number 92 the turkic peoples and caucasia - wilson center

37
NUMBER 92 THE TURKIC PEOPLES AND CAUCASIA Peter B. Golden Conference on "NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL IN TRANSCAUCASIA" Co-sponsored by Kennan Institute for Ad\:anced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center- and American Association fo.r the Advancement Slavic Studies April 24-25, 1980

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NUMBER 92

THE TURKIC PEOPLES AND CAUCASIA

Peter B. Golden

Conference on

"NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CH.~'l'GE IN TRANSCAUCASIA"

Co-sponsored by

Kennan Institute for Ad\:anced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center-

and

American Association fo.r the Advancement Slavic Studies

April 24-25, 1980

Peter B. Golden

THE TURKIC PEOPLES AND CAUCASIA

For more than a millenium and a half, the fortunes of the

peoples of Transcauce.sia have been c+osely, at times inextri­

cably, bound up with those of the Turkic world. Standing at

the "crossroads of empires," Transcaucasia was often a major

thoroughfare through which the predominantly TJrkic nomads of

the Eurasian steppelands entered the zone of sedentary cultures

of the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Indeed, recognition of its

strategic importance to the limes system that separated steppe

from sown was one of the factors which has traditionally drawn

the attention of neighboring, imperial powers to this region.

Transcaucasia's relationship with the steppe peoples was,

at first, largely transient. In time, however, profound, nomadic

interventions into the political life of Armenia, Georgia and • Sirv4n-Ar~n-Azarbayjan did occur. With the advent of the Oguz

Turks and subsequent Mongol and TUrkic invaders, these interven­

tions were regularized, affecting the underlying fabric of society

and altering the texture of life. These sweeping changes in-

eluded the restructuring of the· ethno-linguistic character of the

region (always distinguished by heterogeneity, although never

matching that of the "mountain of tonguest• to the North) with the

TUrkicization of Azarbayjan. The assessment of the impact of

nomadic society on the Transcaucasian polities remains a subject

of lively debate. Thus, some scholars today seek in the disrup-

tions of political, social and economic life that characterized

this period the roots of the backwardness that typified these

societies at the time of their absorption into the RUssian Empire. 1

(2)

Early Armenian and Georgian historical accounts contain a

variety of anachronistic notices on the activities of Turkic

peoples living in close propinquity to Transcaucasia. It is

only with the appearance of the "European" Huns (Hhose antecedants

and relationship to the Hsiung-nu of Chinese sources still require

elucidation) in the mid-fourth century,. however, that we may be­

gin to speak of a genuine interaction between the TUrkic peoples

and the populations of Transcaucasia.2 A Hunnic raiding party,

undoubtedly in connection with their activities against sasanid

Iran, made its way into Armenia Q.§:_.J6J. Hovses Dasxuranc'i's tale • of the victory of Babik of Siwnik', the champion of Sapur II (309-

3'?9), over the "Hun called Ronagurn in single combat in the late

J?O's illustratesthe Hunnic presence here.3 These raids and the

devastating campaign of the Huns (apparently brought about by

famine in the steppe) of 395 in which they menaced Armenia, Iran

and Roman Mesopotamia, induced the Empires to work out a system

of joint responsibility for the forts guarding the Caucasian

passes.4 ~rhe Buns, thus, became an important consideration in

the policy of synarchy by the "superpowers" in Transcaucasia, a po-

licy which ultimately led to the abolition of the local monarchies.

Iran, faced with a constant threat from the nomads, regularly

summoned vassal Armenian and Georgian forces to fight them. The

":northern ImrHders," however, a.l though a potentially double-edged

sword, could also be exploited by the Transcaucasian polities in

attempts to gs.in greater autonomy or indepe::1.dence from their

neighboring overlords. Horeover, Sasanid persecutions of Chris-

tians ··fluctuated in proportion to their success or lack of it in

the wars against the Xion. Thus, when nomadic pressure slackened,

sasanid attempts to implant Zoroastrianism in Christian Transcau­

casia tended to increase. In response, the Armenians could and

(3)

did enter into direct alliance with the 11 Euns" against their

Iranian overlords. This occur'~d during the revolt a.gainst Yazdi-r,

gard II (438-457) which ended in the Armenian defeat at Avara.yr

. lJ/1 ~n ·:J • Similarly, the Albanians (Aiuan) did not hesitate to

bring in the Euns in the course of their revolt against F'eroz

(458-484) during the early years of his reign.5 Indeed, the death

of Peroz in 484 in vrarfare e.gainst the "nuns" gained for the

Georgians, Armenians and peoples of Albania. an easing of direct

sase.nid rule.

While several patterns in the involvement of the 'rurkic nomads

in ·:rranscaucasian affairs up to the early sixth century may be

discerned, we cannot distinguish any broader conceptualization on

their part of their role in the larger clash of empires to their

south. As we are poorly informed regarding the internal workings

of the nomadic formations at this time, it cannot be determined

whether this was due to the absence of a centralized political

command amongst them or the lack of a sustained interest on the

part of the Empires to make use of their services in the struggle

for dominion in the l'Jear East. Nonetheless, the course of events

in the sixth century witnessed some dramatic changes.

A series of nomadic migrations had introduced new Turkic con-

federations to the ?onto-caspian steppes. Driven by the movements

of tribes in Western Siberia and Central Asia touched off by the

expansion of the Juan-Juan in Nongolia, the Ogur TUrkic tribes

crossed the Volga into the western Eurasian steppes ~.463 A.D.6

These Ogurs, speaking a variant form of TUrkicJwere part of a

larger tribal union, the T'ie-1~ of Chinese sources. Long in­

volved with commerce (especially the fur trade) and relatively

(4)

well-advanced in agriculture, metallurgy and military technology,

they were intermittantly drawn into Byzantine anti-Iran coalitions.

This policy became more regularized in the course of the sixth

century and the names of the tribal groupings involved, the Ogur, ~ . . .

Ono~ur, Saragur, Uturgur, appear frequently in Byzantine and

Syriac sources.

In the early decades of the sixth century, the Ogurs were

joined in this region by the Sabirs (who were probably directly

responsible for their westward migration). The bulk of the Sabir

union nomadized in the North caucasian steppelands. Elements of

them, however,_ appear to be located on the Volga as vrell { subse­

quently figuring in the Volga Bulgar tribal union: the suwB.r of

the Islamic authors?). The Sabirs were soon engaged in the lu­

crative (for them) Byzantine-Iranian wars of Justinian I (527-565)

fought in Transcaucasia. Although not adverse to switching sides,

their fickle "loyalties" were more often than not in the Constanti-

nopolitan camp. From the Byzantine standpoint, an alliance with

a large and powerful steppe confederation located i·n the pivotal

North caucasian steppe zone conferred several benefits. such

allies not only provided a constant source of pressure on the

sasanids, but could also be used to check the movements of other

nomads seeking to cross the Volga. With the emergence of the

nomads as a consideration in imperial policy, it soon became appa-

rent that the Volga, a gateway to the North Caucasus and Black Sea,

constituted the first line in Constantinople's defense. The fate

of the peoples of Transcaucasia, as we shall see, came to .be

closely tied to the success of Byzantium in this vital region.

Evidence for an "activistJI approach to the nomad question on

( 5)

the part of the Transcaucasian Christian peoples as well may be

seen in the mission of the bishop of Albania, Kardost, who, ca.

530, went to the 11 land of the Huns" (perhaps the Sabirs). His

alleged mission was to minister to the needs of Christianslanguish-

in captivity there, but, in fact, he attempted to convert the

nomads. In this, he was following a tradition that had begun with

Gregory the Illuminator (d.J31)8. This mission and subsequent

attempts to bring about the conversion of the nomads undertaken

by Armenian/Albanian and Byzantine clerics, had little lasting

effect. Nonetheless, growing hostility toward Iran tended to

place the nomads in the Byzantine camp and as a consequence their

interventions into affairs in Transcaucasia frequently weakened

Sasanid rule.

The appearance of the Avars in Western Eurasia ~·557-558

brought an end to Sabir domination of the North Ca.ucasus. The

Avars, however, were quickly {~.567) driven into Pannonia by the

Ttlrks who had overthrown the Ju~.n-Juan (Avar) Qaganate in Nongolia

in 552. In their pursuit of their erstwhile overlords, the TUrks

extended their hegemony to the western steppes.9 Interested in

both trade (the silk route) and establishing their dominion over

fugitive elements of the Avars, the Tiirks made their initial dip­

lomatic overtures to Iran. When the inherent conflict of interest

between the sasanids and the A~ina became apparent, the T~rks

turned to constantinople .10 The history of Byzs,ntino-'.ri:irk rela­

tions, despite the shared hostility towards Iran, is chequered

with misunderstandings, fears of deception {not always unjustified)

and occasionally devasting raids on Byzantine holdings in the

Crimea and TrA-nscaucasia. On balance, however, it Has the Iranian

hold in the caucasus that was more profoundly shaken. Once again,

(6)

Iran was faced with a. noMadic menace on both its northwestern and

northeastern frontiers. Unli~e the eRrlier threats, the nomads

l'fere now unit under the aegis of the 'I'lirk Qagans. In keeping

with an e.lready established pattern, Sasanid difficulties with

the TUrks, combined no·N 1vi th Byzantine pressure, permi tt the

Transcaucasian states some greater measure of independence.

Thus, ca.588, the F,.,astern Georgians {Iberia/K'art'li) reestabli-- -shed their autonomy. 11 A material reflection of the extent of

the Turk threat may be seen in the extensive building activity

of AnosirvAn (531-578) who carried out a large-scale reinforce-

The Turks also organized the various Sabir, Ogur and other

Turkic elements in the Western Eurasian steppes into a powerful

tribal confederation under the direct authority of the Yab~u

Qagan. The latter was a member of the royal Asina clan and the

ruler of the western part of the TUrk realm. In the course of the

seventh century, two major tribal unions emerged in this region

under the TUrk banner: the Khazars {Q'azar) and Bulgars. Although

the latter were not unknown to our Transcaucasian sources, it was

the former who figure most_ prominently in the contemporary accounts.

Given the understandable confusion in our sources of Khazar and

Turk (the two are virtually interchangeable at this time) and the

anachronistic attribution of the ethnonym Khazar to a number of

nomadic groupings in the early sixth century, it is not until the

mid-seventh century that we can trace the outlines of Khazar in-

volvement in Transcaucasian affairs with any degree of clarity.

Prior to this, they operated in close concert with their Tttrkic

overlords. Thus, the Khazars formed the bulk of the Tftrk forces

used by the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610-641) in his counter-

{?)

offensive against the Sasanids in Transcaucasia. Armenian and

Georgian sources provide important details on the campaigns of

the Jebu Xak'an/Jibgu ( Qagan), in particular his partici-

pation in the conquest of T'bilisi in 6zs.l3

The Tfirko-Khazar involvement played a decisive role in the

Byzantine victory. At the war's conclusion, however, Transcaucasia

once again found itself partioned into ttspheres of influence."

Armenia was placed within the Byzantine orbit while Iberia/

K'art'li enjoyed an uneasy "independence ... In Albania-Azarbayjan,

the situation was somewhat more complicated, The south was firmly

in the Sasanid orbit. The northern zone, controlled by the l1ihranid

dynasty (which was related to the Iranian royal house) was a vas­

sal state. The degree of its dependence, however, was in large

measure determined by the Khazars who frequently raided its north­

ern regions and periodically occupied various territories. The

!1ihranids, of course, attempted to exploit this situation with re­

sults that were occasionally devastating to their lands,l4

Iran and Byzantium had been exhausted by the long contest,

a factor which greatly facilitated the Arab conquest of Transcau­

casia in the mid-seventh century. The only effective opposition

to the new invaders was provided by the Turkic nomads under

Khazar leadership. Needless to say, their involvement here was

hardly altruistic. In the steppe, too, major changes had taken

place. The Tftrk Qaganate, long caught up in domestic strife,

had submitted by 659 to T'ang China. The TUrk hold in the western­

most part of the steppes, the Ponto-caspian zone, had actually

begun to fade in the decades preceding the final collapse. The

period 630-640, then, marks the full emergence of the Khazar and

(8)

Onogur/Onogundur-Bulgar conf.ederations, successor states of the

Ttlrk, ruled by rival clans of the ~vestern Ttlrk (On Oq). Although

faced i-'li th Are.b attacks on their North caucasian territories as

early as 64215, the Khazars, in a protracted struggle with the

Bulgar union, one which largely escaped the notice of our sources,

completely defeated their rivals by the 670's. Those Bulgars

that did not migrate west1-vard to Danubian Europe and the Ball{ans

were absorbed into the Khazar union.

As early as 661-662, the I\hazars, taking advantage of the

slackening of the Arab hold in Transcaucasia brought about by the

struggle between cAl! and Nucrtw!yah (65?-661), unleashed a series

of devastating raids into Albania. Juanser (d.680), the Albanian

ruler and his successor Varaz-Trdat (680-699) tried to maneuver

between the Khazars, Arabs and Byzantines through an elaborate

system of marital ties and timely submissions to one or another

authority. It did little to restrain the incursions of the Khazars

e.nd their subjects, the "North Cauce.sian Huns" and resulted in

placing the Hihranid realm further into the Arab camp. An interest­

ing episode of e, more pacific nature \-ras the dispatch, in 681, of

a religious mission headed by the Albanian bishop Is·ray~l to Alp'

Ilit'uer (=Alp 11-tever/il-teber, a Turkic title designating a

vassal ruler in the Old Tflrk system) of the ttN"orth caucasian :nuns."

The account of this cleric's sojourn amongst the nomads is pre­

served in l'·Tovs~s J)B.sx:uranc' i and provides us with many valuable

details regarding their shamanistic practices.16

Following the geo-political policy lines already established

by Beraclius, Byzantium encouraged Khazar attacks on the Arab­

domin_ated regions of Transcaucasia. Thus, the 680 's vii tnessed

(9)

destructive assaults on Armenia, Iberia/K'art'li and Albania.

·rhe early decades of the eighth century 1-'iere marked by a sharp in-

crease in the scale of Arabo-Khazar warfare for control of Trans­

caucasia.17 The use of '::.:'ranscaucasian forces by the Arabs in

these campaigns only compounded local difficulties. A dramatic

denouement to this phase of the Arabo-Khazar confrontation took

place in 737 when the UmayyB.d commander, i·1arw~n, in a surprise

drive on the Khazar capital on the Volga, Atil, captured the

Qagan. The latter was forced to embrace Islam, signal. ing there­

by his submis'sion to the Caliphate. This, however, was a transient

victory. The Umayyads, r;rho were soon overthrow·n and replaced by

the 'Abb~sids (750), did not have the resources to station a per­

manent army of occupation in Khazaria. The Qagan, discarding

Islam, resumed his independence. ~he old Sasanid limes at B~b al­

Abw~b (Darband-i Xazar~n) became the border between the two empires

and the northernmost extension of Arab power in this region.l8

The ¥~azars were now full partners in a kind of tri-dominium

that was established in Transcaucasia. Their full integration

into the state system here was reflected in a series of marital

ties with the Byzantine and Western Georgian royal houses as well

as with the local Arab governors. Striking evidence that Khazar

policy did not necessarily coincide with that of Constantinople

may be seen in several incidents involving the Georgian lands.

In 780, the Khazars refused to aid the Iberian/K'art'lian prince

Nerse against his Arab overlords. Some six years later, however,

the Qagan supported his kinsman (grandson) Leon, the erist'avi of

Ap'xazet'i (Western Georgia) in the latter's successful bid to

end Byzantine hegemony there.l9 The Khazars, thus, were instru-

(10)

mental in reestablishing Georgian independence. Not long there­

after, ~-799, the last major Khazar raid against the Arabs in

T.ranscaucasia took pla.ce. 20

The ninth century -vri tnessed a weake~ing of both the Caliphate

and ru1azaria brought about by centrifugal forces and a concommi­

tant resurgence of Byzantium. The Khazar decline had serious re-

percussions in 'I'ranscaucasia. The destabilization of the western

steppe zone which resulted from the end of the Pax Chazarica,

per~itted the entnlnce of new nomadic forces into the region. The

Byzantine response was a shift away from the Khazars and an attempt

(ultimately unsuccessful) to transform the Pecenegs into the

guardians of Ponte-caspian steppes.21 At the same time, the poli­

tical fragmentation of the caliphate, in which the large-scale

introduction of Central Asian Turkic gul~ms22 in the latter half

of the ninth century played a significant role, permitted a Byzan­

tine reconquista in the East. These same forces helped to bring

about the revival of the Armenian and Georgian monarchies, in the

course of the 880's, under the ubiquitous Bagratids. In 1008,

Bagrat III (975-1014) united Eastern and Western Georgia {K'art'li

and Ap'xazet'i) thereby paving the way for subsequent Georgian ex­

pansion throughout Transcaucasia. Concurrently with this, Azar­

bayjan was experiencing what Hinorsky has felicitously phrased

the "Iranian Intermezzo,n the brief emergence of local Iranian

dynasties in the wake of the Arab retreat and TUrkic advance.23

The greatest immediate danger to the restored monarchies, however,

was posed by Byz~)ium whose territorial acquisitions in the course

of the tenth and early eleventh centuries came to include Armenian

and Georgian lands. These Byzantine gains, culminating in the

annexation of the Armenian kingdoms of vaspurakan {1021) and Ani

(11)

(1045), proved illusory. Byzantine rule not only removed the

Armenian ''buffer" against steppe forces which had already made

themselves in the region as early as 1016, but did much to

dismantle the Armenian armed forces.24

Heanwhile, a complex concater..ation of events in the Central

Asian steppes galvanized a number of Turkic tribes into motion.

The Oguz confederation which he.d formed on the Syr Darya in the

last quarter of the eighth century in the aftermath of the col-

lapse of the Second Ttirk '~aganate in 741 Has unstable. In

the course of the latter half of the tenth century, some of its

elements v-:rere dra~vn into the web of Byzantine anti-Illie.z:otr coali-

tions (there is evidence that some of these Oguz had been rlliazar

vassals). They appear to have joined t<Tith the Pecenegs, the

Trans-caspian As and the Byzantines in an attack on Khazaria at

this time. Subsequently, they played a role in the destruction

of the Qaganate (965) in alliance with the Rus•. 25 n1e fall of

Khazaria once again opened the northern approaches to Transcauca­

sia (as well as Byzantium). While the Volga-oriented Oguz were

later pushed 't'lest~rard by the Cuman migration collapse of the

Kimek union (these buffetings also brought the Pe~enegs to the

Balkans), their eastern elements were increasil1gly caught up in

the troubled politics of Husl1m Central Asia. Here, Oguz group-

ings, including the followers of the house of Seljuq, were con-¥

verted to Islam e,nd drawn into the Gaznavid- Qaraxanid rivalry.

Subjected to a number of' reversals at the ha.nds of their more

powerful neighbors, some Seljuqid (fmd other Oguz) bands migrated ..

to Gaznavid-controlled Khur~s~n. In 1034, the main mass of the

Seljuqid-led Oguz fled thither as well. ed with starvation,

they took to brigandage. Their raids and depradations resulted

(12) • in a Gaznavid offensive a~ainst them.

v Knowing that they must

either prevail or face extinction, the Seljuqs scored a resound­

ing victory over the Gaznavids at Dandanaq~n in 1040. All of

IrE>n noV>T lay open before them. 26 'Ehe 'Ab~sicl Caliphs, seeking

a means to rid hemsel ves of the Si 't BO.yids, v-i ere induced to

legitimize this new force. Thus, the resultant Seljuqid Sultanate

was provided with a program that would make ~hem masters of a

good portion of the Islamic world.

The precise identity and political/tribal affiliations of

the TUrkic raiders who troubled Vaspurakan in 1016 and the r!ig

region in 1021 are st5.11 in dispute.27 In any event, their ac­

tivities induced Senek'arim, ruler of vaspurakan, to. transfer his

kingdom to Byzantium in exchange for estates in the region of

Sebasteia (Sivas). Bands clearly associated with the Seljuq dy-

nasty may be placed in Azarbayjan as early as 1029. Elements of

these Oguz subsequently raided Armenia (~.1038) and were soon

giving little peace to the Sadd~did rulers of Ganja/Gandzak.28

'rhe size and pace of the Turkic attacks increased as the

events of 1047-1048 show. Thes-e raids may be termed "Seljuq'' only

in so far as they were carried out by bands nominally under the

leadership of the Seljuq dynasty. In reality, the Seljuqs (whose

actual interests were focused on establishing their supremacy with-•

in the Islamic world) were often compelled by their "subjectstt to ·

undertake these ventures against the surrounding Christian states.

Ibn al-At~r gives us some insight into the internal dynamics of

the •'seljuq movement." In connection with the events of 1048 he

notes that the Seljuqid Ibr~h!m Yinal (Yinal/fnal is a high­

ranking Oguz title), finding himself inundated with newcomers

(13' - )

from Transoxiana and not having enough land to provide for them,

suggested that they raid 11 RUm."29 The wretched state of the Oguz

entering the Near Bast accounts for their particular rapacious-

:ness, frequently remarked upon by our sources. Thus, Aristakes

Le.sti vertc 'i notes that they "fell on the Christians like hungry

wolves."JO

The 'rurks launched several attacks into the Basean valley

and defeated a Byzantine-Armenian-Georgian army. The Georgian

magnate, Liparit, who had been exploiting the Byzantine presence

in Vaspurakan and Ani to resist the centralizing polici~s of Bagrat

IV (1027-1072), was captured and carried off to Iran. After a

Byzantine-Georgian counter-offensive had ~riven the Turks from the

Ganja region, Liparit was released (Byzantium continuing its inter­

ference in Georgian affairs paid his ransom) and resumed his di­

visive activities.31 Aristocratic opposition to the centralizing

monarchy, a perennial problem, was, as we shall see, ultimately

strengthened by the nomadic presence.

In 1054, the Sultan Togrul-Beg brought about the submission

of the Raww~did rulers of Southern Azabayjan and the Sadd~dids of

Dvin and Ganja. This 1-ras preparatory to an invasion of Christian

Transcaucasia. Marauding expeditions were directed thither in

1054-1055, resulting in widespread destruction, especially in the

Armenian territories. The pressure continued in 1055-1056 when

the Sadd~did Abu'l-AsvAr, now a vassal of the Sultan, attacked

Armenia, thereby contributing to the growing number of refugees.32

Famine and plague in the lands recently acquired by the Oguz added

to the ferocity of their assaults on their neighbors. Internicine

strife in Byzantium and Georgia lessened the resistence encountered

by the raiders. Indeed, in Georgia, they were even called in by

(14)

rebellious magnates.

Bagrat IV sought to relieve some of the ssure by calling

in the ossetins (with Nhose ruling house he had ensive ties)

to attack Sadd~did Arr~n in 1062 and 1065.33 These measures, how-

ever, were of little avail for a massive Seljuq force was now di­

rected at Transcaucasia. In 1064, Togrul-Beg's successor Alp

Arslan {1063-1072) entered the region. Although all of Transcau-

casia felt the impact of the T~rkmen, the principal target was

Ani, the onetime capital of Bagr0.ticl Armenia. It fell Gagik

of Kars abandoned his lands shortly thereafter. Bagrat IV, despite

his attempts to 'li'i~'trd off approaching danger with tal alli-

anoes and diplomacy, could not save Georgia from attack in 1067-

1068. His neighbor, the Kaxet'ian king Agsart'an, who was fearful

of Bagrat's efforts to "unite 11 his lands with those of K'art'li,

chose a different course. accepted Isls.m and submi ttecl to Alp

Arslan. The reso~ceful Bagrat, however, parried these blow·s, suo-"

oessfully defending himself agai~1st the Sadd~clic: Fadlun who often •

functioned as Alp Arslan•s agent in Georgia. Bagrat, thus, managed

to evade formal to~ens of submission (payment of the xar~j).J4

At the same time, the Seljuq hold in Sirv~n was established

when FEtri burz of the Ya.ztdt/Nazyadid dynasty ruling there submit-

ted to the Sultan in 460/l067-lC68 follov.;ing the appearance of

Oguz ra.iding parties in his realm. Fariburz then joined Alp

Arslan's campaign against Georgia which had often been a trouble­

some and aggressive neighbor.J5

One of the main thrusts of the Seljuq Transcaucasian campaign

thus far had been the securing of Azarbayj~n as a staging area . for future activities to be directed largely against opponents in

(15)

the T·:uslim '"IWrld. The campaign also provided a necessary safety-

valve for the restless energies of the Ttlrkmen. This latter fac-

tor was probably the main consideration behind the raids into

Anatolia. The Seljuqs ~vere really little terested in this area

this time, hoping only to maint.s,in Ft secure flank for their

operations in Syria. The Tftrkmen raids, however, forced a con-

frontation with the Byzant culminating in the dramatic clash

at Nanazkert (Hantzikert/Halazgirt) in 10?1. Continual probing

of Christian defences, both Byzantine and r~ranscaucasian had shmvn

how weak these actually were. As a consequence, raiding would

now give 1/lay to invasion and settlement. After the I·:anazkert de-

bacle, Byzantium withdrew from the region. Armenia, undermined

by Byzantine aggression and shattered by the Turkish raids, was

already experiencing the more permanent presence of the Turks with-

in its borders. Georgia, isolated and surrounded, was noY<l open

to what its contemporary historians termed the didi t'urk'oba (lit.

"the Great Turkdom", i.e. massive Turkish incursions and settle­

ment).36 Meanwhile, waves of refugees had left Armenia to join

their kinsmen in Byzantine held areas of Anatolia. These soon

coalesced into the Cilician Armenian kingdom.37

Giorgi II (1072-1089) succeeded his father Bagrat IV to the

Georgian throne at approximately the same time that Alp Arslan

1.;as assassinated. The latter's son and successor, Haliks~h (1072-

1092) proved to be one of the dynasty's strongest figures. Giorgi,

whose compassion and justice is extolled by the Georgian chronic­

lers (in contrast to his father)38, ~'las plagued by domestic strife

and despite valiant efforts could not effectively deal with the

Turkish threat. r·Ialiks~h unleashed a series of assaults against

both Georgia and the semi-independent Huslim rulers in Sirv~n and

(16)

Arr~n. The latter were brought under Seljuq control in 1074-1075

and Arr~n, in particular, 1-'las now thickly settled by Ttirkmen.

Giorgi was initially successful in fending off the Seljuq forces

led by Sautegin that were sent against him in the late 1070's.

In 1081, however, Ealiks~h began the didi t'urk'oba and Giorg~

was compelled to submit. The renewal of resistance on the part • • of the Sadd~dids and Sirv~ns~hs brought another large-scale Seljuq

invasion in 1086 and a consequent strengthening of Turkish control

throughout the region.J9 Transcaucasia had been.incorporated into

the Seljuq system.

Seljuq rule in Transcaucasia was not uniform in its duration

or impact. On the whole, in keeping with old TUrkic practices,

they were relatively tolerant in religious matters. The negative

aspects of their rule surfaced, rather, in the area of economic

development. The invasions alone were enough to seriously disrupt

the local economy. This was compounded by the Turkish settlements

and resultant transformation of agricultural lands into nomadic

pasturages. Paradoxically, this regression provided a temporary

hiatus in the enserfment of the local peasantry. The great es-

tates tended to be broken up As the Tfirkmen economy was little

interested in large-scale agriculture and lands were needed to be

alloted as ~t~( to the local begs and servitors of the dynasty,

Thus, a less dependent peasantry supported by a system of small

holdings was encouraged. This, of course, only benefitted those

peasants who had not fled and had survived the raids.40 The ~~ac

system41, unwittingly tended to fuel centrifugal forces which

greatly contributed to the Seljuq decline. These same forces of

regionalism-separatism undoubtedly diluted the impact of Seljuq

rule. Horeover, the Old Turkic practice of viewing the conquered

(17)

lands as the common property of the ruling dynasty and the conse­

quent division of this terri tory to provide for "mini-states''

Nithin the larger Nhole, permitted considerable local autonomy in

those regions (such as Georgia) ~vhere the native rulers, noit·T vas-

sals of the Sultan, survived. Indeed, this theory of goverru.7J.ent,

despite the brilliant statesmanship of Nizltm al-Eulk (the principal •

minister of Alp Arslan and I-·:alikstlh) who attempted to create a

centra.lized system, probably contributed to the survival of the

Christian caucasian polities. In practice, it also coincided

1vi th older Near Eastern traditions of superstratification in which

the ''king of kings" was no~r the Sult~ .. n-1 A~zam. --· ·-The rapidity of the Seljuq decline after the death of r:Ia­

liks~h prevented the Turks from achieving a stronger foothold in

regions like Georgia. This decline, in part the result of internal

dynastic struggles, was greatly exacerbated by the hostility of

the Ttlrkmen towards the dynasty. An echo of this hostility could

still be felt centuries later.42 Those regions, however, like

Azarbayjan (where large-scale politico-territorial units had ,not

existed} became tribal reservoirs and Nere dr~u'm into the very

heart of the post-Maliks~h system. In the process, they were per­

manently Turkicized.43

As Seljuq authority became fragmented and diffused, particu­

larly after the death of Berkyaruq (d.ll04), the opposite tendency

is observable in Georgia. Giorgi II was forced to relinquish the

actus.l governance of the country to his energetic son Davit'

• • b ( ) Agmasene eli ''the Builder" • The latter became co-king in 1089

and promptly embarked on an ambitious program of domestic reform

and foreign expansion. This policy laid the groundwork for a pan-

Transcaucasian state. Thus, by 1097, Georgia ceased paying the

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xar~j and had made significant progress in expelling the Turks

beyond its borders. 4L~ FollovJing his vic tory over the Sadd~did

Fadlt!n of Ganja at ?:rcuxi in 1104, Davit' established control over •

Heret'i and Kaxet'i. From 1110 until his death in 1125, he was

continuously at 'iJar ~-;i th his Turko-nuslim neighbors. By the end

of his reign, Georgia had been cleared of the Turks and its borders

greatly expanded. The lands of the former Armenian kingdoms I-T ere

incorporated into the Georgian state. The predominantly Euslim

realm of the Sirv~nsfths Has brought under Georgian jurisdiction45

and a sphere of influence I'Tas extended to the Osetins. On 12

August, 1121, Davit' defeated a coalition of Sel juq -It:uslim forces

at Didgori, thereby confirming Georgian supremacy in Transcauca­

sia.46 T'bilisi which had been in and out of Georgian hands, was

taken in 1122 and became the capital of the greatly enlarged

Georgian state,

These successes in foreign affairs were preceded and accom-

panied by domestic reforms aimed at strengthening central authority.

Here too, a Turkic component is much in evidence. Davit' seeking

to free the government from the stranglehold of the great aristo-

cratic clans, brought in lesser nobles and non-Georgian elements

(the displaced Armenian nobility figured prominently here) who

would be beholden to the crown. Taking advantage of his marital

ties to the Qlpcaq-Cumans of the Ponto-caspian steppes (his wife,

Guranduxt, was the daughter of At'rak'a (otrok of the Rus' sources),

the son of Saragan/Sarukan). Davit' invited some 40,000 Cumans to

settle in Georgia (many regions of which had been depopulated) and

serve in a special military force tied directly to the crown.47

This measure, 't'l'hen viel'l'ed in the context of the role Turkic groups

had played in the Islamic world, was not a radical innovation for

(19)

the region. Even in Rus' (with which Davit• ~pparently had some

contact). rurkic elements were brought into the border-guard .,.

system in the mid-twelfth century (£!. the Cernye Klobuki). Those

Qtpcaqs that ultimately chose to stay on permanently in Georgian

service (others returned with otrok to the steppes) were Chris-

tianized and Georgianized. They were joined by other Qtpcaqs in

the course of the twelfth century and some of t~mcame to occupy

leading positions in the state. Georgian sources distinguished

between the "new Qtpcaqs" (g .. !:~rc 'e.g_ni axalni) and "former '.::ttpca.qs"

(the na~ivc'aqaras).

Georgia had been trFtnsformed into the leading pm'ler in Trans-

caucasia. Davit''s successors would now be hard pressed to retain ...

their Armenian and Sirv~ian possessions. Indeed, the nature of

the relationship of the Georgian crown to these subject territories

was not only poorly defined (to some extent the Georgian kings

functioned as .. kings of kings") but vle.s continually in the process

of being re-defined by the changing fortunes of war. The surround­

ing Turko-Muslim amtrates (the Saltuqids, Artuqids, Mengttjikids,

the ~h-i Armens/S5kmenids of Axl~t/Xlat, Il-Degfizid/Il-Dengizids) 48 •

and their nominal Seljuq overlords (particularly the Iraqi Sul­

tanate) were not reconciled to the loss of these lands and bitter-

ly contested them. Thus, Demetre I (1125-1156) and Giorgi III

(1156-1184) were occupied almost totally with the question of con­

trol over Ani and e.djolning Armenian le,nds and !3irvan. 49 On the

whole, Demetre and Giorgi were relatively successful in maintaining

a Georgian presence in the areas acquired by Davit' Agmasenebeli.

Nonetheless, a qualitative change in Georgia•s relationship with

some of these regions may be noted. The policy of outright anne-

xation was largely abandoned in favor of what became an often

(20)

unstable vassal relationship. The weakening of the Georgian hold

was attributable, in part, to the resurgence of aristocratic op--

position to the crm·m which exploited strife :,o.ri thin the Bagratid

e. 7hus, Giorgi III had to a serious rebellion in

1177 ( ~vas greatly aided by the ~'1.

never resolved the problem of aristocratic opposition which was

bequeathed to his daughter and successor T'e.m:=tr {1184-1213). The

other factor militating against a more dynamic realization of

i's program. was the rise of

HE~s a Qtpcaq gulftm 1·1ho had begun his career in the service of the

Iraqi juq Sultans. In 1133, he was appointed atabe~ of Arrdn

and married into the Seljuq royal house. 1-ii thin several years,

he had control over most of Azarbayjan and become the leading

figure in the Sultanate.50 Despite the extraordinary turbulence

of Seljuq domestic politics, Il-Dengiz -.;..;as able to mount an ef-

fective opposition, in both Western Azarbayjan and Armenia to

Georgian encroachments, This policy·was continued by his son

Jah~n Pahlav~n {1172-1186). After his death, various centrifugal

elements (local am!rs) reasserted themselves. s brother Qtztl

Arslan (1186-1191) tried to combat these di ive forces as well

as the resurgent Iraqi Seljuqid, Togrul III, his nominal overlord.

Allied to the t'Abb!!sid Caliphate w-hich vlas also 1 a bid to

regai11 its secular authority, he was proclaimed Sultan, but was

murdered in 1191. The Iraq~ Sultanate did not long survive him.

In 1194, To~rul III, the last of his line perished fighting the

Xwdrazms~h Teki~ who had increasingly injected himself into the

ever-widening strife. Thereafter, the Il-Dengizids went into a

sharp and irreversible decline.51

Thus, one of the principal roadblocks to a continuation of

(21)

Georgian expansion had been removed. T'amar•s early years, how-

ever, were also filled with domestic strife. The ailing

snasalari and mandaturt'uxuc'esi, QubP..sstr, her father's loya.l

servitor, was purged by anti-crown forces.

Qutlu Arsl9,n, the mecurclet 'uxuc f esi I With the support of the aris-

tocratic opposition, put forward a proposal to create a kind of

parliament which would have greatly limited the power of the crown.52

The plan was dropped but concessions to the magnates were made.

T'ae latter so made their influence felt in the question of her

marriage. Against her will, 'J:' aruar was married to the Rus' prince

Giorgi (=Jurij, son of Andrej Bogoljubskij ) • 'l'he marriage soon

collapsed and T'amar took another husband, the Osetin prince Davit'

Sosla.n (of Bagratid origin) in 1189. Giorgi "the Russian" now be­

came the rallying point for a revolt (1191) and subsequently at­

tempted to use the I1-Dengizids to regain the throne. Although

the insurrections failed, they were further warning signals of

what proved to be fatal, centrifugal forces.

Foreign expansion provided a positive outlet for the energies

of the restless Georgian nobles and much of T'amar's activity {as

well as that of the darbazi, "council of state" that governed with

her) focused on the acquisition of neighboring lands. The series

of impressive victories won by Georgian arms underscored Georgia's

paramountcy in the region. Thus, the defeat of the Il-Dengizid

"' Abu Bakr at Samxor in 1195 and subsequent taking of Ganja gave con-

vincing evidence of Georgia's supremacy in Sirv~n and brought some

am!rs of Ar~n and TUrkmen begs into the Georgian orbit.54 Atten-

tion now shifted to the Armenian lands. The Armeno-Kurdish gene-

rals in Georgian service, the Hxargrdzeli brothers, took Ani (1199) . which was then given to them as a fief {1201)?5 Dvin was taken in

(22)

120.3. These victories led to a confrontation with the Seljuqid

Sultan of Rdm, Rukn ad-D!n, at Basean (in either 1203 or 1204)

which ended in a Georgian victory. Georgia now began a protracted

struggle (1204-1209) to gain control of the southern Armenia.n

lands under the domination of the SBkmenid Ax:l~t-s~hs. Although -· --ultimately unsuccessful in achieving all its goals, some new ter­

ritories (such as Kars, taken in 1206) came into Georgian hands.

This was followed by a massacre of the inhabitants of Ardebil (in

retaliation for their attack on Ani) ·which led, in turn, to a

spectacular raid into Azarbayjan and Iran proper (1210).56 ',L1huS,

by the end of T'amar*s reign, the Georgian state extended from

Osetia and Dagistan to Armenia. Sirv~n and a series of lesser

Turkish statelets ringing her borders were vassals, while the By­

zantine-Georgian Empire of Trebizond was a client-state.

This "golden age" quickly came to an end. Giorgi IV Lasa (121.3-

1222) managed to suppress the attempts by T'amar's newly acquired

vassals to regain their independence. He was unable to deal, how­

ever, with a new steppe fore e, the 1-1ongols, who appeared here in

the winter of 1220-1221. Il-Dengizid Azarbayjan, greatly weakened

by internal strife and Xwarazmian conquests, initially bought off

the newcomers while attempting to join forces with the Georgians.

rrhe I<:ongol force led by Jebe and snbe' etay' 1-'fhich he.d come westward

in pursuit of the Xw~razr.as~h Huha!fu"Uad and to gather intelligence, •

quickly moved against Lasa.. Various regions of ~rranscaucasia were

devastated in a series of lightning fl.ttacks, a preview of future

events. The invaders then crossed the Caucasus into the Qtpcaq

steppes. 57

Recovery was prevented by the visitations of still other steppe

forces set in motion by the !-Tongol whirlwind. In 1222-122.3, Qtpcaq

(23)

refugees caused disturbances in Azarbayjan. The was soon followed

by the appearance of ,ral~l ad-Dtn, heir to the nm·.r destroyed X"lv~­

razms~h state, in 1225.58 A brilliant general but myopic statesman,

,Jalftl ad-D!n, rather than c e an anti-Uongol coalition, s out

conquer and plun(3,_"-~r the on. Georgia, novi ruled by

(1223-1245), Lasa's sister, s to welcome the confrontation.59

The Xi'l'~razrnians destroyed the Il-Dengizids and repeatedly re.vaged

Georgia. Halted by a coalition led by the Seljuqs of Rnm, Jal~l

acl-D!n died (1231) in Ku11 di

Hongols. The Xv.r~razmian nint

consequences, precluding the

ther hs.d had flecl ing

udeu 1.;J'as entirely negative in its

ssibility of effective resi e

to the Jiongols in lands already thoroughly scourged by war.

In the following decade ( 1231-1240), the r·~ongols, spreading

everyNhere "like clouds of locusts," took control of Transcaucasia.

"'Ehe entire country," Kira.kos Gandzakec 'i notes, n~ms filled with

the corpses of the dead and there were no people to bury them."6o

'Vli.th their defeat of the Seljuqs of Rtlm at K8se Dag in 124J, the

!·iongols became masters of much of Ana tolia as well. 1,Ji thin the

Georgian realm, the Armeno-Georgian military aristocracy fled to

their castles or the impenetrable mountains and forests and soon

submitted. Queen Rusudan found sanctuary in the difficult terrain

of t.Jestern Georgia. From here she sought to take advantage of in­

ternal r-:ongol eli visions, preferring to offer her submission to the

more distant Batu. The I•Tongols, ho';;rever, were better able to ex-

ploit Georgian domestic disputes by playing off against one another

Ulu D9.vit' (Lasa's illegitimate son) and Rusudan's son Davit' Narin.

Current scholarly opinion discerns two tendencies that were

operative during the period 1·1ongol domination. One, termed the

"Old Hongol" or "Nomadic" tradition, vie't'led the conquered lands as

(24)

occupied territory to be mercilessly and quickly exploited. This

·Nas a policy of "instant gratification" 1r1hich often led to sizable

pockets of anarchy. The other tendency, represented in the Hear

East by the Iranian bureaucracy (and in China by the Uygur and Qitan

traditions of statecraft) sought to create a centralized monarchy

which would regulate the "shearing of the flock". This not only

curbed centrifugal elements within the nomadic tribal confederation,

but prevented the rapid exhaustion of the resources.of a region and

mad~possible a long and leisurely harvesting of the local riches.

The Nongol ideology, about which our local sources were well­

informea,62 was premised on the belief that it was God's 1·¥ill that ¥ •

the Cinggisids rule the earth. On a more concrete level, Cinggisid

domination was best realized by encouraging regional and separatist

forces in the conquered kingdoms. This policy was pursued with con-

siderable success in Rus' and Transcaucasia. Basic political and

social structures were left intact and the local church, often the

only surviving truly national institution, was subtly coopted. The

insecurity of the subject rulers and their often semi-independent

vassals was heightened by the requirement to journey to the distant

supreme Qagan to personally receive the yarltq confirming their sta­

tus and by sudden and inexplicable shifts of favor. Neanitrhile, re-

gardless of the mode, the conquered lands were systems.tically de-

spoiled by !'!ongol tax-collectors and their henchmen who were often

recruited from the traditional enemies of the land in which reve-

nue was being collected.

The Eongols and the sizable Turkic elements they brought in

with them from Inner and Central Asia were numerically inferior to

the local Georgian and Armenian forces. Hence, the 1·:ongols sought

to incorporate into their armies the large number of TUrkic nomads

(25)

and semi-nomads concentrated in Azarbayjan and Anatolia, whose num­

bers had been SitJ"elled by the arrival of Oguz and other TUrkic groups

from Central Asia. This Nas in keeping with traditional techniques

of nomadic state-building. It was some11J"hat less successful here

than in the Qtpcaq or Transoxanian steppes as Ttirkmen resistence,

flight to the frontiers and general lawlessness attest. In part,

this was undoubtedly the result of the breakdown of the tribes them­

selves, reflected in a diffused pattern of settlement stretching from

Xur~s~n to the Byzantine borders, to which Sel juq rule had contr1butec

The Il-xanid ("Xan of a subject polity") realm established by

7P1e~H lnft 12~6) in t'n .d-t~ 6u. v::c er ::; .. e nenr S8.st and Trnnsct:wcHsia did little

to change this pattern. Indeed, local centrifugation was further

encouraged. 6J ~vhile rapacious tax~collectors bore off the material

wealth of the region, Armenian and Georgian forces were forced to

participate in the relentless drive to acquire new territories and

later in the struggle of the Ilxanids against the Golden Horde •

In keeping with steppe tradition64, vassals newly joined to the

tribal confederation, were placed in the front ranks to absorb the

heaviest losses in combat. Thus, ?·Tongol rule, while allmring for

considerable autonomy {which furthered its policy of "divide and

conquer") took a great toll in lives and treasury.

J:.~ongol interventions in Georgian dynastic politics further

splintered the already ~v-eal~ened monarchy~ Some of the princely

• domains, such as Same 'xe under the Jaqeli family, ·Here evincing

ominous signs of virtual secession by the late thirteenth century.

C:Jntinuin3 st1··L~,:;c;les at the Il-xanid court also ha.d negative rever-

berations in Georgia and Armenia. \H th the mass conversion of the

;.:ongols to Islam (their Turkic subjects were !·:uslims of long-stand-

• ing) during the reign of Gazgn (1295-1.304), the last barriers to

(26)

religious persecution fell. Disturbances in Georgia followed (1297).

Serious persecutions too~ place during the reign of Bljeyttl (d. 65

1317) but appear to have slackened under his successor Abu sat!d

(1317-1335), the last Il-xanid ruler of any note. It is unclear

>Jhethe:r the Georgian king, Giorgi V 3rcqi:nvsle, "the 1.-lesplenclent"

{1314-1346), who worked closely with the am!r Goban, a leading fi-

gure under Arm SA. ,:-~d, actually succeeded in reuniting the GeorgiA-n ~I'

real~.oo In any event, his and the neighboring lands could not es-

cape the anarchy that accompanied the Il-Xanld collapse Hfter the

• In the morass of the Cobanid-.Jalayirid struggle

for control of the Il-xnnid legacy, a contest which vas further exa-

cerbated by the brief invasion of Azarbay·jan by .Janibeg of the Gold­

en Horcle (in 1357-58), the ruination of the region and further dis-

integration of authority continued. The Armenian magnate families

(~ the Zak'arids/Hxargrdzelis), who had kept ali·ve the idea of

Armenian statehood within the Georgian pan-Transcaucasian monarchy,

now fade from the scene. They were reple.ced by Turkish begs. 67

The brief period of Jalayirid ascendancy under Sultan Uways

(1356-1374), undistinguished by any growth in stability, soon gave

way to the wholesale slaughters Hhich attended Timur's invasions

(1386-87, 1394-96, 1399-1403).68 These incursions were immediately

followed by those of the TUrkmen tribal confederations, the Qara

Qoyunlu and Aq qoyunlu.69 The Georgian kingdom experienced still

further fragmentation, leading to the development of the 1'avadni

or independent princes as the most important element in the land.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had begun to encroach on the Abxaz coast. Transcaucasia was soon transformed

into the battleground of two new Turkic states: the Sunn1 Ottomans

.... and the Si~r 9afavids. The region was alternately or simultaneously

(27)

dominated by one or the other, with the Ottomans predominant in

the western zone and the Safavids in the east. The C8.ucasus as . a whole became an important. source for Ottoman and especially

Safavid military slaves. Indeed, the Safavid Qullaragast was • usually a Georgian. 70 All of Christian Transcaucasia riJas now sub­

jected to profound Turkic cultural and linguistic influences.71

In keeping with Turkic and Islamic traditions, the Christian states

retained considerable autonomy. 'This was, perhaps, more true of

Safavid ·rule which was less stable and not as centralized • •

* * * The history of Turko-Transcaucasian relations may be divided

into three broad ods. The first {nunno-Khaza.r se) , charac-

terized by destructive raids and brief occupations of certain re-

gions, most seriously affected the·weakest of the three Transcauca-

sian polities: Albania. It undoubtedly contributed to the more

complete integration of this region into the Caliphate. The second

(Seljuq phase) saw the complete absorption of Azarbayjan, ~ its

Turkicization. The Seljuq presence also crushed any hope for a re-

vival of Armenian statehood, the loss of which, however, should be

ascribed to Byzantine policies. The surviving state, Georgia, in

responding to the shock underwent a remarkable recovery. For a

brief period it created a pan-Transcaucasian monarchy, dominating

the entire region. The third (Mongol phase) proved fatal to it as

well. Hongol rule, by encouraging centrifugation on the part or the

great aristocratic houses, a factor which had always been barely

controlled by central authority in Armenia and Georgia, fatally un­

dermined national unity in Georgia and ultimately destroyed those

same magnate clans in Armenia.7Z The Ottoman-Safavid period, thus, •

although extremely significant in terms of cultural ~nfluences,

constitutes, in effect, a protracted post-script to the history of

the 4§cline and fe.ll of the Transce,ucasian Christian polities.

{28)

NOTES

1. A.P. Novosel'cev, V.T. Pasuto, L.V. Cerepnin, Puti razviti a feodalizma (Zakavkaz'e, Srednjaja Azi ·a, :aus', Pribaltika

Noskva, 1972 , pp. O, 12 -5. A useful historiographical es­say on this and related themes is that of R.A. Gusejnov, "Istoriografija istorii Za.kavkaz'ja XI-XII vv.n Tjurkologiceskij Sbornik {1976), pp.26-5J.

2. ·On the Hunnic migrations, ~ K. Czegledy, A nomad nepE9k vandorlasa napkelett8l napnlugatig (Budapest, 1969), pp.25-9· For the Huns in Europe, see o. Maenchen-Helfen, The World of the Huns (Berkeley, 197Jr;-on the controversial auestion of the ·rurkic speech of the European Huns, see Gy. Nemeth, nA hunok nyelve,. in Attila es Hunjai, ed. Gy. N~meth (Budapest, 1940), pp.217-26 and Maenchen-Helfen, Huns, pp.J76-44J. Ja. A. Fedorov and G.S. Fedorov, Rannie TJurki:n.a:-severnom Kavkaze (Hoskva, 1978), pp.25-27,57 have attempted to prove that Turkic peoples were present here before J5o A.D.

J. P. Vaczy, "A hunok Eur6paban 11 in Attila. es RunJa1, ed. Nemeth, p.64; Novs~s Das:x:uranc'i, Patmut'iwn AXuanic' : ·rhe History

4.

of the caucasian Albanians by I"'ovs~s Dasxuran<;i, trans. C. Dowsett (oxford, 1961), pp.63-64. Contra Dowsett (p.6Jn.4) Honagur is probably not a reference to the Onogurs who did not appear here until the middle of the fifth century.

Maenchen-Helfen, Runs, pp.5lff.; J.B. Bury, History Sf the Later Roman Empire-(LOndon, 1923, repr. : New=-=y~o-rTk~,~l~9~5~8~)-, II, p.6r N. v. Pigulevskaja, Sirijskie isto~niki po istorii narodov SSSR (Moskva-Leningrad, 1941), p.56.

5. Etise, Vasn Vardanay ev Hayoc' Paterazmin : Egi~e, 0 vardane i vojne armjanskoj, trans. I.A. Orbeli (Erevan, 1971), pp.27-JI,58-80, 92, 107, 116-18, 127-8, 169-170.

6.

7. Sabir settlements : : Hovs~s Xorenac • i : Geographie de I1ofse de Corene, ed. trans. A. Soukry (Venise, 1881), p.27; Ibn Xur­dadbih, Kittlb al-f.Tas41ik wa'l-Mam~lik, ed. H.J. de Goeje (Lei­den, 1889), p.124; Ibn al-Faq!h, Kit~b al-Buld~n, ed, ~.J. de Goeje (Leiden,l885), p.297; Ibn Fa~l§n, Ris~lat ibn Fadl~n, ed. s. ad-Dah~n (Damascus, 1959), p.140, These 3abirs also"gave Their name to a grouping within the Proto-Hungarian tribal union which later settled in Transcaucasia. These were the t: ...:p .. ~c-tH ;.d-*f'.t.. >-•" noted in constantine Porphyrogeni tus, De Administrando Imperio, ed. Gy. Moravcsik, trans. R. Jenkins, {Washington, D.c., 1967),p.170 and in Arab sources (of. al­I~ta:x:rt, Kitltb Has411k al-Mam~lik, ed. r~r.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 18?0),pp.l9l-2; al-Ba!IO:uri, Futl!b al-Buldl!n, ed. :a.H. Radw~n (Cairo, 1959), p.206) as ·Siy~warot, Mwai'd!. In Armenian they were called Sevordik' = Hung. szav~rd. In the ninth and tenth centuries they were noted for briga.nuage along the Ganja-T'bilisi route, ~ ?~~meth, h1·1K, pp,J17-19 and the Ta'rfx al-B~b : v.F. l<!inorsky, Studies in Caucasian History (London, 1953), Arab.

(29)

text, p.?, Eng. trans. p.lJ, commentary pp.26n.?,41.

_8. Pigulevskaja, Siri skie istocniki, .166-167; H.I. Arta.monov, Istorija Xazar Leningra , 19 2 , pp.92-4; Gy, !·:ora:vcsik, "Byzantine Christianity and the Magyars in the Period of Their Higration" The American Slavic and Fast European Review, s (1946), p.Js.

9. on the ,Juan-Juan-Avar connection, see czegl~dy, Nomad ~neuek, chaps.IV-VI where all the availabre-data is gathered and A. Kollautz, E. Miyakawa, Geschichte und Kultur eines vBlker­wanderungszeit11chen Nomadenvo1kes {Klagenfurt, 1970), I, pp.lJ4ff.

10.

11.

12.

lJ.

!vienander in Dexi 1, Eunapii, Petri Patricii Prisci, Nalchi, I•1enandri historiarum quae supersunt, ed, er, Niebuhr, pp. 294,JOOff. JBOff.; E. Chavannes, Doclli~ents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux (St. P~tersbourg, 1900, repr. Paris, 1941), p.2JJ.

C. Toumanoff, Studies in Christian Caucasian History (George­town, 1963), pp,J82-4.

_f4 ther Efforts to strengthen this system had begun under his Kavad. Al-Bal~durf, ed. Ra~w~n, pp.198-9; al-YatqQbf, Ta'rfx, ed, 1·1. Th. Houtsma (Leiden, 1883), I, pp.20J-4; al-l·ras 1lidf, Murllj ag-~hab wa Mat~din al-Jawhar. ed. c. Pellet (Beirut,l966-!970), I, pp.205-7; see also R.A. Gusejnov, "O tjurkax IV-VIIvv .. v zone Kavkazsk~Albanii" Voprosy istorii Kavkazskoj A1bani1, ed. I. Aliev (Baku, 1962), pp.181-8.

W. Barthold, P.B. Golden, "Khazar" Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, 1960-),IV, pp.l172=j; P.B. Golden, Khazar studies (Budapest, 1980), I, pp.J9-42, 49-50, 187-190; Dasxuranc'I, trans. Dowsett1 pp.8J,86, 87, 100,106; K'art'lis C'xovreba, ed. s. Qauxc'isvili (T'bilisi, 1955,1959}, I, pp.22J,225; K. czegledy, nn:erakleios tt5r8k szOvetsegesei" !•Ta!3y:ar Nyel v, XLIX (1953), pp.J19-20.

14. R. Grcusset, Histoire de l'Armenie (Paris, 1947, repr. 1973), p.276; Z.I1. Bunijatov, AzerbaJd~an v VII-IX vv. (Baku, 1965), pp.5J-60.

15. A~-·rabar!, Ta 'rfx a~=.~bart, ed. Hui;tammad Abu '1-FacJ.l Ib~hfm (cairo, 1962-1967), IV, p. 158.

16. Dasxuranc'i, trans. Dowsett, pp.l53-171; Golden, Khazar Studies, I, pp.90-9J.

17. see D.M. Dunlop, The History of the Jewish Khazars (Princeton, ~4), chaps. III-IV for a detailed analysis of the course of this war.

18. Dunlop, Khazars, pp.81-4; Artamonov, Ist. Xazar, pp.ZlB-222; Bunijatov, Azerbajdzan, pp.l06-112.

v .. K'art'. C'xov., I, p.251; I. Javaxisvili, K'art'veli eris is-toria (T'bilisi, l9b5-1966), II, pp.82,92-3. Tfie conversion of the Khazar ruling house to Judaism in the late eighth cen-

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tury (~ al-r1as 1rld!, Hurrlj, ed. Pellat, I, p.212) may also be viewed as a sign of Khazar independence of both BagdAd and Constantinople.

20. A~-t-abar!, ed. IbrAhim, VIII, pp.269-70

21. P.B. Golden, "The l·!igrationl'5 of the Oguz" Archivum otto­manicum,IV (1972), pp.75-7·

22. Z.V. Togan, Umum! TUrk tarihine giris, 2nd ed. {Istanbul, 1970), pp.l74-9; I1.A. Sfia'6an, .Islamic Histotay. A New Interpretation A.D. 750-1055 (A.H. 132-~48)(camEridge, 1976), pp.6)-6. An im­portant Turkfc general { of Khazar origin ) who figured promi­nently in Transcaucasian affairs was Buga the Turk. He suppres­sed the rebellious Muslim am!r of Tiflis in 833 but was later recalled when the Caliph began to suspect him of subversive contacts with his Khazar kinsmen (V.F. Hinorsky, 'I'he ;:Ustor~ of Sharv~n and Darband, cambridge, 1958, Arab text p.J, trans. p.25; K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.256-7; A.N. Ter-Gevondjan, Ar-menija i arabskij xalifat ; Erevan,1977, pp.143-7). --

23. Hinorsky, studies, pp.llOff. ·On events in Armenia and Georgia, see Ter-Gevonajan, Armenija i arabskij xalifat, pp.149-l50, 237ff.; Toumanoff, Studies, p.20J.

24. Aristakes Lastivertc'i, Patmut 1 iwn : Povestvovanie vardapeta Aristakesa. Last~vertci, trans. K.N. Juzbasjan O.'foskva, 1968) pp. 64-5,79-8 5; C. Toumanoff, "Armenia and Georgia'' cambridge Hedieval History, IV, ed. J.I1. Hussey (cambridge, 1956) ,pt. 1, p.620; Grousset, Histoire de l'Armenie, PP•551ff.

25. Golden, 11 Migrat1ons of the Oguz" AO, IV {1972), pp.77-80.

26.

28.

The literature on the origins of the Seljuqs is too extensive to be cited here. A good introduction to the problem may be found in S.G. Agad~anov, Ocerki istorii 0 uzov i Turkmen Srednej Azii IX-XIII vv. (Asxabad, 9 9 , esp. chap. IV;-r;.E. Boswor h, The Ghaznavids {Edinburgh, 1963), chap. IX; Cl. cahen, "Le i.Jalik-namah et l'histoire des origines Se1jukides" Oriens, 2 (1949) and in his Pre-ottoman Turkey, trans. J • .rones-~..Tilliams (New York, 1968),pp.l9ff.

I. Kafesog1u argues for their Se1juq origins in his nDogu Ana­dolu'da ilk se19uklu aktnt (1015-1021) ve tarih! ehemmiyeti" Fuad Kaprttln Armagant, ed. o. Turan, H. Eren et al. (Istanbul, 195J), pn.259-274. Opposed to this are S.G. Agadzanov and K. N. Juzba~jan, "K istorii tjurkskix nabegov na Armeniju v XI v.u Palestinskij Sbornik, 13 (76) {1965), pp.147-157· See also discussion in N.N. Senge11a, Se1c'ukeb1 da 8ak'art'Ve1o XI saukunesi (T'bilisi, 1968), pp.l65ff.

Ibn al-Attr, Al-K~m11 f!'t-T.a'rtx, ed. c.J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851-1876, the Beirut, 1965-1966 reprint used here has a dif­ferent pagination), IX, pp.J81-J; F. Sttmer, Oguzlar (Ankara, 1967), pp.81-2; T<!inorsky, Studies, Arab text, p.l2, trans. p.l8.

29. Ibn a1-At!r, ed. Tornberg, IX, p.S46.

30. Aristakes J~stivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan, p.87. Muslim sources

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speak ;n similar terms, cf. al-Eund~r!'s slighly abridged ver­sion Ol ~Imad ad-D!n al-I~fah4ni, Taw~r!x Al saljng, Kit~b Zubdat an-Nu~rat vm Nuxbat al- ~Usrat (Recueil de Textes Relatifs a l'Histoire des Selqjoucides, ed. H.TH. Routsma, Leiden, 1889), II, pp.9-l0.

31. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.J02-4; Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan,.pp.86-88, 94-5; Minorsky, Studies, pp.57, 60-2J Hatt'~os Urhayec'i, Patmut'iwn : Urfalt Hateos Vekayinamesi (952,..1136) ·ve Pap~z· Grf br·•tm-_zeyli {1136-1162), Turk. trans. H. Andreasyan Ankara, 19 2 , pp. 7-90. Liparit, upon his re­turn, took part in a rebellion against Bagrat, was captured, tonsured and subsequently sent off to Byzantium (I('art'. C'xov •• I, p;p.304-5). The SEijuq house was also troubled by discontented magnates. Ibr~htm Yinal revolted in 1050. Agad~anov (Ocerki, pp.216-7) has argued that the result of these revolts 1vas the expansion of the ~~a' system as a means of keeping the TUrk­men aristocracy weil=ciisposed toi'rards the dynasty.

32. Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzba~jan, pp.97-106; Hatt'eos Urhayec'i, trnns. Andreasyan, pp.l00-3; Ibn al-.4.-~tr, ed. Torn­berg, IX, p.599; I·olinorsky, Studies, p._54.

33. Hinorsky, studies, Arab text, pp.l4-15, trans. 20-1 and pp.74-5.

34. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.306-14; Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan, pp.l28-9; Matt'~os Urhayec'i, trans. ~dreasyan, pp.118ff.; al-Husaint, Axb~r ad-Dawlat as-Salj~giyyah, ed. M. Iqbal (Lahore, "1933), pp.39-40, 4J-6; Hinorsky, Studies, Arab text, pp.l5-16,trans.21,23 and pp. 58, 64-7; M.H. Yinan9, Tttrkiye tarihi Selcuklular devri, I, Anadolu'nun fethi {Is­tanbul, 1944), pp.~?-9.

35. )1inorsky, Sharvan and Darband, Arab text, P'J.l2-l4, trans • .35-8 al-~usaini, Axbar, p.44.

'w'

36 Kt t' ('t I )20 1 n 1" '""'1"' 1 b" J·Q1.c>f . ar . v xov., , p. , , see a so 0en~e la, 0e c u.x:e l, pp •.. ~.L •

. 37. See G.G. Mikaeljan, Istori.ia kilikijskogo armjanskogo gosudarstva

{Erevan, 1952). Lesser Armenian statelets in inaccessible re­gions continued to exist as semi-independent or independent units, but with no real political effectiveness, see R. Bedrosian, The Turco-Mon~ol Invasions and the Lords of Armenia in th~-14~ Centuries (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1979), pp.68-~. A smaller "Armenia in exile" was established in the Crimea, probably in connection with the Byzantine conquests and strengthened by new arri~als in the Seljuq period. This .. colony later adopted the ~ipcaq Turkic language of the Cumans~nd has left behind a rich literature in Armeno-Cuman from the areas of their further diaspora in the Ukraine and Poland, cf. E. Schutz, •· Armeno-kiptschakisch und die Krim" Hun:.:;aro-Turcica. Studies in Honour of Julius Nemeth, ed. Gy. Kaldy-Nagy (Buda­pest, 1976), pp.l85-205; J. Deny, L'Armeno-Coman et les Les "Ephemerides" de Kamieniec, 1604-1613 (Wiesbaden, 1957J;T.I. -Grunin, Dokumenty na poloveckom ,jazyke XVI v. (Moskva, 1967); E. Try jarski, ••La li tterature armeno-kiptchak" Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta, II (Wiesbaden, 1964) and Ja. Daskevy6,

;y~h~Jn£3R~~~~~c~~~i~~~K~1~p~ai!rg~~1 H*~ft~f196~~k~~~2:n~~~~~:73.

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JS. K'art'. C'xov., I, p.Jl5 which so (p.Jl6) terms I-!a-liks~h ..... ' f 11 ,..,, ; t . " ' i vne enemy o a vnr~s 1ans. J"\rmen Hn sources, hm.J"ever, have a positive viel'l of Naliks~h (of. :t·:att'eos Urhayec'i, trans. Andreasyan, p.l46; Kirakos,Gsndzakec'i, Patmut'iwn ~ayoc' : Ki s Gandzakeci, Istorija Armenii, trans. L.A. :.canlarjan, skva, 1976, p.89}. '

J9. Hinorsky, Sharv~n and Dn.rband, Arab text, pp.l6, 40, commentary pp.54-5; Kafesoglu, r~elikyah, pp. C'xov. I,pp.Jl?ff. --

, trEms. pp. -7; K'art'.

40. L.o. Babajan, Social'no-~konomiceskaja i politiceskaja is­tori a·Armenii v XIII-XIV vekax (Voskva, 1969),p.J9; ~A. Fies:x:iR, Didgors aJa bitva Tbilisi, 1972), pp.5J-5.

'-n. Ags.dzanov, Ocerki, pp.220-2; , Turkey, pp.l80-l,2JR-44; A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the juq Empire" The Cambridge History of Iran, V, ed. ,T.A. Boyle (Cambridge, l9b8), esp. pp.2Jl-9.

J ' M.P •. '1 :!: j!" /4 ~ • • r1 ~· • I . , • ~· i d ~2. i"'.L. l"ibU -uaZ.J. 1 .:~aJHra-yl .J.art"~.K:lrr:a; B.onoslo'ITnR.J:=l <:UrKmen, eq trans. A.H. Kononov (Eoskvs.-Leningrad, 1958), Turkic text,p.64: "The Seljuqs said 'we are Tt1rkmen, we are brothers,"' but no benefit came to the polity {il) or people. Before becoming ffid-i s~hs, they said 'we are6f the ~~tntq Ttlrkmen,' but after becoming P~d-i s.t~hs they said ' a son of Afr~s~yAb fled from Kayxusraw to the Tt1rkmen clan of the Qtntq and he grev.r up and remained (with them). We nre his sons, from the lineage of Afr~styab ••• "

4J. R.A. Gusejnov, "Irakskie sel'd~ukidy, Il'-degizidy i Zakav­kaz'en falestinskij Sbornik, 21 (1970), pp.l86-7.

44. Sengelia, Selc'ukebi, pp.J40ff.; ]':Iesxia, Didgorskaja bitva, pp.26-7,56; K'art'. C'xov., I, p. 326 : "He neither paid the xaraj to the Sultan nor could the Turks winter in l{' art' li ... A good account of Davit' 's activities r:tay be found in I-'T.D. Lord­kipanidze, Istorija Gruzii XI-nacala XIII veka (Tbilisi, 1974), pp.88-126. His political program is analyzed in v. Abasmadze, Harkvevebi Sak'art'velos politikur modzgvrebat'a istoriidan (T'bilisi, 1969), chap. III.

K'art'. c'xov., I, pp.344-5. On the thorny question of the nature of ~irvanian-Georgian relations, see :'T. Asat'iani, nsa,k'art'velo­Sirvanis poli tikuri urt' iert 'oba :{II sau1mnesi If XII saukunis Sak'art'velos istoriis sakit'xebi, ed. S.A. I-!esxia (T 1bilisi, 1968), pp.7-51¥ and z.r,.r. Bunijatov, Gosudarstvo atabekov Azerbaj­dzana (Baku, 1978), chap. IV.

46. Hesxia, Didgorskaja. bitva, pp.69-85; V.F. Minorsky, ncaucasica in the History of H.ayy§fltriq~n·• Bulletin of the School of Orien­tal and African Studies, XIII (1949), pp.27-J5.

K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.J35-7. The horde of At'rak'a/Otrok was part of the confederation known in Rus' as the Polovci dikii, see P.B. Golden, uThe 'Polovc1 Dik1i'" Eucharister1on {Omeljan Prltsak Festschrift},ed. I. ~evcenko (1n press).

48. on the eastern Anatolian belliks, ~ o. Turan, Do5u Anadolu

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Ttlrk devletleri tarihi (Istanbul, 1973). The Il-Dengizids are exhaustively treated in Bunijatov's Gos. atabekov.

49. The complexities of the struggle for Ani have been meticulously analyzed by !•:inorsky, Studies, esp. pp.B0-106. Although the struggle was occasionally marked by savagery (e.g. the bey of Arzan, Qurtt b. Togan Arslan, is reputed to have-built a-IDinaret of Georgian skulls, see ruran, Doiu Anadolu, p.8), 11uslim rule, such as that of the ~dadids in ni, was often characterized by significant cultural and material advances, see I.A. Orbeli, Gorodisce Ani e e5o raskopki in his Izbrannye-frudy (F.revan,l96J) p.7. On Sirvan, see the studies of Asat'iani and Bunijatov, n.45.

50. H. Aly~r!, Azerbaycan atabe leri Il-deniz ogullarl (1146-1225) (Istanbul, 19 , pp.l2-1Jr Bunijatov, Gos. atabekov, pp.27ff.; Gusejnov, "Ira.kskie sel 'dzukidy ••• " PSb. ,21 (1970), pp.l90-4, on the atabegate (Hhich was introducea:-Tnto Georgia in 1212),see R.A. Gusejnov, ''Institut atabekov" Palestinskij Sbornik,l5 (19'bb}"

51. Bunijatov, Gos. a:tabekov, pp.77-95·

52. K'art'. C'xov., II, pp.J0-1; .Abasmadze, Narkvevebi, chap.IV; I. I. Surguladze, Istori ja gosudarstva i prava Gruzii { 'l'bilisi, 1968), p.471 Lordkipanidze, Istorija, pp.14J-4.

53. K'art'. Cxov., II, pp.J5-6. Ee Y.ras at that hiding from his uncle savalat' (Vsevolod "Bol'soe Gnezdo") in the city of the Cuman xan Sevinc. Jurij's paternal grandflother was a cuman prin­cess; another example of the complex Qtpcaq-Georgian ties.

54. K'art'. C'xov., II, pp.65-78; al-Husain!, Axb~r, pp.186-8; Javaxi~vili, K'art'veli eris istoria . ---- , · II,

56.

57·

58.

p.271 for dating. Bunijfl.tov (Gos. atabekov, p.97) has :1194.

Minorsky, Studies, pp.102-0). on the conquests of the Mxargrdzeli~ see Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans • ./:anlarjan, pp.ll8-9. Babajr-m "[Si'rPist. Arm., pp.l4-23) has argued that this was actually an Armenian kingdom vihich the Georgians helped to revive and vri th ~vhich they had a suzerain-vassal relationship. 'L'his thesis has been questioned by 3unijatov (Gos. ats.bekov, p.l4) ancl Lordkipan-

,(Istorija, p.l74).

javaxisvili, K'art'. eris ist., II, pp.27J-88; ·2urRn, Dogu Ana­dolu, pp.lOJ-108; K~art'. C'xov., II, pp.lOJ-09; al-~usaini, Axb~r, pp.188-9. In the Iranian tmvn of Eiyltne, Zak 'are r,:xargrdz had the local malik and his children ski~~ed and hung on the minaret.

Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans. Xanlarjan, pp.137-8, see discussion in A. Galstjan, "Zavoevanie Armenii mongol' skimi vojskami 11 Tate.ro· Hone;oly v Azii 1 Evrope, ed. S.L. Tixvinskij, 2nd rev. ed, (Nos­kva, 1977),pp.166-9; Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.85-92.

our most important source is Jal~l ad-Dtn's biography, strat as­Sul~~n Jal~l ad-Dtn Mank~birt! by Sih~b ad-D!n an-Nasaw!. A critical edition of the text prepared by Z. rr,. Buni jatov which will supercede the edition of 0. Houdas (P~ris, 1891) has not yet appeared. Bunijatov's Russian translation, however, is available

59.

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!1zneo isa.nie Sultana~. Dzalal ad-Dina Jv!a.nkburn (Baku, 1973). Important data is also foun in Ata Ha ik Juvain!, Ta'r!x-i Jah~n-s:u~a : History of the 1?orld Conqueror, trans. .T .A. Boyle (cambridge, T·Iass., 1958), esp. II, pp.426-59 and K'a.rt'. €''xov. II, pp.~68-185.

According to Ibn al-At!r (XII, p.43.5), the Georgians wrote to cTal~l acl-D!n, commenting that the r'iongols had destroyed his father's realm but t•~ve, however, did not Attribute great signi­ficance to them and that which they thought about m10st was to get away from us entirely ...

60. Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans. Xanlarjan, p.l_56. See also Galstjan, uzavoevanie Armenii,", pp.l?0-4 and the sources gathered in his Armjanskie istocniki o mongolax (Hoskva, 1962).

61. I.P. Petru~evskij, nRa.~!d ad-D!n's Conception of the State 11

Central Asiatic Journal,XIV (1970), pp.l48ff. and the literature cited there; Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.142-3.

62. Grigor Aknerc'i : History of the Nation of the Archers (the I(ongols) by Grisor of .Akanc', Arm. text, Eng. trans. R.P. Blake, R.N. Frye in the Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 12 (1949), Arm. text, p.JOO, trans. JOl ; "It is the will of God that 1ve take the earth and maintain order and impose the (y)asax (= yasag,/yasa) ••• " Cf. the comments of Kirakos. Gandzakec • i, trans. Xanlarjan, p.173 :"They usually say the foJlowing : their sovereig: is a kinsman of God who has taken heaven as his appanage a.nd given the earth to the Xak'an (=Qagan ) ••• " See also the dis­cussion in K. SAgaster, "ITerr.schaftsideologieu:fl.d Friedensgedanke bei den Hongolen'' Central Asiatic . .Journal, XVII (1973), pp.223-242. Kirakos Gandzakec'i apparently learned some Mongolian (~ L. Ligeti, "Le Lexique mongol de Kirakos de Gandza.k" Acta Orien­talia Hungarica, XVIII, 1965, pp.241-97) as did the anonymous author of the Georgian Ghronograph (Zamt'aasmcereli : IC'art'. C'xov., II, p.l59).

Ba.bajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.ll9-J?. On the Ilxanids, see B ... Spuler, Die Hongolen in Iran (Leipzig, 1939); I.P. Petrusevskij, Zemledelie i a rarn e otnosenija v Irane XIII-XIV vv. U~oskva.:. Leningrad, 19 0); A.A. Ali-zade, Social no-~konomiceska·a 1 oli­ticeskaja istorija Azerbajd~ana XIII-XIV vv. Baku, 19.5

64. Nemeth, HHK, pp.l9-20, 234-.5.

6.5. K'art'. C'xov., II, p.303; Rastd ad-D!n, J~mit at-Tav~r!x, III, Pers. text ed. A.A. Ali-zade, Russ. trans. A.K. Arends {Baku, 1957), Pers., p.324, trans. p. 182. Revolts had also occured in the 1240's and 1250's. ~azan Xan is generally favorably portrayed by contemporary Christian sources, cf. A.K. Sanjian, Colophons of Armenian Nanuscripts 1301-1480 (Cambridge, r"ass. ,1969) ~· 1)04, p.48. This was not true of CljeytU (Sanjian, Colophons , pp • .50-2).

66. D.N. Lang, ''Georgia in the Reign of Giorgi the 3rilliant (1319-1346)" Bulletin of !{he School of Oriental and African studies, XVII (1955), pp.?9-91.

67. Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.l69-86; Sanjian, ColoEhons, pp.90-91 describes the general anarchy.

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68. See 1L Tabatadze, K'art 'veli 'CI'iiaa • rnd e X TiT- XV -::s::::a:-:-u:ik~u:-:n::-:e=-e='brri::::s~m:'ii~n=-=a:-:z::-:e:-=-~,r~b7J..""l-ii=-:s:-:;i-=,:..:::..;1~9~. r.-;:=.~?8~-~a:.r:a.:-c~t z:::e indicates pp.27-37 that Georgia, at this time, was reunited under ]3.-':l.grat V ( 1360-1393) and relatively prosperous.

69. On the Qara Qoyun1u, ~ F. Stirner, I\ara Koyunlular, I (Ankara, 1967). On their rivals, the Aq Qoyunlu, see J. E. 'doocls, The Aq Quyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire {Einneapo1is, 1976)

70. K. Kuc'ia,· 11 Kavkasiuri elementi Sep'ie.nt'a Iranis politiJtur sarbielzeu J.Iaxlobe1i A··osavlet'is istoriis sakit'xebi.ed. v. Gaba~vili et al. T'bilisi, 19o3 , pp. -75.

71.

72.

P.B. Golden, "The Oguz Turkic (Ottoman/Safavid) Elements in Georgian : Background and Patterns" 'Tlhe !,:utual Effects of the Islamic and Judea-Christian Worlds : The East ID~ro ean Pattern , e • ·-. Ascher et al. r;ew York 0 1979 ; C. Abuladze, Sultan-Saba Orbe1ianis lek'sikonis sitqvanis t'urk'uli t'e.rgmanebi ('r'bilisi, 1968).

C. Toumanoff, "~he Fifteenth-Century Bagre.tids and the Insti­tution of Collegial Sovereignty in Georgia" 7raditio,VII (1949}, pp.l69-221, emphasizes, rather, the effects of the Byzantine system of collegial sovereignty as the "decisive factor" in Georgia's decline and fall.