new evidence on - wilson center

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Translators’ Note: On 23 August 1958,Chinese Communist forces in the Fujianarea along the People’s Republic of China’sPacific Coast began an intensive artillerybombardment of the Nationalist-controlledJinmen Island. In the following two months,several hundred thousand artillery shellsexploded on Jinmen and in the waters aroundit. At one point, a Chinese Communistinvasion of the Nationalist-controlled off-shore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy)and Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. Inresponse to the rapidly escalating Commu-nist threat in the Taiwan Straits, theEisenhower Administration, in accordancewith its obligations under the 1954 Ameri-can-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S.naval units in East Asia and directed U.S.naval vessels to help the Nationalists pro-tect Jinmen’s supply lines. Even the leadersof the Soviet Union, then Beijing’s closeally, feared the possible consequences ofBeijing’s actions, and sent Foreign Minis-ter Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to in-quire about China’s reasons for shellingJinmen. The extremely tense situation in theTaiwan Straits, however, suddenly changedon October 6, when Beijing issued a “Mes-sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in thename of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (itwas speculated by many at that time, andlater confirmed, that this message wasdrafted by Mao Zedong). The messagecalled for a peaceful solution of the Taiwanproblem, arguing that all Chinese shouldunite to confront the “American plot” todivide China permanently. From this dayon, the Communist forces dramatically re-laxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, theTaiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into warbetween China and the United States.

In analyzing the crisis, certainly one ofthe most crucial yet mysterious episodes inCold War history, it is particularly impor-tant to understand Beijing’s motives. Whydid it start shelling Jinmen? How did theshelling relate to China’s overall domesticand international policies? Why did theBeijing leadership decide to end the crisis

as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time,scholars have been forced to resort to “edu-cated guesses” to answer these questions.

The materials in the following pages,translated from Chinese, provide new in-sights for understanding Beijing’s handlingof the Taiwan crisis. They are divided intotwo parts. The first part is a memoir by WuLengxi, then the director of the New ChinaNews Agency and editor-in-chief of Renminribao (People’s Daily). Wu was personallyinvolved in the decision-making process inBeijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis andattended several Politburo Standing Com-mittee meetings discussing the events. Hismemoir provides both a chronology and aninsider’s narrative of how Beijing’s leaders,Mao Zedong in particular, handled the cri-sis. The second part comprises 18 docu-ments, including two internal speeches de-livered by Mao explaining the Party’s exter-nal policies in general and its Taiwan policyin particular. The two parts together providea foundation to build a scholarly under-standing of some of the key calculationsunderlying the Beijing leadership’s man-agement of the Taiwan crisis. Particularlyinteresting is the revelation that Mao de-cided to shell Jinmen to distract Americanattention from, and counter American movesin, the Middle East. Also interesting is hisextensive explanation of how China shoulduse a “noose strategy” to fight the “U.S.imperialists.” Equally important is his em-phasis on the connection between the tensesituation in the Taiwan Straits and the massmobilization in China leading to the GreatLeap Forward. It should also be noted thatdespite the aggressive appearance ofBeijing’s Taiwan policy, Mao paid specialattention to avoiding a direct military con-frontation with American forces present inthe Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis.Although these materials are not directlyfrom Chinese archives, they create a newbasis for scholars to deepen their under-standing of the 1958 events. [Ed. note: Forrecent accounts of the 1958 crisis usingnewly available Chinese sources, see Shu

Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul-ture: Chinese-American Confrontations,1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, TheDragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press,1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study byThomas Christensen to be published byPrinceton University Press.]

Rendering Chinese- or English-lan-guage materials into the other language isdifficult because the two languages have nocommon linguistic roots. Thus, the materi-als provided below are sometimes free ratherthan literal translations from Chinese toEnglish. Great care has been taken to avoidaltering the substantive meaning intendedby the author of the documents. Materialappearing in the text in brackets has beensupplied to clarify meaning or to providemissing words or information not in theoriginal text. Additional problems with in-dividual documents are discussed in thenotes. The notes also include explanatoryinformation to place key individual andevents in context or to provide further infor-mation on the material being discussed.

Part I. Memoir, “Inside Story of theDecision Making during the Shelling ofJinmen”By Wu Lengxi1

[Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Lit-erature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]]

In August 1958, the members of theStanding Committee of the Chinese Com-munist Party (CCP) Central Committee Po-litburo met at Beidaihe2 for a regular topleaders’ working conference. The meetingoriginally planned to focus on the nation’sindustrial problems, and later the issue of thepeople’s commune was added to the discus-sion.

The Politburo convened its summitmeeting on 17 August. Being very busy inBeijing at the time, I thought I could attendthe meeting several days later. On the 20th,

NEW EVIDENCE ONMAO ZEDONG’S HANDLING O F THE TAI WAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958:

CHINESE RECOLLECTION S AND DOCUMENTS

Translated and Annotatedby Li Xiaobing , Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson

208 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

however, the General Office of the CentralCommittee called, urging me to go toBeidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21August on a scheduled flight arranged by theCentral Committee. After arriving, I stayedwith Hu Qiaomu3 in a villa in Beidaihe’scentral district. This seaside resort area wasused only for the leading members of theCentral Committee during summers. All ofthe villas in the resort area were built beforethe liberation4 for high officials, noble lords,and foreign millionaires. Only ChairmanMao’s large, one-story house was newlyconstructed.

At noon on 23 August, the third dayafter I arrived at Beidaihe, the People’s Lib-eration Army’s artillery forces in Fujianemployed more than 10,000 artillery piecesand heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy],Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding off-shore islands occupied by the Nationalistarmy.

In the evening of the 23rd, I attended thePolitburo’s Standing Committee meetingchaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting Ilearned the reason [for the bombardment].In mid-July, American troops invaded Leba-non and British troops invaded Jordan inorder to put down the Iraqi people’s armedrebellion. Thereafter, the Central Commit-tee decided to conduct certain military op-erations in the Taiwan Straits to support theArabs’ anti-imperialist struggle as well as tocrack down on the Nationalist army’s fre-quent and reckless harassment along theFujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu.Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] announcedon 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu [Pescadores],Jinmen, and Mazu were all “to be on emer-gency alert.” It showed that Jiang’s armywas going to make some moves soon. Wetherefore deployed our air force in FujianProvince at the end of July.5 Our fightershad been fighting the Nationalist air forceand had already taken over control of the airspace along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile,our artillery reinforcement units arrived atthe front one after another. And mass ralliesand parades were organized all over thecountry to support the Iraqi and Arab peoplesand to protest against the American andBritish imperialists’ invasions of the MiddleEast.

Chairman Mao talked first at the meet-ing of August 23. He said that the day’sbombardment was perfectly scheduled.Three days earlier, the UN General Assem-

bly had passed a resolution requesting Ameri-can and British troops to withdraw fromboth Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, Americanoccupation of Taiwan became even moreunjust, Mao continued. Our demand wasthat American armed forces should with-draw from Taiwan, and Jiang’s army shouldwithdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If theydid not, we would attack. Taiwan was too faraway to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmenand Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bom-bardment would certainly shock the interna-tional community, not only the Americans,but also Europeans and Asians. The Arabworld would be delighted, and African andAsian peoples would take our side.

Then Chairman Mao turned to me andsaid that [the reason for] rushing me toattend the meeting was to let me know aboutthis sudden event. He directed me to instructthe New China News Agency (NCNA) tocollect international responses to the bom-bardment. Important responses should beimmediately reported to Beidaihe by tele-phone. Mao asked me not to publish ourown reports and articles on the bombard-ment at present. We needed to wait and seefor a couple of days. This was the rule. Maoalso asked me to instruct editorial depart-ments of the NCNA, the People’s Daily, andnational radio stations that they must obeythese orders and instructions in all theirreports. Our military troops must follow theorders, as well as our media and propagandaunits, Mao emphasized.

Chairman Mao continued his talk. Sev-eral days earlier, at the beginning of thesummit meeting, he addressed eight interna-tional issues. He had been thinking of theseissues for many years. His thinking hadgradually formulated some points and opin-ions, and his mind thereby became clear.Those viewpoints, however, could not be allbrought forth without considering time,place, and circumstance in our public propa-ganda, Mao said to me. We had to use adifferent tone in our media work. What heused as the first example was that at themeeting a couple days earlier he predictedthat world war would not break out. But ourmilitary should still be prepared for a totalwar. And our media should still talk aboutthe danger of world war and call for oppos-ing the imperialists’ aggressive and war-provoking policies to maintain world peace.The next example in his explanations waswhich side feared the other a bit more. Al-

though Mao believed that the imperialistswere more afraid of us, he told me that ourmedia and propaganda should state that firstwe were not afraid of war, and second weopposed war. Another point he made wasthat international tension had a favorableaspect for the people of the world. Ourpropaganda, however, should declare thatwe must prevent the imperialists from mak-ing any international tension, and work onrelaxing such tension. These were onlysome examples, he continued. There wereso many bad things happening in our world.If we were too distracted with worries byeveryday anxieties, we would soon collapsepsychologically under pressure. We shouldlearn how to use a dichotomous method toanalyze the dual nature of bad things. Thoughinternational tension was certainly a badthing, we should see the good side of it. Thetension had made many people awaken anddecide to fight the imperialists to the end.Employing such an analytical method couldhelp us achieve a liberation in our mind andget rid of a heavy millstone round our necks.

Chairman Mao said that the bombard-ment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was ourturn to create international tension for apurpose. We intended to teach the Ameri-cans a lesson. America had bullied us formany years, so now that we had a chance,why not give it a hard time? For the presentwe should first wait and see what interna-tional responses, especially American re-sponses, there were to our shelling, and thenwe could decide on our next move. Ameri-cans started a fire in the Middle East, and westarted another in the Far East. We wouldsee what they would do with it. In ourpropaganda, however, we still need to con-demn the Americans for causing tension inthe Taiwan Straits. We did not put them inthe wrong. The United States has severalthousand troops stationed on Taiwan, plustwo air force bases there. Their largest fleet,the Seventh Fleet, often cruises in the Tai-wan Straits. They also have a large navalbase in Manila. The chief of staff of theAmerican navy had stated not long ago(around 6 August) that the American armedforces were ready anytime for a landingcampaign in the Taiwan Straits just as theydid in Lebanon. That was eloquent proof [ofAmerica’s ambition], Mao said.

Two days later, during the afternoon of25 August, Chairman Mao held another Po-litburo Standing Committee meeting in the

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS


lounge hall of the swimming area atBeidaihe’s beach. Mao chaired the meetingin his bathrobe right after swimming in theocean. Among the participants were LiuShaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, andPeng Dehuai.6 Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei,Hu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meet-ing.7

Chairman Mao started the meeting bysaying that while we had had a good time atthis summer resort, the Americans had ex-tremely hectic and nervous days. Accord-ing to their responses during the past days,Mao said that Americans were worried notonly by our possible landing at Jinmen andMazu, but also our preparation to liberateTaiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmenwith 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. Wedid not say if we were or were not going toland. We were acting as circumstancesdictated. We had to be doubly cautious,Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen wasnot a small matter because it had a bearingon much more important international is-sues. The problem was not the 95,000Nationalist troops stationed there—this waseasy to handle. The problem was how toassess the attitude of the American govern-ment. Washington had signed a mutualdefense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty,however, did not clearly indicate whetherthe U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmenand Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if theAmericans wanted to carry these two bur-dens on their backs. The main purpose ofour bombardment was not to reconnoiterJiang’s defenses on these islands, but toprobe the attitude of the Americans in Wash-ington, testing their determination. TheChinese people had never been afraid ofprovoking someone far superior in powerand strength, and they certainly had thecourage to challenge [the Americans] onsuch offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen,and Mazu, which had always been China’sterritories.

Mao said that we needed to grasp anopportunity. The bombardment of Jinmenwas an opportunity we seized when Ameri-can armed forces landed in Lebanon [on 15July 1958]. Our action therefore not onlyallowed us to test the Americans, but also tosupport the Arab people. On the horns of adilemma, the Americans seemed unable tocope with both the East and the West at thesame time. For our propaganda, however,we should not directly connect the bom-

bardment of Jinmen [to the America’s land-ing in Lebanon]. Our major propagandatarget was America’s aggressions all overthe world, condemning its invasion of theMiddle East and its occupation of our terri-tory, Taiwan, Mao said. The People’s Dailycould begin our propaganda campaign bycriticizing an anti-China memorandum re-cently published by the U.S. State Depart-ment, enumerating the crimes of America’sinvasion of China in the past and refuting thememorandum’s calumny and slander againstus. We could also organize articles andcommentaries on the resolution passed bythe UN General Assembly, requesting Ameri-can and British troops to withdraw fromLebanon and Jordan. Then we could requestthe withdrawal of American armed forcesfrom their military bases in many countriesacross the world, including Taiwan. Ourmedia should now conduct an outer-ringpropaganda campaign. After we learned theresponses and moves of America, of JiangJieshi, and of other countries, we could thenissue announcements and publish commen-taries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu.Mao said that at the present our media shouldbuild up strength and store up energy—drawthe bow but not discharge the arrow.

Peng Dehuai suggested that the mediashould write some reports and articles aboutthe heroic fighting of our commanders andsoldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. Theparticipants at the meeting agreed that ourreporters on the front could prepare articles,and we would decide later when they couldpublish their reports.

That evening I informed the editors ofthe People’s Daily in Beijing, through asecured telephone line, of the Politburo’sinstructions on how to organize our propa-ganda campaign. But I did not say anythingabout the Politburo’s decisions, intentions,and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu,which were a top military secret at that time.

For the next two days, the Politburo’sStanding Committee meeting at Beidaihefocused its discussions upon how to doublesteel and iron production and upon issues ofestablishing the people’s commune. Chair-man Mao, however, still paid close attentionto the responses from all directions to ourbombardment of Jinmen, especially toAmerica’s response. Mao’s secretary calledme several times checking on follow-up in-formation after the NCNA’s Cangao ziliao[Restricted Reference Material]8 printed

America’s responses. During these days, Iasked NCNA to report to me every morningby telephone about headline news from for-eign news agencies. I reported the importantnews to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou.

The Central Committee’s working con-ference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August.Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing tochair the Supreme State Conference. On 4September, one day before the conference,Mao called for another Politburo StandingCommittee meeting, which mainly discussedthe international situation after the bom-bardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzedthe American responses. Both [Dwight]Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles madepublic speeches. They ordered half of theirwarships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific.Meanwhile, the American government alsosuggested resuming Chinese-American am-bassadorial talks at Warsaw.9 Seemingly,the American leaders believed that we weregoing to attack Taiwan. They wanted tokeep Taiwan. However, they seemed not tohave made up their mind whether or not todefend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhowerand Dulles slurred over this matter withoutgiving a straight answer. The participants atthe meeting agreed that the Americans feareda war with us. They might not dare to fightus over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombard-ment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accom-plished our goal. We made the Americansvery nervous and mobilized the people ofthe world to join our struggle.

At the Politburo’s Standing Committeemeeting, however, the participants decidedthat our next plan was not an immediatelanding on Jinmen, but pulling the noose[around America’s neck] tighter andtighter—putting more pressure onAmerica—and then looking for an opportu-nity to act. All participants agreed withPremier Zhou’s suggestion of announcing atwelve-mile zone as our territorial waters soas to prevent America’s warships from reach-ing Jinmen and Mazu.10 Chairman Maoconsidered it righteous for us to defend ourterritory if American ships entered our terri-torial water. Our batteries, however, mightnot fire on them immediately. Our troopscould send a warning signal first, and thenact accordingly.

Chairman Mao also said that we werepreparing another approach as well. Throughthe Chinese-American ambassadorial talks,which would be resumed soon in Warsaw,


we would employ diplomatic means to coor-dinate our fighting on the Fujian front. Wenow had both an action arena and a talkarena. There was yet another useful means—the propaganda campaign. Then ChairmanMao turned to Hu Qiaomu and me and saidthat at present our media should give widepublicity to a condemnation of America forcausing tension in the Taiwan Straits. Weshould request America to withdraw its armedforces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.Our propaganda should emphasize that Tai-wan and the offshore islands were Chineseterritory, that our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu was aimed at punishing Jiang’s armyand was purely China’s internal affair, andthat no foreign country would be allowed tointerfere with what happened there. Ourpropaganda organs, the People’s Daily,NCNA, and radio stations should use a fieryrhetorical tone in their articles and commen-taries. Their wording, however, must bemeasured, and should not go beyond a cer-tain limit, Mao emphasized.

From 5 to 8 September, Chairman Maochaired the Supreme State Conference. Hemade two speeches on the 5th and the 8th.11

Besides domestic issues, his speeches fo-cused on international issues similar to theeight issues which he had explained at theBeidaihe meeting. When Chairman Maotalked about pulling the noose, he said thatour bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu madethe Americans very nervous. Dulles seem-ingly intended to put his neck into the nooseof Jinmen-Mazu by defending all of Taiwan,Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. It was good forus to get the Americans there. Whenever wewanted to kick them, we could do so. Thuswe had the initiative, and the Americans didnot. In the past, Jiang Jieshi made troublesfor us mainly through the breach at Fujian. Itwas indeed troublesome to let Jiang’s armyoccupy Jinmen and Mazu. How could anenemy be allowed to sleep beside my bed?We, however, did not intend to launch animmediate landing on Jinmen-Mazu. [Ourbombardment] was merely aimed at testingand scaring the Americans, but we wouldland if circumstances allowed. Why shouldwe not take over Jinmen-Mazu if there camean opportunity? The Americans in fact wereafraid of having a war with us at the bottomof their hearts so that Eisenhower nevertalked publicly about an absolutely “mutualdefense” of Jinmen-Mazu. The Americansseemingly intended to shy away [from

Jinmen-Mazu]. Although their policy ofescape was acceptable, the Americans alsoneeded to withdraw 110,000 of Jiang’s troopsfrom Jinmen and Mazu. If the Americanscontinued to stay and kept Jiang’s troopsthere, the situation would not be affected asa whole but they would put the noose aroundtheir necks.

During Chairman Mao’s speech on the8th, he asked suddenly whether Wu Lengxiwas attending the meeting. I answered.Chairman Mao told me that his speech neededto be included in that day’s news, and askedme to prepare it immediately. I discussedthis with Hu Qiaomu. Since both of us foundit difficult to decide which part of Mao’sspeech should be published, we agreed even-tually to write the part about the noose first.I drafted the news and then let Hu read it.When the conference adjourned, ChairmanMao and other members of the Politburo’sStanding Committee gathered in the lobbyof Qingzheng Hall for a break. I handed overthe news draft to Mao for his checking andapproval. While talking to the others, hewent over the draft and made some changes.Mao told me that only publishing the nooseissue was all right. It was not appropriate atthat moment to publish all the issues dis-cussed because it was merely an exchange ofopinion among the top leaders. Moreover,Mao did not want to relate the noose issuedirectly to Jinmen-Mazu. This was differentfrom writing articles or editorials for news-papers. In our articles, Mao continued, weshould not write about our policy towardJinmen-Mazu, which was a top military se-cret. Our writing, however, could clarify ourposition toward the Chinese-American am-bassadorial talks which would resume soon,12

expressing that whatever the outcome wouldbe, we placed hopes on the talks. We werenow shelling on the one hand and talking onthe other—military operations combinedwith diplomatic efforts. Our bombardmentwas a test. Mao said that we had fired 30,000shells that day in coordination with the massrally at Tiananmen Square to make a greatshow of strength and impetus. Our talkswere a test through diplomacy in order to getto the bottom of American reaction. Twoapproaches were better than a single one. Itwas necessary to keep the negotiation chan-nel open, Mao emphasized. After checkingand polishing my manuscripts, ChairmanMao asked me to instruct NCNA to transmitthe news that evening and to publish it in the

People’s Daily the next day (9 September).There was another interesting episode.

Khrushchev did not have any idea about ourintentions in shelling Jinmen. Afraid ofbeing involved in a world war, he sentGromyko to Beijing to find out our plans on6 September. During the Supreme StateConference, Chairman Mao and PremierZhou met with Gromyko, informing him ofour decisions and explaining that we did notintend to have a major war. In case a majorwar broke out between China and America,China did not intend to involve the SovietUnion in the war. After receiving our mes-sage, Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower, ask-ing the American government to be verycautious in the Taiwan Straits and warningthat the Soviet Union was ready to assistChina anytime if China was invaded.

Right after the Supreme State Confer-ence, Chairman Mao left Beijing on an in-spection trip of the southern provinces. From10 to 28 September, he visited Hubei, Anhui,Jiangsu, and Shanghai, and other places. On30 September, one day after Mao returned toBeijing, his secretary called to tell me thatChairman Mao wanted to see me. I immedi-ately went to Fengzeyuan in Zhongnanhai.13

When I walked into the eastern wing of theJuixiang Study,14 Chairman Mao was read-ing a book. He asked me to sit down and saidthat during his trip he was impressed by theboundless energy of the people across thecountry, especially in their great efforts todevelop a steel and iron industry and tomobilize massive militias. Mao had drafteda news story for NCNA, which was beingtyped and would be ready soon. ChairmanMao also told me that he particularly invitedGeneral Zhang Zhizhong15 to join in the trip.Besides his interests in a rapid growth ofindustry and agriculture, Zhang showed spe-cial concerns during the trip about the situa-tion in the Taiwan Straits. Zhang did notunderstand why we took so long to land onJinmen. His advice was that even though wewere unable to liberate Taiwan at that time,we must take over Jinmen and Mazu by allpossible means. Zhang suggested not lettingslip an opportunity which might never comeagain.

Chairman Mao told me that in fact wewere not unwilling to take over Jinmen andMazu. Our decision [on the landing], how-ever, not only concerned Jiang Jieshi, butalso had to give special consideration toAmerica’s position. The Americans feared


a war with us. After we announced a twelve-mile zone of territorial waters, Americanwarships at first refused to accept it. Theyinvaded the boundary line of our territorialwaters many times, though they did not sailinto the eight-mile territorial waters whichthey recognized. Later, after our warnings,American ships did not dare to invade ourtwelve-mile territorial waters. Once someAmerican gunships escorted a Nationalisttransportation flotilla shipping munitionsand supplies to Jinmen. When this jointflotilla reached Jinmen’s harbor, I orderedheavy shelling. As soon as our batteriesopened fire, the American ships turnedaround and quickly escaped. The National-ist ships suffered heavy losses. Apparently,America was a paper tiger.

America, however, was also a real ti-ger, Mao continued. At present, Americaconcentrated a large force in the TaiwanStraits, including six out of its twelve air-craft carriers, three heavy cruisers, fortydestroyers, and two air force divisions. Itsstrength was so strong that one could notunderestimate it, but must consider it seri-ously. Thus, our current policy [towardJinmen] was shelling without landing, andcutting-off without killing (meaning thatwithout a landing, we would continue bomb-ing Jinmen to blockade its communicationand transportation and to cut off its rearsupport and supplies, but not to bottle up theenemy [on the island]).

Chairman Mao also told me that theChinese-American ambassadorial talks hadresumed at Warsaw. After several rounds oftalks, we could tell that the Americans werecertain about defending Taiwan but not sureabout Jinmen. Some indications suggestedthat the Americans intended to exchangetheir abstaining from defending Jinmen-Mazu for our recognition of their forcibleoccupation of Taiwan, Mao said. We neededto work out a policy concerning this situa-tion. It was not adequate for us to acceptGeneral Zhang Zhizhong’s advice at thatpoint. Mao asked the People’s Daily andNCNA to suspend the ongoing propagandacampaign and wait for the CentralCommittee’s further decision.

Chairman Mao asked for my commentson his news draft after it was typed out. Inoted that the article particularly mentionedat its end that General Zhang had joinedMao’s inspection trip. I agreed with Mao’smanuscript except the last paragraph about

Zhang Zhizhong, which might mislead pub-lic thinking about relations with the Nation-alists. According to Chairman Mao’s in-struction, the article was published as theheadline news on the front page of thePeople’s Daily on that National Day (1 Oc-tober 1958).

After the National Day, Chairman Maoheld continuous meetings of the Politburo’sStanding Committee to discuss the situationin the Taiwan Straits. From 3 to 13 October,the committee members met almost every-day. The meetings of the 3rd and 4th focusedon an analysis of Dulles’s speech on 30September. In his speech, Dulles blatantlyproposed a “two Chinas” policy, requestingthat the Chinese Communists and the Tai-wan government “both should renounce theemployment of force” in the straits. Mean-while, he criticized Taiwan’s deployment oflarge numbers of troops on Jinmen and Mazuas unnecessary, “unwise and not cautious”actions. A reporter asked him if America’sTaiwan policy would change if the ChineseCommunists made some compromises.Dulles said that “our policy in these respectsis flexible. . . . If the situation we have to meetchanges, our policies change with it.”16

Premier Zhou pointed out at the meetingthat Dulles’s speech indicated America’sintention to seize this opportunity to createtwo Chinas, and Dulles wanted us to committo a non-military unification of Taiwan. Usingthis as a condition, America might ask Tai-wan to give up its so-called “returning to themainland” plan and withdraw its troops fromJinmen and Mazu. In one word, Dulles’spolicy was designed to exchange Jinmen andMazu for Taiwan and Penghu. This was thesame hand of cards we had recently discov-ered during the Chinese-American ambassa-dorial talks in Warsaw. Zhou emphasizedthat the American delegates even spoke moreundisguisedly at the talks than had beensuggested in Dulles’s speech.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng]Xiaoping believed that both China andAmerica were trying to find out the other’sreal intention. The two sides did the samething at both Warsaw and Jinmen. By nowboth had some ideas about the other’s bottomline, they said. Americans knew that weneither intended to liberate Taiwan in thenear future nor wanted to have a head-to-head clash with America. Fairly speaking,both sides adopted a similar cautious policytoward their confrontation in the Taiwan

Straits. Our test by artillery fire in Augustand September was appropriate because theAmericans were forced to reconsider whatthey could do in the area. At the same time,we restricted our shelling to Jiang’s ships,not American ships. Our naval and air forcesall strictly observed the order not to fire onAmerican ships and airplanes. We actedwith caution and exercised proper restraint.Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaopingalso said that we put up quite a pageant in ourpropaganda campaign to condemn America’soccupation of our Taiwan territory and toprotest American ships and aircraft invadingour territorial waters and air space. Ourpropaganda had mobilized not only the Chi-nese masses but also the international com-munity to support the Arab peoples and putvery heavy pressure on the American gov-ernment. They both emphasized that thiswas the right thing to do.

Chairman Mao said at the meeting thatour task of probing [the American response]had been accomplished. The question nowwas what we were going to do next. Hepointed out that regarding Dulles’s policywe shared some common viewpoints withJiang Jieshi—both opposed the two-Chinapolicy. Certainly Jiang insisted that he shouldbe the only legal government, and we thebandits. Both, therefore, could not renouncethe use of force. Jiang was always preoccu-pied with recovering the mainland; and wecould never agree to abandon Taiwan. Thecurrent situation, however, was that we wereunable to liberate Taiwan within a certainperiod; Jiang’s “returning to the mainland”also included “a very large measure of illu-sion” as even Dulles recognized. The re-maining question now was how to handleJinmen and Mazu. Jiang was unwilling towithdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, and we didnot need to land on Jinmen-Mazu. Maoasked us about the proposal of leaving Jinmenand Mazu in the hands of Jiang Jieshi. Theadvantage of this policy was that we couldmaintain contact with the Nationaliststhrough this channel since these islands werevery close to the mainland. Whenever nec-essary, we could shell the Nationalists.Whenever we needed tension, we could pullthe noose tighter. Whenever we wanted arelaxation, we could give the noose moreslack. [The policy of] leaving these islandshanging there neither dead nor alive could beemployed as one means to deal with theAmericans. Every time we bombed, Jiang


Jieshi would ask for American help; it wouldmake Americans anxious, worrying thatJiang might bring them into trouble. For us,not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have littleimpact on our construction of a socialistcountry. Jiang’s troops on Jinmen-Mazualone could not cause too much damage. Onthe contrary, if we took over Jinmen-Mazu,or if we allow the Americans to force Jiangto withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we wouldlose a reliable means by which we can dealwith the Americans and Jiang.

All the participants at the meeting agreedwith Chairman Mao’s proposal to allowJiang’s troops to stay at Jinmen-Mazu andforce the American government to continuewith this burden. The latter would be alwayson tenterhooks since we could kick it fromtime to time.

Premier Zhou expected the Americansto propose three resolutions during the Chi-nese-American talks. Their first propositionmight ask us to stop shelling; in return, Jiangwould reduce his troops on Jinmen-Mazuand America would announce that Jinmen-Mazu was included in the American-Jiangmutual defense perimeter. The second pro-posal might suggest our cease-fire if Jiangreduced troops on Jinmen-Mazu, whileAmerica would declare that their mutualdefense did not include Jinmen-Mazu. Thelast plan might ask for our cease-fire, Jiang’swithdrawal from Jinmen-Mazu, and a com-mitment by both sides not to use force againsteach other. All three propositions wereunacceptable, Zhou emphasized, becausethey were essentially aimed at creating twoChinas and legalizing America’s forcibleoccupation of Taiwan. Zhou, however, con-sidered it favorable for us to continue theChinese-American talks, which could oc-cupy the Americans and prevent Americaand the European countries from bringingthe question of the Taiwan Straits to the UN.We also needed to explain clearly the situa-tion to our friends in Asia and Africa so as togive them the truth and prevent [the crisis]from doing us a disservice. All the partici-pants agreed with Premier Zhou’s sugges-tions.

Chairman Mao concluded at the meet-ing that our decision had been made—con-tinuation of shelling but not landing, block-ading without bottling up and allowingJiang’s forces to stay at Jinmen-Mazu. Ourshelling would no longer be daily, with nomore 30,000 or 50,000 shells each time.

Later on, our shelling could be at someintervals; sometimes heavy shelling, some-times light; and several hundred shells firedrandomly in one day. However, Mao saidthat we should continue to give wide public-ity to our propaganda campaign. We in-sisted in our propaganda that the question ofTaiwan was China’s internal affair, thatbombing Jinmen-Mazu was a continuationof the Chinese civil war, and that no foreigncountry or international organization shouldbe allowed to interfere in China’s affairs.America’s stationing of its land and air forceson Taiwan was an invasion of China’s terri-tory and sovereignty; concentrating a largenumber of naval ships in the Taiwan Straitsrevealed American attempts to cause ten-sions. All U.S. vessels must be withdrawnfrom that area. We must oppose America’sattempts to create two Chinas and to legalizeits forcible occupation of Taiwan. We wouldsolve the problem of Jinmen-Mazu, or eventhe problem of Taiwan and Penghu, withJiang Jieshi through negotiations. Chair-man Mao emphasized that our media propa-ganda should explicitly address the aboveprinciples. Our delegation at the Warsawtalks should also follow these principleswhile using some diplomatic rhetoric. Allthese points would not be publicly propa-gated until we had issued a formal govern-ment statement. At the present, the People’sDaily could have a “cease-fire” for a coupleof days to prepare and replenish munitions.Then, Mao said, ten thousand cannons wouldboom after our orders.

After the meeting of the 4th, ChairmanMao issued an order to the frontal forces on5 September to suspend their bombardmentfor two days. The same day Mao himselfdrafted the “Message to the Compatriots inTaiwan,” which was published on the 6th inthe name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai.The message began with “We are all Chi-nese. Out of the thirty-six stratagems, thebest is making peace.” It pointed out thatboth sides considered Taiwan, Penghu,Jinmen, and Mazu as Chinese territories,and all agreed on one China, not two Chinas.The message then suggested that Taiwanleaders should abolish the mutual defensetreaty signed with Americans. The Ameri-cans would abandon the Taiwanese sooneror later; and one could discern certain cluesabout this in Dulles’s speech of 30 Septem-ber. After all, the American imperialistswere our common enemy. The message

formally suggested that both sides hold ne-gotiations to search for peaceful resolutionsto the Chinese civil war which had beenfought for the past 30 years. It also an-nounced that our forces on the Fujian frontwould suspend their shelling for seven daysin order to allow the [Nationalist] troops andresidents on Jinmen to receive supplies. Oursuspension of bombardment, however,would be with the precondition of no Ameri-can ships providing escort.

This statement drafted by Chairman Maowas a very important turning point in ourpolicy toward Jinmen. That is, our focusshifted from military operations to political(including diplomatic) efforts.

After watching the situation for twodays, Chairman Mao called for another Po-litburo Standing Committee meeting at hisquarters in the afternoon of 8 September. Allthe committee members noticed that theworld had made magnificent and strong re-sponses to the “Message to the Compatriotsin Taiwan.” Some Western newspapers andmagazines even saw the message as a strawin the wind that augured dramatic change inthe relations between both Chinese sides andbetween China and America. Meanwhile,American ships stopped their escorts and nolonger invaded our territorial waters aroundJinmen. Only Jiang’s Defense Departmentbelieved the message to be a Chinese Com-munist “plot.”

Chairman Mao then asked me abouthow the People’s Daily prepared its edito-rial. I answered that the paper had alreadyfinished one article to attack Americans inparticular. Mao told me to work on theGuomindang (GMD) first by writing an ar-ticle which focused on a dialogue with JiangJieshi, while at the same time posing somedifficult questions for the Americans. Thisarticle should explain that our message wasnot a crafty plot, but part of our consistentpolicy toward Taiwan. The message showedour stretching out both our arms once again,Mao said. The article might try to alienateJiang from America, saying that Taiwansuffered from depending on other people fora living, and that getting a lift on an Ameri-can ship was unreliable. Then the articlecould criticize Dulles’s so-called cease-fireand ask the Americans to meet five require-ments for a cease-fire (stopping naval es-corts, stopping the invasion of China’s terri-torial waters and air space, ending militaryprovocation and war threats, ending inter-


vention in China’s internal affairs, and with-drawing all American armed forces fromTaiwan and Penghu). Chairman Mao askedme to finish my writing that evening. Hewas going to wait to read and check thearticle that night. Mao told me that I couldleave right now to write the article withoutwaiting for the end of the meeting.

Leaving Zhongnanhai, I rushed back tothe People’s Daily’s building. After order-ing a dish of fried noodles as my dinner froma restaurant across the street, I began to draftthe editorial hurriedly in my office. WithChairman Mao’s instruction, my writingwas very smooth and fast. A little bit afterthe midnight, I finished my draft. It was twoor three o’clock in the early morning of the9th when the final proof of the article wassent to Chairman Mao for checking andapproval. Mao read the editorial early thesame morning and made important changesin its last paragraph. He re-wrote the para-graph as follows: “Seemingly, the problemstill needs to have more tests and observa-tions. We are still very far away from thetime of solving the problem. After all, theimperialists are the imperialists, and thereactionaries are the reactionaries. Let uswait and see how they will make theirmoves!” Chairman Mao noted his approvalon the final proof: “Not very good, barelypublishable.” The time written down belowhis signature was six o’clock of 9 October.

I received my manuscript sent back byChairman Mao on the morning of 9 Octo-ber. Meanwhile, I received a telephone callfrom Mao’s secretary, Lin Ke. Lin told methat Chairman Mao wanted to includeDulles’s 8 October announcement of Ameri-can ships stopping their escorts in the edito-rial. Mao also suggested postponing itspublication for one day. After reading Mao’srevision and corrections, I felt that theeditorial’s title was not a very bold headline.So, according to the changes he made in thelast paragraph, I changed the title to “Let’sSee How They Make Their Moves.” Afterthe editorial was published on 11 October, itwas thought to be Chairman Mao’s writingbecause of its striking title and special styleclose to that of the “Message to the Compa-triots in Taiwan.”

Two days later, the People’s Daily pub-lished another editorial, “Stop Talking aboutCease-fire; To Leave Is the Best,” on 13October. This editorial was based uponPremier Zhou’s opinion at the Politburo

Standing Committee meeting on 4 October.Zhou gave the editorial his final check andapproval. Its main content was our critiquesand refusal of an American request for acease-fire on the Jinmen-Mazu front. Theeditorial clearly stated that there was no warbetween China and America, so where didthe cease-fire come from? It asked Americato withdraw all of its naval and air forcesfrom Taiwan and surrounding areas aroundthe Taiwan Straits. It was a perfect timing forthis editorial, corresponding to the “DefenseMinistry’s Order,” which was issued on 13October and drafted by Chairman Mao. Inthat order, the Defense Ministry announceda continuation of the suspension of our bom-bardment for two more weeks. The suspen-sion, however, still contained the precondi-tion that no American ships could be escorts.We would resume shelling immediately ifthere were any American escort vessels.

Two days later, Eisenhower ordered allthe warships from the Sixth Fleet which hadbeen sent as reinforcements to the Pacific toreturn to the Mediterranean. He also sentDulles to Taiwan to confer with Jiang Jieshi.The Editorial Department of the People’sDaily, without really knowing what was go-ing on, wrote an editorial entitled “HavingOnly Themselves to Blame,” saying thatDulles and Jiang played a “two-man show.”After the editorial was published on 21 Octo-ber, Premier Zhou called us during the samemorning and gave a pungent criticism thatwe were neither consistent with the facts norwith the policy made by the Central Commit-tee. When Chairman Mao chaired a Polit-buro Standing Committee meeting that after-noon, he also criticized our editorial as book-ish and naive, reeling and swaggering, whichhad a one-sided understanding of the CentralCommittee’s policy and gave an inappropri-ate emphasis to the American-Jiang solidar-ity. Chairman Mao believed that Dulles’smission to Taiwan was to persuade JiangJieshi to withdraw his troops from Jinmen-Mazu in exchange for our commitment not toliberate Taiwan so that America could gain atotal control of Taiwan’s future. Disagree-ing with Dulles, however, Jiang demandedthat America commit to a “mutual defense”of Jinmen-Mazu. Jiang and Dulles had a bigargument in which nobody gave in to theother. As a result, the meeting ended indiscord and was not a “two-men show” ofsolidarity. After the Politburo meeting, Chair-man Mao asked Premier Zhou to talk to me

one more time about this particular matter.Then we wrote another editorial to re-criti-cize the Dulles-Jiang meeting.

Chairman Mao also said at the Polit-buro Standing Committee meeting that therewere many problems in the relationship be-tween America and Jiang. The Americanswanted to make Jiang’s “Republic of China”one of their dependencies or even a man-dated territory. But Jiang desperately soughtto maintain his semi-independence. Thuscame conflicts between Jiang and America.Jiang Jieshi and his son Jiang Jingguo [ChiangChing-kuo] still had a little bit of anti-Ameri-can initiative. They would resist America ifit drove them too hard. Among such cases inthe past were Jiang’s condemnation of HuShi [Hu Shih]17 and his dismissal of GeneralSun Liren18—actions taken because Jiangbelieved that the troublemakers against himwere supported by the Americans. Anothergood example of Jiang’s independence wasthe recent smashing and looting of the Ameri-can Embassy in Taipei by Taiwanesemasses.19 Jiang permitted American armedforces stationed in Taiwan only at the regi-mental level, while rejecting larger units atthe divisional level which America hadplanned to send to Taiwan. After our shell-ing of Jinmen began, Jiang allowed only3,000 more American marines to reinforceTaiwan and they were stationed in Tainan [acity in southern Taiwan]. As Chairman Maohad pointed out two days earlier, we andJiang Jieshi had some common points. Theconflict at the Dulles-Jiang meeting sug-gested that we might be able to ally withJiang to resist America in a certain way. Ourpolicy of not liberating Taiwan in the nearfuture might help Jiang relax and concen-trate on his fight against America’s control.We neither landed on Jinmen nor agreedwith the American proposal for a “cease-fire.” This clearly caused problems betweenAmericans and Jiang. In the past months,our policy had been one of shelling withoutlanding and blockading without drivingJiang’s troops to the wall. While continuingthe same policy, we should from now onimplement it more flexibly in favor of sup-porting Jiang Jieshi to resist America’s con-trol.

All the participants at the meeting agreedwith Chairman Mao’s ideas. Premier Zhouadded that “shelling” was coordinated with“blockading.” Since we relaxed our “block-ading,” we might also need to relax our


“shelling.” Mao agreed with him by sug-gesting that we should announce an odd-numbered-day shelling, with no shelling oneven-numbered days. For the odd-num-bered-day shelling, our targets might be lim-ited only to the harbors and airport, not thedefense works and residential buildings onthe island. From now on, our shelling wouldbe limited in scope, and, moreover, the lightshelling might not be on a regular basis.Militarily it sounded like a joke, since suchpolicy was unknown in the history of Chi-nese or world warfare. However, we wereengaged in a political battle, which wassupposed to be fought this way. ChairmanMao said that we only had “hand grenades”right now, but no atomic bombs. “Handgrenades” could be successful for us to usein beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu],but not a good idea to use in fighting againstAmericans, who had nuclear weapons. Later,when everybody had nuclear weapons, verylikely nobody would use them.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng]Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meet-ing whether we should issue a formal state-ment announcing future shelling on odddays only but not on even days. ChairmanMao believed it necessary. He also requiredme to understand that the editorial men-tioned early in the meeting should not bepublished until our formal statement wasissued.

On 25 October, the “Second Message tothe Compatriots in Taiwan” drafted by Chair-man Mao was issued in the name of DefenseMinister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analy-sis of Dulles’s speech published by the U.S.State Department on 23 October, the mes-sage pointed out that on the one hand Dullesfinally saw a “Communist China” and waswilling to make contact with it. On the otherhand, however, this American bureaucratstill considered the so-called “Republic ofChina” in Taiwan as a “political unit whichwas factually existing.” The American planwas first to separate Taiwan from the main-land, and second to mandate Taiwan’s spe-cial status. The message read, “China’saffairs must be handled by the Chinese them-selves. For any problem unable to be solvedat once, we can give it further thought anddiscuss it later between us. . . . We are notadvising you to break up with Americansright now. These sort of ideas are not prac-tical. We simply hope that you should notyield to the pressure from Americans. If you

live under somebody’s thumb and lose yoursovereignty, you will eventually have noplace to call your home and be thrown outinto the sea.” The message announced thatwe had already ordered PLA batteries on theFujian front not to fire on the airport, har-bors, ships, and beaches of Jinmen on evendays. On odd days, we might not bombeither, as long as there were no ships orairplanes coming to Jinmen.

The same day the statement was issued,Chairman Mao sent for Tian Jiaying20 andme for a conversation. Besides asking us tomake a survey of the current condition ofpeople’s communes in Henan Province, Maotalked about the bombardment of Jinmenand Mazu. He said that during this eventboth we and the Americans adopted abrinkmanship policy. America concentratedmany warships which invaded our territorialwaters and escorted Jiang’s transportationfleets, but never fired on us. We fired 10,000or 20,000 shells a day, or even more when-ever there were American escort ships. Ourshells, however, fell only on Jiang’s shipsnot on American ships. Some shells fell nearAmerican ships, which frightened them andcaused them to turn around. While confront-ing each other in the Taiwan Straits, bothsides continued talks in Warsaw. Ameri-cans were on one side of the brink, and we onthe other. Even though both were at thebrink of war, no one ever crossed the line.We used our brinkmanship policy to dealwith American brinkmanship. Mao contin-ued that there were many stories written inLiaozhai Zhiyi (The Chinese Ghost Sto-ries)21 about people without fear of ghosts.One of the stories was titled “Qing Feng,”which talked about a bohemian scholarnamed Geng Qubing. One night, Geng wasreading late in a remote village house. “Aghost walks into his house with long hair andblack face, and stares at the scholar. Laugh-ing, dipping his fingers into the black ink,and painting his face black himself, Genglooked directly at the ghost with keen, spar-kling eyes. The ghost felt embarrassed andran away.” Chairman Mao told us that if wewere not afraid of ghosts, ghosts would beunable to do anything to us. He said that ourexperience in shelling Jinmen-Mazu was thecase in point.

I can say that what Chairman Mao toldus here is his summary of our managementof the Jinmen-Mazu crisis of 1958.

Part II. Documents

1. Notation, Mao Zedong on Chen Geng’sReport, 18 December 195722

Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji [A Col-lection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers](Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993),6:373

Return to Comrade Peng Dehuai:[What has been suggested in the report]

is absolutely necessary. You should super-vise and push the air force to go all out [tofulfill the task], so that we are sure that theinvading enemy will be annihilated. Pleaseconsider the question regarding our air force’smoving into Fujian in 1958.

2. Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuaiand Huang Kecheng, 27 July 195823

Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao[Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the For-mation of the People’s Republic] (Beijing:The Central Press of Historical Documents,1992), 7:326

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang]Kecheng:

[I] could not sleep [last night], butthought about it again. It seems more appro-priate to hold our [plans] to attack Jinmen forseveral days. While holding our operations,[we will] observe the situational develop-ment there. We will not attack whether ornot the other side relieves a garrison. Untilthey launch a provocative attack, [we will]then respond with a counterattack. Thesolution of the problem in the Middle Easttakes time. Since we have time, why shouldwe be in a big hurry? We will hold our attackplans now, but one day we will put it intoimplementation. If the other side invadesZhang[zhou], Shan[tou], Fuzhou, andHangzhou, a best scenario [for us to takeaction] would emerge. How do you thinkabout this idea? Could you have a discus-sion about this with other comrades? It isextremely beneficial [for our decision-mak-ing] with politics in command and goingthrough repeated deliberations. To make aplan too quickly usually results in an un-thoughtful consideration. I did such thingsquite often and sometimes had unavoidablemiscalculations. What is your opinion? Evenif the other side attacks us, [we still] can waitfor a couple of days for a clear calculation,and then start our counterattack. Can all of


the above points be accounted as workingout splendid plans here to defeat the enemyin battles a thousand miles away, and havingsome certainty of success that we will beever-victorious? We must persist in theprinciple of fighting no battle we are notsure of winning. If you agree [with theabove points], telegraph this letter to Ye Feiand ask him to think about it very carefully.Let me know his opinion.

Have a peaceful morning!

Mao Zedong10 A.M., 27 July24

3. Instruction, Mao Zedong to PengDehuai, 18 August 1958, 1:00 a.m.25

Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:348

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:[We are] preparing to shell Jinmen,

dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and theAmericans indirectly. Therefore, do notconduct military maneuvers in Guangdongand Shengzhen, so that the British wouldnot be scared.

Mao Zedong1 A.M., 18 August

P.S.: Please call air force headquartersattention to the possibility that the Taiwanside might counterattack us by dispatchinglarge groups of air force (such as dozens, oreven over one hundred, airplanes) to try totake back air control over Jin[men] andMa[zu]. If this happens, we should prepareto use large groups of air force to defeatthem immediately. However, in chasingthem, [our planes] should not cross thespace line over Jinmen and Mazu.26

4. Instruction, Mao Zedong to HuangKecheng, 3 September 195827

Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:376

Part IComrade [Huang] Kecheng:

Both the instruction and the appendix28

are well written. Please send them to Com-rade Peng Dehuai immediately for his read-ing. Then, they should be approved by theCentral Military Commission’s meeting andissued thereafter. Please give a detailedexplanation of the reasons [for these docu-

ments] at the Military Commission’s meet-ing.

Part IIDistribute them to the Fujian Military Dis-trict and all other military districts; the partycommittees of all provinces, metropolises,and regions; all departments of the CentralMilitary Commission and all special forcesheadquarters; all members of the Politburoand the Secretariat of the Central Commit-tee; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; LuDingyi;29 and Wu Lengxi.

5. Speech, Mao Zedong at the FifteenthMeeting of the Supreme State Council, 5September 1958 (Excerpt)Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Se-lected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong](Beijing: The Central Press of HistoricalDocuments, 1994), 341-348

As far as the international situation isconcerned, our view has always been opti-mistic, which can be summarized as “theEast Wind prevails over the West Wind.”

At present, America commits itself to an“all-round contract” policy along our coast.It seems to me that the Americans will onlyfeel comfortable if they take complete re-sponsibility for Jinmen and Mazu, or evenfor such small islands as Dadan, Erdan, andDongding. America gets into our noose.Thereby, America’s neck is hanging inChina’s iron noose. Although Taiwan is [forthe Americans] another noose, it is a bitfarther from [the mainland]. America nowmoves its head closer to us, since it wants totake responsibility for Jinmen and other is-lands. Someday we will kick America, andit cannot run away, because it is tied up byour noose.

I would like to present some viewpoints,offering some ideas for the participants atthis meeting. Do not treat them as a decision,or some kind of law. As law, they might notbe changed; as opinions, they are alive andflexible. Let us use these points to reviewand analyze the current international situa-tion.

The first question is who fears whom abit more. I believe that the Americans areafraid of fighting a war. So are we. But thequestion is which side actually fears the othera bit more. This is my point, as well as myobservation. I would like to invite every-body here to apply this point to your observa-

tion from now on. You can observe thesituation for one, two, three, or four years byusing this point. You will eventually findout whether the West fears the East a bitmore, or the East fears the West a bit more.According to my opinion, it is Dulles whofears us more. Britain, America, Germany,France, and other western countries fear us alot more. Why do they have more fears?This is an issue of strength, and an issue ofpopularity. Public attitude is indeed strength.There are more people on our side, and feweron their side. Among the three doctrines [intoday’s world]—communism, nationalism,and imperialism, communism and national-ism are relatively closer. Nationalism domi-nates a large part of the world, including thethree continents: Asia, Africa, and LatinAmerica. Even though the ruling groups ofsome countries in these continents are pro-West, such as those in Thailand, Pakistan,the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, and Iran,among the people in these countries many,probably quite a few, are pro-East. Only themonopoly-capitalists and a few people whohave been totally poisoned by the monopoly-capitalists want a war. Except for them, therest of the people, or the majority of thepeople (not all of them) do not want a war. Innorthern European countries, for example,the ruling classes, though belonging to thecapitalists, do not want a war. The balanceof strength is like this. The truth is in thehands of the majority of the people, not in thehands of Dulles. As a result, while they feelrather diffident, we are solid and dependableinside. We depend on the people, while theysupport those reactionary rulers. This iswhat Dulles is doing right now. He special-izes in such people as “Generalissimo Jiang,”[South Korean leader] Syngman Rhee, and[South Vietnam leader] Ngo Dinh Diem.My viewpoint is that both sides are afraid [ofeach other], but they fear us a bit more.Thus, it is impossible for a war to break out.

The second question is what is the na-ture of the international military alliancesorganized by the Americans and the otherimperialists, such as the North Atlantic[Treaty Organization], the Baghdad [TreatyOrganization], and the Manila [Treaty Orga-nization].30 We say that they are of an ag-gressive nature. It is absolutely true thatthese military organizations are of an ag-gressive nature. However, against whichside do these organizations direct their spear-head? Are they attacking socialism, or na-


tionalism? It seems to me that they arecurrently attacking the nationalist countries,such as Egypt, Lebanon, and the other weakcountries in the Middle East. But they willattack the socialist countries until, say, whenHungary completely has failed, Poland hascollapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Ger-many have fallen down, and even the SovietUnion and us have encountered troubles.They will attack us when we are shaking andcrumbling. Why should they fail to attackyou when you are falling down? Stable andstrong, we are not falling down now, andthey are unable to bite the hard bone. So theyturn to those more bitable countries, gnaw-ing at Indonesia, India, Burma, and Ceylon.They have attempted to overthrow [GamalAbdul] Nasser,31 undermine Iraq, and sub-jugate Algeria. By now Latin America hasmade a significant progress. As [U.S.] vicepresident, [Richard] Nixon was not wel-comed in eight countries, where people spatand stoned him. When the political repre-sentative of America was treated with salivaand rocks there, it means contempt forAmerica’s “dignity,” and an unwillingnessto treat it “politely.” Because you are ourenemy, we therefore treat you with salivaand rocks. Thus, we should not take thethree military organizations too seriously.[We] need to analyze them. Even thoughaggressive, they are not steady.

The third point is about the tension inthe international situation. We are callingevery day for relaxing international tensionsbecause it will benefit the people of theworld. So, can we say that it must be harmfulfor us whenever there is a tense situation? Ido not think it necessarily so. A tensesituation is not necessarily harmful for us inevery circumstance; it has an advantageousside. Why do I think this way? It is becausebesides its disadvantageous side, a tensesituation can mobilize the population, canparticularly mobilize the backward people,can mobilize the people in the middle, andcan therefore promote the Great Leap For-ward in economic construction. Afraid offighting a nuclear war? You have to think itover. Look, we have fired a few shells onJinmen and Mazu, and I did not expect thatthe entire world would be so deeply shocked,and the smoke and mist is shading the sky.This is because people are afraid of war.They are afraid that the Americans willmake trouble everywhere in the world. Ex-cept for Syngman Rhee, no second country

supports America among so many countriesin the world. Probably the Philippines canbe added to the list, but it offers only “con-ditional support.” It is a tense situation, forexample, that caused the Iraqi revolution, isit not? The current tense situation is causedby the imperialists themselves, not by us. Inthe final analysis, however, the tense situa-tion is more harmful for the imperialists.Lenin once introduced this point in his dis-cussions about war. Lenin said that a warcould motivate people’s spiritual condition,making it tense. Although there is no warright now, a tense situation caused by thecurrent military confrontation can also bringevery positive factor into play, while at thesame time stimulating groups of backwardpeople to think.

The fourth point is about the issue ofwithdrawing armed forces from the MiddleEast. American and British troops of ag-gression must withdraw. The imperialistsnow refuse to withdraw and intend to staythere. This is disadvantageous for the people,but it will at the same time educate thepeople. In order to fight against aggressors,you need to have a target; without a target, itis difficult for you to fight against the ag-gressors. The imperialists now come upthere themselves to become the target, andrefuse to leave. This arouses the people ofthe entire world to fight against the Ameri-can aggressors. After all, it seems to me thatit is not so harmful for the people when theaggressors put off their withdrawal. Therebythe people will yell at the aggressors every-day: why do you not leave [our country]?

The fifth question is whether it is a goodthing or bad thing to have [Charles] deGaulle in power. At present, the FrenchCommunist Party and the French peopleshould firmly oppose de Gaulle coming topower, and veto his constitution. Mean-while, they should also be prepared for thestruggle after he takes office in case theycannot stop him. Once in power, de Gaullewill oppress the French Communist Partyand the French people. His taking office,however, may also have advantageous ef-fects in both domestic and foreign affairs.Internationally, this person likes to maketrouble for Britain and America. He likes toargue. He had some miserable experiencesin the past. In his memoirs, de Gaulleblamed Britain and America all the time, butsaid some nice words about the Soviet Union.It seems to me that he will make trouble

again. It is advantageous when France hastrouble with Britain and America. Domesti-cally, he would become a necessary teacherwho can educate the French proletarians,just like “Generalissimo Jiang” in China.Without “Generalissimo Jiang,” it wouldnot be enough for the Chinese CommunistParty’s positive education alone to educate[China’s] 600 million people. Currently, deGaulle is still enjoying his reputation. If youdefeat him now, people are still missing himas he is still alive. Let him come to power,he will run no more than five, six, seven,eight, or ten years. He will be finishedsooner or later. After he is finished, nosecond de Gaulle will be there and his poisonwill be completely released. You must al-low his poison to be released, just like thatwe did to our Rightists.32 You have to lethim release the poison. If not, he always hasthe poison. You can eliminate the poisononly after he releases it.

The sixth point is the embargo, that is,no trade with us. Is this advantageous ordisadvantageous to us? I believe that theembargo benefits us a lot. We do not feel it[to be] disadvantageous at all. It will havetremendous beneficial impact on our [han-dling of] clothing, food, housing, and trans-portation, as well as on our reconstruction(including the production of steel and iron).The embargo forces us to work out all thesolutions ourselves. My appreciation goesto He Yingqin33 all the time. In 1937 whenour Red Army was re-organized into theEighth Route Army under the NationalistRevolution Army, we received 400,000 yuanof fabi every month. After we were paid themoney, we became dependent on it. In 1940,however, the anti-Communist movementreached its peak, and the payment stopped.No more money was paid [to us]. We had tofind out our own means [to support our-selves] from then on. What did we find out?We issued an order that as there was no morefabi, each regiment had to find out its ownway of self-support. Thereafter, all [of our]base areas launched a production move-ment. The value yielded from the produc-tion reached not 400,000, not 4 million, evennot 40 million yuan, but about 100 or possi-bly 200 million yuan, if we combined theproduction of all the base areas together. Wehave since relied on our own efforts. Who istoday’s He Yingqin? It is Dulles, a differentname. Currently, they are carrying out anembargo. We are going own way. We have


initiated the Great Leap Forward, throwingaway dependence and breaking down blindfaith. The result is good.

The seventh is the non-recognition is-sue. Is [imperialist countries’] recognition[of the PRC] or non-recognition relativelymore advantageous to us? Same as on theembargo issue, imperialist countries’ non-recognition of us is more advantageous to usthan their recognition of us. So far there areabout forty some countries which refuse torecognize us. The main reason lies inAmerica. For instance, France intends torecognize China, but it does not dare to do itbecause of America’s opposition. Manyother countries in Central and SouthAmerica, Asia, Africa, and Europe, andCanada, dare not to recognize us because ofAmerica. There are only nineteen capitalistcountries which recognize us now, plusanother eleven countries in the socialistcamp, plus Yugoslavia, totaling thirty-onecountries. It seems to me that we can livewith this small number. Non-recognition[of us], in my opinion, is not a bad thing.Rather, it is relatively good. Let us producemore steel. When we can produce 600 or700 million tons of steel, they will recognizeus at last. They may still refuse to recognizeus by then, but who cares?

The last issue is about preparations foran anti-aggression war. I said in my firstpoint that as both sides are afraid of war, warshould not break out. Everything in theworld, however, needs a safety factor. Sincethere exists a monopoly-capitalist class inthe world, I am afraid that it will maketrouble recklessly and abruptly. We musttherefore be prepared to fight a war. Thispoint needs to be explained clearly to ourcadres. First, we do not want a war, and weoppose any war. So does the Soviet Union.If war comes, it will be started by the otherside and we will be forced to enter thefighting. Second, however, we do not fearfighting a war. We must fight it if we haveto. We have only grenades and potatoes inour hands right now. A war of atomic andhydrogen bombs is of course terrible sincemany people will die. That is why weoppose a war. Unfortunately, the decisionwill not be made by us. If the imperialistsdecide to fight a war, we have to be preparedfor everything. We must fight a war if wehave to. I am saying that it is not so terrify-ing even if half of our population perishes.This is certainly talk in extreme terms.

Thinking about the history of the entire uni-verse, I do not see any reason to be pessimis-tic about the future. I had a debate withPremier [Jawarharlal] Nehru34 over this is-sue. He said that [as the result of a nuclearwar] no government could remain and every-thing would be destroyed. Even thoughsomeone might want to seek peace, no gov-ernment would be there. I told him that itwould never be like that. If your governmentwould be eliminated by atomic bombs, thepeople would form another one which couldwork out a peace. If you fail to think aboutthings in such extreme terms, how can youever sleep? This is no more than a matter ofpeople being killed, and [what is reflectedhere] is the fear of fighting a war. But if theimperialists definitely want to fight a warand attack us first, using atomic bombs, itdoes not matter whether you fear fighting awar or not; in any case they will attack you.If that were the case, what should be ourattitude? Is it better to fear or not to fear? Itis extremely dangerous [for us] to fear thisand fear that every day, which will make ourcadres and people feel discouraged. So Ibelieve that [we] should be case-hardenedtoward fighting a war. We will fight it if wehave to. We will rebuild our country after thewar. Therefore, we are now mobilizing themilitias. All people’s communes shouldorganize their militias. Everyone in ourcountry is a soldier. We should arm thepeople. We can distribute several millionguns at the beginning. Later on we willdistribute several dozen million guns amongthe people. All provinces should be able toconstruct light weapons, including rifles,machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars,and light mortars. Each people’s communeshould have a military office to supervise[combat] training. Some of our participantshere today are intellectuals. You need tomake a call for holding a pen in one hand andgripping a gun in the other. You cannot onlyhave pens in your hands. You should beculturalized as well as militarized.

These eight points are my opinions. Ioffer them to you for your observation of theinternational situation.

6. Speech, Mao Zedong at the FifteenthMeeting of the Supreme State Council, 8September 1958 (Excerpt)Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 348-352

I am going to discuss something wehave talked about before. About the nooseissue we discussed at the last meeting, didwe not? Now I want to say that we need toplace nooses on Dulles, Eisenhower, andother warmongers. There are many placeswhere the nooses can be used on the Ameri-cans. In my opinion, wherever an [Ameri-can] military base is located, [America] istied up by a noose. [This happens], for ex-ample, in the East, in South Korea, Japan,the Philippines, and Taiwan; in the West, inWest Germany, France, Italy, and Britain; inthe Middle East, in Turkey and Iran; and inAfrica, in Morocco and other places. In eachof these countries, America has many mili-tary bases. For instance, in Turkey there aremore than twenty American military bases,and it is said that in Japan there are about800. In some other countries, although thereis no [American] military base, they areoccupied by the troops [of the imperialists].For example, American troops in Lebanonand British troops in Jordan.

Here I am focusing on two of thesenooses: one is Lebanon, the other is Taiwan.Taiwan is an old noose since America hasoccupied it for several years. Who tiesAmerica there? The People’s Republic ofChina ties it there. 600 million Chinese havea noose in their hands. This is a steel nooseand it ties America’s neck. Who tiedAmerica? The noose was made by Americaitself and tied by itself, and it throws theother end of the noose to mainland China,letting us grasp it. [America] was tied inLebanon only recently, but the noose wasalso made by America itself, tied by itself,and the other end of the noose was throwninto the hands of Arab nations. Not only so,America also throws the [other end of the]noose into the hands of the majority of thepeople in the world. Everyone condemnsAmerica, and no one gives it any sympathy.The noose is held by the people and govern-ments in many countries. In the MiddleEast, for example, the UN held meetings [onthe Lebanon issue], but [America’s] mainproblem is that it has been tied by the Arabpeople and cannot escape. At present,America is caught in a dilemma—is it betterto withdraw earlier or later? If an earlywithdrawal, why did it come in the firstplace? If a late withdrawal, [the noose] willbe getting tighter and tighter, and will be-come an encased knot. How can this behandled? Lebanon is different from Taiwan


with which America has signed a treaty. Thesituation in Lebanon is more flexible as notreaty is involved there. It is said that oneissued the invitation, and the other came,and [the noose] is hitched up. As far asTaiwan is concerned, this is an encased knotsince a treaty was signed. There is no differ-ence between the Democrats and Republi-cans in this case. Eisenhower agreed on thetreaty and [Harry] Truman sent the SeventhFleet there. Truman could come and go atwill since there was no treaty during histime. Eisenhower signed the treaty. Americais tied up [in Taiwan] because of theGuomindang’s panic and request, and alsobecause America was willing [to be tied upthere].

Is it [America] tied up at Jinmen andMazu? I think that it has also been tied up atJinmen and Mazu. Why do I think so? Didnot the Americans say that they had not

made any decision yet, and that they wouldmake the decision in accordance with thesituation after the Communists landed there?The problem lies in the 110,000 Guomindangtroops, 95,000 men on Jinmen and 15,000 onMazu. America has to pay attention to themas long as these two large garrisons are onthe islands. This concerns the interest andfeelings of their class. Why do the Britishand Americans treat the governments insome countries so nicely? They cannot foldtheir hands and see these governments col-lapse. Today the Americans and Jiang arehaving a joint military exercise under thecommand of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.]Beakley, commander of the Seventh Fleet.Also is there is [Roland] Smoot,35 the personwho ordered the firing, which made the[U.S.] State Department and Defense De-partment unhappy. He is there, togetherwith Beakley, to take the command.

To make a long story short, you [Ameri-cans] are noosed here. You may be able toget away if you take the initiative to leaveslowly and quietly. Is there not a policy forgetting away? In my view, you had a policyfor getting away from Korea, and now apolicy for getting away from Jinmen-Mazuis being shaped. As a matter of fact, those inyour group really want to get away, and thepublic opinion also asks you to do so. To getaway is to extricate yourself from the noose.How can this be done? That is, the 110,000troops should leave. Taiwan is ours, and wewill never compromise on this issue, whichis an issue of internal affairs. The dealingbetween us and you [the Americans] is aninternational issue. These are two differentissues. Although you Americans have beenassociated with Jiang Jieshi, it is possible todissolve this chemical combination. This isjust like electrolytic aluminum or electro-

Khrushchev’s Nuclear PromiseTo Beijing During the 1958 Crisis

introduction by Vladislav M. Zubok

The history of the “second” TaiwanStraits crisis (August-October 1958) hasgotten a second wind lately, due to the emer-gence of new Chinese evidence.1 While thisresearch has greatly illuminated Chinesedecision-making, scholars still have beenunable to ascertain precisely what transpiredbetween the Chinese and Soviet leadershipsafter the outbreak of the crisis. The docu-ment printed below, a previously secret 27September 1958 communication from theCentral Committee of the Communist Partyof the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) to the Cen-tral Committee of the Chinese CommunistParty (CC CPC), an internally circulatedversion of which is now declassified andavailable to researchers at the Russian For-eign Ministry archives in Moscow, adds onemore piece of evidence to this puzzlingstory.

Two episodes relating to Soviet-Chi-nese interactions during the 1958 crisis haveattracted particular attention: the secret visitof Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromykoto Beijing and his talks with Chinese leaderson September 6-7; and the letter of SovietPremier Nikita S. Khrushchev to PresidentDwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 warn-ing that an attack on the People’s Republic

of China (PRC) would result in Soviet nuclearretaliation. Researchers have assumed forsome time that Soviet leaders were unhappywith the new Sino-American confrontationand considered the Chinese brinkmanship asa dangerous development that interfered withKremlin plans for “detente” with the West.In their memoirs, Khrushchev and, morerecently, Gromyko both described howpuzzled and alarmed they were by Mao’sseemingly reckless attitude toward nuclearwar as not only possible, but actually desir-able for the communist camp.2 However,Khrushchev’s September 7 public declara-tion to Eisenhower—stating that “An attackon the Chinese People’s Republic, which isa great friend, ally and neighbor of ourcountry, is an attack on the Soviet Union”3—seems to contradict this general thesis.

The secret letter from the CC CPSU tothe CC CPC printed below links the twopuzzling events noted above, and helps pointtoward possible answers to the questionsthey raise. It attests to the fact that, in spiteof the genuine tension between the two com-munist giants, the Khrushchev leadership atthat time still was determined to stand withBeijing at a moment of crisis, and tookadditional steps to prove that it remainedloyal to the spirit and letter of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950.

The first article of that treaty, concludedat the end of Mao Zedong’s summit meet-ings in Moscow with Stalin after the estab-

lishment of the PRC the previous fall, statedthat, “in the event of one of the ContractingParties being attacked by Japan or any stateallied with her and thus being involved in astate of war, the other Contracting Partyshall immediately render military and otherassistance by all means at its disposal.”4

(The United States was not mentioned byname in the text, but the implication wasclear enough.)

What emerged from the Gromyko-Chi-nese talks in early September 1958 and whatappeared to have worried the Kremlin lead-ership was not that the Chinese might pro-voke a general war with the United States.Rather, as the text of the Soviet letter belowimplies, it was the general assumption of theChinese Politburo that if the United States“should start a war against the People’sRepublic of China” and used tactical nuclearweapons against the PRC (in response toChinese attacks against the offshore islandsor Taiwan), the Soviet Union should remainpassively on the sidelines, as a strategicreserve in case the Americans decided tobroaden the war by using high-yield (e.g.,thermonuclear) weapons. This interpreta-tion of the Soviet commitments divergedsignificantly from Article I of the Treatysigned in Moscow eight years earlier.

In a forthcoming book, ConstantinePleshakov and I argue that many in theSoviet leadership were unhappy to see the

continued on page 226


lytic copper, the combination will be dis-solved when it is electrolyzed. Jiang Jieshiis [for us] a domestic issue, and you [Ameri-cans] are [for us] a diplomatic issue. [Thetwo] cannot be mixed up.

America now attempts to dominate fourout of the five continents, except for Austra-lia. First of all, in North America, this ismainly America’s own place, and its armedforces are there. The next is Central andSouth America where it intends to provide“protection,” although it does not have gar-risons there. Then, there are Europe, Africa,and Asia, to which [America] has given itsmain attention, and deployed its main forcein Europe and Asia. I do not know how it[America] can fight a war with a few sol-diers scattered everywhere. Thus, I believethat it focuses on occupying the intermedi-ate zone. As far as the territories of our[socialist countries] are concerned, I be-lieve that the Americans do not dare tocome, unless the socialist camp encountersbig trouble and they are convinced that theSoviet Union and China will totally collapseas soon as they come. Except for [thecountries belonging to] our camp, Americais seeking hegemony everywhere in theworld, including Latin America, Europe,Africa, Asia, and, also, Australia. Australiahas linked itself with America through amilitary alliance and follows its orders. Is itbetter for America to try to control theseplaces by utilizing the banner of “anti-com-munism” or by fighting a real war againstcommunism? To fight [a real war] againstcommunism means to dispatch its troops tofight us and fight the Soviet Union. I wouldsay that the Americans are not so stupid.They only have a few soldiers to be trans-ferred here and there. After the incident inLebanon, American troops were transferredthere from the Pacific. After they arrived inthe Red Sea area, the situation changedunfavorably [in the Pacific], and they turnedaround quickly and landed at Malaya. Theyannounced that [the troops] were taking avacation there, and kept quiet for seventeendays. Later, after one of their reportersclaimed that [America] was taking chargeof the Indian Ocean, everyone in the IndiaOcean [area] expressed opposition. Whenwe began our artillery bombardment,America came here since there were notenough [of its] troops here. It will probablybetter serve America’s interests if it leavessuch places like Taiwan in an earlier time. If

it continues to stay, let it be noosed here. Thiswill not affect the overall situation, and wecan continue the Great Leap Forward.

We should strive to produce eleven mil-lion tons of steel, doubling last year’s output.Next year another twenty million tons, striv-ing to reach thirty million tons. The yearafter next, another twenty million tons. Is itnot fifty million tons by then? Three years ofhard efforts, fifty million tons of steel. Atthat time, we will occupy third place in theworld, next only to the Soviet Union and theUnited States. The [steel] output of theSoviet Union reached fifty million [tons] lastyear. In three years, they can make it sixtymillion [tons]. If we make hard efforts in thenext three years, it is possible that [our steeloutput] may surpass fifty million tons. Inanother two years, by 1962, it is possible [forus to produce] eighty to a hundred milliontons [of steel], approaching the level of theUnited States (because of the impact ofeconomic recessions, America’s [steel out-put] will probably only reach a hundredmillion tons at that time). [At the end of] thesecond five-year plan, we will approach oreven surpass America. In another two years,in seven years, [we may] produce a hundredfifty million tons of steel, and surpass Americato become the number one in the world. It isnot good for us to name ourselves as the mostsuperior in the world, but it is not bad tobecome the number one steel producer. [Weshould also] make hard efforts in the nextthree years to [increase] grain production.The output of this year is between threehundred fifty to four hundred million tons.[The output] will double next year, reaching,probably, seven hundred fifty million tons.We should slow down a little bit the yearafter next, for we have to find outlets for[extra] grain. Food will be grain’s mainoutlet; but we also need to find other outletsin industry. For example, [using grain] toproduce ethyl alcohol, and, through ethylalcohol, to produce rubber, artificial fiber,plastic, and other things.

Let me talk a little bit more about thetense situation. You [Americans] cause thetense situation, and you think it advanta-geous to you, do you not? You may bewrong. The tense situation can mobilize thepeople in the world, making everyone blameyou Americans. When a tense situationemerges in the Middle East, everyone blamesthe Americans. When tension comes toTaiwan everyone again blames the Ameri-

cans. Only a few people blame us. TheAmericans blame us, Jiang Jieshi blames us,and Syngman Rhee blames us. Maybe thereare some others [who blame us], but mainlythese three. Britain is a vacillating element.While it will not be militarily involved, it issaid that it has strong sympathy politically.This is because Britain faces problems inJordan. How can it handle the situation inJordan if the Americans withdraw from Leba-non because [the British] failed to showsympathy [to the Americans]? Nehru issueda statement, which basically echoed us, sug-gesting that Taiwan and other [offshore]islands should be returned to us, but hopingthat a peaceful solution can be reached. Thecountries in the Middle East, especially Egyptand Iraq, warmly welcomed [our artillerybombardment] this time. They praise usevery day, saying that we have done the rightthing. This is because our [artillery bom-bardment] here has reduced the pressure theAmericans put on them.

I think that we can tell the people of theworld publicly that, in comparison, a tensesituation is more disadvantageous to thewestern countries, as well as more disadvan-tageous to America [than to them]. Why isit advantageous to them [the people of theworld]? Does the tense situation in theMiddle East do any good for America? Doesit do any good for Britain? Or is it moreadvantageous to the Arab countries and tothe peace-loving people in Asia, Africa,Latin America, and other continents. Towhich side is the tense situation in the Tai-wan [Straits] more advantageous? Let ustake our country as an example. Our countryis now experiencing a nationwide mobiliza-tion. If during the Middle East crisis aboutthirty to forty million people participated inthe rallies and protest parades, this time[during the Taiwan crisis] we will probablymobilize 300 million people [to participatein rallies and parades], educating them andtoughening them. This event will also ben-efit our unity with all democratic parties36 inChina because all the parties now share acommon goal. As a result, those who in thepast had knots in their hearts, who wereunhappy, and who were criticized will nowfeel a little bit more comfortable. If we cancontinue to handle the situation in this way,doing it again and again, we will all belongto the working class one day. Therefore, inmy view, the tense situation caused by theimperialists eventually becomes advanta-


geous to hundreds of millions of Chinesepeople who oppose imperialism, to peace-loving peoples all over the world, and to allsocial classes, all social ranks, and the gov-ernments [in various countries]. They nowhave to believe that America, always arro-gant and aggressive, is no good after all.[The U.S. government] moved six of itsthirteen aircraft carriers [to the TaiwanStraits]. Among these carriers, there aresome big ones with the size reaching 65,000tons. It is said that with 120 ships, it formsthe strongest fleet in the world. It does notmatter if you want to make it even stronger.It does not matter if you want to concentrateall of your four fleets here. I welcome youall. After all, what you have is useless here.Even though you move every ship you havehere, you cannot land. Ships have to be in thewater, and cannot come to the land. You cando nothing but make some threatening ges-ture here. The more you play, the more thepeople in the world will understand howunreasonable you are.

7. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh,10 September 1958Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:413

Comrade President:Your letter of 8 September37 has been

received. Thank you.I believe that (1) the Americans are

afraid of fighting a war. As far as the currentsituation is concerned, it is highly unlikelythat a big war will break out; and (2) it seemsto me that the business in your countryshould go on as usual.

8. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai andHuang Kecheng, 13 September 195838

Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao,7:416-417

Part OnePremier Zhou and Comrade Huang Kecheng:

[I] have received [the documents] yousent to me, including two intelligence re-ports on Jinmen’s situation and the order ofour military.39 In addition to carrying out[the operations] in accordance with the linesset up by the order, it is also necessary to firesome scattered shells day and night aroundthe clock, especially at night, shelling espe-cially the area within the three-mile radius ofLiaoluowan. The sporadic shelling (200 to

300 shells a day) will make the enemypanic[ky] and restless day and night. Itseems to me that [doing this] is a big, or atleast moderate, advantage [to us]. What isyour opinion about it? On the days of heavyshelling we will not fire scattered shells. Onthe days of light shelling we will use thismethod. For the sake of shelling Liaoluowanat night, [we] should accurately calibratebattery emplacements during daytime, whichwill make the shelling at night more accu-rate. Please seek opinions from [the peopleat] the front, to see if this method is workableor not.

As far as the Warsaw talks are con-cerned, in the next three to four days, or oneweek, [we] should not lay all of our cards onthe table, but should test [the Americans]. Itseems that it is unlikely for the other side tolay all of their cards out, and that they willalso test us. What is your opinion, Zhou[Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], Zhang [Wentian],40

and Qiao [Guanhua]41?Congratulations for the success from

the very start.

9. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 19September 1958Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 353

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:Your letter dated the night of the 18th

has been received. It is indeed very good.42

[I am] very happy after reading it since [we]have gained the initiative. Please take dueactions immediately. Please also pass yourletter and my reply here at once to ComradesWang Bingnan43 and Ye Fei. Make sure thatthey understand [the key to] our new policyand new tactics is holding the initiative,keeping the offensive, and remaining rea-sonable. We must conduct our diplomaticstruggle from a far-sighted perspective sothat it will develop without any difficulty.

Mao Zedong4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei

10. Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Conversationwith S.F. Antonov44 on the Taiwan Issue,5 October 1958 (Excerpt)45

Source: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 262-267

The entire situation has already changedat this point. Dulles’s press conferencepublished on 30 September reveals some

changes in America’s position. AlthoughDulles’s talks with reporters do not clearlyindicate [America’s new position], he ex-pressed ambiguously that if China commitsto a cease-fire, America can persuade Jiang’stroops to withdraw from the offshore islands[under his control]. Apparently Americaintends to carry out basically a policy to helpJiang slip away from Jinmen.

After Dulles made this suggestion, JiangJieshi became very upset. Jiang knew thecontent of Dulles’s talks in advance. Thus,he gave a speech on 29 September, andanother on 1 October, stating that the Ameri-cans had done a disservice to him. Two dayslater, when he talked to British reportersfrom The Times [of London], Jiang askedBritain to advise America not to be fooled[by the communists]. This is really funny.

Last night the Indian ambassador [toBeijing] hurriedly informed me of V. K.Krishna Menon’s plan [at the United Na-tions].46 Menon believes that current changesin the situation have already become a ten-dency. Thus, he is planning to make ageneral speech at the UN meeting, includinga suggestion that Jiang’s troops withdrawfrom the offshore islands and a request to usto stop fighting against Jiang. Britain at-tempted to mediate this affair in the past, butwe refused it. Dag Hammarskjold47 of theUN intended to talk to us through Norway,[but] we also turned it down. Even thoughAmerica was not willing to invite India [tomediate] before, it had no choice but toinvite Menon this time. Menon was unwill-ing to come himself, if America did not sendan invitation to him, or if he was unsureabout the situation. At the present, sinceMenon feels certain about the situation be-cause America has asked for his help, he isplanning to deliver this proposition. Ourassumption is as follows: after Menon makeshis proposition, it will be accepted by UNmembers, and then by most countries in theworld. Through this approach, the UN canput pressure on Jiang Jieshi and meanwhileask us to make compromises. Thereby,America can maneuver between Jiang andus to make a bargain.

We calculate that America has threecards to play:

First, to defend Jin[men]-Ma[zu].America’s proposition on 18 September re-quested our cease-fire on Jinmen, we re-jected it immediately. We have been eversince condemning America’s occupation of


Taiwan. America now attempts to expandits occupation to Jinmen-Mazu, we mustoppose it firmly. America dares not engagein a war merely for the sake of Jinmen,because the American people and its alliedcountries oppose it. Moreover, if Americawants a war for Jinmen, we are prepared tofight against it. In addition, the SovietUnion supports us. After our rejection,America took back its first card, that is,defending Jinmen and Mazu.

Its second card is about “two Chinas.”America’s proposition on 30 September hada central point of lining up China with theSoviet Union on the one side, and JiangJieshi with the United States on the otherside. It puts forth a “two Chinas” schemeand pushes us to accept the status quo. Wefirmly oppose it now, and will continue tooppose it.

The third is to freeze the Taiwan Straits.America intends to persuade Jiang’s troopsto withdraw from the offshore islands as anexchange to freeze the situation in the Tai-wan Straits, requesting our renouncing theuse of force on Taiwan, or our acceptingAmerica’s occupation of Taiwan as legiti-mate and “two Chinas” as “an existing fact.”America may not play its third card at once.As soon as Dulles’s meeting with presscaused Jiang Jieshi’s big complaints, Dulleswrote to Jiang for explanation and comfort.At the same time, Eisenhower informed theDemocratic chairman of the Senate ForeignRelations Committee that America couldnot yield to force. He, however, also saidthat if Communist China ceased fire,[America] could reconsider [the situationthere]. It shows that America is still waver-ing, though it wants to get away from Jinmen-Mazu.

According to the above calculations, Itold the Indian ambassador yesterday thatwe did not want Menon to deliver his propo-sition to the UN. We cannot trade a settle-ment of Jinmen-Mazu for a recognition ofAmerica’s occupation of Taiwan as legiti-mate and acceptance of the existence of so-called “two Chinas.”

Meanwhile, some Asian and Africancountries are suggesting that the Eight-na-tion Committee48 can draft a statement aboutthe Taiwan situation. I also told the Indianambassador yesterday that we believed thatthe Asian and African countries could hardlyissue such a joint statement since there ex-isted two different positions among them-

selves. I said to him it was better not to havethis kind of joint statement. If the statementmentioned a cease-fire, it would benefitAmerica; we had to oppose it. If the state-ment criticized both America and China, itwould be unable to tell right from wrong, wehad to disagree as well. A just statementshould include the following major points: torecognize firmly that Taiwan is China’s ter-ritory, and that no foreign countries are al-lowed to intervene; America should with-draw from the Taiwan Straits; no creation of“two Chinas”; China and America shouldcontinue their talks. Obviously, some coun-tries that follow America will not agree tothese points. Thus, if the Asian and Africancountries cannot issue a just statement, it isbetter for them not to issue any joint state-ment.

Moreover, this morning Comrade ChenYi49 met diplomatic envoys from eight con-cerned Asian and African countries that havediplomatic relations with China. Regardingthese countries’ discussion about issuing ajoint statement, he clarified the above posi-tion of the Chinese government and madefurther explanations.

I talked to you on 30 September [aboutour policy toward Taiwan]. Originally, ourplan had two steps: the first was to recoverthe offshore islands; the second to liberateTaiwan. Later, after we began shellingJinmen, our bombardment played a role tomobilize the people of the world, especiallythe Chinese people. Thereafter, many coun-tries launched and joined a new anti-Ameri-can movement on a much larger scale thanthat after the Lebanon event. The situationalready becomes clear. America knows thatwe do not want to fight a war against it.When it escorted Jiang Jieshi’s ships, we didnot fire [on them]. We have no intention toliberate Taiwan immediately. We know thatAmerica does not want to fight a war againstus over Jinmen either. It strictly restrained itsair and naval forces from entering our terri-torial waters between three and twelve milesfrom our coast. Currently America works onhow to persuade Jiang’s troops to withdrawfrom Jinmen-Mazu to prevent its forces frombeing pinned down in this region.

As I said to you on 30 September, werealized that it was better to keep Jiang Jieshion Jinmen-Mazu. After the CentralCommittee’s discussions, we still believethat it is the best to keep Jiang Jieshi onJinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands. It

is extremely beneficial [to us] that Jiangstays at Jinmen and Mazu, and Americacontinues to intervene. It will educate thepeople of the world, especially the Chinesepeople. We will not let America go, when itwants to get away from Jinmen and Mazu.We demand that America withdraw its armedforces form Taiwan. Under this circum-stance, if we need tension, we can shellJinmen and Mazu; if we want relaxation, wecan stop shelling. As Comrade [Liu] Shaoqisaid to you, [we can] have small-, or me-dium-, or large-scale shelling of Jinmen.We can have shelling while negotiating, andwe can stop shelling anytime we like. Thisis advantageous for us. So we are not goingto recover these offshore islands in the nearfuture. We will take back them together withthe Penghus and Taiwan later.

Thus, we decided to issue a “Message tothe Compatriots in Taiwan” in the name ofour defense minister. [It indicates that] wewill suspend our shelling for seven daysfrom 1:00 p.m. on 6 October so as to allowJiang’s troops to transport their logistic sup-plies easily. Our suspension of bombard-ment, however, has a precondition that noAmerican ships provide escort. Moreover,[it] suggests a direct negotiation with JiangJieshi searching for peaceful solutions to theconflicts between both sides. Since ourshelling is actually a punitive operationagainst Jiang’s troops, we can slow it downas long as Jiang is willing to cooperate [withus]. If he is not, we will continue to punishhim. Therefore, we will always be in apositive position.

Our purpose in publishing this “Mes-sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan” is todeepen the conflicts between America andJiang. Jiang’s current garrison on Jinmen,about 80,000 men under the command ofChen Cheng,50 is the main strength of Jiang’sforces. Jiang Jieshi wants to defend Jinmento the last and drag America down to thewater. Chen Cheng, however, wants to savethese troops. If we bottle up the troops onJinmen, it is easier for America to encourageChen to persuade Jiang to withdraw histroops from the offshore islands. If we letthese troops stay on Jinmen, Jiang and Chencan use them to drive a hard bargain withAmerica. In our message to the compatriots[in Taiwan], we warn them that Americawill abandon them sooner or later. There isno need to fight for America’s interestsbetween the two Chinese sides. Although


we can possibly fight for thirty more years,it is better [for both sides] to talk for solu-tions.

To be sure, [on the one hand,] JiangJieshi will likely hold a press conference [assoon as we publish our message], accusingus of attempting to cast a bone between himand America, saying that he will never sitdown with the Chinese Communists for ne-gotiations, and so forth. In his mind, how-ever, Jiang can figure out himself that thereis a lot behind this, and that he can make afurther bargain with America. This is his oldtrick. On the other hand, Americans willalso criticize the Chinese Communist at-tempt to drive a wedge between them andJiang. But, meanwhile, they will suspect intheir minds that we suddenly let up pressureon Jinmen, almost blockaded to the death,because there might be a tacit agreementbetween us and Jiang. The louder Jiangyells, the more suspicious the Americanswill become.

Therefore, we cause a new dilemma forAmerica, and it does not know how to copewith it. America is facing a very difficultsituation right now. It originally planned topersuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw [fromJinmen]. If it again suggests withdrawal,Jiang Jieshi will say that America abandonshim. If America stops persuading Jiang towithdraw, we will achieve our goal.

11. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kechengand Peng Dehuai, 5 October 1958Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:437

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang]Kecheng:

Our batteries should not fire a singleshell on 6 and 7 October, even if there areAmerican airplanes and ships escorts. If theenemy bombs us, our forces should still notreturn fire. [We should] cease our activities,lie low, and wait and see for two days. Then,we will know what to do. Although the airforce must carry on our defense, the air-planes should not fly off the coast. One morething: do not issue any public statementduring these two days because we need towait and see clearly how the situation willdevelop. Please carry out the above orderimmediately. Or [you can] pass this letter[as an order] to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu.51

Mao Zedong

8:00 A.M., 5 OctoberP.S.: After you have handled this letter,please convey it to the Premier.52

12. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kechengand Peng Dehuai, 6 October 1958Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:437

Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Kecheng]:Please pass on to Han [Xianchu] and Ye[Fei]:

Yesterday I said not to issue any publicstatement, and to wait and see for two days.Later [I] thought about this again, and con-sidered it more appropriate to issue a state-ment first. This is the reason for [me towrite] the “Message to the Compatriots inTaiwan.”53 This statement is about to beissued, please instruct the Fujian Front radiostation to broadcast it repeatedly.

Mao Zedong2:00 A.M., 6 October

Send this to [Huang] Kecheng for handlingimmediately.54

13. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai,11 October 1958Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:449-450

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:No hurry to reply to the letters from the

Soviets.55 Need to discuss them first.Cao Juren56 has arrived. Ignore him for

a few days, do not talk to him too soon. [I]will think about whether I need to meet himor not.

Tell [Huang] Kecheng to double-checkaccurate numbers of how many enemy air-planes we shot down, and how many of ourplanes were shot down in more than fiftydays of air engagements since the Shantouair battle on 19 August. Prepare the statisticsfor the Soviets’ information. They believedthe enemy’s false information and do notknow the true story. [The Soviets] shouldsell ground-to-air missiles to us, and let uscontrol the employment of them. The Sovi-ets may send a few people to teach us how touse them. I intend to adopt this policy. [Wecan] discuss and decide whether it is appro-priate tonight or tomorrow night.


14. Notation, Mao Zedong on Zhou Enlai’sReport, “On the Shelling of Jinmen,” 20October 195857

Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:466

Part IThe report is approved.

Part IIIt is more appropriate to start shelling onehour after, or half hour after, the reading [ofthe order] is finished.58

15. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai,Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 31 October1958Source: Mao Zedong Wengao, 7:479

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and[Huang] Kecheng:

[We] should extend the areas where noshelling is allowed on even-numbered days.That means shelling will be prohibited oneven days on all fronts. Allow Jiang’s troopsto come outdoors and get some sunshine sothat they can continue to stay there. Only firea few shells on odd days. Instruct the Fujian[front] by internal channels to carry it out.Do not issue public statement at this point. Ifthere is a need later, [we] will considermaking an announcement then. Please dis-cuss and decide on this matter.

I am leaving for a southern trip thisafternoon.


16. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai,Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 2 November1958Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:490

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and[Huang] Kecheng:

Suggest having a heavy all day shellingtomorrow (the 3rd, an odd day). Fire at least10,000 shells and bomb all the military tar-gets [on Jinmen] in order to affect America’selection, promoting the Democrats’ victoryand the Republicans’ defeat. Meanwhile,give Jiang’s troops an excuse for refusing towithdraw [from Jinmen]. Please considerand decide if this is proper.


Mao Zedong5:00 A.M., 2 November in Zhengzhou

17. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 2November 1958

Part One59

Attention, Military and Civilian Compatri-ots on the Jinmen Islands:

Tomorrow, 3 November, is an odd-numbered day. You must make sure not tocome outside. Do be careful!

Part TwoDeliver to Premier Zhou.The Xiamen Front must broadcast [the

message] this afternoon (2 November) forthree times.

18. Comments, Mao Zedong, on “HuanXiang on the Division within the WesternWorld,” 60 25 November 1958Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:581-582

Part IHuan Xiang’s viewpoint is right. The

situation in the Western world is indeeddisintegrating. Even though currently it isin the middle of a gradual disunification andnot yet breaking into pieces, the West ismoving toward its inevitable final disinte-gration. It will probably take a long time,not overnight nor a single day, for thisprocess. The so-called united West is purelyempty talk. There may be a kind of unitythat Dulles is struggling for. But [he] wants[the West] to “unite” under the control ofAmerica, and asks all his partners and pup-pets to get close to America in front of itsatomic bombs, paying their tributes andkowtowing and bowing as America’s sub-jects. This is America’s so-called unity.The current situation must move toward theso-called unity’s opposite—disunity. Com-rades, please take a look at today’s worldand ask which side has the real control.

Mao ZedongPart IIComrade [Deng] Xiaoping:

Please print and distribute this report.

Mao Zedong10:00 A.M., 25 November

1. Wu Lengxi, a member of the CCP Central Committee,served as director of Xinhua (New China) News Agencyand editor-in-chief of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) in1958.2. Beidaihe is a beach area located at the border of Hebeiand Liaoning provinces, where Chinese leaders regu-larly take vacations and hold meetings during summer.3. Hu Qiaomu, a CCP theorist, was Mao Zedong’spolitical secretary and a member of the CCP CentralCommittee.4. This refers to the Communist takeover in China in1949.5. In late 1957, the Beijing leadership began to plan todeploy air force units in the Fujian area, so that theGuomindang air force would no longer be able tocontrol the air (for more information on this matter, seedocument 1). On 18 July 1958, the CCP Central MilitaryCommission held an urgent meeting attended by headsof the PLA’s different arms and branches. Peng Dehuai,the defense minister, conveyed to the meeting MaoZedong’s instructions: Under the circumstances thatAmerica and Britain continued to dispatch troops to theMiddle East, the Guomindang planned a diversion bycausing a tense situation in the Taiwan Straits. In orderto provide effective support to the anti-imperialiststruggle by the people in the Middle East, it was neces-sary for China to take action. First, air force units shouldbe deployed in Fujian. Second, Jinmen islands should beshelled. The air force units must enter the air bases inFujian and eastern Guangdong by July 27. The next day,the Air Force Headquarters issued the operation order.After extensive preparations, on July 27, 48 MiG-17planes finally took position in the two air bases locatedrespectively at Liancheng, Fujian province, and Shantou,Guangdong province. (See Wang Dinglie et al., Dongdaizhongguo kongjun [Contemporary Chinese Air Force](Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 334-336.)6. Liu Shaoqi, vice chairman of the CCP Central Com-mittee and chairman of the Standing Committee of thePeople’s National Congress, was China’s second mostimportant leader; Zhou Enlai was vice chairman of theCCP Central Committee and China’s premier; DengXiaoping was the CCP’s general secretary7. Wang Shangrong headed the operations departmentof the PLA General Staff; Ye Fei was political commis-sar of the Fuzhou Military District.8. Cangao ziliao [Restricted Reference Material], aninternal publication circulated among high ranking Chi-nese Communist officials, published Chinese transla-tions of news reports and commentaries from foreignnews agencies, newspapers, and journals in a timelyfashion.9. On 23 April 1955, Zhou Enlai stated at the BandungConference that China was willing to hold talks with theUnited States to discuss all questions between the twocountries. On 13 July 1955, through Britain, the U.S.government proposed holding bilateral meetings atGeneva, Switzerland. The Chinese-American ambassa-dorial talks began on 1 August 1955 at Geneva andlasted until December 1957. In September 1958, duringthe Taiwan crisis, the Chinese-American ambassadorialtalks resumed in Warsaw, Poland.10. On 4 September 1958, Premier Zhou Enlai formallyannounced a twelve-mile zone off the Chinese coast asChina’s territorial waters.11. For the minutes of these two talks, see documents 5and 6.12. See note 9.

13. Zhongnanhai is the compound where top Chineseleaders live and work, and Fengzeyuan was MaoZedong’s residence in the 1950s.14. The Juixiang Study was the location of Mao’s officein Zhongnanhai.15. General Zhang Zhizhong, who had been JiangJieshi’s subordinate, shifted to the Communist side in1949 and was then vice chairman of China’s nationaldefense commission.16. For the transcript of Dulles’s answers, see The NewYork Times, 1 October 1958, 8.17. Hu Shi (1891-1962), a prominent Chinese scholarand Chinese ambassador to the United States during theSecond World War, had a pro-American reputation. Hethen served as president of the Central Academy[Academia Sinica] in Taipei.18. Sun Liren, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute,commanded the Taiwan garrison in 1949, when theGuomindang government moved from mainland Chinato Taiwan. In 1955, Jiang dismissed Sun and placed himunder house arrest.19. This is also known as the “May 24th Incident.” On20 March 1957, an American army sergeant, Robert R.Reynolds, shot a Chinese, Liu Zhiran, in Taipei’s Ameri-can military residence area. On 23 May 1957, an Ameri-can court-martial found Reynolds not guilty. The nextday, a riot involving tens of thousands protesters eruptedin Taipei, with the American Embassy and other Ameri-can agencies as the target. Guomindang authoritiesannounced martial law in Taipei on the same evening tocontrol the situation.20. Tian Jiaying (1922-1966) was Mao Zedong’s secre-tary from October 1948 to May 1966, when he commit-ted suicide.21. This is a collection of bizarre stories by Pu Songlingwritten during Qing times.22. Mao Zedong wrote his remarks on the 9 December1957 report of Chen Geng, the PLA’s deputy chief ofstaff, to Peng Dehuai. Chen Geng’s report stated: “Thisyear, planes from Taiwan have frequently invaded [theair space] of important coastal cities and the inner landof the mainland, dropping large numbers of reactionaryleaflets and ‘condolence gifts,’ creating a very badimpression on the masses. Because some leading mem-bers of our army failed to take anti-aircraft operationsseriously and their superiors failed to supervise themclosely, [we have been] unable to shoot down any of theinvading planes [dispatched by] Jiang [Jieshi]. In orderto improve quickly this situation, we have arranged forthe air force and all military regions to take everypositive and effective step necessary to attack the Jiangplanes that are invading the mainland, trying our best toshoot them down.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji,6:372.) Chinese air force units finally took position inFujian on 27 July 1958. See note 5.23. Mao Zedong composed this letter on the eve of thedeadline previously established by the CCP leadershipto shell Jinmen. On 15 July 1958, the Eisenhoweradministration dispatched 5,000 American marines toland in Lebanon. On July 17, the Beijing leadershipmade the decision to bombard Jinmen, and China’sdefense minister, Peng Dehuai, conveyed the decisionto the General Staff. On the evening of July 18, MaoZedong spoke at a decision-making meeting attendedby vice chairmen of the Central Military Commissionand leading officers of the air force and navy, emphasiz-ing that the Arab people’s anti-imperialist struggleneeded more than moral support and China would takereal action. He stated that since Jinmen and Mazu wereChina’s territory and the shelling of Nationalist troopsthere was China’s internal affair, it would be difficult


for the enemy to use this as an excuse [to attackmainland China) while at the same time it would playthe role in checking American actions in the MiddleEast. He believed that the shelling should last for two tothree months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaireda Central Military Commission meeting, which sched-uled the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25.During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered theartillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to “pre-pare for an operational order at any moment.” At thisjuncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter.24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered theartillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone thebombardment and focus on making further prepara-tions for the shelling.25. After three weeks of “waiting and seeing,” MaoZedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. Thisletter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve ofthe shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided toorder the artillery forces concentrated on the FujianFront to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment ofGuomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Mazu)to isolate them. He suggested that after a period ofshelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmenand Mazu. If this happened, it would be decided at thattime if the shelling should be followed by landingoperations in accordance with the actual situation. OnAugust 21, the Central Military Commission issued theorder to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particu-larly emphasized that the shelling should focus on theenemy’s headquarters, artillery emplacements, radarfacilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It alsomade it clear that the initial shelling would last for threedays, and then the shelling would stop, so that the nextaction could be taken in accordance with the responsesof the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizhi et al.,Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [TheMilitary Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army](Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.)26. The italics are Mao’s.27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinesemilitary planners believed that they had succeeded incutting off Nationalist troops on the island from theirsupplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authoritiesrepeatedly requested American assistance to supporttheir forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances,Mao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 tostop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing toobserve the responses of the other side.28. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission’s“Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwanand the Offshore Islands under Jiang’s Occupation.”The instruction emphasized that “because the struggleagainst Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang’soccupation is a complicated international struggle, whichhas huge influence in various aspects, all operations andpropaganda should follow the principles of concentra-tion and unity, and no one should be allowed to act onhis own.” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:376-377)29. Lu Dingyi, an alternate member of the CCP Polit-buro, headed the CCP’s Central Propaganda Depart-ment.30. The Baghdad Pact Organization (CENTO), estab-lished in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan,and Turkey. The United States was related to theorganization as an “observer.” The Manila Treaty Or-ganization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain,New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, andthe United States, is better known as the Southeast AsiaTreaty Organization (SEATO).

31. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) was Egypt’spresident from 1956 to 1970.32. The “Rightists” referred to by Mao were intellectu-als who had been criticized and purged during the“Anti-Rightist” campaign in 1957.33. He Yingqin (Ho Yingching, 1890-1987) was a highranking Nationalist officer. During China’s War ofResistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served aschief of the general staff and headed the Military-Political Department of the Military Commission of theNationalist Government.34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was India’s premierfrom 1947 to 1964.35. Admiral Roland Smoot was head of the TaiwanDefense Command.36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party,eight “democratic parties” existed, all claiming to fol-low the CCP’s leadership.37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president ofthe Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam),telegraphed to Mao Zedong: “Considering the tensesituation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S.imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possiblefor a war to break out between China and the UnitedStates? (B) What preparations should we make here inVietnam?” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,7:413-414.)38. Starting on September 7, American naval shipsbegan escorting Guomindang transport vessels deliver-ing supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjustedits strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. Thisbecomes the background of this letter and the CMC’sorder cited in the next note.39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission’sorder, “On the Shelling of Jinmen,” issued at 11:15a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: “(1) If theAmerican ships continue their escort today and anchorthree miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries shouldshell Jiang’s transport ships entering the Liaoluowanharbor to unload and the people working there. Theships not entering the harbor, be they America’s orJiang’s, should not be shelled. In terms of the standardfor firing artillery shells, it should be set at the levelneeded to sink or to expel Jiang’s transport ships, whileat the same time damaging the enemy positions onground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and anti-aircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal withthe air raids by Jiang’s planes. The air force and anti-aircraft units should well coordinate their operations. Ifenemy planes attack our positions, our fighters mayoperate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to betterhandle opportunities. But our bombers should not besent out today. (3) In accordance with the aboveprinciples, you may make your own decisions on spe-cific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If thesituation changes, [you] must report immediately sothat [we] can report it to the Central Committee to makenew decisions.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji,6:380.)40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCPPolitburo, was China’s first vice foreign minister.41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreignminister; he later served as China’s foreign minister inthe mid-1970s.42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-Americanambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 inthis letter, concluding that China had gained the initia-tive at the meeting.43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, wasthen engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the Ameri-cans in Warsaw.

44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet chargé d’affaires toChina.45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to thealliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing,holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong andother CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however,did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans tobombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of theTaiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent AndreiGromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing’s leaders told theSoviets that they had no intention to provoke a directconfrontation between China and the United States, letalone one between the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relativelywell informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis.46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed theIndian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962.47 Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplo-mat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to1961.48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a groupestablished by Asian and African countries at the UN todraft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nationsincluded Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq,Japan, and the Philippines.49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Polit-buro, was China’s vice premier and foreign minister.50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice presi-dent and prime minister in Taiwan.51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of thePLA’s Fuzhou Military District.52. The italics are Mao’s.53. The “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” wasbroadcast on the morning of 6 October and published inall major newspapers in mainland China the same day.The message announced that the PLA would stopshelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalisttroops to receive supplies.54. The italics are Mao’s.55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, NikitaKhrushchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed toMao Zedong to inquire about Beijing’s intentions onhandling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about thereliability of Beijing’s statistics on the results of airbattles with Guomindang air force, offering to provideChina with ground-to-air missiles.56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had exten-sive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, hevisited Beijing with a commercial delegation fromSingapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him,mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD hadcooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible forthe two parties to cooperate for a third time to bringabout Taiwan’s “peaceful liberation.” After returningto Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with ZhouEnlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao againvisited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messagesbetween Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Maomentioned Cao’s name on the eve of the second “Mes-sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” announcing thatthe PLA would stopping shelling Jinmen for anothertwo weeks, issued during the evening of October 12.57. At 12:30 p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent thefollowing report to Mao Zedong: “The broadcasts towarn America against using its escort vessels in thewaters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. Thebroadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese andEnglish. The texts are attached to this report. The draftof the Defense Ministry’s order has been completed. Itis also enclosed here for your consideration. Please


return it to me right after you have read and approvedit. Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent toComrades Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Huang[Kecheng] for their reading and checking. Everythingis ready on the Xiamen front. Our order [for theshelling] has already been issued [to the front] sepa-rately by telephone and in writing which was signed by[Huang] Kecheng. The order limits shelling to fortifi-cations, defense works, and beachhead boats on theJinmen islands. No shelling of civilian villages, garri-son camps, and command headquarters is allowed,particularly no shelling of any American ships. Our airand naval forces will make no movement at this time.The Defense Ministry’s order will be broadcast at 3:00[p.m.] in Chinese and foreign languages at the sametime. As soon as the reading of the order is finished,[our batteries] will open fire.” (Source: Jiangguo yilaiMao Zedong wengao, 7:466-467.)58. The italics are Mao’s.59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast.60. Huan Xiang was Chinese chargé d’affaires inBritain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to theChinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled thereport “Huang Xiang on the Division within the West-ern World.” The main points of the report were asfollows: The two-year long British-French negotiationto establish a free trade zone in Western Europe hadrecently failed, and a trade war between imperialistcountries had started. The British plans to divide WestGermany and France, neutralize Belgium and Holland,and sabotage the European Common Market had failed.In an economic sense, this was not a big failure forBritain. In a diplomatic sense, however, this was thefirst serious failure Britain had suffered in its diplo-macy toward West Europe. Now Britain faced twoimportant choices: it could take retaliatory measuresand thus destroy the political and economic coopera-tions between European countries, or it could return tonegotiations, searching for the basis of a temporarycompromise. It seemed that only one choice was fea-sible for Britain, that is, to make a continuous effort tofind ways to compromise with France and Germany,and to seek the support of the United States. This failureon the part of Britain reflected the fact that Britain’sposition as the “second power” in the capitalist worldhad been weakened further, and that the postwar Brit-ish hegemony in Western Europe had been thoroughlyshaken. The balance of power in continental WesternEurope now tilted toward France and West Germany,and against Britain. As far as the triangular relationsbetween Britain, France, and Germany were concerned,it seemed that Britain would continue to attempt to takeadvantage of French-West German contradictions inorder to divide the two countries, making them checkeach other. This balance of power policy would cer-tainly last a long time. The balance of power amongimperialist countries in West Europe was changing,and the contradictions between the imperialists overWest European problems had never been so sharp.(Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:582-5823.)

Li Xiaobing is Assistant Professor of History,University of Central Oklahoma; Chen Jian isAssociate Professor of History, Southern IllinoisUniversity at Carbondale, and author of China’sRoad to the Korean War: The Making of theSino-Soviet Confrontation (New York: Colum-bia University Press, 1994); David L. Wilson isAssociate Professor of History, Southern IllinoisUniversity at Carbondale.

Chinese leadership developing their ownschool of brinkmanship that threatened todraw the USSR into a conflict with the UnitedStates. Yet, there is no reason to believe thatKhrushchev, the real authority behind theSoviet letter, was dismayed by the Chineseposition (though he may well have beenmiffed that Mao failed to tip him off duringhis summit in Beijing only a few weeksbefore the PRC opened the crisis by shellingthe offshore islands on August 23).Khrushchev, it appears, actually supportednuclear brinkmanship as a means of achiev-ing China’s reunification, provided that thepolicy was fully coordinated with the Krem-lin.5 He therefore took the Chinese position,reported to him in an urgent cable fromGromyko, as an indication that the Chineseleaders had begun to put their national inter-ests above the common interests of the “en-tire Socialist camp.” This effective unilat-eral Chinese revision of the Treaty signifiedan implicit challenge to the unity of thecommunist bloc under Kremlin leadership—and was therefore anathema to Soviet leaderson both political and ideological grounds.Hence the letter decries the peril of disunityin the strongest terms possible: “...a crimebefore the world working class ... a retreatfrom the holy of holies of the Communists—from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.”

Khrushchev evidently dictated his letterto Eisenhower immediately after he receivedthe warning from Gromyko. It took him 20more days to address the Chinese leadershipthrough party channels. It is still unclearwhat happened inside the Kremlin in theinterim. In effect, in turn, Mao took about thesame time to respond to the CC CPSU’sletter. In a personal letter to Khrushchev, hethanked him “heartily” for his stand andwrote that the Chinese leadership had been“deeply moved by your boundless loyalty tothe principles of Marxism-Leninism and in-ternationalism.”6

In sum, this episode testifies to the am-biguous nature of the Soviet-Chinese rela-tionship: for the majority of the leadership onboth sides, it continued the grim comedy ofmisunderstandings; only Khrushchev beganto suspect what was occurring in farawayBeijing. Behind the facade of proletarianinternationalism the Sino-Soviet rift wasdeepening and would erupt in earnest only a

year later, in the autumn of 1959.

*********

From the CC CPSU’s letter to theCentral Committee of the CPC About

the USSR’s Readiness to ProvideAssistance to the PRC in the Event ofan Attack on It From the Side of theUSA or Japan, 27 September 1958

... Comrade Gromyko informed us abouthis conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlaiwhich took place in Peking on 7 September.Comrade Zhou Enlai said that in the consid-eration of the situation in the Taiwan regionthe Politburo of the Central Committee ofthe Communist Party of China proceededfrom the fact that should the USA start a waragainst the People’s Republic of China andin this event uses tactical nuclear weapons,then the Soviet Union will make a sternwarning to the USA but will not take part inthe war. Only in the event that the UnitedStates uses large yield nuclear weapons, andin this way risks widening the war, will theSoviet Union make a retaliatory strike withnuclear weapons.

We carefully considered this issue anddecided to express to you our opinion... Wecannot allow the illusion to be created amongour enemies that if an attack will be launchedagainst the PRC by the USA or Japan—andthese are the most likely adversaries,—or byany other state, that the Soviet Union willstand on the sidelines as a passive observer.

Should the adversary even presume this,a very dangerous situation would be created.It would be a great calamity for the entireSocialist camp, for the Communist workingclass movement, if, when atomic bombshave begun to fall on the Chinese People’sRepublic and China has begun to pay withthe life of its sons and daughters, the SovietUnion, possessing terrible weapons whichcould not only stop but could also devastateour common enemy, would allow itself notto come to your assistance. This would be acrime before the world working class, itwould be a retreat from the holy of holies ofthe Communists—from the teaching ofMarxism-Leninism.

Thank you for your nobility, that youare ready to absorb a strike, not involving theSoviet Union. However, we believe, and areconvinced, that you also agree that the mainthing now consists of the fact that everyone

KHRUSHCHEV’S NUCLEAR PROMISEcontinued from page 219


has seen—both our friends and, especially,our enemies—that we are firm and united inour understanding of the tasks, which flowfrom Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defendthe camp of Socialism, that the unity of allbrother Communist parties is unshakeable,that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff tothe aggressor in the event of an attack on anySocialist state. This is necessary so that nohopes will arise in our enemies that they willbe able to separate us, so that no cracks willbe created which the enemy could be able touse to break the connection between theSocialist countries.

...It is necessary that neither our friendsnor our enemies have any doubts that anattack on the Chinese People’s Republic is awar with the entire Socialist camp. Forourselves we can say that an attack on Chinais an attack on the Soviet Union. We are alsoconvinced that in the event of an attack onthe Soviet Union the Chinese People’s Re-public would fulfill its brotherly revolution-ary duty. If we in this way will build ourpolicy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism,depending on the unity of our goals, on themight of our states, on our joint efforts, theuniting of which is favored by the geo-graphical disposition of our countries, thenthis will be an invincible shield against ourenemies....

[Source: Information and DocumentationAdministration, First Far Eastern Depart-ment, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949-1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)],Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963)(Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985;internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33.The letter appears in a formerly classifiedSoviet Foreign Ministry documentary col-lection on the history of Sino-Soviet rela-tions, originally prepared, for internal useonly, by an editorial collegium consisting ofKapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A.V.;Rogachev, I.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P.(Deputy Chairman). During his research inthe Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow,Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher atthe National Security Archive, took notesfrom the collection, and provided them toCWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff,National Security Archive.]

1. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: TheUnited States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 129-142; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul-ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267;Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle:Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1959 (Kent,OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; anddocuments translated, annotated, and introduced byXiao-bing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson printed inthis issue of the Cold War International History ProjectBulletin.2. Khrushchev Remembers, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston:Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 469-470; KhrushchevRemembers: The Glasnost Tapes, ed. Jerrold L. Schecterwith Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown,and Co., 1990), 147-150; “Memuari Nikiti SergeevichaKhrushcheva,” Voprosi istorii [Questions of History] 2(1993), 90-91; Andrei A. Gromyko, Memoirs (NewYork: Knopf, 1989), 251-252; see also Philip Taubman,“Gromyko Says Mao Wanted Soviet A-Bomb Used onG.I.’s,” New York Times, 22 February 1988, 1, 6-7.3. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul-ture, 255; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and theEagle, 198.4. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assis-tance Between the People’s Republic of China and theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, 14 February 1950,reprinted in English translation as an appendix to SergeiN. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncer-tain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260.5. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders fromStalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-versity Press, forthcoming, March 1996), 226-227.6. “We are deeply moved by your boundless loyalty tothe principles of Marxism-Leninism and international-ism. In the name of all my comrades-members of theCommunist Party of China, I express to you my heart-felt gratitude.” Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949-1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documentsand Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministryof Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no.148), 231-33.

Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at theNational Security Archive, contributes fre-quently to the Bulletin. His book, Inside theKremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders fromStalin to Khrushchev, co-authored withConstantine Pleshakov, will be published inMarch 1996 by Harvard University Press.


MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES’S“PEACEFUL EVOLUTION”

STRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROMBO YIBO’S MEMOIRS

Introduction, translation, andannotation by Qiang Zhai

Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chi-nese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925.During the Anti-Japanese War, he was aleading member of the CCP-led resistanceforce in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he waselected a member of the CCP Central Com-mittee at the Party’s Seventh Congress.During the Chinese Civil War in 1946-1949, he was First Secretary of the CCPNorth China Bureau and Vice Chairman ofthe CCP-led North China People’s Govern-ment. After the establishment of the People’sRepublic of China (PRC) in October 1949,he became Finance Minister. As a revolu-tionary veteran who survived the CulturalRevolution, Bo Yibo is considered one ofthe most powerful figures in China today.

Between 1991 and 1993, Bo publishedtwo volumes of his memoirs, Ruoganzhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recol-lections of Certain Major Decisions andEvents] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyangdangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The firstvolume covers the period 1949-1956 andthe second volume 1957-1966. In the pref-ace and postscript of his volumes, Bo notesthat in preparing his memoirs he has con-sulted documents in the CCP Central Ar-chives and received the cooperation of Partyhistory researchers. Bo’s reminiscencesrepresent the most important memoirs of ahigh-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966period.

As a still active senior leader, Bo is nota disinterested writer. His arguments andconclusions are completely in line with the1981 Resolution on Party History.1 Mem-oirs in China usually have a didactic pur-pose that encourages the creation of edify-ing stereotypes. Bo’s memoirs conform toa tradition in the writing of memoirs in thePRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo’smemoirs are dry and wooden. There is littledescription of the character and personali-ties of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo’svolumes follow another memoirs-writingtradition in the PRC, which tends to empha-size the role of groups and societal forces at

the expense of individuals. Despite thesedrawbacks, Bo’s memoirs contain many valu-able new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Es-pecially notable are Bo’s references to Mao’sstatements unavailable elsewhere. Since Boplayed a major role in Chinese economicdecision-making during the period, his mem-oirs are especially strong on this topic. Hesheds new light on such domestic events asthe Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns,the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposi-tion to Rush Advance, the Great Leap For-ward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, eco-nomic rectification in 1961-1962, and theSocialist Education Campaign. Althoughinternational relations in general does notreceive much attention, the volumes do in-clude illuminating chapters on some keyforeign policy decisions.2

The translation below is taken fromChapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138-1146). This section is very revealing aboutMao’s perception of and reaction to JohnFoster Dulles’s policy toward China in 1958-1959. The CCP leader took seriously state-ments by the U.S. Secretary of State aboutencouraging a peaceful change of the Com-munist system. In November 1959, accord-ing to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao’s secretary, preparedfor Mao translations of three speeches byDulles concerning the promotion of peacefulevolution within the Communist world. Af-ter reading the documents, Mao commentedon them before having them circulated amonga small group of Party leaders for discussion.Thus Bo’s memoirs not only provide freshtexts of what Mao said, but also an importantwindow into what he read. As a result, theinteractive nature of Mao’s activities—withhis top colleagues and his secretary—is opento examination. A sense of the policy-mak-ing process, as well as Mao’s opinions,emerges from Bo’s memoirs.

The years 1958-1959 were a crucialperiod in Mao’s psychological evolution.He began to show increasing concern withthe problem of succession and worried abouthis impending death. He feared that thepolitical system that he had spent his lifecreating would betray his beliefs and valuesand slip out of his control. His apprehensionabout the future development of China wasclosely related to his analysis of the degen-eration of the Soviet system. Mao believedthat Dulles’s idea of inducing peaceful evo-lution within the socialist world was already

taking effect in the Soviet Union, givenKhrushchev’s fascination with peaceful co-existence with the capitalist West. Maowanted to prevent that from happening inChina. Here lie the roots of China’s subse-quent exchange of polemics with the SovietUnion and Mao’s decision to restructure theChinese state and society in order to preventa revisionist “change of color” of China,culminating in the launching of the CulturalRevolution in 1966. Mao’s frantic responseto Dulles’s speeches constitutes a clear caseof how international events contributed toChina’s domestic developments. It alsodemonstrates the effects of Dulles’s strat-egy of driving a wedge between China andthe Soviet Union.

* * * * *

To Prevent “Peaceful Evolution” andTrain Successors to the Revolutionary

Cause

by Bo Yibo

According to the general law of social-ist revolution, only through the leadership ofa proletarian political party directed by Marx-ism, reliance on the working class and otherlaboring masses, and waging of an armedstruggle in this or that form can a revolutionobtain state power. International hostileforces to the newly born people’s govern-ment would always attempt to strangle it inthe cradle through armed aggression, inter-vention, and economic blockade. After thevictory of the October Revolution, the So-viet Union experienced an armed interven-tion by fourteen countries. In the wake ofWorld War II, imperialism launched a pro-tracted “Cold War” and economic contain-ment of socialist countries. Immediatelyafter the triumph of the revolution in Chinaand the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea,blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and imple-mented an all-out embargo against China.All of this shows that it will take a sharpstruggle with external hostile forces throughan armed conflict or other forms of contestbefore a newly born socialist country canconsolidate its power.

History suggests that although the armedaggression, intervention, and economicblockade launched by Western imperialistsagainst socialist countries can create enor-


mous problems for socialist countries, theyhave great difficulty in realizing their goal ofoverthrowing socialist states. Therefore,imperialist countries are inclined to adopt a“soft” method in addition to employing“hard” policies. In January 1953, U.S. Sec-retary of States Dulles emphasized the strat-egy of “peaceful evolution.” He pointed outthat “the enslaved people” of socialist coun-tries should be “liberated,” and become “freepeople,” and that “liberation can be achievedthrough means other than war,” and “themeans ought to be and can be peaceful.” Hedisplayed satisfaction with the “liberaliza-tion-demanding forces” which had emergedin some socialist countries and placed hishope on the third and fourth generationswithin socialist countries, contending that ifthe leader of a socialist regime “continueswanting to have children and these childrenwill produce their children, then the leader’soffsprings will obtain freedom.” He alsoclaimed that “Chinese communism is infatal danger,” and “represents a fading phe-nomena,” and that the obligation of the UnitedStates and its allies was “to make everyeffort to facilitate the disappearance of thatphenomena,” and “to bring about freedom inall of China by all peaceful means.”3

Chairman Mao paid full attention tothese statements by Dulles and watched care-fully the changes in strategies and tacticsused by imperialists against socialist coun-tries. That was the time when the War to AidKorea and Resist America had just achievedvictory, when the United States was con-tinuing its blockade of the Taiwan Straitsand its embargo, and when our domesticsituation was stable, “the First Five-YearPlan” was fully under way, economic con-struction was developing rapidly, and ev-erywhere was the picture of prosperity andvitality. At that moment, Chairman Mao didnot immediately bring up the issue of pre-venting a “peaceful evolution.” The reasonfor his later raising the question has to dowith developments in international and do-mestic situations.

In 1956, at the 20th Congress of theSoviet Communist Party, Khrushchev at-tacked Stalin, causing an anti-Communistand anti-Socialist wave in the world andtriggering incidents in Poland and Hungary.In 1957, a tiny minority of bourgeois Right-ists seized the opportunity of Party reform toattack the Party. In 1958, Khrushchev pro-posed to create a long-wave radio station and

a joint fleet with China in order to controlChina militarily; he also openly opposed ourParty’s “Three Red Flags”4 and objected toour just action of “shelling Jinmen5.” (Chair-man Mao once said that whether we bom-barded Jinmen or suspended our bombard-ment, our main purpose was to support theTaiwan people and the Taiwan regime tokeep Taiwan [from being] invaded and an-nexed by foreign countries.—Bo’s note).The above events alerted Chairman Mao.

In the meantime, the United States ac-tively practiced its strategy of promoting a“peaceful evolution” of socialist countries.In 1957, the Eisenhower administration in-troduced the “strategy of peaceful conquest,”aiming to facilitate “changes inside the So-viet world,” through a “peaceful evolution.”On October 24, 1958, in an interview with aBBC correspondent, Dulles asserted thatcommunism “will gradually give way to asystem that pays more attention to the wel-fare of the state and people,” and that at themoment, “Russian and Chinese Commu-nists are not working for the welfare of theirpeople,” and “this kind of communism willchange.”

Considering the situation in both theSoviet Union and at home, Chairman Maotook very seriously Dulles’s remarks. In aspeech to the directors of the cooperationregions6 on November 30, 1958, ChairmanMao noted that Dulles was a man of schemesand that he controlled the helm in the UnitedStates. Dulles was very thoughtful. One hadto read his speeches word by word with thehelp of an English dictionary. Dulles wasreally taking the helm. Provincial PartyCommittees should assign special cadres toread Cankao ziliao.7 Chairman Mao hasalways insisted that Party leaders at all lev-els, especially high-ranking cadres, shouldclosely follow international events and thedevelopment of social contradictions on theworld scene in order to be well informed andprepared for sudden incidents. It is verynecessary for Mao to make that demand.Chairman Mao read Cankao ziliao everyday. For us leading cadres, we should con-sider not only the whole picture of domesticpolitics but also the whole situation of inter-national politics. Thus we can keep clear-headed, deal with any challenges confidently,and “sit tight in the fishing boat despite therising winds and waves.” This is a veryimportant political lesson and a leadershipstyle.

In 1959, Sino-Soviet relations were evenmore strained and Sino-Soviet differenceseven greater. In January, the Soviet Unionofficially notified China that it would scrapunilaterally the agreement to help Chinabuild nuclear industry and produce nuclearbombs. In September when the Sino-IndianBorder Incident occurred, the Soviet Unionannounced neutrality, but in actuality it sup-ported India. It openly criticized China afterthe incident. At the Soviet-American CampDavid Talks during the same month,Khrushchev sought to improve relations withthe United States on the one hand and vehe-mently attacked China’s domestic and for-eign policies on the other.8 All these eventsconvinced Chairman Mao that the Sovietleadership had degenerated and thatKhrushchev had betrayed Marxism and theproletarian revolutionary cause and hadturned revisionist. At the Lushan Confer-ence held during July-August that year, whenPeng Dehuai9 criticized the “Three RedFlags,” Chairman Mao erroneously believedthat this reflected the combined attack on theParty by internal and external enemies. Fac-ing such a complex situation, Chairman Maofelt deeply the danger of a “peaceful evolu-tion.” Accordingly, he unequivocally raisedthe issue at the end of that year.

In November 1959, Chairman Mao con-vened a small-scale meeting in Hangzhouattended by Premier Zhou [Enlai], PengZhen,10 Wang Jiaxiang,11 Hu Qiaomu,12

among others, to discuss and examine theinternational situation at the time. Before theopening of the meeting, Chairman Mao askedhis secretary, Lin Ke, to find Dulles’sspeeches concerning “peaceful evolution”for him to read. Comrade Lin Ke selectedthree such speeches: Dulles’s address titled“Policy for the Far East” delivered beforethe California Chamber of Commerce onDecember 4, 1958, Dulles’s testimony madebefore the House Foreign Affairs Commit-tee on January 28, 1959, and Dulles’s speechtitled “The Role of Law in Peace” madebefore the New York State Bar Associationon January 31, 1959. Chairman Mao hadread these three speeches before. After re-reading them, he told Comrade Lin Ke of hisopinions about them and asked him to writecommentaries based on his views and insertthem at the beginning of each of Dulles’sstatements. After Comrade Lin Ke hadcompleted the commentaries, Mao instructedhim to distribute Dulles’s speeches, along


with the commentaries, to the membersattending the meeting.

The three speeches by Dulles all con-tained the theme of promoting a “peacefulevolution” inside socialist countries. Thethree commentaries based on ChairmanMao’s talks highlighted the key points inDulles’s remarks and warned of the dangerof the American “peaceful evolution” strat-egy. The first commentary pointed out:“The United States not only has no intentionto give up its policy of force, but also wants,as an addition to its policy of force, to pursuea ‘peaceful conquest strategy’ of infiltrationand subversion in order to avoid the pros-pect of its ‘being surrounded.’ The U.S.desires to achieve the ambition of preserv-ing itself (capitalism) and gradually defeat-ing the enemy (socialism).” After notingthe main theme of Dulles’s testimony, thesecond commentary contended: Dulles’swords “demonstrate that U.S. imperialistsare attempting to restore capitalism in theSoviet Union by the method of corrupting itso as to realize their aggressive goal, whichthey have failed to achieve through war.”The third commentary first took note ofDulles’s insistence on “the substitution ofjustice and law for force” and his contentionthat the abandonment of force did not meanthe “maintenance of the status quo,” butmeant a peaceful “change.” Then it went onto argue that “Dulles’s words showed thatbecause of the growing strength of the so-cialist force throughout the world and be-cause of the increasing isolation and diffi-culties of the international imperialist force,the United States does not dare to start aworld war at the moment. Therefore, theUnited States has adopted a more deceptivetactic to pursue its aggression and expan-sion. While advocating peace, the UnitedStates is at the same time speeding up theimplementation of its plots of infiltration,corruption, and subversion in order to re-verse the decline of imperialism and tofulfill its objective of aggression.”

At the meeting on November 12, Chair-man Mao further analyzed and elaboratedon Dulles’s speeches and the commentar-ies. He said:

Comrade Lin Ke has prepared forme three documents—threespeeches by Dulles during 1958-1959. All three documents have todo with Dulles’s talks about en-

couraging a “peaceful evolution”inside socialist countries. For ex-ample, at his testimony before theHouse Foreign Affairs Committeeon January 28 Dulles remarked thatbasically the U.S. hoped to encour-age changes within the Soviet world.By the Soviet world, Dulles did notmean just the Soviet Union. He wasreferring to the whole socialist camp.He was hoping to see changes in ourcamp so that the Soviet world wouldno longer be a threat to freedom onthe globe and would mind its ownbusiness instead of thinking aboutrealizing the goal and ambition ofcommunizing the world....

In commenting on Dulles’s statement ofJanuary 31, 1959, Chairman Mao asserted:

Dulles said that justice and lawshould replace violence and that warshould be abandoned, and law andjustice should be emphasized. Dullesalso argued that the abandonment offorce under the circumstances didnot mean the “maintenance of thestatus quo,” but meant a peaceful“change.” (laughter) Change whompeacefully? Dulles wants to changecountries like ours. He wants to sub-vert and change us to follow hisideas.... Therefore, the United Statesis attempting to carry out its aggres-sion and expansion with a much moredeceptive tactic.... In other words, itwants to keep its order and changeour system. It wants to corrupt us bya peaceful evolution.

Chairman Mao believed thatKhrushchev’s speeches reflected the “peace-ful evolution” advocated by Dulles and thatour principle should be:

Under the existing complex interna-tional conditions, our policy is toresist the pressures head-on—pres-sures from two directions,Khrushchev and Eisenhower. Wewill resist for five to ten years. To-ward the United States, we shoulddo our best to expose it with factsand we should do so persuasively.We will not criticize Khrushchev,nor will we attack him through im-

plication. We will only expose theAmerican deception and lay barethe nature of the so-called “peace”by the United States.

This is the first time that Chairman Maoclearly raised and insightfully elaborated onthe issue of preventing a “peaceful evolu-tion.” From that time on, he would pay moreand more attention to the matter. In a seriesof meetings that followed, he would repeat-edly alert the whole party on the issue andgradually unfold the struggle against the so-called revisionism both at home and abroad.

From 1960 forward, differences betweenthe Chinese and Soviet Parties increased.On April 22, an editorial titled “Long LiveLeninism” published by the journal Hongqi13

denounced Comrade Tito of Yugoslavia byname and criticized Khrushchev of the So-viet Union without mentioning his name.On internal occasions, we unequivocallypointed out that the Soviet Union had be-come revisionist and that we should learnthe Soviet lesson. We also felt that “revi-sionists” already existed in China and thatPeng Dehuai and some other comrades wereexamples. We warned against the emer-gence of revisionism in order to prevent a“peaceful evolution.” In his meeting withJespersen,14 Chairman of the Danish Com-munist Party, on May 28, 1960, ChairmanMao said: “There are also revisionists in ourcountry. Led by Peng Dehuai, a Politburomember, they launched an attack on theParty last summer. We condemned anddefeated him. Seven full and alternate mem-bers of our Central Committee followedPeng. Including Peng, there are eight revi-sionists. The total number of full and alter-nate members in our Central Committee is192. Eight people are merely a minority.”

At the “Seven Thousand Cadres Con-ference”15 held in January 1962, Comrade[Liu] Shaoqi delivered a “written report” onbehalf of the Party Central Committee. Hemade a special reference to the question ofopposing contemporary revisionism. In hisremarks concerning the issue of practicingdemocratic centralism, Chairman Maostated: “Without a highly developed democ-racy, there cannot be a high level of central-ism. Without a high level of centralism, wecannot establish a socialist economy. Whatwill happen then to our country if we cannotcreate a socialist economy? China will be-come a revisionist country, a bourgeois coun-


try in fact. The proletarian dictatorship willbecome not only a bourgeois dictatorshipbut also a reactionary and fascist dictator-ship. This is an issue that deserves fullattention. I hope our comrades will considerit carefully.” (Selected Readings of Chair-man Mao’s Works, Vol. II, pp. 822-823.)Here Chairman Mao officially sounded analarm bell for the whole party. In his meetingwith Kapo16 and Balluku17 of Albania onFebruary 3, 1967, Mao contended: At the“Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” in1962, “I made a speech. I said that revision-ism wanted to overthrow us. If we paid noattention and conducted no struggle, Chinawould become a fascist dictatorship in eithera few or a dozen years at the earliest or inseveral decades at the latest. This addresswas not published openly. It was circulatedinternally. We wanted to watch subsequentdevelopments to see whether any words inthe speech required revision. But at that timewe already detected the problem.”

At the Beidaihe Meeting and the TenthPlenum of the Eighth Central Committeeduring August and September, 1962, Chair-man Mao reemphasized class struggle inorder to prevent the emergence of revision-ism. On August 9, he clearly pointed out thenecessity of educating cadres and trainingthem in rotation. Otherwise, he feared thathe had devoted his whole life to revolution,only to produce capitalism and revisionism.On September 24, he again urged the party toheighten vigilance to prevent the countryfrom going “the opposite direction.” Thecommuniqué of the Tenth Plenum publishedon September 27 reiterated the gist of Chair-man Mao’s remarks and stressed that“whether at present or in the future, our Partymust always heighten its vigilance and cor-rectly carry out the struggle on two fronts:against both revisionism and dogmatism.”

From the end of 1962 to the spring of1963, our Party published seven articles insuccession, condemning such so-called “con-temporary revisionists” as Togliatti of Italy,18

Thorez of France,19 and the American Com-munist Party. On June 14, 1963, the CCPCentral Committee issued “A Proposal for aGeneral Line of the International Commu-nist Movement.” On July 14, the CentralCommittee of the Communist Party of theSoviet Union (CPSU) published “An OpenLetter to Party Units at All Levels and to AllMembers of the CPSU,” bringing the Sino-Soviet dispute to the open. From September

last to July 1964, our Party used the name ofthe editorial boards of the Renmin ribao andHongqi to issue nine articles, refuting theSoviet open letter and condemning“Khrushchev Revisionism” by name. Thusthe Sino-Soviet polemics reached a highpoint. In the meantime, the struggle to op-pose “revisionism” and to prevent a “peace-ful evolution” was accelerated at home.

1. The Resolution on Certain Questions in the Historyof Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Repub-lic of China was adopted by the Sixth Plenum of theEleventh Central Committee in June 1981. Whileaffirming the historical role of Mao Zedong, the resolu-tion also blames him for the Cultural Revolution. Afteran analysis of all the crimes and errors in the CulturalRevolution the resolution describes it as, after all, “theerror of a proletarian revolutionary.” It concludes thatalthough Mao has made “gross mistakes” during theCultural Revolution, “if we judge his activities as awhole, his contribution to the Chinese revolution faroutweighs his mistakes.” For the text of the resolution,see Resolution on CPC History (1949-1981) (Beijing:Foreign Languages Press, 1981).2. I have previously translated the chapter in the firstvolume concerning Mao’s decision to make an alliancewith the Soviet Union in 1949-1950. It was first pub-lished in Chinese Historians 5 (Spring 1992), 57-62,and later in Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill,eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations:Volume II: Since 1914, 4th ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C.Heath, 1995), 332-34.3. Bo does not mention precisely when and whereDulles made those remarks about Chinese communism.I have not been able to identify Dulles’s speech to whichBo is referring.4. The “Three Red Flags” refer to the General Line ofSocialism, the Great Leap Forward, and the People’sCommune.5. Jinman (Quemoy).6. These refer to the economic cooperation regionsestablished during the Great Leap Forward. China wasdivided into seven such regions.7. Cankao ziliao (Reference Material) is an internallycirculated reading material, which provided Party lead-ers with translations and summaries of internationalnews from foreign news agencies and press.8. According to the U.S records of the Camp Davidtalks, in his discussions with President Eisenhower,Khrushchev actually defended China’s position onTaiwan. See memorandum of conversation betweenEisenhower and Khrushchev, 26 and 27 September1959, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. X, Part I: Eastern Europe Region; SovietUnion; Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1993), 477-482.9. Peng Dehuai, Defense Minister and a Politburomember.10. Peng Zhen, Party Secretary of Beijing and aPolitburo member.11. Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP InternationalLiaison Department and a Secretary of the CCP CentralCommittee Secretariat.12. Hu Qiaomu, Mao’s political secretary and an Alter-nate Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secre-tariat.

13. Hongqi (Red Flag) is the official journal of the CCPCentral Committee.14. Knud Jespersen, leader of the Danish communistParty.15. The conference was held between January andFebruary, 1962 to review methods of Party leadershipand examine problems caused by the Great Leap For-ward.16. Hysni Kapo, a leader of the Albanian Labor (Com-munist) Party.17. Bequir Balluku, Defense Minister and a Politburomember of the Albanian Communist Party.18. Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian CommunistParty.19. Maurice Thorez, leader of the French CommunistParty.

Qiang Zhai teaches history at Auburn Uni-versity at Montgomery (Alabama) and is theauthor of The Dragon, the Lion, and theEagle: Chinese-British-American Relations,1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State Univer-sity Press, 1994).


This section of the Bulletin presentsnew evidence from Russian, Chinese, andPolish sources on one of the Cold War’smost costly conflicts: the Vietnam War, whichconsumed more than 58,000 American livesand, according to recent estimates, morethan 3.2 million Vietnamese lives. Pre-sented here are articles by Ilya V. Gaiduk(Institute of Universal History, Russian Acad-emy of Sciences, Moscow), who employsdocuments from the CPSU Central Commit-tee archives to illuminate Soviet policy to-ward the Vietnam conflict (in a foretaste ofhis soon-to-be published book on the sub-ject), and by Zhai Qiang (Auburn Universityat Montgomery), who uses newly releasedChinese sources to explore Beijing’s han-dling of the escalation of the war in 1964-65;and a precis of a secretly-prepared memoirby Jerzy Michalowski, a Polish diplomatwho was deeply involved in secret mediationefforts between the United States and NorthVietnam in the mid-1960s.

However, recognizing that the mostimportant “other side” for Americans dur-ing the Vietnam War was, of course, theVietnamese themselves, the Cold War Inter-national History Project has launched an

THE VIETNAM WAR AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1964-1973:

NEW RUSSIAN EVIDENCE

by Ilya V. Gaiduk

The Vietnam War stands out amongCold War crises for its scale, length, inten-sity, and global repercussions. The litera-ture on the war and the American role in itencompasses thousands of volumes, frompolitical memoirs to soldiers’ eyewitnessaccounts to historical and journalistic stud-ies, to novels and political science trea-tises.1 With the passage of time, ever moredocuments have been declassified, enablingmore thorough and comprehensive analy-ses. Now that there is substantial access toarchives in the former USSR, researchershave at their disposal a whole set of previ-ously unavailable materials which shed newlight on unresolved issues as well as onproblems which have either escaped theattention of Western scholars or have notyet been analyzed in detail.

One of those problems relates to theSoviet Union’s participation in the Vietnamconflict, particularly the nature of Soviet-American relations during the war andMoscow’s role as a potential mediator.Although many U.S. researchers have stud-ied these problems and, on the basis of thedocuments analyzed, drawn certain conclu-sions, their analyses of the subject were farfrom exhaustive and quite often insuffi-ciently corroborated by the necessary archi-val sources.

The present article assesses Sovietpolicy toward Vietnam and the war’s im-pact on U.S.-Soviet relations from 1964 tothe early 1970s on the basis of materialsbearing on this subject in the archive of theformer Communist Party of the Soviet UnionCentral Committee (CPSU CC)—a reposi-tory now known as the Storage Center forContemporary Documents (SCCD, orTsKhSD, in its Russian acronym)—locatedin the CC’s former headquarters in StarayaPloschad’ (Old Square) in Moscow. Thisreport was originally prepared for presenta-tion at the January 1993 Moscow Confer-ence on New Evidence on Cold War His-tory, organized by the Cold War Interna-tional History Project (CWIHP) in coopera-tion with the Institute of General History ofthe Russian Academy of Sciences andSCCD. Subsequently, the author expanded

his research into a far broader study of Sovietinvolvement in the Vietnam conflict, utiliz-ing sources in both Russian and Americanarchives (the latter during a CWIHP fellow-ship for research in the United States); thatstudy, The Soviet Union and the VietnamWar, is scheduled for publication by Ivan R.Dee (Chicago) in Spring 1996.

The SCCD archives contain materialsrelated to a broad range of the former CPSUCC’s work, primarily correspondence with awide range of Soviet organizations and es-tablishments dealing with various socio-eco-nomic, domestic, and foreign policy issues.The archive collections (fondy) include aconsiderable number of documents on thesubject of the Vietnam War and Soviet-American relations which were sent to theCPSU CC—mostly to the CC InternationalDepartment and the CC Socialist Countries’Communist and Workers’ Parties Depart-ment—by the Soviet Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Defense Ministry, and Committeeof State Security (KGB). Considerably lessfrequently encountered, alas, is documenta-tion illuminating recommendations, draftdecisions, and top-level decision-making.Thus, the top leadership’s decisions and themechanism of decision-making on this levelare only indirectly reflected in the SCCDmaterials. This unfortunate gap, naturally,creates problems for historians trying to de-termine how policy was actually made by thetop Soviet leadership on important foreignpolicy questions, and necessitates continuedefforts to increase access to materials inRussian archives that remain off-limits, par-ticularly the so-called Kremlin or Presiden-tial Archives, known officially as the Archiveof the President of the Russian Federation(APRF).

At the same time, the SCCD materialsenable historians not only to reconstruct manyevents related to the Vietnam War during theperiod in question, and to present matterswhich were previously interpreted only in-ferentially, but also to assess the develop-ment of U.S.-Soviet relations in close inter-connection with the conflict in SoutheastAsia. This last factor is of obvious import,for one can hardly study U.S.-Soviet rela-tions during the Vietnam War in isolationfrom an understanding of relations betweenthe Soviet Union and North Vietnam (theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam, or DRV),between the Soviet Union and the People’sRepublic of China (PRC), and between the

DRV and PRC. All those interconnectedrelations crucially influenced the relevantSoviet policies.

The escalation of the conflict in Viet-nam after the Tonkin Gulf incident in Au-gust 1964 and the February 1965 attack byarmed units of the National Front for theLiberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV, alsoknown as the NLF) on the base of Americanmilitary advisers in Pleiku (triggering U.S.aerial bombardment of North Vietnam inretaliation), coincided with a certain coolingin Soviet-North Vietnamese relations. Thischill between Moscow and Hanoi, in turn,

was partly attributable to the growing differ-ences between the USSR and the PRC, thetwo chief patrons and supporters of the Viet-namese struggle against the Saigon regime.2

Besides the impact of the Sino-Soviet split,the tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese re-lations during this stretch was also tied to therelatively moderate stand adopted by thethen Soviet government, under the leader-ship of Nikita S. Khrushchev prior to hisdownfall in October 1964. Owing to the

NEW EVIDENCE ON



BEIJING AND THE VIETNAMCONFLICT, 1964-1965:

NEW CHINESE EVIDENCE

by Qiang Zhai

The years 1964-1965 marked a crucialperiod in the Vietnam War. The Gulf ofTonkin Incident and subsequent U.S. esca-lation of war against North Vietnam repre-sented a major turning point in the Americanapproach to Indochina, as the Johnson Ad-ministration shifted its focus from Saigon toHanoi as the best way to reverse the deterio-

rating trend in South Vietnam and to per-suade the North Vietnamese leadership todesist from their increasing involvement inthe South. How did Beijing react toWashington’s escalation of the conflict inVietnam? How did Mao Zedong perceiveU.S. intentions? Was there a “strategicdebate” within the Chinese leadership overthe American threat and over strategies thatChina should adopt in dealing with the UnitedStates? What was in Mao’s mind when hedecided to commit China’s resources to

Hanoi? How and why did a close relation-ship between Beijing and Hanoi turn sourduring the fight against a common foe?Drawing upon recently available Chinesematerials, this paper will address these ques-tions.1 The first half of the article is prima-rily narrative, while the second half providesan analysis of the factors that contributed toChina’s decision to commit itself to Hanoi,placing Chinese actions in their domesticand international context.

China’s Role in Vietnam, 1954-1963

China played an important role in help-ing Ho Chi Minh win the Anti-French Warand in concluding the Geneva Accords in1954.2 In the decade after the Geneva Con-ference, Beijing continued to exert influenceover developments in Vietnam. At the timeof the Geneva Conference, the VietnameseCommunists asked the Chinese CommunistParty (CCP) to help them consolidate peacein the North, build the army, conduct landreform, rectify the Party, strengthen diplo-matic work, administer cities, and restorethe economy.3 Accordingly, Beijing sentFang Yi to head a team of Chinese economicexperts to North Vietnam.4

According to the official history of theChinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG),on 27 June 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap headed aVietnamese military delegation on a secretvisit to Beijing accompanied by WeiGuoqing, head of the CMAG in Vietnam.The Vietnamese visitors held discussionswith Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai,and General Petroshevskii, a senior Sovietmilitary advisor in China, regarding theDemocratic Republic of Vietnam’s recon-struction of the army and the war plan for thefuture. The DRV delegation visited theChinese North Sea Fleet before returning toHanoi in mid-July. That fall, on 15 October1955, Vo Nguyen Giap led another secretmilitary delegation to China, where he talkedwith Peng Dehuai and Soviet General Gushevagain about the DRV’s military develop-ment and war planning. The Vietnameseinspected Chinese military facilities andacademies and watched a Chinese militaryexercise before traveling back to North Viet-nam on December 11.5

The official CMAG history states thatduring both of Giap’s journeys to Beijing, he“reached agreement” with the Chinese andthe Russians “on principal issues.” But it

does not explain why Giap had to make asecond visit to China shortly after his firsttour and why the Soviet participants at thetalks changed. Perhaps disagreementemerged during the discussions of Giap’sfirst trip, leaving some issues unresolved. Infact, according to the study by the research-ers at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sci-ences, the Chinese and the Russians differedover strategies to reunify Vietnam. TheSoviet advisors favored peaceful coexist-ence between North and South Vietnam,urging Hanoi to “reunify the country throughpeaceful means on the basis of indepen-dence and democracy.” The Chinese Com-munists, conversely, contended that becauseof imperialist sabotage it was impossible toreunify Vietnam through a general electionin accordance with the Geneva Accords, andthat consequently North Vietnam shouldprepare for a protracted struggle.6

On 24 December 1955, the Chinesegovernment decided to withdraw the CMAGfrom Vietnam; Peng Dehuai notified VoNguyen Giap of this decision. By mid-March 1956, the last members of the CMAGhad left the DRV. To replace the formalCMAG, Beijing appointed a smaller team ofmilitary experts headed by Wang Yanquanto assist the Vietnamese.7

These developments coincided with amajor debate within the Vietnamese Com-munist leadership in 1956 over who shouldbear responsibility for mistakes committedduring a land reform campaign which hadbeen instituted since 1953 in an imitation ofthe Chinese model. Truong Chinh, GeneralSecretary of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party(VWP), who was in charge of the land re-form program, was removed from his posi-tion at a Central Committee Plenum held inSeptember. Le Duan, who became GeneralSecretary later in the year, accused TruongChinh of applying China’s land reform ex-perience in Vietnam without considering theVietnamese reality.8

The failure of the land-reform programin the DRV dovetailed with a growing real-ization that the reunification of the whole ofVietnam, as promised by the Geneva Ac-cords, would not materialize, primarily as aresult of U.S. support for the anti-Commu-nist South Vietnamese regime of Ngo DinhDiem, who refused to hold elections in 1956.As hopes for an early reunification dimmed,the DRV had to face its own economicdifficulties. The rice supply became a major

effort to organize collaborative researchwith Vietnamese scholars and to collect Viet-namese sources on the international historyof the Vietnam and Indochina conflicts. Tothis end, CWIHP has begun contacts withthe Institute of International Relations (IIR)in Hanoi on the possibility of organizing aninternational scholarly conference on thehistory of U.S.-Vietnam relations since WorldWar II. CWIHP, along with the NationalSecurity Archive at George WashingtonUniversity, is also collecting declassifiedarchival evidence from Vietnamese, Ameri-can, and other sources in connection with anoral history conference of senior formerVietnamese and American decision-makers(including Kennedy and Johnson Adminis-tration Defense Secretary Robert S.McNamara), to be organized by the Councilon Foreign Relations, the Center for For-eign Policy at Brown University, and theIIR. (Agreement in principle to hold theconference was reached during discussionsin Hanoi in November 1995.)

CWIHP also plans to devote a specialissue of the Bulletin to new evidence on thewar, primarily from Vietnamese sources.

--Jim Hershberg, Editor


problem as Hanoi, no longer able to counton incorporating the rice-producing Southinto its economy, was forced to seek alterna-tive food sources for the North and to pre-pare the groundwork for a self-supportingeconomy. In this regard, leaders in Hanoicontinued to seek Chinese advice despitethe memory of the poorly-implemented land-reform program. There are indications thatthe Chinese themselves had drawn lessonsfrom the debacle of the Vietnamese landreform and had become more sensitive toVietnamese realities when offering sugges-tions. In April 1956, Deputy Premier ChenYun, an economic specialist within the CCP,paid an unpublicized visit to Hanoi. At therequest of Ho Chi Minh, Chen proposed theprinciple of “agriculture preceding industryand light industry ahead of heavy industry”in developing the Vietnamese economy.The Vietnamese leadership adopted Chen’sadvice.9 Given the fact that the CCP wasputting a high premium on the developmentof heavy industry at home during its FirstFive-Year Plan at this time, Chen’s empha-sis on agriculture and light industry wasvery unusual, and demonstrated that theChinese were paying more attention to Viet-namese conditions in their assistance to theDRV. Zhou Enlai echoed Chen’s counsel ofcaution in economic planning during histour of Hanoi on 18-22 November 1956,when he told Ho Chi Minh to refrain fromhaste in collectivizing agriculture: “Suchchanges must come step by step.”10

Donald S. Zagoria argues in his bookVietnam Triangle that between 1957 and1960, the DRV shifted its loyalties fromBeijing to Moscow in order to obtain Sovietassistance for its economic development.11

In reality, the Hanoi leadership continued toconsult the CCP closely on such major is-sues as economic consolidation in the Northand the revolutionary struggle in the South.With the completion of its economic recov-ery in 1958, the VWP began to pay moreattention to strengthening the revolutionarymovement in the South. It sought Chineseadvice. In the summer of 1958, the VWPpresented to the CCP for comment twodocuments entitled “Our View on the BasicTasks for Vietnam during the New Stage”and “Certain Opinions Concerning the Uni-fication Line and the Revolutionary Line inthe South.” After a careful study, the Chi-nese leadership responded with a writtenreply, which pointed out that “the most

fundamental, the most crucial, and the mosturgent task” for the Vietnamese revolutionwas to carry out socialist revolution andsocialist construction in the North. As to theSouth, the Chinese reply continued, Hanoi’stask should be to promote “a national anddemocratic revolution.” But since it wasimpossible to realize such a revolution at themoment, the Chinese concluded, the VWPshould “conduct a long-term undergroundwork, accumulate strength, establish contactwith the masses, and wait for opportuni-ties.”12 Clearly, Beijing did not wish to seethe situation in Vietnam escalate into a majorconfrontation with the United States. Judg-ing by subsequent developments, the VWPdid not ignore the Chinese advice, for be-tween 1958 and 1960 Hanoi concentrated oneconomic construction in the North, imple-menting the “Three-Year Plan” of a socialisttransformation of the economy and society.

The policy of returning to revolutionarywar adopted by the VWP Central Committeein May 1959 did not outline any specificstrategy to follow. The resolution had merelymentioned that a blend of political and mili-tary struggle would be required. During thenext two years, debates over strategy andtactics continued within the Hanoi leader-ship.13 Ho Chi Minh continued to consult theChinese. In May 1960, North Vietnameseand Chinese leaders held discussions in bothHanoi and Beijing over strategies to pursuein South Vietnam. Zhou Enlai and DengXiaoping argued that in general politicalstruggle should be combined with armedconflict and that since specific conditionsvaried between the city and the countrysidein South Vietnam, a flexible strategy ofstruggle should be adopted. In the city, theChinese advised, political struggle wouldgenerally be recommended, but to deliver afinal blow on the Diem regime, armed forcewould be necessary. Since there was anextensive mass base in the countryside, mili-tary struggle should be conducted there, butmilitary struggle should include politicalstruggle.14 The Chinese policymakers, pre-occupied with recovery from the economicdisasters caused by the Great Leap Forward,clearly did not encourage a major commit-ment of resources from the North in supportof a general offensive in the South at thisjuncture.

In September 1960, the VWP convenedits Third National Congress, which made nomajor recommendations affecting existing

strategy but simply stated that disintegrationwas replacing stability in the South. To takeadvantage of this new situation, the Con-gress urged the party to carry out both politi-cal and military struggle in the South andcalled for an increase of support from theNorth.15 This emphasis on a combination ofpolitical and military struggle in the Southreflected to some degree the Chinese sug-gestion of caution.

In the spring of 1961, U.S PresidentJohn F. Kennedy approved an increase in theMilitary Assistance and Advisory Group(MAAG) of 100 advisers and sent to Viet-nam 400 Special Forces troops to train theSouth Vietnamese in counterinsurgency tech-niques. This escalation of U.S. involvementin Indochina aroused Chinese leaders’ con-cern. During DRV Premier Pham VanDong’s visit to Beijing in June 1961, Maoexpressed a general support for the wagingof an armed struggle by the South Vietnam-ese people while Zhou Enlai continued tostress flexibility in tactics and the impor-tance of “blending legal and illegal struggleand combining political and military ap-proaches.”16

1962 saw a major turning point in bothU.S. involvement in Vietnam and in Chineseattitudes toward the conflict. In February,Washington established in Saigon the Mili-tary Assistance Command, Vietnam(MAC,V), to replace the MAAG. TheKennedy Administration coupled this movewith a drastic increase in the number ofAmerican “advisers” and the amount of mili-tary hardware it was sending to the Diemregime, marking a new level of U.S. inter-vention in Vietnam.

That spring, an important debate brokeout within the Chinese leadership over theestimation of a world war, the possibility ofpeaceful coexistence with capitalist coun-tries, and the degree of China’s support fornational liberation movements. On Febru-ary 27, Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCPForeign Liaison Department, sent a letter toZhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi(the three PRC officials directly in charge offoreign policy), in which he criticized thetendency to overrate the danger of world warand to underestimate the possibility of peace-ful coexistence with imperialism. In termsof support for national liberation movements,Wang emphasized restraint, calling atten-tion to China’s own economic problems andlimitations in resources. On the issue of


Vietnam, he asked the party to “guard againsta Korea-style war created by American im-perialists,” and warned of the danger of“Khrushchev and his associates dragging usinto the trap of war.” Wang proposed that inorder to adjust and restore the economy andwin time to tide over difficulties, Chinashould adopt a policy of peace and concilia-tion in foreign affairs, and that in the area offoreign aid China should not do what itcannot afford.17 But Mao rejected Wang’sproposal, condemning Wang as promoting a“revisionist” foreign policy of “three ap-peasements and one reduction” (appease-ment of imperialism, revisionism, and inter-national reactionaries, and reduction of as-sistance to national liberation movements).18

The outcome of the debate had majorimplications for China’s policy toward Viet-nam. If Wang’s moderate suggestions hadbeen adopted, it would have meant a limitedChinese role in Indochina. But Mao hadswitched to a militant line, choosing con-frontation with the United States. This turnto the left in foreign policy accorded withMao’s reemphasis on class struggle and radi-cal politics in Chinese domestic affairs in1962. It also anticipated an active Chineserole in the unfolding crisis in Vietnam. Withthe rejection of Wang’s proposal, an oppor-tunity to avert the later Sino-American hos-tility over Indochina was missed.

In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minhand Nguyen Chi Thanh came to Beijing todiscuss with Chinese leaders the serioussituation created by the U.S. intervention inVietnam and the possibility of an Americanattack against North Vietnam. Ho asked theChinese to provide support for the guerrillamovement in South Vietnam. Beijing satis-fied Ho’s demand by agreeing to give theDRV free of charge 90,000 rifles and gunsthat could equip 230 infantry battalions.These weapons would be used to supportguerrilla warfare in the South.19 In March1963, Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff of theChinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA),visited the DRV and discussed with his hostshow China might support Hanoi if the UnitedStates attacked North Vietnam.20 Twomonths later, Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of thePRC, traveled to Hanoi, where he told HoChi Minh: “We are standing by your side,and if war broke out, you can regard China asyour rear.”21 Clearly Beijing was making amajor commitment to Hanoi in early 1963.Toward the end of the year, Chinese and

North Vietnamese officials discussedBeijing’s assistance in constructing defenseworks and naval bases in the northeasternpart of the DRV.22 According to a Chinesesource, in 1963 China and the DRV made anagreement under which Beijing would sendcombat troops into North Vietnam if Ameri-can soldiers crossed the Seventeenth Paral-lel to attack the North. The Chinese soldierswould stay and fight in the North to free theNorth Vietnamese troops to march to theSouth.23 But the precise date and details ofthis agreement remain unclear.

In sum, between 1954 and 1963 Chinawas closely involved in the development ofHanoi’s policy. The CCP urged Ho ChiMinh to concentrate on consolidating theDRV and to combine political and militarystruggles in the South. Although before1962 Beijing policy makers were not eagerto see a rapid intensification of the revolu-tionary war in South Vietnam, neither didthey discourage their comrades in Hanoifrom increasing military operations there.Between 1956 and 1963, China provided theDRV with 270,000 guns, over 10,000 piecesof artillery, nearly 200 million bullets, 2.02million artillery shells, 15,000 wire trans-mitters, 5,000 radio transmitters, over 1,000trucks, 15 aircraft, 28 war ships, and 1.18million sets of uniforms. The total value ofChina’s assistance to Hanoi during this pe-riod amounted to 320 million yuan.24 1962was a crucial year in the evolution of China’sattitudes toward Vietnam. Abandoning thecautious approach, Mao opted for confron-tation with the United States and decided tocommit China’s resources to Hanoi.Beijing’s massive supply of weapons to theDRV in 1962 helped Ho Chi Minh to inten-sify guerrilla warfare in the South, trigger-ing greater U.S. intervention. By the end of1963, Chinese leaders had become very ner-vous about American intentions in Vietnambut were ready to provide full support for theDRV in confronting the United States.

China’s Reaction to U.S. Escalation

In the first half of 1964, the attention ofU.S. officials was shifting increasingly fromSouth Vietnam toward Hanoi. This trendreflected mounting concern over the infiltra-tion of men and supplies from the North anda growing dissatisfaction with a policy thatallowed Hanoi to encourage the insurgencywithout punishment. In addition to expand-

ing covert operations in North Vietnam,including intelligence overflights, the drop-ping of propaganda leaflets, and OPLAN34A commando raids along the North Viet-namese coast, the Johnson Administrationalso conveyed to Pham Van Dong through aCanadian diplomat on June 17 the messagethat the United States was ready to exertincreasingly heavy military pressure on theDRV to force it to reduce or terminate itsencouragement of guerrilla activities in SouthVietnam. But the North Vietnamese leaderrefused to yield to the American pressure,declaring that Hanoi would not stop its sup-port for the struggle of liberation in theSouth.25

Mao watched these developmentsclosely. Anticipating new trouble, the chair-man told General Van Tien Dung, Chief ofStaff of the (North) Vietnamese People’sArmy, in June: “Our two parties and twocountries must cooperate and fight the en-emy together. Your business is my businessand my business is your business. In otherwords, our two sides must deal with theenemy together without conditions.”26 Be-tween July 5 and 8, Zhou Enlai led a CCPdelegation to Hanoi, where he discussedwith leaders from the DRV and Pathet Laothe situations in South Vietnam and Laos.27

Although the details of these talks are un-known, clearly the three Communist partieswere stepping up their coordination to con-front the increasing threat from the UnitedStates.

Immediately after the Gulf of TonkinIncident, Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing sent acable on August 5 to Ho Chi Minh, PhamVan Dong, and Van Tien Dung, asking themto “investigate the situation, work out coun-termeasures, and be prepared to fight.”28 Inthe meantime, Beijing instructed theKunming and Guangzhou Military Regionsand the air force and naval units stationed insouth and south-west China to assume astate of combat-readiness. Four air divi-sions and one anti-aircraft division weredispatched into areas adjoining Vietnam andput on a heightened alert status.29 In August,China also sent approximately 15 MiG-15and MiG-17 jets to Hanoi, agreed to trainNorth Vietnamese pilots, and started to con-struct new airfields in areas adjacent to theVietnamese border which would serve assanctuary and repair and maintenance facili-ties for Hanoi’s jet fighters.30 By movingnew air force units to the border area and


building new airfields there, Beijing in-tended to deter further U.S. expansion ofwar in South Vietnam and bombardmentagainst the DRV. Between August andSeptember 1964, the PLA also sent an in-spection team to the DRV to investigate thesituation in case China later needed to dis-patch support troops to Vietnam.31

The first months of 1965 witnessed asignificant escalation of the American warin Vietnam. On February 7, 9 and 11, U.S.aircraft struck North Vietnamese militaryinstallations just across the 17th Parallel,ostensibly in retaliation for Vietcong at-tacks on American barracks near Pleiku andin Qui Nhon. On March 1, the JohnsonAdministration stopped claiming that its airattacks on North Vietnam were reprisals forspecific Communist assaults in South Viet-nam and began a continuous air bombingcampaign against the DRV. On March 8,two battalions of Marines armed with tanksand 8-inch howitzers landed at Danang.32

Worried about the increasing U.S. in-volvement in Vietnam, Zhou Enlai on April2 asked Pakistani President Ayub Khan toconvey to President Johnson a four-pointmessage:

(1) China will not take the initiativeto provoke a war with the UnitedStates. (2) The Chinese mean whatthey say. In other words, if anycountry in Asia, Africa, or else-where meets with aggression by theimperialists headed by the UnitedStates, the Chinese government andpeople will definitely give it sup-port and assistance. Should suchjust action bring on American ag-gression against China, we willunhesitatingly rise in resistance andfight to the end. (3) China is pre-pared. Should the United Statesimpose a war on China, it can besaid with certainty that, once inChina, the United States will not beable to pull out, however many menit may send over and whatever weap-ons it may use, nuclear weaponsincluded. (4) Once the war breaksout, it will have no boundaries. Ifthe American madmen bombardChina without constraints, Chinawill not sit there waiting to die. Ifthey come from the sky, we willfight back on the ground. Bombing

means war. The war can not haveboundaries. It is impossible for theUnited States to finish the war sim-ply by relying on a policy of bomb-ing.33

This was the most serious warning issued bythe Chinese government to the United States,and given the caution exercised by PresidentJohnson in carrying out the “Rolling Thun-der” operations against the DRV, it was onethat Washington did not overlook. Clearly,U.S. leaders had drawn a lesson from theKorean War, when the TrumanAdministration’s failure to heed Beijingwarning against crossing the 38th parallelled to a bloody confrontation between theUnited States and China.

The U.S. escalation in early 1965 madethe DRV desperate for help. Le Duan and VoNguyen Giap rushed to Beijing in early Aprilto ask China to increase its aid and sendtroops to Vietnam. Le Duan told Chineseleaders that Hanoi needed “volunteer pilots,volunteer soldiers as well as other necessarypersonnel, including road and bridge engi-neers.” The Vietnamese envoys expectedChinese volunteer pilots to perform fourfunctions: to limit U.S. bombing to the southof the 20th or 19th parallel, to defend Hanoi,to protect several major transportation lines,and to boost morale.34 On behalf of theChinese leadership, Liu Shaoqi replied to theVietnamese visitors on April 8 that “it is theobligation of the Chinese people and party”to support the Vietnamese struggle againstthe United States. “Our principle is,” Liucontinued, “that we will do our best to pro-vide you with whatever you need and what-ever we have. If you do not invite us, we willnot go to your place. We will send whateverpart [of our troops] that you request.Youhave the complete initiative.”35

In April, China signed several agree-ments with the DRV concerning the dispatchof Chinese support troops to North Viet-nam.36 Between April 21 and 22, Giap dis-cussed with Luo Ruiqing and First DeputyChief of Staff Yang Chengwu the arrange-ments for sending Chinese troops.37 In May,Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to Mao inChangsha, the chairman’s home province,where he asked Mao to help the DRV repairand build twelve roads in the area north ofHanoi. The Chinese leader accepted Ho’srequest and instructed Zhou Enlai to see tothe matter.38

In discussions with Luo Ruiqing andYang Chengwu, Zhou said: “According toPham Van Dong, U.S. blockade and bomb-ing has reduced supplies to South Vietnamthrough sea shipment and road transporta-tion. While trying to resume sea transporta-tion, the DRV is also expanding the corridorin Lower Laos and roads in the South. Theirtroops would go to the South to build roads.Therefore they need our support to constructroads in the North.” Zhou decided that theChinese military should be responsible forroad repair and construction in North Viet-nam. Yang suggested that since assistanceto the DRV involved many military andgovernment departments, a special leader-ship group should be created to coordinatethe work of various agencies. Approving theproposal, Zhou immediately announced theestablishment of the “Central Committeeand State Council Aid Vietnam Group” withYang and Li Tianyou (Deputy Chief of Staff)as Director and Vice Director.39 This epi-sode demonstrates Zhou’s characteristic ef-fectiveness in organization and efficiency inadministration.

In early June, Van Tien Dung held dis-cussions with Luo Ruiqing in Beijing toflesh out the general Chinese plan to assistVietnam. According to their agreement, ifthe war remained in the current conditions,the DRV would fight the war by itself andChina would provide various kinds of sup-port as the Vietnamese needed. If the UnitedStates used its navy and air force to supporta South Vietnamese attack on the North,China would also provide naval and air forcesupport to the DRV. If U.S. ground forceswere directly used to attack the North, Chinawould use its land forces as strategic re-serves for the DRV and conduct militaryoperations whenever necessary. As to theforms of Sino-Vietnamese air force coop-eration, Dung and Luo agreed that Chinacould send volunteer pilots to Vietnam tooperate Vietnamese aircraft, station bothpilots and aircraft in Vietnam airfields, or flyaircraft from bases in China to join combatin Vietnam and only land on Vietnamesebases temporarily for refueling. The thirdoption was known as the “Andong model” (areference to the pattern of Chinese air forceoperations during the Korean War). In termsof the methods of employing PRC groundtroops, the two military leaders agreed thatthe Chinese forces would either help tostrengthen the defensive position of the DRV


troops to prepare for a North Vietnamesecounter offensive or launch an offensivethemselves to disrupt the enemy’s deploy-ment and win the strategic initiative.40

But despite Liu Shaoqi’s April promiseto Le Duan and Luo Ruiqing’s agreementwith Van Tien Dung, China in the end failedto provide pilots to Hanoi. According to theVietnamese “White Paper” of 1979, theChinese General Staff on 16 July 1965 noti-fied its Vietnamese counterpart that “thetime was not appropriate” to send Chinesepilots to Vietnam.41 The PRC’s limited airforce capacity may have caused Beijing tohave second thoughts, perhaps reinforcingBeijing’s desire to avoid a direct confronta-tion with the United States. Whatever thereasons for China’s decision, the failure tosatisfy Hanoi’s demand must have greatlydisappointed the Vietnamese since the con-trol of the air was so crucial for the DRV’seffort to protect itself from the ferociousU.S. bombing, and undoubtedly contributedto North Vietnam’s decision in 1965 to relymore on the Soviet Union for air defense.

Beginning in June 1965, China sentground-to-air missile, anti-aircraft artillery,railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, andlogistical units into North Vietnam to helpHanoi. The total number of Chinese troopsin North Vietnam between June 1965 andMarch 1973 amounted to over 320,000.42

To facilitate supplies into South Vietnam,China created a secret coastal transportationline to ship goods to several islands offCentral Vietnam for transit to the South. Asecret harbor on China’s Hainan Island wasconstructed to serve this transportation route.Beijing also operated a costly transportationline through Cambodia to send weapons,munitions, food, and medical supplies intoSouth Vietnam.43 When the last Chinesetroops withdrew from Vietnam in August1973, 1,100 soldiers had lost their lives and4,200 had been wounded.44

The new materials from China indicatethat Beijing provided extensive support (shortof volunteer pilots) for Hanoi during theVietnam War and risked war with the UnitedStates in helping the Vietnamese. As AllenS. Whiting has perceptively observed, thedeployment of Chinese troops in Vietnamwas not carried out under maximum securityagainst detection by Washington. The Chi-nese troops wore regular uniforms and didnot disguise themselves as civilians. TheChinese presence was intentionally commu-

nicated to U.S. intelligence through aerialphotography and electronic intercepts. Thisevidence, along with the large base complexthat China built at Yen Bai in northwestVietnam, provided credible and successfuldeterrence against an American invasion ofNorth Vietnam.45

The specter of a Chinese intervention ina manner similar to the Korean War was amajor factor in shaping President Johnson’sgradual approach to the Vietnam War.Johnson wanted to forestall Chinese inter-vention by keeping the level of militaryactions against North Vietnam controlled,exact, and below the threshold that wouldprovoke direct Chinese entry. This China-induced U.S. strategy of gradual escalationwas a great help for Hanoi, for it gave theVietnamese communists time to adjust toU.S. bombing and to develop strategies tofrustrate American moves. As John Garverhas aptly put it, “By helping to induce Wash-ington to adopt this particular strategy,Beijing contributed substantially to Hanoi’seventual victory over the United States.”46

Explaining PRC Support for the DRV

Mao’s decision to aid Hanoi was closelylinked to his perception of U.S. threats toChina’s security, his commitment to na-tional liberation movements, his criticism ofSoviet revisionist foreign policy, and hisdomestic need to transform the Chinese stateand society. These four factors were mutu-ally related and reinforcing.

Sense of Insecurity:Between 1964 and 1965, Mao worried

about the increasing American involvementin Vietnam and perceived the United Statesas posing a serious threat to China’s secu-rity. For him, support for North Vietnamwas a way of countering the U.S. strategy ofcontainment of China. The Communist suc-cess in South Vietnam would prevent theUnited States from moving closer to theChinese southern border.

On several occasions in 1964, Maotalked about U.S. threats to China and theneed for China to prepare for war. During aCentral Committee conference held betweenMay 15 and June 17, the chairman con-tended that “so long as imperialism exists,the danger of war is there. We are not thechief of staff for imperialism and have noidea when it will launch a war. It is theconventional weapon, not the atomic bomb,

that will determine the final victory of thewar.”47 At first Mao did not expect that theUnited States would attack North Vietnamdirectly.48 The Gulf of Tonkin Incidentcame as a surprise to him. In the wake of theincident, Mao pointed out on October 22 thatChina must base its plans on war and makeactive preparations for an early, large-scale,and nuclear war.49

To deal with what he perceived as U.S.military threats, Mao took several domesticmeasures in 1964, the most important ofwhich was the launching of the massiveThird Front project. This program called forheavy investment in the remote provinces ofsouthwestern and western China and envi-sioned the creation of a huge self-sustainingindustrial base area to serve as a strategicreserve in the event China became involvedin war. The project had a strong militaryorientation and was directly triggered by theU.S. escalation of war in Vietnam.50

On 25 April 1964, the War Departmentof the PLA General Staff drafted a report forYang Chengwu on how to prevent an enemysurprise attack on China’s economic con-struction. The report listed four areas vul-nerable to such an attack: (1) China’s indus-try was over-concentrated. About 60 per-cent of the civil machinery industry, 50percent of the chemical industry, and 52percent of the national defense industry wereconcentrated in 14 major cities with over onemillion people. (2) Too many people lived incities. According to the 1962 census, inaddition to 14 cities of above one million, 20cities had a population between 500,000 andone million. Most of these cities were lo-cated in the coastal areas and very vulner-able to air strikes. No effective mechanismsexisted at the moment to organize anti-airworks, evacuate urban populations, continueproduction, and eliminate the damages of anair strike, especially a nuclear strike. (3)Principal railroad junctions, bridges, andharbors were situated near big and medium-size cities and could easily be destroyedwhen the enemy attacked the cities. Nomeasures had been taken to protect thesetransportation points against an enemy at-tack. In the early stage of war, they couldbecome paralyzed. (4) All of China’s reser-voirs had a limited capacity to release waterin an emergency. Among the country’s 232large reservoirs, 52 were located near majortransportation lines and 17 close to impor-tant cities. In conclusion, the report made it


clear that “the problems mentioned aboveare directly related to the whole armed forces,to the whole people, and to the process of anational defense war.” It asked the StateCouncil “to organize a special committee tostudy and adopt, in accordance with thepossible conditions of the national economy,practical and effective measures to guardagainst an enemy surprise attack.”51

Yang Chengwu presented the report toMao, who returned it to Luo Ruiqing andYang on August 12 with the following com-ment: “It is an excellent report. It should becarefully studied and gradually imple-mented.” Mao urged the newly establishedState Council Special Committee in chargeof the Third Front to begin its work imme-diately.52 Mao’s approval of the reportmarked the beginning of the Third Frontproject to relocate China’s industrial re-sources to the interior. It is important to notethe timing of Mao’s reaction to the report—right after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. TheU.S. expansion of the war to North Vietnamhad confirmed Mao’s worst suspicions aboutAmerican intentions.

Deputy Prime Minister Li Fuchun be-came Director, Deputy Prime Minister BoYibo and Luo Ruiqing became Vice Direc-tors of the Special Committee. On August19, they submitted to Mao a detailed pro-posal on how to implement the Third Frontideas.53 In the meantime, the CCP Secre-tariat met to discuss the issue. Mao madetwo speeches at the meetings on August 17and 20. He asserted that China should be onguard against an aggressive war launchedby imperialism. At present, factories wereconcentrated around big cities and coastalregions, a situation deleterious to war prepa-ration. Factories should be broken into twoparts. One part should be relocated to inte-rior areas as early as possible. Every prov-ince should establish its own strategic rearbase. Departments of industry and trans-portation should move, so should schools,science academies, and Beijing University.The three railroad lines between Chengduand Kunming, Sichuan and Yunnan, andYunnan and Guizhou should be completedas quickly as possible. If there were ashortage of rails, the chairman insisted, railson other lines could be dismantled. Toimplement Mao’s instructions, the meet-ings decided to concentrate China’s finan-cial, material, and human resources on theconstruction of the Third Front.54

While emphasizing the “big Third Front”plan on the national level, Mao also orderedprovinces to proceed with their “small ThirdFront” projects. The chairman wanted eachprovince to develop its own light armamentindustry capable of producing rifles, ma-chine guns, canons, and munitions.55 TheThird Five-Year Plan was revised to meet thestrategic contingency of war preparation. Inthe modified plan, a total of three billionyuan was appropriated for small Third Frontprojects. This was a substantial figure, butless than 5 percent of the amount set aside forthe big Third Front in this period.56 In sum,the Third Front was a major strategic actiondesigned to provide an alternative industrialbase that would enable China to continueproduction in the event of an attack on itslarge urban centers.

In addition to his apprehension about astrike on China’s urban and coastal areas,Mao also feared that the enemy might deployparatroop assault forces deep inside China.In a meeting with He Long, Deputy Chair-man of the Central Military Commission,Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu on 28April 1965, Mao called their attention tosuch a danger. He ordered them to preparefor the landing of enemy paratroopers inevery interior region. The enemy might useparatroops, Mao contended, “to disrupt ourrear areas, and to coordinate with a frontalassault. The number of paratroops may notbe many. It may involve one or two divisionsin each region, or it may involve a smallerunit. In all interior regions, we should buildcaves in mountains. If no mountain is around,hills should be created to construct defenseworks. We should be on guard against en-emy paratroops deep inside our country andprevent the enemy from marching unstoppedinto China.”57

It appears that Mao’s attitudes towardthe United States hardened between Januaryand April 1965. In an interview with EdgarSnow on January 9, Mao had expressed con-fidence that Washington would not expandthe war to North Vietnam because Secretaryof State Dean Rusk had said so. He toldSnow that there would be no war betweenChina and the United States if Washingtondid not send troops to attack China.58 Twodays later, the CCP Central Military Com-mission issued a “Six-Point Directive on theStruggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft inthe South China Sea,” in which it instructedthe military not to attack American airplanes

that intruded into Chinese airspace in orderto avoid a direct military clash with theUnited States.59

In April, however, Mao rescinded the“Six Point Directive.” Between April 8 and9, U.S. aircraft flew into China’s airspaceover Hainan Island. On April 9, YangChengwu reported the incidents to Mao,suggesting that the order not to attack invad-ing U.S. airplanes be lifted and that the airforce command take control of the naval airunits stationed on Hainan Island. Approv-ing both of Yang’s requests, Mao said thatChina “should resolutely strike Americanaircraft that overfly Hainan Island.”60 It isquite possible that the further U.S. escala-tion of war in Vietnam in the interveningmonths caused Mao to abandon his earlierrestrictions against engaging U.S. aircraft.

It is important to point out that the entireChinese leadership, not just Mao, took thestrategic threat from the United States veryseriously during this period. Zhou Enlai toldSpiro Koleka, First Deputy Chairman of theCouncil of Ministers of Albania, on 9 May1965 in Beijing that China was mobilizingits population for war. Although it seemedthat the United States had not made up itsmind to expand the war to China, the Chi-nese premier continued, war had its own lawof development, usually in a way contrary tothe wishes of people. Therefore China hadto be prepared.61 Zhou’s remarks indicatedthat he was familiar with a common patternin warfare: accidents and miscalculationsrather than deliberate planning often lead towar between reluctant opponents.

In an address to a Central Military Com-mission war planning meeting on 19 May1965, Liu Shaoqi stated:

If our preparations are faster andbetter, war can be delayed.... If wemake excellent preparations, theenemy may even dare not to in-vade.... We must build the big ThirdFront and the small Third Frontand do a good job on every front,including the atomic bomb, the hy-drogen bomb, and long-distancemissiles. Under such circum-stances, even if the United Stateshas bases in Japan, Taiwan, and thePhilippines, its ships are big tar-gets out on the sea and it is easy forus to strike them. We should de-velop as early as possible new tech-


nology to attack aircraft and war-ships so that we can knock out oneenemy ship with a single missile.The enemy’s strength is in its navy,air force, atomic bombs, and mis-siles, but the strength in navy andair force has its limits. If the enemysends ground troops to invadeChina, we are not afraid. There-fore, on the one hand we should beprepared for the enemy to comefrom all directions, including a jointinvasion against China by manycountries. On the other, we shouldrealize that the enemy lacks justifi-cation in sending troops.... Thiswill decide the difference betweena just and an unjust war.62

Zhu De remarked at the same meeting that“so long as we have made good preparationson every front, the enemy may not dare tocome. We must defend our offshore islands.With these islands in our hands, the enemywill find it difficult to land. If the enemyshould launch an attack, we will lure theminside China and then wipe them out com-pletely.”63

Scholars have argued over Beijing’sreaction to the threat posed by U.S. interven-tion in Vietnam. Much of this argumentfocuses on the hypothesis of a “strategicdebate” in 1965 between Luo Ruiqing andLin Biao. Various interpretations of this“debate” exist, but most contend that Luowas more sensitive to American actions inIndochina than either Lin or Mao, and thatLuo demanded greater military preparationsto deal with the threat, including acceptingthe Soviet proposal of a “united front.”64

However, there is nothing in the re-cently available Chinese materials to con-firm the existence of the “strategic debate”in 1965.65 The often cited evidence to sup-port the hypothesis of a strategic debate isthe two articles supposedly written by LuoRuiqing and Lin Biao on the occasion of thecommemoration of V-J day in September1965.66 In fact, the same writing grouporganized by Luo Ruiqing in the GeneralStaff was responsible for the preparation ofboth articles. The final version of the“People’s War” article also incorporatedopinions from the writing team led by KangSheng. (Operating in the Diaoyutai NationalGuest House, Kang’s team was famous forwriting the nine polemics against Soviet

revisionism). Although the article includedsome of Lin Biao’s previous statements, Linhimself was not involved in its writing. WhenLuo Ruiqing asked Lin for his instructionsabout the composition of the article, theDefense Minister said nothing. Zhou Enlaiand other standing Politburo members readthe piece before its publication.67 The ar-ticle was approved by the Chinese leader-ship as a whole and was merely published inLin Biao’s name. Luo Ruiqing was purgedin December 1965 primarily because of hisdispute with Lin Biao over domestic mili-tary organization rather than over foreignpolicy issues.68 Luo did not oppose Mao onVietnam policy. In fact he carried out loy-ally every Vietnam-related order issued bythe chairman. Mao completely dominatedthe decision making. The origins of the“People’s War” article point to the danger ofrelying on public pronouncements to gaugeinner-party calculations and cast doubts onthe utility of the faction model in explainingChinese foreign policy making.69

Commitment to National LiberationMovements:

The second factor that shaped Mao’sdecision to support the DRV was his desireto form a broad international united frontagainst both the United States and the SovietUnion. To Mao, national liberation move-ments in the Third World were the mostimportant potential allies in the coalitionthat he wanted to establish. In the early1960s, the chairman developed the conceptof “Two Intermediate Zones.” The first zonereferred to developed countries, includingcapitalist states in Europe, Canada, Japan,Australia, and New Zealand. The secondzone referred to underdeveloped nations inAsia, Africa, and Latin America. These twozones existed between the two superpowers.Mao believed that countries in these twozones had contradictions with the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union and that Chinashould make friends with them to create aninternational united front against Washing-ton and Moscow.70

Mao initially developed the idea of the“intermediate zone” during the early yearsof the Cold War. In a discussion with AnnaLouise Strong in 1946, the CCP leader firstbroached the idea. He claimed that theUnited States and the Soviet Union were“separated by a vast zone including manycapitalist, colonial and semi-colonial coun-

tries in Europe, Asia, and Africa,” and that itwas difficult for “the U.S. reactionaries toattack the Soviet Union before they couldsubjugate these countries.”71 In the late1940s and throughout the greater part of the1950s, Mao leaned to the side of the SovietUnion to balance against the perceivedAmerican threat. But beginning in the late1950s, with the emergence of Sino-Sovietdifferences, Mao came to revise his charac-terization of the international situation. Hesaw China confronting two opponents: theUnited States and the Soviet Union. Tooppose these two foes and break China’sinternational isolation, Mao proposed theformation of an international united front.

Operating from the principle of makingfriends with countries in the “Two Interme-diate Zones,” Mao promoted such anti-American tendencies as French PresidentDe Gaulle’s break with the United States inthe first zone and championed national lib-eration movements in the second zone. ForMao, the Vietnam conflict constituted a partof a broader movement across Asia, Africa,and Latin America, which together repre-sented a challenge to imperialism as a whole.China reached out to anti-colonial guerrillasin Angola and Mozambique, to the “pro-gressive” Sihanouk in Cambodia, to the left-ist regime under Sukarno in Indonesia, andto the anti-U.S. Castro in Cuba.72 Towardthe former socialist camp dominated by theSoviet Union, Mao encouraged Albania topersuade other East European countries toseparate from Moscow.73

During this increasingly radical periodof Chinese foreign policy, Mao singled outthree anti-imperialist heroes for emulationby Third World liberation movements: HoChi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella, the Alge-rian nationalist leader. In a speech to adelegation of Chilean journalists on 23 June1964, Mao remarked: “We oppose war, butwe support the anti-imperialist war wagedby oppressed peoples. We support the revo-lutionary war in Cuba and Algeria. We alsosupport the anti-U.S.-imperialist war con-ducted by the South Vietnamese people.”74

In another address to a group of visitors fromAsia, Africa, and Oceania on July 9, Maoagain mentioned the names of Ho Chi Minh,Castro, and Ben Bella as models of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.75

Envisioning China as a spokesman forthe Third World independence cause, Maobelieved that the Chinese revolutionary ex-


perience was relevant to the struggle ofliberation movements in Asia, Africa, andLatin America. By firmly backing the Viet-namese struggle against the United States,he wanted to demonstrate to Third Worldcountries and movements that China wastheir true friend. Victory for NorthVietnam’s war of national unification withChina’s support would show the politicalcorrectness of Mao’s more militant strategyfor coping with U.S. imperialism and theincorrectness of Khrushchev’s policy ofpeaceful coexistence.

A number of Chinese anti-imperialistinitiatives, however, ended in a debacle in1965. First Ben Bella was overthrown inAlgeria in June, leading the Afro-Asianmovement to lean in a more pro-Sovietdirection due to the influence of Nehru inIndia and Tito in Yugoslavia. The fall ofBen Bella frustrated Mao’s bid for leader-ship in the Third World through the holdingof a “second Bandung” conference of Afro-Asian leaders. Then in September, Sukarnowas toppled in a right-wing counter-coup,derailing Beijing’s plan to promote a mili-tant “united front” between Sukarno and theIndonesian Communist Party (PKI). TheChinese behavior, nevertheless, did con-vince leaders in Washington that Beijingwas a dangerous gambler in internationalpolitics and that American intervention inVietnam was necessary to undermine aChinese plot of global subversion by proxy.76

Criticism of Soviet Revisionism:Mao’s firm commitment to North Viet-

nam also needs to be considered in thecontext of the unfolding Sino-Soviet split.By 1963, Beijing and Moscow had com-pletely broken apart after three years ofincreasingly abusive polemics. The conclu-sion of the Soviet-American partial NuclearTest Ban Treaty in July 1963 was a majorturning point in Sino-Soviet relations. There-after the Beijing leadership publicly de-nounced any suggestion that China wassubject to any degree of Soviet protectionand directly criticized Moscow for collabo-rating with Washington against China. Theeffect of the Sino-Soviet split on Vietnamsoon manifested itself as Beijing and Mos-cow wooed Hanoi to take sides in theirideological dispute.

After the ouster of Khrushchev in Oc-tober 1964, the new leadership in the Krem-lin invited the CCP to send a delegation to

the October Revolution celebrations. Beijingdispatched Zhou Enlai and He Long to Mos-cow for the primary purpose of sounding outLeonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin on themany issues in dispute: Khrushchev’s long-postponed plan to convene an internationalCommunist meeting, support for revolution-ary movements, peaceful coexistence withthe United States, attitudes toward Tito, and“revisionist” domestic policies within theSoviet Union. The Chinese discovered dur-ing their tour on November 5-13 that nothingbasic had changed in the Soviet position: thenew leaders in Moscow desired an improve-ment in Sino-Soviet relations on the condi-tion that Beijing stopped its criticisms andlimited competition in foreign policy, prob-ably in return for the resumption of Sovieteconomic aid.77

Instead of finding an opportunity to im-prove mutual understanding, the Chinesevisitors found their stay in Moscow unpleas-ant and the relationship with the Soviet Unioneven worse. During a Soviet reception,Marshal Rodion Malinovsky suggested toZhou Enlai and He Long that just like theRussians had ousted Khrushchev, the Chi-nese should overthrow Mao. The Chineseindignantly rejected this proposal: Zhou evenregistered a strong protest with the Sovietleadership, calling Malinovsky’s remarks “aserious political incident.”78 Zhou Enlai toldthe Cuban Communist delegation during abreakfast meeting in the Chinese Embassyon November 9 that Malinovsky “insultedComrade Mao Zedong, the Chinese people,the Chinese party, and myself,” and that thecurrent leadership in the Kremlin inherited“Khrushchev’s working and thought style.”79

Before Zhou’s journey to Moscow, theChinese leadership had suggested to the Viet-namese Communists that they also sendpeople to travel with Zhou to Moscow to seewhether there were changes in the new So-viet leaders’ policy. Zhou told Ho Chi Minhand Le Duan later in Hanoi, on 1 March1965, that he was “disappointed” with whathe had seen in Moscow, and that “the newSoviet leaders are following nothing butKhrushchevism.”80 Clearly Zhou wantedthe Hanoi leadership to side with the PRC inthe continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, andBeijing’s extensive aid to the DRV was de-signed to draw Hanoi to China’s orbit.

The collective leadership which suc-ceeded Khrushchev was more forthcomingin support of the DRV. During his visit to

Hanoi on 7-10 February 1965, Kosygin calledfor a total U.S. withdrawal from South Viet-nam and promised Soviet material aid forHo Chi Minh’s struggle. The fact that agroup of missile experts accompaniedKosygin indicated that the Kremlin was pro-viding support in that crucial area. The twosides concluded formal military and eco-nomic agreements on February 10.81 Clearlythe Soviets were competing with the Chi-nese to win the allegiance of the VietnameseCommunists. Through its new gestures toHanoi, Moscow wanted to offset Chineseinfluence and demonstrate its ideologicalrectitude on issues of national liberation.The new solidarity with Hanoi, however,complicated Soviet relations with the UnitedStates, and after 1965, the Soviet Unionfound itself at loggerheads with Washing-ton. While Moscow gained greater influ-ence in Hanoi because of the North Viet-namese need for Soviet material assistanceagainst U.S. bombing, it at the same time lostflexibility because of the impossibility ofretreat from the commitment to a brotherCommunist state under attack by imperial-ism.

Before 1964, Hanoi was virtually onChina’s side in the bifurcated internationalcommunist movement. After the fall ofKhrushchev and the appearance of a moreinterventionist position under Kosygin andBrezhnev, however, Hanoi adopted a morebalanced stand. Leaders in Beijing werenervous about the increase of Soviet influ-ence in Vietnam. According to a Vietnam-ese source, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary Gen-eral of the CCP, paid a secret visit to Hanoishortly after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident inan attempt to wean the Vietnamese awayfrom Moscow with the promise of US$1billion aid per year.82 China’s strategy todiscredit the Soviet Union was to emphasizethe “plot” of Soviet-American collaborationat the expense of Vietnam. During his visitto Beijing on 11 February 1965, Kosyginasked the Chinese to help the United Statesto “find a way out of Vietnam.” Chineseleaders warned the Russians not to use theVietnam issue to bargain with the Ameri-cans.83 Immediately after his return to Mos-cow, Kosygin proposed an international con-ference on Indochina. The Chinese con-demned the Soviet move, asserting that theRussians wanted negotiation rather than con-tinued struggle in Vietnam and were con-spiring with the Americans to sell out Viet-


nam. But as R.B. Smith has observed, theChinese “may have oversimplified a Sovietstrategy which was... more subtle....Moscow’s diplomatic initiative of mid-Feb-ruary may in fact have been timed to coin-cide with—rather than to constrain—theCommunist offensive in South Vietnam.”84

The Chinese criticism of the Soviet peaceinitiative must have confirmed the Ameri-can image of China as a warmonger.

The Sino-Soviet rivalry over Vietnamcertainly provided leaders in Hanoi an op-portunity to obtain maximum support fromtheir two Communist allies, but we shouldnot overstate the case. Sometimes the ben-efits of the Sino-Soviet split for the DRVcould be limited. For example, the Hanoileadership sought a communist internationalunited front to assist their war effort. Theywanted Moscow and Beijing to agree oncommon support actions, particularly on asingle integrated logistical system. Theyfailed to achieve this objective primarily

because of China’s objection.85

Domestic Need to Transform the ChineseState and Society:

Beginning in the late 1950s, Mao be-came increasingly apprehensive about thepotential development of the Chinese revo-lution. He feared that his life work hadcreated a political structure that would even-tually betray his principles and values andbecome as exploitative as the one it hadreplaced. His worry about the future ofChina’s development was closely related tohis diagnosis of the degeneration of theSoviet political system and to his fear aboutthe effects of U.S. Secretary of State JohnFoster Dulles’ strategy of “peaceful evolu-tion.”86 Mao believed that Dulles’ approachto induce a peaceful evolution within thesocialist world was taking effect in the So-viet Union, given Khrushchev’s fascinationwith peaceful coexistence with the capitalistWest. Mao wanted to prevent that from

happening in China.The problem of succession preoccupied

Mao throughout the first half of the 1960s.His acute awareness of impending deathcontributed to his sense of urgency. TheU.S. escalation of war in Vietnam made himall the more eager to the put his own house inorder. He was afraid that if he did not nip inthe bud what he perceived to be revisionisttendencies and if he did not choose a propersuccessor, after his death China would fallinto the hands of Soviet-like revisionists,who would “change the color” of China,abandon support for national liberationstruggles, and appease U.S. imperialism.Mao was a man who believed in dialectics.Negative things could be turned into posi-tive matters. The American presence inIndochina was a threat to the Chinese revo-lution. But on the other hand, Mao foundthat he could turn the U.S. threat into anadvantage, namely, he could use it to inten-sify domestic anti-imperialist feelings and

POLISH SECRET PEACEINITIATIVES IN VIETNAM

by Jerzy Michalowski

This summary was prepared by the author’sson, Stefan Michalowski.

This is the story of peace initiativesundertaken by Polish diplomats during theheight of the Vietnam war. It was written byone of the main participants, JerzyMichalowski, who was, at the time, a seniorofficial in the Polish Foreign Ministry, and aclose friend and colleague of Foreign Minis-ter Adam Rapacki. The events took placeduring the years 1963-1966, when Polandwas in a unique position to act as brokerbetween the U.S. and North Vietnam. Whileformally allied with the latter, and subject toSoviet domination in numerous ways, Po-land was able to steer a course of limitedindependence in its internal and interna-tional affairs. Polish diplomats were likedand respected in the West, where they main-tained many useful contacts. JerzyMichalowski, for instance, had been a mem-ber of the UN Control and Monitoring Com-mission that was set up under the 1954Geneva Accords following the French de-feat in Indochina.

In the late 1970s, after a distinguished

career as ambassador to Great Britain, theUnited Nations and the United States,Michalowski found himself out of favorwith the government of Communist Partyboss Edward Gierek. Removed from posi-tions of responsibility, he was nonethelessgiven access to secret Ministry archives, andwas able to prepare this 120-page report.Eventually, after being expelled from theParty, he retired from the foreign service.The manuscript was brought to the UnitedStates shortly before his death in March of1993.

Polish Secret Police Initiatives in Viet-nam is terse, honest, and highly readable.The author describes events that he actuallytook part in. Whenever possible, he suppliesreferences from the Foreign Ministry ar-chives or from published material. He pro-vides accounts of personal meetings withMao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Leonid Brezhnev,Ho Chi Minh, Phan Van Dong, LyndonJohnson, Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk andothers. Whenever he feels that the historicalrecord has been distorted, he does not hesi-tate to put forth his own version. He takesstrong issue, for example, with the publishedmemoirs of Henry Cabot Lodge.

Michalowski’s perspective, both aspeace-maker and author, is that of a profes-sional diplomat, rather than an official rep-resentative of a Soviet Bloc nation. His goal

was simply to end the bloodshed in Indochinaby moving the conflict from the battlefieldto the negotiating table. Poland’s peaceproposals did not attempt to specify theterms of any final settlement. The focus wason defining the principles and conditionsthat would being the two sides together. Inthe end, even this limited goal could not beachieved. The author’s analysis of this fail-ure constitutes perhaps the most interestingand instructive part of the narrative. Bothsides were committed to the military struggle.The Vietnamese had an almost absolute be-lief in final victory. They were convinced ofthe similarity of their situation to the previ-ous conflict with the French, and were will-ing to absorb even the most horrendousblows that the United States could inflict.Michalowski reserves his most critical com-ments, however, for the Johnson Adminis-tration. America’s “carrot and stick” policyof cautious peace feelers combined with acampaign of savage bombing raids was di-sastrous, for it served only to strengthen theenemy’s resolve, and deepened suspicionsabout America’s true motives and inten-tions. Time and again, during the mostcritical and sensitive diplomatic maneuvers,the bombing raids turned the diplomats’carefully crafted arrangements into rubble.

continuied on page 258


mobilize the population against revision-ists. Mao had successfully employed thatstrategy during the Civil War against JiangJieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. Now he couldapply it again to prepare the masses for theGreat Cultural Revolution that he was goingto launch. Accordingly, in the wake of theGulf of Tonkin Incident, Mao unleashed amassive “Aid Vietnam and Resist America”campaign across China.87

Sino-Vietnamese Discord

In its heyday the Sino-Vietnamesefriendship was described as “comrades plusbrothers,” but shortly after the conclusion ofthe Vietnam War the two communist stateswent to war with each other in 1979. Howdid it happen? In fact signs of differenceshad already emerged in the early days ofChina’s intervention in the Vietnam con-flict. Two major factors complicated Sino-Vietnamese relations. One was the histori-cal pride and cultural sensitivity that theVietnamese carried with them in dealingwith the Chinese. The other was the effectof the Sino-Soviet split.

Throughout their history, the Vietnam-ese have had a love-hate attitude towardtheir big northern neighbor. On the onehand, they were eager to borrow advancedinstitutions and technologies from China;on the other hand, they wanted to preservetheir independence and cultural heritage.When they were internally weak and facingexternal aggression, they sought China’shelp and intervention. When they wereunified and free from foreign threats, theytended to resent China’s influence. A pat-tern seems to characterize Sino-Vietnameserelations: the Vietnamese would downplaytheir inherent differences with the Chinesewhen they needed China’s assistance tobalance against a foreign menace; they wouldpay more attention to problems in the bilat-eral relations with China when they werestrong and no longer facing an externalthreat.

This pattern certainly applies to theSino-Vietnamese relationship during the1950s and the first half of the 1960s. TheVietnamese Communists during this periodconfronted formidable enemies, the Frenchand the Americans, in their quest for na-tional unification. When the Soviet Unionwas reluctant to help, China was the onlysource of support that Hanoi could count

upon against the West. Thus Ho Chi Minhavidly sought advice and weapons fromChina. But sentiments of distrust were neverfar below the surface. Friction emergedbetween Chinese military advisers and Viet-namese commanders during the war againstthe French in the early 1950s.88 Vietnamesedistrust of the Chinese also manifested itselfwhen Chinese support troops entered Viet-nam in the mid 1960s.

When Chinese troops went to Vietnamin 1965, they found themselves in an awk-ward position. On the one hand, the Viet-namese leadership wanted their service infighting U.S. aircraft and in building andrepairing roads, bridges, and rail lines. Onthe other hand, the Vietnamese authoritiestried to minimize their influence by restrict-ing their contact with the local population.When a Chinese medical team offered medi-cal service to save the life of a Vietnamesewoman, Vietnamese officials blocked theeffort.89 Informed of incidents like this, Maourged the Chinese troops in Vietnam to “re-frain from being too eager” to help the Viet-namese.90 While the Chinese soldiers werein Vietnam, the Vietnamese media remindedthe public that in the past China had invadedVietnam: the journal Historical Studies pub-lished articles in 1965 describing Vietnam-ese resistance against Chinese imperial dy-nasties.91

The increasing animosity betweenBeijing and Moscow and their efforts to winHanoi’s allegiance put the Vietnamese in adilemma. On the one hand, the change ofSoviet attitudes toward Vietnam from reluc-tant to active assistance in late 1964 and early1965 made the Vietnamese more unwillingto echo China’s criticisms of revisionism.On the other hand, they still needed China’sassistance and deterrence. Mao’s rejectionof the Soviet proposal of a “united action” tosupport Vietnam alienated leaders in Hanoi.During Kosygin’s visit to Beijing in Febru-ary 1965, he proposed to Mao and Zhou thatBeijing and Moscow end their mutual criti-cisms and cooperate on the Vietnam issue.But Mao dismissed Kosygin’s suggestion,asserting that China’s argument with theSoviet Union would continue for another9,000 years.92

During February and March, 1966, aJapanese Communist Party delegation led bySecretary General Miyamoto Kenji, visitedChina and the DRV, with the purpose ofencouraging “joint action” by China and the

Soviet Union to support Vietnam. Miyamotofirst discussed the idea with a CCP delega-tion led by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, andPeng Zhen in Beijing. The two sides workedout a communiqué that went part of the waytoward the “united action” proposal. Butwhen Miyamoto, accompanied by Deng,came to see Mao in Conghua, Guangdong,the chairman burst into a rage, insisting thatthe communiqué must stress a united frontagainst both the United States and the SovietUnion. Miyamoto disagreed, so the Beijingcommuniqué was torn up.93 Clearly, Maoby this time had connected the criticism ofSoviet revisionism with the domestic struggleagainst top party leaders headed by Liu,Deng, and Peng. It was no wonder that theseofficials soon became leading targets forattack when the Cultural Revolution sweptacross China a few months later.

In the meantime the Vietnamese madetheir different attitude toward Moscow clearby deciding to send a delegation to attend the23rd Congress of the Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union (CPSU), which was to beheld between March 29 and April 8 andwhich the Chinese had already decided toboycott. The Vietnamese were walking atightrope at this time. On the one hand theyrelied on the vital support of Soviet weap-ons; on the other hand, they did not want todamage their ties with China. Thus Le Duanand Nguyen Duy Trinh traveled from Hanoito Beijing on March 22, on their way toMoscow. Although no sign of differencesappeared in public during Duan’s talks withZhou Enlai, China’s unhappiness about theVietnamese participation in the 23rd Con-gress can be imagined.94

In sum, the Beijing-Hanoi relationshipincluded both converging and diverging in-terests. The two countries shared a commonideological outlook and a common concernover American intervention in Indochina,but leaders in Hanoi wanted to avoid thedanger of submitting to a dependent rela-tionship with China. So long as policymakersin Hanoi and Beijing shared the commongoal of ending the U.S. presence in theregion, such divergent interests could besubordinated to their points of agreement.But the turning point came in 1968, whenSino-Soviet relations took a decisive turn forthe worse just as Washington made its firsttentative moves toward disengagement fromSouth Vietnam. In the new situation,Beijing’s strategic interests began to differ


fundamentally from those of Hanoi. Whereasthe Chinese now regarded the United Statesas a potential counterbalance against theSoviet Union, their Vietnamese comradescontinued to see Washington as the mostdangerous enemy. After the withdrawal ofU.S. troops from Vietnam and the unifica-tion of the country, Hanoi’s bilateral dis-putes with Beijing over Cambodia, a territo-rial disagreement in the South China Sea,and the treatment of Chinese nationals inVietnam came to the fore, culminating in adirect clash in 1979.

Was China Bluffing During the War?

The fact that Beijing did not openlyacknowledge its sizable presence in NorthVietnam raised questions about the justifi-cation for Washington’s restraint in U.S.conduct of war, both at the time and in lateryears. Harry G. Summers, the most promi-nent of revisionist critics of PresidentJohnson’s Vietnam policy, asserts that theUnited States drew a wrong lesson from theKorean War: “Instead of seeing that it waspossible to fight and win a limited war inAsia regardless of Chinese intervention,we...took counsel of our fears and acceptedas an article of faith the proposition that weshould never again become involved in aland war in Asia. In so doing we allowed ourfears to become a kind of self-imposed de-terrent and surrendered the initiative to ourenemies.” Summers contends that “whetherthe Soviets or the Chinese ever intendedintervention is a matter of conjecture,” andthat the United States allowed itself “to bebluffed by China throughout most of thewar.” He cites Mao’s rejection of the Soviet1965 proposal for a joint action to supportVietnam and Mao’s suspicions of Moscow’splot to draw China into a war with the UnitedStates as evidence for the conclusion thatMao was more fearful of Moscow than Wash-ington and, by implication, he was not seri-ous about China’s threats to intervene tohelp Hanoi.95

Was China not serious in its threats togo to war with the United States in Indochina?As the preceding discussion has shown,Beijing perceived substantial security andideological interests in Vietnam. From thesecurity perspective, Mao and his associateswere genuinely concerned about the Ameri-can threat from Vietnam (although they didnot realize that their own actions, such as the

supply of weapons to Hanoi in 1962, hadhelped precipitate the U.S. escalation of thewar) and adopted significant measures athome to prepare for war. China’s assistanceto the DRV, to use John Garver’s words,“was Mao’s way of rolling back U.S. con-tainment in Asia.”96 From the viewpoint ofideology, China’s support for North Viet-nam served Mao’s purposes of demonstrat-ing to the Third World that Beijing was aspokesman for national liberation strugglesand of competing with Moscow for leader-ship in the international communist move-ment.

If the actions recommended by Sum-mers had been taken by Washington in Viet-nam, there would have been a real danger ofa Sino-American war with dire consequencesfor the world. In retrospect, it appears thatJohnson had drawn the correct lesson fromthe Korean War and had been prudent in hisapproach to the Vietnam conflict.

* * * * *

NEW CHINESE DOCUMENTS ONTHE VIETNAM WAR

Translated byQiang Zhai

Document 1: Report by the War Depart-ment of the General Staff, 25 April 1964.

Deputy Chief of Staff Yang97:

According to your instruction, we havemade a special investigation on the questionof how our country’s economic constructionshould prepare itself for a surprise attack bythe enemy. From the several areas that wehave looked at, many problems emerge, andsome of them are very serious.

(1) The industry is over concentrated.About 60 percent of the civil machineryindustry, 50 percent of the chemical indus-try, and 52 percent of the national defenseindustry (including 72.7 percent of the air-craft industry, 77.8 percent of the warshipindustry, 59 percent of the radio industry,and 44 percent of the weapons industry) areconcentrated in 14 major cities with over onemillion population.

(2) Too many people live in cities.According to the census conducted at theend of 1962, 14 cities in the country have apopulation over one million, and 20 cities a

population between 500,000 and one mil-lion. Most of these cities are located in thecoastal areas and are very vulnerable to airstrikes. No effective mechanisms exist atthe moment to organize anti-air works, evacu-ate urban population, guarantee the continu-ation of production, and eliminate the dam-ages of an air strike, especially the fallout ofa nuclear strike.

(3) Principal railroad junctions, bridges,and harbors are situated near big and me-dium-size cities and can easily be destroyedwhen the enemy attacks cities. No measureshave been taken to protect these transporta-tion points against an enemy attack. In theearly stage of war, they can become para-lyzed.

(4) All reservoirs have a limited capac-ity to release water in an emergency. Amongthe country’s 232 large reservoirs with awater holding capacity between 100 millionand 350 billion cubic meter, 52 are locatednear major transportation lines and 17 closeto important cities. There are also manysmall and medium-size reservoirs locatednear important political, economic, and mili-tary areas and key transportation lines.

We believe that the problems mentionedabove are important ones directly related tothe whole armed forces, to the whole people,and to the process of a national defense war.We propose that the State Council organizea special committee to study and adopt, inaccordance with the possible conditions ofthe national economy, practical and feasiblemeasures to guard against an enemy surpriseattack.

Please tell us whether our report is ap-propriate.

The War Department of the General Staff,April 25, 1964.

[Source: Dangde wenxian98 (Party Docu-ments) 3 (1995), 34-35.]

Document 2: Mao Zedong’s Commentson the War Department’s April 25 Re-port, 12 August 1964.

To Comrades Luo Ruiqing99 and YangChengwu:

This report is excellent. We must care-fully study and gradually implement it. TheState Council has established a special com-


mittee on this question. Has it started itswork?

Mao ZedongAugust 12.

[Source: Ibid., 33.]

Document 3: “Report on How OurCountry’s Economic ConstructionShould Prepare Itself Against an EnemySurprise Attack” by Li Fuchun 100, BoYibo101, and Luo Ruiqing102, 19 August1964.

Chairman103 and the Central Committee:

In accordance with Chairman’s com-ments on the General Staff WarDepartment’s report of how our country’seconomic construction should prepare itselffor a surprise attack by the enemy, we havegathered comrades with responsibility inthese areas for a meeting. All of us agreethat Chairman’s comments and the WarDepartment’s report are extremely impor-tant. We must pay serious attention to anddo our best on such an important issueconcerning our country’s strategic defense.The meeting has decided:

(1) To establish a special committee onthis case within the State Council. Wesuggest that the committee consist of thir-teen people including Li Fuchun, LiXiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Bo Yibo, LuoRuiqing, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, ZhangJichun, Zhao Erlu, Cheng Zihua, Gu Mu,Han Guang, and Zhou Rongxin. Li Fuchunserves as Director, and Bo Yibo and LuoRuiqing Deputy Directors.

(2) In addition to the four areas men-tioned by the War Department, our prepara-tion measures also need to include universi-ties and colleges, scientific research andplanning institutions, warehouses, govern-ment departments and institutions as well ascivil shelters in cities and mines. We mustfollow Chairman’s principle of “carefulstudy and gradual implementation” in con-ducting our investigation into various areasas early as possible and pay attention to thefollowing issues.

(a) All new construction projects willnot be placed in the First Front, especiallynot in the fifteen big cities with over a

million population.(b) For those currently on-going con-

struction projects in the First Front and par-ticularly in the fifteen big cities, except thosethat can be completed and put into effectiveoperation next year or the year after, all therest must be reduced in size, undergo noexpansion, and be concluded as soon as pos-sible.

(c) For existing old enterprises, espe-cially those in cities with high industrialconcentration, we must remove them or someof their workshops. Particularly for militaryand machinery enterprises, we must breakthem in two parts if possible, and shift onepart to the Third and Second Fronts. If wecan remove them as a whole, we must do thatwith careful planning and in steps.

(d) Beginning in next year, no new largeand medium-size reservoirs will be built.

(e) For key national universities andcolleges, scientific research and planninginstitutes in the First Front, if they can beremoved, we must relocate them to the Thirdand Second Fronts with careful planning. Ifthey can not be removed, we must breakthem into two parts.

(f) From now on, all new projects, inwhatever Front they will be located, mustcomply with the principle of dispersion, close-ness to mountains, and concealment. Theymust not be concentrated in certain cities orareas.

We have divided labor to deal with theabove work:

(a) The State Economic Commissionand the State Planning Commission will beresponsible for the arrangement of the indus-trial and transportation systems.

(b) The Ministry of Railway will beresponsible for preparation measures con-cerning railroad junctions.

(c) The Office of National Defense In-dustry will be responsible for the arrange-ment of national defense industry.

(d) The General Staff will be respon-sible for the division of the First, Second, andThird Fronts on the national level and for thearrangement of national defense fortifica-tions and war preparation mobilizations.

(e) Comrade Tan Zhenlin will be re-sponsible for preparation measures concern-ing reservoirs.

(f) Comrades Zhang Jichun and HanGuang will be responsible for the arrange-ment of universities and colleges, scientificresearch and planning institutes.

(g) Comrade Zhou Rongxin will be re-sponsible for the protection of city buildingsand government departments and institu-tions.

We will spend the months of Septemberand October investigating the various as-pects and produce detailed plans that can beimplemented gradually. The special com-mittee will synthesize the plans before sub-mitting them to the Central Committee forinclusion in the general plan for the next yearand in the Third Five-Year Plan.

(3) We propose to revive the People’sAnti-Air Committee. Premier104 shouldstill serve as Director and Comrade XieFuzhi as Secretary General (Comrade LuoRuiqing was Secretary General originally).The Ministry of Public Safety will be re-sponsible for the daily work of the commit-tee.

We should restore the Planning Officefor the Construction of Underground Rail-way in Beijing and carry out an active prepa-ration for the building of underground rail-way in Beijing. In the meantime, we shouldconsider the construction of undergroundrailway in Shanghai and Shenyang. TheMinistry of Railway will be responsible forthis task.

(4) If the central leadership approvesthe above suggestions, we propose to dis-tribute our report along with the GeneralStaff War Department report as well asChairman’s comments as guidelines to allParty Bureaus, to all provincial, municipal,and district Party committees, and to allParty committees within government minis-tries.

Please inform us whether our report iscorrect.

Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, LuoRuiqing

August 19, 1964.

[Source: Ibid., 33-34.]

Document 4: Zhou Enlai’s Conversationwith Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 2April 1965.

(1) China will not take the initiative to pro-voke a war (with the United States). (2)China means what it says and will honor theinternational obligations it has undertaken.(3) China is prepared. China’s policies are


both prudent and prepared.... (4) If the Ameri-can madmen carry out an extensive bomb-ing, China will not sit still and wait to bekilled. If they come from the sky, we willtake action on the ground. Bombing meanswar, and war will have no boundaries. It isimpossible for the United States to resolvethe issue of war simply by relying on a policyof bombing.

[Source: The Diplomatic History ResearchOffice of the People’s Republic of ChinaForeign Ministry, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiaohuodong dashiji, 1949-1975 (Chronologyof Zhou Enlai’s Major Diplomatic Activi-ties, 1949-1975) (Beijing: World Knowl-edge Press, 1993), 445.]

Document 5: Liu Shaoqi’s Speech to theCentral Military Commission war plan-ning meeting on 19 May 1965.

The enemy has many contradictions,weaknesses, and difficulties. Its problemsare no less than ours. If our preparations arefaster and better, war can be delayed. Theenemy will find it difficult to invade. If wemake excellent preparations, the enemy mayeven dare not to invade. If it does not invade,we will not fight out. Such a prospect is notimpossible. But we must work hard toachieve this goal. We must build the bigThird Front and the small Third Front and doa good job on every front, including theatomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long-distance missiles. Under such circumstances,even if the United States has bases in Japan,Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are bigtargets out on the sea and are easy for us tostrike. We should develop as early as pos-sible new technology to attack aircraft andwarships so that we can knock out one en-emy ship with a single missile. Our Red Flag1 and Red Flag 2105 can shoot down theenemy’s high-altitude airplanes. If we haveassurance to shoot down high-altitude air-planes, we can have more assurance to knockdown low-altitude ones. The enemy’sstrength lies in its navy, air force, atomicbombs, and missiles, but the strength in navyand air force has its limits. If the enemysends ground troops to invade China, we arenot afraid. Therefore, on the one hand weshould be prepared for the enemy to comefrom all directions, including a joint inva-sion against China by many countries. On

the other hand we should realize that theenemy lacks reasons and justifications insending troops. If the enemy invades uswithout our attacking it first, the enemy’smorale cannot be high. This will decide thedifference between a just and an unjust war.

In addition, there is the issue of increas-ing the size of troops. In order to buildfortifications, we can organize some engi-neer units. After working for a period andcompleting fortifications, they can be dis-missed. Troops engaged in agricultural pro-duction and divisions on semi war alertshould also construct fortifications. Produc-tion troops are busy with agricultural work,but during slack seasons they should spendmost of their time building fortifications.This means that they can work on fortifica-tions for half a year in North China and forfour to five months in the Yangtze valley. Ifwar begins and we have to expand troops, wejust need a mobilization. This matter will beeasy. At the moment, we need to do a goodjob in organizing militia forces.

What we cannot have time to preparewhen war begins includes fortification con-struction, third fronts, bases as well as com-munications, a reconnaissance network, andnew technology. We must pay attention tothese issues. We should start work on the bigThird Front, the small Third Front, materialstorage, state-of-the-art technology, scien-tific investigation, and research on new weap-ons. If we delay work on these matters, wewill find ourselves unprepared later. To dothese things needs time.

As to the issues of the size of troops, thenumber of military regions, and a unifiedleadership between the local civilian gov-ernment and the military, we can have timeto deal with them when war begins. Some ofthe issues will be dealt with only after theenemy has invaded our country. In case thatthe enemy occupies the Longhai Railroad,106

or the Yangtze valley, or the Jinghan Rail-road107, or the Jinpu Railroad108, our coun-try will then be divided into sections. If thathappens, we have to practice a unified lead-ership of the party, the government and thearmy. But this will be decided at that time,not now. With trains and airplanes at itsdisposal, the enemy will not do things ac-cording to our methods. Only when thattime comes will our leadership go to moun-tains. At present, the leadership must live inthe city because it will be inconvenient if itdoes not live in the city. Only when a large

number of enemy troops invades China andcuts us into parts will the leadership go to themountains. It will not do that when China isnot cut into parts. For instance, if the enemydoes not occupy cities like Xian andTongguan, Shaanxi109 will not create aShaanan Military region and a Shaanbeimilitary region. The leadership will decideon this matter after the enemy has invaded,and there is time to do that. There is also timeto mobilize troops. At present, we can beginthe organization of the militia....(the rest ofthe speech is about how to organize themilitia).

[Source: Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40.]

Document 6: Mao’s Conversation withthe Party and Government Delegation ofthe Democratic Republic of Vietnam110 ,20 October 1965.

You are fighting an excellent war. Boththe South and the North are fighting well.The people of the whole world, includingthose who have already awakened and thosewho have not awakened, are supporting you.The current world is not a peaceful one. It isnot you Vietnamese who are invading theUnited States, neither are the Chinese whoare waging an aggressive war against theUnited States.

Not long ago the Japanese AsahiShimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun publishedseveral reports filed by Japanese correspon-dents from South Vietnam. U.S. newspa-pers described these reports as unfair, thusprovoking a debate. I am not referring to theJapanese Communist newspaper, Akahata.I am talking about Japanese bourgeois news-papers. This shows that the direction of themedia is not favorable to the United States.Recently the demonstration by the Ameri-can people against the Americangovernment’s Vietnam policy has devel-oped. At the moment it is primarily Ameri-can intellectuals who are making trouble.

But all this are external conditions. Infact what will solve the problem is the waryou are fighting. Of course you can conductnegotiations. In the past you held negotia-tions in Geneva. But the American did nothonor their promise after the negotiations.We have had negotiations with both ChiangKai-shek and the United States. Rusk saidthat the United States has had most negotia-


tions with China. But we stick to one point:the United States must withdraw from Tai-wan, and after that all other problems can beeasily resolved. The United States does notaccept this point. China and the UnitedStates have been negotiating for ten yearsand we are still repeating the same oldwords. We will not give up that point. TheUnited States once wanted to exchange pressdelegations with us. They argued that whenwe began with minor issues, we could bettersettle major problems later. We contendedthat only by starting from major issues couldminor problems be easily resolved.

You withdrew your armed forces fromthe South in accordance with the GenevaAccords. As a result, the enemy began tokill people in the South, and you revivedarmed struggle. At first you adopted politi-cal struggle as a priority supplemented byarmed struggle. We supported you. In thesecond stage when you were carrying outpolitical and armed struggles simulta-neously, we again supported you. In thethird stage when you are pursuing armedstruggle as a priority supplemented by po-litical struggle, we still support you. In myview, the enemy is gradually escalating thewar; so are you. In the next two and threeyears you may encounter difficulties. But itis hard to say, and it may not be so. We needto take this possibility into consideration.So long as you have made all kinds ofpreparations, even if the most difficult situ-ation emerges, you will not find it too farfrom your initial considerations. Isn’t this agood argument? Therefore there are twoessential points: the first is to strive for themost favorable situation, and the second toprepare for the worst.

The Algerian experience can serve as areference for you. Possibly in the fourth orfifth year of their war, some Algerian lead-ers became worried. At that time, theirPrime Minister Arbas came to talk with us.They said that Algeria had a very smallpopulation of ten million. A million hadalready died. While the enemy had an armyof 800,000, their own regular forces pos-sessed only about 30,000 to 40,000 troops.To add the guerrillas, their total forces wereless than 100,000. I told them at the time thatthe enemy was bound to defeat and that theirpopulation would increase. Later, after ne-gotiations France began to withdraw itstroops. Now it has completed the with-drawal, only leaving behind a few small

naval bases. The Algerian revolution is anational democratic revolution led by thebourgeoisie. Our two parties are Commu-nist. In terms of mobilizing the masses andcarrying out people’s war, our two parties aredifferent from Algeria.

I talked about people’s war in my article.Some of the statements refer to specific prob-lems of ten to twenty years ago. Now youhave encountered some new conditions.Many of your methods are different from ourmethods in the past. We should have differ-ences. We also learn about war gradually. Atthe beginning we lost battles. We have notdone as smoothly as you have.

I have not noticed what issues you havenegotiated with the United States. I only payattention to how you fight the Americans andhow you drive the Americans out. You canhave negotiations at certain time[s], but youshould not lower your tones. You shouldraise your tones a little higher. Be preparedthat the enemy may deceive you.

We will support you until your finalvictory. The confidence in victory comesfrom the fighting you have done and from thestruggle you have made. For instance, oneexperience we have is that the Americans canbe fought. We obtained this experience onlyafter fighting the Americans. The Ameri-cans can be fought and can be defeated. Weshould demolish the myth that the Ameri-cans cannot be fought and cannot be de-feated. Both of our two parties have manyexperiences. Both of us have fought theJapanese. You have also fought the French.At the moment you are fighting the Ameri-cans.

The Americans have trained and edu-cated the Vietnamese people. They haveeducated us and the people of the wholeworld. In my opinion it is not good withoutthe Americans. Such an educator is indis-pensable. In order to defeat the Americans,we must learn from the Americans. Marx’sworks do not teach us how to fight the Ameri-cans. Nor do Lenin’s books write about howto fight the Americans. We primarily learnfrom the Americans.

The Chinese people and the people ofthe whole world support you. The morefriends you have, the better you are.

[Source: The People’s Republic of ChinaForeign Ministry and the Chinese Commu-nist Party Central Documentary ResearchOffice, comp., Mao Zedong Waijiao wenxuan

(Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong)(Beijing: Central Documentary Press andWorld Knowledge Press, 1994), 570-573.]

Document 7: Mao’s Conversation withPham Van Dong, 17 November 1968.

Because there has been no battle to fightrecently, you want to negotiate with theUnited States. It is all right to negotiate, butit is difficult to get the United States towithdraw through negotiations. The UnitedStates also wants to negotiate with you be-cause it is in a dilemma. It has to deal withproblems of three regions: the first is theAmericas—the United States, the second isEurope, and the third is Asia. In the last fewyears the United States has stationed itsmajor forces in Asia and has created animbalance. In this regard American capital-ists who have investments in Europe aredissatisfied. Also throughout its history theUnited States has always let other countriesfight first before it jumps in at halfway. It isonly after World War Two that the UnitedStates has begun to take the lead in fighting,first in the Korean War and then in theVietnam War. In Vietnam the United Statesis taking the lead, but it is followed by onlya small number of other countries. Whetherthe war is a special war or a limited war, theUnited States is totally devoted to it. Now itcannot afford to pay attention to other coun-tries. Its troops in Europe, for example, arecomplaining, saying that there is a shortageof manpower and that experienced soldiersand commanders have been removed andbetter equipment has been relocated. TheUnited States has also redeployed its troopsfrom Japan, Korea and other areas of Asia.Did not the United States claim that it has apopulation of two hundred million? But itcannot endure the war. It has dispatchedonly several hundred thousand troops. Thereis a limit to its troops.

After fighting for over a dozen yearsyou should not think about only your owndifficulties. You should look at the enemy’sdifficulties. It has been twenty-three yearssince Japan’s surrender in 1945, but yourcountry still exists. Three imperialist coun-tries have committed aggression against you:Japan, France, and the United States. Butyour country has not only survived but alsodeveloped.

Of course imperialism wants to fight.


One purpose for its war is to put out fire. Afire has started in your country, and imperi-alism wants to put out that fire. The secondpurpose is to make money through produc-ing munitions. To put out fire they mustproduce fire-extinguishing machines, whichwill bring about profits. Every year theUnited States expends over 30 billion dol-lars in your country.

It has been an American custom not tofight a long war. The wars they have foughtaverage about four to five years. The fire inyour country cannot be put out. On thecontrary, it has spreaded. Capitalists in theUnited States are divided into factions. Whenthis faction makes more profit and that fac-tion make less profit, an imbalance in booty-sharing will occur and trouble will begindomestically. These contradictions shouldbe exploited. Those monopolized capital-ists who have made less money are unwill-ing to continue the war. This contradictioncan be detected in election speeches made bythe two factions. Especially the Americanjournalist Walter Lippmann has publishedan article recently, warning not to fall intoanother trap. He says that the United Stateshas already fallen into a trap in Vietnam andthat the current problem is how to find waysto climb out of that trap. He is afraid that theUnited States may fall into other traps. There-fore your cause is promising.

In 1966, I had a conversation with Chair-man Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou. At thattime, the United States had already resumedattack on North Vietnam, but had not re-newed bombing. I said that the United Statesmight end the war that year because it was anAmerican election year. No matter whichpresident came to power, he would encoun-ter the problem of whether the United Statesshould continue the war or withdraw now. Ibelieved that the difficulties that the UnitedStates faced would increase if it continuedthe war. Countries in all of Europe did notparticipate in the war. This situation wasdifferent from that of the Korean War. Japanprobably would not enter the war. It mightlend some help economically because it couldmake money by producing ammunition. Ithink the Americans overestimated theirstrength in the past. Now the United Statesis repeating its past practice by overstretch-ing its forces. It is not just us who make thisargument. Nixon has also said so. TheUnited States has stretched its forces notonly in the Americas and Europe but also in

Asia. At first I did not believe that the UnitedStates would attack North Vietnam. Laterthe United States bombed North Vietnam,proving my words wrong. Now the UnitedStates has stopped bombing. My words arecorrect again. Maybe the United States willresume bombing, proving my words wronga second time. But eventually my words willprove correct: the United States has to stopbombing. Therefore I believe that it is allright for you to make several contingencyplans.

In sum, in the past years the Americanarmy has not invaded North Vietnam. TheUnited States has neither blockadedHaiphong nor bombed the Hanoi city itself.The United States has reserved a method. Atone point it claimed that it would practice a“hot pursuit.” But when your aircraft flewover our country, the United States did notcarry out a “hot pursuit.” Therefore, theUnited States has bluffed. It has nevermentioned the fact that your aircraft haveused our airfields. Take another example,China had so many people working in yourcountry. The United States knew that, buthad never mentioned it, as if such a thing didnot exist. As to the remaining people sent byChina to your country who are no longerneeded, we can withdraw them. Have youdiscussed this issue? If the United Statescomes again, we will send people to you aswell. Please discuss this issue to see whichChinese units you want to keep and whichunits you do not want to keep. Keep the unitsthat are useful to you. We will withdraw theunits that are of no use to you. We will sendthem to you if they are needed in the future.This is like the way your airplanes have usedChinese airfields: use them if you need andnot use them if you do not need. This is theway to do things.

I am in favor of your policy of fightingwhile negotiating. We have some comradeswho are afraid that you may by taken in bythe Americans. I think you will not. Isn’tthis negotiation the same as fighting? Wecan learn experience and know patternsthrough fighting. Sometimes one cannotavoid being taken in. Just as you have said,the Americans do not keep their words.Johnson once said publicly that even agree-ments sometimes could not be honored. Butthings must have their laws. Take yournegotiations as an example, are you going tonegotiate for a hundred years? Our Premierhas said that if Nixon continues the negotia-

tions for another two years and fails to solvethe problem, he will have difficulties inwinning another term of presidency.

One more point. It is the puppet regimein South Vietnam who is afraid of the Na-tional Liberation Front of South Vietnam.Some people in the United States havepointed out that the really effective govern-ment popular among the South Vietnamesepeople is not the Saigon government but theLiberation Front. This is not a statementattributed to someone in the U.S. Congress.It is reported by journalists, but the name ofthe speaker was not identified. The state-ment was attributed to a so-called U.S. gov-ernment individual. The statement raises aquestion: Who represents the governmentwith real prestige in South Vietnam? NguyenVan Thieu or Nguyen Huu Tho? Thereforealthough the United States publicly praisesNguyen Van Thieu, saying that he will notgo to Paris to attend the negotiations, it infact realizes that problems can not be solvedif the National Liberation Front of SouthVietnam does not participate in the negotia-tions.

[Source: Ibid., 580-583.]

1. Using recent Chinese sources, Chen Jian’s “China’sInvolvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69,” The ChinaQuarterly 142 (June 1995), 357-387, provides an infor-mative and insightful analysis of China’s decision toassist Hanoi during the Vietnam War, but he does notaddress the historiographical controversy of whetherthere was a “strategic debate” in Beijing in 1965. Freshmaterials released in China in 1994 and 1995 shed newlight on this issue.2. See Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model:Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War,1950-1954,” The Journal of Military History 57 (Octo-ber 1993), 698-715; idem., “China and the GenevaConference of 1954,” The China Quarterly 129 (March1992), 103-122; Chen Jian, “China and the FirstIndochina War, 1950-1954,” The China Quarterly 133(March 1993), 85-110.3. Guo Ming, ed., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian[The Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations over theLast Forty Years] (Nanning: Guangxi People’s Press,1991), 65. The contributors in this volume are from theGuangxi Academy of Social Sciences, a major researchcenter on Sino-Vietnamese relations in China.4. Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., Zhonghua renmingongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949-1956 [A Diplomatic His-tory of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1956](Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 94; HoangVan Hoan, Canghai yisu: Hoang Van Hoan geminghuiyilu [A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’sRevolutionary Reminiscences] (Beijing: LiberationArmy Press, 1987), 267.5. The Writing Team on the History of the ChineseMilitary Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshiguwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Histori-cal Facts about the Role of the Chinese Military Advi-


sory Group in the Struggle to Aid Vietnam and ResistFrance] (Beijing: Liberation army Press, 1990), 126-127. On 16 October 1955, Mao personally selectedPeng Dehuai, Chen Geng, and Wei Guoqing as mem-bers of the Chinese delegation for the forthcomingdiscussions during Giap’s second visit. See Mao to LiuShaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, 16October 1955, in the CCP Central Documentary Re-search Office, comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao[Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of thePRC] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1991), 5:419.Deputy Defense Minister Chen Geng, who had servedas China’s chief military advisor to the Vietminh in1950, was not mentioned during Giap’s first visit;evidently, Mao wanted to present a stronger Chineseteam to talk with Giap during his second trip.6. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65.7. The Writing Team on the History of the ChineseMilitary Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshiguwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi , 142-143.8. During the Vietnamese land reform, an excessivepersecution of so-called landlords and rich peasantsoccurred, creating serious resentments among the peas-ant population against the party. Hoang, Canghai yisu,279-285. Truong Chinh was often regarded by West-ern observers as a member of the “pro-Chinese” wingof the VWP.9. Pei, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949-1956, 94.10. For Zhou’s visit to Hanoi, see the PRC ForeignMinistry’s Diplomatic History Research Office, comp.,Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [AChronology of Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities,1949-1975] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993),169-170; Huang Zheng, Hu Zhiming he Zhongguo [HoChi Minh and China] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press,1987), 182-183. Zhou’s quote is taken from HanSuyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making ofModern China, 1898-1976 (New York: Hill and Wang,1994), 260.11. Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow,Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 102-104.12. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. Ac-cording to a recent study by William J. Duiker, LeDuan as General Secretary was “a powerful advocateof an aggressive strategy to achieve national reunifica-tion with the South.” At the Fifteenth Plenum of theVWP held at the end of 1958, the Central Committeeadopted a new policy which advocated a return torevolutionary war to unify the South. But the new linealso included the ambivalence that had shaped atti-tudes in Hanoi from the time of the Geneva Confer-ence. Though urging a return to revolutionary war, theCentral Committee report, which was not issued untilMay 1959, asserted that the “political strength of themasses” would remain the principal from of struggle,although it would now be supplemented by low-levelmilitary operations conducted by local guerrilla forcesand village self-defense units of the type that had beenemployed during the August 1945 Revolution. Will-iam J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Con-flict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1994), 235. It is possible that China’s advice for cau-tion in waging revolutionary struggle in the Southcontributed to the ambivalence in Hanoi’s policy.13. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflictin Indochina, 265.14. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67.15. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflictin Indochina, 266.16. For Pham Van Dong’s visit to China, see the PRC

Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office,comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 313-314. Remarks by Mao and Zhou are takenfrom Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67.17. Cong Jin, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue [Years of Twist-ing Development] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press,1989), 500-502. The author is a party history researcherat the Chinese National Defense University. See alsoZhu Zhongli, Liming yu wanxia: Wang Jiaxiang wenxuezhuanji [Dawn and Dusk: A Literary Biography ofWang Jiaxiang] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1986),394-396. The author is the wife of Wang Jiaxiang.18. Ma Qibin, Chen Wenbin, et al. Zhongguogongchandang zhizheng sishinian, 1949-1989 [The FortyYears of the Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-1989] (Beijing: CCP Party History Material Press, 1989),213; Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 502; Zhu, Liming yuwanxia, 396-399.19. Xue Mouhong and Pei Jianzhang, chief comp.,Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary ChineseDiplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press,1990), 159; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian,69; Wang Xiangen, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [A FactualRecord of Assistance to Vietnam against the UnitedStates] (Beijing: International Culture Press, 1990), 25.Wang Xiangen was a secretary at the headquarters of thePLA Engineering Corps in the late 1970s and is cur-rently working with the PLA General Staff. His bookcontains much useful data on the role of Chinese armyengineer troops in Vietnam.20. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159.21. Ibid.22. Li Ke, “The Indelible Mark on History of ChineseAssistance to Vietnam against the United States,” Junshilishi [Military History] 4 (1989), 30. This bi-monthlyjournal is published by the Chinese People’s Revolu-tionary Military Museum in Beijing.23. Interview with a Chinese military history researcher,Beijing, 13 July 1995.24. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dagemingzhong de renmin jiefangjun [The People’s LiberationArmy during the Cultural Revolution] (Beijing: CCPHistorical Materials Press, 1989), 409.25. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: TheUnited States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: 2nded., Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 117-119.26. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159.27. Present at the meetings were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi,Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu, and Tong Xiaopeng ofthe CCP; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, PhamVan Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, HoangVan Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP; andKaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong, andPhoumi Vongvochit of the Lao People’s RevolutionaryParty. The PRC Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic HistoryResearch Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodongdashiji, 1949-1975, 413.28. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renminjiefangjun, 408.29. Chen, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War,”364.30. Allen S. Whiting, “How We Almost Went to Warwith China,” Look, 29 April 1969, p. 76; Melvin Gurtovand Hwang Byong-moo, China Under Threat: ThePolitics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1980), 160-161.31. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of ChineseAssistance to Vietnam against the United States,” 30.32. Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat: The Poli-tics of Strategy and Diplomacy, 162; Herring, America’sLongest War, 128-131.

33. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic HistoryResearch Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodongdashiji, 1949-1975, 445; Xue and Pei, DangdaiZhongguo waijiao, 160-161.34. Han Huaizhi and Tan Jingjiao, chief comp., Dangdaizhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Workof the Contemporary Chinese Armed Forces] (Beijing:Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), 1:539-40; Li andHao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun,415; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69-70;Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assis-tance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31.35. Han and Tan, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshigongzuo, 539-540; Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 44;Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assis-tance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31.36. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161.37. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 45.38. Ibid. 35, 44; Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhongde renmin jiefangjun, 422. R. B. Smith also mentionsHo’s meeting with Mao in Changsha. He dates themeeting at May 16-17. His source is the diary of Ho’spersonal secretary. See R. B. Smith, An InternationalHistory of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making ofa Limited War, 1965-66 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1991), 139.39. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 46-48. According toLi Ke and Hao Shengzhang, to facilitate the transporta-tion of materials to Vietnam, Beijing in 1965 alsoestablished a special leadership group in charge oftransportation to Vietnam. Luo Ruiqing was director.Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, Yang Chengwu, Li Tianyou,Fang Yi, Li Qiang, and Liu Xiao were vice-directors. Liand Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun,413.40. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renminjiefangjun, 417.41. Quoted in Smith, An International History of theVietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a LimitedWar, 1965-66, 171. According to Luu Doan Huynh,from the International Relations Institute of the Minis-try of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Beijing informedHanoi in June 1965 that it would not be able to defendNorth Vietnam from U.S. air attacks. Quoted in AllenWhiting, “China’s Role in the Vietnam War,” in JayneWerner and David Hunt, eds., The American War inVietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast AsiaProgram, 1993), 71-76.42. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161; Guo,Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 70.43. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of ChineseAssistance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31;Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69. For adescription of the Chinese use of the Cambodian port ofSihanoukville to send military supplies to the NationalLiberation Front in South Vietnam between 1966-1967, see Kang Daisha, “My Days in Cambodia,” inCheng Xiangjun, ed., Nu waijiaoguan [Women Diplo-mats] (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1995), 482-483.Kang Daisha is the wife of Chen Shuliang, who was theChinese ambassador to Cambodia between 1962-1967.For a detailed treatment of Chinese aid to the DRVbetween 1965-1969, see Chen, “China’s Involvementin the Vietnam War,” 371-380.44. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 71.45. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deter-rence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press, 1975), 186; idem., “Forecasting Chi-nese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie,”in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds.,Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford:


Clarendon Press, 1994), 506-523.46. John W. Garver, “The Chinese Threat in the Viet-nam War,” Parameters 22 (Spring 1992), 73-85, quo-tation on 75.47. Sun Dongsheng, “The Great Transformation in theStrategic Planning of Our Country’s Economic Con-struction,” Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 3(1995), 42-48. Sun’s indirect quotation of Mao’s re-marks is on p. 44. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthlyjournal published by the CCP Central DocumentaryResearch Office and the Central Archives. It oftencontains important party documents. Sun Dongsheng isa researcher at the Central Documentary ResearchOffice.48. Mao’s conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17November 1968, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and theCentral Documentary Research Office, comp., MaoZedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Worksof Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press andWorld Knowledge Press, 1994), 582.49. Yuan Dejin, “The Evolution of Mao Zedong’sTheory of War and Peace since the Founding of NewChina,” Junshi lishi [Military History] 4 (1994), 36.50. For an excellent discussion of the origins, develop-ment and consequences of the Third Front, see BarryNaughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrializationin the Chinese Interior,” The China Quarterly 115(September 1988), 351-386.51. For the complete text of the report, see Dangdewenxian 3 (1995), 34-35.52. Mao to Luo and Yang, 12 August 1964, in ibid, 33.53. For the text of the Special Committee report of 19August 1964, see ibid., 33-34.54. Mao’s remarks are quoted in Sun, “The GreatTransformation in the Strategic Planning of OurCountry’s Economic Construction,” 45.55. Sun, “The Great Transformation in the StrategicPlanning of Our Country’s Economic Construction,”44.56. Naughton, “The Third Front,” 368.57. Mao’s conversation with He Long, Luo Ruiqing,and Yang Chengwu, 28 April 1965, in Mao Zedongjunshi wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong’s MilitaryWritings] 6 vols. (Beijing: Military Science Press andCentral Document Press, 1993), 6:404.58. For Snow’s version of his conversation with Mao,see Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York:Random House, 1971), 215-216. For the Chinese ver-sion, see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the CentralDocumentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedongwaijiao wenxuan, 544-562.59. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renminjiefangjun, 341.60. Ibid., 341-342; Mao Zedong junshi wenji , 6:403.61. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic HistoryResearch Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodongdashiji, 1949-1975, 455.62. Liu Shaoqi’s speech at the war planning meeting ofthe Central Military Commission, 19 May 1965, inDangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40.63. The CCP Central Documentary Research Office,comp., Zhu De nianpu [Chronicle of Zhu De] (Beijing:People’s Press, 1986), 537-538.64. Harry Harding, “The Making of Chinese MilitaryPower,” in William Whitson, ed., The Military andPolitical Power in China in the 1970s (New York:Praeger, 1973), 361-385; Uri Ra’anan, “Peking’s For-eign Policy ‘Debate’, 1965-1966,” in Tang Tsou, ed.,China in Crisis, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1968), 23-71; Donald Zagoria, “The StrategicDebate in Peking,” in ibid., 237-268; Michael Yahuda,

“Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-66,” The China Quarterly 49 (January-March 1972),32-75.65. Barry Naughton has made a similar criticism.Naughton, “The Third Front,” 370-371.66. Luo Ruiqing, “The People Defeated Japanese Fas-cism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. ImperialismToo,” Peking Review, 3 September 1965, 31-39; LinBiao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War,” ibid.,9-30.67. Xu Yan, Junshijia Mao Zedong [Military StrategistMao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1995),149; Huang Yao, Sanci danan busi de Luo RuiqingDajiang [Senior General Luo Ruiqing who SurvivedThree Deaths] (Beijing: CCP Party History Press, 1994),263, 265, 270-271. This book is based on sources fromthe Central Archives, the PLA General Staff Archives,and the Ministry of Public Security Archives.

It is possible that the two articles published in Luoand Lin’s names were written in response to Sovietarguments on war and peace. On 30 January 1965, Maoasked Yang Chengwu and Lei Yingfu, Deputy Directorof the Combat Department of the General Staff, to finda person well versed in political and military issues toprepare a commentary on the book Military Strategyedited by Soviet Chief of Staff V. D. Sokolovsky andpublished by the Soviet Defense Ministry’s MilitaryPress in 1962. See Mao to Yang Chengwu and LeiYingfu, 30 January 1965, in Mao Zedong junshi wenji,6:402.68. For a detailed discussion of the Luo-Lin dispute, seeHuang, Sanci danan busi de Luo Riqing Dajiang,chapters 24-34. Allen Whiting attempts to establish acausal relationship between Luo’s purge and China’sforeign policy change in mid-1965. Citing the Viet-namese claim that China decided in June 1965 toprovide no air cover for North Vietnam, Whiting arguesthat this timing dovetails with a major personnel changein the Chinese leadership: “At some point between Mayand September Luo Ruiqing fell from office, afterwhich Lin Biao published a major treatise on guerrillawar implicitly rejecting Luo’s forward strategy andwith it any advanced air combat. Chinese ground sup-port apparently came as a substitute form of help forHanoi.” Whiting, “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy,”516. In fact, Luo did not fall from office until December1965.69. Michael H. Hunt has also criticized the emphasis onfactions to account for Chinese foreign policy forma-tion. He poses the question sharply: “Does the factionalmodel transpose on China the competitive ethos ofAmerican politics and underestimate the restrainingauthoritarian and hierarchical qualities of China’s po-litical culture?” See Michael H. Hunt, “CCP ForeignPolicy: ‘Normalizing the Field,’” in Michael H. Huntand Niu Jun, eds., Toward a History of Chinese Com-munist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalitiesand Interpretive Approaches (Washington, DC:Woodrow Wilson International Center for ScholarsAsia Program, 1995), 163-191. The quotation is on p.170.70. For Mao’s statements on the “Two IntermediateZones,” see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCPCentral Documentary Research Office, comp., MaoZedong waijiao wenxuan, 506-509. See also Chi Aiping,“The Evolution of Mao Zedong’s International Strate-gic Thought,” in Dangde wenxian 3 (1994), 46-52; LiJie, “Study of Mao Zedong’s International StrategicThought,” in the International Strategic Studies Foun-dation, ed., Huanqiu tongci liangre [All Is the Same inthe World] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1993), 1-

16.71. Mao Zedong, “Talks with the American Correspon-dent Anna Louise Strong,” in Selected Works of MaoTse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965),4:99.72. For a recent study of China’s policy toward Angolaand Mozambique, see Steven F. Jackson, “China’sThird World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola andMozambique, 1961-93,” The China Quarterly 143 (June1995), 387-422.73. On Beijing’s attempt to divide the Soviet-led bloc,see the putative memoirs of Enver Hoxha, Reflectionson China, 2 vols., (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1979). For anoverview of Chinese-Albanian relations, see FanChengzuo, “The ‘Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Win-ter’ in Chinese-Albanian Relations,” Waijiao xueyuanxuebao [Journal of Foreign Affairs College] 3 (1993),50-52.74. Mao’s conversation with the Chilean JournalistDelegation, 23 June 1964, in the PRC Foreign Ministryand the Central Documentary Research Office, comp.,Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 529-533.75. Mao’s talk with delegates from Asia, Africa, andOceania on 9 July 1964, in ibid, 534-539. These del-egates came to China after participating in Pyongyangin the Second Asian Economic Forum.76. For a good discussion of anti-imperialism in Chi-nese foreign policy, see Edward Friedman, “Anti-Im-perialism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S.Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Rela-tions in the Post Cold War Era, 3rd ed. (Boulder:Westview Press, 1994), 60-74.77. Gurtov and Hwang, China under Threat, 161.78. For a detailed, first-hand account of Zhou Enlai’svisit to Moscow, see Yu Zhan, “An Unusual Visit:Remembering Zhou Enlai’s Last Visit to the SovietUnion,” Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 2 (1992),85-91. It is also included in the Foreign Ministry Dip-lomatic History Research Office, comp., XinZhongguowaijiao fengyun [Episodes of New China’s Diplomacy](Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 3:14-30. YuZhan was Director of the Department of the SovietUnion and Eastern Europe of the Chinese ForeignMinistry in 1964 and accompanied Zhou to Moscow.79. The PRC Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic HistoryResearch Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodongdashiji, 1949-1975, 428.80. Zhou’s conversation with Ho Chi Minh and LeDuan, 1 March 1965, in ibid., 438.81. Smith, An International History of the VietnamWar, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66, 54.82. The Vietnamese claim is quoted in Nayan Chanda,“Secrets of Former Friends,” Far Eastern EconomicReview (15 June 1979), 38-39. I have not seen anyChinese material that confirms the Vietnamese claim.83. Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi: Zhonghuarenmin gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979 [A DiplomaticHistory of China: The Period of the People’s Republicof China, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’sPress, 1988), 344.84. Smith, An International History of the VietnamWar, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66, 55.85. Douglas Pike describes Hanoi’s strategy to put theSino-Soviet dispute to its own use in service of its waras “the alternating tilt gambit.” See Douglas Pike,Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 54-55.86. For Mao’s reaction to Dulles’ policy, see Bo Yibo,Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollec-


tions of Certain Important Decisions and Events], vol.2 (Beijing: CCP Party School Press, 1993), 1137-1157.87. For more discussions of Mao’s attempt to use theescalation of the Indochina conflict to radicalize China’spolitical and social life, see Chen, “China’s Involve-ment in the Vietnam War,” 361-365.88. For a description of this problem, see Zhai, “Trans-planting the Chinese Model,” 712-713.89. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 60-68.90. Ibid., 74-75.91. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 102.92. Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 607.93. Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, “The Dilemma ofMao Tse-tung,” The China Quarterly 35 (July-Sep-tember 1968), 58-77; Smith, An International Historyof the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of aLimited War, 1965-66, 285-304.94. Smith, An International History of the VietnamWar, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66, 298-299. For Zhou’s reception of the Vietnamesedelegation led by Le Duan, see The PRC ForeignMinistry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp.,Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 491.95. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A CriticalAnalysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publish-ing Co., Inc., 1982), 93-94, 96.96. Garver, “The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War,”75.97. Yang Chengwu.98. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly journal publishedby the CCP Central Documentary Research Office andthe Central Archives. It often contains important partydocuments99. Chief of Staff.100. Deputy Prime Minister, Director of the StateCouncil Special Committee on war preparation.101. Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Director of theState Council Special Committee on war preparation.102. Luo was also named Deputy Director of the StateCouncil Special Committee on war preparation.103. Mao Zedong.104. Zhou Enlai.105. These are the names of Chinese missiles.106. A major railway trunk running east and westbetween Lianyungang and Lanzhou.107. A major railway trunk running north and southbetween Beijing and Wuhan.108. A major railway trunk running north and southbetween Tianjin and Nanjing.109. A province in North China.110. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Pham VanDong.

Qiang Zhai teaches history at Auburn Uni-versity at Montgomery (Alabama) and is theauthor of The Dragon, the Lion, and theEagle: Chinese-British-American Relations,1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State Univer-sity Press, 1994). This article is adaptedfrom a paper prepared for presentation atthe CWI HP Conference on New Evidenceon the Cold War in Asia at the University ofHong Kong on 9-12 January 1995.

GAIDUKcontinued from page 232

palpable improvement in Soviet-Americanrelations following the shared fright of the1962 Caribbean (Cuban missile) crisis, theKremlin sought to minimize Soviet involve-ment in the Vietnam conflict, which was notonly problematic from the viewpoint of pos-sible foreign-policy advantages but was alsofraught with possible new clashes betweenthe USSR and the USA. Moreover, theSoviet leaders were apprehensive of radicalviews held by North Vietnam’s leaders, whohad a clearly pro-Chinese orientation.

The extent of the difference in the posi-tions held by the two countries became clearafter a visit to Moscow in Jan.-Feb. 1964 bya delegation of the Workers Party of Vietnam(WPV), led by Le Duan, the party’s FirstSecretary. The DRV Communists came outin support of their Chinese colleagues withsuch zeal and expressed such radical ideasabout the role of the national liberation move-ment in Third World countries that theirMoscow interlocutors were obliged to switchfrom “the patient explanation of the CPSUstand and the general line of the world com-munist movement” to direct warnings aboutthe possible consequences such views couldhave for “the Vietnamese friends’” relationswith the Soviet Union.3

Further evidence that the two sides wereslowly but surely drifting apart surfaced dur-ing a July 1964 visit to Moscow by an NLFdelegation at the invitation of the SovietAfro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The rep-resentatives of the patriotic forces of SouthVietnam presented to the Soviet leaders anumber of requests and proposals, includingrequests for increased supplies of arms andammunition. They also expressed a desirethat a permanent mission of the NFLSV beopened in the USSR. The CPSU CC viewedskeptically all those requests. In his report tothe CC about that delegation’s visit, D.Shevlyagin, deputy head of the CC Interna-tional Department, advised that no definiteanswer about the opening of such a missionbe given and that all talks be held exclusivelyvia the North Vietnamese state agencies. Inview of this, it was decided not to receive thedelegation at the CPSU CC, for that wouldhave raised the awkward necessity for theKremlin leaders to state in clear terms theirstand on the above-mentioned issues. CCSecretary Boris Ponomarev, who was the

curator of relations between the CPSU andother parties, accepted that advice.4

Meanwhile, faced with the Sovietleadership’s unwillingness to plunge intothe Southeast Asian conflict, Hanoi re-doubled its efforts to improve relations withChina. According to the information of theSoviet Defense Ministry, PRC and DRVofficials opened talks in 1964 on a bilateraltreaty of military cooperation. North Viet-nam hosted a delegation of PRC militaryleaders, led by the Defense Minister, and inDecember 1964 a bilateral treaty was signedwhich provided for the introduction of PRCtroops to the DRV.5 Prior to that, the DRVGeneral Staff had informed the Soviet mili-tary attaché in Hanoi that there was no longerany need for Soviet military experts to stayin the country and they should leave theDRV without replacement by other Sovietadvisors as soon as they completed theircurrent business.6 The rapprochement be-tween Hanoi and Beijing was facilitated bycommon views on the need to fight against“U.S. imperialism.” Although the NorthVietnamese leaders never fully trusted China(as later conflicts demonstrated), coolnessin relations with the Soviet Union predeter-mined their official position.7

Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964marked a turning point in Soviet-North Viet-namese relations.8 For reasons that remainunclear, the Soviet Union made an about-face and again oriented itself toward closercooperation with North Vietnam. ProbablyLeonid I. Brezhnev and his entourage feareda loss of Soviet influence in the region,particularly in the context of the mountingdifferences between Beijing and Moscowwhich threatened to develop into an openconflict. In that context, the consolidation ofChina’s position in Southeast Asia at theUSSR’s expense posed a potential threat tothe Soviet authority in the world communistmovement.9 Furthermore, the assassinationof U.S. President John F. Kennedy in No-vember 1963 and advent to power of LyndonB. Johnson (whose election as president in1964 was regarded in the USSR as an indi-cator of greater right-wing influence inAmerican politics) dimmed the hopes ofimprovement in Soviet-American relationsthat had arisen in the last year of Kennedy’slife. This development offered a certainfreedom of action to Moscow’s new leader-ship, which had reverted to the policy ofconfrontation—a policy which was, in turn,


facilitated by Johnson’s escalation of U.S.involvement in Vietnam.

From late 1964 on, Soviet policy withrespect to Vietnam pursued several goals.First and foremost, the USSR emphasizedmoral and political support to what it de-scribed as the Vietnamese people’s waragainst American aggression. The Sovietmass media now promptly and frequentlycarried official statements by Soviet leadersdenouncing U.S. aggressive actions in South-east Asia, no longer delaying as it had withTASS’s statement on the Tonkin Gulf inci-dent. Steps were taken to expand contactsboth with Hanoi and representatives of theSouth Vietnamese patriotic forces, and, ac-cordingly, the CPSU CC now approved theopening in Moscow (at the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee), on 24 Decem-ber 1964, of a permanent mission of theNFLSV.

Second, Soviet material assistance (eco-nomic and, primarily, military) to the DRVand NLF expanded. Soviet military suppliesin the period from 1963 to 1967 (particularlyafter 1965) exceeded one billion rubles, ac-cording to the data of the Soviet Embassy inHanoi.10 Prior to 1965, German models ofarms were sent to North Vietnam from theSoviet Union, but from then on the Kremlinprovided only Soviet-made arms to the “Viet-namese friends,” including the latest de-signs of surface-to-air missiles, jet planes,rockets, and field artillery, as well as a largearray of especially sophisticated arms andcombat hardware for the DRV air defensesystem.11 And Soviet economic and mili-tary assistance to Vietnam kept on increas-ing. According to estimates of the SovietEmbassy in Hanoi, by 1968 Soviet materialassistance accounted for 50 percent of all aidto the DRV, and as of 1 January 1968 thetotal value of Soviet assistance over thatperiod was in excess of 1.8 billion rubles,with military supplies accounting for 60percent.12

Such a turnabout in Soviet policy withrespect to cooperation with Vietnam wasreceived with satisfaction by the Hanoi lead-ers, who increasingly stressed the impor-tance of Soviet moral, political, and materialassistance in their conversations with theofficials of the Soviet Embassy and those ofother socialist countries. However, the NorthVietnamese leaders’ appreciation for thislargesse by no means signified that theywould now take the USSR’s side in the Sino-

Soviet dispute, or otherwise rely exclusivelyon only one communist patron. Rather, afterMoscow changed its attitude to the DRV,Hanoi took steps to secure maximum profitby exploiting its friendship with both of itsmighty allies—the PRC and the USSR—asthey competed for influence in SoutheastAsia. Precisely this policy was pursued bythe WPV Central Committee grouping whichwas formed in late 1964-early 1965 andincluded Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and VoNguyen Giap.13 This group sought to ridNorth Vietnam of China’s excessive ward-ship, on the one hand, and, on the other, toavoid any kind of dependence on the SovietUnion. As a result, in that period reports bySoviet representatives in Vietnam, the USSRDefense Ministry, and the KGB regardingreduced Chinese influence in the DRV wereaccompanied by complaints of insincerity,egoism and unmanageability on the part of“the Vietnamese friends.”

For instance, back in 1966, in his analy-sis of the prospects of Soviet-Vietnameserelations, Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi IlyaShcherbakov pointed out: “Just as before,the Embassy believes that the process ofpromotion of our relations with the WPVand the DRV will hardly be steady or rapidin view of the policy pursued by the Viet-namese comrades. This was, regrettably,confirmed in the past few years. Even themanifestation of a more serious discord be-tween the WPV and the Communist Party ofChina will not probably mean automatic orproportionate Soviet-Vietnamese rapproche-ment. The year 1966 showed once more thatwe are obliged constantly to display initia-tive and unilaterally, as it were, drag theVietnamese comrades to greater friendshipand independence.” The ambassador thenstressed the “general positive nature” of theWPV’s tendency for independence butpointed to its negative aspects, primarily toindications that the Vietnamese conductedits foreign policy, including its relationswith Moscow, from a narrow, nationalisticviewpoint. Soviet aid was regarded by Hanoiexclusively from the standpoint of their ben-efit to Vietnam, rather than for the good ofthe international socialist cause.14

This undercurrent of tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations, produced bywhat Moscow viewed as Hanoi’s parochialperspective, cropped up repeatedly. In 1966,for example, the North Vietnamese expressedindignation at the partial reduction of Soviet

and U.S. military contingents in Germany.Why? Because, they explained, the Soviettroops had allegedly been transferred to theSoviet-Chinese border, which provoked ten-sions there and diverted Beijing from NorthVietnamese military requirements, and theU.S. troops were immediately transferred toSouth Vietnam.15

The Vietnamese side’s egoism and itsdesire (in the words of a Soviet Embassypolitical letter) “to have a monopoly on thecorrect assessment and methods of solutionto the Vietnam conflict,” often verged oncynicism. Indicative in this respect was acomplaint by the Soviet Ministry of Com-mercial Shipping, dated 18 July 1966, sentto the CPSU CC, in connection with theactions by the Vietnamese in Haiphong, theDRV’s chief port. The port authorities, theministry complained, had artificially delayedthe unloading of Soviet vessels, evidentlybelieving that the longer they held the large-tonnage vessels flying the Soviet flag in theport and its vicinity, the less risk of damagethey would run of U.S. bombing raids. More-over, they usually placed those Soviet ves-sels in close proximity to the most danger-ous areas (e.g., near anti-aircraft guns), inhopes of ensuring their safety during airraids. Moreover, during air raids Vietnam-ese military boats lurking behind Sovietvessels fired at the enemy, thus making theSoviet “shields” the targets of U.S. bombers(and those vessels contained loads of car-goes meant as assistance to “the embattledVietnamese people”). The clearly outragedministry officials demanded that Soviet com-mercial vessels be kept out of danger whiledischarging their noble mission.16

No less complicated was the situationconcerning Soviet-North Vietnamese mili-tary cooperation. The USSR Defense Min-istry and embassy in Hanoi repeatedly in-formed Moscow about “the Vietnamesefriends’ insincere attitude” toward the So-viet Union, the Soviet people, and the SovietDefense Ministry. They pointed out thatthey received slanted reports from thePeople’s Army of (North) Vietnam regard-ing the situation in South Vietnam, belittlingthe role and importance of Soviet militaryassistance to the DRV and discrediting theperformance of Soviet arms and militaryhardware. They also reported that the NorthVietnamese had raised obstacles in the wayof Soviet military experts who wished toinspect U.S. military hardware, and displayed


other signs of distrust and suspiciousnesstoward Soviet Defense Ministry representa-tives. The Soviet leadership was informedabout violations of storage rules for Sovietmilitary hardware, wasteful use of missilesand ammunition, and neglect of Soviet ex-perts’ advice on the rules of exploitation ofmilitary hardware, which led to its spoilage.All this coincided with Hanoi’s requests formore assistance, but the DRV leaders evi-dently saw no contradiction in this: It waspointed out in the 1970 political report of theSoviet Embassy in Hanoi that, while “at-taching great importance to the Soviet mili-tary assistance, the command of the People’sArmy of Vietnam at the same time regardedit exclusively as the obligatory discharge ofits internationalist duty by the SovietUnion.”17

All the above-mentioned facts suggesthow complicated and contradictory Soviet-Vietnamese relations were, and demonstratethe great discrepancy between the scale ofSoviet assistance to Vietnam and the degreeof Soviet influence on Hanoi’s policy. As aVietnamese journalist in his conversationwith M. Ilyinsky, an Izvestia correspondent,put it: “Do you know,” the Vietnamesejournalist asked, “what is the Soviet Union’sshare in total assistance, received by Viet-nam, and what is the share of Soviet politicalinfluence there (if the latter can be measuredin percent)? The respective figures are: 75-80 percent and 4-8 percent.” The Sovietjournalist noted: “If the Vietnamese jour-nalist has exaggerated the former figures(by 15-20 percent), the share of Soviet influ-ence is probably correct.”18

Sino-Vietnamese relations were no lesscomplicated and contradictory. That Mos-cow monitored their development closely istestified to by the vast number of reports inthe CPSU CC archives on this subject, sentby the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, the KGB,and the Military Intelligence Agency (GRU)of the General Staff of the Soviet ArmedForces. An early sign of the incipient dis-cord between the two countries seems tohave appeared in a still-classified 21 Febru-ary 1966 KGB report to the CPSU CCstating that Chinese leaders were concernedabout the WPV’s increasingly independentforeign policy, especially in relations withthe PRC and the conduct of the war.19 Andthe Soviet Embassy in Hanoi pointed out inits 1966 report that, although the WPVtendency to settle the Vietnam issue inde-

pendently from China was not yet pro-nounced, the DRV’s trust in Beijing hadalready been undermined. However, thereport admitted that one could hardly hopefor the WPV leadership to display initiativeto opt for one patron over the other, for “thecomrades probably have not yet risen to thelevel of clear-cut choice.” In view of this, theSoviet Embassy set itself the task “to renderall-round assistance to the Vietnam leader-ship in its adoption of an independent standon the issues of home and foreign policy.”That “independent” policy naturally wasmeant to be independent from China, for thereport then underlined the need “to reactmore firmly to any action by Vietnamesecomrades which may be directly or indi-rectly damaging to Soviet-Vietnamese friend-ship.”20

Sino-Vietnamese contradictions tendedto sharpen as the DRV leadership came torealize the need for a diplomatic settlementwith the USA. The DRV’s consent to holdtalks with Washington in 1968 profoundlyirritated Beijing, which was dead-set againstany compromise settlement leading to a ces-sation of hostilities. To advance its moremilitant policy, the Chinese leaders began toexpand separate contacts (bypassing Hanoi)with the NLF, urging it to carry on protractedwarfare. Moreover, the PRC started to ob-struct carriages of Soviet arms and ammuni-tion delivered by rail through Chinese terri-tory, with the express aim of underminingSoviet-Vietnamese relations. Although thePRC leadership’s approach to the talks issuelater softened, Sino-Vietnamese relationsremained strained.

Although discord between the Beijingand Hanoi leaderships affected Sino-Viet-namese relations, no major conflict betweenthe two countries threatened a complete rup-ture during the course of the war. Vietnamstill needed Chinese assistance and support,so it took steps to reduce or contain the levelof tensions. The DRV’s party and govern-ment leaders, as before, regularly visitedBeijing to discuss with “the Chinese friends”important foreign policy issues. No matterhow riled, Hanoi carefully avoided givingcategorical assessments of Chinese policy—either regarding the world communist move-ment or Soviet-Chinese relations. “The WPVleaders realize full well,” the Soviet Em-bassy in Hanoi explained to Moscow, “thatChina is situated quite close to Vietnam,whereas the Soviet Union is far away. Viet-

nam would be hard put to do without Chi-nese assistance in its struggle and in futurepeaceful construction. So it would be pre-mature to ask the Vietnamese now to statetheir clear-cut position with respect to theUSSR and China.”21 And the following factis quite indicative: Hanoi named Xuan Thuy,well-known for his pro-Chinese views and apast president of the Vietnamese-ChineseFriendship Association, as the head of theDRV delegation to the Paris talks.

The details of relations among the USSR,DRV, and PRC also throw light on the So-viet Union’s relations with the USA. Sovietleaders could hardly react indifferently orsimplistically to the Vietnam conflict andthe dramatic escalation of American mili-tary activity in Southeast Asia. From apurely propaganda viewpoint, the conflictplayed into Soviet hands. While U.S. sup-port for an unpopular neo-colonial regime inSaigon offered a ripe target for condemna-tion and undermined Washington’s interna-tional stature, the USSR could simulta-neously pose as a consistent fighter for thetriumph of a just cause, acting in the spirit ofproletarian internationalism—as evidencedby its moral-political, economic, and mili-tary assistance to North Vietnam—and alsoas a potential mediator in the forging of apeaceful settlement. Furthermore, the likelyprotracted nature of the conflict promised tosap the strength of the Soviet Union’s prin-cipal rivals, distracting the United States andChina and thereby enhancing Soviet secu-rity interests in other regions (especiallyEurope and the Soviet Far East).

Yet the Vietnam War also presentedlong-term difficulties and dangers for Mos-cow, especially to the extent that there was areal threat of its escalating from a local intoa world war, if (as was sometimes specu-lated) the USA were driven to desperationand resorted to the use of nuclear weapons.In that case, the USSR could hardly havekept neutral—and yet retaliating against theUnited States might have led to disastrousconsequences. All the same, even if nonuclear conflict broke out, the risk of a directclash between the two superpowers arisingfrom the Southeast Asian crisis was toogreat and this was precisely what the Sovietleadership wished to avoid at all costs. Plus,to the extent Kremlin leaders genuinely de-sired an improvement in relations with Wash-ington, the war would inevitably serve as adistraction and potential sticking point.


There were naturally other “pros” and“cons” which Moscow must have taken intoaccount in determining its policy toward thestruggle: Military factors constituted onemajor positive incentive favoring a moreactive Soviet involvement, according to ar-chival documents. There were two princi-pal, interconnected perceived opportunities:Vietnam offered a live battlefield testingground for Soviet military hardware, includ-ing the latest models, and also a chance toobtain a windfall of hard information aboutup-to-date U.S. weaponry, by inspecting thewar booty captured or obtained by the DRVforces. The North Vietnamese air defensewas fully equipped with modern Soviet hard-ware, whose effectiveness was shown by thefact that even the Vietnamese personnelmanaged to operate it successfully, despite afrequent lack of training or competence.Those systems were being constantly im-proved, taking into account the capabilitiesof U.S. warplanes.22 Apart from the anti-aircraft defense system, the archival docu-ments note, the North Vietnamese used theSoviet-made Grad artillery shelling systems,which were highly effective in attacks onU.S. bases, airfields, ammunition depots,etc.,23 as well as MiG-21 jets.

The Soviet military also relished theopportunity to pore over the latest U.S. mili-tary hardware. In accordance with a Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement signed in thespring of 1965, the Vietnamese undertook totransfer to the USSR models of capturedU.S. military hardware for inspection. Alldifficulties notwithstanding, according tothe data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, atotal of 700 models were delivered to theUSSR between May 1965 and January 1967.The embassy pointed out that the work donewas very valuable: the CPSU CC adopted adecision to apply in Soviet industry of anumber of selected and studied models.24

However, apart from obvious assets theUSSR gained in the course of the VietnamWar, its expenditures were likewise enor-mous, primarily in the sphere of ever in-creasing material assistance to Vietnam. (Seethe figures cited above.) In 1966-1968 theSoviet Union undertook to render to theDRV economic assistance to the tune of121.6 million rubles, but in fact the assis-tance was far greater in view of Hanoi’sincessant requests for additional supplies.In 1968 Soviet assistance to the DRV totaled524 million rubles, with 361 million rubles

transferred as a gift. Soviet assistance in1969 was planned to remain on the samelevel (525 million rubles), but with the open-ing of peace talks and reduction of the scaleof hostilities in Vietnam, part of the fundsoriginally assigned for military deliverieswas reallocated for other purposes, so Sovietassistance to Vietnam in 1969 totaled 370million rubles and in 1970, 316 millionrubles.25

One negative factor, from the Sovietleaders’ viewpoint, in decision-making onaid to the DRV was what they saw as theVietnamese allies’ unmanageability andunpredictability. Hanoi’s independent coursein relations with the USSR hardly inspiredMoscow to greater enthusiasm in its supportfor the war, and as time went on, thoseVietnamese properties might have led toundesirable consequences—perhaps an openbreak. So from that standpoint, at least,Moscow had every reason to favor an earlycease-fire and political solution.

In fact, the hope for a peaceful settle-ment was shared by both Soviet and Ameri-can leaders, and their tactics on this issue,paradoxically enough, were surprisinglysimilar. However, the Soviet governmentbacked a settlement on Hanoi’s terms,whereas the U.S. sought to ensure the maxi-mum consideration of the Saigongovernment’s interests. Moreover, of course,as a direct participant in the conflict, theUnited States could not possibly play thepart of an arbiter, which remained a privi-lege of the Soviet Union. For this reason,with U.S. armed forces directly involved inhostilities, the Johnson Administration wasobliged to rely on intermediaries in its at-tempts to convince Hanoi to sit down at thenegotiating table rather than pursue a purelymilitary outcome. And in this respect Wash-ington pinned much of its hopes on theSoviet Union.26

U.S. leaders had every reason for suchhopes, for they believed that since the USSRrendered massive and ever-growing mili-tary and economic assistance to Vietnam (ofwhich Washington was well aware),27 so theSoviet Union could exert leverage on theDRV leadership. Both Johnson and, afterJanuary 1969, his successor Richard M.Nixon were convinced that Moscow wouldpress Hanoi to agree to open negotiations,once Washington: 1) demonstrated to theSoviet Union that the Vietnam War washardly in its interests; 2) seduced it by the

promise of cooperation with the UnitedStates; or, better still, 3) warned it that ifSoviet cooperation were not forthcomingthe United States might resort to rapproche-ment with China—or some optimal combi-nation of all those approaches. When inretirement, Johnson disclosed his calcula-tions as president in a conversation at hisTexas ranch with Soviet citizens that wasreported to the Kremlin leadership by theKGB in December 1969. The USSR couldbe instrumental in helping the United Statesto bring the Vietnam War to a conclusion,Johnson argued, for “if we take Soviet stra-tegic, not tactical, interests, the end of theVietnam War fully accords with the SovietUnion’s interests,” considering that, “afterall, it is the United States, not Vietnam,which is the main partner of the USSR.”And Johnson rejected the argument that theSoviet Union was not in a position to exertpressure on the DRV as groundless from theviewpoint of realpolitik. “It’s highly doubt-ful for a country supplying Vietnam with 75percent of [its] arms not to have real levers ofinfluence on it,” the ex-president was quotedas saying.28

Thus, the problem, from the U.S. per-spective, consisted only in discovering howbest to approach Moscow. The United Statesmight have acted through official channels,since although Soviet-American relationswere rather cool at that time, they weremaintained. And the United States certainlyprobed what could be done in that direction.For instance, at an August 1966 meetingbetween Colonel C.C. Fitzgerald, a militaryattaché of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,with officers of the Department of ExternalRelations of the Soviet Defense Ministry,the American stressed the important role theUSSR could play in the settlement of theVietnam conflict as the initiator of and ac-tive mediator in peace negotiations. Col.Fitzgerald drew the attention of his inter-locutors to the Johnson Administration’sconstant efforts to open talks, stating that thevisit to Moscow of Senator Mike Mansfieldand Averell Harriman’s appointment as aspecial presidential advisor aimed at pre-cisely this purpose.29 However, worriedthat a formal, top-level overture to Moscowmight result in a rebuff or even denunciationby the Kremlin leaders, the White Houseopted not to run the risk, but to first sound outSoviet officials in order to ascertain theirattitudes and try to reach agreement unoffi-


cially.Regrettably, we do not yet have access

to all the documents, including the still-classified “special dossiers” (osobaya papki)at SCCD, as well as KGB, Foreign andDefense Ministry, and Presidential Archivematerials, that are necessary to reconstructfully from Soviet sources all of the manyconversations and probes connected to vari-ous diplomatic efforts aimed at ending theVietnam conflict in 1965-67, including, per-haps most importantly, the so-called MARI-GOLD and SUNFLOWER initiatives (touse the secret U.S. government code names),in both of which the Soviet Union played animportant role.30 An initial survey of theSCCD archives disclosed only cryptic tracesof Soviet contacts with potential intermedi-aries. For instance, documents failed toclarify what was discussed in conversationswith L. Mulkern (vice-president for interna-tional relations of the Bank of America),who asked for assistance in establishingunofficial contacts between U.S. PresidentJohnson and the Soviet government, or withMarshall D. Shulman (then an associate ofHarvard University’s Russian ResearchCenter), both of which were recorded by theKGB (the latter with the recommendationthat Shulman be advised that his informa-tion had to be confirmed by the U.S. Presi-dent). While the documents encounteredduring this early stage of research left theseand many other questions unresolved, theycertainly pointed at the high intensity ofunofficial Soviet-U.S. contacts apparentlyrelated to the war (either directly or throughmediators, as, for instance, through the ser-vices of Austrian Ambassador in the USSRVodak) in the summer-autumn of 1965.31

Moscow’s seeming reluctance to meetWashington half-way in its diplomatic ef-forts was probably at least partly attribut-able to the fact that the Kremlin was acutelyaware of its limited ability to exert influenceon Hanoi’s policy—an awareness due inlarge measure to the complete and objectiveinformation sent to Moscow by the SovietEmbassy in the DRV, led by AmbassadorShcherbakov. Perusing the great number ofminutes of conversations between SovietEmbassy officials and Vietnamese leaders,WPV members, and Vietnamese citizens,as well as informational letters and reportssent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and theCPSU CC, one gets the impression thatdecision-making on the Vietnamese issue

was largely produced in accordance withrecommendations and draft decisions sentby the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi—not by thePolitburo, the CC Secretariat, nor the For-eign Ministry—and only later were thoserecommendations and draft decisions rub-ber-stamped by the top Soviet leaders. Thisconclusion, albeit preliminary, is based onample documentary evidence, when, for in-stance, the Soviet Ambassador sets out anumber of ideas in his political letter toMoscow about what should be done, andlater the same considerations were put for-ward as the official views of the CPSU andSoviet government in conversations withPham Van Dong or Nguyen Duy Trinh.32 SoMoscow obviously deemed it advisable toconsult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoibefore adopting decisions.

Take the following two examples. Thepolitical letter33 of the Soviet Embassy in theDRV, entitled “Soviet-Vietnamese RelationsAfter the Talks Held in April 1968,” pre-pared for Moscow Center on 1 September1968, assessed the results and significance ofthe opening of the Paris peace talks. Regard-ing the situation as favorable for achieving asettlement in the best interests of the Viet-namese people, the Ambassador, who signedthe letter, believed that the prime task at themoment was “to help the Vietnamese com-rades to put an end to the hostilities this yearand switch over to a political settlement ofthe Vietnamese issue.” With this aim inview, Shcherbakov believed, it would beadvisable to invite a higher-level DRV gov-ernment delegation to Moscow in Octoberand “try once more to analyze jointly thesituation and convince the DRV governmentto express its opinion on the whole packageof the Vietnamese settlement.”

Soon afterward, V. Chivilev, the Sovietcharge d’affaires in the DRV, presented PhamVan Dong with a letter of invitation fromBrezhnev and Alexei Kosygin for a DRVparty and government delegation to visit theSoviet Union. The date of the visit was latersettled and a decision was adopted on a visitto the USSR by a Vietnamese governmentdelegation led by Le Duan in November1968. Though the materials on the visitremain inaccessible, it seems highly likelythat Soviet leaders followed the recommen-dations of their man in Hanoi.34

Another example of the importance ofthe Soviet ambassador’s advice in decision-making dates to early 1974. CC Secretary

Boris Ponomarev, who was in charge of theParty’s international relations, submitted tothe CPSU CC Secretariat a memorandum,entitled “On a Proposal to the VietnameseFriends,” in which he raised the issue ofestablishing and promoting relations betweenthe CPSU and the communist parties ofseveral Southeast Asian countries by mak-ing use of the authority wielded by the WPVin the communist movement in the region.In other words, he suggested possible Sovietpenetration of Thailand, Indonesia, Malay-sia, and the Philippines. After inconclusivediscussion of the proposal, Ponomarev, alongwith CC secretaries Suslov, Kirilenko,Demichev, Katushev, and Rakhmanin, de-cided to consult the Soviet Ambassador inHanoi on the matter.35

The new importance attached to the roleof ambassadors and embassies in the processof decision-making on foreign-policy issuesreflected a general trend, typical of theBrezhnev era: the growing influence of thebureaucratic apparatus, especially medium-level officials, on policy-making. Since topSoviet leaders had little idea of the reality inVietnam, they willingly entrusted decision-making in the sphere of current policy toexperts, signing ready-made decisions orintervening only in extraordinary situa-tions.36

Thus, indirect evidence suggests that indefining its stand on the Vietnam War, Mos-cow largely drew on the opinion of its diplo-matic representatives in the DRV. And in1965-1966 the Soviet Embassy was far fromoptimistic about the prospects for a peacefulsettlement. Meetings and conversations be-tween the Soviet Embassy officials andmembers of the diplomatic corps and jour-nalists accredited in Hanoi revealed thatNorth Vietnam’s leaders were fully commit-ted to continuing the hostilities against theUSA. Indicative in this respect was a con-versation at the WPV CC on 23 August 1966between Soviet charge d’affaires P. Privalovand Nguyen Van Vinh, Chairman of theCommittee for the Unification of the Coun-try. Gen. Vinh firmly believed that thesituation was hardly favorable for openingNorth Vietnamese-U.S. talks. “Had we beendefeated by the Americans,” Vinh said, “wewould have had no other choice than to agreeto hold talks, but we are confidently dealingblows at the enemy and winning decisivevictories. What would it mean for us to holdtalks now? That would mean losing every-


thing....”37 This viewpoint was shared bythe entire WPV top leadership.

That is why the Soviet Embassy’s re-port for 1966 included very cautious fore-casts about possible changes in the DRVstand. The embassy, in the belief that it wasnecessary to “exert and broaden, with thesupport of all peace-loving forces and thesocialist countries, strong political and dip-lomatic efforts in order to bring the matter tothe settlement of the conflict in the currentyear,” suggested that the USSR might even-tually have to elaborate and present its ownpeace plan to the Vietnamese comrades.That supposition was made on the basis ofwhat the embassy viewed as a certain coin-cidence of the CPSU and WPV “assessmentof the situation and active promotion ofpolitico-diplomatic struggle for Vietnam.”38

In that contest, the USSR sought toevade the issue of acting as a formal media-tor at the U.S.-DRV talks (which was whatthe USA sought). The only role the SovietUnion was then prepared to play was that ofa “postman,” who would carry both sides’messages, and that of “a night watchman” byoffering an opportunity for unofficial meet-ings between U.S. and North Vietnameseembassy officials in Moscow.39 At the sametime, Moscow spared no effort to convinceits “Vietnamese friends” of the need to switchfrom military to political-diplomatic meth-ods to attain a settlement.

The USSR undertook the mission of “apostman” and “a night watchman” very re-luctantly, probably for fear of being turnedinto an official mediator. At least it did notwish to perform those functions on a perma-nent basis. So the United States had to usethe services of other countries, in particular,Poland, Canada, India, etc. However, earlyin 1967 a new flurry of activity was observedin Moscow. In Jan.-Feb., DRV ForeignMinister Nguyen Duy Trinh receivedShcherbakov and familiarized him with thegist of President Johnson’s letter to Ho ChiMinh, handed over at a regular meeting inMoscow of representatives of the DRV andthe US embassies. And Ho Chi Minh’sreply, according to Trinh, was to be sentalong the same channels.40 Those factsmake it possible for us to suppose that by1967, meetings of diplomats of the two war-ring parties were held in Moscow on a regu-lar basis.

As to its function of “a postman,” in1967 Moscow regularly supplied Hanoi with

information regarding the requests and of-fers of U.S. representatives, conveyed dur-ing meetings with Soviet diplomats, anddelivered messages between the two sides.For instance, on 24 April 1967, “Vietnamesecomrades” were informed about a request ofthe U.S. Embassy in Moscow that the Sovietgovernment take the necessary steps for theDRV government to give access to represen-tatives of the international commission ofthe Red Cross to American POWs then heldin North Vietnam. And on April 28, theDRV leaders learned that Johnson envoyAverell Harriman had handed over a U.S.statement on the withdrawal of U.S. troopsfrom the demilitarized zone to the Sovietcharge d’affaires in the United States.41

There is no doubt that Hanoi also receivedexhaustive information about the June 1967Glassboro summit between Kosygin andJohnson.

In 1967, too, the Soviet Union failed toconvince the Vietnamese leaders to holdtalks with the USA on a peaceful settlement.The Soviet Embassy in Hanoi believed thatthe DRV leadership would accept the idea ofsuch a settlements only under the followingconditions: a worsening of the military situ-ation; U.S. acceptance of North Vietnam’smain demands; a change in China’s attitudeto the Vietnam War; and finally, the socialistcountries’ clear declaration to the NorthVietnamese that they could not afford tobear the ever growing burden of that war forreasons of an international nature or for fearof its protracted nature. So in assessing theresults of the Soviet-Vietnamese talks inApril 1967 and the subsequent DRV policy,the Soviet Embassy drew the conclusion thatat that juncture, “not a single [one] of theabove-mentioned situations makes the Viet-namese comrades take the road of activesearching for ways to a peaceful settle-ment.”42

Nevertheless, summing up the resultsof 1967, Soviet diplomats in Hanoi reachedthe optimistic conclusion that the year 1968would be the most favorable for starting theprocess of settlement. They strongly de-nounced Hanoi’s rejection of Johnson’s SanAntonio formula—so-named after a speechin the Texas city on 29 September 1967 inwhich LBJ declared that Washington wouldstop bombing North Vietnam when assuredthat this would “lead promptly to productivediscussions”—pointing out that that formulacould not be regarded as “insurmountable”

and advising that the DRV leadership takesteps to snatch the diplomatic initiative. Inorder to convince Hanoi to change its intrac-table stand on talks with Washington, theSoviet Embassy advised Moscow to informthe North Vietnamese at their next summitwith Soviet leaders that the USSR could notafford to pursue a policy of brinkmanshipwith respect to the United States by gettingmore deeply involved in the Vietnam con-flict, and that therefore the best plan for boththe Soviet Union and Vietnam would be ifthe hostilities drew to a close in 1968.43

The fact that talks on the settlement ofthe Vietnam issue in fact finally started in1968 may be regarded as a matter of purecoincidence. At the same time, the SovietEmbassy in Hanoi was farsighted in its as-sessments—what mattered was not that itsforecasts had proved correct but rather thefactors on which those forecasts were based.And in this respect, the Soviet Embassy hadevery reason to hope that the pressure ex-erted by Moscow on the Vietnamese leadersto accept a political rather than militarysolution, would finally bear fruit.

Preliminary U.S.-North Vietnamesetalks opened on 13 May 1968, followed on18 January 1969 by the official quadripartite(U.S.-South Vietnam-North Vietnam-NLF)Paris negotiations. Soviet diplomats justifi-ably regarded the event as their own success,at least in part. “Without acting as an officialmediator,” the Soviet Embassy in the DRVpointed out, “the Soviet Union rendered animportant service for the two sides to sitdown at the negotiating table and open offi-cial talks. The USSR spared no effort toconvince world opinion and national gov-ernments to support an end to bombing raidson the DRV, and exerted pressure on theUSA. At the same time it emphasized to theVietnamese comrades that the year 1968was most favorable for a number of reasonsfor launching the process of the politicalsettlement of the Vietnam issue.”44

The USSR did much to organize theParis meeting, including influencing thechoice of venue. The record of a conversa-tion between V. Chivilev, Soviet actingcharge d’affaires, and Le Duan, First Secre-tary of the WPV CC, held on 2 May 1968,suggests that on the eve of the opening ofU.S.-DRV peace talks, the Vietnamese sideoffered Paris as the venue with due regardfor the Soviet opinion. By that time Sovietdiplomacy had already performed “a certain


amount of work with the French.” The mainfactor behind Hanoi’s choice of the Frenchcapital, Le Duan told Chivilev, was “theopportunity to maintain contacts with Mos-cow from it.”45

The same factor was taken into accountby Moscow, which faced the task of keepingthe sides at the negotiating table. With thisaim in mind, the Kremlin exerted constantpressure on North Vietnam not to disruptthe process. On 13 June 1968, the CPSU CCand Soviet government sent a letter to theWPV CC and DRV government stressingthat the Paris talks were vitally importantfor achieving a settlement of the Vietnamissue. The Soviet leaders also emphasizedthat they were living through an importantperiod from the viewpoint of opportunitiesfor diplomatic struggle, offering to put theentire weight of Soviet authority in the worldin order to triumph in the political anddiplomatic contest.46 In an effort to influ-ence the North Vietnamese side and as ahedge against the DRV’s sometimes unpre-dictable behavior, the Soviet Embassy inHanoi offered to send experts on Vietnam-ese affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Paris.47

Moreover, Moscow reached an agreementwith the DRV leadership for the Vietnam-ese regularly to inform Moscow on thesituation at the talks and their future strat-egy, tactics, and plans. In turn, the USSRgave the Vietnamese exhaustive informa-tion about U.S. intentions.

Nevertheless, despite its promises,Hanoi on several occasions confronted Mos-cow with a fait accompli. Yet, having“forgotten” to inform its ally about a plannedaction, the Vietnamese leadership neverthe-less insisted on Moscow’s immediate sup-port. This happened, for instance, when theNLF published its program of ten points andestablished the Provisional RevolutionaryGovernment of South Vietnam (RSV PRG).Although Le Duc Tho met with Kosygin onthe eve of the program’s publication (duringa stopover in Moscow on his way to Paris),the leading DRV negotiator never men-tioned the planned steps.48

However, in attempting to convinceSoviet leaders to exert greater pressure onVietnam to achieve progress in the talks,U.S. officials often forced an open door.Assessing the steps taken by Moscow forthe settlement of the Vietnam conflict along-side the difficulties it encountered in deal-ing with Hanoi’s foreign policy, one may

reasonably conclude that the USSR did itsutmost to ensure a favorable outcome of thetalks, naturally with due account of its owninterests.

Moscow continued to play an importantrole at the Paris talks after Nixon came topower in 1969. The Soviet leaders keptabreast of the latest developments and didtheir best to influence the Vietnamese posi-tion through the services of the USSR em-bassies in Hanoi and Paris. At his regularmeetings with the leaders of the DRV andNLF delegations, the Soviet Ambassador inFrance, V. Zorin, asked the Vietnamese whatquestions they considered it necessary forhim to raise in his conversations with theU.S. delegation. At the same time, Zorinexpressed his “desire” for the Vietnameseside to put forward some specific proposalson military issues and for the NLF to elabo-rate a specific diplomatic program. Simulta-neously, the Soviet ambassador in the DRV,Shcherbakov, warned “the Vietnamesefriends” against following an extremist path,such as the temptation to pursue a purelypropagandist policy or to resort exclusivelyto military methods in relations with theUSA.49

Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968elections marked a turning point in U.S.policy toward the USSR, as the incomingadministration made every effort to obtaingreater Soviet involvement and cooperationin the process of achieving a peaceful settle-ment in Vietnam. The newly elected U.S.president and his national security adviser,Henry A. Kissinger, decided that all prob-lems in Soviet-American relations werelinked to the Soviet stand on the Vietnamissue. And if efforts in Moscow did notquickly or sufficiently pay dividends, Nixonand Kissinger were prepared not to miss anopportunity to play “the Chinese card” tomake the Soviet leaders more tractable.

Like his predecessors, Nixon was con-vinced that the USSR had unlimited controlover Hanoi’s policy and that as soon as itissued the appropriate orders, the Vietnam-ese leaders would be ready, willing, andobliged to conclude the talks. As a result,each time the Paris talks reached a blindalley, the White House turned to Moscow tohelp find an acceptable escape route. After ameeting with Kissinger on 12 June 1969,when the American openly asked the USSRfor assistance to overcome the latest crisis inthe talks, Soviet Ambassador in the United

States Anatoly F. Dobrynin reported to Mos-cow: “All indications are that his [Nixon’s]attempts to convince the USSR to help theUSA in the settlement of the [Vietnam]conflict, will be repeated in the future, andthis will probably be felt in the course of ourtalks with this administration on other inter-national issues, if not directly, then at least inthe form of procrastination in the course ofsuch talks or in decision-making on otherissues.”50

In this respect, however, former CIAchief William Colby was probably rightwhen he wrote in his memoirs about his deepskepticism with respect to the Soviet Union’sability to exert pressure on its friends, whowere “stubborn and full of determination.”51

Nevertheless, in spite of its limited opportu-nities, the USSR managed to make a consid-erable contribution to the peaceful settle-ment of the Vietnam conflict. So the signingof the bilateral agreement by the DRV andUSA, on 27 January 1973, on the end ofhostilities and restoration of peace in Viet-nam, irrespective of all its weak points, wasan important result of the efforts of Sovietdiplomacy as well.

In conclusion, in assessing Soviet policytoward the Vietnam War in the 1964-1973period, including in the sphere of Soviet-American ties, it may be asserted that in spiteof all the difficulties, complications, andhuman costs associated with the conflict inSoutheast Asia, the superpowers avoidedgrave crises, upheavals, or direct confronta-tions in their bilateral relations—thus pre-serving a degree of general internationalstability and paving the way toward theU.S.-Soviet détente of the early-mid-1970s.

1. Space precludes a full listing of relevant titles here:for detailed references see Ilya V. Gaiduk, The SovietUnion and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,forthcoming [1996]).2. According to data of the Soviet Ministry of ForeignAffairs, in the period from 1961 to 1966 the SovietUnion supplied the NLF via the DRV as disinterestedassistance 130 recoilless weapons and mortars, 1400machine guns, and 54,500 fire-arms with ammunition.Prior to 1965 the USSR supplied to North VietnamGerman models of arms. (Top Secret Memorandum ofthe Southeast Asia Department, USSR Foreign Minis-try, “Soviet Moral and Political Support of and MaterialAid to the South Vietnam Patriots,” 24 March 1966,SCCD, fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 50, delo (d.) 777, listy (ll.)58-59.) This aid supplemented the economic assistanceMoscow rendered to the DRV. China, in turn, in theperiod from 1955 to 1965, supplied the DRV witheconomic assistance to the total value of 511.8 millionrubles, including 302.5 million rubles as gift. (Memo-randum of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, “CPR’s


[Chinese People’s Republic’s] Economic Assistance tothe Socialist Countries,” 30 March 1966, SCCD, f. 5,op. 58, d. 254, l. 172.)3. Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to France, SCCD,f. 4, op. 18, d. 582, St.-95/462 g., 14 February 1964.4. International Department of the CPSU CC to the CC,25 July 1964, SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, l. 163-164.5. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Defense to theCPSU CC, 14 July 1967, SCCD, f. 4, op. 59, d. 416, l.119-120.6. Top Secret Memorandum from the Soviet Embassyin the DRV, “On the Political Situation in South Viet-nam and the Position of the DRV,” 19 November 1964,SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, l. 253.7. See, e.g, Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam,the United States and the Modern Historical Experi-ence (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 157.8. For further analysis of the impact of Khrushchev’soverthrow on Soviet policy toward Vietnam, see thepaper presented by Ilya V. Gaiduk to the conference onthe Vietnam War held in October 1993 at the Lyndon B.Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.9. A memo, sent to the CPSU CC by I. Shchedrov, aPravda correspondent in Southeast Asia, may serve asan indirect basis for such suppositions. In it Shchedrovanalyzes the situation in the region in the first half of the1960s from the viewpoint of Soviet and Chinese influ-ence on the events in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Henot only criticizes the Soviet Union’s restraint, shownbefore the end of 1964, and expresses concern in viewof stepped-up activities by the PRC in those countries,but also offers a series of measures to improve thesituation. In their time the top CPSU leadership famil-iarized themselves with that memo, and the followingnote by Boris Ponomarev testifies to this: “Please readthis memo and submit proposals and measures on issueswhich call for them.” (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264.)10. Political Report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi for1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 148.11. Memorandum, “Soviet Moral and Political Sup-port,” SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 773, l. 59; Soviet Embassyin Hanoi Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58,d. 263, l. 148.12. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1967,SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 331, l. 26.13. Shchedrov Memorandum, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d.264, l. 96.14. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966,SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 130.15. Memorandum of Conversation between SovietEmbassy in Hanoi interpreter M. Isaev and Ho HaiThuy, 25 October 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 261, l.167.16. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of CommercialShipping for the CPSU CC, 18 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5,op. 58, d. 263, l. 38-41. The report by the Ministry ofCommercial Shipping was a source of concern by theSoviet leadership. It was decided to make use of theinformation contained in it, in the course of talks withthe DRV party and government delegation to be held inMoscow (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 43).17. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970,SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 109.18. Memorandum from Izvestia correspondent M.Ilyinskii for CPSU CC, 29 January 1968, SCCD, f. 5.,op. 60, d. 368, l. 19.19. Memorandum from Committee of State Security(KGB), 21 February 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 511.Regrettably, this document is kept in a “special dos-sier,” so we have had no opportunity as yet to study it.20. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966,

SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 141, 259.21. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970,SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 104.22. A memo by Defense Minister Grechko to Brezhnevserves as testimony to this fact. Grechko wrote that on30 March 1968 a U.S. F-111A plane was brought downby an anti-aircraft Dvina complex in the area of Hanoi.He also mentioned measures, adopted by Soviet expertsto improve the anti-aircraft complexes after they hadobtained information about the use of high-speed air-craft (up to 3700 km per hour) by the US air forces(SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 232, ll. 9-10).23. Memorandum of Conversation between DeputyChief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Southeast AsiaDepartment S. Nemchina and Head of the NFLSVPermanent Mission in Moscow Dang Cuong Minh, 2September 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 416, l. 139.24. Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in theDRV, 14 March 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 329, l. 43.25. Memorandum from the State Committee on theEconomic Relations (GKES), “On the Economic andTechnical Assistance to the Democratic Republic ofVietnam,” 29 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, ll.54-55; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 48; Soviet Embassyin the DRV, Political Report for 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op.61, d. 459, l. 123; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, PoliticalReport for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 104.26. Washington’s first attempts to reach agreementwith the DRV leaders were made back in 1962, underPresident Kennedy’s administration, so we can onlysuppose what could be the results of those contacts, hadPresident Kennedy been alive. A. Goodman, for in-stance, believes that as a result of President Kennedy’sassassination, the USA lost an opportunity to reachagreement with Hanoi. (A.E. Goodman, The Lost Peace:America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of theVietnam War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1978), 14.)27. To this testifies the KGB information of PresidentJohnson’s talks with Italian Foreign Minister A. Fanfani(SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 690, l. 93).28. KGB Memorandum, 11 December 1969, SCCD, f.5, op. 61, d. 558, l. 178-179.29. Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), USSRMinistry of Defense, to CPSU CC, 23 August 1966,SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 262, ll. 237-238. (For an Englishtranslation of this document, see CWIHP Bulletin 3(Fall 1993) 61-62.)30. The most complete records of these and other secretVietnam peace efforts during the period 1964-68, basedon classified U.S. government records, can be found inGeorge C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of theVietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Penta-gon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,1983). MARIGOLD and SUNFLOWER are coveredin greater detail, using additional Soviet and U.S. sources,in Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War(forthcoming).31. KGB Memoranda, 5 and 21 July 1965 and 7 October1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 379, 389, 533.32. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Demo-cratic Republic of Vietnam.33. Political letters from Soviet embassies were in factdetailed reports of the situation in the respective coun-tries, their domestic and foreign policy, and usuallywritten in connection with particular events.34. Political Letter, “Soviet-North Vietnamese Rela-tions after the April 1968 Talks,” 1 September 1968,SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 114; see also SCCD, f. 5,op. 60, d. 369, ll. 129, 131-132, 133.

35. Memorandum from B. Ponomarev for the CPSUCC, “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese Friends,” at-tached to resolution of the CPSU CC Secretariat, SCCD,f. 4, op. 22, d. 1240, Art. No. 113/10, 12 February 1974.36. Sometimes the situation looked simply ridiculous.Mentioned in the list of materials, included in “specialdossiers,” is the draft decision on the reply to Le Duan’spersonal message to Brezhnev, presented by the CCDepartment and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairson 24 December 1974. There is the following note onthe card of that document, written by Brezhnev’s aide,Alexandrov: “to C-de K.U. Chernenko. Leonid Ilyichasked to hold a vote on this proposal (he has not read thetext).” It turns out that top Soviet leaders signeddocuments either having learned the gist of the docu-ment at best, or having read only its title.37. Memorandum of Conversation between SovietCharge d’Affaires in Hanoi P. Privalov and Chairmanof the Lao Dong Party’s Committee on the Unificationof the Country Nguyen Van Minh, 23 August 1966,SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264, ll. 173-174.38. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 259.39. For details, see Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacyof the Vietnam War, and Gaiduk, The Soviet Union andthe Vietnam War (forthcoming).40. KGB Memorandum, 28 January 1967, SCCD, f. 5,op. 60, d. 680; Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador Shcherbakov and DRV ForeignMinister Nguyen Duy Trinh, 15 February 1967, SCCD,f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 145.41. USSR Foreign Ministry, list of questions on whichthe Vietnamese comrades were informed, SCCD, f. 5,op. 60, d. 369, l. 15.42. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, “So-viet-North Vietnamese Talks of April 1967 and thePolicy of the PTV [Workers’ Party of Vietnam] on theSettlement of the Vietnamese Problem,” August 1967,SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 263.43. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 332, l. 133-138.44. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 30-31.45. Memorandum of Conversation between SovietCharge d’Affaires in the DRV V. Chivilev and LeDuan, 2 May 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 376, l. 47.46. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, “So-viet-North Vietnamese Relations After the April 1968Talks,” SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 109.47. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 31.48. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 459, l. 117.49. Memorandum of Conversation between SovietAmbassador V. Zorin and Xuan Thuy and Tranh ByuKhiem, 21 February 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 460,ll. 56-60, 131-134. (For an English translation, seeCWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 62-63.50. Memorandum of Conversation between A. Dobryninand H. Kissinger, 12 June 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d.558, l. 103. (For an English translation of this docu-ment, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 63-67.) Thecontents of this conversation, as the note on the docu-ment testifies, were reported to Brezhnev, so the topSoviet leadership had been informed aboutWashington’s intentions.51. William Colby and James McCargar, Lost Victory:A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year In-volvement in Vietnam (Chicago, N.Y., 1989), 335.


Ilya V. Gaiduk, a research scholar at the Instituteof Universal History (IUH), Russian Academy ofSciences, Moscow, is the author of The SovietUnion and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R.Dee, forthcoming). A recipient of fellowshipsfrom CWIHP and the Norwegian Nobel Institute,he originally presented the findings in this ar-ticle to the January 1993 Conference on NewSoviet Evidence on Cold War History in Mos-cow, organized by CWIHP and IUH. The authorgratefully acknowledges the assistance of OganezV. Marinin, then a staff archivist at SCCD (nowat the State Archive of the Russian Federation[GARF]), in locating archival documents forthis article.

MICHALOWSKIcontinued from page 241

Michalowski was hopeful that the Vietnam-ese would eventually express a willingnessto negotiate.

After returning to Warsaw, Michalowskijoined his chief Adam Rapacki in efforts topersuade the Vietnamese that a positive sig-nal of some kind was in their best interests.Working through U.S. Ambassador JohnGronouski, they made it clear that a resump-tion of bombing raids in the North wouldeliminate any chance for peace. NormanCousins, a personal friend of LyndonJohnson, tried to play the role of intermedi-ary in this process, but to no avail. To thedismay of the Polish diplomats, the UnitedStates resumed bombing raids on January31, and Operation Lumbago came to anunsuccessful end.

Operation Marigold1

This was another attempt to bring theUnited States and North Vietnam together insecrecy and with a minimum of precondi-tions. This time, Polish diplomats workedclosely with their colleagues from Italy.Michalowski worked on the Warsaw end ofthe operation. Poland’s representative to theInternational Control Commission, JanuszLewandowski, Italy’s ambassador to SouthVietnam, Giovanni Orlandi, and U.S. Am-bassador Henry Cabot Lodge were the mainprotagonists in Saigon.

Phase I of Marigold developed from adiscussion between Lewandowski and Pre-mier Phan Van Dong in June of 1966 inHanoi. Lewandowski learned that the NorthVietnamese would be willing to begin peacenegotiations, provided the U.S. suspendedthe bombing campaign. He relayed thisinformation to Orlandi who, in turn, notifiedU.S. ambassador Lodge. The American sidewas anxious to know whether Hanoi wouldmake any overt sign of accommodation (suchas refraining from offensive military opera-tions in the South, or reducing traffic alongthe Ho Chi Minh Trail) in return for a bomb-ing halt. In spite of their best efforts, Polishdiplomats could obtain no assurances fromHanoi, and the U.S. withdrew its inquiries.

Phase II was a lengthier and more com-plex operation that began when ambassadorLodge requested that Lewandowski presenta 10-point peace plan to the North Vietnam-ese. This time, an unconditional bombinghalt would precede the substantive negotia-tions. Rapacki and Michalowski under-

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Operation Lumbago

In the early morning of 29 December1965, Jerzy Michalowski was awakened byPolish military authorities, who informedhim that U.S. Air Force One, with ambassa-dor Averell Harriman on board, was request-ing permission to land in Warsaw. Harriman’speace mission was part of a broad diplomaticoffensive that coincided with the Christmasbombing halt of 1965. A 14-point peaceplan, including immediate face-to-face ne-gotiations, was presented to the Poles, withthe request that it be passed on to the NorthVietnamese government. A meeting withCommunist Party Secretary WladislawGomulka followed (Michalowski was notpresent, but he could hear Gomulka harangu-ing Harriman through a thick oak door). Thenext day, Michalowski departed for Hanoi,with intermediate stops in Moscow andBeijing. Friends and co-workers were toldthat his absence was due to a severe bout oflumbago.

In Moscow, Michalowski met with For-eign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who ex-pressed support for the mission, but pre-dicted (correctly) that Chinese leaders wouldtry to sabotage it in any way they could. InBeijing, Deputy Foreign Minister WangBingnan angrily denounced any offers ofpeace and condemned Poland’s participa-tion in the American scheme. Michalowskidecided to terminate the meeting when Wangbecame abusive. This stormy session wasfollowed by a lavish banquet, with manycordial toasts and remarks. Arriving in Hanoion January 4, Michalowski was met by For-eign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, whoseinitial response to the American offers wasunenthusiastic. The Vietnamese, he claimed,were doing well on the battlefield, and thetime had not yet come to exploit these suc-cesses at the negotiating table. The samesentiments were echoed during the next twodays by Prime Minister Phan Van Dong (lessemphatically) and Party Secretary Ho ChiMinh (in much stronger terms).Michalowski’s account of these discussionsmakes clear that the Poles were acting asstrong advocates of the peace process, pre-senting the American plan in as favorable alight as possible. As he left Hanoi,


stood the importance of this new develop-ment, and flew to Bulgaria to brief LeonidBrezhnev, who encouraged them to pro-ceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duan went toBeijing at about the same time, where hereceived contradictory advice from MaoZedong and Zhou Enlai.

Phan Van Dong’s reply to Lewandowskigenerated considerable excitement since itcontained a request to arrange an unprec-edented face-to-face meeting, in Warsaw,between the Americans and the North Viet-namese. Rapacki and Michalowski began aseries of consultations with John Gronouski,to set the stage for these critical talks. Fromthe beginning, however, difficulties emerged.First, the American side began to expressdoubts about certain unspecified details ofthe 10-point plan as it had been recorded byLewandowski. Secondly, the Chinese gov-ernment, opposed to any talks, increased itspressure on the Vietnamese. Worst of all,the tempo and brutality of American bomb-ing raids in the Hanoi area were stepped up.On December 13 and 14, the center of thecity was hit for the first time. Stunned bythese attacks, the North Vietnamese with-drew their offer to meet. In a dramaticconfrontation on December 19, whenGronouski accused the Poles of acting in badfaith, Rapacki’s frustration overflowed: hesmashed his glasses down on the table, andthey flew into the American ambassador’sface. Operation Marigold appeared to bedead.

The Poles continued to hope that a basisfor face-to-face talks still existed, however.They briefed UN General Secretary U Thant,who promised to do whatever he could.They also contacted Pope Paul VI (usingItalian Premier Fanfani as an intermediary).The pontiff sent a letter to Hanoi and toWashington, begging both sides to save thepeace process. Gronouski left Warsaw toconsult with President Johnson, whileRapacki drafted an urgent appeal from mem-bers of the Polish Politburo to their counter-parts in Hanoi, calling for a reconsiderationof the American proposals. As snowstormsclosed down airports all over Europe,Gronouski returned to Warsaw unexpect-edly, and requested a meeting with Rapackion Christmas Eve. He announced that allbombing with 10 miles of the center ofHanoi had been suspended, and that he wasready to meet with a Vietnamese representa-tive in Warsaw. This message was promptly

conveyed to Phan Van Dong by Poland’sambassador Siedlecki. The Vietnamese,still smarting from the bombing raids ofearly December, and under intense pressurefrom China, refused to discuss the matterany further. Operation Marigold had failed.

The great hopes that were raised byMarigold, and its dramatic collapse, gaverise to many commentaries, explanations,and to some finger-pointing. In his report,Jerzy Michalowski provides a detailed re-buttal of certain claims made by Henry CabotLodge in his memoirs. Michalowski had theopportunity to discuss Marigold with Presi-dent Johnson in September of 1967. LBJ didnot accept Michalowski’s interpretation ofthe events, nor would he acknowledge thecontinuing determination of the North Viet-namese to keep fighting. In time, he wouldchange his views.

After personally witnessing some of theunsuccessful attempts to end America’s en-tanglement in Vietnam, after discussing theevents with many of the participants, andafter studying many of the relevant docu-ments, Michalowski closes his report with astrong indictment of U.S. policy. He isconvinced that Lyndon Johnson and his circleof hawkish advisors never understood howdiplomatic efforts could lead to the resolu-tion of what they saw as an essentially mili-tary crisis. Thus, the President’s half-heartedattempts to seek non-military solutions (suchas Marigold) were doomed, mocking thehard work and good will of dozens of com-mitted professional diplomats all around theworld.

Here is what Michalowski writes on thelast page of his report:

Based on newly-revealeddocuments and memoirs, we nowknow that Secretary of State DeanRusk was one of the chief “hawks”in the ornithological roster of Presi-dent Johnson’s advisors. Thus, thesurprising nature of the event that Inow relate in closing this accountof Polish peace initiatives in Viet-nam.

January 19, 1969 was the eveof the inauguration of PresidentRichard Nixon. The departing Sec-retary of State met with the Wash-ington diplomatic corps in a sad,but formal, ceremony on the sev-enth floor of the State Department

building. Following the toasts andsentimental speeches I was prepar-ing to leave, when Dean Rusk’ssecretary informed me that he wouldlike to have a few words with me inprivate.

Rusk was subdued as he spokeat length about his upcoming aca-demic work, and his retirementplans. Then he said: “During mylong tenure as Secretary of State,I’m sure I made many erroneousjudgments and bad decisions. Butmy intentions were always pure,and I acted according to the dictatesof my conscience. Thus, I have noregrets. Except for one thing—thatin 1966 we did not take advantageof the opportunities and your roleas go-between. We should havebegun a negotiating process that,with your help, could have ended aconflict that has cost us so muchblood and treasure, and that nowhas cost us the election. I wanted tosay this to you today, to thank youfor your efforts, and to ask that youconvey my words to MinisterRapacki.”

1. [Ed. note: For the declassified U.S. account of Opera-tion Marigold, see George C. Herring, ed., The SecretDiplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Vol-umes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: Universityof Texas Press, 1983), 209-370.]


SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS:THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE PROGRAM

[Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of theCambodian Genocide Program, based at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies,Council of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Law School, Orvill H. Schell Jr. Center forInternational Human Rights, Yale University.]

Executive Summary

The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling thedocumentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes ofPol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement“the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the KhmerRouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975and January 7, 1979.” [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two yearmandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit:

1. Identifying Legal Options for RedressUntil now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to

organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime’s crimes. TheRoyal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of thegenocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the CambodianGenocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference,chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned bythe Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminalviolations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law inCambodia. Cambodia’s two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; bothpraised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others,including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council ofMinisters and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers.

2. Documenting the Cambodian GenocideUntil now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators

of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides inassembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodiangenocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through theInternet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sitesacross Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whomcomprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the KhmerRouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminalacts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot’s1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the KhmerRouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of raredocuments from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for thefirst time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languageson the Pol Pot regime. Yale’s CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because ofYale’s singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legalresources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively executethis complex research undertaking.

3. Recreating Lost HistoriesUntil now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge

THE CAMBODIAN NATIONALARCHIVES

by Kenton J. Clymer

On a graceful boulevard radiating outfrom Wat Phnom in Cambodia’s capital,Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly reno-vated National Library of Cambodia. Builtby the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24December 1924), the library also housed thecountry’s archives. A separate archivesbuilding, located directly behind the Na-tional Library (and thus not visible from thestreet) was built in 1930. Unlike the library,it still awaits renovation. Designed withhigh ceilings, large windows, and electricceiling fans, both buildings incorporatedthe best available technology for preservingbooks and manuscripts in tropical climates.

During the French colonial period andafter, until the end of the Khmer Republic in1975, the library and archives were admin-istered jointly. In 1986, however, followingthe Vietnamese model, they were separated.The library is controlled by the Ministry ofInformation and Culture, while the archivesreports to the Council of Ministries.1

During the terrible period of the KhmerRouge (1975-78), the library and archiveswere home to pig keepers, who served theChinese advisers living in the hotel nextdoor. The pigs rooted in the beautiful gar-dens. All of the staff from the library andarchives, about forty people, fled. Only ahandful survived the Khmer Rouge regime,and only two or three returned to work in thelibrary once the Khmer Rouge were drivenout in 1979.

The library’s holdings today are only afraction of what they were in 1975. Butcontrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rougemay not have systematically destroyed booksand documents.2 To be sure many bookswere ruined, some simply pushed off theshelves to make room for cooking pots,others used for cooking fires or for cigarettepapers.3 Subsequent neglect and misman-agement made matters worse, arguably muchworse. Many books that did survive theKhmer Rouge years were improperly storedand soon succumbed to insects and the ele-ments. Two Australians archivists, Helen


CAMBODI A AND THE COLD WAR


regime had been contemplated. The Cam-bodian Genocide Program has nine newhistories already underway, comprising de-tailed and original research on the fates ofvarious regions and population groups intowhich Pol Pot’s regime divided Cambodia.In the process, Cambodian scholars are be-ing trained in both social science methodsand computer documentation. In addition tothese nine separate studies in preparation,others are in the planning stage. The firstvolume of these studies is to be published in1997.

4. Training Cambodian LawyersUntil now, the legal expertise did not

exist in Cambodia to support a trial of KhmerRouge leaders utilizing due process guaran-tees and unimpeachable evidentiary stan-dards. The Cambodian Genocide Programhas just graduated the first class of seventeenCambodian legal professionals, governmentofficials, and human rights workers fromCGP’s nine-week intensive summer schoolon international criminal law and interna-tional human rights law. The school washeld in Phnom Penh from June to August1995, with the participation of the Orville H.Schell Jr. Center for International HumanRights at the Yale Law School. A secondsummer school will be held in Cambodia inmid-1996. The individuals trained in theCGP program will be able to staff a domesticor international tribunal.

5. Creating a Permanent CambodianDocumentation Center

Until now, no “center of gravity” ex-isted in Cambodia to provide a spark for theserious study of what happened to Cambo-dian society during the Khmer Rouge re-gime. The Cambodian Genocide Programhas established an international non-gov-ernmental organization in Phnom Penh,known as the Documentation Center of Cam-bodia. The Documentation Center is facili-tating the field operations of the CGP, train-ing Cambodians in research and investiga-tive techniques, and will enable an indig-enous organization to continue the work ofthe program after the conclusion of the CGPmandate in January 1997.

Introduction

In Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, theworld witnessed one of the worst cases of

genocide and crimes against humanity everperpetrated. While those responsible for theNazi Holocaust in the first half of the 20thcentury were punished, there has been littleeffort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justicefor the atrocities they committed. In 1994,the U.S. Congress sought to address thisproblem by enacting the Cambodian Geno-cide Justice Act. A team of world-classCambodia scholars based at Yale was cho-sen to receive funding from the U.S. Depart-ment of State, and subsequently, by theAustralian Department of Foreign Affairsand Trade. That team has now, in threequarters of a year, made tremendous progressin remedying this omission of justice andaccountability. Four major problems faceany effort to bring the Khmer Rouge tojustice:

1) a paucity of specific documen-tary evidence linking high-levelpolicymakers and military person-nel to acts of genocide and crimesagainst humanity;2) insufficient training of Cambo-dian officials and lawyers with thepolitical will and legal skills to bringthe Khmer Rouge to justice;3) insufficient awareness amongCambodian policymakers of the op-tions available for legal redress ofgenocide and crimes against human-ity; and4) the lack of a permanent, indig-enous Cambodian NGO tasked tocarry out independent research anddocumentation on the Cambodiangenocide.Yale University’s Cambodian Geno-

cide Program is making excellent progresstoward solution of these four problems.That progress is described in this First In-terim Progress Report of the CambodianGenocide Program.

Identifying Legal Options for Redress.Until now, no conference of Cambodian andinternational observers has examined spe-cific legal options for redress of Cambodia’sgenocide. On 21 and 22 August 1995, theCambodian Genocide Program hosted aninternational conference under the banner,“Striving for Justice: International CriminalLaw in the Cambodian Context.” The Striv-ing for Justice Conference brought togethera wide range of interested observers anddecisionmakers for discussions with twointernational criminal law experts. Under a

contract with the U.S. Department of State,Mr. Jason Abrams of the Open Society Insti-tute and Professor Steven Ratner of the Uni-versity of Texas are now completing a studyof options for legal redress of criminal hu-man rights violations during the DemocraticKampuchea (DK) regime between 17 April1975 and 7 January 1979. When it is com-pleted, the study will offer an analysis of themost probable cases of violations of crimi-nal human rights laws under the DK regime,and the most likely avenues for redress.Abrams and Ratner have tentatively con-cluded that the Khmer Rouge are culpableon several counts of violating internationalcriminal laws concerning genocide, warcrimes, and crimes against humanity. Theyfurther have concluded that there are severalpossible avenues for legal redress of thesecriminal violations, including an ad hoc in-ternational tribunal, a domestic Cambodiantribunal, and/or some form of an interna-tional commission of inquiry.

At the Striving for Justice Conference,Abrams and Ratner presented their draftconclusions to an invitation-only audienceof nearly 100 distinguished guests. The au-dience consisted of representatives from theOffices of the Co-Prime Ministers, theDeputy Prime Minister, the Council of Min-isters, several key ministries including Inte-rior and Justice, numerous Cambodian andinternational human rights organizations,members of the Cambodian National As-sembly, a representative of the United Na-tions Secretary General, a member of theU.S. Congress, and others. The conferencewas also addressed by the First Prime Min-ister, His Royal Highness Samdech KromPreah Norodom Ranariddh, and the SecondPrime Minister, His Excellency SamdechHun Sen. The conference offered extensiveopportunities for discussion and exchangeof ideas among the participants. Conferenceparticipants reached a clear consensus on theneed for accountability, and outlined impor-tant specific next steps to be taken to bringthe Khmer Rouge leadership to justice.

Documentation Databases. The Cam-bodian Genocide Program is assembling anelaborate family of databases collectivelyknown as the Cambodian Genocide DataBase (CGDB). Using the ComputerizedDocumentation System (CDS/ISIS) de-signed by UNESCO and modified to suitCGP’s particular needs by our program-mers, CGP is making rapid progress in the


compilation of all known primary and sec-ondary material relating to the Khmer Rougeregime. The Program has already obtainedaccess to several little-known caches ofdocuments, including a DK Foreign Minis-try archive, archives of the DK Trade Min-istry, the only known surviving archive froma DK regional prison, original maps ofKhmer Rouge killing fields, and severalcollections of rare photographs taken by theDK regime itself. Another collection madeavailable to the CGP includes a set of inter-nal minutes of key meetings of the DK“Party Center” held in 1975 and 1976. CGPcurrently has two missions at work in Viet-nam, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City,searching for relevant documentation in stateand private archives.

These databases will bridge a huge gapin the case against the Khmer Rouge. Be-cause these databases did not previouslyexist, policymakers could not precisely iden-tify victims and perpetrators, nor could theyestablish empirical links between the two ona national scale. Yale’s CGDB resolves thisproblem. When the databases are complete,an investigator using them could, for ex-ample, identify individual victims and per-petrators of a particular atrocity, perhapswith photographs and biographies of theindividuals in question. Yale’s CGP isuniquely qualified to carry out this workbecause of Yale’s singular combination ofCambodia area and archival studies, geno-cide research, legal resources, informationsystems, and geographical expertise neces-sary to effectively execute this complexresearch undertaking.

The Bibliographic Databases. The bib-liographic database will contain records onthis new material and on all other knownprimary and secondary sources of informa-tion pertaining to the Khmer Rouge regime,including books, articles, monographs, docu-ments, reports, interviews, tapes, films andvideos, transcripts, and so forth. As noted,CGP research efforts have already led to adramatic increase in existing documentaryevidence through discovery of previouslyunknown archival sources. Rapid progresshas been made with the design and estab-lishment of this database. The initial pro-gram timelines projected the creation ofsome three hundred records in a biblio-graphic database by the end of December1995. That milestone was achieved in Feb-ruary 1995. As of August 1995, approxi-

mately 1000 records representing some50,000 pages of documentation had beenentered into the bibliographical database.

The Victim Database. The CambodianGenocide Program has made arrangementsto obtain and make electronically accessibleto an international audience Dr. JustinCorfield’s biographical database containingmore than 40,000 entries on the Cambodianelite. We express our thanks to Dr. Corfield.We have plans to expand this database withadditional information obtained as a result ofour original research. Given the patterns ofviolence in Democratic Kampuchea, it islikely that a large number of the individualslisted in this database became victims of theKhmer Rouge. Thus this database may be-come useful for identifying and cross-ref-erencing victims of genocide and crimesagainst humanity.

The Photographic Database. The Cam-bodian Genocide Program is preparing toscan several large collections of photographsinto the CGDB. These collections contain asignificant number of items which are likelyto have a high degree of evidentiary value forthe prosecution. Examples include a largenumber of photos of DK leaders, of forcedlabor brigades, and the entire collection ofprisoner photographs from the Tuol SlengGenocide Museum. Most of the 4,000 pris-oner mugshots are currently not accompa-nied by any identification of the prisoners.By making these photographs available onthe internet, and adding to the database aspecial field for readers to key in suggestednames for each photograph, we hope to ob-tain identities for many of the victims of theKhmer Rouge. The names could be used toprosecute perpetrators on charges of killingspecific persons.

The Khmer Rouge Biographical Data-base. The Cambodian Genocide Program isassembling a second biographical databasecontaining data on members of the KhmerRouge organization between 1975 and 1979.This database will include both political andmilitary leadership, down to the srok (dis-trict) level. Thus this database will be usefulfor identifying the chain of command invarious regions at various times, and in es-tablishing command responsibility for par-ticular atrocities.

The Imaging Database. The Cambo-dian Genocide Program is in the process ofscanning images of original DK documentsinto the database. We have already accom-

plished the scanning of several hundred rel-evant documents, including a near-completeset of the records in Khmer from the 1979 inabsentia genocide tribunal of Pol Pot andIeng Sary. Using custom software alreadydesigned specifically for CGP, CGDB userswill be able to browse through the biblio-graphic database and, upon finding a recordof particular interest, “jump” to a full digitalimage of that specific document with the“click” of a mouse. This capability canconsiderably expedite the search for incrimi-nating evidence of genocidal intent.

The Geographic Database. The Cam-bodian Genocide Program is also in theprocess of constructing an elaborate com-puter-based map showing the physical loca-tions of facilities of the Khmer Rouge “inter-nal security” apparatus, including prison and“killing field” sites. The Cambodian MineAction Center established by the UnitedNations Transitional Authority in Cambo-dia has designed standardized software formapping work in Cambodia, and CGP hasobtained access to this system for our pur-poses. Utilizing the Global Positioning Sys-tem to pinpoint the precise coordinates oflocations identified by our researchers, CGPwill accurately map the Khmer Rouge terrorsystem and the resting places of its victims.The resulting display is likely to constitutean incriminating indictment of the scope ofKhmer Rouge terror, providing strong evi-dence of widespread crimes against human-ity.

Disseminating the Databases. In addi-tion to publishing analytical indexes of thedatabases, user access to the computer data-bases themselves will be enabled in severalways. First, physical copies of the databasewill be deposited at several locations in theUnited States and Cambodia. Second, wehope to make the entire database availableon CD-ROM. Finally, through the Internet,the database will be made accessible to allinterested parties worldwide. The projectedimplementation date for the online genocidedatabase is early 1997.

Collecting and compiling data on Cam-bodia under the Khmer Rouge will be one ofthe most significant contributions of theCGP, for both historical and legal reasons.Organizing this mass of new informationinto a structured whole will enable citizensto fully comprehend the nightmare of whathappened in Cambodia under the KhmerRouge. It will allow historians to compile a


more compelling and accurate picture of thepast. It will allow policymakers to fashion acase for the necessity of accountability forthe Cambodian genocide. And it will pro-vide prosecutors with critical informationon crimes committed by specific individu-als.

Research. Cambodian Genocide Pro-gram Director Ben Kiernan’s new book, ThePol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocidein Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979, will soon be available from Yale Uni-versity Press. A comprehensive survey ofthe Cambodian genocide, it provides abaseline of existing information from whichmore specific research can be initiated. TheCGP has already begun implementing a widerange of new social science research on theCambodian genocide.

For instance, six professional Cambo-dian researchers and an American have beenat work for several months on new historiesof the seven geographic zones and regions ofthe Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime:the Southwest Zone, the Western Zone, theNorthwest Zone, the Siemreap-OddarMeanchey Region, the Northern Zone, theNortheast Zone (including Kratie) and theEastern Zone. One of these 70-page mono-graphs is already well on the way to comple-tion, and the others are expected to be com-pleted in 1996, for publication in 1997.

The Cambodian Genocide Program hasalso commissioned several additional stud-ies, including one of the DK “Party Center”(whose members included Pol Pot, NuonChea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Samphan,Ieng Thirith, Yun Yat, Mok, Ke Pauk andVorn Vet). This monograph will examinethe Khmer Rouge chain of command and thedegree of central authority over events in thezones and regions. This study will com-mence in September 1995, and is expectedto be completed in 1996. The CGP hascommissioned a further study of the geno-cide against the Cham Muslim minority un-der the Pol Pot regime, and work on thismonograph will also commence in Septem-ber 1995. In addition, the CGP plans newmonographs on the Buddhist monkhood, onwomen, and on the Vietnamese, Chineseand tribal minorities, focussing on the fate ofthese population cohorts under the Pol Potregime. We expect at least one and possiblytwo collected volumes of these monographsto be published in 1997 and 1998.

These studies will be of crucial impor-

tance in synthesizing the general and theparticular in Cambodia’s genocide. Fewdetailed studies exist of particular regionsunder the Khmer Rouge, and so up to now ithas been impossible to assemble a completepicture of what happened on a national scale.By breaking down the research task intoparticular regions, and simultaneously se-lecting several integrating themes such asthe Party Center, Cham Muslims, Buddhistsand women, the CGP studies will recon-struct the nexus between the local situationand national policy. This will provide cru-cial analytical evidence of the extent ofnational control by the Khmer Rouge, andthe impact of this control on all the people ofCambodia.

Legal Training Project. On 18 August1995, the Cambodian Genocide Programproduced its first graduates in internationalcriminal law and international human rightslaw. Seventeen Cambodian legal profes-sionals successfully completed the nine-weektraining program, including officials fromthe Ministries of Justice and Interior, theCouncil of Ministers, and three Cambodiannon-governmental human rights organiza-tions. The training covered principles ofinternational criminal law pertaining to geno-cide, crimes against humanity and warcrimes; the structure of national and interna-tional legal enforcement mechanisms, in-cluding national courts, ad hoc internationaltribunals, the International Court of Justice,and truth commissions; and the requirementsof due process and evidentiary standards.

The Cambodian Genocide Program willbuild on this foundation next year to furtherenhance the capacity of the Cambodian legalsystem to cope with the anticipated politicaldecision to move forward with legal redressfor crimes committed during the Pol Potregime. After consulting with the RoyalCambodian Government and other inter-ested observers as to the preferred fora forseeking redress, the CGP will fashion asecond training project designed to incul-cate the skills necessary to implement thosemeans of redress selected by the appropriatepolitical authorities.

Several additional varieties of trainingunder CGP auspices are in progress. Train-ing of Khmer researchers in Cambodia onsocial science methods, historiography anddatabase management has been proceedingsince June 1995 on a weekly basis. TwoCambodian scholars are currently enrolled

for MA’s at Yale, in History and Interna-tional Relations. Training of Khmer staffand researchers in Cambodia on all aspectsof operating the Documentation Center ofCambodia is also occurring on a weeklybasis.

Until now, no one in Cambodia had therange of legal skills required to bring theKhmer Rouge to justice in fair and procedur-ally sound trials. The CGP’s training pro-grams have directly addressed this short-coming. This is consistent with the Cambo-dian Genocide Justice Act, which states thatit is “the policy of the United States tosupport efforts to bring to justice membersof the Khmer Rouge for their crimes againsthumanity committed in Cambodia betweenApril 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979.” [PL103-236, Sec. 572.]

The Documentation Center of Cambo-dia. The Documentation Center of Cambo-dia (“DC-Cam”) is a non-profit internationalnon-governmental organization (NGO) es-tablished in January 1995 by the CGP tofacilitate training and field research in Cam-bodia related to the CGP’s mission. Withoffices in Phnom Penh, the DC-Cam servesas a base of operations for the documenta-tion, research and training activities carriedout under the auspices of the CGP. The staffof DC-Cam is entirely Cambodian in com-position, and weekly staff development train-ing is already in progress to prepare indig-enous personnel to assume full responsibil-ity for all aspects of operations in 1997.

In January 1997, at the conclusion of theCGP’s mandate, DC-Cam will be trans-formed into a Cambodian NGO to serve as apermanent institute for the study of topicsrelated to the Khmer Rouge regime, and as aresource for Cambodians and others whomay wish to pursue legal redress for geno-cide, war crimes and crimes against human-ity perpetrated under that regime. The docu-mentation and research products of the CGPwill be deposited with the DocumentationCenter of Cambodia for access by the Cam-bodian people.

[For those who have access to theinternet, DC-Cam has a World Wide WebHomePage containing more informationabout that organization, located at http://www.pactok.net.au. The DocumentationCenter e-mail address [email protected].]

Research Collaboration. The Cambo-dian Genocide Program has won strong sup-


port from the worldwide Cambodia studiescommunity (see “Scholars Speak out onCambodia Holocaust,” letter to the WallStreet Journal, signed by 29 Cambodiascholars and specialists, 13 July 1995). Thesescholars represent virtually the entire fieldof Cambodian studies. Leading Cambodianscholars David P. Chandler, Milton E.Osborne, and Michael Vickery have alreadyprovided help in various ways. Others whohave responded positively to requests forinformation on their personal archival hold-ings include Justin Corfield, Mark Dodd,Stephen Heder, Henri Locard, and JudyLedgerwood. Additional Cambodia schol-ars like David Ashley and Jason Robertshave generously offered to work with theCGP on a volunteer basis.

An Australian professional workingwith the CGP has also initiated a project tobegin the computer mapping of KhmerRouge prison and mass grave sites. Thisproject has now been funded by the Austra-lian government at the level of A$24,300.Additional funding is being sought. This isthe first time anyone has attempted to con-struct a comprehensive inventory of theterror apparatus used by the Khmer Rougeregime to murder up to two million people.

In June, July, and August 1995, CGPDirector Ben Kiernan presented theProgram’s work-in-progress at the U.S. Fo-rum on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (inNew York), at Monash University and theUniversity of New South Wales (in Austra-lia), and at the Foreign Correspondents’Club in Phnom Penh. These occasions allproduced new collaboration from foreignscholars and specialists, ranging from anoffer of a large biographic database to apromise of rare photographs of the Pol Potleadership. The ability of the CGP to attractthe cooperation of Cambodia scholars, alongwith legal and technical experts worldwide,is a key factor in explaining the success ofthe Program to date.

Cambodian Reception of the CGP.Cambodian leaders have complained foryears that the outside world had not recog-nized the crimes of the Khmer Rouge andthe tragedy of the Cambodian people. Theinitiation of the Cambodian Genocide Pro-gram helped answer this complaint on aninternational scale. This measure of recog-nition sparked a new willingness among theCambodian political elite to squarely facethe darkest chapter of Cambodian history.

Cambodians have become full partners in theCGP’s work. His Majesty King NorodomSihanouk wrote to CGP Manager Dr. CraigEtcheson on 21 July 1995, “I infinitely thankthe distinguished promoters of this researchprogram, especially Dr. Ben Kiernan andyourself, for the care that you have mani-fested, thanks to the ‘Cambodian GenocideProgram,’ in nourishing truth and promotingand assuring respect for human rights in mycountry.”

Since the earliest days of the CGP inJanuary 1995, the Royal Cambodian Gov-ernment has been unreservedly supportive ofthe mandate given to Yale University by theU.S. government. The Co-Prime Ministers,the Deputy Prime Minister, the Co-Ministersof Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Co-Ministers of Defense, and the President ofthe National Assembly have all pledged theirpersonal and institutional cooperation withthe CGP. Enthusiasm about the goals of theprogram transcends political affiliation, withsupport coming from the leadership of allthree parties represented in the government.But the cooperation of the Royal Govern-ment has gone far beyond pledges. TheRoyal Government is providing the CGPwith a wide range of resources to facilitateour work in Cambodia and in the region atlarge.

At the Striving for Justice Conference inPhnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995, FirstPrime Minister Samdech Krom PreahNorodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Min-ister Samdech Hun Sen publicly committedthe Royal Cambodian Government to bringthe Khmer Rouge leadership to justice fortheir crimes against humanity. In his open-ing address to the conference, the First PrimeMinister complimented the CGP, saying,“On behalf of the Royal Government, onbehalf of Samdech Hun Sen, Second PrimeMinister, and on my own behalf, I would liketo express my deepest appreciation and warm-est congratulations to the Office of Cambo-dian Genocide Investigation and Yale Uni-versity for embarking on the two yearsprogramme of documentation, research andtraining on the Cambodian genocide. I wouldalso like to express my sincere thanks equallyto the United States to create the CambodianGenocide Justice Act and its appointment ofYale University to carry out the two yearprogramme.”

Substantively, the First Prime Ministerargued, “The international crimes of the

Khmer Rouge violated the most centralnorms of international law and this clearlyaffected the interests of all states in generaland Cambodia in particular.” His RoyalHighness the First Prime Minister added,“The Royal Government is determined tobring those responsible for the perpetrationof these heinous crimes against the Cambo-dian people to face justice.” In his closingaddress to the conference, His ExcellencySamdech Hun Sen summed up the view ofmany participants by saying of the confer-ence, “This is not about politics, it is aboutjustice. If we do not bring the Khmer Rougeto justice for killing millions of people, thenthere is no point in speaking about humanrights in Cambodia.”

Large numbers of ordinary Cambodiancitizens seem to concur with the Co-PrimeMinisters. Many Cambodians in Cambodia,the U.S., and other countries have volun-teered their assistance. Since June 1995, ateam of Cambodian volunteers in New Ha-ven, CT, has been preparing a biographicalindex of Khmer Rouge political leaders andmilitary commanders. As of September1995, Cambodian-American citizens’groups in New York, New Jersey, Virginia,Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, California, andTexas have offered to compile witness testi-mony on behalf of the CGP. The thirst forjustice is powerful among the survivors ofPol Pot’s genocide.

Consistent with these feelings of ordi-nary Cambodians and the policy of the gov-ernment, the CGP has received from theRoyal Cambodian Government significantassistance to our research program. One ofthe most useful forms of this aid is theunprecedented assistance from the RoyalGovernment in retrieving documentationfrom Vietnam unavailable to researchers upuntil now. In combination with previouslyunexamined archives from the CambodianPeople’s Party, Royal Government minis-tries, and private archives now being openedto the CGP in Cambodia, a wealth of newdata pertaining to criminal culpability dur-ing the Khmer Rouge regime seems destinedto come to light. It is the expressed policy ofthe Royal Government to assist the CGP inuncovering such important information.

Evaluation. To ensure objectivity andquality control, the CGP has instituted arigorous two-tier system of program evalu-ation. In the first tier, the Steering Group ofthe Department of State’s Office of Cambo-


dian Genocide Investigations conducts peri-odic external reviews of CGP operations.As a basis for these evaluations, in May 1995CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson produceda 209-page Implementation Plan outliningthe Program’s strategy for achieving its ob-jectives. The first external evaluation, heldin June 1995, termed the progress of CGPoperations “excellent” (Time Magazine, 26June 1995).

CGP also carries out an internal reviewprocess, staffed by distinguished experts ininternational law and genocide investiga-tion, such as Professor Cherif Bassiouni,former Chair of the United Nations Com-mission of Experts for the inquiry on viola-tions of international humanitarian law inthe Former Yugoslavia (predecessor to theYugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal). The firstround of internal evaluation of CGP opera-tions began in June 1995. This evaluationhas already produced numerous useful ideasfor improving various aspects of our opera-tions, and yielded an overall positive ap-praisal of CGP progress. According to oneevaluator, “Your thoughtful and methodicalexplanations for the preparation of such aproject should serve as a model for thedocumentation and analysis of crimes againsthumanity in other countries.... The trainingprogram designed to support the project isoutstanding.”

Summary. In 1994 the prospect of atrial of the Khmer Rouge leaders seemedremote. Now, through the work of the Cam-bodian Genocide Program, it has become astrong probability. In 1994, the informationresources and legal evidence necessary for ajudicial accounting of the genocide had yetto be identified or assembled, and the re-quired legal skills did not yet exist. Theseprerequisites are now well on the way to-ward fulfillment. By the end of 1996, whenthe CGP’s mandate will expire, an interna-tional Cambodian genocide tribunal mayhave already commenced functioning. Bythen, the CGP will certainly have providedthe scholarly and legal resources for Cambo-dians to pursue their own justice for thevictims of the Khmer Rouge regime. Inshort, the Cambodian Genocide Programhas taken major steps to fulfill its own three-part mandate: to expose and document thecrimes of the Khmer Rouge, and to hold theperpetrators accountable.

Jarvis and Peter Arfanis, who visited thearchives at the end of 1992 were “dismayedat what we saw. . . . Valuable records fromthe French colonial days are on the floorsand shelves rotting away. About 50% of therecords—and there are about 2000 linearmetres of records all up—are either wrappedin brown paper or still in their original boxes.The boxes have been constructed from acidicpasteboard, starch-filled cloth, and proteinadhesive which has promoted insect infiltra-tion, mainly termites and beetle larvae. Otherrecords are sitting unwrapped gathering dust,mould and also being attacked by insects.”4

By the end of 1994, conditions were stillfar from good. During my two visits to thearchives that year, stacks of books, mostbeyond repair, still stood on the floor of thelibrary’s storage areas and in the archives.Wrapped and unwrapped documents re-mained on dusty shelves in the archives, andinsect damage was evident everywhere. Nev-ertheless, thanks to the dedication of someCambodians and some foreign (mainly Aus-tralian) assistance, there have been improve-ments, and the archives can in any event beused. There are now typescript guides tosome of the more important documentarycollections, and proper archival storageboxes, a gift from Australia, are increasinglybeing used.

The archives contain numerous, if eclec-tic, works including official journals, theUnited States Civil Code, Russian encyclo-pedias, and works from the French period.More significant are the collections of pub-lished and unpublished documents that havesurvived. The bulk of the collection consistsof those colonial records which the Frenchdid not take with them when they left, par-ticularly records of the Résidence Supérieuredu Cambodge. Some of the manuscriptsdate to the late nineteenth century and con-cern a wide range of mostly domestic mat-ters. These, along with some printed For-eign Affairs records from the 1950s and1960s, were the documents most useful tome. However, other records concern theBuddhist Institute, Norodom Sihanouk, andthe Khmer Rouge period.5

Permission is required to use the ar-chives, and prospective researchers need toapply at the Council of Ministers. There isno fee. Writing ahead might be useful (it is

CAMBODIAN ARCHIVEScontinued from page 260

very unlikely that a reply will be sent even ifthe letter is received), but I was able to obtainpermission in Phnom Penh without greatdifficulty. It may, however, take a few days.(The first time I applied on the Friday beforea holiday week. Nevertheless, permission touse the archives was received the Mondayfollowing the holidays.)

The archives is open only about four orfive hours per day. Many documents remainwrapped in paper. The documents them-selves are often in very fragile condition,and insects sometimes scurry out from amongthe pages. There is no working electricity inthe building, and plumbing is rudimentary.Miss Kim Ly, the archivist, is helpful, as areother members of the staff. Kim Ly under-stands French and some English.

In May 1994, there were few research-ers (often I was alone in the building), andthe rainy season added to a sense of gloomand foreboding resulting from reports ofrebel Khmer Rouge gains in the countryside.But by December the Khmer Rough threatseemed to have receded. Now governmentofficials and private citizens did come by toconsult the archive’s records. School chil-dren also visited. The library was heavilyused, especially in December when therewas a very well attended celebration of thelibrary’s seventieth anniversary. Perhapsthis is a hopeful sign of Cambodia’s return-ing health.

1. Peter Arfanis and Helen Jarvis, “Archives in Cambo-dia: Neglected Institutions,” Archives and Manuscripts[Australia] 21:2 (1993), 252-62.2. Ibid., 255. George Smith, a librarian employed by thestate of Alaska, made the same point in a paper deliv-ered at the “Seminar on the Khmer Culture’s Revival,”Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 21 December 1994.3. Helen Jarvis, “The National Library of Cambodia:Suriving Seventy Years of Drastic Socio-EconomicImpact,” Paper delivered at CONSAL9, the Ninth Con-gress of Southeast Asian Librarians, Bangkok, Thai-land, 2-6 May 1993.4. Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambodia,” 256-57.5. For a more complete description of the archive’sholdings, see Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambo-dia.”

Kenton J. Clymer, professor of history anddepartment chair at the University of Texasat El Paso, is researching a history of U.S.-Cambodian relations. His most recent bookis Quest for Freedom: The United States andIndia’s Independence (New York: Colum-bia University Press, 1995).