In addition, health and education

services are “stretched beyond their limit” (Berti, 2015, p. 44). Social and economic fractures

have negatively impacted the security situation- not just in Lebanon but across the region.

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SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

A new and shaky Lebanese government was elected in 2014. They established a Crisis

Cell to deal with the issue of Syrian refugees present in Lebanon. As a result, a new set of

policies were adopted which seriously restricted the inflow of Syrians into Lebanon. As reported

by the UNHCR (March 2015): “Lebanon has, until now, demonstrated remarkable tolerance and

generosity towards Syrian refugees. There are an increasing number of indications that after

accepting more one than million refugees, Lebanese generosity has begun to reach its limits” (p.

6).

Given these discouraging dynamics, what services are being provided to the refugee

community? Who is providing them? How are the efforts being integrated?

Services provided by Lebanese Government and partners

In response to the regional crisis, the international community under UN leadership has

created an international Regional Response Plan (RRP), which seeks to integrate the efforts of

over 100 NGOs, INGO’s, government to government aid and various UN agencies. This is a

large undertaking, spanning the various countries affected across the region. Berti (2015)

describes the efforts:

The RRP appeal for 2014, set at 3.7 billion to sustain the emergency assistance and relief

efforts, in one of the largest ever presented in United Nations history. When adding

appeals from other agencies and host governments, the sum rises to a staggering 7.7

billion. The 2015 UN appeal for the sum of 8.4 billion similarly shows that the

emergency is far from subsiding (p. 49).

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SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

The Lebanese variant of the RRP is the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP)5, which is

a joint project of the UN and other agencies working collaboratively with the Government of

Lebanon to provide for a humanitarian response to the refugee crisis and support for national and

local institutions6. Most of these organizations are comprised of CSO’s of one type or another.

The UNHCR (2015) sums up the LCRP as follows:

Programmes in health, education, social services and water supply together with direct

community support projects at municipal level contributed directly to addressing priority

needs of Lebanese communities most affected by the crisis. In 2015, the Lebanon Crisis

Response Plan, an integrated plan, will aim to increase assistance to addressing both the

humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable communities and the stabilization needs of

Lebanon. This means increased

efforts on strengthening

national institutions and public

services while targeting the 1.5

million vulnerable Lebanese

through direct assistance and

service delivery, community

services and economic recovery

(Section 5).

5 LCRP found here: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2015-2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf6 The LCRP partners include: Government of Lebanon, ABAAD, ACTED, ACF, ActionAid, ADRA, AMEL Lebanon, ANERA, ARMADILLA, AVSI, British Council, CARE, CCPA, CISP - Lebanon, CLMC Lebanon, CONCERN, COOPI, Digital Opportunity Trust, DCA, Danish Refugee Council, FAO, FPSC, GVC Lebanon, HI, Humedica, HWA, ILO, IMC Lebanon, International Alert, Intersos, International Orthodox Christian Charities, IOM, IR Lebanon, IRC, Leb Relief, MAG, Makassed, Makhzoumi, MAP, Medair Lebanon, Mercy Corps, Mercy USA, NRC, OXFAM, PCPM, PU-AMI, RET, RI, Safadi Foundation, Save the Children, SFCG, SI, SIF, Solidar Suisse, SOS Village, TdH - It, TdH - L, Toastmasters International, UNDP, UNESCO,UNFPA, UNHABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNOCHA, URDA, War Child Holland, WHO, WRF, World Vision International, UNRWA, Seraphim Global and WFP.

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UNHCR Refugee Response in Lebanon Briefing Documents, 2015.

SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

In each of the various sectors identified, non-governmental partner agencies and foreign

government aid work alongside the Government of Lebanon in the LCRP to increase co-

ordination of efforts and build up state capacity to deal with the humanitarian crisis. An example

of this can be seen in the educational sector.

LCRP and education

One of the bigger issues facing recently arrived refugee populations is education. Often not able

to attend school in Syria due to the conflict, refugees find that they do not have access or

resources to attend Lebanese educational institutions. The LCRP 2015/16 describes the situation

with respect to education as follows:

Public schools are significantly over-stretched and face high costs per child to enroll

additional students. At least 700 Lebanese public schools in 250 localities are under

severe pressures due to an overload of demand - affecting teachers, students and school

infrastructure. Education remains a critical unmet need for many de facto refugee Syrian

families: 66 percent of Syrian children registered as refugees with UNHCR are currently

not in school, kept out by a combination of lack of space, high costs, too many years out

of school, unfamiliar languages, and curricula (p.15).

In response, the LCRP seeks to place 400,000 Syrian children in school by the end of

2016, a dramatic increase from 200,000 in 2015 and 106,000 in 2014. This ambitious project will

require the assistance of many partners, 28 of which have been identified for the educational

sector7.

7 These partners are: ACTED  CONCERN  Makhzoumi  UNICEF  ActionAid  CCPA Lebanon  NRC  UNRWA  ADRA  Digital Opportunity Trust  PUAMI  WCH  AMEL Lebanon  HWA  RET  WVI ANERA  IOCC  RI  Toastmasters  International  AVSI  IR Lebanon  Save the Children  UNESCO  British Council  IRC  Seraphim Global  UNHCR . LCRP: Education, section 5.

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Lebanese Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016.

SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

The outcomes of the

educational sector initiatives

include assistance to cover the

costs of school registration,

parents fees and school

materials, as well as support to

the Government in efforts to

expand the teaching staff to

cover a ‘second shift’ at local

schools which caters to the

refugee population. School

buildings will need to be

modified, which will enable the

teaching of many more students

than current capacity can

absorb.

94 million USD was committed by the UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Bank and bilateral

donors for this initiative. (UNHCR, October, 2015). This type of inter-agency co-operation and

co-ordination can be found in all of the various sectors which are identified as pressing needs in

the LCRP.

There are risk factors associated with this scale of endeavor. The funding might not

materialize- often actual remittances fall short of pledges. The Lebanese government may not be

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able to generate the promised results. The efforts may be too little, too late. Nevertheless, these

efforts are commendable, and perhaps precedent-setting.

Conclusion

The Syrian refugee crisis highlights the limitations of service provision by states that are

weak and/or failing. There is an increasing realization that aspects of governance normally

relegated to the purview of sovereign states are often inadequate to sufficiently cope with

pervasive human security issues.

Lebanon is a case in point: an already weak and fractured government with limited

capacity for service delivery to its own citizens finds itself hosting 1.2 million refugees from the

Syrian conflict. Without intensive outside interventions and assistance, Lebanon could descend

into the kind of chaos that generated the refugee exodus from Syria.

What we have witnessed in Lebanon offers a glimpse into a newly emerging paradigm, in

which state sovereignty is recognized but not sacrosanct. Into this present chaos came many

actors: western governments, NGO’s, INGO’s, local organizations and various UN entities.

Under the organizational capabilities of the UNHCR and the Government of Lebanon, partners

collaborated to provide services to the afflicted and effected communities, which included

assisting and underwriting the capacity of the host community.

There are therefore some opportunities in this current emergency. Investing in the mid to

long-term viability of the Lebanese state has become a priority, and the model of national and

international co-ordination and co-operation for the delivery of needed services might function as

a template in other conflicted areas. Weiss’ question (see page one) can thus be tentatively

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answered affirmatively, at least in this case. While not perfect governance, it is a vast

improvement on the prior and prevailing patterns of dysfunction.

The international response is inadequate for the need8, but even in the absence of a fully

funded program, and one which is perhaps less than fully implemented, the international

community has not witnessed the descent into calamity of another Levant country, to the

detriment of the local populations and indeed, the world.

8 2014 funding for the LCRP stood at 47%. See data on page 7 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2015-2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf

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References

Berti, B. (January, 2015). The Syrian refugee crisis: Regional and human security implications. Strategic Assessment. 17(4). 41-53.

Food and Agricultural Organization, (2013). Lebanon: Plan of action for resilient livelihoods 2014-2018. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4379e.pdf

Lebanese Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2015-2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf

Mayer, R. (2015). The imperative of improving Syrian refugee children’s access to education in Lebanon. Retrieved from http://s3.amazonaws.com/inee-assets/resources/RMayer_Research_Syrian_ChildrenLebanon_AA.docx.pdf

Rainey, V. (11 March, 2015). Lebanon: No formal refugee camps for Syrians. Al Jazzera. Retrieved 20 October 2015 from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/lebanon-formal-refugee-camps-syrians-150310073219002.html

Schenker, D. (September, 2015). Syria’s good neighbors: How Jordan and Lebanon sheltered millions of refugees. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 20 October 2015 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/jordan/2015-09-28/syrias-good-neighbors

Thibos, C. (2014). One million Syrians in Lebanon: a milestone quickly passed. Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute. Retrieved 20 October 2015 from http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31696/MPC_THIBOS_2014_.pdf?sequence=1

United Nations High Commission on Refugees, (2015). 2015 UNHCR country operations profile – Lebanon. Retrieved October 20 from http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486676.html

UNHCR (March, 2015). Refugee Response in Lebanon Briefing Documents. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/95_finalbriefingkit_/95_finalbriefingkit_en.pdf

UNHCR (September, 2015). Seven factors behind movement of Syrian refugees to Europe. Retrieved October 20 from http://www.unhcr.org/560523f26.html

UNHCR (October 2015). 200,000 Syrian refugee children to get free schooling in Lebanon. Retrieved October 20 from http://www.unhcr.org/560e96b56.html Weiss, T. (2000). Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges, Third World Quarterly, 21(5), 796-5-814. DOI: 10.1080/713701075

World Bank, (September, 2013). Report No. 81098-LB Lebanon economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict. Retrieved from http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/

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