number 92 the turkic peoples and caucasia - wilson center
TRANSCRIPT
NUMBER 92
THE TURKIC PEOPLES AND CAUCASIA
Peter B. Golden
Conference on
"NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CH.~'l'GE IN TRANSCAUCASIA"
Co-sponsored by
Kennan Institute for Ad\:anced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center-
and
American Association fo.r the Advancement Slavic Studies
April 24-25, 1980
Peter B. Golden
THE TURKIC PEOPLES AND CAUCASIA
For more than a millenium and a half, the fortunes of the
peoples of Transcauce.sia have been c+osely, at times inextri
cably, bound up with those of the Turkic world. Standing at
the "crossroads of empires," Transcaucasia was often a major
thoroughfare through which the predominantly TJrkic nomads of
the Eurasian steppelands entered the zone of sedentary cultures
of the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Indeed, recognition of its
strategic importance to the limes system that separated steppe
from sown was one of the factors which has traditionally drawn
the attention of neighboring, imperial powers to this region.
Transcaucasia's relationship with the steppe peoples was,
at first, largely transient. In time, however, profound, nomadic
interventions into the political life of Armenia, Georgia and • Sirv4n-Ar~n-Azarbayjan did occur. With the advent of the Oguz
Turks and subsequent Mongol and TUrkic invaders, these interven
tions were regularized, affecting the underlying fabric of society
and altering the texture of life. These sweeping changes in-
eluded the restructuring of the· ethno-linguistic character of the
region (always distinguished by heterogeneity, although never
matching that of the "mountain of tonguest• to the North) with the
TUrkicization of Azarbayjan. The assessment of the impact of
nomadic society on the Transcaucasian polities remains a subject
of lively debate. Thus, some scholars today seek in the disrup-
tions of political, social and economic life that characterized
this period the roots of the backwardness that typified these
societies at the time of their absorption into the RUssian Empire. 1
(2)
Early Armenian and Georgian historical accounts contain a
variety of anachronistic notices on the activities of Turkic
peoples living in close propinquity to Transcaucasia. It is
only with the appearance of the "European" Huns (Hhose antecedants
and relationship to the Hsiung-nu of Chinese sources still require
elucidation) in the mid-fourth century,. however, that we may be
gin to speak of a genuine interaction between the TUrkic peoples
and the populations of Transcaucasia.2 A Hunnic raiding party,
undoubtedly in connection with their activities against sasanid
Iran, made its way into Armenia Q.§:_.J6J. Hovses Dasxuranc'i's tale • of the victory of Babik of Siwnik', the champion of Sapur II (309-
3'?9), over the "Hun called Ronagurn in single combat in the late
J?O's illustratesthe Hunnic presence here.3 These raids and the
devastating campaign of the Huns (apparently brought about by
famine in the steppe) of 395 in which they menaced Armenia, Iran
and Roman Mesopotamia, induced the Empires to work out a system
of joint responsibility for the forts guarding the Caucasian
passes.4 ~rhe Buns, thus, became an important consideration in
the policy of synarchy by the "superpowers" in Transcaucasia, a po-
licy which ultimately led to the abolition of the local monarchies.
Iran, faced with a constant threat from the nomads, regularly
summoned vassal Armenian and Georgian forces to fight them. The
":northern ImrHders," however, a.l though a potentially double-edged
sword, could also be exploited by the Transcaucasian polities in
attempts to gs.in greater autonomy or indepe::1.dence from their
neighboring overlords. Horeover, Sasanid persecutions of Chris-
tians ··fluctuated in proportion to their success or lack of it in
the wars against the Xion. Thus, when nomadic pressure slackened,
sasanid attempts to implant Zoroastrianism in Christian Transcau
casia tended to increase. In response, the Armenians could and
(3)
did enter into direct alliance with the 11 Euns" against their
Iranian overlords. This occur'~d during the revolt a.gainst Yazdi-r,
gard II (438-457) which ended in the Armenian defeat at Avara.yr
. lJ/1 ~n ·:J • Similarly, the Albanians (Aiuan) did not hesitate to
bring in the Euns in the course of their revolt against F'eroz
(458-484) during the early years of his reign.5 Indeed, the death
of Peroz in 484 in vrarfare e.gainst the "nuns" gained for the
Georgians, Armenians and peoples of Albania. an easing of direct
sase.nid rule.
While several patterns in the involvement of the 'rurkic nomads
in ·:rranscaucasian affairs up to the early sixth century may be
discerned, we cannot distinguish any broader conceptualization on
their part of their role in the larger clash of empires to their
south. As we are poorly informed regarding the internal workings
of the nomadic formations at this time, it cannot be determined
whether this was due to the absence of a centralized political
command amongst them or the lack of a sustained interest on the
part of the Empires to make use of their services in the struggle
for dominion in the l'Jear East. Nonetheless, the course of events
in the sixth century witnessed some dramatic changes.
A series of nomadic migrations had introduced new Turkic con-
federations to the ?onto-caspian steppes. Driven by the movements
of tribes in Western Siberia and Central Asia touched off by the
expansion of the Juan-Juan in Nongolia, the Ogur TUrkic tribes
crossed the Volga into the western Eurasian steppes ~.463 A.D.6
These Ogurs, speaking a variant form of TUrkicJwere part of a
larger tribal union, the T'ie-1~ of Chinese sources. Long in
volved with commerce (especially the fur trade) and relatively
(4)
well-advanced in agriculture, metallurgy and military technology,
they were intermittantly drawn into Byzantine anti-Iran coalitions.
This policy became more regularized in the course of the sixth
century and the names of the tribal groupings involved, the Ogur, ~ . . .
Ono~ur, Saragur, Uturgur, appear frequently in Byzantine and
Syriac sources.
In the early decades of the sixth century, the Ogurs were
joined in this region by the Sabirs (who were probably directly
responsible for their westward migration). The bulk of the Sabir
union nomadized in the North caucasian steppelands. Elements of
them, however,_ appear to be located on the Volga as vrell { subse
quently figuring in the Volga Bulgar tribal union: the suwB.r of
the Islamic authors?). The Sabirs were soon engaged in the lu
crative (for them) Byzantine-Iranian wars of Justinian I (527-565)
fought in Transcaucasia. Although not adverse to switching sides,
their fickle "loyalties" were more often than not in the Constanti-
nopolitan camp. From the Byzantine standpoint, an alliance with
a large and powerful steppe confederation located i·n the pivotal
North caucasian steppe zone conferred several benefits. such
allies not only provided a constant source of pressure on the
sasanids, but could also be used to check the movements of other
nomads seeking to cross the Volga. With the emergence of the
nomads as a consideration in imperial policy, it soon became appa-
rent that the Volga, a gateway to the North Caucasus and Black Sea,
constituted the first line in Constantinople's defense. The fate
of the peoples of Transcaucasia, as we shall see, came to .be
closely tied to the success of Byzantium in this vital region.
Evidence for an "activistJI approach to the nomad question on
( 5)
the part of the Transcaucasian Christian peoples as well may be
seen in the mission of the bishop of Albania, Kardost, who, ca.
530, went to the 11 land of the Huns" (perhaps the Sabirs). His
alleged mission was to minister to the needs of Christianslanguish-
in captivity there, but, in fact, he attempted to convert the
nomads. In this, he was following a tradition that had begun with
Gregory the Illuminator (d.J31)8. This mission and subsequent
attempts to bring about the conversion of the nomads undertaken
by Armenian/Albanian and Byzantine clerics, had little lasting
effect. Nonetheless, growing hostility toward Iran tended to
place the nomads in the Byzantine camp and as a consequence their
interventions into affairs in Transcaucasia frequently weakened
Sasanid rule.
The appearance of the Avars in Western Eurasia ~·557-558
brought an end to Sabir domination of the North Ca.ucasus. The
Avars, however, were quickly {~.567) driven into Pannonia by the
Ttlrks who had overthrown the Ju~.n-Juan (Avar) Qaganate in Nongolia
in 552. In their pursuit of their erstwhile overlords, the TUrks
extended their hegemony to the western steppes.9 Interested in
both trade (the silk route) and establishing their dominion over
fugitive elements of the Avars, the Tiirks made their initial dip
lomatic overtures to Iran. When the inherent conflict of interest
between the sasanids and the A~ina became apparent, the T~rks
turned to constantinople .10 The history of Byzs,ntino-'.ri:irk rela
tions, despite the shared hostility towards Iran, is chequered
with misunderstandings, fears of deception {not always unjustified)
and occasionally devasting raids on Byzantine holdings in the
Crimea and TrA-nscaucasia. On balance, however, it Has the Iranian
hold in the caucasus that was more profoundly shaken. Once again,
(6)
Iran was faced with a. noMadic menace on both its northwestern and
northeastern frontiers. Unli~e the eRrlier threats, the nomads
l'fere now unit under the aegis of the 'I'lirk Qagans. In keeping
with an e.lready established pattern, Sasanid difficulties with
the TUrks, combined no·N 1vi th Byzantine pressure, permi tt the
Transcaucasian states some greater measure of independence.
Thus, ca.588, the F,.,astern Georgians {Iberia/K'art'li) reestabli-- -shed their autonomy. 11 A material reflection of the extent of
the Turk threat may be seen in the extensive building activity
of AnosirvAn (531-578) who carried out a large-scale reinforce-
The Turks also organized the various Sabir, Ogur and other
Turkic elements in the Western Eurasian steppes into a powerful
tribal confederation under the direct authority of the Yab~u
Qagan. The latter was a member of the royal Asina clan and the
ruler of the western part of the TUrk realm. In the course of the
seventh century, two major tribal unions emerged in this region
under the TUrk banner: the Khazars {Q'azar) and Bulgars. Although
the latter were not unknown to our Transcaucasian sources, it was
the former who figure most_ prominently in the contemporary accounts.
Given the understandable confusion in our sources of Khazar and
Turk (the two are virtually interchangeable at this time) and the
anachronistic attribution of the ethnonym Khazar to a number of
nomadic groupings in the early sixth century, it is not until the
mid-seventh century that we can trace the outlines of Khazar in-
volvement in Transcaucasian affairs with any degree of clarity.
Prior to this, they operated in close concert with their Tttrkic
overlords. Thus, the Khazars formed the bulk of the Tftrk forces
used by the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610-641) in his counter-
{?)
offensive against the Sasanids in Transcaucasia. Armenian and
Georgian sources provide important details on the campaigns of
the Jebu Xak'an/Jibgu ( Qagan), in particular his partici-
pation in the conquest of T'bilisi in 6zs.l3
The Tfirko-Khazar involvement played a decisive role in the
Byzantine victory. At the war's conclusion, however, Transcaucasia
once again found itself partioned into ttspheres of influence."
Armenia was placed within the Byzantine orbit while Iberia/
K'art'li enjoyed an uneasy "independence ... In Albania-Azarbayjan,
the situation was somewhat more complicated, The south was firmly
in the Sasanid orbit. The northern zone, controlled by the l1ihranid
dynasty (which was related to the Iranian royal house) was a vas
sal state. The degree of its dependence, however, was in large
measure determined by the Khazars who frequently raided its north
ern regions and periodically occupied various territories. The
!1ihranids, of course, attempted to exploit this situation with re
sults that were occasionally devastating to their lands,l4
Iran and Byzantium had been exhausted by the long contest,
a factor which greatly facilitated the Arab conquest of Transcau
casia in the mid-seventh century. The only effective opposition
to the new invaders was provided by the Turkic nomads under
Khazar leadership. Needless to say, their involvement here was
hardly altruistic. In the steppe, too, major changes had taken
place. The Tftrk Qaganate, long caught up in domestic strife,
had submitted by 659 to T'ang China. The TUrk hold in the western
most part of the steppes, the Ponto-caspian zone, had actually
begun to fade in the decades preceding the final collapse. The
period 630-640, then, marks the full emergence of the Khazar and
(8)
Onogur/Onogundur-Bulgar conf.ederations, successor states of the
Ttlrk, ruled by rival clans of the ~vestern Ttlrk (On Oq). Although
faced i-'li th Are.b attacks on their North caucasian territories as
early as 64215, the Khazars, in a protracted struggle with the
Bulgar union, one which largely escaped the notice of our sources,
completely defeated their rivals by the 670's. Those Bulgars
that did not migrate west1-vard to Danubian Europe and the Ball{ans
were absorbed into the Khazar union.
As early as 661-662, the I\hazars, taking advantage of the
slackening of the Arab hold in Transcaucasia brought about by the
struggle between cAl! and Nucrtw!yah (65?-661), unleashed a series
of devastating raids into Albania. Juanser (d.680), the Albanian
ruler and his successor Varaz-Trdat (680-699) tried to maneuver
between the Khazars, Arabs and Byzantines through an elaborate
system of marital ties and timely submissions to one or another
authority. It did little to restrain the incursions of the Khazars
e.nd their subjects, the "North Cauce.sian Huns" and resulted in
placing the Hihranid realm further into the Arab camp. An interest
ing episode of e, more pacific nature \-ras the dispatch, in 681, of
a religious mission headed by the Albanian bishop Is·ray~l to Alp'
Ilit'uer (=Alp 11-tever/il-teber, a Turkic title designating a
vassal ruler in the Old Tflrk system) of the ttN"orth caucasian :nuns."
The account of this cleric's sojourn amongst the nomads is pre
served in l'·Tovs~s J)B.sx:uranc' i and provides us with many valuable
details regarding their shamanistic practices.16
Following the geo-political policy lines already established
by Beraclius, Byzantium encouraged Khazar attacks on the Arab
domin_ated regions of Transcaucasia. Thus, the 680 's vii tnessed
(9)
destructive assaults on Armenia, Iberia/K'art'li and Albania.
·rhe early decades of the eighth century 1-'iere marked by a sharp in-
crease in the scale of Arabo-Khazar warfare for control of Trans
caucasia.17 The use of '::.:'ranscaucasian forces by the Arabs in
these campaigns only compounded local difficulties. A dramatic
denouement to this phase of the Arabo-Khazar confrontation took
place in 737 when the UmayyB.d commander, i·1arw~n, in a surprise
drive on the Khazar capital on the Volga, Atil, captured the
Qagan. The latter was forced to embrace Islam, signal. ing there
by his submis'sion to the Caliphate. This, however, was a transient
victory. The Umayyads, r;rho were soon overthrow·n and replaced by
the 'Abb~sids (750), did not have the resources to station a per
manent army of occupation in Khazaria. The Qagan, discarding
Islam, resumed his independence. ~he old Sasanid limes at B~b al
Abw~b (Darband-i Xazar~n) became the border between the two empires
and the northernmost extension of Arab power in this region.l8
The ¥~azars were now full partners in a kind of tri-dominium
that was established in Transcaucasia. Their full integration
into the state system here was reflected in a series of marital
ties with the Byzantine and Western Georgian royal houses as well
as with the local Arab governors. Striking evidence that Khazar
policy did not necessarily coincide with that of Constantinople
may be seen in several incidents involving the Georgian lands.
In 780, the Khazars refused to aid the Iberian/K'art'lian prince
Nerse against his Arab overlords. Some six years later, however,
the Qagan supported his kinsman (grandson) Leon, the erist'avi of
Ap'xazet'i (Western Georgia) in the latter's successful bid to
end Byzantine hegemony there.l9 The Khazars, thus, were instru-
(10)
mental in reestablishing Georgian independence. Not long there
after, ~-799, the last major Khazar raid against the Arabs in
T.ranscaucasia took pla.ce. 20
The ninth century -vri tnessed a weake~ing of both the Caliphate
and ru1azaria brought about by centrifugal forces and a concommi
tant resurgence of Byzantium. The Khazar decline had serious re-
percussions in 'I'ranscaucasia. The destabilization of the western
steppe zone which resulted from the end of the Pax Chazarica,
per~itted the entnlnce of new nomadic forces into the region. The
Byzantine response was a shift away from the Khazars and an attempt
(ultimately unsuccessful) to transform the Pecenegs into the
guardians of Ponte-caspian steppes.21 At the same time, the poli
tical fragmentation of the caliphate, in which the large-scale
introduction of Central Asian Turkic gul~ms22 in the latter half
of the ninth century played a significant role, permitted a Byzan
tine reconquista in the East. These same forces helped to bring
about the revival of the Armenian and Georgian monarchies, in the
course of the 880's, under the ubiquitous Bagratids. In 1008,
Bagrat III (975-1014) united Eastern and Western Georgia {K'art'li
and Ap'xazet'i) thereby paving the way for subsequent Georgian ex
pansion throughout Transcaucasia. Concurrently with this, Azar
bayjan was experiencing what Hinorsky has felicitously phrased
the "Iranian Intermezzo,n the brief emergence of local Iranian
dynasties in the wake of the Arab retreat and TUrkic advance.23
The greatest immediate danger to the restored monarchies, however,
was posed by Byz~)ium whose territorial acquisitions in the course
of the tenth and early eleventh centuries came to include Armenian
and Georgian lands. These Byzantine gains, culminating in the
annexation of the Armenian kingdoms of vaspurakan {1021) and Ani
(11)
(1045), proved illusory. Byzantine rule not only removed the
Armenian ''buffer" against steppe forces which had already made
themselves in the region as early as 1016, but did much to
dismantle the Armenian armed forces.24
Heanwhile, a complex concater..ation of events in the Central
Asian steppes galvanized a number of Turkic tribes into motion.
The Oguz confederation which he.d formed on the Syr Darya in the
last quarter of the eighth century in the aftermath of the col-
lapse of the Second Ttirk '~aganate in 741 Has unstable. In
the course of the latter half of the tenth century, some of its
elements v-:rere dra~vn into the web of Byzantine anti-Illie.z:otr coali-
tions (there is evidence that some of these Oguz had been rlliazar
vassals). They appear to have joined t<Tith the Pecenegs, the
Trans-caspian As and the Byzantines in an attack on Khazaria at
this time. Subsequently, they played a role in the destruction
of the Qaganate (965) in alliance with the Rus•. 25 n1e fall of
Khazaria once again opened the northern approaches to Transcauca
sia (as well as Byzantium). While the Volga-oriented Oguz were
later pushed 't'lest~rard by the Cuman migration collapse of the
Kimek union (these buffetings also brought the Pe~enegs to the
Balkans), their eastern elements were increasil1gly caught up in
the troubled politics of Husl1m Central Asia. Here, Oguz group-
ings, including the followers of the house of Seljuq, were con-¥
verted to Islam e,nd drawn into the Gaznavid- Qaraxanid rivalry.
Subjected to a number of' reversals at the ha.nds of their more
powerful neighbors, some Seljuqid (fmd other Oguz) bands migrated ..
to Gaznavid-controlled Khur~s~n. In 1034, the main mass of the
Seljuqid-led Oguz fled thither as well. ed with starvation,
they took to brigandage. Their raids and depradations resulted
(12) • in a Gaznavid offensive a~ainst them.
v Knowing that they must
either prevail or face extinction, the Seljuqs scored a resound
ing victory over the Gaznavids at Dandanaq~n in 1040. All of
IrE>n noV>T lay open before them. 26 'Ehe 'Ab~sicl Caliphs, seeking
a means to rid hemsel ves of the Si 't BO.yids, v-i ere induced to
legitimize this new force. Thus, the resultant Seljuqid Sultanate
was provided with a program that would make ~hem masters of a
good portion of the Islamic world.
The precise identity and political/tribal affiliations of
the TUrkic raiders who troubled Vaspurakan in 1016 and the r!ig
region in 1021 are st5.11 in dispute.27 In any event, their ac
tivities induced Senek'arim, ruler of vaspurakan, to. transfer his
kingdom to Byzantium in exchange for estates in the region of
Sebasteia (Sivas). Bands clearly associated with the Seljuq dy-
nasty may be placed in Azarbayjan as early as 1029. Elements of
these Oguz subsequently raided Armenia (~.1038) and were soon
giving little peace to the Sadd~did rulers of Ganja/Gandzak.28
'rhe size and pace of the Turkic attacks increased as the
events of 1047-1048 show. Thes-e raids may be termed "Seljuq'' only
in so far as they were carried out by bands nominally under the
leadership of the Seljuq dynasty. In reality, the Seljuqs (whose
actual interests were focused on establishing their supremacy with-•
in the Islamic world) were often compelled by their "subjectstt to ·
undertake these ventures against the surrounding Christian states.
Ibn al-At~r gives us some insight into the internal dynamics of
the •'seljuq movement." In connection with the events of 1048 he
notes that the Seljuqid Ibr~h!m Yinal (Yinal/fnal is a high
ranking Oguz title), finding himself inundated with newcomers
(13' - )
from Transoxiana and not having enough land to provide for them,
suggested that they raid 11 RUm."29 The wretched state of the Oguz
entering the Near Bast accounts for their particular rapacious-
:ness, frequently remarked upon by our sources. Thus, Aristakes
Le.sti vertc 'i notes that they "fell on the Christians like hungry
wolves."JO
The 'rurks launched several attacks into the Basean valley
and defeated a Byzantine-Armenian-Georgian army. The Georgian
magnate, Liparit, who had been exploiting the Byzantine presence
in Vaspurakan and Ani to resist the centralizing polici~s of Bagrat
IV (1027-1072), was captured and carried off to Iran. After a
Byzantine-Georgian counter-offensive had ~riven the Turks from the
Ganja region, Liparit was released (Byzantium continuing its inter
ference in Georgian affairs paid his ransom) and resumed his di
visive activities.31 Aristocratic opposition to the centralizing
monarchy, a perennial problem, was, as we shall see, ultimately
strengthened by the nomadic presence.
In 1054, the Sultan Togrul-Beg brought about the submission
of the Raww~did rulers of Southern Azabayjan and the Sadd~dids of
Dvin and Ganja. This 1-ras preparatory to an invasion of Christian
Transcaucasia. Marauding expeditions were directed thither in
1054-1055, resulting in widespread destruction, especially in the
Armenian territories. The pressure continued in 1055-1056 when
the Sadd~did Abu'l-AsvAr, now a vassal of the Sultan, attacked
Armenia, thereby contributing to the growing number of refugees.32
Famine and plague in the lands recently acquired by the Oguz added
to the ferocity of their assaults on their neighbors. Internicine
strife in Byzantium and Georgia lessened the resistence encountered
by the raiders. Indeed, in Georgia, they were even called in by
(14)
rebellious magnates.
Bagrat IV sought to relieve some of the ssure by calling
in the ossetins (with Nhose ruling house he had ensive ties)
to attack Sadd~did Arr~n in 1062 and 1065.33 These measures, how-
ever, were of little avail for a massive Seljuq force was now di
rected at Transcaucasia. In 1064, Togrul-Beg's successor Alp
Arslan {1063-1072) entered the region. Although all of Transcau-
casia felt the impact of the T~rkmen, the principal target was
Ani, the onetime capital of Bagr0.ticl Armenia. It fell Gagik
of Kars abandoned his lands shortly thereafter. Bagrat IV, despite
his attempts to 'li'i~'trd off approaching danger with tal alli-
anoes and diplomacy, could not save Georgia from attack in 1067-
1068. His neighbor, the Kaxet'ian king Agsart'an, who was fearful
of Bagrat's efforts to "unite 11 his lands with those of K'art'li,
chose a different course. accepted Isls.m and submi ttecl to Alp
Arslan. The reso~ceful Bagrat, however, parried these blow·s, suo-"
oessfully defending himself agai~1st the Sadd~clic: Fadlun who often •
functioned as Alp Arslan•s agent in Georgia. Bagrat, thus, managed
to evade formal to~ens of submission (payment of the xar~j).J4
At the same time, the Seljuq hold in Sirv~n was established
when FEtri burz of the Ya.ztdt/Nazyadid dynasty ruling there submit-
ted to the Sultan in 460/l067-lC68 follov.;ing the appearance of
Oguz ra.iding parties in his realm. Fariburz then joined Alp
Arslan's campaign against Georgia which had often been a trouble
some and aggressive neighbor.J5
One of the main thrusts of the Seljuq Transcaucasian campaign
thus far had been the securing of Azarbayj~n as a staging area . for future activities to be directed largely against opponents in
(15)
the T·:uslim '"IWrld. The campaign also provided a necessary safety-
valve for the restless energies of the Ttlrkmen. This latter fac-
tor was probably the main consideration behind the raids into
Anatolia. The Seljuqs ~vere really little terested in this area
this time, hoping only to maint.s,in Ft secure flank for their
operations in Syria. The Tftrkmen raids, however, forced a con-
frontation with the Byzant culminating in the dramatic clash
at Nanazkert (Hantzikert/Halazgirt) in 10?1. Continual probing
of Christian defences, both Byzantine and r~ranscaucasian had shmvn
how weak these actually were. As a consequence, raiding would
now give 1/lay to invasion and settlement. After the I·:anazkert de-
bacle, Byzantium withdrew from the region. Armenia, undermined
by Byzantine aggression and shattered by the Turkish raids, was
already experiencing the more permanent presence of the Turks with-
in its borders. Georgia, isolated and surrounded, was noY<l open
to what its contemporary historians termed the didi t'urk'oba (lit.
"the Great Turkdom", i.e. massive Turkish incursions and settle
ment).36 Meanwhile, waves of refugees had left Armenia to join
their kinsmen in Byzantine held areas of Anatolia. These soon
coalesced into the Cilician Armenian kingdom.37
Giorgi II (1072-1089) succeeded his father Bagrat IV to the
Georgian throne at approximately the same time that Alp Arslan
1.;as assassinated. The latter's son and successor, Haliks~h (1072-
1092) proved to be one of the dynasty's strongest figures. Giorgi,
whose compassion and justice is extolled by the Georgian chronic
lers (in contrast to his father)38, ~'las plagued by domestic strife
and despite valiant efforts could not effectively deal with the
Turkish threat. r·Ialiks~h unleashed a series of assaults against
both Georgia and the semi-independent Huslim rulers in Sirv~n and
(16)
Arr~n. The latter were brought under Seljuq control in 1074-1075
and Arr~n, in particular, 1-'las now thickly settled by Ttirkmen.
Giorgi was initially successful in fending off the Seljuq forces
led by Sautegin that were sent against him in the late 1070's.
In 1081, however, Ealiks~h began the didi t'urk'oba and Giorg~
was compelled to submit. The renewal of resistance on the part • • of the Sadd~dids and Sirv~ns~hs brought another large-scale Seljuq
invasion in 1086 and a consequent strengthening of Turkish control
throughout the region.J9 Transcaucasia had been.incorporated into
the Seljuq system.
Seljuq rule in Transcaucasia was not uniform in its duration
or impact. On the whole, in keeping with old TUrkic practices,
they were relatively tolerant in religious matters. The negative
aspects of their rule surfaced, rather, in the area of economic
development. The invasions alone were enough to seriously disrupt
the local economy. This was compounded by the Turkish settlements
and resultant transformation of agricultural lands into nomadic
pasturages. Paradoxically, this regression provided a temporary
hiatus in the enserfment of the local peasantry. The great es-
tates tended to be broken up As the Tfirkmen economy was little
interested in large-scale agriculture and lands were needed to be
alloted as ~t~( to the local begs and servitors of the dynasty,
Thus, a less dependent peasantry supported by a system of small
holdings was encouraged. This, of course, only benefitted those
peasants who had not fled and had survived the raids.40 The ~~ac
system41, unwittingly tended to fuel centrifugal forces which
greatly contributed to the Seljuq decline. These same forces of
regionalism-separatism undoubtedly diluted the impact of Seljuq
rule. Horeover, the Old Turkic practice of viewing the conquered
(17)
lands as the common property of the ruling dynasty and the conse
quent division of this terri tory to provide for "mini-states''
Nithin the larger Nhole, permitted considerable local autonomy in
those regions (such as Georgia) ~vhere the native rulers, noit·T vas-
sals of the Sultan, survived. Indeed, this theory of goverru.7J.ent,
despite the brilliant statesmanship of Nizltm al-Eulk (the principal •
minister of Alp Arslan and I-·:alikstlh) who attempted to create a
centra.lized system, probably contributed to the survival of the
Christian caucasian polities. In practice, it also coincided
1vi th older Near Eastern traditions of superstratification in which
the ''king of kings" was no~r the Sult~ .. n-1 A~zam. --· ·-The rapidity of the Seljuq decline after the death of r:Ia
liks~h prevented the Turks from achieving a stronger foothold in
regions like Georgia. This decline, in part the result of internal
dynastic struggles, was greatly exacerbated by the hostility of
the Ttlrkmen towards the dynasty. An echo of this hostility could
still be felt centuries later.42 Those regions, however, like
Azarbayjan (where large-scale politico-territorial units had ,not
existed} became tribal reservoirs and Nere dr~u'm into the very
heart of the post-Maliks~h system. In the process, they were per
manently Turkicized.43
As Seljuq authority became fragmented and diffused, particu
larly after the death of Berkyaruq (d.ll04), the opposite tendency
is observable in Georgia. Giorgi II was forced to relinquish the
actus.l governance of the country to his energetic son Davit'
• • b ( ) Agmasene eli ''the Builder" • The latter became co-king in 1089
and promptly embarked on an ambitious program of domestic reform
and foreign expansion. This policy laid the groundwork for a pan-
Transcaucasian state. Thus, by 1097, Georgia ceased paying the
(18)
xar~j and had made significant progress in expelling the Turks
beyond its borders. 4L~ FollovJing his vic tory over the Sadd~did
Fadlt!n of Ganja at ?:rcuxi in 1104, Davit' established control over •
Heret'i and Kaxet'i. From 1110 until his death in 1125, he was
continuously at 'iJar ~-;i th his Turko-nuslim neighbors. By the end
of his reign, Georgia had been cleared of the Turks and its borders
greatly expanded. The lands of the former Armenian kingdoms I-T ere
incorporated into the Georgian state. The predominantly Euslim
realm of the Sirv~nsfths Has brought under Georgian jurisdiction45
and a sphere of influence I'Tas extended to the Osetins. On 12
August, 1121, Davit' defeated a coalition of Sel juq -It:uslim forces
at Didgori, thereby confirming Georgian supremacy in Transcauca
sia.46 T'bilisi which had been in and out of Georgian hands, was
taken in 1122 and became the capital of the greatly enlarged
Georgian state,
These successes in foreign affairs were preceded and accom-
panied by domestic reforms aimed at strengthening central authority.
Here too, a Turkic component is much in evidence. Davit' seeking
to free the government from the stranglehold of the great aristo-
cratic clans, brought in lesser nobles and non-Georgian elements
(the displaced Armenian nobility figured prominently here) who
would be beholden to the crown. Taking advantage of his marital
ties to the Qlpcaq-Cumans of the Ponto-caspian steppes (his wife,
Guranduxt, was the daughter of At'rak'a (otrok of the Rus' sources),
the son of Saragan/Sarukan). Davit' invited some 40,000 Cumans to
settle in Georgia (many regions of which had been depopulated) and
serve in a special military force tied directly to the crown.47
This measure, 't'l'hen viel'l'ed in the context of the role Turkic groups
had played in the Islamic world, was not a radical innovation for
(19)
the region. Even in Rus' (with which Davit• ~pparently had some
contact). rurkic elements were brought into the border-guard .,.
system in the mid-twelfth century (£!. the Cernye Klobuki). Those
Qtpcaqs that ultimately chose to stay on permanently in Georgian
service (others returned with otrok to the steppes) were Chris-
tianized and Georgianized. They were joined by other Qtpcaqs in
the course of the twelfth century and some of t~mcame to occupy
leading positions in the state. Georgian sources distinguished
between the "new Qtpcaqs" (g .. !:~rc 'e.g_ni axalni) and "former '.::ttpca.qs"
(the na~ivc'aqaras).
Georgia had been trFtnsformed into the leading pm'ler in Trans-
caucasia. Davit''s successors would now be hard pressed to retain ...
their Armenian and Sirv~ian possessions. Indeed, the nature of
the relationship of the Georgian crown to these subject territories
was not only poorly defined (to some extent the Georgian kings
functioned as .. kings of kings") but vle.s continually in the process
of being re-defined by the changing fortunes of war. The surround
ing Turko-Muslim amtrates (the Saltuqids, Artuqids, Mengttjikids,
the ~h-i Armens/S5kmenids of Axl~t/Xlat, Il-Degfizid/Il-Dengizids) 48 •
and their nominal Seljuq overlords (particularly the Iraqi Sul
tanate) were not reconciled to the loss of these lands and bitter-
ly contested them. Thus, Demetre I (1125-1156) and Giorgi III
(1156-1184) were occupied almost totally with the question of con
trol over Ani and e.djolning Armenian le,nds and !3irvan. 49 On the
whole, Demetre and Giorgi were relatively successful in maintaining
a Georgian presence in the areas acquired by Davit' Agmasenebeli.
Nonetheless, a qualitative change in Georgia•s relationship with
some of these regions may be noted. The policy of outright anne-
xation was largely abandoned in favor of what became an often
(20)
unstable vassal relationship. The weakening of the Georgian hold
was attributable, in part, to the resurgence of aristocratic op--
position to the crm·m which exploited strife :,o.ri thin the Bagratid
e. 7hus, Giorgi III had to a serious rebellion in
1177 ( ~vas greatly aided by the ~'1.
never resolved the problem of aristocratic opposition which was
bequeathed to his daughter and successor T'e.m:=tr {1184-1213). The
other factor militating against a more dynamic realization of
i's program. was the rise of
HE~s a Qtpcaq gulftm 1·1ho had begun his career in the service of the
Iraqi juq Sultans. In 1133, he was appointed atabe~ of Arrdn
and married into the Seljuq royal house. 1-ii thin several years,
he had control over most of Azarbayjan and become the leading
figure in the Sultanate.50 Despite the extraordinary turbulence
of Seljuq domestic politics, Il-Dengiz -.;..;as able to mount an ef-
fective opposition, in both Western Azarbayjan and Armenia to
Georgian encroachments, This policy·was continued by his son
Jah~n Pahlav~n {1172-1186). After his death, various centrifugal
elements (local am!rs) reasserted themselves. s brother Qtztl
Arslan (1186-1191) tried to combat these di ive forces as well
as the resurgent Iraqi Seljuqid, Togrul III, his nominal overlord.
Allied to the t'Abb!!sid Caliphate w-hich vlas also 1 a bid to
regai11 its secular authority, he was proclaimed Sultan, but was
murdered in 1191. The Iraq~ Sultanate did not long survive him.
In 1194, To~rul III, the last of his line perished fighting the
Xwdrazms~h Teki~ who had increasingly injected himself into the
ever-widening strife. Thereafter, the Il-Dengizids went into a
sharp and irreversible decline.51
Thus, one of the principal roadblocks to a continuation of
(21)
Georgian expansion had been removed. T'amar•s early years, how-
ever, were also filled with domestic strife. The ailing
snasalari and mandaturt'uxuc'esi, QubP..sstr, her father's loya.l
servitor, was purged by anti-crown forces.
Qutlu Arsl9,n, the mecurclet 'uxuc f esi I With the support of the aris-
tocratic opposition, put forward a proposal to create a kind of
parliament which would have greatly limited the power of the crown.52
The plan was dropped but concessions to the magnates were made.
T'ae latter so made their influence felt in the question of her
marriage. Against her will, 'J:' aruar was married to the Rus' prince
Giorgi (=Jurij, son of Andrej Bogoljubskij ) • 'l'he marriage soon
collapsed and T'amar took another husband, the Osetin prince Davit'
Sosla.n (of Bagratid origin) in 1189. Giorgi "the Russian" now be
came the rallying point for a revolt (1191) and subsequently at
tempted to use the I1-Dengizids to regain the throne. Although
the insurrections failed, they were further warning signals of
what proved to be fatal, centrifugal forces.
Foreign expansion provided a positive outlet for the energies
of the restless Georgian nobles and much of T'amar's activity {as
well as that of the darbazi, "council of state" that governed with
her) focused on the acquisition of neighboring lands. The series
of impressive victories won by Georgian arms underscored Georgia's
paramountcy in the region. Thus, the defeat of the Il-Dengizid
"' Abu Bakr at Samxor in 1195 and subsequent taking of Ganja gave con-
vincing evidence of Georgia's supremacy in Sirv~n and brought some
am!rs of Ar~n and TUrkmen begs into the Georgian orbit.54 Atten-
tion now shifted to the Armenian lands. The Armeno-Kurdish gene-
rals in Georgian service, the Hxargrdzeli brothers, took Ani (1199) . which was then given to them as a fief {1201)?5 Dvin was taken in
(22)
120.3. These victories led to a confrontation with the Seljuqid
Sultan of Rdm, Rukn ad-D!n, at Basean (in either 1203 or 1204)
which ended in a Georgian victory. Georgia now began a protracted
struggle (1204-1209) to gain control of the southern Armenia.n
lands under the domination of the SBkmenid Ax:l~t-s~hs. Although -· --ultimately unsuccessful in achieving all its goals, some new ter
ritories (such as Kars, taken in 1206) came into Georgian hands.
This was followed by a massacre of the inhabitants of Ardebil (in
retaliation for their attack on Ani) ·which led, in turn, to a
spectacular raid into Azarbayjan and Iran proper (1210).56 ',L1huS,
by the end of T'amar*s reign, the Georgian state extended from
Osetia and Dagistan to Armenia. Sirv~n and a series of lesser
Turkish statelets ringing her borders were vassals, while the By
zantine-Georgian Empire of Trebizond was a client-state.
This "golden age" quickly came to an end. Giorgi IV Lasa (121.3-
1222) managed to suppress the attempts by T'amar's newly acquired
vassals to regain their independence. He was unable to deal, how
ever, with a new steppe fore e, the 1-1ongols, who appeared here in
the winter of 1220-1221. Il-Dengizid Azarbayjan, greatly weakened
by internal strife and Xwarazmian conquests, initially bought off
the newcomers while attempting to join forces with the Georgians.
rrhe I<:ongol force led by Jebe and snbe' etay' 1-'fhich he.d come westward
in pursuit of the Xw~razr.as~h Huha!fu"Uad and to gather intelligence, •
quickly moved against Lasa.. Various regions of ~rranscaucasia were
devastated in a series of lightning fl.ttacks, a preview of future
events. The invaders then crossed the Caucasus into the Qtpcaq
steppes. 57
Recovery was prevented by the visitations of still other steppe
forces set in motion by the !-Tongol whirlwind. In 1222-122.3, Qtpcaq
(23)
refugees caused disturbances in Azarbayjan. The was soon followed
by the appearance of ,ral~l ad-Dtn, heir to the nm·.r destroyed X"lv~
razms~h state, in 1225.58 A brilliant general but myopic statesman,
,Jalftl ad-D!n, rather than c e an anti-Uongol coalition, s out
conquer and plun(3,_"-~r the on. Georgia, novi ruled by
(1223-1245), Lasa's sister, s to welcome the confrontation.59
The Xi'l'~razrnians destroyed the Il-Dengizids and repeatedly re.vaged
Georgia. Halted by a coalition led by the Seljuqs of Rnm, Jal~l
acl-D!n died (1231) in Ku11 di
Hongols. The Xv.r~razmian nint
consequences, precluding the
ther hs.d had flecl ing
udeu 1.;J'as entirely negative in its
ssibility of effective resi e
to the Jiongols in lands already thoroughly scourged by war.
In the following decade ( 1231-1240), the r·~ongols, spreading
everyNhere "like clouds of locusts," took control of Transcaucasia.
"'Ehe entire country," Kira.kos Gandzakec 'i notes, n~ms filled with
the corpses of the dead and there were no people to bury them."6o
'Vli.th their defeat of the Seljuqs of Rtlm at K8se Dag in 124J, the
!·iongols became masters of much of Ana tolia as well. 1,Ji thin the
Georgian realm, the Armeno-Georgian military aristocracy fled to
their castles or the impenetrable mountains and forests and soon
submitted. Queen Rusudan found sanctuary in the difficult terrain
of t.Jestern Georgia. From here she sought to take advantage of in
ternal r-:ongol eli visions, preferring to offer her submission to the
more distant Batu. The I•Tongols, ho';;rever, were better able to ex-
ploit Georgian domestic disputes by playing off against one another
Ulu D9.vit' (Lasa's illegitimate son) and Rusudan's son Davit' Narin.
Current scholarly opinion discerns two tendencies that were
operative during the period 1·1ongol domination. One, termed the
"Old Hongol" or "Nomadic" tradition, vie't'led the conquered lands as
(24)
occupied territory to be mercilessly and quickly exploited. This
·Nas a policy of "instant gratification" 1r1hich often led to sizable
pockets of anarchy. The other tendency, represented in the Hear
East by the Iranian bureaucracy (and in China by the Uygur and Qitan
traditions of statecraft) sought to create a centralized monarchy
which would regulate the "shearing of the flock". This not only
curbed centrifugal elements within the nomadic tribal confederation,
but prevented the rapid exhaustion of the resources.of a region and
mad~possible a long and leisurely harvesting of the local riches.
The Nongol ideology, about which our local sources were well
informea,62 was premised on the belief that it was God's 1·¥ill that ¥ •
the Cinggisids rule the earth. On a more concrete level, Cinggisid
domination was best realized by encouraging regional and separatist
forces in the conquered kingdoms. This policy was pursued with con-
siderable success in Rus' and Transcaucasia. Basic political and
social structures were left intact and the local church, often the
only surviving truly national institution, was subtly coopted. The
insecurity of the subject rulers and their often semi-independent
vassals was heightened by the requirement to journey to the distant
supreme Qagan to personally receive the yarltq confirming their sta
tus and by sudden and inexplicable shifts of favor. Neanitrhile, re-
gardless of the mode, the conquered lands were systems.tically de-
spoiled by !'!ongol tax-collectors and their henchmen who were often
recruited from the traditional enemies of the land in which reve-
nue was being collected.
The Eongols and the sizable Turkic elements they brought in
with them from Inner and Central Asia were numerically inferior to
the local Georgian and Armenian forces. Hence, the 1·:ongols sought
to incorporate into their armies the large number of TUrkic nomads
(25)
and semi-nomads concentrated in Azarbayjan and Anatolia, whose num
bers had been SitJ"elled by the arrival of Oguz and other TUrkic groups
from Central Asia. This Nas in keeping with traditional techniques
of nomadic state-building. It was some11J"hat less successful here
than in the Qtpcaq or Transoxanian steppes as Ttirkmen resistence,
flight to the frontiers and general lawlessness attest. In part,
this was undoubtedly the result of the breakdown of the tribes them
selves, reflected in a diffused pattern of settlement stretching from
Xur~s~n to the Byzantine borders, to which Sel juq rule had contr1butec
The Il-xanid ("Xan of a subject polity") realm established by
7P1e~H lnft 12~6) in t'n .d-t~ 6u. v::c er ::; .. e nenr S8.st and Trnnsct:wcHsia did little
to change this pattern. Indeed, local centrifugation was further
encouraged. 6J ~vhile rapacious tax~collectors bore off the material
wealth of the region, Armenian and Georgian forces were forced to
participate in the relentless drive to acquire new territories and
later in the struggle of the Ilxanids against the Golden Horde •
In keeping with steppe tradition64, vassals newly joined to the
tribal confederation, were placed in the front ranks to absorb the
heaviest losses in combat. Thus, ?·Tongol rule, while allmring for
considerable autonomy {which furthered its policy of "divide and
conquer") took a great toll in lives and treasury.
J:.~ongol interventions in Georgian dynastic politics further
splintered the already ~v-eal~ened monarchy~ Some of the princely
• domains, such as Same 'xe under the Jaqeli family, ·Here evincing
ominous signs of virtual secession by the late thirteenth century.
C:Jntinuin3 st1··L~,:;c;les at the Il-xanid court also ha.d negative rever-
berations in Georgia and Armenia. \H th the mass conversion of the
;.:ongols to Islam (their Turkic subjects were !·:uslims of long-stand-
• ing) during the reign of Gazgn (1295-1.304), the last barriers to
(26)
religious persecution fell. Disturbances in Georgia followed (1297).
Serious persecutions too~ place during the reign of Bljeyttl (d. 65
1317) but appear to have slackened under his successor Abu sat!d
(1317-1335), the last Il-xanid ruler of any note. It is unclear
>Jhethe:r the Georgian king, Giorgi V 3rcqi:nvsle, "the 1.-lesplenclent"
{1314-1346), who worked closely with the am!r Goban, a leading fi-
gure under Arm SA. ,:-~d, actually succeeded in reuniting the GeorgiA-n ~I'
real~.oo In any event, his and the neighboring lands could not es-
cape the anarchy that accompanied the Il-Xanld collapse Hfter the
• In the morass of the Cobanid-.Jalayirid struggle
for control of the Il-xnnid legacy, a contest which vas further exa-
cerbated by the brief invasion of Azarbay·jan by .Janibeg of the Gold
en Horcle (in 1357-58), the ruination of the region and further dis-
integration of authority continued. The Armenian magnate families
(~ the Zak'arids/Hxargrdzelis), who had kept ali·ve the idea of
Armenian statehood within the Georgian pan-Transcaucasian monarchy,
now fade from the scene. They were reple.ced by Turkish begs. 67
The brief period of Jalayirid ascendancy under Sultan Uways
(1356-1374), undistinguished by any growth in stability, soon gave
way to the wholesale slaughters Hhich attended Timur's invasions
(1386-87, 1394-96, 1399-1403).68 These incursions were immediately
followed by those of the TUrkmen tribal confederations, the Qara
Qoyunlu and Aq qoyunlu.69 The Georgian kingdom experienced still
further fragmentation, leading to the development of the 1'avadni
or independent princes as the most important element in the land.
By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had begun to encroach on the Abxaz coast. Transcaucasia was soon transformed
into the battleground of two new Turkic states: the Sunn1 Ottomans
.... and the Si~r 9afavids. The region was alternately or simultaneously
(27)
dominated by one or the other, with the Ottomans predominant in
the western zone and the Safavids in the east. The C8.ucasus as . a whole became an important. source for Ottoman and especially
Safavid military slaves. Indeed, the Safavid Qullaragast was • usually a Georgian. 70 All of Christian Transcaucasia riJas now sub
jected to profound Turkic cultural and linguistic influences.71
In keeping with Turkic and Islamic traditions, the Christian states
retained considerable autonomy. 'This was, perhaps, more true of
Safavid ·rule which was less stable and not as centralized • •
* * * The history of Turko-Transcaucasian relations may be divided
into three broad ods. The first {nunno-Khaza.r se) , charac-
terized by destructive raids and brief occupations of certain re-
gions, most seriously affected the·weakest of the three Transcauca-
sian polities: Albania. It undoubtedly contributed to the more
complete integration of this region into the Caliphate. The second
(Seljuq phase) saw the complete absorption of Azarbayjan, ~ its
Turkicization. The Seljuq presence also crushed any hope for a re-
vival of Armenian statehood, the loss of which, however, should be
ascribed to Byzantine policies. The surviving state, Georgia, in
responding to the shock underwent a remarkable recovery. For a
brief period it created a pan-Transcaucasian monarchy, dominating
the entire region. The third (Mongol phase) proved fatal to it as
well. Hongol rule, by encouraging centrifugation on the part or the
great aristocratic houses, a factor which had always been barely
controlled by central authority in Armenia and Georgia, fatally un
dermined national unity in Georgia and ultimately destroyed those
same magnate clans in Armenia.7Z The Ottoman-Safavid period, thus, •
although extremely significant in terms of cultural ~nfluences,
constitutes, in effect, a protracted post-script to the history of
the 4§cline and fe.ll of the Transce,ucasian Christian polities.
{28)
NOTES
1. A.P. Novosel'cev, V.T. Pasuto, L.V. Cerepnin, Puti razviti a feodalizma (Zakavkaz'e, Srednjaja Azi ·a, :aus', Pribaltika
Noskva, 1972 , pp. O, 12 -5. A useful historiographical essay on this and related themes is that of R.A. Gusejnov, "Istoriografija istorii Za.kavkaz'ja XI-XII vv.n Tjurkologiceskij Sbornik {1976), pp.26-5J.
2. ·On the Hunnic migrations, ~ K. Czegledy, A nomad nepE9k vandorlasa napkelett8l napnlugatig (Budapest, 1969), pp.25-9· For the Huns in Europe, see o. Maenchen-Helfen, The World of the Huns (Berkeley, 197Jr;-on the controversial auestion of the ·rurkic speech of the European Huns, see Gy. Nemeth, nA hunok nyelve,. in Attila es Hunjai, ed. Gy. N~meth (Budapest, 1940), pp.217-26 and Maenchen-Helfen, Huns, pp.J76-44J. Ja. A. Fedorov and G.S. Fedorov, Rannie TJurki:n.a:-severnom Kavkaze (Hoskva, 1978), pp.25-27,57 have attempted to prove that Turkic peoples were present here before J5o A.D.
J. P. Vaczy, "A hunok Eur6paban 11 in Attila. es RunJa1, ed. Nemeth, p.64; Novs~s Das:x:uranc'i, Patmut'iwn AXuanic' : ·rhe History
4.
of the caucasian Albanians by I"'ovs~s Dasxuran<;i, trans. C. Dowsett (oxford, 1961), pp.63-64. Contra Dowsett (p.6Jn.4) Honagur is probably not a reference to the Onogurs who did not appear here until the middle of the fifth century.
Maenchen-Helfen, Runs, pp.5lff.; J.B. Bury, History Sf the Later Roman Empire-(LOndon, 1923, repr. : New=-=y~o-rTk~,~l~9~5~8~)-, II, p.6r N. v. Pigulevskaja, Sirijskie isto~niki po istorii narodov SSSR (Moskva-Leningrad, 1941), p.56.
5. Etise, Vasn Vardanay ev Hayoc' Paterazmin : Egi~e, 0 vardane i vojne armjanskoj, trans. I.A. Orbeli (Erevan, 1971), pp.27-JI,58-80, 92, 107, 116-18, 127-8, 169-170.
6.
7. Sabir settlements : : Hovs~s Xorenac • i : Geographie de I1ofse de Corene, ed. trans. A. Soukry (Venise, 1881), p.27; Ibn Xurdadbih, Kittlb al-f.Tas41ik wa'l-Mam~lik, ed. H.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1889), p.124; Ibn al-Faq!h, Kit~b al-Buld~n, ed, ~.J. de Goeje (Leiden,l885), p.297; Ibn Fa~l§n, Ris~lat ibn Fadl~n, ed. s. ad-Dah~n (Damascus, 1959), p.140, These 3abirs also"gave Their name to a grouping within the Proto-Hungarian tribal union which later settled in Transcaucasia. These were the t: ...:p .. ~c-tH ;.d-*f'.t.. >-•" noted in constantine Porphyrogeni tus, De Administrando Imperio, ed. Gy. Moravcsik, trans. R. Jenkins, {Washington, D.c., 1967),p.170 and in Arab sources (of. alI~ta:x:rt, Kitltb Has411k al-Mam~lik, ed. r~r.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 18?0),pp.l9l-2; al-Ba!IO:uri, Futl!b al-Buldl!n, ed. :a.H. Radw~n (Cairo, 1959), p.206) as ·Siy~warot, Mwai'd!. In Armenian they were called Sevordik' = Hung. szav~rd. In the ninth and tenth centuries they were noted for briga.nuage along the Ganja-T'bilisi route, ~ ?~~meth, h1·1K, pp,J17-19 and the Ta'rfx al-B~b : v.F. l<!inorsky, Studies in Caucasian History (London, 1953), Arab.
(29)
text, p.?, Eng. trans. p.lJ, commentary pp.26n.?,41.
_8. Pigulevskaja, Siri skie istocniki, .166-167; H.I. Arta.monov, Istorija Xazar Leningra , 19 2 , pp.92-4; Gy, !·:ora:vcsik, "Byzantine Christianity and the Magyars in the Period of Their Higration" The American Slavic and Fast European Review, s (1946), p.Js.
9. on the ,Juan-Juan-Avar connection, see czegl~dy, Nomad ~neuek, chaps.IV-VI where all the availabre-data is gathered and A. Kollautz, E. Miyakawa, Geschichte und Kultur eines vBlkerwanderungszeit11chen Nomadenvo1kes {Klagenfurt, 1970), I, pp.lJ4ff.
10.
11.
12.
lJ.
!vienander in Dexi 1, Eunapii, Petri Patricii Prisci, Nalchi, I•1enandri historiarum quae supersunt, ed, er, Niebuhr, pp. 294,JOOff. JBOff.; E. Chavannes, Doclli~ents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux (St. P~tersbourg, 1900, repr. Paris, 1941), p.2JJ.
C. Toumanoff, Studies in Christian Caucasian History (Georgetown, 1963), pp,J82-4.
_f4 ther Efforts to strengthen this system had begun under his Kavad. Al-Bal~durf, ed. Ra~w~n, pp.198-9; al-YatqQbf, Ta'rfx, ed, 1·1. Th. Houtsma (Leiden, 1883), I, pp.20J-4; al-l·ras 1lidf, Murllj ag-~hab wa Mat~din al-Jawhar. ed. c. Pellet (Beirut,l966-!970), I, pp.205-7; see also R.A. Gusejnov, "O tjurkax IV-VIIvv .. v zone Kavkazsk~Albanii" Voprosy istorii Kavkazskoj A1bani1, ed. I. Aliev (Baku, 1962), pp.181-8.
W. Barthold, P.B. Golden, "Khazar" Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, 1960-),IV, pp.l172=j; P.B. Golden, Khazar studies (Budapest, 1980), I, pp.J9-42, 49-50, 187-190; Dasxuranc'I, trans. Dowsett1 pp.8J,86, 87, 100,106; K'art'lis C'xovreba, ed. s. Qauxc'isvili (T'bilisi, 1955,1959}, I, pp.22J,225; K. czegledy, nn:erakleios tt5r8k szOvetsegesei" !•Ta!3y:ar Nyel v, XLIX (1953), pp.J19-20.
14. R. Grcusset, Histoire de l'Armenie (Paris, 1947, repr. 1973), p.276; Z.I1. Bunijatov, AzerbaJd~an v VII-IX vv. (Baku, 1965), pp.5J-60.
15. A~-·rabar!, Ta 'rfx a~=.~bart, ed. Hui;tammad Abu '1-FacJ.l Ib~hfm (cairo, 1962-1967), IV, p. 158.
16. Dasxuranc'i, trans. Dowsett, pp.l53-171; Golden, Khazar Studies, I, pp.90-9J.
17. see D.M. Dunlop, The History of the Jewish Khazars (Princeton, ~4), chaps. III-IV for a detailed analysis of the course of this war.
18. Dunlop, Khazars, pp.81-4; Artamonov, Ist. Xazar, pp.ZlB-222; Bunijatov, Azerbajdzan, pp.l06-112.
v .. K'art'. C'xov., I, p.251; I. Javaxisvili, K'art'veli eris is-toria (T'bilisi, l9b5-1966), II, pp.82,92-3. Tfie conversion of the Khazar ruling house to Judaism in the late eighth cen-
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tury (~ al-r1as 1rld!, Hurrlj, ed. Pellat, I, p.212) may also be viewed as a sign of Khazar independence of both BagdAd and Constantinople.
20. A~-t-abar!, ed. IbrAhim, VIII, pp.269-70
21. P.B. Golden, "The l·!igrationl'5 of the Oguz" Archivum ottomanicum,IV (1972), pp.75-7·
22. Z.V. Togan, Umum! TUrk tarihine giris, 2nd ed. {Istanbul, 1970), pp.l74-9; I1.A. Sfia'6an, .Islamic Histotay. A New Interpretation A.D. 750-1055 (A.H. 132-~48)(camEridge, 1976), pp.6)-6. An important Turkfc general { of Khazar origin ) who figured prominently in Transcaucasian affairs was Buga the Turk. He suppressed the rebellious Muslim am!r of Tiflis in 833 but was later recalled when the Caliph began to suspect him of subversive contacts with his Khazar kinsmen (V.F. Hinorsky, 'I'he ;:Ustor~ of Sharv~n and Darband, cambridge, 1958, Arab text p.J, trans. p.25; K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.256-7; A.N. Ter-Gevondjan, Ar-menija i arabskij xalifat ; Erevan,1977, pp.143-7). --
23. Hinorsky, studies, pp.llOff. ·On events in Armenia and Georgia, see Ter-Gevonajan, Armenija i arabskij xalifat, pp.149-l50, 237ff.; Toumanoff, Studies, p.20J.
24. Aristakes Lastivertc'i, Patmut 1 iwn : Povestvovanie vardapeta Aristakesa. Last~vertci, trans. K.N. Juzbasjan O.'foskva, 1968) pp. 64-5,79-8 5; C. Toumanoff, "Armenia and Georgia'' cambridge Hedieval History, IV, ed. J.I1. Hussey (cambridge, 1956) ,pt. 1, p.620; Grousset, Histoire de l'Armenie, PP•551ff.
25. Golden, 11 Migrat1ons of the Oguz" AO, IV {1972), pp.77-80.
26.
28.
The literature on the origins of the Seljuqs is too extensive to be cited here. A good introduction to the problem may be found in S.G. Agad~anov, Ocerki istorii 0 uzov i Turkmen Srednej Azii IX-XIII vv. (Asxabad, 9 9 , esp. chap. IV;-r;.E. Boswor h, The Ghaznavids {Edinburgh, 1963), chap. IX; Cl. cahen, "Le i.Jalik-namah et l'histoire des origines Se1jukides" Oriens, 2 (1949) and in his Pre-ottoman Turkey, trans. J • .rones-~..Tilliams (New York, 1968),pp.l9ff.
I. Kafesog1u argues for their Se1juq origins in his nDogu Anadolu'da ilk se19uklu aktnt (1015-1021) ve tarih! ehemmiyeti" Fuad Kaprttln Armagant, ed. o. Turan, H. Eren et al. (Istanbul, 195J), pn.259-274. Opposed to this are S.G. Agadzanov and K. N. Juzba~jan, "K istorii tjurkskix nabegov na Armeniju v XI v.u Palestinskij Sbornik, 13 (76) {1965), pp.147-157· See also discussion in N.N. Senge11a, Se1c'ukeb1 da 8ak'art'Ve1o XI saukunesi (T'bilisi, 1968), pp.l65ff.
Ibn al-Attr, Al-K~m11 f!'t-T.a'rtx, ed. c.J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851-1876, the Beirut, 1965-1966 reprint used here has a different pagination), IX, pp.J81-J; F. Sttmer, Oguzlar (Ankara, 1967), pp.81-2; T<!inorsky, Studies, Arab text, p.l2, trans. p.l8.
29. Ibn a1-At!r, ed. Tornberg, IX, p.S46.
30. Aristakes J~stivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan, p.87. Muslim sources
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speak ;n similar terms, cf. al-Eund~r!'s slighly abridged version Ol ~Imad ad-D!n al-I~fah4ni, Taw~r!x Al saljng, Kit~b Zubdat an-Nu~rat vm Nuxbat al- ~Usrat (Recueil de Textes Relatifs a l'Histoire des Selqjoucides, ed. H.TH. Routsma, Leiden, 1889), II, pp.9-l0.
31. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.J02-4; Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan,.pp.86-88, 94-5; Minorsky, Studies, pp.57, 60-2J Hatt'~os Urhayec'i, Patmut'iwn : Urfalt Hateos Vekayinamesi (952,..1136) ·ve Pap~z· Grf br·•tm-_zeyli {1136-1162), Turk. trans. H. Andreasyan Ankara, 19 2 , pp. 7-90. Liparit, upon his return, took part in a rebellion against Bagrat, was captured, tonsured and subsequently sent off to Byzantium (I('art'. C'xov •• I, p;p.304-5). The SEijuq house was also troubled by discontented magnates. Ibr~htm Yinal revolted in 1050. Agad~anov (Ocerki, pp.216-7) has argued that the result of these revolts 1vas the expansion of the ~~a' system as a means of keeping the TUrkmen aristocracy weil=ciisposed toi'rards the dynasty.
32. Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzba~jan, pp.97-106; Hatt'eos Urhayec'i, trnns. Andreasyan, pp.l00-3; Ibn al-.4.-~tr, ed. Tornberg, IX, p.599; I·olinorsky, Studies, p._54.
33. Hinorsky, studies, Arab text, pp.l4-15, trans. 20-1 and pp.74-5.
34. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.306-14; Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan, pp.l28-9; Matt'~os Urhayec'i, trans. ~dreasyan, pp.118ff.; al-Husaint, Axb~r ad-Dawlat as-Salj~giyyah, ed. M. Iqbal (Lahore, "1933), pp.39-40, 4J-6; Hinorsky, Studies, Arab text, pp.l5-16,trans.21,23 and pp. 58, 64-7; M.H. Yinan9, Tttrkiye tarihi Selcuklular devri, I, Anadolu'nun fethi {Istanbul, 1944), pp.~?-9.
35. )1inorsky, Sharvan and Darband, Arab text, P'J.l2-l4, trans • .35-8 al-~usaini, Axbar, p.44.
'w'
36 Kt t' ('t I )20 1 n 1" '""'1"' 1 b" J·Q1.c>f . ar . v xov., , p. , , see a so 0en~e la, 0e c u.x:e l, pp •.. ~.L •
. 37. See G.G. Mikaeljan, Istori.ia kilikijskogo armjanskogo gosudarstva
{Erevan, 1952). Lesser Armenian statelets in inaccessible regions continued to exist as semi-independent or independent units, but with no real political effectiveness, see R. Bedrosian, The Turco-Mon~ol Invasions and the Lords of Armenia in th~-14~ Centuries (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1979), pp.68-~. A smaller "Armenia in exile" was established in the Crimea, probably in connection with the Byzantine conquests and strengthened by new arri~als in the Seljuq period. This .. colony later adopted the ~ipcaq Turkic language of the Cumans~nd has left behind a rich literature in Armeno-Cuman from the areas of their further diaspora in the Ukraine and Poland, cf. E. Schutz, •· Armeno-kiptschakisch und die Krim" Hun:.:;aro-Turcica. Studies in Honour of Julius Nemeth, ed. Gy. Kaldy-Nagy (Budapest, 1976), pp.l85-205; J. Deny, L'Armeno-Coman et les Les "Ephemerides" de Kamieniec, 1604-1613 (Wiesbaden, 1957J;T.I. -Grunin, Dokumenty na poloveckom ,jazyke XVI v. (Moskva, 1967); E. Try jarski, ••La li tterature armeno-kiptchak" Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta, II (Wiesbaden, 1964) and Ja. Daskevy6,
;y~h~Jn£3R~~~~~c~~~i~~~K~1~p~ai!rg~~1 H*~ft~f196~~k~~~2:n~~~~~:73.
•
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JS. K'art'. C'xov., I, p.Jl5 which so (p.Jl6) terms I-!a-liks~h ..... ' f 11 ,..,, ; t . " ' i vne enemy o a vnr~s 1ans. J"\rmen Hn sources, hm.J"ever, have a positive viel'l of Naliks~h (of. :t·:att'eos Urhayec'i, trans. Andreasyan, p.l46; Kirakos,Gsndzakec'i, Patmut'iwn ~ayoc' : Ki s Gandzakeci, Istorija Armenii, trans. L.A. :.canlarjan, skva, 1976, p.89}. '
J9. Hinorsky, Sharv~n and Dn.rband, Arab text, pp.l6, 40, commentary pp.54-5; Kafesoglu, r~elikyah, pp. C'xov. I,pp.Jl?ff. --
, trEms. pp. -7; K'art'.
40. L.o. Babajan, Social'no-~konomiceskaja i politiceskaja istori a·Armenii v XIII-XIV vekax (Voskva, 1969),p.J9; ~A. Fies:x:iR, Didgors aJa bitva Tbilisi, 1972), pp.5J-5.
'-n. Ags.dzanov, Ocerki, pp.220-2; , Turkey, pp.l80-l,2JR-44; A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the juq Empire" The Cambridge History of Iran, V, ed. ,T.A. Boyle (Cambridge, l9b8), esp. pp.2Jl-9.
J ' M.P •. '1 :!: j!" /4 ~ • • r1 ~· • I . , • ~· i d ~2. i"'.L. l"ibU -uaZ.J. 1 .:~aJHra-yl .J.art"~.K:lrr:a; B.onoslo'ITnR.J:=l <:UrKmen, eq trans. A.H. Kononov (Eoskvs.-Leningrad, 1958), Turkic text,p.64: "The Seljuqs said 'we are Tt1rkmen, we are brothers,"' but no benefit came to the polity {il) or people. Before becoming ffid-i s~hs, they said 'we are6f the ~~tntq Ttlrkmen,' but after becoming P~d-i s.t~hs they said ' a son of Afr~s~yAb fled from Kayxusraw to the Tt1rkmen clan of the Qtntq and he grev.r up and remained (with them). We nre his sons, from the lineage of Afr~styab ••• "
4J. R.A. Gusejnov, "Irakskie sel'd~ukidy, Il'-degizidy i Zakavkaz'en falestinskij Sbornik, 21 (1970), pp.l86-7.
44. Sengelia, Selc'ukebi, pp.J40ff.; ]':Iesxia, Didgorskaja bitva, pp.26-7,56; K'art'. C'xov., I, p. 326 : "He neither paid the xaraj to the Sultan nor could the Turks winter in l{' art' li ... A good account of Davit' 's activities r:tay be found in I-'T.D. Lordkipanidze, Istorija Gruzii XI-nacala XIII veka (Tbilisi, 1974), pp.88-126. His political program is analyzed in v. Abasmadze, Harkvevebi Sak'art'velos politikur modzgvrebat'a istoriidan (T'bilisi, 1969), chap. III.
K'art'. c'xov., I, pp.344-5. On the thorny question of the nature of ~irvanian-Georgian relations, see :'T. Asat'iani, nsa,k'art'veloSirvanis poli tikuri urt' iert 'oba :{II sau1mnesi If XII saukunis Sak'art'velos istoriis sakit'xebi, ed. S.A. I-!esxia (T 1bilisi, 1968), pp.7-51¥ and z.r,.r. Bunijatov, Gosudarstvo atabekov Azerbajdzana (Baku, 1978), chap. IV.
46. Hesxia, Didgorskaja. bitva, pp.69-85; V.F. Minorsky, ncaucasica in the History of H.ayy§fltriq~n·• Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XIII (1949), pp.27-J5.
K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.J35-7. The horde of At'rak'a/Otrok was part of the confederation known in Rus' as the Polovci dikii, see P.B. Golden, uThe 'Polovc1 Dik1i'" Eucharister1on {Omeljan Prltsak Festschrift},ed. I. ~evcenko (1n press).
48. on the eastern Anatolian belliks, ~ o. Turan, Do5u Anadolu
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Ttlrk devletleri tarihi (Istanbul, 1973). The Il-Dengizids are exhaustively treated in Bunijatov's Gos. atabekov.
49. The complexities of the struggle for Ani have been meticulously analyzed by !•:inorsky, Studies, esp. pp.B0-106. Although the struggle was occasionally marked by savagery (e.g. the bey of Arzan, Qurtt b. Togan Arslan, is reputed to have-built a-IDinaret of Georgian skulls, see ruran, Doiu Anadolu, p.8), 11uslim rule, such as that of the ~dadids in ni, was often characterized by significant cultural and material advances, see I.A. Orbeli, Gorodisce Ani e e5o raskopki in his Izbrannye-frudy (F.revan,l96J) p.7. On Sirvan, see the studies of Asat'iani and Bunijatov, n.45.
50. H. Aly~r!, Azerbaycan atabe leri Il-deniz ogullarl (1146-1225) (Istanbul, 19 , pp.l2-1Jr Bunijatov, Gos. atabekov, pp.27ff.; Gusejnov, "Ira.kskie sel 'dzukidy ••• " PSb. ,21 (1970), pp.l90-4, on the atabegate (Hhich was introducea:-Tnto Georgia in 1212),see R.A. Gusejnov, ''Institut atabekov" Palestinskij Sbornik,l5 (19'bb}"
51. Bunijatov, Gos. a:tabekov, pp.77-95·
52. K'art'. C'xov., II, pp.J0-1; .Abasmadze, Narkvevebi, chap.IV; I. I. Surguladze, Istori ja gosudarstva i prava Gruzii { 'l'bilisi, 1968), p.471 Lordkipanidze, Istorija, pp.14J-4.
53. K'art'. Cxov., II, pp.J5-6. Ee Y.ras at that hiding from his uncle savalat' (Vsevolod "Bol'soe Gnezdo") in the city of the Cuman xan Sevinc. Jurij's paternal grandflother was a cuman princess; another example of the complex Qtpcaq-Georgian ties.
54. K'art'. C'xov., II, pp.65-78; al-Husain!, Axb~r, pp.186-8; Javaxi~vili, K'art'veli eris istoria . ---- , · II,
56.
57·
58.
p.271 for dating. Bunijfl.tov (Gos. atabekov, p.97) has :1194.
Minorsky, Studies, pp.102-0). on the conquests of the Mxargrdzeli~ see Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans • ./:anlarjan, pp.ll8-9. Babajr-m "[Si'rPist. Arm., pp.l4-23) has argued that this was actually an Armenian kingdom vihich the Georgians helped to revive and vri th ~vhich they had a suzerain-vassal relationship. 'L'his thesis has been questioned by 3unijatov (Gos. ats.bekov, p.l4) ancl Lordkipan-
,(Istorija, p.l74).
javaxisvili, K'art'. eris ist., II, pp.27J-88; ·2urRn, Dogu Anadolu, pp.lOJ-108; K~art'. C'xov., II, pp.lOJ-09; al-~usaini, Axb~r, pp.188-9. In the Iranian tmvn of Eiyltne, Zak 'are r,:xargrdz had the local malik and his children ski~~ed and hung on the minaret.
Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans. Xanlarjan, pp.137-8, see discussion in A. Galstjan, "Zavoevanie Armenii mongol' skimi vojskami 11 Tate.ro· Hone;oly v Azii 1 Evrope, ed. S.L. Tixvinskij, 2nd rev. ed, (Noskva, 1977),pp.166-9; Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.85-92.
our most important source is Jal~l ad-Dtn's biography, strat asSul~~n Jal~l ad-Dtn Mank~birt! by Sih~b ad-D!n an-Nasaw!. A critical edition of the text prepared by Z. rr,. Buni jatov which will supercede the edition of 0. Houdas (P~ris, 1891) has not yet appeared. Bunijatov's Russian translation, however, is available
59.
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!1zneo isa.nie Sultana~. Dzalal ad-Dina Jv!a.nkburn (Baku, 1973). Important data is also foun in Ata Ha ik Juvain!, Ta'r!x-i Jah~n-s:u~a : History of the 1?orld Conqueror, trans. .T .A. Boyle (cambridge, T·Iass., 1958), esp. II, pp.426-59 and K'a.rt'. €''xov. II, pp.~68-185.
According to Ibn al-At!r (XII, p.43.5), the Georgians wrote to cTal~l acl-D!n, commenting that the r'iongols had destroyed his father's realm but t•~ve, however, did not Attribute great significance to them and that which they thought about m10st was to get away from us entirely ...
60. Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans. Xanlarjan, p.l_56. See also Galstjan, uzavoevanie Armenii,", pp.l?0-4 and the sources gathered in his Armjanskie istocniki o mongolax (Hoskva, 1962).
61. I.P. Petru~evskij, nRa.~!d ad-D!n's Conception of the State 11
Central Asiatic Journal,XIV (1970), pp.l48ff. and the literature cited there; Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.142-3.
62. Grigor Aknerc'i : History of the Nation of the Archers (the I(ongols) by Grisor of .Akanc', Arm. text, Eng. trans. R.P. Blake, R.N. Frye in the Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 12 (1949), Arm. text, p.JOO, trans. JOl ; "It is the will of God that 1ve take the earth and maintain order and impose the (y)asax (= yasag,/yasa) ••• " Cf. the comments of Kirakos. Gandzakec • i, trans. Xanlarjan, p.173 :"They usually say the foJlowing : their sovereig: is a kinsman of God who has taken heaven as his appanage a.nd given the earth to the Xak'an (=Qagan ) ••• " See also the discussion in K. SAgaster, "ITerr.schaftsideologieu:fl.d Friedensgedanke bei den Hongolen'' Central Asiatic . .Journal, XVII (1973), pp.223-242. Kirakos Gandzakec'i apparently learned some Mongolian (~ L. Ligeti, "Le Lexique mongol de Kirakos de Gandza.k" Acta Orientalia Hungarica, XVIII, 1965, pp.241-97) as did the anonymous author of the Georgian Ghronograph (Zamt'aasmcereli : IC'art'. C'xov., II, p.l59).
Ba.bajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.ll9-J?. On the Ilxanids, see B ... Spuler, Die Hongolen in Iran (Leipzig, 1939); I.P. Petrusevskij, Zemledelie i a rarn e otnosenija v Irane XIII-XIV vv. U~oskva.:. Leningrad, 19 0); A.A. Ali-zade, Social no-~konomiceska·a 1 oliticeskaja istorija Azerbajd~ana XIII-XIV vv. Baku, 19.5
64. Nemeth, HHK, pp.l9-20, 234-.5.
6.5. K'art'. C'xov., II, p.303; Rastd ad-D!n, J~mit at-Tav~r!x, III, Pers. text ed. A.A. Ali-zade, Russ. trans. A.K. Arends {Baku, 1957), Pers., p.324, trans. p. 182. Revolts had also occured in the 1240's and 1250's. ~azan Xan is generally favorably portrayed by contemporary Christian sources, cf. A.K. Sanjian, Colophons of Armenian Nanuscripts 1301-1480 (Cambridge, r"ass. ,1969) ~· 1)04, p.48. This was not true of CljeytU (Sanjian, Colophons , pp • .50-2).
66. D.N. Lang, ''Georgia in the Reign of Giorgi the 3rilliant (1319-1346)" Bulletin of !{he School of Oriental and African studies, XVII (1955), pp.?9-91.
67. Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.l69-86; Sanjian, ColoEhons, pp.90-91 describes the general anarchy.
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68. See 1L Tabatadze, K'art 'veli 'CI'iiaa • rnd e X TiT- XV -::s::::a:-:-u:ik~u:-:n::-:e=-e='brri::::s~m:'ii~n=-=a:-:z::-:e:-=-~,r~b7J..""l-ii=-:s:-:;i-=,:..:::..;1~9~. r.-;:=.~?8~-~a:.r:a.:-c~t z:::e indicates pp.27-37 that Georgia, at this time, was reunited under ]3.-':l.grat V ( 1360-1393) and relatively prosperous.
69. On the Qara Qoyun1u, ~ F. Stirner, I\ara Koyunlular, I (Ankara, 1967). On their rivals, the Aq Qoyunlu, see J. E. 'doocls, The Aq Quyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire {Einneapo1is, 1976)
70. K. Kuc'ia,· 11 Kavkasiuri elementi Sep'ie.nt'a Iranis politiJtur sarbielzeu J.Iaxlobe1i A··osavlet'is istoriis sakit'xebi.ed. v. Gaba~vili et al. T'bilisi, 19o3 , pp. -75.
71.
72.
P.B. Golden, "The Oguz Turkic (Ottoman/Safavid) Elements in Georgian : Background and Patterns" 'Tlhe !,:utual Effects of the Islamic and Judea-Christian Worlds : The East ID~ro ean Pattern , e • ·-. Ascher et al. r;ew York 0 1979 ; C. Abuladze, Sultan-Saba Orbe1ianis lek'sikonis sitqvanis t'urk'uli t'e.rgmanebi ('r'bilisi, 1968).
C. Toumanoff, "~he Fifteenth-Century Bagre.tids and the Institution of Collegial Sovereignty in Georgia" 7raditio,VII (1949}, pp.l69-221, emphasizes, rather, the effects of the Byzantine system of collegial sovereignty as the "decisive factor" in Georgia's decline and fall.