electoral reforms: extinguishing ethnic hegemony in the kenyan executive

1 Masitta/Electoral

C HRIS MASITTA

PRESENTED AT THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL KABARAK CONFERENCE ON

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION

ELECTORAL REFORMS: EXTINGUISHING ETHNIC HEGEMONY IN THE

KENYAN EXECUTIVE

2 Masitta/Electoral

“Friends are not permanent, but rather for use in the interest of controlling the highly

centralized executive authority.” (Holmquist,Githinji,2009:102).

Kenyas electoral system is one that has been plagued with controversy and which has

propagated ethnic conflict and therefore with the first elections under the new

constitution, Kenyans had a lot of hope of a new Kenya. What unfolded after the March

2013 General elections left many reeling at theendless tragic possibilities that the

electoral system could bring upon Kenyas political infrastructure. The new constitution

had not cured many of the demons of ethnicity that have pervaded Kenya and what

was even more apparent was the installation of an ethnic hegemony and a political

dynasty that has been predicted to last for 20 years. This discourse endures to unravel

the ethnic hegemony that the Kikuyu community has installed in Kenyas‟political

sphere and takes a peek at viable electoral systems and seeks to extinguish the ethnic

hegemony by postulating ways and means of changing the current electoral system to a

system that will ensure that inclusiveness of all the other 41 ethnic communities is

guaranteed in politics and that the system will never negate the possibility of any ethnic

group ascending to Presidency.

In his book Reilly(2001) notes that the jeopardies of “`tribalism' and ethnic division”

are the key reasons for the failure of democracies in modern Africa(1).He notes that

“there are countless electoral system variations, but essentially the majority fall into

three broad families” (Reilly et.al1999:27) plurality majority systems, semi-proportional

systems, and proportional representation (PR) systems(Reilly, 2001:14). These constitute

the major electoral systems used for national elections in the world today.The way the

electoral votes cast in a national election translate to seats won in the legislature depict

how proportional an electoral system is(Reilly et.al 1999p.27). There is no single

electoral system that is likely to be best for all divided societies(Reilly et.al1999 :1).

Designers of electoral systems shy away from the „one size fits all‟ approach of

recommending one system for all countries(Reilly et.al,1999:10).It therefore becomes

3 Masitta/Electoral

obvious that each political system offers certain benefits and disadvantages in terms of

the representation of different groups in society(Matlosa,2003:16). Variables that will be

taken into consideration in changing an electoral system in Kenya are:

1. Knowledge of the societal division,

2. Nature of the political system, and

3. The process that led to the adoption of the electoral system being practiced.

In his other book, Reilly(2001) postulates that Democracy is inherently difficult in

societies with deep ethnic cleavages that are ancient and permanent or exist as a form of

social construction always moving and always changing (Holmquist, Githinji,2009:102).

Elections in such societies can encourage extremist ethnic appeals, zero-sum political

behavior and ethnic conflict, and consequently often lead to the breakdown of

democracy(p.i).

THE ETHNIC QUESTION

Politicization of ethnicity has been a key tact that has been used in the handful of

elections that Kenya has had (Bodil: 1073).The question that Kenyans need to ask is

whether it is possible to design an electoral and political systems which avoid conflicts

but promote inter-ethnic accommodation.Jaini in his article Hierarchy, Hegemony and

Dominance: Politics of Ethnicity in Uttar Pradesh(1996) defines ethnicity as the degree of

conformity of members of a collectivity to shared norms in the course of interaction and

it is primarily the political community that inspires such „ethnic aspirations‟(p.220). A

system that “facilitates cross-communal communication, bargaining and

interdependence between rival politicians and the groups they represent”(Reilly,

2001:4) is an imperative if ethnic hegemonies are to be smothered. Political competition

propagates the politicization of ethnic demands in which winner takes-all politics

where some groups are permanently included and some are permanently excluded.

Therefore politicians in such divided societies as Kenya have immense incentives to

play the ethnic card (Reilly, 2001:4). “Ethnic identity influences political and social

4 Masitta/Electoral

behavior. It may influence who one trusts, does business with, gets married to or votes

for (Gutierrez-Romero,2013 p.291).”Obviously, the various ethnic groups occupying the

7 of the 8 provinces will not accept to be governed in perpetuity by a Kikuyu-Kalenjin

tribal cartel which has already declared that they will close roads to democratic

elections. Aggrieved communities will in turn seek for solution such as cessation. Thus

the politics of „Majimbo‟ or regionalism are born with every ethnic group wanting to

assert its destiny through self-determination . To avoid this there needs to be electoral

systems that would extinguish what could be Kikuyu-Kalenjin hegemony in Kenya‟s

politics until Kingdom comes.The Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kamba and Kalenjin consitute

70 per cent of the population, leaving the other 37 communities to their mercies

(Business Daily).Reilly asserts that certain electoral systems, “will provide rational

political actors with incentives towards cooperation, moderation and accommodation

between themselves and their rivals, while others will lead to “hostile, uncooperative

and non-accommodative behavior” (Reilly, 2001:6). A core way of combating such

ethnic pedagogy is to design electoral rules and laws that make politicians reciprocally

dependent on the votes of members of other ethnic groups rather than their own. In

order to gain support from other tribes politicians must then behave to electorate in a

manner that is very appealing and that would boost accommodative behavior on both

sides of the divide (Reilly, 2001:10). Gutierrez-Romero (2013) states that the voting

choices of Kenyans is strongly influenced by ethnic origin and ethnic grievances (p.308).

Although not the only Politician who does this,the fact that Kenyas‟ current President

prolifically uses the Kikuyu language while addressing members of his tribe over

controversial issues only adds onto the theparanoia and mistrust that the Agikuyu

share with other communities(Bodil:1075). It is not contested that the Agikuyu voted

overwhelmingly for their „son‟ to ascend to the coveted seat and therefore the

continuous use of the language for the Amherst graduate during campaign periods to

bash his opponents can only be translated as a ploy to strengthen the ethnicity and

inculcate a feeling of „Us vs. Them‟. In an electoral democracy, the kikuyu –the

dejuresuperior community possesses the power to abuse its electoral strength against

5 Masitta/Electoral

the minority to elect a government that suppresses other communities. The imposition

of diversity poses serious challenges for democratic politics and places ethnic

governments like Mr. Kenyatta on their toes( Swain et.al:2009)

THE PROBLEM: Ethnic Hegemony in the Kenyan Presidency

Daniel Posner states that the one unique feature about African politics is that it is

profoundly President-centered and the culmination of battles political amongst various

communities (p.1305).The UHURUTO government a product of the 2013 Kenyan

elections has endeared to establish a political and ethnic hegemony, which means a

predominance of a cohort of politicians and citizenry associated with the Jubillee Party

agenda and the furtherance of ethnic dominance in Kenya. This cohort controls access

to political office within the territory they claim as their state to such an extent that they

can bar from office politicians who would advance alternative nation-state projects.It is

the institutionalization of dominant symbolic framework (Roeder,2011:82). A

framework that puts Kenyans in automation and believing that NO other is greater than

a Kikuyu President.The combined Kenyanpopulation is now “united by ethnicity but

divided by nationality”( Roeder,2011: 108). There can be no destructive assertion to

national cohesion than the assertion of a Kikuyu elitism in the socio-political sphere of

Kenya.Gutierrez-Romero notes that the unique ethnic diversity existing in Kenya-“a

system where the winner takes all must beprevented,”as it will propagate more

ethnicity and drive more Kenyans into their ethnic enclaves. This is what a Kikuyu

hegemony in the executive postulates as an imminent eventuality. Kenyan voters will

go to the polling stations not driven by agenda or policy, but the driving force being to

install a member of their own community into the Presidency.

Jaini(1996), points out theGramscian view that it hegemony is the supremacy of a social

group or class manifesting itself in two ways

1. Domination/ coercion

2. Intellectual/ Moral Leadership

6 Masitta/Electoral

This ethnic hegemony that is being entrenched in politics is characterized by equivocal

consent by the populace and becomes so powerful that it counteracts dissidence. It is

the consensual nature of ideological domination and is practically brainwashing. The

Kikuyu Kalenjin hegemonic assertions are plagued by contradictions of a forlorn cry

for national unity and intergration and sustained by deceptions that this Hegemony has

all Kenyans in mind(Jaini,1996:218).The Kikuyu dominance emanates from economic

and political success that was available to the Agikuyu to the exclusion of other

ethnicities and therefore the same opportunities were clearly not afforded paripasu, and

therefore this „capital accumulators‟ of Kenya have placed themselves a few light years

away from other communities (Holmquist,Githinji,2009:102).Uhuru Kenyatta Kenyas

current president has been adversely linked to a social group- the Mungiki, which

group has been a purveyor of ethnic animosities and engrains ethnic supremacy

amongst the Kikuyu. Ethnic hegemony removes legitimacy out of any presidency and

authenticity of such an office is only felt amongst a chosen few

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS.

STV (IRE)

PR

List-PR

(S.A)

Plurality-

Majority Semi-PR

FPTP

(UK)

AV

(Aus.) Block

Vote

(Palest)

Two-

Round

(KEN)

Parallel

(JAP.)

SNTV

(JORD.)

MMP

(GER.)

7 Masitta/Electoral

Key: FPTP: First-past-the-post; AV: Alternative vote; SNTV: Single non-transferable vote; PR:

Proportional representation; MMP: Mixed-member proportional; STV: Single transferable vote.

(Matlosa,2003:23)

Plurality/Majority Systems

The First Past The Post (FPTP) System is the simplest of the electoral systems in the

world.(Matlosa,2003:27).It is also the most commonly used electoral model the winner

is the candidate with the most votes butnot necessarily an absolute majority of the

votes(Reilly et.al,1999 p.28). This is the system that is employed in Kenyas legislature

electoral System. It is a simple majority or winner takes all system. The candidate in an

election who wins most votes cast will fill the position regardless of how many votes

he/she got in relation to the opponents, it is hinged on plurality of the vote rather than

majority of the votes and therefore a considerable number of votes does not form part of

the final determination of the election results(Matlosa,2003:27). First Past The Post, is

defended primarily on the grounds of simplicity, and does not create quagmires and

ambiguities in elections. However FPTP has excluded smaller ethnic communities,

minorities, women and smaller political parties from the reigns of leadership. In Kenya,

this system has encouraged the development of ethnic hegemonies in political parties

which may base their campaigns and policy platforms on conceptions that are attractive

to the majority of people in their district or region but exclude or are hostile to others

and this was quite evident with the TheNational Alliance party being an exclusive

Kikuyu outfit, Orange Democratic Movement being a Nyanza party amongst many

other political parties whose names are synonymous with a particular ethnic group or

region and accentuates regional fiefdoms where these parties win most if not all the

seats in a particular region .

The majoritarian approach employs the Two Round System (TRS) in Kenyas

Presidential elections (Reilly et.al 1999p.28) that is enshrined in the Constitution of

Kenya 2010 and is geared towards ensuring that an absolute majority takes office.

Article 138 (4) of the Kenyan Constitution stipulates that a candidate shall be declared

8 Masitta/Electoral

elected as President of Kenya if the Candidate receives more than half of all the votes

cast in the election and at least twenty-five percent of the votes cast in each of more

than half of the counties and this is where this paper will determine the deep flaws

that are not inherent with the system of Majoritarian election/two-round system, but

the fact that the system cannot capture the deep ethnic cleavages that are manifest in

Kenya and the likelihood of stalemate was alive and well during Kenyas Presidential

Election of 2013. TRS is inherently costly to the Government and also to candidates in

the eventuality that the second round is activated(Wamugo:3). Reilly gives two

illustrations of African countries show how close Kenya came close to such a stalemate.

“In Angola in 1992, in what was supposed to be a peacemaking election, rebel

leader Jonas Savimbi came second in the first round of a TRS presidential

election to Jose dos Santos with 40 per cent of the vote as opposed to dos

Santos‟ 49 per cent. As it was clear that he would lose the run-off phase, he had

little incentive to play the democratic opposition game and immediately

restarted the civil war in Angola, which went on for another decade. In Congo

(Brazzaville) in 1993, prospects of a government landslide in the second round

of a TRS election prompted the opposition to boycott the second round and take

up arms. In both cases, the clear signal that one side would probably lose the

election was the trigger for violence.” (Reilly et.al,1999 p.53).

It suffices to say that “plurality elections for the presidency and simultaneous

presidential and legislative elections are often seen as helping to focus the party system

into fewer and more viable challengers for power (Reilly et.al,1999p8-9).” The dangers

inherent in vesting absolute power in a directly elected President through the use of a

plurality method in a diverse or ethnically divided country like Kenya where no single

group has an absolute majority can be devastating for legitimacy or for healing wounds

of yesteryears. (Reilly et.al,1999 p8-9).

Proportional Representation Systems

9 Masitta/Electoral

The rationale behind Proportional Representation systems is to reduce the disparity

between a party‟s share of the national vote and its share of the parliamentary seats

gained at any one election such that if a major party such as the Jubillee Coalition with

its pyrrhic victory of 50.7 per cent of the votes, it should win approximately 50.7 per

cent of the seats, and the CORD Coalition with 43 per cent of the votes should also have

acquired the same percentage of the legislative seats. Proportional representation is

hinged on party lists where political parties present a list of candidate‟s bases on

national or regional parity with the ultimate aim of them taking up the allotted

positions (Reilly et.al,1999 p.29) The PR system reduces the uncharacteristic results that

emanate from plurality/Majoritarian systems and is better placed to produce a more

representative legislature. Establishment of a Kikuyu/ Kalenjin ethnic Hegemony

further fragments the Kenyan political arena which is already deeply ethnicized and

therefore the inclusion of all ethnic groups would be paramount in furtherance of

extinguishing such hegemonies. The PR system can be lauded for translating the votes

cast in an election to the seats won by a particular party (Reilly et.al,1999 p.57) This

negates election acrimony and ensures that parties that get even 1% of the total votes

cast will get 1% of the total Number of allocated seats and encourages smaller parties to

take part in such elections and the likelihood of political parties venturing beyond their

home base and comfort zones is possible. This eventually builds ideological based

political fora as opposed to Political parties pervaded with frailty.This system is

notorious for installing coalition governments which seek to distribute and share power

have been found to reduce the likelihood of conflict (Gutierrez-Romero,2013 p.308). A

democratic legislature should be one that is representative of all and the PR system

ideally achieves this (Lijphart,p.5). The following table shows the translation of

presidential results by Matlosa as depicted in the outcome of the parliamentary

elections. It can be noted that wide gaps and disparities between the two elections are

negated.

Mozambique’s election results, 1999

10 Masitta/Electoral

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

PARTY CANDIDATE

TOTAL VOTES

% OF TOTAL

WON VOTES

WON

FRELIMO CHISSANO

2 338 333 52.3

RENAMO

DHLAKAMA

2 133 655 47.7

Total 4 471 988 100.0

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

PARTY/

COALITION

TOTAL VOTES

WON

% OF TOTAL

VOTES

PARLIAMENTARY

SEATS

FRELIMO 2 005 703 48.53 133

RENAMO 1 603 811 38.81 117

Other 532 789

12.66 -

Total 4 132 303 100.00 250


(Matlosa,2003:28)

The List Proportional Representation System entails voters voting for a party, and

parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote in the electoral

district(Reilly et.al,1999p.60). A populated list of candidates will be used to select

winning candidates in the order in which they appear on the list. The List PR considers

the whole country as one single constituency for the election, hence there is no need for

the delimitation of election boundaries. It is opinion-based electoral system and not

based on electoral units( Matlosa,2003:34). The lists populated can either be open, closed

or free, in which the open or free lists give the voter autonomy to choose between a

party and candidate(Reilly et.al,1999 p.84) however a majority of the lists in various

electoral systems are closed.

Mixed Systems.

This system has features of the FPTP/plurality/ majority system and the Proportional

Representation system but which run independently of each other and known as the

parallel system (Reilly et.al p.29). The MixedMember Proportional system(MMP) is

meant to mitigate and compensate for the disparities that may arise out of the

plurality/majoritarian system and this mixed system is now an acceptable system in

emerging democracies (Reilly et.al 1999 p.29)MMP operates when “the results of the

two types of election are linked, with seat allocations at the PR level being dependent

on what happens in the plurality/majority (or other) district seats and compensating for

any disproportionality that arises there.” For example if a party wins about 10 % of the

vote nationally in a plurality or majority vote but does attain the 10% representation in

parliament then the PR list will be used to award seats and bring it to par with the

national tally(Reilly et.al,1999 p91). “In Venezuela there are 100 FPTP seats while the

rest are National List PR seats and extra compensatory seats. In Mexico 200 List PR

seats compensate for imbalances in the results of the 300 FPTP seats, which are usually


high. Lesotho‟s post-conflict electoral system contains 80 FPTP seats and 40

compensatory ones” (Reilly et.al,1999 p91). The amalgamation of the

plurality/majoritarian systems and the PR systems in Kenya will be go a long way in

alleviating ethnic hegemony both in Kenya‟s presidential and Bicameral elections. The

ideality of a system such as MMP is phenomenal and if adopted in a country like Kenya

the likelihood of disproportionality will be reduced to almost negligible.

TOWARDS A CHANGE IN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Purpose Of An Electoral System.

1. It should translate the votes cast into seats won in a legislative chamber

2. A way by which people can be held accountable by the electorate

3. Structures boundaries of acceptable political discourse and for politicians to

structure the delivery of their discourse in a way that is appealing to the

electorate

In a deeply divided ethnic society like Kenya, there is a likelihood that an undesirable

political system may widen this divide(Reilly et.al,1999: 6) and therefore Kenyans need

to proceed with precision if the electoral reforms are to take place.

Elections are not sufficient by themselves for representative democracy, by any means,

but they are a necessary minimal condition in achieving this end.Majoritarian electoral

systems are designed to promote accountable single-party government by awarding the

greatest representation to the two leading parties with the most votes. Proportional

electoral systems aim to generate inclusive and consensual power sharing by producing

legislatures that show some semblance of vote sharing. (Pippa,2004 p.4). The electoral

system of the United Kingdom underwent radical changes during the Blair regime.

Japan has also moved from a single transferable vote to a mixed system of proportional

representation and First Past The Post system. It is apparent that various Kenyan

president have ascended to power through their ethnic groups and at the same time


give unrivaled support to their coethnics after ascension to power. This electoral system

reform was envisaged in the Constitutional review process but the aspirations never

made it into the constitution save for the ambiguous two round system that may leave

Kenya in a perpetual judicial process at the Kenyan supreme court(Business Daily).

Tensions were rife during the Supreme court hearing of RailaOdinga v. Uhuru Kenyatta,

William Ruto and the Interim Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. The

controversies that shroud the Kenyan two round system of presidential elections were

alive and well with the possibility of violence in case the Supreme court went against

the putative winner(Business Daily).An aggrieved candidate is left with alarmingly

inadequate opportunities for redress and even less time since the second round must be

held within thirty days of the first round.The Lacuna in the constitution on procedure at

presidential elections casts a shadow of doubt on the viability of the TRS(Wamugo:2)

FEASABLE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

COLLEGIATE SYSTEM

The African Policy Institute has put forth and bolstered progressive notions of electoral

reforms through introduction of an Electoral College. The electoral college will be a

system that officially elects the President of Kenya via special electors. These electors

will be equal to the number of Members of Parliament and senators that a county has

and are elected the same way the legislative representatives are elected during the party

nominations or primaries. Therefore there will be 384 electors based on the 290 elected

members of parliament, the 47 elected women representatives and the 47 elected

members of the senate. Each elector will have one vote for the presidency and one vote

for the Deputy President. Electors are pledged to presidential candidates and in the

eventuality that the presidential candidate they pledged to happens to win the county

votes, then they become the electors of that particular county. Although the names of

the presidential candidates will be listed on the ballot box, in actuality, the voters are

actually voting for the electors who will eventually vote in the President. Each county

will have a designated number of electoral votes and once the electors in a particular


county elect the Presidential candidate then the candidate automatically bags the

county electoral votes. The candidate who receives an absolute majority of 193 electoral

votes wins the presidency.The collegiate system is an indirect plurality/majority

system that ensures that not only numbers count but a broader geographical

representation and acceptance is gained. The following data from the Interim

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission exemplifies the application of the

electoral college in Kenya

IEBC DATA ON THE TOP TWO CONTENDERS

RAILA

ODINGA

COUNTIES

UHURU

KENYATTA

COUNTIES

MOMBASA

69.77

MANDERA

92.33

KWALE 80.74 ISIOLO 55.41

KILIFI

83.74

MERU

89.41

TANARIVER 61.41 THARAKA-

NITHI

92.38

LAMU

COUNTY

51.98

EMBU 89.00

TAITA

TAVETA

81.56

NYANDARUA 97.11

GARISSA

48.67

NYERI 96.33

WAJIR

49.59

KIRINYAGA 95.99

MARSABIT 48.78 MURANGA 95.92


KITUI 79.53 KIAMBU 90.21

MACHAKOS 85.89 WEST POKOT 73.33

MAKUENI 90.73 UASIN GISHU 74.26

TURKANA 67.53 ELGEYO

MARAKWET

92.07

SAMBURU 57.62 NANDI 81.52

TRANS NZOIA 46.03 BARINGO 87.93

NAROK 50.21 LAIKIPIA 85.49

KAKAMEGA 63.84 NAKURU 80.19

BUNGOMA 52.83 KERICHO 90.74

BUSIA 85.62 BOMET 92.68

SIAYA 98.47 KAJIADO 52.36

KISUMU 96.64

HOMABAY 98.93

MIGORI 86.38

KISII 67.93

NYAMIRA 66.26

NAIROBI 49.00

VIHIGA NO WIN NO WIN

TOTAL NO OF

COUNTIES

WON

26 20

(IEBC:2013)

HYPOTHESIS

COUNTY WON

BY ODINGA

ELECTORAL

VOTES

COUNTY WON

BY KENYATTA

ELECTORAL

VOTES

MOMBASA 7 MANDERA 7


KWALE 5 ISIOLO 3

KILIFI 8

MERU 10

TANARIVER 4 THARAKA-

NITHI

(130,000WIN)

4

LAMU

COUNTY

3

EMBU 5

TAITA

TAVETA

5

NYANDARUA

(232,000 WIN)

6

GARISSA

(91,000 WIN)

7

NYERI 7

WAJIR

7

KIRINYAGA 5

MARSABIT 5 MURANGA 8

KITUI 9 KIAMBU 13

MACHAKOS 9 WEST POKOT 5

MAKUENI 7 UASIN GISHU 7

TURKANA 7 ELGEYO

MARAKWET

5

SAMBURU 4 NANDI 7


TRANS NZOIA 6 BARINGO 7

NAROK 7 LAIKIPIA 4

KAKAMEGA 13 NAKURU 12

BUNGOMA 10 KERICHO 7

BUSIA 8 BOMET 6

SIAYA 7 KAJIADO 6

KISUMU 8

HOMABAY 9

MIGORI 9

KISII 10

NYAMIRA 5

NAIROBI 18

VIHIGA NO WIN (6

Electoral Votes)

NO WIN

TOTAL NO. OF

ELECTORAL

VOTES WON

223 154

Considering the Hypothesis above Raila Odinga would not have won the popular vote

but would have won the electoral vote by negating the ethnic card that was played by

the other presidential candidate to only consolidate votes from his ethnic community

and his running mates‟. The inherent nature of the Kenyan society does not allow for


the popular vote to take cognizance because this would negate the national outlook of

elections as exhibited in the march 2013 general elections. The hypothesis also shows

that very populous counties are not necessarily allocated more electorate votes than

least popular counties but the electors are based on representatives to the Parliament

from that particular county

WHY ELECTORAL COLLEGE.

Electoral College system of Voting will rubbish the popular vote that has proved to be

controversial after the 2013 general elections. Uhuru Kenyatta won the election by

consolidating votes from only 2 of the most populous provinces in Kenya- The Rift

Valley and Central provinces and the very least populated North Eastern Province,

while the looser Raila Odinga won the rest of the 5 provinces. This win exemplified the

assertion of this discourse that the election of a Kenyan president could infinitely

remain in these two ethnic communities. The irrelevancy of this popular vote will be a

motivating factor for ethnic politicians to venture and broaden their scope of

inclusiveness since they will only be able to amass electoral votes from their provinces

albeit populous will never meet the threshold of the electoral college majority to win the

Presidency.

The presidential vote will also be widespread such that it is not only votes of heavily

populated areas that matter but votes of all areas even the least populated that in

totality contribute towards a presidency. Therefore the residents of Mandera will not be

intimidated by the votes of urban areas like Kisumu. Minority groups are better

represented and their presence in an electoral process becomes profoundly imminent

and a presidential candidate will have to court their support because they represent a

„swing vote‟ that they cannot afford to lose. Political parties will move away from ethnic

underpinnings and will begin to have an ideological base that becomes inculcated into

the Kenyan people. Hence one is born knowing what kind of ideological base he /she

represent. For the most part many americansknow that they are either born democrat or


republican. This epitaph of „partyism‟ is tolerable than the one of labeling oneself

black,white,Luo or Kikuyu. To exemplify the assertion of ethnicity in Politics, Mr.

Kenyatta‟s debut into politics in 1997 was in his backyard of Gatundu south. No one

was more Kikuyu than Kenyatta since he was the darling son of Kenyas‟ First president,

a Kikuyu icon. So it was shocking whenever he was rejected by the electorate because of

running on a KANU Party ticket which was synonymous with the Kalenjins. He had to

be politically and ethnically correct(Posner,2007p1316). The electoral college will

eliminate such ethnocentrism . Electoral college system discourage the formation of

briefcase political parties that sprout in Kenya every election season and designates

competition between two representative parties that have the basic requirements of

parties as envisioned at Article 91 of the Constitution of Kenya(Lijphart p.5).

Single-Transferable Vote.

This system is ideal to the Kenyan scenario and mirrors the two round system but

negates the majoritarianism that the two round system has. It is part of the PR regime

and therefore could afford the Kenyan voter peace of mind that the election will not be

pervaded by ethnicity. At a general election voters are allowed to rank in order of

preference their candidates on the ballot box. The votes are then tallied and the top two

contenders proceed if no one secures an absolute majority by having the rest of the

voters preferences of the bottom canditates shared amongst the two contenders. If one

of them secures an absolute majority from the preference voting then they are elected. A

quota for proceeding in the election is always set by considering the number of

registered voters in a constituency. In such a system a Presidential has to appeal

extensively and equally across ethnic divides and it would be impossible for a

candidate to win if he/ she does not court communities outside their comfort zone.

This negates the two round systemand the election is taken care of with the first round

vote. An appropriate example is where a quota has been set at 5000 votes for every

candidate, then the candidate who does not attain such a quota is automatically kicked


out and the votes attained are distributed evenly amongst the top contenders.(Center

for Governance and Development,p.3)

Mixed Member Proportional system

Introduction of the MMP, a member of the PR system family will go a long way in

achieving equity because every vote counts and is most appropriate for our legislature.

Because the MMP combines facets of both majoritarian and PR system it has proved in

many countries to be most effective. So for example if there are 349 seats in the national

assembly, a section of these seats will be elected by a majoritarian FPTP system while

the remainder will be elected by PR Party lists.PR systems is about ensuring the

proportionality between the votes cast at a general election and seats won to the

national assembly or senate(Center for Governance and Development,p.9) PR system

will see the elimination of such affirmative action quagmires as the one Kenyans now

face via the provisions of Article 81(b) and Article 27(6),(7),(8) because the system

allows for the inclusion of minorities into its party lists. This affirmative action quotas

will prove to make the provisions ineffective as they are hard to attain as opposed to

having parties predestined lists(Center for Governance and Development,p.9-10). This

quotas like the infamous 2/3 gender rule can be legally set threshold as an internal

mechanism for regulation of Political Parties. It‟s a simple yet effective means of killing

ethnicity and provides for inclusiveness on all fronts because legislation will provide for

certain minimums that parties have to meet. The two coalitions that massed the largest

number of votes in the 2013 general election would be required to have a certain

number of ethnic candidature that represents a national picture such that the Jubilee

coalition that has only the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities as its representatives in

the legislature will be required to include other ethnicities into their party list, which

communities they are historically known to have excluded from their grand plan.In

May 2002, Lesotho abandoned the FPTP system in favour of the MMP system. Lesotho

thus became the first African country to test the MMP electoral model with positive

results(Matlosa,2003:33).


For LijPhart, PR systems are purely applicable in our legislature, but when it comes to

filling a single office like the presidency, majoritarian systems are to be used albeit not

pure ones (Lijphart, p.5) but the PR system is a perfect model for war-torn societies

emerging from deep-seated violent ethnic conflicts like Kenya(Matlosa,2003:45).

Conclusion

Elections are powerful levers of democratic engineering. Too often constitutional

drafters choose the electoral system they know best, often the one the colonialist left

behind (Reilly et.al,1999p57). Moderate reforms to the Kenyan electoral process would

be better than jumping into a completely new system(Reilly et.al,1999 p57). Kenyans

need to therefore scrutinize their political history, the way and degree to which

ethnicity is politicized, the intensity of conflict and the geographic and demographic

distribution of ethnic groups (Reilly et.al,1999 p57). Employing centripetal theories of

electoral system design which draw on theories of bargaining and cooperation, and

advocates institutional designs which encourage opportunities for dialogue and

negotiation between opposing political forces in the context of electoral competition. By

privileging cooperative campaign strategies between political parties with increased

prospects of electoral success, candidates representing competing interests are

presented with incentives to negotiate for communal support, thus creating a brokering

field where vote-trading arrangements can be discussed(Reilly, 2001 p.167). It is

therefore incumbent upon the Kenyan executive that has declared a Kikuyu Kalenjin

political dominance for the next 20 years to seek a higher ground of inclusion.Electoral

systems in which politicians depend on votes only from co-ethnics tend to reward

ethnic extremists who assert maximal demands. Systems in which politicians seeking

election must appeal to members of more than a single ethnic community and depend

on their electoral support generally produce more moderate politics and reward

accommodative politicians with cross-ethnic appeals (Reilly, 2001 p.168).Extinguishing

sucha hegemony must seeDemocracy deepen and inclusion must have a wide reach to

include social class, gender, and age categories, and more so


ethnicity(Holmquist,Githinji,2009 p102).Posterity demands immediate electoral and

Constitutional reforms. The drafters of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 envisioned a

robust electoral system that would meet the aspirations of all Kenyans who for the

longest time have been subjected to bogus and cosmetic electoral systems. After the

2013 general elections it has become apparent that the system enshrined therein is a

clear departure from the past but evidently does not cure the deep ethnic rifts that exist

in Kenya to date. Changes to an electoral system may not be probable any time soon,

but it is worth a try (Lijphart,p.12).The clamor for constitutional amendment must

begin.

Works Cited

Bodil Folke Frederiksen.Mungiki, Vernacular Organization and Political Society in

KenyaInstitute of Social Studies.

<http://content.ebscohost.com/pdf25_26/pdf/2010/7QQ/01Nov10/55292764.pdf

?T=P&P=AN&K=55292764&S=R&D=buh&EbscoContent=dGJyMNLr40SeprY4zdn

yOLCmr0uep7NSsKm4Ta6WxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGutEu0qLZRuePf

geyx44Dt6fIA>

Centre For Governance and Development. Fairer, Friendly Electoral System for women&

minorities:Benefits of a mixed member proportional representation system

.April,2002.<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/01362.pdf>

Daniel N. PosnerRegime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in AfricaComparative Political

Studies 2007 40: 1302 September

2007.<http://cps.sagepub.com/content/40/11/1302>

Guttierez-Romero, R.To What Extent Did Ethnicity and Economic Issues Matter in the

2007

Election2013.<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/dpr.12008/asset/dpr.

12008.pdf?v=1&t=hmekanmf&s=ae6f91abf8b0fe9b931d7599214835bfd1607149>

Holmquist, F., & MwangiWa, G. (2009). The Default Politics of Ethnicity in

Kenya.Brown Journal

OfWorldAffairs,16(1).<http://content.ebscohost.com/pdf23_24/pdf/2009/JI8/01

Sep09/47279009.pdf?T=P&P=AN&K=47279009&S=R&D=buh&EbscoContent=d

GJyMNLr40SeprY4zdnyOLCmr0uep7tJSs6m4SLKWxWXS&ContentCustomer=d

GJyMPGutEu0qLZRuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA >

IEBC (2013).Summary of 2013 Presidential Results Declared on

9/3/2013.<http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/resources/downloads/category/tally-of-

presidential-results>

Khabele Matlosa. Electoral System Reform,Democracy and stability in the SADC

Region: A Comparitive Analysis.Electoral Institute Of Southern Africa Report

No.12003.<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30331/1/rr1.

pdf?1>

Lijphart, Arend, Grofman, Benard. Choosing and Electoral

System.<http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bgrofman/R16%20Lijphart%20and%20Grof

man.%201984.%20Introduction.%20In%20Choosing%20an%20Electoral....pdf>

Pippa, N.,(2004). Electoral Engineering : Voting Rules and Political Behavior. (New

York: Cambridge University

Press)<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/kabarak/Doc?id=10124680&ppg=20>

Ravindra K. Jain Hierarchy, Hegemony and Dominance: Politics of Ethnicity in Uttar

Pradesh, 1995Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jan. 27,

1996)<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4403720>

Reilly, Ben Reynolds, 1999 Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies(Washington, DC:NationalAcademiesPress<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/kabarak/docDetail.action?docID=10041046&p00=ben%20reilly>

Reilly, Ben(2001). Democracy in Divided Societies : Electoral Engineering for Conflict

Management.(New York:Cambridge University

Press)<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/kabarak/Doc?id=5008034&ppg=1>

Reilly,Ben (2005).Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA

Handbook<http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/loader.cfm?csmodule=security

/getfile&pageid=10445>

Roeder, Philip G (2011). Where Nation-States Come From : Institutional Change in the

Age of Nationalism.(Princeton: Princeton University Press)

<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/kabarak/Doc?id=10521861&ppg=95>

Swain, A (Editor); Amer, R (Editor); Öjendal, J (Editor) (2009). Democratization Project :

Opportunities and Challenges.(London: Anthem Press.)

<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/kabarak/Doc?id=10481466&ppg=23>

Think-tank proposes US-style electoral college for Kenya Business Daily. March

31 2013 <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Think-tank-proposes-US-style-

electoral-college-for-Kenya/-/539546/1735558/-/f9af8o/-/index.html>

Wamugo, E. Ready or Not. Notes on The Forthcoming Presidential Elections. Kenyans For

Peace with Truth and Justice

http://marsgroupkenya.org/pdfs/2013/01/Ready%20or%20Not%20notes%20on%

20the%20two%20rounds%20system%20of%20elections%20Two%20Rounds%20Rep

ort%201(1).pdf

electoral reforms: extinguishing ethnic hegemony in the kenyan executive

Documents