hostilities must stop – democracy and respect to its principles must be anhenced in mozambique...

Hostilities must stop – democracy and respect to its principles must be anhenced in Mozambique

1 FOMICRES Annual Report 2013: We believe training empowers and develop communities

Annual Report 2013

We believe:

Training empowers and develop communities



Peacebuilding

Monitoring implementation of international

instruments related to

Peace, Safety & Security

acceeded by Mozambique

Institutional

Governance

Crime

Prevention



http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-26-mozambique-prominant-renamo-member-killed-in-raid



Chapter I: about FOMICRES

Executive Summary 06

The Vision and mission 08

FOMICRES 10

Chapter II: Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding 12

FOMICRES’ intervention in search for peace 13

Conversations with RENAMO’s Residual armed Group 17

Dhlakama’s dilemma 22

Analysis on what should be civil society role in this conflict 26

The civil war and the Mozambique National resistence – RENAMO 28

The peace process 29

Implementation of the Peace Agreement 30

War threats 31

RENAMO armed attacks 35

Challenges, achievements and hope 36

FOMICRES’ position and recommendations 38

Chapter III: Crime Prevention Initiative

Crime Prevention strategy 40



Crime Prevention Initiative 43

Triangular Model (TM) – The Concept 45

TM-basic logic and community engagement 48

The five stages and nineteen steps 49

Community mobilisation and participation 51

Analysis and research findings at KaMavota District 55

Crime statistics – Municipal District KaMavota 56

Organisational topics at community level 57

Adopted immediate interventions 62

Impact of the Crime Prevention Initiative (TM) 63

Chapter IV: Monitoring implementation of regional, sub-regional and global

instruments related to peace, Safety and security accessed by Mozambique

National reporting on security and armed violence Prevention 65

Monitoring the Arm Trade Treaty 69

Monitoring the Ottawa and Cluster Munition Conventions 72

Monitoring the Pelindaba Treaty – Abolish Nuclear weapons 75

Chapter V: Institutional Governance

Institutional Governance 77

Financial Page 79



____________________________________________Executive Summary

he year 2013 was characterized by major national challenges in the sphere of peace and security, by the

way, areas where FOMICRES is undertakin focused work. while in 2012 the biggest concern was the

prevention of crime, reinsertion of recidivists, child soldiers still and former combatants, in 2013 this was

increased by the need to reflect on the possible ways of solutions for the open military and political conflict, result

of attacks by residual armed forces of RENAMO party against populations and Mozambique’s Defence and Security

Units in Sofala, Inhambane and Nampula Provinces. The absence of, or threats to security can destroy people’s

lives and properties, hampers community ties and affects daily activities. Experience shows that insecurity and

armed violence are complex phenomena that need solid evidence-base and concerted efforts in order to be

understood and comprehensively addressed. The evidence can be gathered through community and institutional

interacting capacities with envolved actors or/and regular measurement and monitoring of the issue. In this

context, FOMICRES undertook comprehensive reflections followed by deep work on the ground, based on its own

experience in the area of conflict resolution, co-operation with communities, ex-combatants, former child soldiers,

traditional leaders, ... during the last 20 years in the process of promoting civic education, collection and

destruction of remaining weaponries, putting to ourself the following question, how that experience could be

useful to understand the real reasons of the curent conflict, and probably allow FOMICRES to design solution

mechanism.

nother aspect of utmost importance for 2013, was to follow up practical implementation of the great

initiative launched by FOMICRES in 2012, at the presence of Government and other national and

international stakeholder, baptized as "Triangle Model" New Vision on Community Participation in the

Prevention and Combating Violent Crime. As we will see later, in the way it was designed and introduced the

"Triangular Model" is a pilot initiative in the FOMICRES’work but also in the history of Mozambique, being

therefore needs to deepen and

harvest specific lessons from the

Mozambican socio-cultural context

for further improvements. For this

reason, we decided that this report

should understand once again, an

analysis of earnings of pilot project

related to that Crime prevention

initiative in sellected communities and

also describe the steps of the strategy

itself.

The Triangular Model (TM) is a

targeted strategic vision to the social

processes of preventing and

combating crime, especially violent

crime in the community. It’s based on

the Partnership of three major actors:

community + Local Government Agencies + Law enforcement – Police, who achieve understanding that crime

manifestations have multisectorial risk factors (roots causes), therefore, there is a need to work together

T

A



(Memoradum of Understanding), in developing a community crime profile (mapping the crime) situational

analysis, crime prevention strategies (safety Plans) till the stage of implementing that crime strategy, monitoring

and evaluate it. TM comprises multi-sectorial oriented training methods on how to understand risk factors that

origin crime phenomenon as well as how to prevent the same root causes. Yet, MT cultivates a responsible and

methodical players by leting community members ownering the process and giving permanently capacity to other

remaining members of the community. This crime prevention strategies, implemeted as such, target changes in

community infrastructure, cultural aspects, physical environment and in people’s beheviour and attitude toward

crime reduction improving the concept of community. In extended phase, the diversity of approaches include

neighborhood watch, community policing, urban or physical design, and comprehensive or multi-disciplinary

efforts. These strategies seeks to engage residents individually, families as institutions, community, faith-based

organizations, and local government agencies in addressing the factors that contribute to the community’s crime,

delinquency, disorder including armed violence. On each chapter of the report, we make a description first of the

subject, secondly progress of activities undertaken in third place analysis and conclusions.

inked to our oversighting and advocacy work on international treaties related to Peace, Safety and security

that Mozambique has adopted, signed or ratified, FOMICRES promoted advocacy work, monitoring the

engagement of Mozambique on The Geneva Declarations on Armed Violence and Development, The

Pelindaba treaty (abolish Nuclear Weapons), The Ottawa Convention, The Conventions on Cluster Munitions, The

SADC Protocol on firearms and related materials, The United Nations Plan of Action and the Arm Trade Treaty

(ATT). In many of these instruments Mozambique is doing very well although still need to ratify urgentely the Arm

Trade Treaty which negotiation has been suporting since 2006. ATT was adopted by overwhelming vote at the UN

building on 2 April 2013, and is the first international Treaty aimed at regulating international transfers of

conventional arms. The Treaty, though imperfect, sets an important basis for global action to control the

conventional arms trade and creates a new global norm against which states’ practice will be measured, by other

states and by international civil society.

The Mine Ban Treaty’s Third Review Conference (3RC) will take place from 23 to 27 June in 2014 in Maputo,

Mozambique, a thematic that FOMICRES is following since 1998, being the focal point of the International

Campaign to Ban landmines and coordinator of Mozambique’s campaign for the same prupose, organized national

workshop to measure the treaty implementation as well as evaluating the civil society commitments in relations to

the convention since its adoption. The June review conference will mark a critical moment in the Treaty’s history,

taking place 15 years after the Treaty’s entry into force and the First Meeting of States Parties in 1999, which was

also held in Maputo. The Review Conference will assess the progress made to date and provide a roadmap for the

work ahead. Inspired by Mozambique’s example of how a heavily mine-affected country has effectively tackled its

landmine contamination and is expected to complete its mine clearance in 2014, the ICBL sees completion as the

most appropriate theme for the period in the lead-up to, during, and beyond the Review Conference. Over one

hundred states will gather in Maputo to assess progress made in addressing the problem of antipersonnel mines

worldwide, and to draw a roadmap to finish the job during the coming years.

L

Albino Forquilha-Executive Director /CEO (Sociologist)

[email protected] +25821405902 /+258829434780

mailto:[email protected]



1. Vision:

2. Mission:

3. Change of denomination

FOMICRES’ statutory objectives:

FOMICRES

(NGO)

1:

Vision

2:

Mission

3:

Change of

denomination 4:

Statutory

Objectives

5:

Activities in

2013

Empowered and participatory communities in problem identification, analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation of measures

relating to the prevention, combating and elimination of obstacles to justice, human security, peace and social reintegration,

prioritizing resources and locally sustainable methods.

Study environments that contribute to the emergence of anti-social behavior, public disorder, violent crime, armed

violence and empower communities to take their own responsibility in the prevention of such environments.

Through the General Assembly minutes of April 13, two thousand and twelve, the "Mozambican Force for Crime

Investigation and Social Reinsertion 'Association - FOMICRES, registered in the Legal Entities under number

(NUEL) 100006820, published in the Government Gazette on 4, Series III, 2nd supplement of January 26, 2007,

approved and required to change its name, hence the first Article of Association, which began to be replaced by

the following:

Article I (Denomination). The Association adopts: Promoting Peace, Crime Prevention and Social Reinsertion,

hereinafter referred FOMICRES, published in the Bulletin of the Republic, Series III, No. 23, dated Wednesday,

June 6, 2012.



a) Develop in a systematic way analyzes, studies and research in order to have always the root causes, influences, implications and likely the practice groups and victims of crimes at given time;

b) Develop actions aimed at educating the community to care for the child, former child soldier as well as ex-combatant to guarrattee their education and social reinsertion as a root measure of preventing and combating violent crime at community level;

c) Develop activities aimed at national, regional and global cooperation in exchange of information, experience and advocacy under the Prevention and Combating of manufacture, trade, trafficking, possession and use of illicit small arms and Light weapons in all its aspects;

d) To undertake prevention and combating of violent crime through community capacity building, dissemination of successful experiences and approved legal provisions on the subject as well as studies of community and national security;

e) Promote activities of public gathering and destruction of war artifacts remaining after the war as well as other weaponry outside government control in Mozambique;

f) Publication of annual independent of safety and security report with deep insight analyses on root causes, influences, operating mode, focused enviroments, and frequent type of crimes .... to facilitate adoption of preventions and combating strategies at community and national levels;

g) Contribute to the strategies of national safety, security and public tranquility through the design of appropriate preventive proposals, policies programs and recomemdations to prevent and combat crime in the country and the region;



________FOMICRES

FOMICRES (Promotion of Peace, Crime

Prevention and Social Reinsertion) was

founded after the vicious civil war in

Mozambique by a group of former child

soldiers. Its members reintegrated over

1,000 child soldiers into their communities.

In partnership with the Christian Council of

Mozambique, FOMICRES was responsible

for the technical managment of all aspects

of intelligence, research, collection and

public destruction of war artifacts (1995-

2005), considering military expertise of its

member and additional trainings by South

Africa Police Service, being the civic

education component of the responsability

of the Christian Council of Mozambique

through its member churches. Through this

work, and under FOMICRES’ community

Desarmament Programme (DECO) more

than 950.000 war atifacts were collected in

collaboration with RENAMO’s former

combatants.

As a result of this work FOMICRES was the

first civil society organisation to make a

presentation to the UN on participatory

Disarmament Demobilisation and

Reinsertion (DDR) strategies, at a

Preparatory Conference in New York in

2001. It was a co-founder and technical

adviser to Mozambique’s National

Commission on Small Arms and Light

Weapons, headed by the Ministry of Interior,

and was the main civil society

representative in lobbying on revising

legislation on small arms. Recently,

FOMICRES has helped to initiate the

Southern Africa NGO’s Network on Human

Security (HUMANET), being elected chair of

management council. FOMICRES is

member of Global Action on Armed

Violence (GAOAV), and Focal Point of the

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

and Cluster Munitions Coalition (MBT/CMC)

in Mozambique.

After 10 years of work on Small arms (1995-

2005), FOMICRES bridged its attention to

crime prevention strategies, following its

own research on capacity of community

policing. The previous pilot project has laid

the foundations for many reflection and

debates in Mozambique, refining training

methods and building relations with senior

government officials, Municipal authorities

and Law enforcements. Its mission is for

Mozambique’s communities to be trained to

identify sources of conflict/violent crime and

to devise and implement locally-based

strategies to deal with these.

FOMICRES’ current aims are to: (1)

develop a systematic method by which the

incidence and causes of violence on and by

young people can be mapped; (2) assist in

building capacity in local organisations

engaged in violence reduction, community

integration, peace and reconciliation and the



decommissioning of locally-held

armaments; (3) assist the community in

reintegrating former child soldiers, and

others at risk of being drawn into violence;

and (4) Influence regional, national and

international level government strategies to

eradicate the illicit trade in small arms.

FOMICRES has been through a lengthy

transition period between the end of funding

for its small arms work (2005), and the

assessment of the feasibility of its current

focus on the Triangular Model of policing–

i.e., Community Safety councils, the police

and Municipal Authorities working together.

Its network of volunteers across the country

has continued to contact its ballistic teams

to collect artefacts of war, as well as

developed this programme, including

research between 2007 and 2009 that

involved interviews with over 12,000

community members.

Despite its cohesion and national

recognition for its activities on civic

education and reconciliation, training of

community activists, collection and

destruction of weapons, FOMICRES was for

10 years (1995-2005) simply a patriotic

movement, based on voluntarism and civic

responsibility, without formal legal status.

FOMICRES received its legal approval by

Her Excellency the Minister of Justice as

non-profit organisation on 31 October 2006,

registered at Legal Entities under the ID

number 100006820, publicised at Gazette

of the Republic under the ID number 4, 3rd

Series of 26 January 2007.

FOMICRES has a Board of 11, plus 780

active volunteer members representing all

11 country provinces and income in 2013 of

US$ 64,500 from members, with

approximately 7 staff members in the

Maputo office, four in Chimoio (Manica

Province) and satellite working teams at all

Provinces and in 75 Districts. The

governing structure has been functioning

regularly since 2006. Every year the

General Assembly meeting is held and

narrative and financial reports presented,

discussed, commented and deliberations

made. Budgets and Plan of Activities are

proposed, commented and approved.

The members of FOMICRES’s Fiscal

Council has been proactive in terms of

visiting the project sites, checking record

books, formulates reports and submits well

informed endorsements of annual reports to

the general Assembly. The governing board

is always informed on the progress of the

implementation of the approved plan of

action and whenever necessary gives

adequate guidance to managing Council.

FOMICRES’s leadership is driven by

democratic principles whereby collaborators

relate to each other based on horizontal

relations. Each member of staff feels

accountable for respective tasks and reports

to weekly and monthly staff meetings where

progress, challenges and solutions are

jointly debated in view of anticipating and

avoiding major risks that can harm the

performance of the organization as a whole.



___PEACEBUILDING

Since mid-2013, 20 years after the peace

agreement, the fear of a return to war

intensified in the hearts of Mozambicans. Its

also known that Mozambique has been

considered one of the successful history in

the process of peace building in the world.

Alongside of that successful history,

Mozambique is building another successful

pillar based in its economic growth: there is

a recognised boom in the prospecting and

discovery of its mineral resource in the last

10 years, including other socioeconomic

branches that well-managed can reinforce

and ensure the stability of the same Peace

and democracy. Nevertheless, peace is

threatened.

Mozambicans witness armed attacks on

people, property, on socioeconomic

infrastructures perpetrated by RENAMO,

one of the signing parties of the General

Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992. A party

with seats in parliament house by one

hand, but on the other, with armed groups

in the bush since 1992 reminding one of the

most brutal civil wars that Africa already

knew from 1977 to 1992 lived by Mozambicans and driven by the same political movement.

What did failed in our system of peacekeeping? Synthetically, peacebuilding is understood ...to

refer to those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and processes which

strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak,

reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict. The concept of violence prevention has

developed further and moved its focus from preventive diplomacy, including a limited set of

More than 79 people have died, 380 seriously

injured, 6347 families are internally displaced,

seeking Government Protection in the capital

city of Gorongosa District (Sofala Province) and

other 1000 have been in Homoine District

(Inhambane Province), 27 schools have been

closed and 16 thousand students have

abandoned their schools. Fears of hit-and-run

attacks by armed RENAMO partisans have

increased in all the Province of Sofala, as well

as in the country barring people from

continuing with their development projects,

causing deep traumatic problems to children.

Children praying for Peace



diplomatic or military initiatives, to more structural interventions. Academics and practitioners

have stretched the concept to include, in addition to diplomacy and military operations,

institution building, economic development, and grassroots community building.

In the 2001 Report of the U.N. Secretary General on Prevention of Armed Conflict an "effective

preventive strategy" is said to require "a comprehensive approach that encompasses both

short-term and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental,

institutional, and other measures taken by the international community, in cooperation with

national and regional actors, what seems to be followed by Mozambicans during the last 20

years of maintaining the Peace, the questions remain the same, what did failed in our system of

peacekeeping?. The work done by FOMICRES in 2013 and the first quarter of 2014 seeks to

identify the probable reasons and also introduced his own work done with the RENAMO’s

residual forces in the bush whose aim is to balance political arguments we hear everyday in the

cities and military arguments behind this attacks, those directly involved in attacks.

________FOMICRES’

intervention in search for peace

When people become directly affected by armed conflict, they develop a central interest in

contributing to its resolution. Despite being confronted with harsh realities and huge dilemmas,

civil society actors, individually as well as collectivelly can make significant contributions to

peace processes. Their capacities may help to create the conditions for talks, build confidence

between the parties, parties with communities, shape the conduct and content of negotiations

and influence the sustainability of peace understandings and agreements. As our mission and

statutory objectives clarify, FOMICRES works in three key areas: promotion of peace,

prevention of violent crime and the social reinsertion of former child soldiers, combatants and

youth in conflict with law as strategy for a sustainable peacebuilding methods and crime

prevention for Mozambique. Understanding the interconnection of these areas at some point

and the need to promote peace in Mozambique shortly after the general peace agreement

signed in 1992, FOMICRES has worked in the last 20 years collecting and destructroying

weapons remained after the last conflict as one major high-priority peace agenda for

Mozambique and community participation. Its members reintegrated over 1,000 child soldiers

into their communities, and developed civic education programmes through which over 950,000

artefacts were collected and destroyed under its community disarmament Programme (DECO)

in partnership with other civil Society organizations and Goverment through Operation Rachel

Programme.



Seeing the restart of armed conflict characterised by Renamo attacks to people, their property,

social and economic infraestrutures and to defence Force positions, basically in Sofala

Province, FOMICRES developed reflections on the conflict in order to meet possible ways of

interventions toward solutions. Using its extensive network of contacts within the RENAMO’s ex-

combatant, some with whom worked through the last 20 years in identifying arm cashes and its

removal, designed a way to intervene, talking directly with Renamo’s military of residual forces,

seeking primarily to understand the great motivation for the attacks to that level, being the one

involved directly in those attacks. At other hand we knew that other Organizations, e.g. electoral

observatory and personnalities as Dom Dinis Sengulane (Bishop of the Aglican Churche) and

the Prof. Dr. Joaquim Lourenço da Costa Rosário (Rector of the Polytechnic University and

currently chair of the National Forum of the African Peer Review Mechanism - APRM) were

already envolved in contacting top leaders (HE Excellency Armando Emilio Guebuza –

President of Republic Mozambique and Mr. Afonso Marceta Macacho Dhlakama – President of

Mozambique’s National Resistence – RENAMO in order to find ways to restore peace for

Mozambique.

FOMICRES’ interventions in activities of peacebuilding during the last 20 years as already

mentioned, and in the present conflict (2013/14) is based on the understand that traditional

diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches have largely focused on a narrow definition of a

peace process -namely the crucial task of bringing the political and military leaders of opposing

groups into a process of dialogue and negotiation with the aim of exploring, reaching agreement

on and implementing measures to end violent conflict and create the conditions for peaceful co-

existence. This approach is guided by the belief that the leaders have the power to reach

decisions and bring along their constituencies in support of any resulting settlement. However,

modern civil wars present strong arguments for a more holistic understanding of a peace

process. Negotiations between the leaders of opposing groups do not take place in a social or

political vacuum. They may sometimes be unable to adequately address the complex and

dynamic inter-relationships between these actors and other groups affected by and involved in

the armed conflict, including the parties’ constituencies, the wider public and even the broader

regional or international forces. People’s independent initiatives in their towns and villages, as

well as at regional, national and international level therefore have the potential to become key

elements in a broader peace process that is capable of addressing these complexities.

Guided by these thoughts, and as local peacemaker, FOMICRES indicated a team of ballistics

in the month of July 2013 to do research of first and second levels in central and south areas of

Mozambique, covering possibly following Provinces: Tete, Manica, Sofala, Gaza, Inhambane

and Maputo, doing some consulting meetings with relevant RENAMO commanders and their

subordinates military who are directly envolved in attacks. This work was done in following sites:

Nr Visited and researched area

District Province Level of research

Findings

1 Matondo Chibabava Sofala II Combatants & firearms to be removed

2 Massala Maringue Sofala II Combatants & firearms to be removed

3 Gravata Gorongosa Sofala II Combatants & firearms to be removed



4 Vunduzi Gorongosa Sofala II Combatants & firearms to be removed

5 Macheve Chibabava Sofala II Combatants & firearms to be removed

6 Marombe Chibabava Sofala I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

7 Sitantonga I & II Sussundenga Manica I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

8 Kalingamunthy Tambara Manica I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

9 Ndindiza Chibuto Gaza II Combatants & firearms to be removed

10 Mapulanguene Magude Maputo II Combatants & firearms to be removed

11 Mathsequenha Namaacha Maputo I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

12 Chinhanguanine Manhiça Maputo I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

13 Tinonganine Matituine Maputo II Combatants & firearms to be removed

14 Newe Homoine Inhambane I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

15 Chipanzane Vilanculos Inhambane I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

16 Kambulathsithsi Mutarara Tete I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

17 Kassuende Mágué Tete I Suspicion of firearms to be removed

18 Nhamapadza Maringue Sofala II Combatants & firearms to be removed

The findings os this research combined to other enviroments that represent enouph risk factors

to Peace of Mozambique e.g uncompleted reintegration of ex-combatants some of them

claiming for their rights now, RENAMO’ frequent peace threatning speachs turned into attacks

now, poverty problems, .... revealed the existence of enough risk factors for the country to return

to war. Although it was known that after 15 years of work with communities and ex-combatants

in researching, collection and destructroying weapons and considerable reduction of funding for

this activities by donors, FOMICRES had changed its work strategy given more focus on violent

crime prevention briedging arm collection to issues of crime using the large community network

created, the findings of above reserach and analysis done around this, conducted FOMICRES

to the need to revisit its mechanism of arm cashes identification (reserach) and Social

reinsertion agenda for former combatants as an contribution to national efforts to restore peace

in Mozambique. With limited resources in transport and ballistic team assistence was decided to

restard the work, taken advantage of existing collaboration with many RENAMO’s commanders

who are leading military companies in front line of attcks, but interested in contributing for

peace.

Research, Disarmament and Social Reinsertion 2012-2013 Type of material collected and destroyed

Province of Sofala

City of Maputo

Province of Gaza

Province of Manica

Province of Tete

Province of Inhambane

Total Obsolete equipment

Observations

The collection of the material does not cover in total the areas surveyed, as it’s showed in the table above. There are still remaining material to be collected in the

AKM 23 0 3 7 5 0 38 7 Pistols (various) 5 13 0 0 0 0 18 0 MG 3 0 0 2 3 0 8 3 PPX 2 0 0 4 1 1 8 2 Bazooka / RPG 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 Mortars (various) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Machine Gun (Metralhadora)

2 2 11 15

Automatic gun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mouser 0 0 0 1 0 11 12 0 G3 3 0 1 3 0 0 7 2 Semi-Automatic 4 0 7 2 5 3 21 0



Grenade launcher 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 same areas that couldn’t be done in 2013 because of logistical constrains

Carbines 3 0 2 1 0 0 6 0 FBP 0 0 0 11 0 0 11 0 M20 1 0 1 2 0 ZG1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

other removed items Explosives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Munitions (various) 5103 64 800 208 118 3007 9300 0 Cartridges 18 0 0 3 0 0 21 0 Other equipment 8 0 0 0 3 9 20 0 Bayonets 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 Total 5182 77 813 244 147 3034 9492 14

Collected and destroyed weapons Photo: FOMICRES



_______Conversations

with renamo’s residual armed groups

It’s of extreem importance to emphasize that the work of peace, justice and reconciliation with

emphasy to weapons collections that FOMICRES implemented successfully from 1995-2005,

resulting in more than 900,000 war artifacts collected and destroyed had strong collaboration of

demobilized soldiers, especially those who came from the rebel group, today RENAMO Party.

FOMICRES had and still have strong network of collaborating RENAMO commanders and

Soldiers, some of them envolved in current attacks against civilians and defence forces. Using

the trust builded along the past years of collaboration FOMICRES established number of

important meetings with RENAMO’s commanders and soldiers envolved in those attacks aiming

to hear directly from them why this attacks, but also to judge if the soldiers envolved in this are

really in connection with the speechs (demands) of their political top leaders. Again, benefiting

from our trustful network within RENAMO soldiers were possible to arrange the meeting that

took place in August, September and October 2013, in place and days we ommit in this report

for security reasons as discussed with our counterpart. During meeting preparation rules have

been agreed with RENAMO comanders for the meeting to happen, concretely that FOMICRES

would compromise itself not to bring police, active duty military, journalists and in his team

maximal three (3) people without photo machine would be accepted to meet soldiers. The rules

was fully respected by FOMICRES.

_____________________The Summary of the first Meeting

Some extracts from the conversation with military commanders cunducted in local lunguages – ndau, tewe and Sena.

Introduction by FOMICRES: Many thanks Commander for receiving us for this conversations.

You know me and my colleague here, the other here is our collegue working at FOMICRES too,

his name is Y. As you know, we have built together experience of more than 15 years of a

trustful work in weapons collection and handing over reinsetion incentives to you and to many of

your collaborators, therefore have come as friend and partner once again, to hear frankly your

deep concerns as the commander in relation to the current conflict in order to allow us a certain



judgement, according FOMICRES’s capacity on the ways of provide contributions toward finding

solution for the problem, our entry-point questions are as follow:

After a brutal and destructive war that resulted in more than one (1) million of deaths,

60% of socioeconomic infraestrures in the rural areas destroyed, millions of external and

internl desplyed and which fortunatelly culminated with a Peace Agreement;

After more than 20 years of peace of Mozambique, with RENAMO party in the National,

Provincial parliarments, with official national, Provincial, District as well as Community

offices to develop Political work, what makes you returning back to the bush and

attacking people, defence and security forces as well as socioeconomic infraestrutes as

you are doing now?

Response: in 1982 , when I was very child, was drafted into the War of RENAMO , I spent most

of my life fighting. I was pleased by the General Peace Agreement because my desire was even

going to civilian life and return to live with my family, but my bosses said that although the war

ended I had to stay as commander and control remaining armament well as other colleagues

who were also as civilians. From 1995 until 1999, RENAMO gave me some money, but then

never until now, I’m leaving from my farm and incentives you gave in exchange of weapons I

delivered to your Organizations (FOMICRES) in the past. With that I/we built some improved

cabin and bought our chickens and ducks that are helping income within my family.

..... Dhlakama always said would pay all troops left in the bush , always said tomorrow , in three

weeks, in two month, or after next elections thinks would be better, and so on,..., and later

began to say he was stolen votes by FRELIMO, being the reason why is not get money to pay

us , sometime, said that the government is corrupted therefore he coudin’t get money to pay me

and other collegues, till he called me in conjuntion with other combatants to say that we have to

fight against FRELIMO’s government because our votes are always stollen including money that

would belong to our party. It was not easier for me to join the idea, but lastly I joint, and because

my past military position they indicated me to lead three companies which commanders you can

meet one day.

But to be honest, I'm in the war and I know that at any moment I could die, I am aware that after

the attacks happened days ago the riot police in conjunction with the Defence Forces of

Mozambique are now in possession of my name and of other commanders including soldiers

and must be looking for us, therefore, I know that I can die at any moment, .... however, can

also leave this gun anytime if my interests are met, ....I'm not interested in what they always say

on television, ... I know that there is a dialog going on between RENAMO and Government in

Maputo, but this is not for me, it will never benefit me and my family. since the war ended in

1992 they are living well in Maputo and in other Provincial capitals cities, eating wel with their

families and living in very decent houses, driving good cars, forgething completely our existency

here in the bush sufering with mosquitos,... that’s why I say that if you or someone else solves

my problems, I can deliver this weapon to you FOMICRES, as we did with in the past and would

also be able to influence others to give up this fight.



FOMICRES: thank you for being so open. Actually noticed that some processes have not been

well conducted, then your major concern Mr. Commander and your soldiers are related to the

lack of payments as yourself reported, in fact who should pay you? Response: I was recruited

by RENAMO that I served throughout my youth. Dhlakama is the President of RENAMO party,

he should pay me. It was him who told me and other combatants to stay behind, here in the

bush for new orders and to guard remaining war materials, without doubt he should pay me.

FOMICRES: but it definitely seems that Mr. Dhlakama and his Party (RENAMO) will not have

money to pay you in the short, probably not even in the medium term, which will be the output of

this conflict, will you and your soldiers continue to fight? Commander: As I said, till we die,

anytime we can die, I’m not sure whem, but in the war, anytime a soldier can die....

Most of Mozambicans, including Mr. Commander want peace, won’t you? If FOMICRES had

money could pay RENAMO’s debts so that peace returns to this earth. However, let’s like this, if

FOMICRES would find support among it’s partners, probably would not be enough money to

cover all your needs, but given that the Peace is an important asset for all of us including Mr.

Commander and your troops, what would you sellect/choose as priority of all priorities that

FOMICRES would share with his partners seeking for a kwick assistence to you, outside money

directly, even known that will be of a minimum safisfation, but that can take you to end current

attacks and surrender your weapons to us, ... because when we leave here, we would like to

talk to our partners to see the possibilities of satisfying your main concerns in order to restore

rapidely peace in our country, and as you might imagine, to do this we need concrete choose

from your side. Could talk on this?

Commander response: of course I want to leave peacefully with my family, I’m tired from the

powder bullets ..., to me and I guess to my soldiers too, we would like to see following:

1. Ensure our safety, meaning that the riot Police and the Mozambican Defence Forces

should stop looking for us to kill or arrest to jail;

2. Please, build one (1) decent house of conventional material to allow us to leave

decently with our families, even without decent job, because its known that we grow up

in this war and therefore none of us possesses a school certificate, but with recognising

me the right of a decent house, would continue to be farmer, producing with my family

enough to eat and to exchange in order to gain money.

3. ...the third aspect to support my reinsertion would be some three animals, could be kids

for creation and reproduction, ....

...if you and your partners would provide us with this, myself and my soldiers will deliver the

weapons we have to you for destruction as we did with other material in the past, said repitedely

the commander.

FOMICRES: If our partners agree with the idea of building a houses of conventional material,

purchase of some domestic animals, sewing machines and a bike as you expressed, would be

in what quantities? Do you agree Mr. Commander to provide us the number of soldiers for this



purpose? As you can imagine, to process all this in a serious manner we will need exat figures

to facilitate the process of designing the project, would you think on this, maybe to provide us

during a next meeting, if you allow?

Laughs... If I'm still alive next time we will talk in detail about exact figures ... but are you sure in

providing me and my troop what we are asking for? I can say, under assets and under my

command in this four Districts of Sofala Province would be approximately X soldiers directly in

functions, divided into three guerrilla companies (Gorongosa, Chibabava, Buzi and

Nhamatanda) that are working alternatively, responded the Commander.

FOMICRES: you know us Mr. Commander from the past cooperation, we fullfil what we

promise, considering conversation we had here, now we are going to contact our partners to

see if they can be of help in terms of funding some of your major concerns on behalf of peace,

than we would be back to contact you again, of course if you accetpt to meet us in about 14

days, note that even if we can’t find cooperation soon in funding your needs, FOMICRES’s team

will be back to inform you on stage of the process if necessary discuss with you on other

possible solutions for peace, would you be available to meet us again within 14 days?

Commander Response: if I'm still alive will meet you again, you know how to proceed in other to

contact me, please use always the same souce because failing to proceed like that will be

impossible to meet me and you can have problems.

______________________________The Summary of the 2nd Meeting

After following the recommended procedures the second meeting happened but in other District

(Buzi) diffrent from the first one, at this time with other three commanders mentioned in first

meeting.

FOMICRES-Thank you very much for having us other time. As the promise we made about 8

days ago, in fact we could contact our partners who also welcomed the opening of the Mr.

Commander. Our partners are interested in finding ways for the re-establishment of peace in

Mozambique, particularly in Sofala province, so would be interested in helping Mozambique in

this process, however, need to know for sure the seriousness of your words Mr. commander

and your soldiers in relation to our first meeting, but also details on the:

1. Types of homes that you guys want, animals ....

2. Exact number of beneficiaries and their dependents;

3. If the houses would be built in isolation from one another or Neighborhoods. If in

Neighborhoods, these woud be in each of the Districts or a single district?

4. If this by offerering a decent house for you and other soldiers you would collaborate in

convincing other of other location to join the project, handing their weapons too to

FOMICRES?

5. As we are taking the process seriously would you and your soldiers accept to fillful a

complete a matrix provided by FOMICRES in relations to all your soldiers in following



manner: Complete name of the beneficiary, date of birth, number of the military

identification document (ID) if exist, date of incorporation in the RENAMO, was

demobilized in 1994 or not, military rank, number of dependents in the family, number of

gun (s) you are using and to be delivery to FOMICRES once the process has been

agreed, and so on?

About two weeks after, in the third meeting these questionaire were answered fully and

satisfactorily, however, and given the required ethic, especially the sensitivity of these matter,

FOMICRES can not expose all the data in this report, but everything is fully corresponded by

our counterparty. Until now seven (8) meetings has bee held with RENAMO’s residual armed

forces in the forests of Sofala Districts ensuring the maintenance of trust in the process of

peacebuilding and the ninth meeting is already planned. While the talks between FOMICRES

and RENAMO soldiers has been gaining shape and trust, specifically with commanders

operating in Sofala Province toward their disarmament and social reinsertion, FOMICRES is

looking for sensitive partners/Donors to work with in order to make this effort reality, securing

fund for this peace initiative, because we see this as important window, through which

RENAMO soldiers are showing their interest and collaboration to peacebuilding by accepting

handing over to FOMICRES all their weapons for destruction, although being a group initiative.

There is no doubt that they might be recognising the illegality of these weapons in their hands.

In respect to this contacts, FOMICRES has now prepared a Project that will be submitted to

some donors for funding, it’s a project aiming at reinsertion of RENAMO’s armed residual force

and having them participating in disarmament. If necessary working logistic means are met

more than three thousand firearms will be collected and destroyed, outside ammunitions in

sofala Province only. This fugure does not include those registered weapons now in

possessions of each soldier in contact with FOMICRES, according our sources. In two months

joint work with commanders, FOMICRES were able to register all soldiers envolved in armed

attacks, at least in Chibabava, Buzi, Gorongosa and Nhamatanda Districts of Sofala Province,

concretely their complete names, date of their births, copies of military ID, date of incorporation

in the RENAMO, if was demobilized in 1994 by UN or not, military rank and number of

dependents in the family.

We think that the issue of reintegration of combatants in Mozambique should be viewed very

seriously because it is part of the strengthening of peace, reconciliation and even the

socioeconomic development including democracy. The project we mentioned aims to answer

the problem of attacks, so it comes with a timely solution to the problem, however, in the near

future we hope to promote deep reflections concerning reintegration of combatants, creating

synergies with other local and regional institutions in order to understand the problem toward

find sustainable solutions to it. Despite government’s efforts during the last 10 years addressing

the problem we feel that there is a need to promote more reflections. Mozambique is reminded

that along the last five years Maputo had many strikes of ex-combatants led by well known

Herminio Dos Santos claiming for their social reintegration which seam to be the same concern

of RENAMO’s residual armed group who envolved in armed attacks now although behind

Political motivations.



_____Dhlakama’s dilemma

From our field work (1995-2005) with RENAMO residual armed forces including ex-combatants

and now that the work of disarmament restart, we conclude that a good portion of these fighters

want peace and contribute to its construction. The collection of about 1 million artifacts of war by

FOMICRES with other partners, including million and millions of ammunition was possible with

a large participation of these residual forces at some extend, moved by their deep knowledge of

objectives of the work, which were and continue to be contributing to peacebuilding and

reconciliation. Having said this, we are sure that many will ask of course, why some of these

fighters are involved in the current attacks that are terrorize and kill other Mozambicans?

Being this what we can call as Dilemma of Dhlakama, of fighters and of RENAMO itself, that in

our analysis is explained by the following situations: (1) anti-democratic genesis of RENAMO,

(2) Residual armed groups left in the bush by Dhlakama’s instructions in 1992/3 and (3)

logistical conflicts between residual armed group and RENAMO’s political class of cities

(Members of Parliament, Provincial Secretariats...).

_________________________________________The anti-democratic genesis of RENAMO

As the name suggest, "Mozambican National Resistance, created in 1976, simply means

resisting the independence. Simply, we would ask: after 500 years of colonial domination, who

from mozambicans would be interested in resisting the independence of his country? Who from

Mozambicans knew at that time malice of communism that RENAMO claimed to be fighting?

Therefore, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), represented the interests of the

colonial system and its friendly neighbors (South Rhodesia and Apartheid Regime) of course

using less clarified Mozambicans. As is known, the aim or purpose of a political organisation is

often the fundamental starting point from which that entity’s structure and strategy are

determined being why during the war RENAMO killed, killed and brutally killed without clear

explanations to people.

What’s democracy?: Is a form of government in which all eligible citizens participate equally-

either directly or indirectly through elected representatives-in the proposal, development, and

creation of laws, according the free encyclopedia. It encompasses social, religious, cultural,

ethnic and racial equality, justice, and liberty. In 1960, about 230,000 people made up the white

population in Southern Rhodesia which completely dominated in all aspects over the 2,830,000

black Zimbabwean population native to earth. This aspect in itself demonstrates the anti-

democracy regime that created RENAMO, so this organization could never be a democratic



creation. Alex Vines cites a 1979 radio interview on Voz da África Livre by Renamo’s first

President Andrè Matsangaissa saying, “We are not interested in policy making … later we will

have to work out politics but first communism must go from our country”, as reflecting Renamo’s

initial lack of a clear political vision. Some literatures refers that for Dhlakama to talk on peace

and democracy, as well as stop killing their countrymen, government and the United Nations

had to agree during the Peace negotiation to pay him large sums of money, estimated at 17

million dollars, paid at once for the period of 1992-2004. This finding means that Mozambicans

bought peace, because it means that the peace we have been enjoying was not from the

contribution and the human desire of RENAMO’s President. Other anti-democratic confirmative

aspect is that in the history, there is no record of meetings to discuss vision of state, democracy

and human rights in RENAMO. There are no records of democratic elections to find leaders

while RENAMO were guerrila movement, this is of great importance to understand RENAMO's

anti-democratic life during the 20 years of peace and democracy in which mozambicans have

been expecting them to adapt democracy.

Residual armed groups left in the bush by Dhlakama’s instructions: Expecting difficulties in the

management of democracy, but with great appetite for power, RENAMO let men and weapons

of war hidden in the forest to serve as a resource of pressure

if their hopes of coming to power were not democratically

achieved, violating in this way, from the beginning the General

Peace Agreement signed in Rome. Dhlakama promised to

give assistance to these armed men for the duration of their

mission (waiting for new instructions and ensuring the safety

of war material hidden) what he did till 1999 and some few

month during the first quarter of 2000 according our sources.

Despite the lack of preparation for democracy and defeat of the first elections (1994),

Dhlakama’s connection with some international circles encouraged him to keep in democracy

lines, expectantly to win the elections that followed in 1999, these encouragements were

accompanied by a favorable economic environment for Dhlakama, in that he had enough

money coming from the same international circles, associated with the so called "trust fund"

from the UN, generally to support political parties that actively were involved in democratic

process soon after the peace agreement of Mozambique. Out of these, Renamo had other

sources of money, namely the parliamentary seats (112) 1.4 million of U$D annually (1994-

1999) which increased in the period of 2000-2004 because of seats achieved (117) paid by

Mozambican state as the law stipulates, but also from its internal revenue, as we are

remembered of the inter-provincial public transport, called "Transport Panga-Panga", Radio

Terra Verde, besides MINERAL companies whose owner was the RENAMO’s President. During

these conditions RENAMO was paying their residual forces, maintaining contact and loyalty to

the leader, and as confirming this, FOMICRES received in 2001 a list of 570 men that

comprised RENAMO’s residual military group of South and Central Zone of Mozambique who

were paid monthly for having remained in the bush, guarding war material which were ready for

new instructions from the leader. Unfortunately, either deliberately or by ignorance RENAMO

did not use this huge opportunity to reintegrate social and economic all its residual militaries



knowing that they were no longer in responsibility of the State because the general peace

agreement had already passed into the Constitution approved with RENAMO’s support in the

Parliament house, moreover, RENAMO did not use the same period and the opportunity of

having economic conditions to learn the basic principles of democracy, and thus keep their

electorate gain in 1999.

Here start Dhlakama’s dilemma verse (3) logistical conflicts between residual armed groups

and RENAMO’s political class of the cities, example of the members of the Parliament,

Provincial Secretariats and other beneficiaries of RENAMO’s services including those in

national electoral commission. According to our sources (Renamo’s Military residual force) in

late 1999 the payments to militaries left in bush began to demonstrate serious lack of

compliance and from 2000 till now they never benefited from that assistance without any

satisfaction from the leader, what according to them, has been extended in terms of contact to

people close to the leader, those who had such responsibility for maintaining liaison with the

remaining military groups in representation of Dhlakama who also failed to contact. From this

time until the time Dhlakama left his home in Maputo, capital of Mozambique to the city of

Nampula, militaries sent many demands recommending payment including threats of death if

the leader continued to ignored the commitment made in 1992/3, and along the demands,

military accused Dhlakama to live well in Maputo and enjoy the results of the 16 years of war

with members of the parliament (MPs) and other, the so-called intellectuals who have never

been suffering in wartime, forgetting soldiers in bush who defended Dhlakama life from

government troops who could have killed him. In order to guarantee his safety, Dhlakama kept

payments to his personal guard

in Maputo and some in

Gorongosa base, avoiding be

betrayed since this had

continued personnel contacts

with other military in several

points of Mozambique. This

occurs at a time when

Dhlakama had no more

conditions to pay all his military.

He does not have another 17

million U.S. dollars from friends

and the international

community, by an unhealthy

management has no more

companies that can generate

internal revenue, his political

popularity decreases drastically

in favor of other political parties,

the number of members of his caucus in parliament decreases dramatically (117-90-51), most

of the so-called intellectuals abandoned RENAMO to other political formations.



Recognizing the seriousness of the problem with military and threat to his own life but also

seeking justice between Political teams of cities (members of parliament …) and military without

assistance in the bush, Dhlakama tried unsuccessfully to ban the occupation of seats (51) won

by his party in the Parliament House in 2009 but maybe in respect of the law in terms of

responsibility of the 51 members of parliament elected by the people through RENAMO’s list,

associated to their wages within the parliament, MPs ignored instructions of their leader, a fact

that has created more discomfort for the life of Dhlakama along its democratic political class

which has added successively defeats at the polls. At this stage, Dhlakama made a difficult

mental exercise featured between staying in the city, with his political party represented by

those who live in the cities too (MPs, Provincial Secretariats …) who try to understand and

exercise democratic principles and seek to come to power in that line or return to comfort the

soldiers who sought him dead or alive but with huge arm cashes he can use as done in past, so

Dhlakama decided to leave for Nampula first, than to Gorongosa simulating to be closer to its

military or at least avoid being deemed to be eating with the so-called intellectual class at the

expense of the military. In making that decision, Dhlakama joined the military side and

continued to give talks of war, joined, prepared and organized military that left in the bush

including contacts with old friends seeking support for a new decision.

_____________________________________________Dhlakama’s Residual Force Dilemma

According to our sources, making decision to join Dhlakama again for new incursions of war in

2012 was quite difficult because they remember very well the meaning of war. The recent

history says that Mozambique underwent a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

(DDR) program in 1993/4, administered by ONUMOZ. The program was widely hailed as a

success. Good portion of weapons were turned in, and combatants were demobilized, given

small amount of money, education kits, and support in transitioning from their lives as soldiers.

In our modest analysis this was reinsertion Process but not Reintegration of former combatants

in its full concept. Mozambique’s process aimed to bridge combatants with their families and

communities but never for a durable process of socioeconomic stabilities at individual and family

levels of the combatant. The 20 years of peace has not depended primarily on disarmament and

reintegration of combatant’s, but the great will of the people to bury the war and live in peace,

no one else wanted the war, being the foundation that led demobilized soldiers to keep up

pacific and patients but never the so-called reintegration program because definitely did not

exist in a programmatic way. Yet today, reintegration success "is still an open question. In 2009,

the Mozambican government established a new program to carry out reintegration efforts in

order to address the unmet needs of 100,000 former combatants, which impose serious ground

challenges related to paper work and infimum government support capacity. Dhlakama residual

armed soldiers feel that during the 16 years of war did not go to school because were fighting

and today have no academic degree, fought for a better life and for the last 20 years have been

overlooked in favor of those who studied, have no decent habitation, have no wages, do not

have personal transportation as others have in the cities and are living in inhumane conditions

which is why decided to take the weapons from the caches stored over the last 20 years to

shoot again.



_________Analysis on

what should be civil society role in this conflict The history of Mozambique’s last armed conflict is full of civil society efforts that definitely contributed to peacebuilding. From that point, we know that civil society-led dialogue processes and mediation efforts have a number of impacts: they have built trust and understanding between the grassroots membership of divided communities; they have assisted in identifying and resolving local-level conflicts, which benefited the communities affected as well as built confidence between the conflicting parties; experience that Mozambique had opportunity to share with many countries, therefore we know that in some cases, modest activities by civic actors have even leaded to great door of peacebuilding and coexistence. If we look to the traditional diplomacy, this has largely relied on governmental and inter-governmental actors to facilitate talks or mediate between the conflicts protagonists. Certainly, the leverage exercised by an acceptable governmental or UN representative can have a significant impact on the prospects for agreement. However, in situations of protracted internal conflict, violence often penetrates through the social fabric, involving a larger array of armed actors, some ideological - often with differing levels of autonomy and accountability, as well as a complex tapestry of inter-connected and self-sustaining conflict dynamics at the community level. The state-based international system is comparatively ill-equipped to deal with the people involved in localized armed violence. In such situations, civil society actors – whether indigenous or external – are arguably best placed to complement state-driven diplomatic efforts at the leadership level, given their comparatively low-profile, access within communities and greater flexibility than state or multi-lateral actors. As is well known, the roles of civil society actors in peace processes are determined by a number of factors, including both external factors such as the attitudes of the warring parties and the degree of “political space” afforded to civic groups, and internal factors such as the resources and skills available for groups to draw on. The particular combination of opportunity and constraint in each context will lead civil society to assume a variety of possible roles. This is an example of a short but strong advocacy work done with residual armed forces of RENAMO, through setting up advocacy agenda of confidence and trust building by showing alternatives to war, trying to attend their presented concerns. At other hand, the interaction in place between FOMICRES and RENAMO military groups, revealed lack of dialogue within that political party in order to solve internal problems, particularly of combatants remained in the bush since 1992, fulfilling Dhlakama’s orders however, without assistance in the last 15 years.



Civil society meeting Differently from last conflict, the actual position of civil society to the current conflict, characterized by armed attacks of a political party, formalized in the country and with seats in parliament, in general, was not yet clear. Mozambique is maybe going through a growing civil society, in regards the emergence of associations, which is good thing, however, disassociated from their own missions and visions whose base would be the maintenance of peace to ensure the continued socioeconomic growth of the country. Currently, FOMICRES is the president of the League of civil society organizations in Mozambique – JOINT, and found that some Civil Society Organizations are publicly defenders of some position that well analysed encourages the conflict, instead of its transformation or come up with declaration that defend state’s needs, what would mean, positions based on the constitution and other laws, based on what is important to peace maintenance, social and economic harmony as well as continued growth of Mozambique. Practices by some political parties in Mozambique demonstrate a total lack of knowledge of matters of state and its difference with party’s internal affairs, saying the same to some civil society organizations which unfortunately exchange their missions with the political parties to the point of not noticing that evil of evils in democratic society is the armed conflicts that any member of Civil Society should condemn. At this stage and analytically, educational initiatives would also make a crucial contribution to the broader socio-political dimension of a peace process in Mozambique which is one of critical civil society role, by challenging public perceptions about the current conflict, risk factors and ways forward. This would play fundamental role and particularly true in contexts where opposing groups promote divergent and mutually–exclusive analyses of the social and political context, and where demands on the dialogue table are changed every passing day with no respect to initial agenda, consequently no respect to people suffering, where power sharing is being required to a government that resulted from elections that have been seen as free and fair by all national and international observers, where a political party with seats in the Parliament possesses armed groups in the bush, as is the reality of RENAMO who currently attacks and kills innocent people in jurisdictional territory that respects and conducts elections every five years. Here are enough spaces for civil society organizations to act on behalf of the state if are not tied to Political parties with obscure schedule. It seems that Mozambique is dealing with



political party that even satisfied its demands on the table of dialog, as is the case of proportionality in the electoral law, RENAMO continues to attack and kill people with some accomplice silence of civil society in general. Against the backdrop of armed violence, the careful presentation of balanced and inclusive accounts of the causes and dynamics of the conflict can facilitate changed understanding of the “other side”, encouraging fearful, divided communities to re-assess the prospects of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, in societies where violence has become the dominant mode of conflict resolution, which can be seen as the case of Mozambique to some extend - struggle of liberation (1964-1974), Civil war (1977-1992), current RENAMO attacks (2013…), civil society groups can play an important role in educating their membership and wider public constituencies about the possibilities of non-violent approaches to conflictual issues, legitimizing dialogue as a viable and effective tool can encourage vital public support for political negotiations and mutual respect between the protagonists.

____________________________________________________

SITUATIONAL DESCRIPTION

____________________________________________________

_______Civil War

and the Mozambique National Resistence (RENAMO)

Refrexing our memories, we all know that the Mozambican Civil War managed by RENAMO

(Mozambique National Resistance) began in 1977, two years after the end of the war of

independence. RENAMO was founded in 1975 following Mozambique's independence as an

anti-Communist political organisation, sponsored by the Central Intelligence Organisation of

Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). André Matade Matsangaissa, an ex-FRELIMO army commander was

the first leader. The Ian Smith administration in Rhodesia sought to prevent the FRELIMO

government from providing a safe haven for Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF)

militants seeking to overthrow the Rhodesian government. RENAMO waged a guerrilla war

throughout rural Mozambique against the FRELIMO Government targeting social and economic

infrastructures, rural villages and the transport system and corridors to neighboring countries

(Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and South Africa). Matsangaissa was killed by government soldiers

on 17 October 1979 in District of Gorongosa, Sofala Province. Following a violent succession



struggle, Afonso Dhlakama became the new RENAMO leader, and with independence of

Zimbabwe (1980) RENAMO loose its support from Rhodesia, and immediately replaced by

South Africa of Apartheid. With this, the Government, and the army (Mozambique’s Liberation

Armed Forces – FPLM), were violently opposed by RENAMO Guerrilla as is happening since

mid 2013.

________Humanitarian consequences of Mozambique’s civil war

The 16 years civil of Mozambique, resulted in almost 1 million human lives, 45% of who were

children under the age of 15 (UNDP, 1990) and many were made amputees by landmines, a

legacy from the war that continues to plague Mozambique today. One and a half million

Mozambicans had to seek refuge in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa.

Still another 3 million became "internally displaced' as rural communities were forced to migrate

to urban centres seeking government protection. 600,000 children found themselves deprived of

access to school due to the destruction of 2,655 primary schools, 22 secondary and 36 boarding

schools in rural areas, including communication and transport systems (Ratilal, 1989). By the

end of the conflict, 2 million anti-personnel mines were still scattered around the country. By

1988, UNICEF estimated that almost 250,000 Mozambican children suffered from psychic and

physical traumas. These children had witnessed the death of their parents and family, had been

forcibly displaced from their homes in search of secure shelter, and had been subjected to

various forms of abuse, including kidnappings and sexual violence. Countless families were

decimated or separated.

Children were also used as soldiers by all sides involved in the conflict. According to UNICEF,

around 10,000 children were still being used in combat by RENAMO's guerilla forces in 1988.

An unknown number of children were forcibly integrated into the "milicias populares", local

paramilitary forces directed by FRELIMO. Many children were also used as soldiers in the

government army. The data gathered during demobilization efforts at the end of the conflict

revealed that 27% (around 25,498) of the demobilized soldiers had been under the age of 18 at

the time of their recruitment. Of these, 16, 553 belonged to the government forces of FRELIMO

and 8, 945 to RENAMO (ONUMOZ, 1994).

_____________________________________The peace process

After recognized field preparation by Mozambican civil society, the government and RENAMO

initiated cease-fire negotiations in mid-1990, which after 27 month culminated with a General

Peace Agreement (GPA) signed in Rome on 4 October 1992. The GPA provided the framework

for the transition to peace and multiparty democracy through: the Assembly and demobilizations

of troops, the formation of a new Defence Force (FADM – Mozambique’s Defence Armed

Forces); reintegration of demobilized military personnel into civilian life even not in a durable

programme; resettlement of returning refugees and displaced persons; and the implementation

of the peace accords, the United Nations Security Council formally established on the 16

December 1992 – S/Res/797(1992) – the United Nations Operations in Mozambique



(ONUMOZ), whose mandate encompassed peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and

electoral supervision. Despite considerable naturals difficult of such a process and delays, all

the massive and complex operations foreseen under the GPA were completed. The peace

accord led to the disarmament of RENAMO, to the integration of some of its fighters into the

Mozambican new army and to its transformation into a regular political party, being now, the

main opposition party in Mozambique. Mozambicans (Government and RENAMO) including

international stakeholder felt they were satisfied by the process.

_________________________Implementing peace agreement 1994-2012

After signing of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, already in town, RENAMO

justified the brutal and destructive war done with the need to bring multiparty democracy,

however, the multiparty elections of 1994 happen four years from adoption of the multiparty

constitution by one-party in 1990, replacing the independence constitution, meaning that the

FRELIMO government realized, before the peace agreement that one of the solutions to ending

the war would be the passage of mono to multiparty regime followed by correspondent

elections.

Armando Emilio Guebuza-President of the Republic in his open Presidency

The 1990 constitution separetes executive, legislative and judiciary powers, it enshrined the

principles of political pluralism and election by secret ballot of a government based on majority

rule. The president is head of state and government and is directly elected every five years for a

maximum of two terms. The president appoints the prime minister and council of ministers. The

national legislature is the 250-member of which are also elected by direct, universal adult

suffrage every five years. The 1990 constitution abolished the death penalty, affirmed the right

to strike and protected freedom of movement. It also avows the right to live in a ‘balanced

environment’ and establishes the framework for a liberal market economy and the private

ownership of land. Under the constitution that was adopted in November 2004 with RENAMO’s



input and came into force in January 2005, the Constitutional Council was established to ensure

strict observance of the constitution, including the electoral acts; also established was the

Council of State – comprising the prime minister, and representatives of the opposition and civil

society – to advise the president on specific matters. The new constitution emphasises that its

interpretation should always be consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

______________________________________________________Elections and results

Afonso Marcacho Dhlakama (RENAMO’s Leader) has competed as the RENAMO candidate in

all four multiparty presidential elections held in Mozambique. In 1994, he was defeated by

incumbent President and FRELIMO candidate Joaquim Chissano by a margin of 53.3% to

33.7%. He received 47.7% of the vote in the 1999 presidential election with Chissano capturing

52.3%. In the December 2004 presidential election, he was defeated by FRELIMO candidate

Armando Guebuza, who received 63.7% of the vote to his 31.7%.

Dhlakama voting in 2009 elections

In 2009, FRELIMO was able to increase its majority from the 62,03% achieved in the 2004

Parliamentary election to 74,66% in the latest poll, which effectively gives the ruling party a two-

thirds majority and the power to change the constitution. RENAMO's support was badly affected

by its infighting, which led to factionalism and the subsequent emergence of the Mozambique

Democratic Movement (MDM), leaded by former RENAMO’s senior member (David Simango).

The opposition's parliamentary support dropped from 29,73%, in 2004, to 17,68%, which

translates into a loss of 39 seats in the National Assembly. Despite the MDM gaining 3,93% of

the vote, and eight Parliamentary seats, the main beneficiary was FRELIMO, which managed to

substantially increase its Parliamentary dominance. In terms of the presidential vote,

FRELIMO's Guebuza candidate, achieved 75% of the vote, with his long-term opponent Afonso



Dhlakama achieving 16,41%. The third candidate, Daviz Simango of the MDM, achieved 8,59%

of the vote. The total voter turn out increased from 36%, in 2004, to 44,52%.

_______War Threats

and the problem behind renamo’s attacks!

Dhlakama’s war threats have been constantly throughout the 20 years of peace and multparty

life of Mozambique’s democracy, particularly always short before elections and soon after

elections results announcements. Visible, because of insight fighting’s and bad electoral results,

Dhlakama repeatedly threatened the peace by reestablish RENAMO's armed forces and to let

the country "burn". In 2011 he stated that RENAMO was preparing a "revolution" to rid the

government from power and establishing new barracks for this purpose. In October 2012

Dhlakama relocated to RENAMO's former headquarters near Casa Banana in Gorongosa

District (Province of Sofala) and set up a training camp for several hundred partially armed

followers. He threatened to destroy the country if his political demands were not met.

What are RENAMO Political demands?

RENAMO asked for audience with Government and at first meeting following demanding points

were presented:

1. Electoral legislation, (RENAMO has consistently called for the formation of a National

Elections Commission - CNE, with equality of circumstance in representative members

of the Parties with seats in the Parliament House);

2. Alleged discrimination against Renamo in the armed forces since the formations of joint

army – Goverment – RENAMO in 1994,

3. The supposed domination of the state by the ruling FRELIMO Party, and

4. Equality in economic opportunities.

Since the start of the dialogue in December 2012, the new electoral laws have been passed in

the country’s parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, with the ruling Frelimo Party and the

second opposition force, the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) voting in favour, and

Renamo voting against. So by demanding that the electoral laws be rewritten Renamo were in

reality demanding a postponement of the scheduled elections in Mozambique, analysing.



Dhlakama in Santujira

__________________________________________At later stage, RENAMO demanded:

1. Immediate and unconditional release of 15 Renamo members arrested in early April, in

the small town of Muxungue, in the central province of Sofala. At the time, the police

claimed that Renamo was gathering large numbers of demobilized fighters in Muxungue

and transforming it into a military base. The police used tear gas to clear the area and

made 15 arrests. A day later Renamo attacked the Muxungue police post in an attempt

to release the 15, and killed four members of the riot police. The 15 are currently being

held in Beira, accused of crimes against state security. The government letter said the

matter is in the hands of the judiciary, not the executive. In respect for the

constitutionally enshrined separation of powers, and the independence of the courts and

prosecution services, the government cannot intervene and simply order their release.

The government “recommends that Renamo act within the law and deal with this matter

with the bodies of the administration of justice”. The government assured Renamo that it

would follow the case and, and wait for the cases to be decided by the relevant legal

bodies.

2. Renamo’s second demand was for the removal of the riot police from its office in the

northern city of Nampula, occupied by the police in clashes in March 2012, and from the

vicinity of Satunjira, in the central district of Gorongosa, where Renamo leader Afonso

Dhlakama were living. But the government had no intention of allowing Renamo to

decide where police units can be stationed. The mission of the police, the letter said, “is

to guarantee public order, security and tranquility in the entire national territory, through

the defence of the rights and freedoms of citizens and the protection of public and



private property”. Faced with “specific operational situations” the police will dispatch

fixed or mobile units “to establish strategic positions in any part of the country to deal

with such situations”. The government, the letter added, “will continue to follow the

performance of the police, and strengthen its institutional and operational capacity, so

that it can carry out its work with zeal, effectiveness and professionalism”.

Government troops in Gorongosa Districts protecting population from RENAMO’s attacks

Renamo soldiers in exercise camp

Renamo’s third demand was to internationalize the talks – it wanted domestic facilitators and

foreign observers, from bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC),

the African Union and the European Union, to attend the next rounds of talks. The Government

saw no reason whatsoever for third parties to play any role in its dialogue with Renamo. “The

government is aware of its mandate, attributes and powers under the Constitution”, the letter

http://www.dw.de/renamo-não-conseguirá-dividir-moçambique/a-17683227



said, “and so it sees no need for third parties, national or foreign, to interfere in the dialogue”.

“The self-esteem and capacities of Mozambicans confer legitimacy on the government and

Renamo to continue the dialogue in the current form without the presence of national facilitators

and international observers”, it said. Since these questions should not be pre-conditions for

continuing the dialogue, the letter concluded with an offer for further talks next Monday “in strict

respect for the Constitution and the laws in force”. The dialogue should be conducive “to the

consolidation of national unity, peace and democracy, and encourage the sustainable economic

and social development of Mozambique”.

_______________________________Renamo armed Attacks!

In April 2013, Renamo militants attacked the riot police's headquarters in the central

Mozambican town of Muxungue, District of Chibabava, Province of Sofala where Dhlakama was

born. Four policemen and a civilian were confirmed dead, while ten other were hospitalized,

where the commander (leader) of the attackers was also killed by the Police. A Renamo

spokesman pronounced that "Our demobilized soldiers will retaliate against any attack and not

only in the location where it occurs, but across the entire country, including Maputo City,

country’s Capital. Dhlakama confirmed that he had personally ordered the attack on the police

station. From this time throughout the year (2013) including first quarter of 2014, RENAMO is

attacking and killing many civilians violating systematically the constitution of Mozambique and

Humanitarian laws that Mozambique domesticated. More than 79 people have died, 380

seriously injured, 6347 families are internally displaced, seeking Government Protection in the

capital city of Gorongosa District (Sofala Province) and other cities. 1000 other have been in

Homoine District (Inhambane Province), 27 schools have been closed and 16 thousand

students have abandoned their schools. Fears of hit-and-run attacks by armed RENAMO

partisans have increased in all the Province of Sofala, as well as in the country itself barring

people from their development projects.

RENAMO’s attackers captured by Defense force – 2013

http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-26-mozambique-prominant-renamo-member-killed-in-raid



United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has voiced concern at the recent escalation of

violence in Mozambique between government forces and residual members of armed forces of

the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). “The Secretary-General calls on all parties to

refrain from any act that can threaten the peace and stability that has prevailed during the past

21 years, since the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords,”. “He urges them to fully engage in an

inclusive dialogue to resolve differences within the established democratic order and to ensure

that the country continues to achieve social inclusion and sustainable development for all.”

_______________________________________________________

Challenges, achievements and the hope

_______________________________________________________

States like Mozambique emerging from armed conflict face the difficult challenge of transitioning

from "war-weakened economies and highly polarized political and social relations to rejuvenated

economies capable of providing the basic needs of all citizens and political groups that offer all

social groups meaningful participation as well" in decision-making. An essential component of

peacebuilding is the rebuilding of strong economic institutions, government institutions, and

communities as we are doing with proper Mozambican steps. Because the transition from war to

peace poses great challenges for economic policy, reforms needed to develop the economy,

promote equity, and consolidate peace. Furthermore, poor economic conditions as Mozambique

were soon after Peace agreement are often part of what gave rise to armed conflict in the first

place, understanding this, the new government implemented pillar policy reforms at all levels in

order to cover development needs of the country but also inspire hope to citizens on the future.

Here, let’s begin by recalling the Peace Agreement, today transformed in constitutions of the

Republic. FOMICRES understands that the event of signing the General Peace Agreement, by

itself on the 4th October 1992, couldin’t solve the problems that have been fuelling the fight

between Rebel Moviment (RENAMO) and the Government of Mozambique from 1977-1992.

The peace agreement was an event that had immediately two important objectives to achieve

while all other would be achieved in the medium and long terms as the country is progressing

socioeconomically and democratically as well.

Immediately purpose that was met, was the change/transformation of the means of struggle, ie,

instead of armed struggle, the struggle should pass to one of ideas, instead of using weapons to

solve the problems identified, the parties agreed to settle the same problems in a democratic

way, in a parliarment House, including many other dialogue and political forums/spaces

throughout the country (Municipal and Provincial Forums or Assemblies), presenting projects of

governance by each competitor and allow Mozambicans choose the best in a free and

transparent base. For this, Mocambique prepared, policies and establishing democratic

institutions within which these processes must take place in ways that are credible and legally

respected. These young institutions, although some normal problems of growth, are in good



working order and are gradually gaining sympathy among the majority of Mozambicans

according the 2009 elections results and people’s participations, being the 1994 elections the

entry point of this process, which is still edequatelly respected in terms of cycle every five years.

In our analysis, the second immediate and important aspect of the mozambican peace

agreement was the ceasefire, fully respected soon after signing the Peace Agreement and

along the 20 years (1992-2012). But as mentioned, all other divergent issues, for example the

chapter of country development in all its aspects, is of medium and long term solutions. As

Mozambicans and the international community can say, soon after the 1994 elections there was

extreme need to establish, or re-establish, basic underpinnings of the economy. Indeed, one of

the fundamental requirements for economic growth is a state capable of furnishing public goods

and providing a legal framework for investment. This required the country re-establishment as

well as establishment of new government institutions, including a well-defined system of

distributing property, a legal system to enforce property rights, and state infrastructure that can

perform necessary economic tasks not fulfilled by markets. Again, as we have witnessed, this

clear identification of needs also required from the elected government the opening of roads that

much money need to be reconstructed and constructed, as we all might know, is one of the

ongoing challenges. Anyway, with engagement of all Mozambicans on base of clear orientation

of the Government, Mozambique is one of the most prosperous countries in the world,

particularly in Africa.

According to very credible sources

(IMF and "Economist"), the world's

countries with higher GDP growth

from 2010 to 2011 were in

descending order as follows:

Angola (11.1%), China (10.5%),

Myanmar, formerly Burma

(10.3%), Nigeria (8.9%), Ethiopia

(8.4%), Kazakhstan (8.2%) and in

the seventh, Mozambique (7.9%),

followed by Chad (7.9%),

Cambodia (7.7%) and Rwanda (7.6%). For the period 2011-2015, the same sources, in

descending order countries with higher rates of GDP growth: China (9.5%), India (8.2%),

Ethiopia (8.1%), fourth Mozambique (7.7%), Tanzania (7.2%), Vietnam (7.2%), Congo (7%),

Ghana (7%), Zambia (6.9%) and Nigeria (6.8%). Despite knowing that this growth is still not in

every Mozambican family, however, we are on track of sustainable development, therefore

should be proud for all Mozambicans, including political parties.

Apart from this, let’s remember that 10 years ago the question of mineral resources (gas, oil ...)

did not exist in the Mozambican agenda. Today, Mozambique became a major holder of mineral

resources of great value, these findings should enhance our self-esteem, democracy and rule of

law, but never evil and war that can destroy large gains made after the General Peace

Agreement.



________FOMICRES’

position and recommendations

To this specific chapter, we have the following positions, recommendations and concluding

remarks:

1. The RENAMO attacks against people and their property, against Defence and Security

Forces, are attacks against the General Peace Agreement transformed into constitutions

of the Republic and other laws adopted during the last 20 years,

... are attacks against the Mozambican young democracy,

... are attacks against the development of Mozambicans and therefore,

... are attacks against the sovereignty of the state itself, therefore,

2. FOMICRES condemns RENAMO’s attacks and calls for immediate cessation of

hostilities against the civillians, Security and Defense Forces and the

development of Mozambique;

3. After a struggle of 16 years which killed more than 1 million people, completely

destroyed social and economic infrastructure and reached a peace agreement after 27

month of negotiations, Mozambique and mozambicans should by no means allow a

Political Party with seats in the parliarment House, who receive salaries from the taxes

of the people, to possesse firearms that are used to kill the same people as pressuere to

government in order to meet political demands while the country is enjoing elections

every five years.

4. Sovereignty is the power of a state to do everything necessary to govern itself, such as

making, executing, and applying laws; imposing and collecting taxes; making war and

peace; and forming treaties or engaging in commerce with foreign nations, therefore the

dialogue underway in Maputo, looking for ways of cessation of hostilities is part of the

exercise of sovereignty that must be thus seen by RENAMO and all Mozambicans,

however, within constitutional beacons that represents the ultimate expression of

Mozambicans and in case of need changed only by the parliament .

5. The concept of sovereignty means also the capacity os state to:

To protect against external aggression;

To Keep law and order;



To oppose against internal threats in accordance with the constitution of the

Republic;

To protect the borders, territorial waters and the air space;

To promote measures towards security and confidence;

To pay attention to sub-regional/ regional issues such as provision of water

resources, citizenship, transnational crime and terrorism, which represent a potential

to instability and insecurity.

6. Generally, sovereignty of the state is the ability of the state to defend its territory and its

people, if necessary by all means in order to see constitutional principles and other laws

respected by those who do not want peace in the country.

7. If RENAMO thinks has reason on its demands in ongoing dialogue, other parties may

have reason on their positions as well, however the strength of all Political Parties must

reside in the Parliament House where RENAMO possesses 51 seats and at other hand

in its permanent contact with communities outside the Parliarment allowing them to know

RENAMO’s thesis and through that gain the elections if the time comes, being this way

that democracy works everywhere and should work also in Mozambique;

8. Having lost more than 4 elections, despite some recognised slight institutional problems,

the elections was seen by international observers as free and fair, and reading

RENAMO insidefighting e.g, lack of strategic vision of governance, lack of internal

debates that normally would culminate with party congress, demonstrating reflections

and decisions for the future, RENAMO ... shows its fragility to follow and implement

democratic agenda they says always have struggled to win,

9. .... having residual armed force and arm caches still in the bush, RENAMO is

abandoning democratic ways of reaching power returning back to attacks to peaple as

done during last 16 years of war which is unacceptable;

10. The desarmament, dimobilisation and social reintegration of former combatants,

particularly the so called RENAMO’s Presidential guards is an urgent matter and of

crucial importance for the Peacebuilding process, democracy, people’s liberty

throughout the country and maintanance of Mozambique’s economic grow.

11. FOMICRES consider RENAMO’s power sharing demands aims at destabilize initiatted

multiparty state, economic growth that Mozambique is achieving including well

functioning of democratic institutions.

12. Accept demands of a political party (RENAMO) and handing over command of the

Defence and Security Forces, as demanded, would open dangerous precedents of

ungovernable and undemocratic natures, since it would just RENAMO in control of the



army with the Mozambican state, because, so far none of the 50 parties have applied

the same control, completely known its unconstitutionality here in Mozambique and

worldwide;

13. The collaboration and openness of RENAMO’s residual armed groups, as is the case of

those who are in contact with FOMICRES, must be seen and considered an important

window for the desired disarmament of RENAMO, giving secure steps toward social

reintegration and peacebuilding, therefore, Mozambique and the international community

should support the initiative as done in the past;

14. Once transformed into a Political party, RENAMO should know that does not longer

possesses military force. All RENAMO soldiers who joined the formation of

Mozambique’s single army in 1994, no longer belong to RENAMO, but to the

Mocambican state and constitutionally obey only single Commander in Chief, the

President of the Republic. However, within the parliament RENAMO can and should

raise problems of the army, if any, toward finding solutions, but never consider it still

having soldiers in that army, since this would pushing the military to obey two commands

- one legitimate and the other ilegitimated.

15. The unique army that remained for RENAMO as political party are the members of the

parliarment whose weapons are words and governance projects but never armed groups

in the bush eather in army.

____________________________________________________________

CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY

____________________________________________________________



Problem Statement Escalating levels of violent crime, including armed violence are a serious threat to human development, democratic institutions, and governability throughout much of the world. Criminal justice solutions are the usual national response for a host of reasons. The causal complexities of crime are a disincentive to adoption of prevention policies because the impact can be difficult to measure and because real improvement may not be felt during short terms in political office. Cross agency coordination is also notoriously difficult even in the best of circumstances and often stymies effective public sector management of complex social problems. Confounding matters further are authoritarian legacies, the politicization of crime and violence issues, the overall fragility of institutional capacity and rule of law, and adverse structural conditions of poverty and inequality. For the majority of Mozambicans, access to formal justice is non-existent; police stations and courts are too far away to reach, and they lack the financial means to pay for legal representation and other associated costs. Data from a survey conducted by the Mozambique National Institute for Statistics asserts that only approximately 10% of all crime was actually reported to the police in 2010. Additionally, the community courts that are closest to the people do not form part of the judicial court system and as a consequence they are underfunded and their contribution very frequently disregarded. There is also a scarcity of information based on victim surveys. To date the approach to dealing with crime and violence in Mozambique has relied primarily on law enforcement and criminal justice interventions and the crime prevention and broader safety debate has yet to find traction within the national discourse. FOMICRES’s crime prevention initiative “Triangular Model” is premised on the view that the criminal justice system alone cannot alone curb violence. Addressing violence and promoting safety requires an integrated, long-term approach that addresses the root causes and drivers of crime, in addition to traditional law enforcement and criminal justice sanctions.



______________________________________________Comparing crimes in the 90’s

year Number of declarade crimes

Arrested and / or detained

% Of cases in prison or detained

Crimes against property

% Crimes against property

1990 29.760 10.556 35.4 14.697 49.3

1991 20.334 7.224 35.5 11.792 57.9

1992 24.954 8.909 35.7 16.373 65.6

1993 31.285 12.320 39.3 18.612 59.4

1994 30.579 10.601 34.6 19.202 62.7

1995 37.396 15.396 41.1 22.564 60.3

1996 42.967 16.710 38.8 27.641 64.3

1997 13.993 6.912 40.5 5.854 41.8

1998 19.906 16.047 80.6 11.512 57.8 Source: PIC. Estatísticas da Policia de investigação criminal (1990-1996) Procuradoria-Geral da República. Informação Anual a Assembleia da República. Abril 1998) Comando Geral da Policia da República. Balanço de Trabalho do Comando -Geral da Policia (Semestre 1998. Maputo Setembro 1998).

___________________________Government and community reaction to crime

In 2001 the government appealed communities to participate in crime prevention process,

creating community safety councils across Mozambique, in total around 500, unpaid volunteers

community groups of 100 to 150 each, to assist the police in tackling crime. Most are working

reasonably well due to high levels of good will and strong commitment to improve their

communities, despite a lack of training in community-based policing and crime prevention.

However, other volunteers have been stepping outside their role; e.g., asking people for IDs

during night patrols, asking to be armed or paid, and some have been attacking suspected

offenders and criminals. In the last 7 years the prisons in Mozambique have been completely

overcrowded by children and young peoples in conflict with law, statistically, 195,543

Mozambican citizens became prisoners according police statistics.

According to the 2012 Attorney General annual report, a total of 41,228 crimes were committed

in 2011 throughout the country. This is an increase of 4,241 of reported crimes from 2010

showing difference with police statistics, for instance, the police reported that the total number of

crimes in 2008 was 27,254 while the Attorney General published figure of 40,312 what

represents inconsistencies between the data captured and published. In 2011 the provinces

with the greatest number of reported crimes were Maputo (8,413), Maputo City (8,117) and

Nampula (5,389). The two provinces with the lowest number of reported cases were Zambezia

and Niassa with 1,478 and 1,516 reported cases respectively. These two provinces are largely

rural with Niassa being one of the most sparsely populated and remote province in the country.

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Totals by crime typology in seven (7) years

Crime against people 12896 10535 9723 8811 8029 7416 6195 63605

Crime against property 23163 19393 19185 18602 17555 15678 12350 125926 Crime against order and public tranquillity

1193 858 781 810 850 812 708 6012

Totals 37252 30786 29689 28223 26434 23906 19253 195543

Source: National Institute of Statistic



The most common offenses recorded in 2011 are illustrated in the table below:

Criminal Offense Number of offenses recorded

Qualified Theft 5937

Simple Larceny 4521

Theft 4416

Domestic Violence 2053

Qualified Physical Offenses 1837

Simple Voluntary Bodily Offenses 1726

All crimes in Mozambique are characterised either as “crimes against people”, “crimes against

property”, or “crimes against public order and tranquillity”. In the reporting period a total of

24,931 cases of crimes against property and 10,161 cases of crimes against people were

reported. Both categories have shown an increase since 2010. Since 2011, there is been a

growing number of kidnappings for ransom and extortion. These kidnappings have received

considerable media attention, probably because kidnappers have targeted wealthy and often

prominent Mozambicans and foreign citizens. Initially these kidnappings occurred in exclusively

in Maputo; however they have since occurred in other large Mozambican cities, including Beira

and Nampula. Over the years the abductions have become increasingly violent with victims

being mutilated and sometimes murdered. Out of the figures above, there is a public perception

that more than 10 violent crimes are committed every day in each of urban sites, particularly at

slum communities of all Provincial Capital Cities of Mozambique which due many reasons are

note reported to the Police (FOMICRES research 2010).

Confronted by that perception, FOMICRES monitored “Quarteirao 57” (the smallest;2

administrative city territorial division in Mozambique) attached to Ferroviario Community, and

leaded by Mr. Julio Nhawene, from 8th March to 8th April 2010 and found out that 9 violent

crimes have been committed during that period, being six (6) physical aggressions, three (3)

housebreaking, and one (1) shooting by firearm, this last presented to the police. If we note that

Ferroviario Community comprehends 160 quarteiroes, would be assumed that 1440 violent

crime have been committed in entire community in thirty (30) days, being 17,280 violent crimes

in one year in Ferroviario Community only. If we would look at 64 communities that compose

Maputo city, it would come to 1,105,920 violent crimes committed a year only in Maputo city, out

of other 10 Provincial Capital cities.

How do we see and define violent crime: A violent crime or crime of violence is a crime in which

the offender uses or threatens to use violent force upon the victim. It integrates four offenses:

murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.



________FOMICRES’

Crime Prevention Initiative - “The Triangular Model”

Situation Analysis as Initial Point for Project Planning

Background

The war, though it ended in 1994, left a legacy of violent crime:

Profound traumas created by the prolonged armed conflict that Mozambique experienced where many families lived 16 years in military bases witnessing a vast range of inhuman atrocities

More than 100,000 combatants were demobilized, many with over 10 years of combat, without adequate social and reintegration programs

Huge numbers of rural citizens migrated to urban areas during the armed conflict looking for protection, creating severe overcrowding

More than 25,000 child soldiers were identified during the DDR process, but received no assistance in demobilization or reintegration because they were under 18

There remain many caches of small arms and light weapons left over the from the war

Finally a lack of employment opportunities, and a gang culture, is leading to the growth

in organized crime.

FOMICRES’ research suggests that actual violent crime, much of which is never reported to the

police, is increasing by about 15% per year. In parallel, police numbers are failing to keep pace

with demand (1,200 police are trained each year, but roughly 1,000 are lost to AIDS alone,

according to Vice Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Joseph Mandla).

From October 2007 to August 2009 FOMICRES implemented a field evaluation project entitled

“Evaluating Community Policing Progress as integrating part of the Justice Administration

System at Community level in Mozambique”. The research involved interviews with over 12,000

members of the public, including intensive group workshops attended by the Vice Minister of

Home Affairs and members of the defence and security forces. Experts in a wide range of fields,

including border control, crime prevention, sociology and psychology were consulted, as well as

representatives from child soldiers’ organisations and other former combatants. This expert

consultation took place in three main population centres (Maputo, Beira, Nampula).

The primary research findings include:



66% of those interviewed identified violent crime as the greatest fear among Mozambican communities, particularly for commercial business and night students and workers;

98% of the communities interviewed throughout the country endorse the government appeal for communities to participate in security matters by creating dedicated volunteer community safety councils to police them and monitor local police performance.

66% of respondents believe that partnership between the community safety councils and

the police is the crucial strategy to reduce crime, build confidence, speed up reform of the security sector and combat corruption;

72% respondents underlined the important role that the community safety councils can

play in the process of reforming the security sector in Mozambique, as well as in preventing and combating crime;

78% of the respondents pointed out the need to adequately train the community safety

councils about their mission, remits of action, human rights and how to effectively interact with local law enforcement agents;

53% of the interviewees said that the remaining community members are not assuming

their responsibility or do not know exactly how to govern their security forces, including monitoring these activities;

67% respondents said that there is an on-going need to build the capacity of

local/community institutions and civic leaders who are involved in activities related to the administration of justice administration activities on a daily basis;

48% of those interviewed said there is a need for greater cooperation between

community members and community based organisations, and the central government;

76% of respondents consider the urban slum areas to be the most affected by unreported criminality;

34% of respondents indicated that they have lost confidence in the police because they

are perceived to be corrupt;

39% of respondents in some settlements recognised that the community safety councils are an important part of solving the problem because they can be trusted;

19% of respondents said that the community safety councils are abusing human rights

and becoming criminal elements in themselves;

52% of those interviewed believe that Mozambique’s social and economic context requires an appropriate strategy or model to enable communities to participate more effectively in preventing and fighting crime.



The conclusion of this research was that the most cost-effective way to mount a rapid and

nationwide challenge to criminality and poor policing was to revive and professionalise the

existing (over 500) community safety councils.

_________________________________Triangular Model – What is?

Vision oriented to the social processes of preventing crime, especially the Violent at Community level. It focuses on (1) interactive Partnership of three collective actors in community methods of preventing and combating crime, and (2) Training to all actors in multi-sectorial understanding of crime risk factors, (3) Diagnostic of Crime Risk factor at community level, and (4) identified locally sustainable prevention methods of encountered problems.

We call it Triangular Model (MT) because its efficient implementation requires the active, selfless and coordinated participation of three key players in Mozambique, specifically:

1. The Community, through established Community Safety Councils (CCS) that includes multi-sectorial formal, informal and traditional cultural and socioeconomic organizational structures);

2. Justice administration, highlighting the Police through the local police station, and

3.. Municipal Council - Local Government agencies

Police (PRM)

Community Safety

Councils (CSC)

Local Government

Agencies



Introducing the Triangular Model in 2012, a community training manual was vital in the conduct of the training, and it formed the basis of the sessions conducted by the trainers. The manual had been shared with a wide selection of stakeholders, to have their inputs, both at the initial elaboration stage, and just prior to the training at the official launch of the project (in September 2012). The stakeholders from Minister of Interior (MINT), the Police (PRM) and the District Community Safety Council coordinators who had reviewed the manual all felt that the manual contained appropriate subject matter and was suited to social environment and to the training to be conducted. Indeed the manual was so well received by the city command of Police that they asked FOMICRES to present it in a general meeting of the police of the city of Maputo (102 people including sector chiefs and police station commanders).

The trainers also felt that the time allotted for the training was not sufficient to cover all of the material. They suggested that the daily sessions could be 4 hours instead of 2, with lunch provided. It was their opinion that people were interested enough to stay that length of time. Indeed from observations of the sessions, volunteers were very engaged and discussions frequently continued beyond the scheduled time. Along the 2013 the training manual was revised, improved and the training length too, to 4 hours a day along four weeks.



_________________________Public launching of Triangular Model

On the 19th September 2012, Mr. Egino Atanasio Longamane, Permanent Secretary of the

Ministry of Territory Administration, on behalf of the Ministry of Interior publicly launched the

pilot project -“Triangular Model” – FOMICRES’ initiative in Community Participation in Crime

Prevention. The Permanent Secretary stated that the launch of the pilot project by the central

government represents a strong political will and agreement with FOMICRES to work together

(Central/Local Governments, the system of Justice Administration particularly the Police,

Municipal authorities and the Communities) in the context of the Triangular Model. Also present

at the event were the following government representatives: National Directorate of Crime

Investigation, National Prison Service, and Provincial Police Commander of Maputo City,

members of the Municipal Assembly, District Administrator, District Police Commander, police

officials, community administrators, traditional leaders and more than 300 community members.

Ms Silja Pieper participated on behalf of the Germany Embassy in Mozambique as well. In a

pilot project, formally introducing FOMICRES’s initiative in Crime Prevention Strategies

“Triangular Model”, 263 members of community Safety Councils, gender balanced, were trained

on 2012 in specific aspects related to crime prevention in selected Neighbourhoods of Hulena

“A” and “B” and Mavalane “B”, all belonging to the Municipal District of KaMavota, Maputo City.

The training includes the Police, representatives of Municipal agencies and Community

members themselves. Outside this, FOMICRES monitored in 2013 the other 202 activists of

Peace and Security trained in two Districts of Manica Province, Gondola and Sussundenga in

2011, in course launched with UNDP Mozambique.

______________________________________________________Addressing the gap

Based on the interviews conducted, it is apparent that the training undertaken by FOMICRES is

addressing a serious gap in terms of the implementation of the system of Community Safety

Councils. The spokesperson for PRM indicated that no training had ever been conducted with

these councils (numbering 500 volunteers groups across the country) since they were formed in

2001, and cited incidences of councils equipping themselves with uniforms and machetes and

organising patrols, as evidence that training were seriously needed to dispel the perception that

the councils should act as an extension of the police force. Community Safety Councils in

Mozambique belongs to communities including their control and managed process, however

they need to establish strong partnership with other key players such as the case of Police and

City Council as the Triangular Model strategized. The lack of a legal instrument outlining clearly

the role and responsibilities of the councils was cited as one reason that no training had taken

place until now.



MT-basic Logic and Community engagement

Mobilise community and select their Safety

Council (CCS)

Train the community Safety Council on how to prevent violent crime as trainer of

remaining community members

Design a participative Community Crime

Diagnisis & program

Deep analysis on collected data and choose priority

Problems

Discuss & Design a sustanable intervention strategy by each

priority problem

Identify group of interveners within the community

Disign & implement a Capacity building course to each group of

interveners identified

Plan intervention, monitoring program & eveluation

Accountability to the Community - Result

presentation



FOMICRES’s work in Maputo City

The City is administratively a municipality with an elected government and has also, since 1980,

the status of province. Not to be confused with the province of Maputo this occupies the

southernmost part of the national territory, except the city of Maputo. Maputo city has an area of

347.69 km, and a population of 1,094,315, according to (2007 Census), representing an

increase of 13.2% in ten years.

The work done by pilots communities in 2013, as well as by FOMICRES and Triangular Model

partners, aimed especially in the practical implementation of the knowledge acquired during the

course obtained in 2012, and restrict obedience to the basic logic of this;2 paradigm following

five (5) stages and nineteen (19) steps has been produced. In this report the steps are not

detailed, we have summarised essential aspects of each stage in implementation by pilot

communities of Maputo city and Manica Province.

STAGE 1: Laying the groundwork Step 1: Community Mobilization process and Participation Step 2: Communication strategy STAGE 2: Assessing violence and safety in our community Step 3: Diagnostic the crime - Identifying violence and safety issues in our community Step 4: Analyzing the environmental characteristics of our community Step 5: Sharing our diagnostic results to whole the community Step 6: Deciding which problems are most important (prioritizing) Step 7: Creating Crime Prevention Teams by risk factor identified

Key Player Objective Rationality Methods First steps Community Safety

Council (CCS) Identify specific crimes and how often are committed and study ways to remove the risk factors behind them

Consider prevention as the mainstay combat crime

Diagnosis, analysis, planning, intervention, monitoring / evaluation and accountability

Identification of problems and periodization

The Police of Mozambique (PRM)

;- Policing

Relations Police - Community for proactive prevention of crime and disorder towards confidence building Police – Citizen

Consider the community's support as crucial to the efficiency of police work

Contact and planning with the community as a method of building trust

Designate one or group of police-agents to the community to identify security needs in conjunction with community safety Council

Local Government & its service provider

agencies (CM)

Provide sociocultural, economic and political welfare to citizens and ensure their development

Consider citizen participation in all aspects, as best way of ensuring the human and material development of the Municipal jurisdiction.

Democratic presence of the community in all definition and decisions of any public policy

Nomination or election of community representatives administratively and diagnosis of recurring problems in the Community



Step 8: Carrying out a SWOT analysis STAGE 3: Developing a violence prevention action plan Step 9: Defining a vision Step 10: Setting goals and objectives Step 11: Selecting the most suitable solutions/interventions and refining them Step 12: Creating our action plan Step 13: Going the extra step: developing a logic model by each community safety plan Step 14: Identifying indicators to measure our project Step 15: Planning for monitoring and evaluation STAGE 4: Managing and implementing our violence prevention action plan Step 16: Presenting the plan, documenting the process, and sharing information Step 17: Obtaining support for our plan by remaining community members and partners

involved STAGE 5: Evaluating our project Step 18: Monitoring project implementation Step 19: Conducting an outcomes‐based evaluation

STAGE 1: Community mobilisation process and Participation

Introductory note:

The process of community mobilisation and participation was seen at this stage as a 2nd one.

The first was when communities mobilised themselves to respond government appeal in

relations to the creation of Community Safety Councils (CCS) in 2001, where the strategy was

designed and agreed among community key players (local government representatives,

community members and the Police) building the same time communications strategy. In 2013,

the process was deeply reviewed and facilitated by formal presentation of trained community

members of the safety councils where the contents of training and objective were much clear. At

this 2nd stage, one of the highest priorities defined was to build strong relationships between the

remaining members of community with their trained safety council, which they have selected

and sent to FOMICRES for training. Their relationships are from the beginning built on trust and

respect, which started with the very first process and meeting during their selection in the

community. Community meeting with 350 to 400 participants was held in all three sites leaded

by community administrators (Secretarios de Bairros) in partnership with the police and

FOMICRES.



______Community Participation

In the context of Triangular Model, community mobilization and participation is about meeting

the interests of the whole community. When every member of a community has the chance,

directly or through representation, to participate in the design, implementation and monitoring of

community-level initiatives, there is a higher likelihood that the program accurately reflects their

real needs and interests. Is this what FOMICRES with initiative in Crime Prevention (Triangular

Model) did along since its conception. The approach takes into consideration the different

experiences, needs and capabilities of various groups in a community – women and men, youth

and the elderly, persons with disabilities and the ethnic, religious, and language minorities and

majorities.

Along the work, we discovered that community participation takes a number of forms. At one

end of the spectrum is “passive participation” in which community members participate by being

informed about something about what happened with their selected Community Safety Councils

along the course they had and what will happen from that day on implementing Triangular

Model. At the other end of the spectrum is “self-mobilization”, when communities organize and

take initiative independent of any external actors, what we started to witness along some

clusters from the pilot benef;8iciary communities of Hulene “A”, “B”, as well as Mavalane “B”.

This is also to see in Sussundenga and Gondola Districts as the Provincial police Commander

stated during FOMICRES monitoring visits in June 2013.

Overview of Community Mobilisation and Participation

Site & Province Meetings held

Total of Participants

Total of Women

Mobiliser

Hulene A – Maputo City 3 1134 602 Local Municipal administrator, Police & FOMICRES

Hulene B – Maputo City 3 1090 711 Local Municipal administrator, Police & FOMICRES

Mavalane B – Maputo City 3 1340 630 Local Municipal administrator, Police & FOMICRES

Gondola – Manica Province 6 832 311 Post chief, Police & FOMICRES Sussundenga–Manica Province

6 680 119 Post Chief, Police & FOMICRES



Levels of community Participation we can describe

Bearing in mind Mozambique’s socioeconomic deficiencies, our communities need a

mobilization that aims to minimize dependency and create a sense of ownership at the

grassroots level. Such efforts also tap into the local knowledge and resources of a community,

with the recognition that these resources can be crucial to a successful intervention for a lasting

implementation of the Triangular Model. In particular case of Mozambique, communities foster

indigenous democratic elements in community communications and intervention, conflict

resolution mechanisms, and civil society participation, promoting as well democratic

development that reflects local values and history. One of fundamental essence by creating a

crime prevention strategy that implements and develop partnership Community + Local

Government Agencies + Law enforcement is because we have understood that the

transformation of the security sector in Mozambique lies on the need to ensure the

harmonization of the sector according to values, principles and vital practices for democratic

governance of a state, that takes better speed if it starts from the grassroots.

Community meeting - Hulene A & B – Kamavota District

Passive Participation

Participation in Information Giving

Participation by Consultation

Participation for Material Incentives

Functional Participation

Interactive Participation

Self-Mobilisation



Pilot Sites Community key Stakeholders involved in Triangular Model

Hulene “A” Municipal District of KaMavota – Maputo City

ONG, Community leaders, Community Safety councils, community court, judicial court, social activists, satellite police station, churches/ Islamic mosques, health post, school community councils, schools, district directorate of education, Community Radios, Municipality police, political parties, Market managers

HUlene “B” Municipal District of KaMavota – Maputo City

Community leaders, Community council, community court, judicial court, social activists, churches/ Islamic mosques, health center, LEC ( community schools league), primary school, political parties, private companies, Community radios, Market managers, Based Organizations, ONGs, High community school.

Administrative Post of Cafumpe Gondola District in Manica Province

ONG, bairros or settlements, Community leaders, Community Safety councils, community court, social activists, satellite police station, churches/ Islamic mosques, Cafumpe market, private health clinic, school community council, schools, community safety council, government administration Post, political parties, Nucleus of Liberation struggle combatants , Trade companies.

Mavalane “B” Municipal District of KaMavota – Maputo City

Community Safety Council, community leaders, community court, judicial court, social activists, churches/ Islamic mosques, health Centre, LEC ( community schools league), primary school, political parties, private companies, Community radios, Market managers, Based Organizations, ONGs, High community school.

Administrative post of Sussundenga, District of same name at Province of Manica

ONG, bairros or settlements, Community leaders, Community Safety councils, community court, social activists, satellite police station, churches/ Islamic mosques, Cafumpe market, private health clinic, school community council, schools, community safety council, government administration Post, political parties, Nucleus of Liberation struggle combatants , Trade companies.

The central goal of community mobilization we enhanced throughout the meetings held with

pilot communities was to re-empower communities to make vital decisions, participations and

strengthen their capacity to address the needs of their own communities in Partnership and with

local Government agencies and the Police. The key players of the Triangular Model sees

community empowerment as crucial and something resulting from a processes that promotes

self-awareness, and encourage community/public participation in the process of naming and

creating appropriate responses to community's crime prevention needs.

STAGE 2: Assessing violence and safety in our community

At this stage, the three pilot communities in Maputo City and the District of Manica Province that

benefited from FOMICRES’s training, worked in order to diagnose/identify the four levels of risk

factors specifically applied to youth violence as recommended by FOMICRES researches.

While in Districts of Sussundenga and Gondola, all of Manica Province FOMICRES gave

training to 202 community activists for Peace and Security, in Maputo City 263 members of

community safety councils of following sites: Ferroviario, Hulene A, B and Mavalane B who

benefited a specific training on crime Preventions in 2012, have done researches in their own

communities based on the following approach:



Household questionnaire

Victimisation rates, perceptions of safety, perceptions of police;

BUT ALSO demographic information, employment status, access to basic services,

living in poverty index

Key informant interviews

Key government, civil society and private sector stakeholders identified for more detailed

conversations about specific safety issues

Focus groups

Focus groups assembled to represent particular groups within each site. May include

school children, informal traders, neighbourhood watches, etc. depending on issues

identified in household questionnaire

Mapping safety

Focus groups will be asked to mark areas that affect their safety on a map. Their

responses will be collated and represented visually using Google Earth.

Understanding that deviant behaviours have to do with multidisciplinary factors, our

approach went beyond the criminal justice



Analysis and research findings at KaMavota Municipal District

The Municipal District of KaMavota is one of the seven Districts of the City of Maputo. Has a

population of 293.361 inhabitants and administratively subdivided into following 11 communities:

Mavalane A e B; FPLM; Hulene A e B; Ferroviário; Laulane; 3 de Fevereiro; Mahotas, Albazine

e Costa do Sol. Data from the Mozambican INE estimated that only 10% of the KaMavota

population was illiterate in 2012 . Residents over the age of 60 were the most likely to be

illiterate, with an illiteracy rate of 43.6%. Women are also more likely than men to be illiterate,

although this gender gap is less pronounced among younger people. For instance, 6.9% of men

and 44.2% of women aged 50-59 were found to be illiterate, while the same census found that

3% of boys and 4.1% of girls aged 15-19 were illiterate .

In the district KaMavota the most common building material used in the construction of houses

are cement blocks, which are used in 84.5% of households while only a few (8.4%) of

households are made of traditional material such as bamboo/sticks . In the 2007 census the INE

found that only 5.5% have access to piped water inside their household while 30.6% have

access to piped water outside their household. The majority (54.4%) of the KaMavota

population access water at fountains. The 2007 census found that most households in the

district had no access to sanitation services with just 1.5% having no access at all. The rest of

the population has access to toilet connected to a septic tank (22.3%) and improved latrines

(45.8%). Others also had access to improved traditional latrines (15%) and traditional latrines

that have not been improved (15.4%). In 2007, the majority of households had access to other

utilities: 60.9% had access to electricity. The major source of energy for residents without

access to electricity is oil or paraffin (30.8%). In 2012, there were 73 primary schools and 43

high schools in the district. These schools were expected to accommodate 64 709 primary

school pupils and 33 750 high school pupils in 2011 in the District. There seems to be quite a

high dropout rate once young people complete primary school with less youth entering high

school. Health facilities were however limited in KaMavota. In the entire district in 2012 there

was no hospital and only seven health centres. In 2007, the Mozambican census showed that

the KaMavota population possessed few durable household goods: computer (6.2%), car

(9.8%), telephone (3.1%) and television (2.9%). Radios and television sets were found more

frequently in respondents’ households. These could be found in 66.8% and 59.9% of

households respectively. Almost a quarter of the households (24.4%) did not possess any of the

household goods mentioned above. Unemployment is a challenge in KaMavota: the

dependency ratio in 2007 was 70.7%. The majority of the population makes its living from

informal trade. Other important economic activities include agriculture and bread making.

Women in the area are the main drivers of the informal economy.



Common crimes identified by residents include house breaking, domestic violence and theft.

However, the population has noted a decrease in crime in the area. The local population

attributes the reduction in crime in the area to the installation of streetlights in many public

spaces. There is still a high incidence of mugging, particularly on the unlit pathway that

connects the community to the popular tourist area of Costa del Sol. This tourist resort provides

employment for many residents of Ferroviario, Hulene “A”, “B” and Mavalane “B” as well. There

are community courts throughout the district to deal with minor civil and criminal disputes. The

constitution officially recognises these courts. However, they do not receive financial resources

from the government or judicial courts, have no any formal links with the judicial courts. The

community courts consider local customs and are well recognised by the community as a

judicial forum.

Crime Statistics – Municipal District of KaMavota

Types of offenses 2014 2013 police operability

against property Registered Clarified Not Clarified Registered Clarified Not Clarified 2014 2013

Simple swipe 22 20 2 30 25 5 91% 83% Robbery 32 29 3 35 26 9 91% 74% Theft 29 27 2 23 11 12 93% 48% Property damage 9 9 0 11 6 5 100% 55% Abuse of Trust 3 3 0 6 6 0 100% 100% Theft from vehicle 2 1 1 5 3 2 50% 60% Theft of vehicle 1 1 0 0 0 0 100% 0% Swindle 6 6 0 2 1 1 100% 50% Arson 2 2 0 3 3 0 100% 100% SUB/AC 1 1 0 0 0 0 100% 0% SUB-TOTAL 107 99 8 115 81 34 93% 70% Against people Volunteer homicide 2 2 0 3 2 1 100% 67% Frustrated homicide 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0% Corporal simples offences 14 13 1 23 23 0 93% 100% Corporal Simple voluntary offences

23 22 1 24 24 0 96% 100%

Infringement of Minors 4 4 0 3 3 0 100% 100% Violation of Women 1 1 0 2 2 0 100% 100% Threat of death 4 4 0 1 1 0 100% 0% Defamation 0 0 1 1 0 1 0% 100% Injury 1 1 0 3 1 2 100% 33% ICA 2 2 0 2 2 0 100% 100% Moral Offences 0 0 0 1 1 0 0% 100% Abortion 1 1 0 0 0 0 100% 0% SUB-TOTAL 54 52 2 64 61 3 96% 95%



Against Public Order and Security

Active corruption 1 1 0 0 0 0 100% 0% False Qualities 1 1 0 0 0 0 100% 0% Disobedience 0 0 0 1 1 0 0% 100% Negligence 1 1 0 4 4 0 100% 100% SUB-TOTAL 3 3 0 5 5 0 100% 100% TOTAL-GERAL 164

154

10 184 147 37 94% 80%

Source: Police KaMavota

Diagnosis Findings at Hulene A & B

Research Findings at Ferroviario - Neighbouring Community of Hulene “A” & ”B” and

Mavalane “B”

Category of crime

Number (%) households who experienced crime

Number (%) where crime took place within previous 12 months

Where did this crime take place?

Who was the victim of this crime?

Who do victims believe the perpetrators to be?

Assault 177 (35%) 88 (50%) On street 66%

At home 18%

Respondents 46%

Parents 18%

Other relatives 18%

Unknown members of the community 63%

Persons from outside the community 27%

Robbery 242 (48%) 100 (42%) At home 75%

On street 21%

Entire household 36%

Respondents 31%


Persons from outside the community 21% Burglary 13 (4%) 7 (37%) At home 100% Respondent 32%




Theft of vehicle or bicycle 19 (4%) 5 (26%) At home 47%

On street 37%

Respondent 42%

Parent 16%




Pergunta 3: Há 16 anos após o conflito armado, que problemas ameaçam a sua vida e seus

sonhos de desenvolvimento?

66.3

24.51

6.82.39

0

68.84

55.94

33.23

38.63

0

31.16

44.06

66.77

61.37

0

61.02

19.71

53.1650.47

0

38.98

80.29

46.8449.53

00

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Crime violento Falta de emprego HIV/SIDA Outros problemas Não responderam

Total por resposta

Zonas urbanas

Zonas rurais e fronteiriças

Mulheres

Homens



Hijacking of vehicle or bicycle

8 (2%) 3 (38%) On street 88%

At home 13%

Respondent 38%

Sibling 25%

Other Relative 25%



Police 13% Sexual assault or rape 21 (4%) 8 (38%) On street 57%

At home 29%

Other relatives 48%

Siblings 38%


Known members of the community 13%

Police 11%

Friend 11% Deliberate damage to property

28 (6%) 17 (63%) At home 64%

On street 21%

Respondent 36%

Sibling 21%



Relative 18%

Murder 41 (8%) 13 (32) On street 54%

At home 37%

Grandparent 58%

Parent 30%

Known members of community 53%

Gang member 17% Stock theft 103 (20%) 42 (42%) At home 97%

On street 3%


Respondent 23%


Persons outside the community 16% Theft of personal property 160 (33%) 75 (43%) At home 69%

On street 29%t

Respondent 35%




60%

38% 2%

Já alguma vez viu alguém agredir outra pessoa fora da sua casa?

SimNãoSem resposta

26%

63%

6% 4% 1%

In which place the crime occurred

em casa

Na rua

Em lugar publico/recreativo(dia)Lugares comerciais (lojas, etc)

Most crimes in three sites

including Ferroviário occurred on the street

But a significant number of

crimes (over ¼) also occurred at home



TM - Organizational topics at community level

(Objectives, activities and indicators)

Considering organizational factors that weaken the Mozambican communities in implementing

crime preventions initiatives since the introduction of community safety councils, particularly the

financial, when it comes to implement Community safety plans, the Triangular Model predicts

following organizational aspects in all communities to ensure ownership of the process.

Ob

je

ctive

1

To improve community Social cohesion through the partinership building between Municipal Authorities + Police and the Community Safety Councils (CCS)

Ac

tivity 1

Mobilisation and signing Memoradum of Understanding between Key players of the Triangular Model (Municipal Authorities representatives at Community level + Police through community local station and finally by Community through created Community Safety Councils (CCS) I

nd

ic

ato

r 1

&

2

1. Three party agreement signing

2. Three key players working together as agreed in the MoU

Ob

je

ctive

2

&

3

To ensure existence of driving (implementing) body at each site by showing publicly their interest on the thematic, understand and moral capacity to support the purpose

Ac

tivity 2

Identify community member interests, understanding and moral or .. capacity on each one of identified priority problems.

Create five groups of 15 member each for each of priority problems according interest.

In

dic

ato

r 3

Number of community members and intervener groups interested and registered

Ob

je

ctive

4

Train each selected driving group on steps to be followed along crime preventions activities

and in

Designing interventions Projects - Safety plan, monitoring and evaluation program

Ac

tivity 4

Design the content of the training and introduce it to selected beneficiaries - Done in part by trained community Safety Councils (CCS) members with a consultant/facilitator

In

dic

ato

r 4

Contents of each activity understood and able to design their own safety plans according diagnosis of the problem identified and group assigned thematic



Overview of the main levels of Crime risk factors found at Municipal District KaMavota – Maputo

City (Ferroviario, Hulene “A” & “B”, Mavalane “B”)

Individual factors Family factors: Interpersonal factors Community factors: Aggressiveness;

Early initiation of violent behaviour;

Involvement in other forms of antisocial behaviour;

Beliefs and attitudes favourable to deviant or antisocial behaviour.

Parental criminality;

Child maltreatment;

Poor family management practices;

Low levels of parental involvement;

Poor family bonding and family conflict;

Parental attitudes favourable to substance use and violence;

Parent-child separation School factors:

Academic failure;

Low bonding to school;

Dropping out of school;

Delinquent peers;

Gang membership.

Absolute Poverty;

Community disorganization;

Availability of drugs and firearms;

Neighbourhood involved in crime;

Exposure to violence

The Top four Problems and related risk factors in three Communities: Mavalane B, Hulene A & B

Priority Problem: Gun related crimes - murder -

shootings

Risk Factors

• Availability/access to firearms

• Gang involvement

• Drug activity in the community

• Low socioeconomic conditions

• Antisocial peer groups

• Unsafe neighbourhood

Priority Problem: Burglary of House

& Robbery

Risk factors

• Anti-Social Peer Groups

• History of Aggression

• Drug and Alcohol Abuse

• Gang Involvement

• Unsafe Neighbourhood

• Access to weapons & Drugs

Priority Problem: Physical

Agression/Domestic Violence

Risk Factors

• Alcohol and Drug Availability & comsumption

• Community norms & values favorable to drug production & comsumption

• Family managment problems

• Law academic achievement

• Unsafe neighbourhood

• Law socioeconomic conditions

Priority Problem: Rape & Sexual offences

Risk factors

•Prior victim of rape or sexual offense

•Low academic achievement

•Drug and alcohol use

•Low socioeconomic conditions

Problems & Risk Factors in Pilot

sites



Top problem found Percentage (%) Protective factors

Physical aggression/Domestic Violence

31% • Alcohol control bill and closure of illegal beer dens;

• Peer counsellors creating awareness of alcohol abuse; • Youth opportunities including self-employment, use of sports, arts and music; • Voluntary weapon surrender programs; • NGos working with families to enhance functional families, and parent support centre; • Peace building programs; • Programs addressing negative cultural values and stereotypes; • Enforcement of the sexual offenses act; • Promote and support Community Safety Councils • Civil society network in the neighbourhoods, • Conflict resolution at the chiefdom, • Some small training centre for carpentry, sewing, metalwork, • A football fields for youth,

Burglary of house & robbery 24% Gun Related Crimes-Murder-Shootings

20%

Rape & Sexual Offenses 19% Other 6%

Adopted immediate interventions in Hulene A, B & Mavalane B

Top problem found Strategy Project topics to be addressed Observations

Physical aggression

/ Domestic Violence

Strategy 1:

Changing cultural norms that support violence

The Mozambique’s family law and the • Child maltreatment

• Intimate partner violence • Sexual Violence

Mozambique has a family act that punishes all king of domestic violence

Strategy 2:

Reduce alcohol & drugs availability and consumption

• Implementation of law on alcohol

consumptions and productions • Linkage between alcohol, drug and violence • Regulation and control of production and consumption of homemade traditional alcohol

Mozambique has a law and regulation on alcohol, what is failing is its implementation

Objectives

By 2016, all quarteiroes (smallest administrative units of Mozambican cities) are considered centre of crime diagnostics, planning and interventions in support of the community.

By 2016, 30% of physical aggressions, robbery, gun related crimes, burglary of hause, rape and Sexual offenses are reduced

By 2017, the perceptions of crime is chenged, and the fear of crime and violence in the Hulene A, B and Mavalane B are is reduced

By 2017, 50% of the streets neighbourhood are lighting

Indicator

Six groups, for each topproblem identified are trained on how to intervene and working within the cluster on the base of community's diagnosis findings.

Statistical decrease of number of Physical aggressions, burglary of house, gun related crimes as well as of rape and sexual offenses in those three sites The participation and understanding of community’s clusters, residents and of safety councils in crime preventions is increased owning the process

• 50% of streets are lighting;

• Visibility at night is improved



Burglary of House &

Robbery

Strategy 1:

Youth skill training & Entrepreneurism

• Safe, stable and nurturing relationship between children and their parents • Support & train Community Safety Councils; • Enhance functional and stable families

Gun related crimes

– murder - shootings

Strategy1:

Reducing the proliferations of firearms

• Reduce access to firearms and knives by Voluntary surrender programs; • Youth opportunities including self-employment, use of sports, arts and music; • Peace building programs;

Rape & Sexual

offenses

Strategy 1:

Peer counsellors & Gender equality

• Peer counsellors creating awareness of alcohol abuse; • Promote gender equality; • Development of youth life skills

Along the implementation of Crime Prevention Strategies, comprise the step called “Budgeting

and assigning resources for our project”, one of the most important steps for the successful of

the safety Plan. In special case of Mozambique, a country with huge financial problems for its

own national budget, communities does not expect to receive financial support from the

Government even being one of the key partner in these strategy. It’s always necessary to

underline that 30% of the budget of Mozambique still depends on the goodwill of the

international community therefore, not always the international community is able to fund

community projects. Therefore, assigning resources for the strategy means community

mobilisation to contribute morally, technically and making themselves available in time to

perform agreed activities. The Triangular Model has been making clear in all meetings with

stakeholders that a sustained community mobilization takes only place when communities

remain active and empowered thought the time of program implementation and afterwards..

______________Monitoring Community work in Manica Province

In 2013 FOMICRES undertook various activities of advocacy and monitoring activities

performed by trained peace and community safety activists in Districts of Manica Province,

concretely, in Gondola and Sussundenga, which allowed us to see the level of compliance and

their connection with community leaders, local government authorities at District level, and with

other stakeholders in community safety processes.

Concretely, FOMICRES monitored following aspects:

a) Understand the management of issues of community security;

b) Identify outbreaks that contribute to crime and conducive environments;

c) Mapping of unsafe areas;

d) Involve the communities in security mechanisms;

e) Strengthen-binding activity of peace – safety and security to justice administration

In partnership with other organizations FOMICRES established and trained following District

platforms of Civil Society in Manica Province



District Platform Number of Associations

Gondola PLASIGO (Civil Society Platform of Gondola) 15-Associations

Sussundenga PLASOS (Civil Society Platform of Sussundenga) 15-Associations

Tambara PLASCIT (Civil Society platform of Tambara) 33-Associations

Macossa PLASCIM (Civil Society Platform of Macossa) 17-Associations

Manica PLASCMA (Civil Society Platform of Manica) 12-Associations

Chimoio PLASOC (Civil Society Platform of Chimoio) 40-Associations

FOMICRES Peace activists and member platforms in Manica Province

_____________________________Impact of the Triangular Model The impact of community participation in the processes of prevention of crime and violence -

Triangular Model, statistically will be better measured in the next two years, however, since now

communities, the police and Municipal representatives are concluding that in the pilots

neighbourhoods, crime reduced somehow, given the large mobilization and call for vigilance

and participation of communities in crime mapping process. Communities understood that

Primary prevention - means, implement measurable actions in our own families and community,

aimed at preventing violent behaviour occur, which mean that priorities can be directed to

projects with children of school age, reaching adolescence (youth associations) including their

Parents or guardians of Education. Interventions can be based on training the family (parents) in

social and life skills to children, promoting policies against violence, those dealing with risk

factors (gender inequality, socioeconomic, sociocultural norms) supporting the use of violence,

access and / or proliferation of firearms, alcohol and illicit drugs. This first and foremost

understanding of community members about the causes and ways to prevent crime, created

basic conditions for each one began to see that violence and crime, could have originated in his

own house and his own behaviour, therefore, prevention of such attitudes, behaviours or

traditional values should began to be seen as individual, Family, Community and society task,

with concrete boundaries of responsibilities. Municipal authorities, administration of justice,

particularly the police and the Mozambican communities that currently are benefiting the

Triangular Model training, know and assume the coordination of the three actors as a key

measure toward achieving needed success in crime reduction by implementing specific safety

plans according each one of diagnosed priority problems.



Monitoring implementation of regional, sub-regional

and global instruments related to peace, Safety and

security accessed by Mozambique

In this chapter FOMICRES promoted advocacy work, monitoring the engagement of

Mozambique in following instruments, protocols; Declarations that Mozambique accede as well

as other debates and initiative:

The Geneva Declarations on Armed Violence and Development.

The Pelindaba treaty,

The Ottawa Convention,

The Conventions on Cluster Munitions,

The SADC Protocol on firearms and related materials,

The United Nations Plan of Action and

The Arm Trade Treaty (ATT).

A strict compliance with these instruments represents the alignment of Mozambique to other

nations in the matter of peace, public safety and socioeconomic development of people. When

FOMICRES does its work of advocacy and monitoring international instruments, do so in full

conscience that we are contributing to the same process, increasingly necessary for a nation

emerging from destructive armed conflicts.

National Report on security and armed violence prevention

and reduction

In 2012 in a meeting organized by Global Action on Armed Violence (GAOV), FOMICRES

joined a number of interested expert civil society organisations in Geneva, Suisse on behalf of

Mozambique to discuss a joint strategy to promote national reporting on security and armed

violence. This initiative aims to increase the number of countries producing regular national

reports. It considers national reports as a first step to comprehensive domestic responses to the

problem of Security and armed violence prevention and reduction.

_____________________________________________________Meeting objectives

The Expert Group aims to provide practical and technical support to national and local

governments, and other non-government stakeholders, to develop comprehensive reports on

armed violence that should:

create a baseline on which to show progress in addressing violence;

provide systematic information on needs and areas to be prioritized;



facilitate sharing of information between actors from different stakeholder groups and

standardise types of information to be recorded and monitored;

integrate various information sources to highlight different types of violence (i.e.

intentional homicides, unintentional homicides, indirect conflict deaths, conflict deaths,

victims of legal interventions, victims of extrajudicial killings);

help influence institutional approaches to addressing armed violence;

Support resource mobilisation for responses to prevent and reduce armed violence.

During 2013, this Group has developed a template that provides practical support to national

and local governments undertaking such reports. Specific guidelines for completing the template

and designing national processes to develop the reports has been produced and shared with

interested countries as is the case of Mozambique.

_____________________________________________________Background and Rationale

Security is a cornerstone of individual and social wellbeing. The absence of, or threats to

security can destroy people’s lives and properties, hampers community ties and affects daily

activities. Research shows that insecurity and armed violence are complex phenomena that

need solid evidence-base and concerted efforts in order to be comprehensively addressed. This

evidence can be gathered through regular measurement and monitoring of the issue. A clear

constituency of Member States that Mozambique is part of committed to building national

systems to monitor insecurity and armed violence has been growing within the Geneva

Declaration on Armed Violence and Development and the Oslo Commitments on Armed

Violence and Development, as well as under the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and

Light Weapons, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities , the Mine Ban Treaty

and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, parliamentarian initiatives and regional agreements.

At national and local levels, public health institutions, security agencies, civil society

organisations and media are all increasingly engaging in various ways to measure and monitor

this problem. In this perspective, the production of a national report on security and armed

violence provides an opportunity to gather all the evidence that illustrates the problem into one

report. It also reflects a commitment to acknowledge and address the problem at a domestic

level, and facilitates initiatives that are effective and that support the most vulnerable

populations.

___________________________________________________________Purpose of the reports

National reports on security and armed violence prevention and reduction aim to assess the

incidence of and responses to armed violence at national and local levels. They provide an

opportunity to:

1. Produce a baseline assessment that can be used to track changes over time and

demonstrate and share clear advances in tackling the problem both in terms of effective

legislation and successful programmes;



2. Increase coordination of different reporting obligations by producing an encompassing

report that contains in one place all the relevant information on the problem and

progresses to tackle it. This will facilitate engagement with national stakeholders,

international donors and institutions working to address this issue;

3. Map all the domestic actors that have a stake in armed violence prevention and

reduction, and security enhancement. This includes not only actors that work to tackle

armed violence, but also people and communities that are directly affected by the

problem;

4. Facilitate coordination between national and local efforts and among state and civil

society organisations. This will enhance resource mobilisation and allocation, identify

specific challenges at national and local levels, identify and address critical gaps in

existing capacities to deal with violence, and adopt inclusive strategies to tackle them

effectively;

5. Assess effectiveness of a number of key actions undertaken at a domestic level to

address the problem. Evaluating and monitoring results on the impact of existing

initiatives is a key way to promote good practices nationally and internationally;

6. Collate different data-recording systems (from the public health, criminal justice, media

and other sources), enhancing common understanding and improving comparability of

data.

___________________________________________________The Role of the Working Group

Along the 2013, the Working Group established during the 2012 meeting in Geneva, has

established partnerships with experts who supported the development of the template and with

partners at a national level to initiate dialogue with relevant stakeholders and engage with them

throughout the process. Local and international experts were at disposal of governments that

adhere to this initiative, as Mozambique did, to support in data collection and in the drafting and

production of the report. In this, the national commission to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the

Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (COPRECAL) has been working

in close coordination with the UNDP and other organizations.

__________________________________________________________Structure of the reports

The structure of the reports must recognise different national realities and complexities. It

should consider criteria such as relevance of the data for local actors; viability and reliability of

the data; and clarity so that it can be easily understood. In general the report will contain

information on the following areas:

1. The problem of insecurity and armed violence, including its impact and incidence;

2. Responses to prevent and reduce armed violence and to enhance security, this includes

information on policies, legislation and programmes;

3. General contextual information on the country.



_____________________________Methodological information on the data presented

Taking into consideration national realities, it is suggested that the report be structured in two

different sections with different levels of complexity. The 2-tiered approach aims to minimise the

burden on countries whilst ensuring that all the relevant data is captured. Tier 1: Includes a set

of core areas and data that should be filled in by every country, in particular case by

Mozambique. It is based on basic statistical information that captures the physical

manifestations of armed violence and insecurity (impact and incidence), and a simplified

analysis of the data as follow:

Violent Deaths

Homicides Deaths due to legal interventions

Total number of homicides;

Homicides disaggregated by victims’ age group, sex and nationality;

Homicides disaggregated by mean used;

Provide trends in the total number of homicides

Total number of deaths due to legal interventions by the police, military or other state official in service;

Provide trends in the total number of deaths due to legal interventions

(In the last five years or from the earliest year with available data)

Deaths due to internal or external armed conflict

Suicides

Deaths due to internal or external armed conflict disaggregated by victims’ age group and sex;

Deaths due to internal or external armed conflict disaggregated by mean used;

Provide trends in the total number of deaths due to internal or external armed conflict

Total number of suicides

Suicides disaggregated by victims’ age group and sex

Suicides disaggregated by mean used;

Provide trends in the total number of suicides

Accidental deaths caused by firearms Firearms deaths due to undetermined external causes

Total number of accidental deaths caused by firearms

Total number of firearms deaths due to undetermined external causes

Physical assaults Robberies

Total number of physical assaults;

Physical assaults disaggregated by victims’ age group and sex

Physical assaults disaggregated by mean used

Total number of robberies

Number of robberies disaggregated by mean used

Total number of carjacks/car robberies

Rapes Police, legislation and Program to address insecurity and armed violence

Total number of rapes

Number of rapes disaggregated by victims’ age group and sex

The importance of the policy, law or programme, and;

The impact of the policy, law or programme.



Tier 2: This will be filled in if the information available. Data on Tier 2: builds on Tier 1 to

further illustrate the problem through disaggregated data, trends and in-depth analysis. In

addition, this section includes case studies to further illustrate the problem.

______________________________________National processes to produce the reports

Producing domestic reports on security and armed violence of Mozambique, that FOMICRES

hopes to be available during the first quarter of 2015, requires a coordinated national effort. To

do this effectively, Mozambique has adopted a multi-stakeholder approach by assigning roles to

both relevant government through COPRECAL and non-governmental institutions, and to other

actors involved in armed violence prevention and reduction and security enhancement. The

Publication of the report will be voluntary. Mozambique will decide how to best publicise and use

the findings. If Mozambique decides to publish the report, this can be done in hard copy, but

should also be available online so that it links to other relevant reports.

_____THE ARM TRADE TRETY

FOMICRES is since 1998, fully involved at national and international levels in debates on illicit

proliferation of small arms, its impact in human security, peacebuilding and democracy as well.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), that hoppe will enter into force soon, adopted by overwhelming

vote by the UN on 2 April 2013, is the first international Treaty aimed at regulating international

transfers of conventional arms. The Treaty sets an important basis for global action to control

the conventional arms trade. It creates a new global norm against which states’ practice will be

measured, by other states and by Civil society nationally and international. The ATT clearly

states what its objective and purpose which is the (1) establishment of the highest possible

common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international

trade in conventional arms, (2) Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and

prevent their diversion, for the purpose of contributing to international and regional peace,

security and stability, reducing human suffering, promoting cooperation, transparency and

responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby

building confidence among States Parties. 118 States have signed the treaty including

Mozambique, 32 have ratified so far.



__________________________________________What does the Arms Trade Treaty do?

The ATT is the first international instrument to establish legally binding obligations on; States to

ensure responsible and effective controls on all types of international transfers of conventional

arms, ammunition and parts and components. The items explicitly named in the Treaty are:

Battle tanks; Armoured combat vehicles; Large-calibre artillery systems; Combat aircraft; Attack

helicopters; Warships; Missiles and missile launchers; Small arms and light weapons;

Ammunition; and Parts and Components. However the Treaty goes further, in that it encourages

States parties to “apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional

arms”. This reflects widespread practice among arms exporting States of controlling a

comprehensive range of military equipment for export. In practice this means that States should

apply the Treaty’s provisions to items such as training and transport aircraft, non-combat

armoured vehicles, anti-tank landmines, hand-grenades, other weaponised explosives and

drones, and include them in the national control systems and lists that are required by the ATT.

The ATT includes explicit prohibitions against States

authorising arms transfers under certain circumstances,

including where there is knowledge that the arms would be

used to perpetrate war crimes, genocide, attacks against

civilians, and other grave breaches of the Geneva

Conventions. Where the prohibitions do not apply, in

considering whether or not to authorise an arms export States

must conduct a comprehensive risk assessment and consider

possible risk mitigation measures. The assessment explicitly

requires States to examine whether there is a risk: of serious

violations of international human rights or humanitarian law; of

contravening conventions relating to terrorism and organised

crime (which include corruption); or of facilitating gender-

based violence or violence against children.

The Treaty also addresses the risk of diversion of arms, and outlines a number of possible

actions that can be taken to address this problem, including denying export authorisation. While

the diversion controls in the Treaty do not explicitly refer to ammunition – a result of difficult

compromises between negotiating parties – most 2 States Parties are expected in practice to

apply all the Treaty’s provisions to the full range of conventional arms, ammunition, parts and

components in their national control systems. Another positive element of this Treaty is the

requirement that States Parties submit annual reports on international transfers and national

implementation activities. The Treaty text also provides for reports to be made publicly

available, thereby improving transparency in the global arms trade.

_____________________________________________How the risk assessment will work

The ATT requires States Parties to assess whether a proposed export of conventional arms,

ammunition, or parts and components would contribute to or undermine peace and security; or



could be used in facilitating serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law,

terrorism, organised crime, or serious acts of gender based violence or serious violence against

women and children. States Parties must also take account of the risk that arms might be

diverted. States are required to refuse authorisation where this assessment concludes there is

an “overriding risk” of the negative consequences listed. Given that humanitarian considerations

have been the principal driving force behind the adoption of an ATT, this points towards refusing

authorisation if the risks of an undesirable outcome are judged to go beyond a specified

threshold, for example where there is a substantial or clear risk.

_______________________How the Treaty will be enforced and monitored

The Treaty will be enforced at national level by States Parties who are required to “take

appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that implement the provisions of

this Treaty”. To this end, States will require a range of legislative, administrative and practical

provisions and capacities. Based on existing good practice, these measures should include: (a)

National legislation or other measures to implement the Treaty; (b) Law enforcement and

judicial mechanisms to enforce relevant legislation; (c) Criminal or civil penalties to address

breaches of relevant legislation; and (d) Reserving the power to inspect and/or seize shipments

that are suspected of violating the Treaty. The ATT also requires states to co-operate on

implementation and enforcement including through information sharing regarding illicit activities

and actors, by providing mutual assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial

proceedings and by co-operating in tackling corruption.

SADC conference on Arms Trade Treaty Held in Pretoria 2013

Monitoring of Treaty implementation will be undertaken both by States Parties and civil society.

The effectiveness of these efforts will be determined, to a large extent, by the quality and

quantity of information that States Parties produce under the reporting and transparency



provisions of the ATT. For its part, FOMICRES and other civil society organizations will closely

monitor implementation of the Treaty, and press their national governments to produce and to

make public the most comprehensive national reports possible, we know, the government of

Mozambique have been doing this other process, like the UNPoA. The Conference of States

Parties is the forum formally responsible for monitoring implementation of the ATT. This body

has a broad mandate to review implementation of the Treaty, to consider issues arising from the

interpretation of the Treaty, and to consider and adopt recommendations regarding its

implementation and operation. Once the ATT comes into force, this body will play a critical role

not only in reviewing and promoting implementation but also in further developing the treaty so

that it can better achieve its objectives. This forum should establish early precedent whereby

national reports on Treaty implementation are reviewed and debated allowing States Parties to

raise questions, including in relation to specific arms transfers.

The ATT also provides for settlement of disputes among States Parties regarding interpretation

or application of the Treaty through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or

other peaceful means, by mutual consent.

____Monitoring the implementation of

Ottawa Convention and Cluster Munitions

Mozambique’s Vice Minister – Henriques Banze with ICBL Delegations in Geneva



Mozambique ratified in 1998 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,

Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, known as Ottawa

Convention and the 2011 the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Ottawa convention aims at

eliminating anti-personnel landmines (AP-mines) while the Cluster bomb Convention aims at

elimination cluster munitions/bombs around the world. To date, there are 161 States Parties to

the Ottawa treaty and Cluster Munitions was signed by 94 countries at the Oslo Signing

Conference in December 2008, and entered into force on 1 August 2010, after 30 states ratified

it by 16 February 2010.

FOMICRES in partnership with RAVIM, HI, NPA and Halo Trust organised the workshop entitled

“Maputo civil society workshop on Ottawa convention” with objective of measure the Progress

made by Mozambique, remaining challenges and Civil Society organizational level to

performance its obligations under the convention. The seminar concluded that Mozambique has

made good progress in implementing the Convention, particularly Articles Monitoring-Civil

Society knows that Mozambique, a post conflict country, did a considerable job in some

thematic areas of the Ottawa Convention, especially in Disarmament: destroyed all the

stockpiles on time; Mine Clearance: Mozambique worked hard in the past 15 years to clean all

contaminated areas, remaining at the time some areas along the border with Zimbabwe; and on

other obligations of the convention: Mozambique has been submitting annual transparency

reports along the last 14 years as part of its obligations as state party. Being FOMICRES focal

point and coordinator of the campaign against landmines in Mozambique, has been following

with satisfaction the process of preparation of the National Plan for Victim assistance, by

Ministry for Women and Social Action in coordination with RAVIM and Handicap International, to

be presented in the coming Review conference in Maputo being the major challenge for

Mozambique in years to come. Mozambique will host the 3rd review conference next year

(2014), 15 years after the first meeting of state parties held in Maputo in May 1999, therefore

and particularly for Mozambique, it will be appropriate time to review deeply progress made on

the implementation of the Ottawa Convention and prepare itself to reallocate forces for

remaining challenges.

____________________________Demining results in Mozambique - 2008-2013

Plan 2007/2008 Demining results 2008/2013

Areas m2 Areas m2 Destroyed landmines

UXO’s Destructions

2008 203 1,571,252 237 2,346,130 1142 846

2009 82 1,997,266 126 4,314,197 914 871

2010 100 2,239,402 136 6,134,630 883 531

2011 28 2,574,329 229 7,204,777 8487 406

2012 104 2,503,476 255 8,714,708 9053 1126

2013 24 1,278,676 243 7,002,630 6799 279

Total 541 12,164,401 1226 35,717,072 27278 4059 Source: IND – Government of Mozambique



Based Research (2007/2008) New areas from (2009-2013)

Total

Provinces Districts Areas square meter

Areas square meter

Areas square meter

Maputo 3 - - 12 499,961 12 499,961

Inhambane 4 29 172,630 16 334,976 45 507,606

Sofala 6 32 629,553 102 3,867,866 134 4,497,419

Manica 4 2 303,784 17 1,581,349 19 1,885,133

Tete 2 - - 11 876,722 11 876,722

Total 19 63 1,105,967 158 7,160,874 221 8,266,841

Source: IND – Government of Mozambique

________________________________________________Financial support 2008-2012 U$D

Government Partners Total

2008 1,563,270 3,879,000 5,442,270

2009 1,167,647 5,026,808 6,194,455

2010 1,422,260 6,485,311 7,907,571

2011 2,309,490 12,413,704 14,723,194

2012 2,325,366 13,361,881 15,687,247

Total 8,788,033 41,166,704 49,954,737 Source: IND-Government of Mozambique

Site events on Ottawa Convention in Geneva



The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)

Nuclear weapons

FOMICRES organized advocacy work in Mozambique and participate in three roundtables at

regional level for fully participation of governments in Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones Treaties. In

this FOMICRES encourages the government all states, including Mozambique to welcome the

Vienna conference; to express support for an international treaty banning nuclear weapons; and

to consider following key messages in their statements?

The humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapon detonation would be

catastrophic and would spread beyond borders remaining for generations to come;

It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used

again, under any circumstances;

The risk of a nuclear weapon detonation is significant, with recent research on accidents

and near-misses exposing the unsustainable nature of the status quo;

Awareness of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all

approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament;

A legal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons would strengthen the NPT by fulfilling the

Treaty’s disarmament and non-proliferation objectives;

It is time to start a process of negotiations for a new legal instrument prohibiting nuclear

weapons, even if the nuclear-armed states refuse to participate.



Representatives of Mozambique and Kenya in ICAN regional meeting in Nairobi

FOMICRES is member of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a

global civil society coalition of 361 organisations in 92 countries, calls on states, international

organisations, civil society organisations and other actors to take immediate action to support a

multilateral process of negotiations for a new legal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons. The

purpose of the NPT is to prevent the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear

weapons use by halting proliferation and achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons

through good faith negotiations. The 2010 RevCon expressed “deep concern at the catastrophic

humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons”. Since then, the humanitarian

perspective has become the dominant theme in the international nuclear weapons debate, as

shown by the high attendance at the Oslo and Nayarit conferences on the humanitarian impact

of nuclear weapons and by the overwhelming support for several joint statements expressing

concern at the devastating humanitarian consequences of these weapons, most recently at the

2013 PrepCom and in the 2013 First Committee of the UN General Assembly. During the

Nayarit conference, Austria announced its intention to take discussions of the humanitarian

impact of nuclear weapons forward by hosting a follow-up conference in Vienna later this year.

In light of evidence demonstrating the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and

the risk of their use by accident, miscalculation or design, the lack of progress in the

implementation of Article VI of the NPT, as well as in other disarmament forums, is

unacceptable. Already 115 states have prohibited nuclear weapons on a regional basis through

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones treaties in case of Mozambique and some other African states.

Yet, in contrast to other weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons are not yet subject to

an international legal prohibition. ICAN believes the only logical response to the humanitarian



impact of nuclear weapons is to start a process of negotiation for a legal prohibition on these

weapons, even if the nuclear-armed states refuse to participate. Such an instrument would fulfil

and strengthen the NPT and create conditions for disarmament by establishing a clear norm

against possession of nuclear weapons; challenge the assertion that nuclear weapons provide

security; provide a strong moral incentive for nuclear possessor states to eliminate their

arsenals; reinforce non-proliferation; and increase the likelihood for a successful outcome of the

2015 RevCon.

ICAN regional meeting held in Kenya

______________________________________Institutional Governance

FOMICRES’ governing structure has been functioning regularly since 2006. Every year the

General Assembly meeting is held and narrative and financial reports presented, discussed,

commented and deliberations made. Budgets and Plan of Activities are proposed, commented

and approved but is honnest to say that in 2013 was more active, providing necessary security

and assistance to the executive body.

The members of FOMICRES’s Fiscal Council has been proactive in terms of visiting the project

sites, checking record books, formulates reports and submits well informed endorsements of

annual reports to the general Assembly. The governing board is always informed on the

progress of the implementation of the approved plan of action and whenever necessary gives

adequate guidance to managing Council. FOMICRES’s leadership is driven by democratic

principles whereby collaborators relate to each other based on horizontal relations. Each



member of staff feels accountable for respective tasks and reports to weekly and monthly staff

meetings where progress, challenges and solutions are jointly debated in view of anticipating

and avoiding major risks that can harm the performance of the organization as a whole

During the year 2013 FOMICRES has reviewed its financial and administrative policy and

adopted following new internal instruments:

1. Corruption and conflicts of interest policy;

2. Policy communication and confidentiality;

3. Politicy of human rights;

4. Policy on HIV/AIDS;

5. Policy of gender and equality;

6. Policies of complaints and denunciation and

7. Human resources policy

The great challenges of the institution have to do with the training of their technical staff in a

sectoral way, infrastructure (own offices, means of transport for their activities) as well as

sustainability strategies.

_______________________________________FOMICRES’ International Partners in 2013

Entities Address

Peace Direct Uk & Germany Development House/56-64 Leonard Street, London UK Telephone +44 (0)20 7549 0285 Fax:+44 (0)20 7549 0286 www.peacedirect.org

Institute for Security Studies – ISS , South Africa Brooklyn court, 361 veale street, New Muckleneuk, Pretoria – South Africa / www.issafrica.org

Action On Armed Violence (AOAV) London UK 5th floor Epworth House 25 City Road/London EC1YAA. www.aoav.org.uk

Small Arms Survey - SAS Geneva Avenue Blanc 47, 1202 Geneva Suisse/ Tel: +41229085770 / www.smallarmssurvey.org

ICBL/CMC ICBL/9 Rue de Cornavin /CH-1201 Geneva /Switzerland/Tel.:+41 (0)22 920 03 25/Fax:+41

(0)22 920 01 15 www.icblcmc.org

Open Society Institute & OSIA Open Society Foundations, 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW/Washington, D.C. 20006/202-721-

5607/Fax: 202-530-0128

PRIO (International Peace Research Institute), Oslo Fuglehauggata 11, 0260 Oslo, Norway / Tel/Fax: +4755574000 / +4755574166 www.prio.no

PARLIAMENTARY FORUM on small arms & light

weapons

Visit Kungsholmsgatan 8, Stockholm/Sweden, Tel/Fax:´+4686532543 www.parlforum.org

The Government of Norway Av. Julius Nyerere 1162, Maputo – Mozambique: Tel: +258821280100/ www.norway.org.mz

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Av Tomas Nduda, 1313

Government of Mozambique: Ministries of Interior,

Justice, foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Defence &

Women and Social Affairs which comprise COPRECAL

Av. Olof Palme 46/48, fifth floor/Phone: (+ 258) 21 32 72 44/Fax: (+ 258) 21 32 72 44/Maputo /

Mozambique, www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz

http://www.peacedirect.org/

http://www.issafrica.org/

http://www.aoav.org.uk/

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/

http://www.icblcmc.org/

http://www.prio.no/

http://www.parlforum.org/

http://www.norway.org.mz/

http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/



__________________________________________________________The Financial Page

May

Fanacial page Date: 2014

From Till

Total Budget 8,072,665.75 Period 02/01/2013 31/05/2014

Difference between planned &

Item Description Budget lines Expenses made approved

Nº MTN % absolut

1 Saláries and Subsidies 1,465,463.00 1,465,463.00 0% -

2 Crime Prevention & Community Capacity building 2,961,996.14 2,961,996.14 0% -

3 Peace, Disarmament and social reinsertion 1,301,105.40 1,299,979.68 9% 1,125.72

4 Advocacy & Monitoring International instruments 1,219,996.00 1,218,997.90 8% 998.100

5 Trips & Conferences 1,124,105.21 1,123,155.00 8% 950.210

Total expenses 8,072,665.75 8,069,591.72 4% 3,074.03

Financial donations

Fund Provenance Total Revenue Difference from the expected

% absolut

External donations(outside Mozambique) 6,098,565.75 - 0% -

External donations (inside Mozambique) - - 0% -

Member contributions 1,974,100.00 - 0% -

Total 8,072,665.75 - 0% -

Total (Revenue less expenses) 8,069,591.72 3,074.03

hostilities must stop – democracy and respect to its principles must be anhenced in mozambique...

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