Marston, John (2001) “Camboya.” Asia Pacífico No. 8, pp. 21-43. English version below:

CAMBOYA EN 2000, by John Marston

Given the degree to which Cambodia is associated in thepopular mind with war and political unrest, the degree ofstability in 2000 comes as a relief. Economic indicatorsshowed progress in 2000, and international donors, on whomCambodia still heavily depends, judged that Cambodia had madeprogress on key issues of social and economic reform. Thecountry demobilized many troops during the year and acampaign to remove weapons from circulation in the generalpopulation made significant strides. The internationalvisitor found Cambodia an increasingly orderly and pleasantplace to spend time, and tourism boomed. Nevertheless,relations between the government and the political oppositionremain troubled, and it is still a country with deep,festering problems of poverty, dependency on foreign aid, andarbitrary exercise of power reinforced by legal impunity.Few observers of the country would dare to be wholeheartedlyoptimistic.

Three political stalemates and a natural disaster

If the headlines in 2000 seemed remarkably similar tothose of 1999, it was partly because so little progress hadbeen made on some of the most central political issues.Political negotiations over a proposed tribunal to try KhmerRouge leaders stretched out for the course of the year, withno resolution in sight, as did the legislative process to setin motion long-overdue local elections. Cambodia and Thailandwere also negotiating for over a year over the return of aCambodian dissident politician, accused of an assassinationattempt against Prime Minister Hun Sen. All three deadlocksillustrated how pervasive and arbitrary the power of theCambodian People’s Party (CPP) was, with Prime Minister HunSen as strongman; at the same time they illustrate the degree

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to which that role has involved complex negotiations with theinternational community, the Cambodian opposition, andCambodian NGOs. The response to devastating floods in latesummer and fall also quickly devolved into a political issue,bringing in the same cast of characters.

The trial of Khmer Rouge leaders is the issue which hasmost captured the imagination of the international public.While keeping in mind that for the Cambodian public this isnot THE Cambodian issue in quite the way it seems to be forthe rest of the world, one should not underestimate theimpact of growing public cynicism in relation to this long,drawn-out process, especially among intellectuals. At issuehas always been the precise roles of the UN and Cambodia inthe proposed trials. A breakthrough seemed to have takenplace in October, 1999, after extended deadlock, when the US,without consulting the UN, proposed a compromise formulawhich seemed to be acceptable to the Cambodian government.The compromise plan involved a tribunal with a majority ofCambodian jurists but veto power by international jurists.In December Cambodian sent a draft law to the UN, originallyannouncing it would not wait for a UN response to begin thetrial. This draft law was approved by the Cambodian cabineton Jan. 6 and sent to the National Assembly on Jan. 19. Theplan was rejected by the UN and human rights groups, however,and negotiations with the UN continued, with input by the USand Japan. The UN sent a team of legal experts in March, butnegotiations stalled and they left without a settlement.1 InApril, after meetings between Hun Sen and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the G-77 meetings in Cuba, Hun Senagreed to further talks, wavered back and forth on a proposedplan, and finally agreed to it on April 29. It was then sentto the Cambodian National Assembly.2 Despite a further visitin July, to iron out details, by UN Under-Secretary-Generalfor Legal Affairs Hans Corell, no bill authorizing the trialwas even debated in the National Assembly before it adjournedin August. In October the (non-CPP) chairman of the National

1 Fontaine, Chris (2000) “UN, Cambodia Don’t Reach Agreement.” AP, March 21.2 Ker Munthit (2000) “Deal Reached on Cambodian Tribunal.” AP, April 29.

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Assembly committee responsible for the bill said he had notyet been allowed to see the Memorandum of Agreement reachedbetween Hans Corell and the government in July.3 Whetherfairly or not, popular opinion increasingly sees Hun Sen asblocking its passage.4 In the meantime, a Khmer Rouge leaderwas tried in July for the 1994 murders of three Westernbackpackers. His acquittal, on the basis that he hadpreviously been granted amnesty, was widely protestedinternationally, and perceived as demonstration of a lack ofwill by the Cambodian government to proceed with the KhmerRouge tribunal. (The case is being appealed.) News reportsalso came out during the summer about the failing health oftwo key Khmer Rouge leaders, and speculation focused on thepossibility that the government was hoping to postpone thetrials until the aging Khmer Rouge leaders had died naturaldeaths. High ranking political figures continue to statetheir commitment to hold the trials; the UN and otherobservers, however, have expressed skepticism about theCambodian government’s real will to do so.5 A tribunal mayyet take place, but there remains a fundamental distrust bythe international community for leaving the trialsignificantly in the hands of Cambodian jurists and afundamental unwillingness, on behalf of Hun Sen, to set upmechanisms where he may not, finally, be in control.

Opposition leader Sam Rainsy has, predictably, taken astrong stand in support of a trial dominated by the UN.Perhaps more significant has been the lobbying local humanrights organizations on behalf of the trials, including theorganization of petition drives and surveys. According toHuman Rights Watch, NGO workers in seven provinces wereintimidated in January while trying to collect signatures forthe petition calling for UN-sponsored trials.6 While theseefforts at advocacy are still modest in scale, and have had

3 Marcher, Anette (2000) “UN Accepts Flawed Tribunal for KR.” Phnom Penh Post, Oct. 13-26, pp. 1-2.4 Johnson, Kay (2000) “Hun Sen ‘Stalling Tribunal Debate.’” South China Morning Post, May 23.5 Marcher, Annette and Vong Sokheng (2000) “KR Tribunal Drowning in Smokescreens and Politics.” Phnom Penh Post, Sept. 15-28, p. 14.6 Human Rights Watch (2000) “Asia Letter to Donors.” May 11.

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no discernible effect, they are significant as new strategiesfor Cambodian NGOs.

An issue which has received much less press, but hasmore immediate political implications, is the continuingdeadlock over plans to hold district and commune elections inthe country. By law local elections should have been heldduring the first national legislative session following the1993 UN-sponsored elections, but half way through a secondlegislative session they have still not taken place. Thismeans that local officials are still largely CambodianPeople’s Party (CPP) officials who were in place in the1980s. As late as March, news reports were still talkingabout elections taking place in 2000, but it became clear bythe summer that that was impossible. While the partycongresses of both the ruling CPP and the opposition SamRainsy Party (SRP) called for speedy elections there isspeculation that, in the absence of any particular advantageto CPP, the elections will keep being postponed. SRP hasused the issue to attack CPP and in March called forinternational donors to stipulate elections as a conditionfor international aid.7 An initial obstacle is passing thecommune election law, drafts of which have been criticized bythe local NGO community, led in particular by the Committeefor Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL). In July COMFREL helda four-day workshop/rally which attracted 2,000 participantsand presented demands to the National Assembly.8 This newactivism by local NGOs is itself a significant phenomenon.As of late 2000, the commune election law had not been passedand there was no scheduled date for elections. While it maybe a long time before the elections take place, they are in asense the next key event; it is the even in preparation forwhich Cambodian political forces are already re-groupingthemselves.

A rather different kind of deadlock resulted in keepingthe case of Sok Yoeun unresolved for over a year. InSeptember, 1998, shortly before Hun Sen and members of the7 Sam Rainsy (2000) “Donor Community Must Push for Communal Elections.” Press released posted to camnews e-mail group, March 24.8 Chon, Gina and Jody McPhillips (2000) “4 Days of Meetings on Commune Elections Scheduled.” Cambodia Daily, July 11, p. 12.

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national assembly were to be sworn in in Siem Reap, a rocketbomb exploded during a procession. Although the bomb, whichkilled a child, did not explode near Hun Sen, governmentstatements have assumed that he was the target. A year laterthe government arrested two SRP politicians in connectionwith the explosion. Another accused SRP politician, SokYoeun, fled into Thailand in October, 1999 and sought out theprotection of the United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR). SRP has always maintained that there wasno real evidence that these politicians were involved in therocket-bombing and that they were accused merely because thegovernment wanted to link incident to SRP. (This ispartially confirmed by the fact that the two other menarrested have never been tried and were released after a sixmonth legal limit was reached for holding untried prisoners.9

The two quickly fled to Thailand and were given asylum inSweden in August.10)

Soon after entering Thailand, Sok Yoeun was taken fromthe house was he was staying and made a videotapedconfession; he almost immediately thereafter filed astatement with Amnesty International that the confession hadbeen made under duress.11 Sok Yoeun was categorized by theUNHCR as a “person of concern” and offered their protection,although UNHCR never officially informed the Thai governmentof this. His presence in the country only came to nationalattention when a Thai opposition leader used it to makeallegations that the Thai Prime Minister had allowed aterrorist to reside in the country. It was then that SokYoeun was brought into custody and imprisoned as an illegalimmigrant, and Cambodia formally petitioned for hisextradition. There is not extradition treaty betweenCambodia and Thailand but Thai law allows the extradition ofpersons guilty of crimes punishable in Thailand. SRP andhuman rights organizations contested the extradition and9 AFP (2000) “Court Releases Pair Accused of Attempt on Cambodian PM’s Life.” March 6.10 BBC World Service (2000) “Cambodians ‘Given Asylum’ In Sweden.” Aug. 24. 11 Wassana Nanuam (1999) “Sok Yoeun Repudiates Confession Statement ‘Coerced after Abduction.’” Bangkok Post, Dec. 27.

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claimed that Sok Yoeun was at great risk if he returned toCambodia. During his six month imprisonment for illegalentry, UNHCR arranged for him to go to a third country oncehis case was settled.12 In June he was released from prisonand put under UNHCR custody while awaiting his extraditiontrial. In October the hearings were still taking place, withSok Yoeun’s lawyers claiming that the Cambodian governmenthad provided little concrete evidence against him.13

Both the Khmer Rouge trials and Sok Yoeun’s trial pointto international assumptions that the Cambodian legal systemis arbitrary and subject to political manipulation; withinthe country, a cynicism based on the same assumptions appliesto the delays in legislation on the commune election laws.Fairly or not, these assumptions are exploited by theCambodian opposition. If only because it is so dependent oninternational aid, Cambodia cannot completely ignoreinternational judgments. (And in the case of Sok Yoeun doesnot have the physical means to do so.) Deadlocks such asthose we are looking at may have to do with an essentialtension between the CPP-dominated government’s attempts toassure its continued control over political networks based onpatronage while maintaining a public stance of deference tointernational standards based on the rule of law.

The great tragedy of the year was unquestionably thefloods, in the period from July to September, which resultedin the deaths of 258 persons and affected millions.14 Thefloods were regional, with 327 deaths in the Mekong Delta ofVietnam and high death tolls in Bangladesh and India. InCambodia the floods were believed to have damaged 390,000hectares of crops. Cambodia, already heavily dependent onforeign aid, appealed for emergency relief, and receivedassistance from the World Food Program (WFP), Great Britain,Germany, Luxembourg, the U.S., and Australia; In mid October,

12 Marcher, Anette (2000) “Refuge for Arrested SRP Men.” Phnom Penh Post, May12-25, 2000, p. 2.13 Chimprabha, Marisa (2000) “Extradition Case Weak, Sok Yoeun’s Lawyer Says.” The Nation, Oct. 27. 14 AP (2000) “Cambodia Floor Relief Hampered by Heavy Rains; Six drowned.”Oct. 11.

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loans for emergency rehabilitation were expected from AsianDevelopment Bank.15

The tragedy soon took on political overtones. UNanalysts blamed the flooding on regional deforestation andother environmental effects of development.16 Oppositionleader Sam Rainsy quickly availed of the opportunity to blamethe floods on the ways government corruption in Cambodia hasaffected deforestation. Hun Sen was as quick as Sam Rainsyto denounce local officials pocketing money to flood victims.However, Sam Rainsy’s accusations were more pointed; heclaimed that Hun Sen, flying by helicopter to distribute aidto flood victims, was giving aid priority to members of CPP.Rainsy, never shy of political theater, began a hunger strikeon October 24 in a park in front of the National Assembly,then moved the strike to a Buddhist temple after policecleared the demonstrators away from the park.17 The previousweek he had led a rally of 2000 people from the provinces tothe offices of the WFP and the International Federation ofthe Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to appeal for aid.Whether Sam Rainsy’s claims are ultimately justifiable, theydisplay a disturbing tendency to exploit any negativesituation for political mileage.

The Political Opposition

Following the 1998 elections, after an extended periodof negotiations, the second most popular political party, theNational United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peacefuland Cooperative Cambodia (known by the French acronymFUNCINPEC), formed a coalition with CPP in order to createthe two-thirds majority required by the constitution tocreate a government. Since then there have been increasingaccusations that FUNCINPEC has sold out to CPP as well asmore specific accusations of corruption against individual15 AFP (2000) “ADB Mulls Large Scale Flood Assistance for Cambodia.” Oct.12.16 Reuters (2000) “UN Agency Blames Mekong Floods on Deforestation.” Sept. 22.17 AP (2000) “Cambodia Opposition Leader Put Under Medical Watch.” October 27.

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FUNCINPEC politicians who, it was said, have literally soldthemselves out to CPP. In Phnom Penh, during summer, 2000,one heard reference to the “prostitution” of FUNCINPEC. AFUNCINPEC official told a political scientist18 frankly thatthe party’s internal coherence depended on its ability toprovide jobs and protection – that is, patronage -- and that,given the debts incurred at the time of the 1997 coup, theparty found that a coalition with CPP was the only way itcould generate the patronage it needed to survive. During2000 FUNCINPEC did not play the role of an opposition partyand increasingly distanced itself from the confrontationaltactics of SRP. In March, at its party congress, FUNCINPECvoted to re-incorporate members, such as Ung Huot, who hadbroken with the party and brokered deals with CPP at the timeof the 1997 coup. All this meant that the mantle ofpolitical opposition fell more and more clearly to SRP.

SRP’s unrelentingly confrontative politics were oftenexasperating to an outside observer, and the party, whosegrassroots rhetoric is often tinged with racism anddemagoguery, is not the simple voice of justice and innocencethat it pretends to be. Nevertheless, SRP’s confrontativestyle did serve to call attention to many issues that neededto be raised, and its stands often represented real courage.

Events suggest that CPP and FUNCINPEC had reached anagreement to squeeze out SRP before the commune elections.At the beginning of the year SRP issued an extended statementin English which he called a New Years message to theCambodian people, in which he asked them to reject thefatalism associated with the idea of karma and work forconcrete change. It included the line, gleefully repeated bythe international press, that, “The Cambodian presentleadership is made up of criminals, crooks, and clowns.”19

The statement also said that “the world’s perception ofCambodia is blurred by a thin veneer of monarchy which isactually nothing more than a façade of legality and democracyfor an illegal and dictatorial regime.” 18 Hughes, Caroline (unpublished m.s.) “Transforming Oppositions in Cambodia.”19 Sam Rainsy (2000) “The CPP Accused Sam Rainsy of Sedition.” Press release posted on camnews user group, Jan. 18.

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CPP and FUNCINPEC moved immediately to denounce SamRainsy’s statements in ways which to a non-Cambodian observerseemed harsh and disproportionate, with FUNCINPEC claimingthat Sam Rainsy was guilty of treason and sedition. Bothparties wrote letters to the king, HRH Norodom Sihanouk,accusing Sam Rainsy of statements hostile to the monarchy andBuddhism. They translated Sam Rainsy’s statements into Khmerin a way which Sam Rainsy claimed distorted his originalmessage. The letter from Hun Sen said, “He has insulted theLord Buddha and is inciting people not to believe in sin andinciting people to destroy tradition. The letter called forCambodians to “unite and protect our nation, religion andking from the plans of traitors.”20 Sihanouk originallythanked CPP and FUNCINPEC for their intervention; later,after receiving a letter from Sam Rainsy explaining hisposition and declaring his loyalty to the monarchy, the kingasked the government not to pursue complaints of sedition andtreason.21

Another well-publicized controversy, lasting over fourmonths, involved SRP’s attempts to erect a monument in a parkacross from the national assembly where a grenade had beenthrown into an SRP rally in 1997. The monument was in theform of a “stupa,” a conical structure which traditionallyencloses burial ashes or relics, and had inscriptions of thenames of those who died in the grenade attack. SRP had nopermission to erect the stupa, and the monument was clearlyintended to provoke a government response which wouldgenerate publicity. The original stupa was erected on March29, the anniversary of the grenade attack, and was dumpedinto the river by government authorities two days later.Various stupas followed, to be either crushed on the site ordumped in the river.22 On April 30, Sam Rainsy led a group of1000 demonstrators in a march against corruption. (Thiswould be followed by two days of even larger labor20 AFP (2000) “Cambodian King Blasts Opposition Leader over ‘Defamation’.”Jan. 20.21 AFP (2000) “Leave Opposition Alone, Sihanouk Tells Cambodian Government.” Jan. 26.22 O’Connell, Stephen and Bou Saroeun (2000) “Stupa Standoff Simmers afterFourth Round.” Phnom Penh Post, May 20 – June 8, 2000, p. 5.

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demonstration.) While this was happening, a mob of 200people, bussed into the city, smashed and burned a stupa andthrew stones at Sam Rainsy’s house. The fourth stupa,containing the ashes of grenade victims, was destroyed inearly June in a confrontation with police which left 10people wounded, including an SRP National Assembly member,who SRP claimed was beaten with sticks.23 In all, five stupaswere destroyed. It is significant that the issue was onlyresolved with the intervention of international players, whenthe US ambassador helped to negotiate a compromise wherebythe government gave permission to erect on August 3 a sixthstupa 50 meters from the original site of the grenadeincident.24

If wranglings of this kind were basically a form ofpolitical theater, a more deadly game was being played aroundkillings and intimidation of SRP provincial activists slatedto be candidates in the commune elections. (SRP alwaysclaimed that Sok Yoeun was targeted because he was apotential SRP candidate.) Although in individual cases itwas not always clear whether the candidates had been victimsof crime or political violence, a clear pattern emerged. InFebruary a party member and his daughter were killed inKampong Cham (in what might have been a dispute over water).In what was more clearly political violence, an SRP activistwas attacked with an axe in the same province on June 30 onhis way back from requesting government permission to put upan SRP sign. Then in the course of one week, from August 17to 22, two SRP provincial activists were killed and anotherinjured in three separate shooting incidents.25 A FUNCINPECprovincial candidate was also killed in June in Kampotprovince.

In a particularly strange incident, on September 29 anarmed solider approached an SRP National Assembly member whowas using a phone booth in Phnom Penh. The soldier shouted,“I hate SRP and FUNCINPEC,” and pointed the gun at him. The23 AFP (2000) “Cambodia’s Sam Rainsy Accused Police of Beating Up MP.” 24 Saing Soenthrith and John Gravois (2000) “Bricks for 6th Memorial StupaLaid.” The Cambodia Daily, Aug. 4, p. 12.25 Sam Rainsy Party (2000) “More Killing at Sam Rainsy Activist [sic].” Press release posted to camnews user group, Aug. 23.

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MP walked away, leaving his car, and returned a half hourlater with two generals and UN human rights officials. Therewas again a standoff for 20 minutes, with the solider wavinghis gun and threatening the MP, the generals, and the humanrights officials. Two weeks later there was no indicationthat he would be prosecuted.26

These cases seem to represent a new wave of politicalintimidation, which had greatly decreased since the beginningof 1999. Even when the incidents were not clearly ordered bycentral CPP authorities, there is a clear pattern ofpermitting violence against SRP to happen. And the threeshooting incidents in one week, soon after CPP was forced toconcede permission to erect the stupa, strongly suggests adeliberate campaign.

Besides leading demonstrations on behalf of floodvictims, Sam Rainsy also throughout the year worked activelyto organize demonstrations on behalf of victims of landconfiscations and was closely associated with the labormovement. Sam Rainsy denied government accusations that hewas behind demonstrations at the time of the visit of theThai Prime Minister; what is clear is that SRP’sdemonstrations have established a precedent for NGO-organizedprotests which have followed. SRP was living proof thatpublic opposition to the government could take place.Nevertheless, it took place at great human cost, and it isnot clear how long this kind of confrontative politics cansurvive.

Labor

The rapid expansion of the garment industry in Cambodiameant that labor disputes came into the fore even more thanthey had during the two previous years. The garmentindustry, largely owned by foreign Chinese and Taiwanesefirms, now accounts for over half of Cambodia’s exports. Of198 garment factories, more than 100 have opened in the lastthree years; they now employ 100,000 workers, mostly women.

26 O’Connell, Stephen and Vong Sokheng (2000) “Soldier Threatens SRP MP.” Phnom Penh Post, Oct. 13-26, p.4.

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A Cambodian Development Resource Institute survey found that91% of workers come from rural areas and 81% from farmfamilies.27 Western-style labor organization, new toCambodia, has very quickly become an important socio-political force in Cambodia, and Cambodian unions, workingwith the International Labor Organization and theInternational Textile, Garment and Leather WorkersFederation, as well as such organizations as the French laborrights NGO Réseau Solidarité, have grown more efficient andtactically sophisticated. At the same time, some keydemonstrations have grown out of spontaneous walkouts atfactory sites with little planning by unions. Althoughobservers say that by regional standards Cambodian labor lawis not bad, it is often ignored in practice, and the garmentfactories are associated with endemic problems of health andsafety hazard, refusal to grant holiday pay and annual leave,forced overtime, harassment of workers involved in unionactivity, and payment of less than the minimum wage.28 At thebeginning of the year the minimum wage for garment workerswas US $40 a month.

Frequent strikes and demonstrations acquired their ownmomentum over the course of the first half of the year. OnDecember 30, 1999, 900 workers at Kun Mao Hsing company inPhnom Penh struck for five days after they were told theywould not receive monthly bonuses for December or Januarybecause of a three-day holiday over New Year. On Feb. 3, 700striking workers from a single company marched through PhnomPenh to protest working conditions and non-payment of over-time pay. Later that month 300 workers from Tack FatGarments demonstrated in front of the National Assemboy,protesting less-than-minimum wage pay. They claimed they hadbeen beaten by police and factory guards as they began theirmarch.29 On April 24, 1000 workers went on strike at afactory that produced Ralph Lauren clothing. They protestedthe suspension of their union representative. Then on May27 Sok Hach and Pou Dorina (2000) “Economy Watch – Domestic Performance.” Cambodian Development Review, Vol. 4, No.2, pp. 13-5.28 AP (2000) “Cambodia’s Growing Experiment with Unionism.” Aug. 14. 29 Reuters (2000) “Cambodian garment workers strike, allege beatings.” Feb. 23.

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Day, following SRP rallies against corruption, anunprecedented 4,000 workers marched in the city to demandhigher wages and a shorter work week, a protest that extendedfor three days and shut down 30 garment factories.30

But the largest strikes took place in June. Some 400workers took to the street on June 18 after a short circuitsent a powerful electric surge through the sewing machines of160 workers, knocking them unconscious. Worker frustrationbroke out again three days later when wage negotiations brokedown between factory owners and union representatives, and agroup of 1,500 spontaneously marched in the streets. Thefollowing day five persons were injured in skirmishes withfactoring guards, including two hit by bullets when a guardopened fire.31 The strike continued over six days, gainingmomentum until some 10,000 workers from 20 garment factoriesparticipated, the largest strike in the country’s history.32

With the intervention of Cambodia’s Labor Advisory Committee,factory owners agreed to an increase in the minimum wage fromUS $40 to $45 a month (much less than the $70 demand indemonstrations), and the Free Trade Union of the Workers ofthe Kingdom of Cambodia announced there would be no morestrikes or demonstrations that year.

International Relations

Foreign aid is still crucial to Cambodia’s economy. ADecember, 1999 study, based on date for 1998, for example,pointed out that external assistance represented 66% of theamount foreign exchange from domestic exports.33 Annualmeetings of international donors to Cambodia, organized bythe World Bank, have thus become one of the key events of theyear and have far-reaching economic and politicalimplications. This is because donors have more and more

30 AP (2000) “Cambodian Garment Indus Shrugs Off Strike with Import Deal.”May 4.31 Phnom Penh Post (2000) “Striking Workers Shot.” June 23-July 6, pp. 1-2.32 Kyodo News Service (2000) “Cambodian Garment Factory Workers End Strike.” June 27.33 Godfrey, Martin (1999) “How Important Is External Assistance to Cambodia?” Cambodian Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 4.

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explicitly linked aid to Cambodia’s success in implementingreform. And for this reason NGOs, human rights groups, andthe Cambodian opposition have increasingly used the donormeetings as a forum to press for social agendas, both interms of what aid should be targeted and what stipulationsfor reform should be put on aid. The May, 2000 meetings inParis also included, for the first time, representatives ofthe private sector.34 Donors pledged US $548 million in aid,$48 million more than requested by the Cambodian government,and expressed satisfaction that Cambodia had made progress inkey reform related to the introduction of Value Added Tax,demobilization of the military, restructuring of civilservice, increased budget allocation in the social sector,and a crackdown on illegal logging. Donors also responded toa 4.5% gross domestic product growth during 1999, up from 1%in 1998. Despite the donors’ optimistic assessments, therewas a call for mechanisms of closer scrutiny of progresstoward reform in the coming year. An International MonetaryFund (IMF) representative told reporters that where donorshad reservations, it had to do, in particular, with slowprogress toward troop demobilization, shortfalls ingovernment revenue collection, and a need for restructuringof government bureaucracy. Despite significant progress inreducing deforestation, IMF said, there were stillsignificant problems.35

Prior to the meetings, Sam Rainsy criticized the donors,saying, “They are technocrats who just look at figures likeeconomic growth and GDP. But this economic growth is basedon illegal logging, over-fishing, and prostitution. So Iwill tell them to look at social costs.”36 This is, ofcourse, an over-simplification. However, it was true thatthe reforms that really occurred were mostly in the area ofmoney management. Troop demobilization had barely begun to

34 Boua, Chanthou (2000) “Behind the Headlines at the CG Meetings in Paris.” Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 8-9.35 AFP (2000) “Cambodia Set for Smooth Ride at Donor Conference.” May 16.“Economic Reform, Good Governance Top Agenda for Cambodian Donor Meeting.” May 24.36 AFP (2000) “Economic Reform, Good Governance Top Agenda for Cambodian Donor Meeting.” May 24.

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take place. As the statement by IMF indicated, progress incracking down on illegal logging was the most dubious of thereforms praised by the donors; the Asian Development Bankstudy which donors cited as evidence of progress was roundlycriticized by the environment group Global Witness.37 And SamRainsy’s statement is accurate in pointing out that, withrespect segments of the economy which drove GDP growth, suchas the garment industry and tourism, there was too littleassessment of who precisely “progress” benefited and who itharmed.

In addition to a World Bank grant and loans from theAsia Development Bank and the IMF, Cambodia was pledgedsignificant aid from Japan, China, the European Union (andindividual European countries), Canada, and Australia. USpolicy has emphasized giving aid to NGOs working in Cambodiarather than directly to the Cambodian government and sincethe 1997 coup US aid has been much less, for example, thanthat of Japan; however, US aid pledged in 2000 doubled theyear before.38

This was only Cambodia’s second year as a member ofASEAN and the first year that Cambodia attended an ASEANsummit. Hun Sen continued a systematic schedule of visitingthe member countries of ASEAN. During the year, Cambodianconducted significant border talks with each of its threeneighbors, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos; in each case thetalks were marked by small demonstrations by studentsclaiming that the other countries had encroached Cambodianterritory.

During the year several minor disputes in Thai-Cambodianrelations made headlines and drew attention to the bordernegotiations: the call for Sok Yoeun’s extradition, thestudent demonstrations at the time of the Thai PrimeMinister’s June visit, Phnom Penh protests about the Thaiembassy blocking access to a squatter settlement, and theconstruction of a casino on the Cambodian side of the borderwith Thailand, which, Thais argued, would block a canal and37 Global Witness (2000) “ADB Concession Review Still Falling Short.” Press release, March 3.38 AFP (2000) “Security, Support for New Democracies Mark US Foreign Policy Budget.”

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cause flooding in Thailand. Quite apart from the issue offlooding, Thailand had reservations about the growing numberof casinos near the border with Thailand (there are already12) and in November delayed opening up an internationalcheckpoint near the Cambodian province of Pailin becausethere was a casino near the site.39 The most unsettlingstories were the separate reports, in two well-respectedEnglish newspapers in Cambodia, of the incursion of hundredof Thai troops on Cambodian soil on the northern and westernborders.40 41 Thailand quickly issued statements that the landwas in fact territory belonging to Thailand.42 The Cambodiangovernment never issued protests, the issue never receivedwidespread international press, and, after border agreementswere signed between the two countries in June, the Thaimilitary conducted a general withdrawal of troops from theborder area.43 The incident seemed to suggest that Thailandwas conducting its border negotiations more forcefully thanwas generally acknowledged.

There was extensive diplomatic exchange between Cambodiaand China during the year, culminating in the visit ofChinese President Jian Zemin in November. Analysts point to anew closeness between the countries in the past three years,since which China has become a major donor.44

As in the past, Cambodia’s porous borders and lax lawenforcement meant a number of bizarre transnational scamsgravitated to Cambodia, creating sensational headlines:Romanian sex slaves for Cambodian politicians, attempts tolaunder eight billion Iraqui dinar, Cambodian flags issued toillegal international fishing boats, the arrest of aTaiwanese mafia chief, the attempts to deport an internetpornographer.

39 The Nation (2000) “Casino Delays Upgrading of Border Pass.” Nov. 15.40 The Nation (2000) “Thai Army Denies Incursion into Cambodia.” Feb. 16.41 Kyne, Phelim and Yin Soeum (2000) “Thai Forces Try Border Move.” Phnom Penh Post, March 31-April 13, 2000, pp. 1, 3.42 Kyne, Phelim, Steven O’Connell and Bou Saroeun (2000) “Border Land Ours, Not Yours, Say Thais.” Phnom Penh Post, April 14 –24, pp. 1, 3.43 Kyodo News Service (2000) “Thailand to Withdraw Military from CambodianBorder.” Aug. 10.44 The Nation (2000) “China Moves to Seal Its Southern Flank.” Nov. 15.

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Agriculture, Industry, and the Cambodian Economy

In the closing months of 2000 it was still difficult toevaluate the effects of the floods on the economy. A March,2000 study by a respected research institute predicted GDPgrowth during the year of 5%;45 however, it was estimated thatthe floods will have reduced this figure by at least onepoint. In addition to damaging some 390,000 hectares ofcrops, the floods caused significant infrastructural damageto roads, schools and other public buildings. Prior to thefloods, the economy demonstrated modest progress, driven inlarge part by the garment industry and tourism. In April theAsian Development Bank said that it believed Cambodia couldhave real GDP growth of six to seven percent per year “ifpolitical stability and structural reform can bemaintained.”46

The agricultural sector represents 35% of Cambodia’s GDPand 80% of the labor force. The wet season rice cropharvested in late 1999 came in at 3.1 million tons, comparedwith 2.87 million tons the year before. Together with thedry season crop, harvested in February, it representedCambodia’s best harvest since 1970, and Cambodia expected toexport 50,000 tons.47 Although prices fell to disappointinglevels in April, they soared again in June in trading withVietnam.48 There was also increase in other crops: corn,cassava, and soybeans. On the other hand, vegetableproduction decreased, and imported fruits and vegetables(primarily from Vietnam) represented 20% of consumption inPhnom Penh.49 In response to studies which showed extreme(and perhaps increasing) rural poverty, the Cambodian45 Sok Hatch (2000) “Prospects for the Cambodian Economy in the Year 2000.” Cambodian Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 8-10.46 Reuters (2000) “ADB Sees Cambodia GDP Up 6-7 Pct with Stability.” April 26.47 Reuters (2000) “Cambodian Traders Expect to Export 50,000 T Rice.” March 27.48 Reuters (2000) “Cambodian Rice Prices Soar on Vietnam’s Border.” June 20.49 Sok Hatch and Pon Dorina (2000) “Economy Watch – Domestic Performance.”Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 13-15.

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government expressed a commitment to developing agricultureand during the year received major funds for agriculturalinfrastructural development from Japan and Asia DevelopmentBank.

The fish catch rose by 20% over the previous year in the1999-2000 season. The increase was attributed to agovernment crackdown on illegal fishing and to early rains.50

Export of fish generated US 1 million in income.Industry represents 20% of GDP although it accounts for

only 5% of the workforce. The garment industry continued toexpand, although this growth was complicated by theimposition of quotas by the U.S., to be contingent onprogress in labor conditions. While the U.S. indicated thatgarment quotas could increase up to 14% per year, theyinitially increased only 5%, due to claims that labor lawswere laxly enforced. However the quota was raised again by5% in May and in July the government announced that the USwas considering another raise of 3-5%.51 The quotas, combinedwith labor unrest, caused a drop in investment in theindustry and many factories closed, perhaps squeezed out inthe bidding process whereby allotments of the total quotawere assigned to different factories. In July there were 198garment factories, compared with 270 the year before –although the smaller number of factories was producing moregarments.52 Quotas generated government revenue, sincefactory bids on allotments were paid to the government, andby March, 1999 it had received US $30 million from biddingfactories.53 The pressure of the quota system relaxed in Maywhen Cambodia signed an agreement for quota-free access toEuropean markets for the next three years.54 During the firstquarter of the year, garment exports were up 47% over theyear before; exports to the US still represented 80% of the

50 The Cambodia Daily (2000) “Fish Catch Improves.” July 26, p. 12.51 Reuters (2000) “Cambodia Says US Garment Quota May Increase.” July 31.52 Reuters (2000) “Cambodian garment exports grow 53% in first half.” July 20.53 Long Piseth, Pon Dorina and Sok Hach (2000) “Economy Watch – Domestic Performance.” Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 13-5.54 Reuters (2000) “Cambodia Garment Deal Stitched Up Free EU Access.” May4.

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total.55 However, with the signing of the agreement with theEuropean Union, government officials estimated that thepercentage of exports to Europe would increase to 30-35%.

During the year notorious business tycoon Theng Bun Maopened a factory to produce cotton cloth, intended to servethe garment industry. The firm was initially importing rawmaterials from Pakistan but hoped to encourage cotton farmingin Cambodia.

Some 45% of GDP derives from the service sector, whichemploys 15% of the labor force. Tourism boomed during theyear. This related to increasing international perception ofthe stability of the country. It also was related to thefact that Cambodia adopted an “open skies” polity forflights to Siem Reap (the province where the most famousancient Angkorean temples are located), meaning that foreignairlines could fly directly to Siem Reap, without havingtourists change planes in Phnom Penh. During the yearagreements for direct flights were worked out with airlinesin Thailand, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia.Tourism in 1999 had already improved 28.35% from the yearbefore (and up 41.1% if measured in terms of air arrivals inPhnom Penh and Siem Reap).56 This trend continued in thefirst five months of 2000, during which tourist arrivals byair were up 42% from the same period in 1999.57 The numbersof tourists from China (mostly Hong Kong and Guangzhou)increased dramatically, and were second only to the number oftourists from the U.S. The numbers of Vietnamese touristsalso increased dramatically. Phnom Penh hotels, however,complained that “open skies” policies cut into theirbusiness, and many were forced to drastically cut room rates.Concern was also expressed that the open skies policyfostered a situation in which tourists tended to stay onlyshort periods, usually no more than two days.

Cambodia actively pursued foreign investment, with mixedresults. During the first quarter of 2000, approved

55 Sok Hatch and Pon Dorina (2000) “Economy Watch – Domestic Performance.”Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 13-15.56 Xinhua (2000) “Tourist Arrivals in Phnom Penh Rise.” Jan. 19.57 Reuters (2000) “Tourist Arrivals to Cambodia Rise.” July 4.

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investment actually fell 79% compared with the year before,58

perhaps due primarily due to the U.S. quotas, but also,according to a December meetings with investors, due tofrustration about corruption, lack of infrastructure, and aninconsistent legal system. However, by the end of the thirdquarter the investment climate had improved. Although duringthe first three quarters investment in industry andagriculture had fallen 1.6% compared to the previous year,and textile investment had fallen 11.5%, investment intourism had increased by 48.53%.59 The country with thelargest number of new investments was Taiwan. In addition tothe numbers of investments, the Finance Ministry expressedconcern about the degree to which investment in the countrywas dominated by a “casino economy” ambience where investorshave no long-term commitment to the country.60

The volume of trade during the first half of the yearincreased by 72.3% at Cambodia’s main seaport inSihanoukville and by 19% at the port of Phnom Penh, comparedto the first half of 1999.

With the introduction of VAT, tax revenues increaseddramatically in 1999 over 1998, but had already declined inthe third and fourth quarters over the second quarter and atrend has continued into 2000 of serious shortfalls of bothtax and duty payments.

Health and Social Conditions

Cambodia has the highest infection rate for AIDS in Asiaand the enormity of the toll the disease is bound to take onthe country is still difficult to conceive. There isincreasing public awareness of AIDS and there have beensignificant campaigns to educate youth and distribute condoms– in brothels and, for example, at the time of the annualwater festival in Phnom Penh; however, there is still no58 Reuters (2000) “Cambodia Investment Falls 79 Percent in Q1 yr/yr.” April 22.59 Xinhua (2000) “Cambodia Approves Investment Projects with over 200 Million Dollars in Nine Months.” Oct. 24.60 Kyne, Phelim (1999) “Combating ‘Cowboy Operators’ of the ‘Casino Economy’.” Phnom Penh Post, Dec. 10-23, p. 18.

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concrete evidence of improvement in the situation. Fourpercent of the sexually active population is HIV positive and50% of sex workers. Nearly 20% of the armed forces is HIVpositive. The annual rate of increase of HIV infection issix percent.61 Perhaps the most disturbing phenomenon was theincreasing incidence of infected children, many who becameorphans when their parents died of AIDS or abandoned them.Seven out of 10 abandoned children in the country had HIV.Cambodia also has one of the highest rates of tuberculosis inthe world, 541 cases per 100,000 population, compared to anaverage, globally, of only 61; the outbreak in tuberculosismay be related to HIV infection.62

The AIDS problem reflected in part the widespreadcommercial sex industry in Cambodia. More and moreinternational attention focused during the year ontrafficking in women and children, which seemed to beincreasing. The issue had an international dimension, sincemany prostitutes in Cambodia were from other countries,particularly Vietnam, and many Cambodian prostitutes weretrafficked into Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan.Commercial sex in Cambodia – and child prostitution – wasalso linked to tourism (the dark side of GDP growth).Perhaps 35% of sex workers in Cambodia are under 18 years ofage. It is important to emphasize that child prostitution,like prostitution in general, is not only a problem oftourism; it is an internal problem as well. Nevertheless thelink to tourism seemed to be increasing. In a study issuedin August by the international NGO World Vision, threefourths of 28 Ministry of Tourism officials interviewed saidthat they had requested tour operators to find girls fortourists; half of the officials interviewed said theybelieved a child between the ages of 14 to 17 was legallymature. In major tourist centers, the study found that of 68children interviewed (street children, child vendors, andbeer-promotion girls under 18), three-fourths had had sexual

61 Cochrane, Joe (1999) “Generation May Be Lost to Aids Virus: Officials.”South China Morning Post, Nov. 10.62 Kyodo News Service (2000) “WHO Urges Asia to Implement Low-Cost Strategy to Halt TB.” March 23.

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relations with tourists.63 As many as half of the prostitutesin Cambodia’s brothels have been forced into prostitution,some sold into prostitution by impoverished rural parents. AJune report by the Human Rights NGO LICADHO documented thefrequent torture of Cambodian prostitutes. Thirty-eightpercent of prostitutes interviewed reported abuse, includingbeatings, electric shock, and burns with battery acid. Thereport described new girls being forced to take heroin orvalium to become more compliant.64

As cited in last years’ report on Cambodia, there remainentrenched problems of rural poverty in Cambodia, with 38% ofall Cambodian households under the poverty level and, in someareas, significant shortages of food. A new study, by theCambodian government, UNESCO, and UNDP, was released in 2000which gave emphasis to problems of literacy in the country,which it showed to be much lower than the 1998 censusindicated.65 The study found that 24.7% of males and 45.1% offemales could be considered totally illiterate. Another26.6% of the population had only rudimentary literacy skills.Only 37.1% had literacy skills at a truly functional level.

Perhaps the most positive social development during theyear was the campaign to reduce weapons in the country. Thecampaign began in April, 1999 when a sub-decree was passedseverely restricting the categories of persons who couldpossess guns. As of October, 1999, 64,088 weapons had beencollected from the 22 provinces, and by the end of 199927,244 weapons had been destroyed publicly in sixceremonies.66 Weapons continued to be actively collectedthroughout 2000.

63 Reuters (2000) “Cambodian Children Face Tourist Sex Exploitation.” April 21. 64 Johnson, Kay (2000) “Brutal Sex Industry ‘Protected by Police’.” South China Morning Post, June 27. 65 So Chunn and Supote Prasertsri (2000) “Literacy Rates Much Lower than Estimated.” Cambodian Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 1-4.66 NGO Statement to the 2000 Consultative Group Meeting on Cambodia (2000)“Weapons Reduction.” May 24-26.

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