gender and cash child support in jamaica

Gender and cash child support in Jamaica

Brenda Wyss*

Department of Economics, Wheaton College, Norton, MA 02766, USA

Received 1 November 1999; accepted 29 July 2000

Abstract

Nonresident parents pay a small proportion of the total pecuniary costs of raising children inJamaica. This paper uses household survey data to identify conditions that promote cash support byabsent parents. The paper highlights several ways in which gender influences Jamaican child supportdecisions. Absent fathers contribute cash support more consistently than absent mothers do, and absentfathers support their daughters more consistently than they support sons. Gendered norms of resourcetransfer in adult relationships help explain low levels of paternal support for children. But results fromJamaica cast doubt on the argument that male poverty explains most paternal default on child supportobligations. © 2001 URPE. All rights reserved.

JEL codes: D1; J13; J16

Keywords: Jamaica; Child support; Gender

1. Introduction

Knowing who invests in children and what conditions promote adequate levels of invest-ment in children are crucial for economic policy makers seeking to improve child welfare,to enhance human capital formation, and to promote economic development more broadly.Recent research in developing countries debunks the notion that two coresident biologicalparents support most children. But we have very little information about the relationshipbetween where parents live and how well they support children. Policy makers often assumethat children have access to the resources of both biological parents, even when children and

* Tel.: �1-508-286-3665; fax: �1-508-286-3650.E-mail address: [email protected] (B. Wyss).

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parents live in separate households. But they have not substantiated this assumption, partlybecause many surveys designed for developing countries fail to elicit information aboutchildren�s relationships to their fathers (Lloyd and Desai 1992).1

The question of how living arrangements relate to parents’ support for children isparticularly important in the Jamaican context, since so many Jamaican parents do not livewith their children, and since these parents’ contributions could make a critical difference tochildren’s living standards. In Jamaica, well over half of children (under age fifteen) liveapart from one or more biological parent. Most absent parents are fathers. But there are asignificant number of absent mothers in Jamaica as well. More than half of Jamaican childrenlive apart from their biological fathers, and almost one-fourth live apart from their biologicalmothers (see Table 1). Lloyd and Desai (1992) report for nineteen developing countries thepercentage of children (under age fifteen) who live apart from their mothers. Only two of thecountries they survey have proportions of children with nonresident mothers that are as largeas the proportion in Jamaica (Botswana with 27.6 percent and Liberia with 25.3 percent). Justover 70 percent of all Jamaican households with children under age fifteen are missing atleast one parent. By comparison, in the United States in 1990, 24 percent of all householdswith children under eighteen were missing a parent (Ries and Stone 1992).

Jamaican law assigns responsibility for the support of a child to the biological parentsregardless of whether or not the parents live in the child’s household, but practices ofJamaican parents often diverge from the legal prescriptions. The majority of Jamaicanhouseholds with absent parents report receiving no monetary support from these parents.Only about one-fourth of households with nonresident parents receive financial support fromthem. This pattern persists even though the Jamaican government created a special court toenforce family law. The court is underutilized (Brody 1981), partly because child supportawards are small, and because women hesitate to sue their babyfathers for support out of fearof retaliation or abandonment (Jamaicans use the terms “babymother” and “babyfather” torefer to unmarried coparents). LaFont (1996) estimates that less than one-tenth of urbanJamaican mothers with potential legal justification to collect child support actually attemptto use the court for this purpose.

1Even the U.S. Census Bureau did not begin collecting child support data until about twenty years ago (Folbre1994).

Table 1With whom do Jamaican children live?

Ages 0–14(N � 5917)

Ages 0–5(N � 2308)

Ages 6–14(N � 3609)

Live with mother but not father 37.3% 42.5% 34.0%Live with both parents 33.2% 34.7% 32.3%Live with neither parent 18.4% 12.3% 22.3%Live with father but not mother 5.7% 3.8% 6.9%Living situation undefined 5.4% 6.7% 4.5%

Source: Compiled from Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions 1989-II.

416 B. Wyss / Review of Radical Political Economics 33 (2001) 415–439

While very few absent parents give cash support, these contributions are a significantcomponent of aggregate resources in recipient households. In 1989, households that receivedsupport from absent parents received on average J$966.54 per child missing a parent, equalto 14.8 percent of their reported average yearly per capita consumption expenditures.2

Furthermore, households that received child support money allocated larger proportions ofaggregate household resources to child-specific goods (e.g., children’s clothing and schoolfees) than did nonrecipient households (Wyss 2000).

Recent economic conditions in Jamaica have heightened the importance of child supportpayments for children’s welfare. A prolonged period of economic restructuring and recessionhas eroded the ability of many custodial parents to earn the income needed to provide forchildren (per capita GDP growth has been negative for much of the last 25 years). Over thesame period, the Jamaican government has progressively reduced spending on social pro-grams, first by agreement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, andmore recently out of the conviction that the country has no choice but to comply withneoliberal policy prescriptions (Davies 1997). Government cutbacks have increased theproportion of total child rearing costs paid by private families and households. Custodialparents (mostly women) are increasingly strapped for time and cash, and must intensify theirunpaid household activities in order to replace goods and services no longer provided bygovernment or affordable in the market. In this economic climate, cash child supportpayments from absent parents are critical for children’s living standards and for the well-being of custodial mothers.

Gender relations shed light on Jamaican child support outcomes, and help determineimplications of those outcomes. Feminist economists conceptualize gender as social mean-ings given to biological sex differences (Cagatay, Elson, and Grown 1995: 1828). Genderrelations are power relations between women and men that shape allocations of social,economic, and political resources (Barriteau 1998). Caribbean feminist scholars emphasizethe multiplicity and mutability of Jamaican gender identities as well as their historicalvariability (Barrow 1998; Besson 1998; Barriteau 1998). But these scholars also argue thatthe most powerful and pervasive Jamaican gender ideologies justify women’s subordinationto men. On the other hand, a recent study of gender ideologies and roles in Dominica,Guyana, and Jamaica found that Jamaican women were the most assertive of women in thethree countries, and the least likely to play a subordinate or passive role (Leo-Rhynie 1998:242).

In this paper, I use household survey data from Jamaica to highlight how gender shapescash child support outcomes and implications. I frame the analysis by contrasting thegender-neutral neoclassical child support model with an alternative feminist economicapproach. My empirical findings about Jamaican child support receipts are consistent with

2 In November 1989 one Jamaican dollar (J$) exchanged for US $0.1541 (IDB 1990). I use householdexpenditure data rather than income data to represent aggregate household standards of living. Of households withabsent parents included in my analysis, only about 55 percent have reliable income data. Using expenditure datarather than income data permits me to make comparisons across all households in the sample.

417B. Wyss / Review of Radical Political Economics 33 (2001) 415–439

major predictions of the neoclassical model. But, as feminist economists suggest, thesefindings also illustrate the important role gender plays in determining receipts.

2. Economic theory and child support

The predominant economic theory of child support says almost nothing about genderrelations per se. Yoram Weiss and Robert Willis (1985) expand Gary Becker’s New HomeEconomics framework (Becker 1981) to explicitly address noncustodial parents’ childsupport expenditures. Weiss and Willis model child support choices by noncustodial parentsin a utility maximization framework. In this model children are “consumer durables,” fromwhich a parent expects to enjoy a future stream of satisfaction. Thus parents’ contributionsto children depend on the amount of pleasure they derive from parenting and from theirchildren’s welfare.

Within this utility maximization framework, an absent parent makes decisions aboutgiving financial support to children based on her/his attitude toward them (i.e., her/hiswillingness or desire to pay), her/his ability to pay, the custodial family’s financial needs, andthe legal environment (Beller and Graham 1988; Beron 1990; Paasch and Teachman 1991).The parent’s attitude toward the children depends in part on her/his proximity to them (e.g.,visitation privileges). The custodial family’s financial need is related to its change (reduc-tion) in living standards after parents separate. The absent parent derives utility fromspending time with children and from the custodial family being better off. Thus, in Weissand Willis’s analysis, the amount of child support paid should be larger the more extensiveare the parent’s visitation rights and the larger the reduction in living standards for thecustodial family.

Economists who adopt Weiss and Willis’s approach to child support analysis generallysidestep the question of whether there are gender differences in parental behavior, at leastpartly because their mostly U.S.-based studies focus only on absent fathers’ support behav-ior. But presumably Weiss and Willis’s framework is gender-neutral. Predicting an absentparent’s support behavior requires only preference orderings for each parent (and perhaps forchildren involved), an accounting of resources available to each parent, and informationabout the legal environment. Any observed gender differences in child support behavior canbe explained by identifying ways in which preferences, budget constraints, and the appli-cation of family law vary systematically by gender.

While Weiss and Willis’s explanation of parents’ behavior is gender-neutral on thesurface, they use it to shift responsibility for paternal default in the United States from fathersto mothers. In Weiss and Willis’s analysis, paternal default is the response of frustratedfathers to mothers’ misguided spending patterns. Weiss and Willis attribute fathers’ actionsto a principal-agent problem and lack of physical proximity. Weiss and Willis see childrenas collective consumption goods (or public goods) for the father and mother. Becausechildren are public goods, supporting them presents the traditional free-rider problem: oneparent can benefit from the children without contributing to their support. But as long as thefather and mother are married, proximity and altruism overcome the free-rider problem, andthe married parents allocate an optimal amount of resources to their children. After a divorce,


however, things change. The noncustodial parent (usually the father) loses influence over theallocative decisions of the custodial parent. He fears that money he contributes to the familywill be spent on his ex-spouse, rather than on their children. Kurt Beron states the problemsuccinctly, “The father as principal is unable to monitor the agent’s (mother’s) behavior”(Beron 1990: 652).

According to Weiss and Willis, the father’s fears are justified. The custodial mother nolonger accounts for the benefit to the father of spending on children, and therefore allocatesresources to the children as if they were rival or private goods, not public goods.3 The motherspends part of each child support dollar she receives on her own personal consumption ratherthan on her children. Because of this, even well-meaning fathers default. Or as Weiss andWillis put it, “Since the wife, in effect, taxes every dollar that the husband transfers to herwith the intention of raising the welfare of his children, his incentive to transfer declines, andunderpayment by the husband is generated” (Weiss and Willis 1993: 631).

According to Weiss and Willis, a second reason fathers withdraw child support is becausethey no longer spend much time with their children. Since one motive for a father to supportchildren is to gain access to “child services,” when these services are withdrawn the fathermay withdraw his support. As Weiss and Willis note, maintaining contact is costly, and thesecosts tend to increase with time. Therefore, the incidence of fathers’ noncompliance withchild support agreements increases with time.

Neoclassical economists have not completely sidestepped the potential role of gender inchild support relations. Kathleen Paasch and Jay Teachman (1991) hypothesize that thegender of children affects the allocation of resources by U.S. absent fathers. Paasch andTeachman cite evidence that fathers are more directly involved in the rearing of sons than ofdaughters. Direct involvement strengthens fathers’ commitment to sons, increasing thelikelihood that fathers pay child support. Paasch and Teachman argue that the gender ofchildren has an even greater impact on gender-specific forms of support (e.g., spending timeinteracting with children or taking them shopping for clothing). Fathers will find it easiest tosupport sons in gender-specific ways. But Paasch and Teachman’s empirical findings do notsupport their hypotheses; they find no significant differences in U.S. fathers’ child supportbehaviors related to the gender of children.

A feminist approach suggests a richer view of child support decision making. From agender-sensitive perspective, Weiss and Willis’s analysis looks suspiciously like a commonmale excuse for nonpayment: that mothers cannot be trusted to spend child support moneyappropriately. But on the other hand, feminist economists agree with Weiss and Willis thatabsent fathers have economic reason to avoid supporting children. Nancy Folbre (1994)argues that the process of economic development in the United States has increased the netcosts of raising children, giving both men and women an incentive to default on parentalobligations. But Folbre argues that U.S. men have been in a stronger position than women

3According to Paul Samuelson’s rule for public goods, while parents are married, spending on children shouldbe determined by equating the marginal social utility from spending (the sum of the father’s and mother’smarginal utilities) with the marginal cost. After the divorce, the mother chooses to spend on children the amountthat equates only her own marginal utility from spending with the marginal cost.


to avoid supporting children. She identifies what she calls “patriarchal structures of con-straint” that result in mothers defaulting less often than fathers.

Folbre envisions societies as unique configurations of socially created bundles of con-straints based on gender, age, race, class, sexual orientation, nation, and other culturallysalient categories. An individual’s location within a particular structure (their group identityor membership) is determined by some combination of their asset endowments, formallydefined rules or implicit norms of behavior, and personal preferences. For instance, womenare members of a group defined by gender. Folbre explains, “Women have some similarassets (their reproductive and sexual endowments), are subject to similar rules (many rightsand responsibilities are gender-specific), are governed by similar norms (such as ideals offemininity), and express some similar preferences (such as enjoyment of caring relation-ships)” (Folbre 1994: 55).

In addition to determining group memberships, Folbre’s four structural factors (assets,rules, norms, and preferences) also define the realm of choice for group members. Individualswith similar social locations face similar realms of choice, but groups defined along only onedimension of constraint (e.g., gender) are crosscut by other webs of constraint. A woman’smembership in groups defined by race, class, or sexual orientation, for instance, determinewhich gender-based bundles of constraints she faces.

Folbre’s structures of constraint approach goes beyond lengthening and deepening the listof constraints on economic choice. She also proposes replacing the notion of “rationalchoice” in neoclassical economics with a less restrictive notion of “purposeful choice.”Purposeful choice involves conscious deliberation and the ability of individuals to challengethe constraints that they face. The concept also builds on feminist insights that “self” and“self-interest” are social constructions. Women may perceive their self-interests in lessbounded and individualistic terms than men do. Women (and men) in some cultures may notexperience their self-interest as separate from that of their families (Kondo 1990; Olmsted1997). The notion of purposeful choice allows for outcomes to be generated by conformityrather than calculation, for choices to be motivated by what’s “right” rather than by what’sadvantageous, and for individuals to act on group allegiance rather than personal gain (Folbre1994).

Structures of constraint foster collective identities and action among individuals withsimilar social locations who face similar realms of choice. Because structures of constrainttend to be hierarchical (systematically advantaging members of some groups and disadvan-taging members of others), group members share a collective interest in either perpetuatingor modifying these structures. This means that gender-differentiated assets, rules, norms, andpreferences are themselves shaped by gender-based collective action in pursuit of groupinterests. Men act collectively and women act collectively to create, reinforce, and reshapethe distribution of assets between men and women and the formal and informal rules ofappropriate gendered behavior (England 1993; Folbre 1993; McCrate 1988).

In Folbre’s view, U.S. gender-based structures of constraint systematically disadvantagemothers and children by permitting (if not promoting) male default on child supportobligations. Key aspects of the U.S. patriarchal structure of constraint shaping parentalbehavior include “family law, social policy, social norms, and personal preferences” (1994:112). U.S. family courts award child custody to mothers more often than to fathers,


practically guaranteeing that women pay the largest share of the opportunity costs of raisingchildren, if not of the out-of-pocket costs. When U.S. courts order noncustodial fathers to paycash support for children, amounts ordered are usually very low, nonpayment rates are high,and enforcement measures are grossly inadequate. U.S. gender ideologies reinforce thetendency for fathers not to pay their share of child rearing costs. Mothering is arguably morecentral to women’s identity than fathering is to men’s, meaning that male default on childrearing obligations may not seriously undermine a man’s self-esteem or social standing. Andgender socialization shapes preferences in systematic ways, resulting in some women’swillingness to pay a disproportionate share of the costs of raising children. U.S. women’slimited access to valuable resources (money, good jobs, control of media, educational andreligious institutions, political clout, even “free” time) has limited their ability to reversemale biases in family law, social policy, social norms, and preference formation.

Folbre’s framework can be fruitfully applied to Jamaica, where the gender distribution ofchild rearing costs is even more skewed towards women than in the United States. InJamaica, child support decisions are determined by more than just exogenous preferencesand a narrowly defined set of constraints (including incomes, relative prices, and perhapslegal constraints). Deep-seated notions of what types of conduct are “appropriate” and ofwhat types of outcomes are “legitimate” (Sen 1990) help regulate child support behavior.The desire (or compulsion) to live up to social ideals of masculinity and femininity maymotivate fathers’ and mothers’ support behaviors, even when these ideals dictate actions thatconflict with individual economic self-interest. Jamaican parents make purposeful choicesabout supporting children within structures of constraint that include social norms andendogenous preferences, in addition to assets and formal rules.

Gender-based structures of constraint in Jamaica ensure that women pay the lion’s shareof the costs of raising children, largely because children are much more likely to live withmothers, or aunts, or grandmothers than with fathers, uncles, or grandfathers. Parents wholive with their children incur most of the opportunity costs of rearing children (by foregoingincome-generating or leisure activities to care for children), and often most out-of-pocketexpenses too (when noncustodial parents fail to pay much child support). Social norms andstate policy both help determine custody patterns. The English-speaking Caribbean inheritedfrom Europe an idealized gender division of rearing children in which women are primarycaretakers and men are financial providers (Douglass 1992; LaFont 1996). Despite signifi-cant extended family involvement in child rearing and a widespread practice of childfostering, most Jamaicans believe that it is best for children (especially very young children)to be raised by their biological mothers (Douglass 1992; LaFont 1996). Child custody israrely formalized through official legal channels in Jamaica, but Jamaican women prevail ina majority of legal custody cases (LaFont 1996: 89).

Jamaican norms of gendered behavior also help explain why noncustodial parents (bothmothers and fathers) pay so little cash child support. Since good mothering is measuredmostly in nonpecuniary terms (by nurturing and caretaking), noncustodial mothers facelimited community pressure to pay child support. But breadwinning is considered a father’sprimary contribution, so noncustodial fathers do risk social condemnation when they fail topay support. On the other hand, anthropologist Suzanne LaFont argues that many low-income Jamaican fathers have not internalized the commitment to paternal provisioning


embodied in idealized visions of parenting and in the Jamaican legal code (LaFont 1996:207). Because of this, LaFont argues, social sanctions against paternal default are relativelyweak and ineffectual.

Deep-seated notions of masculinity and femininity further erode absent fathers’ supportfor their children. Both Jamaican men and Jamaican women assert that it is a man’s “nature”to need more than one woman, while a woman can be satisfied with one man (Smith 1987;Sobo 1993). This shared sense of male nature reinforces the tendency for fathers to havechildren living in a number of different households, exacerbating difficulties men havesupporting children.

Gendered norms of resource exchange in sexual relationships also limit the degree towhich Jamaican fathers help pay child rearing costs. In Jamaica, women expect male loversto give them money and material goods, while female lovers provide men services (Brody1981; Clarke 1966; Senior 1991). Some scholars suggest that the link between sex andmaterial goods has been strengthened in recent decades by intensified consumerism inJamaica (Leo-Rhynie 1998: 250). This norm creates conflict for men who no longer haveromantic or sexual relationships with their babymothers, but wish to continue supportingchildren. Jamaican mothers report that babyfathers stop paying child support when sexualrelationships end (LaFont and Pruitt 1997) or that babyfathers send gifts in kind rather thancash out of concern that babymothers will spend cash on a new boyfriend or another man’schild (Black 1995). Janet Brown found that Jamaican fathers severely curtail interactionswith their children when the children live in another man’s home (Brown 1993). Men areparticularly likely to stop paying support when a babymother legally marries, because thenew spouse is legally liable for children’s support (French 1990b).

Jamaican state policy permits paternal default. Jamaican women organized around genderinterests to modify family law in ways designed to weaken men’s ability to avoid sharingchild rearing costs (Cumper and Daly 1979). Prior to 1976, Jamaican law automaticallyobliged fathers to support only “legitimate” children (less than half of all children born anygiven year).4 But the Status of Children Act of 1976 obliged fathers to support all biologicalchildren, including those born out of wedlock. The legal change was intended, in part, toreshape Jamaican notions of “appropriate” paternal behavior, contributing to changes infathers’ child support practices.

Unfortunately, the short-run impact of the new law has been limited by other Jamaicangender constraints. Jamaican men draw on their physical strength, gender ideology, andpublic power (male assets) to keep mothers from effectively using family courts to collectsupport. Domestic violence and the threat of violence are used by babyfathers to deterbabymothers from taking them to court (LaFont and Pruitt 1997). When a woman takes herbabyfather to court, she “shames” him with an act that demonstrates he has lost control ofher (LaFont and Pruitt 1997). Many Jamaicans believe that a woman who publicly humiliatesher man in this way actually invites or deserves a beating (LaFont 1996: 102–103). AndJamaicans tolerate a degree of male violence because many believe violence is an essential

4In the early 1980s, for instance, 70 percent of children were born to unmarried parents (Seager and Olson1986).


aspect of masculinity (Clarke 1998). In this context, some Jamaican mothers avoid the familycourt defensively, in order to avoid domestic violence.

Male-dominance of the Jamaican police force helps babyfathers use violence (and threatsof violence) as a support avoidance tactic. Clarke (1998) reports that Caribbean police oftentreat domestic violence as a private matter requiring conciliation rather than as a criminaloffense. Caribbean women’s organizations have organized successfully to change somepolice policies (and hopefully practices as well). The Jamaican Police Service has establishedspecial units mandated to intervene in domestic violence incidents, and to counsel and securemedical treatment for battered women. The units also conduct public education in schools,churches, and community groups (Clarke 1998).

According to LaFont (1996), Jamaican family law provides fathers with another tool toavoid paying support. While the 1976 Status of Children Act required fathers to supportchildren born out of wedlock, it also gave fathers equal custody rights to these children. Priorto the legislative change, only mothers of children born out of wedlock had custodial rights.LaFont argues that the new legislation enables babyfathers to sue for child custody in“retaliation” when a babymother sues for child support. When this happens, babymotherstend to withdraw their formal claims for support in order to avoid the risk of losing custody.Threat of a custody suit prevents other mothers from taking babyfathers to court in the firstplace.

3. Gender and cash child support in Jamaica

The New Home Economics model and Folbre’s structures of constraint approach generatea number of testable hypotheses about Jamaican child support behavior. Consistent with theNew Home Economics model, I expect cash child support receipts to correlate positivelywith the neediness of a custodial household, with the degree of contact between an absentparent and her/his child(ren), and with the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay. But I alsoexpect to find differences in child support behavior between absent mothers and absentfathers, even after controlling (to the degree possible) for their income levels, for theexpenditure levels of custodial households, and for the degree of contact between noncus-todians and their children.

Breadwinning continues to be more closely associated with fatherhood than withmotherhood in Jamaica, and I expect this norm to result in absent fathers providing morecash support for children than absent mothers do. Despite gendered socialization prac-tices which may result in women’s greater altruism or devotion to family, men facegreater social pressure to provide income for children. But because of Jamaican normsgoverning resource transfers in adult relationships, I expect absent fathers to give lesscash support to custodial mothers who live with new romantic partners than to motherswithout live-in partners.

Both the New Home Economics and the structures of constraint approaches generate theexpectation that absent fathers will support sons better than daughters. From a neoclassicalperspective, fathers who are more closely involved with raising sons than daughters will tendto reap greater utility from supporting sons, and will favor sons when giving support.


Attention to gender-based structures of constraint suggests a similar outcome. In this view,fathers support sons better than daughters out of gender-based solidarity grounded in aconscious or unconscious belief in male superiority, or in the desire to shore up malesocioeconomic dominance. Similarly, absent mothers may favor daughters, hoping that bydoing so the next generation of women will be better off.

3.1. Data and methods

I use data from the November 1989 component of the Jamaican Survey of LivingConditions (JSLC) and the linked October 1989 Labor Force Survey (LFS) to test myhypotheses. The LFS, conducted by the Jamaican government, includes labor force infor-mation for a nationally representative sample of households. The JSLC is based on the WorldBank’s Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys, and was administered totwo-thirds of the LFS sample.5 The JSLC reports child support income for 1,629 householdswith children missing parents. The data include only aggregate child support income for eachhousehold, making it impossible in most cases to determine which absent parent of whichchild contributed to the household, or how much they contributed. This is problematic sinceso many households include groups of children having different combinations of mothers andfathers.6 Ideally, I would correlate each child’s support with attributes of that child andher/his parents, as well as with attributes of the child’s household. But given limitations ofthe data, I relate child support outcomes for each household to attributes of the entire groupof children with missing parents.

Because the household is the unit of analysis in the JSLC, the data also lack relevantinformation about nonresident parents. While the data do include educational informationabout absent parents, they do not include information about absent parents’ employmentstatus or income, their relationship status, the number of children they have fathered or givenbirth to, or the degree of support they provide to children in other households. U.S. childsupport studies face similar data limitations (e.g., Beller and Graham 1985; Beller andGraham 1993; Beron 1990). Like the U.S. research, my analysis uses socioeconomiccharacteristics of resident parents together with the limited educational information providedas proxies for nonresident parents’ incomes.

I model child support receipts as a function of a vector of characteristics of absent parents

5The JSLC survey has been conducted annually since 1988 (with the exception of 1989 when it was conductedtwice). The data are available to the general research community only by written permission from the PlanningInstitute of Jamaica. The November 1989 data are particularly useful for my analysis because they include almosttwice as many households as other rounds of the survey, and because they provide information about children’sparents that is excluded in most later rounds of the JSLC (The World Bank 1999). See Grosh (1990) for furtherinformation about this data source.

6Multiple, mostly nonlegal, marriages (both sequential and simultaneous) are relatively common in Jamaica,creating complex webs of family and household relationships. One common residential arrangement includes agrandmother, some of her adult children, a variety of her grandchildren (usually the children of her daughters),and perhaps other relatives and/or fictive kin.


(A) and characteristics of custodial households (C). Equation one represents this relation-ship.7

AMOUNT � f(A,C), (1)

where AMOUNT is the Jamaican dollar amount of child support reported per child with atleast one missing parent.

But child support receipts are really the outcome of two related decisions by absentparents: first, whether or not to give at all, and second, how much to give. The following twoequations provide an alternate expression of the model.

GET � f�(A�,C�) for all households with missing parents, and (2)

AMOUNT � f�(A�,C�) for households that report cash receipts. (3)

GET is a dummy variable set equal to one for households that receive positive amountsof cash support, and zero otherwise. Vectors A� and A� include three binary independentvariables indicating average educational levels reported for absent parents affiliated withcustodial households. The characteristics of custodial households in vectors C� and C�include three dummy household location variables (to control for potential locational dif-ferences in norms, preferences, and economic conditions); the continuous variable, EXP,which measures adjusted per capita household expenditure levels; and a string of variablesreporting numbers of household members in various demographic categories. Table 2provides complete definitions for variables used in the analysis, and Table 3 reports variablemeans.

Because Eq. (3) can only be estimated for the subset of households reporting some cashsupport (26.3 percent of households in the JSLC), OLS coefficient estimates for Eq. (3) maysuffer from selectivity bias. Selectivity bias is a problem to the degree that omitted variablesrelated to whether or not a household receives support also help determine the amount ofthese receipts.

I use two approaches to correct for the possible selectivity bias: James Heckman’s sampleselection model and a one-limit tobit estimation. With the Heckman approach, I first estimatedeterminants of the probability of receiving any child support, using maximum likelihoodprobit. I then use probit estimates to calculate an inverse Mills ratio, LAMBDA, forhouseholds receiving support (LAMBDA represents the omitted variable(s) which may causeselectivity bias). Finally, LAMBDA is included as an explanatory variable in a least squaresregression on the per-child amount of cash support received, using only those observationswith positive amounts of support (Heckman 1979). Ex post, I find only limited evidence ofsample selection bias. The coefficient estimate for LAMBDA is insignificantly different fromzero in both sample selection model regressions.

Using the Heckman approach, parameter estimates for Eq. (3) are consistent but inefficient

7Equation (1) could be seen as a reduced form expression derived from equilibrating custodial parents’demand for child support with absent parents’ supply of child support. I choose not to pursue this approach sincemy data are better suited to analyzing the reduced form rather than the structural equations.


compared with maximum likelihood techniques which incorporate observations with zeroamounts paid in addition to those with positive amounts paid (Beron 1990: 651). Heckman’stechnique has other limitations as well, some of which are described in Lewis (1986) andStolzenberg and Relles (1990). Because of the weaknesses of Heckman’s approach, I alsopresent the results of a tobit estimation of the determinants of cash support per child. Unlikethe Heckman least squares estimation, the tobit uses all observations, both those with zerocash child support and those with positive amounts of support. Tables 4 and 5 reportcoefficient estimates for the least squares regressions and marginal effects for probit and tobitregressions.8

3.2. Neoclassical insights

As New Home Economists predict, all else being equal, the poorest custodial householdsin Jamaica (the neediest) are most likely to receive cash child support. The need of custodialhouseholds is represented in my analysis by the independent variable EXP, an adjusted per

8The marginal effect reported for any explanatory variable is the derivative of the expected value of thedependent variable with respect to that explanatory variable, evaluated at the sample means of the observationsused to fit the model.

Table 2Variable definitions

Variable Definition

KMA � 1 if household is in Kingston Metropolitan Area and 0 otherwiseTOWN � 1 if household is in a town and 0 otherwiseRURAL � 1 if household is in a rural area and 0 otherwiseEXP � Deflated and adjusted per capita annual household expenditure levelCHMF � Number of household children under age 15 with absent fathersCHMM � Number of household children under age 15 with absent mothersCHMB � Number of household children under age 15 with both parents absentBMF � Number of household boys under age 15 with absent fathersBMB � Number of household boys under age 15 with both parents absentGMF � Number of household girls under age 15 with absent fathersGMB � Number of household girls under age 15 with both parents absentWOMEN � Number of household womenMEN � Number of household menMOMPART � Number of children with absent fathers whose mother’s new male partner lives in the

householdNOINFO � 1 if household does not know or does not report any educational levels for absent parents

and 0 otherwiseLOWED � 1 if the mean years of education reported for absent parents are nine or less and 0

otherwiseHIGHED � 1 if the mean years of education reported for absent parents are 10 or greater and 0

otherwiseGET � 1 if household receives some amount of cash support from absent parents and 0 otherwiseAMOUNT � Annual dollars of child support reported per household child with one or more absent

parent


capita household expenditure measure. Both my probit and my tobit regressions relate EXPnegatively to child support receipts.

My findings also support the hypothesis that increased parental interaction with childrenincreases the likelihood that parents pay cash support. I use the explanatory variableNOINFO as a proxy for the degree of contact between absent parents and their children.NOINFO is a dummy variable set equal to one when a custodial household reports noinformation about absent parents’ educational levels. NOINFO equals one both when noinformation is recorded for educational levels of missing parents (i.e., when these data aremissing), and when the household respondent reports no knowledge of the educational levelsof missing parents. I hypothesize that households lacking knowledge of absent parents’educational levels also lack consistent contact with these parents. As expected, householdsthat do not provide information about the educational levels of absent parents are signifi-cantly less likely than others to receive cash child support (NOINFO is negative andsignificant in both the probit and the tobit estimations).

The New Home Economics hypothesis about the importance of a noncustodial parent’sability to pay support is more difficult to test with available data. The best proxy for absentparents’ incomes in the JSLC is the educational level reported for absent parents; parentswith the highest educational attainment should have the highest incomes on average. Thedummy variables LOWED and HIGHED identify households reporting mean educationallevels for noncustodial parents of nine or less years or of more than nine years respectively.As noted above, a third dummy variable (NOINFO) identifies households that report noeducational levels for noncustodial parents. Consistent with the neoclassical prediction,

Table 3Variable means

All households withmissing parents

Households that receivecash support

Sample size 1629 428KMA 0.17 0.12TOWN 0.26 0.27EXP 8.05 6.73CHMF 1.34 1.59BMF 0.69 0.77GMF 0.65 0.82CHMM 0.20 0.10CHMB 0.65 0.84BMB 0.32 0.41GMB 0.33 0.43WOMEN 1.54 1.61MEN 1.10 0.93MOMPART 0.21 0.10NOINFO 0.32 0.21LOWED 0.42 0.47HIGHED 0.26 0.32LAMBDA 0.00 1.14GET 0.26 1.00AMOUNT 261.83 996.54


JSLC households with the most highly educated absent parents (those parents expected tohave the highest incomes) are more likely to receive support and report higher amounts ofsupport than do comparable households with less educated absent parents. But HIGHED isstatistically significant only in the tobit estimation. In the tobit estimation, having morehighly educated absent parents (those with an average of ten or more years of education) isassociated with an additional J$89.38 in annual child support receipts per child with amissing parent.

The story is complicated somewhat when we consider the relationship between the

Table 4Regression results

Heckman selectivity model Tobit model

Probability of receipt(marginal effects)

Amount of receipts(coefficient estimates)

Amount ofreceipts(marginal effects)

KMA �.042 812.51** 22.81(1.25) (2.94) (0.44)

TOWN .028 525.44** 93.69*(1.05) (2.62) (2.28)

EXP �.008** 4.16 �11.27**(4.40) (0.19) (3.63)

CHMF .037** �176.18* 29.27*(4.40) (2.14) (2.26)

CHMM �.041� �149.13 �78.54*(1.83) (0.77) (2.20)

CHMB .040** �289.80** 18.64(3.50) (2.67) (1.06)

WOMEN �.010 195.67* 9.13(0.70) (2.01) (0.44)

MEN �.043** �140.22 �68.12**(3.68) (1.13) (3.75)

MOMPART �.101** — �144.81**(4.50) (4.07)

NOINFO �.089** 283.87 �92.08*(3.21) (1.06) (2.14)

LOWED Omitted Omitted OmittedHIGHED .037 271.10 89.38*

(1.36) (1.37) (2.18)LAMBDA — �149.23 —

(0.20)CONSTANT �.118 1104.38 �268.03

(3.48) (1.30) (5.10)ADJ R2 — .086 —LIKELIHOOD

RATIOTEST

142.05 — —

N 1629 428 1629

** Significant at 1%.* Significant at 5%.� Significant at 10%.


expenditure level of the custodial household and the economic status of noncustodial parents.Since Jamaicans practice what Gary Becker calls “positive assortive mating,” children of thepoorest absent parents are likely to live in the poorest custodial households. This means thatthe variable EXP is also a proxy (but perhaps a weaker one than HIGHED and LOWED) forabsent parents’ ability to pay; as EXP increases, ceteris paribus, we would expect thehousehold’s absent parents to be increasingly well paid. But households with the highestexpenditure levels are least likely to receive cash child support. This means that many

Table 5Regression results with gender of children

Heckman selectivity model Tobit model

Probability of receipt(marginal effects)

Amount of receipts(coefficient estimates)

Amount ofreceipts(marginal effects)

KMA �.042 791.45** 23.36(1.25) (2.88) (0.45)

TOWN .027 563.62** 93.25*(1.01) (2.80) (2.25)

EXP �.008** �1.91 �11.46**(4.03) (0.09) (3.68)

BMF .021� �75.43 15.99(1.69) (0.75) (0.82)

BMB .039* �227.87 21.80(2.25) (1.60) (0.81)

GMF .058** �246.57* 49.11**(4.59) (2.02) (2.55)

GMB .049** �302.13* 30.01(2.86) (2.07) (1.14)

WOMEN �.006 210.49* 16.16(0.43) (2.20) (0.78)

MEN �.047** �187.55 �77.34**(4.16) (1.13) (4.35)

MOMPART �.099** — �141.15**(4.43) (3.95)

NOINFO �.090** 263.64 �93.19*(3.26) (0.97) (2.15)

LOWED Omitted Omitted OmittedHIGHED .037 268.08 89.99*

(1.38) (1.35) (2.18)LAMBDA — 13.10 —

(0.02)CONSTANT �.131 922.53 �292.76

(3.95) (1.04) (5.66)ADJ R2 — .086 —LIKELIHOOD

RATIOTEST

142.52 — —

N 1629 428 1629

** Significant at 1%.* Significant at 5%.� Significant at 10%.


presumably high income absent parents do not contribute cash support, despite their rela-tively favorable ability to do so.

This finding is particularly interesting in light of the well-worn argument that “maleeconomic marginality” drives men’s default from paternal responsibilities (Bolles 1991;Sobo 1993). In the JSLC sample, even men likely to be quite poor (those with loweducational levels) respond to the financial need of children living in poor households bygiving cash support. Relatively uneducated fathers associated with the least well-off custo-dial households are particularly likely to be poor. But over half (51.5 percent) of householdsin the poorest per capita consumption quintile, with relatively uneducated absent fathers (andno absent mothers), receive cash support from these fathers, compared with only 26.3 percentof all households with missing parents.

3.3. Gendered structures of constraint

New Home Economists’ gender-neutral analysis takes us some distance towardsexplaining variations in Jamaican child support receipts. But the gender of an absentparent gives insights into child support behavior not available when we consider only theabsent parent’s resource base, the expenditure level of the custodial household, and thedegree of parent-child contact. Absent fathers’ child support behavior is considerablymore predictable than absent mothers’ child support behavior, even among parents withsimilar educational levels, similarly needy children, and similar evidence of contact withtheir children. The probability that a household receives child support is positively andsignificantly related (at the 1 percent level) to the number of children with nonresidentfathers (CHMF), while the probability of receipt is negatively (but not significantly)related to the number of children with nonresident mothers (CHMM). The number ofchildren with both parents absent (CHMB) has an even larger positive impact on theprobability of receipt than does CHMF, and the coefficient estimate for CHMB is alsosignificant. In the least squares regression, the coefficient estimate for CHMM is largerthan the coefficient estimate for CHMF, suggesting that contributing mothers might givelarger amounts of cash support than contributing fathers, but the two coefficient esti-mates are not statistically different in size.

The negative signs on these parameter estimates indicate that per child support declinesas the number of children with missing parents increases. Absent parents do not increase theircontributions in direct proportion to the number of children they have living in a household.Parents may assume that there are economies of scale in raising children. Or they may simplybe unable to provide each of several children the level of support they could provide for onechild. It is also possible that greater numbers of children missing parents are associated withgreater numbers of nonresident parents, not all of whom contribute support. In the tobitestimation, as in the probit, CHMF is positively related to receipts while CHMM isnegatively related to receipts.

The finding that absent fathers are more likely to give cash support than absent mothers(even after controlling for the factors I describe above) reflects some degree of sampleselection bias grounded in gendered expectations for parents. Absent mothers are likely tohave some characteristics not controlled for in my estimations that are associated with very


low likelihoods of contributing child support. Absent mothers are more likely than absentfathers to be very young, to be ill or otherwise disabled, to have died, or to havecompletely abandoned their parental responsibilities. In Jamaica, it is quite common fora father not to live in his child’s household. The father’s absence does not necessarilyindicate extenuating circumstances which might prevent him from contributing support,or circumstances which might augment his contributions (e.g., emigration). But amother’s absence is less common, and is more often associated with circumstanceswhich threaten her financial contributions to her children (e.g., abandonment of children,early motherhood, mother’s ill health, or her death).9 At the other extreme, a mother mayleave her children’s household (or perhaps even leave Jamaica) in order to earn moremoney to support them.10 Thus, mothers exhibit a wider range of child support behavior(i.e., less predictable behavior) than fathers do.

I doubt that Jamaican fathers’ more predictable child support behavior reflects the relativestrength of their preferences for children (i.e., that men have stronger preferences for childrenthan women do). In theory, absent parents who reap the most utility from spending onchildren will contribute the most cash support, all else being equal. But all else is not equal.(I have not completely controlled for gender differences in parental resources, norms, andexpectations.) The preference hypothesis contradicts both conventional wisdom and thecommon neoclassical assumption that women have stronger preferences for children thanmen do (Fuchs 1988). Furthermore, the preference hypothesis is suspect in light of evidencefrom Jamaica and other countries that women devote larger proportions of their earnings thanmen do to meet basic family needs (Bruce, Lloyd, and Leonard 1995; Handa 1994; Louat,Grosh, and van der Gaag 1992).

On the other hand, some part of the estimated impact of absent parents’ genders onreceipts probably does reflect gender differences in incomes (i.e., in absent parents’abilities to pay), since I can only imperfectly control for absent parents’ incomes. Onaverage, Jamaican women face more binding income constraints than Jamaican men face(i.e., women tend to earn less income and suffer higher unemployment rates). In 1985,average weekly earnings were J$68.30 for women and J$86.90 for men (French 1990a).In 1989, the average monthly unemployment rate for women was 26.1 percent while formen the average was 10.9 percent (PIOJ 1990). As I report above, at any giveneducational level fathers are more likely to support children than mothers are. But sinceJamaican women earn less than comparably educated Jamaican men (Scott 1991),education is an imperfect proxy for income.

My probit and tobit estimations provide strong evidence that many absent fathers stopgiving support when a babymother’s new partner lives in the custodial household.11

9 Using the JSLC data, it is not possible to determine whether an absent parent is living or dead.10 Migration is an important Jamaican survival strategy. In the late 1980s, net migration was roughly 30,000

to 40,000 per year, or more than 80 percent of the natural population increase (Polanyi Levitt 1990). A 1991 studyof 792 low-income Kingston households found that about 60 percent had relatives abroad. About half of allhouseholds had relatives in the United States (Itzigsohn 1995).

11Because of the small number of custodial fathers in the sample, I cannot evaluate how absent mothersrespond when their babyfathers (and children) live with the babyfathers’ female lovers.


MOMPART is negative and significant at the 1 percent level in both the probit and tobitestimations (see Tables 4 and 5). Child support receipts decrease by over J$140.00 per childfor each additional child whose mother’s male partner is in residence. Because giving tobabymothers and children has two distinct motives (to fulfill expectations for male lovers andto support children), default by absent fathers must be interpreted with care. Default maysignal attenuation of the father’s commitment to children or changes in the economicwell-being of either the father or the custodial household. But it may also signal a change inthe sexual relationship of the babyfather and the babymother. A man’s desire to stopcontributing money to his babymother when she has a new lover may conflict with his desireto give to his children who live with her.

Child support receipts are sensitive to the presence of adult custodial household membersother than mothers’ new partners. For custodial households at any given consumptionexpenditure level, the larger the number of adult male household members, the smaller theprobability that the household receives support. The explanatory variable, MEN, is negativeand significant in the probit and tobit estimations (see Tables 4 and 5). Additional numbersof adult women in a household may also decrease the likelihood of receipt, but the evidencefor this is weaker (WOMEN is negative in the probit estimations but not significant).Interestingly, greater numbers of women in a custodial household are statistically associatedwith higher amounts of cash support per child.

Noncustodial parents’ perceptions of the financial need of a custodial householddepend in part on the demographic composition of the household. It is plausible thatabsent parents expect men to contribute resources to the children they live with (andthereby to reduce the need for child support) even when these men do not makesignificant contributions. The relatively generous amounts of cash support reported byhouseholds with large numbers of adult women probably reflect receipt of “babymothersupport” in addition to child support (such households often include a group of sistersraising children in their mother’s household). Babyfathers contributing cash child sup-port often are still romantically or sexually involved with their babymothers. Thesebabyfathers are expected to contribute to the babymother’s personal consumption andnot just to their children. Thus, as the number of women in a household increases, sodoes the potential number of babymothers whose cash receipts from babyfathers includepersonal support as well as child support.

A feminist reinterpretation of Weiss and Willis’s principal-agent problem also helpsexplain the negative correlations between MOMPART, MEN, and child support receipts.Absent fathers resist contributing money over which they feel they have little or nocontrol, and fathers feel especially unable to control child support monies when ababymother lives with her new lover or with other adult men. Jamaican fathers appar-ently believe their babymothers spend money selfishly (LaFont 1996; Sobo 1993). Butit is doubtful that custodial mothers really do spend large amounts of child supportmoney on their own personal consumption items, since child support payments tend tobe so small relative to the costs of rearing children, and since most Jamaican womenspend more on child and family goods than Jamaican men do (Handa 1994; Louat,Grosh, and van der Gaag 1992).


3.4. Sons and daughters

I find no evidence that Jamaican fathers contribute more cash support to boys than to girls.In fact, Jamaican fathers support daughters more consistently than sons. Unfortunately, Icannot examine how absent mothers respond to children’s genders because the number ofhouseholds with missing mothers is prohibitively small. In the sample selectivity model (seeTable 5), the presence of girls with absent fathers (GMF) increases the probability of receiptsignificantly more dramatically than does the presence of boys with absent fathers (BMF).The same is true for girls missing both parents (GMB) compared to boys missing bothparents (BMB). Only the numbers of girls with missing parents are significant determinantsof support in the least squares and tobit estimations (GMF and GMB in the least squaresregression and GMF in the tobit). But while fathers are more likely to support daughters thansons, they may contribute larger amounts of money to sons than to daughters. The coefficientestimate for boys missing fathers (BMF) in the AMOUNT regression is larger than that forgirls missing fathers (GMF), but the two coefficient estimates are not significantly differentin size.

While they are inconsistent with my expectations, these findings can be explained usingtools of both neoclassical economics and feminist economics. Most neoclassical literatureabout child support behavior considers spending on children to be a form of consumptionspending: absent parents allocate available resources between their own consumption andtheir children’s consumption with the goal of maximizing personal utility. But spending onchildren also can be viewed through the neoclassical lens of human capital theory.12 Onemotive for absent parents to pay child support is to invest in children’s human capital inhopes of receiving a future return on this investment (e.g., by enjoying children’s support inold age). Ethnographic research suggests this motive is an important one in Jamaica (Sobo1993). To maximize the expected return on human capital investments, an absent parentshould allocate child support money according to a child’s relative likelihood of acquiringand utilizing valuable forms of human capital and her/his likelihood of sharing the returnswith the absent parent. In Jamaica, adult sons will have greater incomes on average than adultdaughters. But Jamaican daughters appear more likely to share income with their elderlyparents (Brody 1981; Senior 1991). Favoring daughters is an economically rational patternof cash support behavior, then, for Jamaican parents concerned with their own futureeconomic security.

Alternatively, absent fathers may believe that daughters are more vulnerable than sons;that daughters have greater economic need, necessitating greater support. Feminist econo-mist, Bina Agarwal, extends Amartya Sen’s analysis of how notions of legitimacy helpdetermine consumption shares. Sen (1990) argues that social perceptions of individuals’contributions to households help determine what consumption shares are legitimate. Agarwal

12 Human capital theory attributes individual and group differences in labor market outcomes (e.g., occupa-tional attainment and earnings) to differing investments in productivity-related skills. Neoclassical economists usehuman capital theory to explain gender divisions of labor in homes and labor markets. See Jacobsen for feministcritiques of human capital theory (1999: 445–447).


(1994) argues that perceived needs play an equally important role in justifying consumptionshares. Because gender-differentiated economic opportunities in Jamaica make it easier forboys than for girls to help support themselves, daughters appear to have greater economicneed than sons do. In 1989, the unemployment rate for young women (under age twenty-five)was over twice the unemployment rate for young men (PIOJ 1990). Nonetheless, teenageboys in Jamaica are not very likely to be economically self-sufficient. Even young men sufferunemployment rates of 20 percent and upwards (PIOJ 1990). And while 28 percent offourteen to seventeen year olds were not enrolled in school in 1989, only 57 percent of thesewere in the labor force (Handa 1994).

I am not the first researcher to find evidence of daughter-preference in Jamaica. ErnaBrodber (1974: 33) identifies “a cultural reluctance to care for male children,” evidenced inhigher numbers of custody disputes over girls than over boys, and in the relatively highnumbers of sons abandoned by mothers. Brodber links this pattern to data showing thatparents (particularly mothers) perceive sons as more difficult to discipline and to socializethan girls.

4. Conclusions

Empirical findings I report in this paper are consistent with central neoclassical tenetsabout child support behavior. Jamaican cash child support receipts correlate positively withthe neediness of a custodial household, with the degree of contact between an absent parentand her/his child(ren), and with the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay. But the neoclassicalmodel does not tell the full story of Jamaican child support economies. Because they ignoregender relations, neoclassical economists miss important power dynamics that shape childsupport outcomes. And without consideration of these power dynamics, paternal defaultappears to be an inevitable response to mothers’ misguided spending patterns. Thus, neo-classical arguments may be used to justify men’s default, thereby reinforcing this behaviorand its threat to women’s and children’s welfare. Gender plays a role in Jamaican childsupport practices that goes beyond determining parental access to resources, contact withchildren, and the neediness of custodial households. In Jamaica, nonresident fathers givemoney to their children more consistently than nonresident mothers do. And absent fathersare more likely to contribute cash to daughters than to sons. Rather than arguing thatnonresident fathers value children more highly than do nonresident mothers, I argue that myevidence reflects differences in role expectations and in access to resources between womenand men. And the Jamaican belief that daughters are more likely than sons to help supportor care for parents in old age helps explain the fact that fathers support daughters better thansons.

But while nonresident fathers exhibit more predictable child support behavior thannonresident mothers do, these fathers pay a small proportion of the total pecuniary costs ofraising children. Less than one-third of households with missing fathers receive any cashsupport from them. And on average, children with missing fathers receive an amount equalto only about one-fifth of the household’s yearly per-capita expenditure level. Absent fathers’support contributions are constrained by gender-specific norms of resource transfer in adult


relationships and by union patterns which often result in men having children in manyhouseholds, while most men have limited earnings. At the same time, the incidence ofsupport is highest among the neediest households. This last finding is consistent withneoclassical economists’ assumption that noncustodial parents respond to custodial families’financial needs. But this finding also calls into question the argument that most paternaldefault results from male economic marginality (i.e., men’s limited access to income andother resources).

The combination of gender roles in parenting (which result in children living with mothersmore often than with fathers) and gender roles in adult relationships (which include normsgoverning resource transfers from men to women) threatens the stability of male support forchildren. These roles also entail an asymmetry of power between babyfathers and baby-mothers which may reinforce Jamaican women’s subordinate status. A breakdown orinfidelity in two parents’ relationship may result in the babyfather penalizing his babymother(and thereby their children who live with her) by ceasing to give support. The woman has nosimilar economic recourse. It is unlikely she will stop supporting their children, who live inher own household, in the event that her babyfather starts seeing a new woman. The mothermay, however, withdraw visitation privileges. But this move likely would exacerbate heralready precarious economic situation, since fathers who do not visit are particularly unlikelyto pay child support. A mother’s actions are almost always constrained by the risk of losingher babyfather’s economic support, while a father’s actions usually are not similarly con-strained.

Women’s disproportionate share of child rearing costs reinforces unequal gender relationsthrough other channels as well. Custodial mothers without economic support from theirbabyfathers may be forced to forgo income-generating opportunities in order to care forchildren or to produce goods and services at home that they cannot afford in the market. Longwork hours (devoted to a combination of income generating activities and home production)leave little time for involvement in community organizations, social interactions, or politicalactivity. The loss of economic options and incomes, of strong social ties and supportnetworks, and of political clout all weaken women’s relative bargaining power (i.e., theirability to negotiate outcomes reflecting their own interests and desires), both individually intheir relationships with specific men and collectively in struggles with male-dominatedorganizations, institutions, and practices.13

My analysis has important implications for survey design, and for policy makers andtheorists. Findings I present in this paper suggest that absent parents’ support for Jamaicanchildren is quite limited. But I cannot fully substantiate this claim until child support datainclude information about parents’ gifts in kind and child rearing labor. In the Jamaicancontext, noncash contributions surely account for a large fraction of total support by

13Many feminist economists use bargaining models (a game theoretic approach) to explain gender differencesin household economies. Bargaining theory views households as collections of individuals with personal (andpotentially conflicting) preferences who negotiate household outcomes. Household members with the greatestrelative bargaining power are most able to negotiate outcomes consistent with their own preferences. Feministeconomists are beginning to apply bargaining analyses to gender relations outside households (Seiz 1999).


nonresident parents. Many Jamaican parents are cash-poor. And when they give childrengifts in kind (like clothing or shoes) rather than cash, they avoid the risk that gifts will beconsumed by adults in the custodial household rather than by their children. Jamaicanemigrants to the U.K., U.S., and Canada are known for the barrels of personal and householditems they ship to relatives back home in Jamaica. The value of goods emigrant parents sendtheir children must be quite significant. In order to bolster my claim that gendered norms ofbehavior affect child support independently of gender differences in preferences and inincomes, future surveys must also elicit more information about both custodial and noncus-todial parents. Income data are particularly important for this purpose. The 1996 round of theJSLC includes a special module with questions about children’s mother’s and father’s ages,education, residence, and occupations. Analysis of this new data promises richer insight intochild support economies.

Changes in Jamaican family law and enforcement mechanisms could promote increasedchild support by absent parents. For instance, increasing the size of support payments theFamily Court awards might increase women’s use of the court. And the government shouldenforce parents’ compliance with support orders more strictly. But as legal scholar SusanBoyd (1997) argues, government efforts to increase private child support transfers arerelatively ineffective at reducing poverty when absent fathers earn meager incomes. Theseefforts also reinforce women’s economic dependence on men which further erodes women’sindividual and collective bargaining power. Public supports for child rearing (e.g., subsidizedchild care, family allowances, tax breaks, or even a child support assurance program) aredesirable because they reduce women’s dependence on individual men and help redistributeresources from richer to poorer citizens, and from nonparents to parents. But such socialprograms will be difficult to implement in Jamaica in the current neoliberal climate.

The Jamaican government has a central role to play in reducing violence against women,a change which would boost women’s relative power in negotiations around child supportand in other realms as well. Clarke (1998) provides comprehensive domestic violence policyproposals focused on legal responses, education and training, research and compilation ofstatistics, and programs and services for victims of violence.

But legislative changes alone are not sufficient to significantly change child supportpractices. Transforming social norms is equally important. My findings suggest somechanges in Jamaican notions of “masculinity” that would increase nonresident parents’support for their children. First, male commitment to children needs to be delinked fromromantic and sexual relationships in order for absent fathers to consistently support children.Making economic commitments to children and to parents in old age more central to maleself-image and status would have a similar impact. And both fathers and mothers would havegreater economic incentives to support sons if they could expect greater economic returnsfrom sons over time. Finally, masculinity must be redefined so that violence is no longerconsidered a central part of men’s nature (Clarke 1998).

But how do norms change? And what role can theorists, researchers, and policy makersplay in effecting such changes? Economists are beginning to explore these questions andtheir relationship to household economics. This paper offers a strong rationale for theirresearch agenda by pointing to how existing norms contribute to outcomes that are detri-mental to women and children.


Acknowlegement

My sincere thanks to the Planning Institute of Jamaica for kind permission to use the dataand to Ellen Mutari, Laurie Nisonoff, and Anu Seth for insightful feedback on prior draftsof the paper. Carmen Diana Deere, Carlene Edie, Nancy Folbre, and Lisa Saunders helpedme shape earlier versions of this analysis. Thanks also to Lois Joy, Elaine McCrate, andCleve Willis for patiently answering my econometrics questions. Responsibility for anyerrors is all mine

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