a case study on the management of internally displaced persons of the 2011 post-election violence in...
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A Case Study on the Management of Internally Displaced Persons of the 2011 Post-‐Election Violence in Kaduna State, Nigeria in Kaduna
BY
Maikudi A. S. Sanusi Adamu Bala
Hassan Mohammed Abdullahi
MAY 2014
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Map of Kaduna State that suffered about 80 percent of lives lost and Displacements as per the Report of the Federal Investigation Panel
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A Case Study on the Management of Internally Displaced Persons of the 2011 Post-‐Election Violence in Kaduna State, Nigeria in Kaduna
“The violent riots that trailed the April 2011 Presidential elections may have come and gone but for Awwal and several other victims, the memories may indeed last for as long as they live”1.
Preamble The ugly phenomena of involuntary Internal Displacements of persons are growing rapidly in Nigeria, both in terms of the population size involved and the geographical spread of the areas being affected since 1999 when the country transited to democratic rule. A United Nations document defined Internally Displaced Persons as:
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obligated to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-‐made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.2
Conversely, those who crossed national frontiers into a different country are termed refugees.
It was also observed that;
One of the gravest humanitarian consequences of armed conflict is the displacement of populations. Those who are forced to flee and leave everything behind are often the victims who suffer the most. Their voices are seldom heard in peace negotiations, and yet realizing durable solutions for them is a crucial element for lasting peace. Return of internally displaced populations is often used as a benchmark against which progress in post-‐conflict stabilization and peace building is measured. 3
The Chairman of Nigeria’s National Refugees Commission (NRC), Prof. Abayomi Durosinmi –Etti, recently disclosed that over one million Nigerians are internally displaced consisting mainly of women and children, factored by conflicts, fire and flood disasters and general insecurity. This is a worrisome development; urgent action needs to be taken to contain it before it degenerates further.4
1 Agaju Madugba (2012) Pain and Anguish: The Inside Story of Suffering in Kaduna Hajj Camp 2 McHugh, Gerard (2010) Integrating Internal Displacement in Peace Processes and Agreements, United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC, USA
3 See ibid pp 4 Prof. Abayomi Durosinmi –Etti (2012) Providing for Internally Displaced Persons, Sahara Reporters, Washington DC, USA
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The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Norwegian Refugee Council, Switzerland in a specific study of the Nigerian situation argued that:
Internal displacements are caused by both communal violence and internal armed conflict is a recurrent phenomenon in most states in Nigeria. The parties to the fighting have sought political, economic and social advantages in a country with endemic poverty, low levels of education and a huge and alienated youth population. In the absence of accurate and comprehensive number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the country ad-‐hoc local registration exercises have hinted at the scale of displacement, but many people have sought shelter and support from family and friends and so have not been counted.5
Although Internal Displacements can also be caused by natural disasters such as floods, land and Mud Slides, earthquakes, droughts, bushfires or volcanic eruptions but in Nigeria there are several human factors identified as being responsible for this growing tragedy, some of these include ethno-‐religious and sectional diversity that fuels intense competition for advantage of one group over others, poor rule of law, pervasive corruption and long period of military rule that suppressed national dialogues for consensus building on the National Question.
This paper is a case study on the three years experience of the Network for Justice on the Management of Internally Displaced Persons of the 2011 Post Election Violence in Kaduna State Nigeria camped at Hajj Camp Mando, Kaduna from 19th April, 2011 to 30th April, 2014.
The Network for Justice6 is a non-‐governmental organization registered as Incorporated Trustees in Nigeria in 1991. It is principally to champion the cause of social and judicial justice, democracy, Human Rights, anti-‐corruption, good governance and Consumer Protection, which over the years the network has been crystallized into a four-‐item agenda of action.
The Network facilitated the management Committee with representatives of the Internally Displaced Persons. The committee was made up of 25 persons made up ten (10) members from the network and fifteen members from amongst the IDPs under the chairmanship of Abdullahi Hassan Mohammed a retired Director from the Kaduna State Government and a member of one of the affected communities.
The Camp Management Committee registered Cooperative Society named Sultan Road Orphans and Widows Cooperative Society for the purposes of meeting the legal requirements to operate in Nigeria.
The committee worked, for three years, with government, its agencies, other civil societies, donors, researchers, Human Rights Groups both local and international, journalists and other relevant stakeholders to as much as possible sustained the basic needs of the IDPs and the sanitation of the Camp to avoid outbreak of diseases that usually bedeviled similar sites.
5 Nigeria: No end to internal displacement (2009) Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Norwegian Refugee Council, Switzerland.
6 See the Website: www.networkforjusticenigeria.com
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Census and Enumeration of IDPs on arrival at the Mando Camp on
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The Conflict that Precipitated the Displacement The dawn of Monday 18th April 2011 reveals nothing that there was something extraordinary to be associated with it for a long time apart from the result of the Presidential Election April 16, 2011 that was trickling in the media from the Independent National Electoral Commission. The Presidential Election was trailed by widespread violence in several parts of the country. The crises took different typology depending on the fault line exploited in different localities. It seems the ensuing conflict provided cover for settling subsisting old scores such as political affiliation, ethno-‐religious identities or other sectional rivalries. It was not uprising that Kaduna State, which is one of the most conflict-‐prone States in the federation. The State since the Kasuwan Magani Crisis of 1981, has suffered from about thirty ethno-‐religious conflicts of varying dimensions out of which the 2011 Post-‐Election Violence stood on a class of its own on account of the number of lives lost, properties destroyed and the territorial spread and impact of the violence.
Some Corpses of those killed at Zonkwa, Zangon Katab Local Government Area of Kaduna State
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The April 2011 Post-‐Election Violence took the typology of ethno-‐religious cleansing (genocide) in some parts of Southern Kaduna and had led to the death of about a thousand persons (made up of people residing in the area and others caught on transit), the forceful displacement of over twenty five thousand families from 38 settlements and the complete destruction of their dwellings, places of worship, farmlands, livestock and other means of livelihoods. Other categories of victims of this large-‐scale violence were people caught on transit as they were innocently transiting the scenes and were subsequently trapped by the fighters on the ground of belonging to ethno-‐religious background different from their assailants. If a Muslim was caught up within a Christian mob he easily got killed or robbed of all his belonging, this is equally applies if a Christian on transit was trapped by Muslim mobs. In the aftermath of the crises “a panel of investigation, set up by the federal government, found that 938 people in northern Nigeria were killed in the violence—more than 80 percent of those deaths occurred in Kaduna State.”7 The Human Rights Watch observed, “The attacks were widespread and in many cases appeared to be carried out in a coordinated manner. The federal panel of investigation found that more than 80 percent of the deaths in Kaduna State occurred in the southern part of the state”8 Further records of the violence reported by a an ad hoc Commission of Inquiry, set up by the state government, and listed the names of 815 people killed in the violence. The State’s Commission also compiled an extensive list of property damage and it listed that:
1,976 houses, 925 shops, 1,352 vehicles, 96 Churches, and 47 Mosques destroyed, burned, or vandalized. The Christian Association of Nigeria reported that 75 Christians were killed and 129 churches destroyed in the violence. Muslim leaders from five communities in Southern or Central Kaduna—Zonkwa, Matsirga, Gidan Maga, Kafanchan, and Maraban Rido—as well as Fulani leaders representing rural Fulani pastoralists, reported that, together, 825 Muslims were killed in the violence.”9
Another observer noted:
While the 2011 post-‐election violence may be outstanding in terms of its magnitude, severity and consequences, it is pertinent to note that elections are synonymous with violence in Nigeria. All the eight general elections conducted in Nigeria since independence in 1960 (including 1964, 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections) have been marred by various degrees of violence.10
7 “Leave Everything To God” Accountability for Inter-‐Communal Violence in Plateau and Kaduna States, Nigeria (2013) Human Rights Watch, Washington DC USA.
8 See ibid 9 See Ibid 10 The Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research (2002) Election Violence in Nigeria: The Terrible Experience, 1952-‐2002, Kaduna: Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical
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It was this violent conflict that precipitated the forceful displacements of the IDPs that were camped at Hajj Camp Mando by the Jama’atu Nasril Islam Headquarters, Kaduna.
Officials of Kaduna State Emergency Management Agency Addressing IDPs at the Camp Before they withdrew their services. Contrary to the report of the State Commission of Inquiry that 825 Muslims got killed, our investigations show that in Southern Kaduna alone, nothing less than a thousand Hausa/Fulani and associated peoples were massacred, several others were seriously and mercilessly injured as many were permanently crippled. Several homes, means of earning their livelihoods and places of worship were completely destroyed. Surprisingly, even members of the so-‐called autochthonous ethnic nationalities who are Muslims of assorted Southern Kaduna extraction by voluntary choice, such as Kamantan, Bajju, Jaba, Ikulu, Kagoro were not spared from these inhuman treatment of man against his fellow mankind simply on account of being of different faith from the mob assassins. The lucky survivors consisting mainly of Widows, Orphans and other vulnerable persons witnessed the entire genocide before they were completely displaced from their places of abode in at least Nineteen (19) Southern Kaduna settlements, at least they could tell their sordid stories to posterity whenever they might be beckoned to do so. The victims who survived the ethno–religious massacre on a large scale, were violently uprooted and forcefully displaced from their respective places of abode. Their entire life saving and personal
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belongings were completely destroyed with impunity; as they emerged out of the gruesome attacks without money, food items, clothes and other belongings necessary from optimal survival. Some of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have fled out of Kaduna State to other States such as Kwara, Oyo, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Niger, FCT, Jigawa, Kano and Katsina. Areas of Displacements
The violence, which quickly took on a sectarian dimension, erupted in 18 of 23 Local Government Areas of Kaduna State,11 as a result of which several families were displaced from the places listed below: -‐
I. Chikun Local Government Area i. Gonin Gora ii. Maraban Rido iii. Sabon Gidan Hausawa
II. Zangon Kataf Local Government Area
i. Zonkwa ii. Unguwan Rimi Bajju iii. Chenchuk iv. Zako v. Samaru vi. Gidan Maga vii. Matsirga viii. Kamuru-‐Ikulu ix. Madakiya x. Katsit
III. Kaura Local Government Area i. Kagoro ii. Fadan Daji iii. Kukum Daji iv. Kukum Gida v. Agban vi. Tuyit vii. Malagun
IV. Jema’a Local Government Area
i. Kafanchan ii. Kagoma
11 Stuart Windsor (2011) Nigeria: Soldiers sent to Southern Kaduna State following an armed attack on a Village, Christian Solidarity World Wide.
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V. Jaba Local Government Area i. Kwoi ii. Sabon Gari iii. Daddu iv. Chori
VI. Kachia Local Government Area i. Kurmin Musa ii. Jaban Kogo iii. Sabon Sarki
VII. Soba Local Government Area VIII. Giwa Local Government Area IX. Igabi Local Government Area X. Kaduna North Local Government Area XI. Kaduna South Local Government Area
Population and Location of IDPs The Internally Displaced Persons are in two categories of Camps namely those who occupy public buildings and those who lived with family and friends in borrowed, hired or donated dwellings in towns and villages other than those of habitation prior to the crisis. The Mando Hajj Camp as the name implies was before the Post-‐Election Violence the transit camp for Kaduna State Muslim Pilgrims to Saudi Arabia. It is located in Igabi Local Government Area of Kaduna State, at least 7 km from the city center. It was the largest camp that housed the entire IDPs from Zonkwa, Matsirga, Mararaban Rido Kamuru-‐Ikulu villages and some rural Fulani. The second major camp was the Ladduga grazing Reserve in Kachia Local Government Area that accommodated mostly the Fulani Pastoralists from other areas of Southern Kaduna where they have been living for centuries. Other IDPs can be found in informal camps located in the following locations: -‐
i. Maraban Jos, Igabi Local Government Area ii. Zaria, Zaria Local Government Area iii. Sabon Gari, Sabon Gari Local Government Area iv. Pambegua, Kubau Local Government Area v. U/Bawa, Lere Local Government Area vi. Saminaka, Lere Local Government Area vii. Mariri, Lere Local Government Area viii. Zangon Kataf, Zagon Kataf Local Government Area ix. Kagarko, Kagarko Local Government Area x. Keffi, Nassarawa State xi. Gidan Abe, Kagarko Local Government Area xii. Jere, Kargarko Local Government Area xiii. Tafa, Kagarko Local Government Area xiv. Kauru, Kauru Local Government Area xv. Kafanchan, Jema’a Local Government Area xvi. Keke, Chikun Local Government Area xvii. Gadan Malam Mamman, Kachia Local Government Area xviii. Dan Kande Mobile Police Barracks, Igabi Local Government Area
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This write up is concerned with the management experience obtained from the Hajj Camp, Mando, Kaduna because a committee was charged with the responsibility of managing it including mobilizing donations, record keeping and liaison with government and other stakeholders.
The Historic Visit of HRH Dr. Abdulmuminu Kabir Usman the Emir of Katsina to the Camp to calm the IDPs and Present Relief materials for and on behalf of the Government and People of Katsina State.
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Population of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as at August 2011. S/NO LOCATION POPULATION NATURE OF LIVING
CONDITION REMARKS.
1 Hajj Camp, Mando 2,987, Persons
Sheltered in Govt. Hajj Camp, Mando
Displaced from Zonkwa, M/Rido, Kamuru and Matsirga
2 Ladduga 2,502 Persons
Housed in make shift Huts (temporary)
Displaced from Entire Southern Kaduna.
3 Kachia 1121 Persons Housed in borrowed/ Rented houses.
Displaced from Kamuru-‐Ikulu, Zonkwa & Gidan Maga.
4a Kafanchan 264 Persons Housed in borrowed/ Rented houses.
Displaced from Matsirga,U/Rimi Gidan Maga, U/Fari, & U/Baki
4b Kafanchan 406 Persons Housed in borrowed/rented houses.
Displaced from within Kafanchan
5 Kagarko 1,750 Persons
borrowed/rented houses
Displaced from Kwoi, Daddu, Chori etc
6 Pambegua/Kauru 253 Person borrowed/rented houses
Displaced from Kamuru & Zonkwa.
7 U/Bawa 2,513 Persons
Borrowed/rented houses
Displaced from Zonkwa, Kamuru & Matsirga
8 Dan Kande Mobile Police Barracks
63 families Abandoned Classroom Blocks
Igabi Local Government Area
TOTAL 11,796 Persons
LIVING CONDITIONS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS The Internally Displaced Persons lived in very pathetic, sub human and difficult conditions. They initially had difficulty obtaining basic food, medications and sanitary items prior to the intervention of the Network for Justice and other Civil Society Organizations in the affairs of the Camp All the displaced students and pupils except few had lost School sessions until an NGO named Back to School introduced School classes for Western and Islamic Education for almost one year. A NECO examination Centre was also opened for displaced Senior Secondary Students for 2011 May/June Examinations. 189 women have put to bed in an exceptionally difficult condition in the Camp. An entire active and productive population had been reduced to relying on charity or alms for survival. Several able-‐bodied men and women are living idly at the mercy of the elements. A delegation of the Christian Solidarity World Wide reported their findings “in the disused classrooms of a police barracks in Dankande, the team encountered 63 displaced families from four villages destroyed during the April violence, who were living in squalid conditions where they
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lacked adequate food and water and were under threat of eviction”12
Similar threat of eviction from mated out to IDPs at Mando using subtle means which included disconnecting water and electricity supplies and withdrawal of security personnel that manned the Camp.
The IDPs at the Mando Hajj Camp were slightly better-‐off when compared to those in other Camps located away from the state capital possibly on account of the camp’s location in the city and their visibility, which attracted sympathy, support and assistance coming from several NGOs, Philanthropists and other good Samaritans, who supplied the Victims with adequate food, clothing, beddings; and other basic amenities including cash gifts. In spite of the above support 28 persons died at the Camp while 145 fall sick and were treated at FOMWAN, Jinya, Barau Dikko,, Yusuf Dantsoho Hospitals as well as the Nigerian Army Reference. HANDLING OF THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS BY KADUNA STATE GOVERNMENT It is incontrovertible fact that one of the fundamental responsibilities of any legitimate authority is the maintenance of law and order through which the sacred human lives and valuable properties are protected from aggressors both internal and external. On account of the above truism one can argue that any breach of the above obligation that results in massive and wide spread violence is a failure by commission or omission on the part of the state (government) and its relevant agencies. Perhaps that was why many analysts asked albeit rhetorically how come Kaduna State, which is the fourth most populous State in the country should suffer the un-‐proportionate 80% lost in human lives?
12 Stuart Windsor (2011) Nigeria: Soldiers sent to southern Kaduna State following an armed attack on a Village, Christian Solidarity World Wide
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Although this write-‐up is concerned with the management of IDP camp it is necessary to obtain an overview of the actions or inactions of the Kaduna State Government that in the first place caused the crises and thereafter mismanaged it to such an extent that it made the avoidable violence unavoidable and the displacement of persons inevitable, the side effects of which is still simmering in many places and manifested in different dimensions. Regardless of the degree of the risk of violence associated with the April, 2011 on accounts of historical antecedents and the intense competition for power I can boldly opined that the unhealthy post-‐election violence was absolutely preventable if the State had the desire to do so. This government failed to use conflict prevention methodologies and institutions put in place by the previous administration particularly those of Brigadier General Ja’afaru Isah and Ahmed Muhammed Makarfi. Particularly the Kaduna State Religious Harmony Committee constituted with two Muslim and Christians from each drawn from JNI and CAN respectively out of the 23 Local government Areas of the State. The primary responsibility of is promotion of dialogues between the Muslim and Christians in each locality and at the statewide levels foe complex issues required high-‐level negotiations or interventions. It was a huge surprise that the vital committee was not convened to proactively identify and fix potential conflict risks likely to emanate from the impending election. Secondly it also provoked suspicion as to why the then State Governor refused to answer distressed GSM phone calls from different and even highly placed citizens people in distress, who hitherto are in talking terms with him on political and governance issues. Such that he ignored text messages (SMS) sent by the Director of Planning and Research of his Nakowa Campaign Movement,13 which read viz: “The security situation in Kafanchan and Matsirga is getting out of hand. Kindly do something about it to avert lost of lives. Comrade Sanusi “14 It was reasonably expected that the Governor could have used the usually heavy security mobilized and deployed into the area in question for the purpose of the April, 2011 Election Rounds. After the worst had happened by way of commission or omission, it was expected that the administration would have swiftly taken steps to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide and rehabilitate the victims irrespective of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. Instead observers were shocked with “the alacrity with which the State government contracted for the evacuation of substantial evidence of the genocide at Gonin Gora Abuja Road, Kaduna, Zonkwa and Mastirga Zangon Kataf Local Government Area without extending the same zeal in the treatment of the wounded, resettlement of the unfortunate persons displaced thereby paving way for restoration of normalcy”15
13 Yakowa-‐ Nakowa was the re-‐lection Campaign Outfit of the late Kaduna State Governor Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa. 14 Matsirga Muslim Community (2011) A Text of Memoranda Submitted to Federal Government Panel of Investigation into Post Election Violence and Civil Disturbances. 15 Sanusi Maikudi (2011), “Open Letter on Peace and Reconciliation Committee on April 2011 Post-‐Election Ethno-‐Religious Cleansing in Southern Kaduna”, Daily Trust Newspaper.
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While public attention and expectation was on the government to act decisively to arrest the situation through objective, non-‐partisan and result oriented intervention the Southern Kaduna Council of Christian Elders16 and the Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU)17 charged the atmosphere with their opinions that blamed the victims of the violence for the crises, which they concluded was politically motivated. Most of the survivors of the crisis who populated the Camps of Internally Displaced Persons were either citizens of Kaduna State or spouses of Kaduna State Citizens, who have the right to receive adequate support, De-‐traumatization and rehabilitation from the State Government, whose gross negligence gave the organized army of mass-‐murders the opportunity to carry out genocidal attacks that ended with the cleansing of Muslims and Displacement of Survivors to the afore mentioned Camps. It was also noted Since in the aftermath of the crisis the major action of the State Government was the quickened and thorough in the evacuation of charred corpses, burnt vehicles and clearing of debris probably destroy all evidences of the Crime Committed by culprits at the nineteen locations mentioned above coordinated by the state Ministry of Health and the Red Cross Society. Thereafter, the State Government had abandoned the victims to their fate after the initial consignment of Relief Materials provided through the State Emergency and Management Agent (SEMA), which lasted for about thirty days only in May 2011. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) also provided some relief materials three times in the form of food items, beddings and provisions. Another unrealistic monetary provision in the of paltry sum of between Fifteen Thousand Naira (N15,000.00) to Twenty Five Thousand Naira (N25,000.00) to heads of Household with One, Two and Three Wives respectively for alternative accommodation of families outside the IDPs Camp. Many communities rejected because, apart from being grossly inadequate it was also a ploy to move them out of public attention, which was purportedly causing Government a lot of embarrassment. Meanwhile the Nigerian Police had made some sporadic arrests of some suspected persons, moly of street urchins across the divide of the conflict but so far there was no diligent prosecution resulting in zero conviction of both the masterminds and the foot soldiers of this monumental crime against humanity. The Government also set up a Judicial Commission of enquiry under justice Mohammed Lawal Bello with Members 9 including the representatives of JNI and CAN. 16 Peace and Justice Commission Kafanchan Catholic Dioceses (2011) The Violent Crisis In Kafanchan And Its Environs Following The April 16th. 2011 Presidential Election
17 Professor I.N. Nock (2011) An Assessment Of The Post-‐election Violence That Swept Kaduna And Some Northern States Of Nigeria by SOKAPU, www.saharareporters.com
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The Committee ab initio sent a wrong signal that contrary to the custom and practice of similar Commissions, it was only a-‐fact-‐finding Commission that required depositors of Memoranda to “adopt their Memoranda and go” without cross examination. It also looked bizarre that even though the Judicial Commission was constituted according to the Laws of the State with full cooperation of the State Ministry of Justice and the State judiciary and had an active High Court Judge serving as its chairman, it cannot indict any one in spite of the mountain of evidences to do so before it. This led a Coalition of Victims to issue a press statement bitterly rejecting the so-‐called “adopt their Memoranda and go” approach to investigating the matter18. The disregard of the disregard of the of the concerns of one of the parties in the conflict, among other factors, eventually lead to the boycott of the Proceedings by 14 Muslim Communities and organizations from across the State which was followed by a Press Conference during which a vote of no confidence was passed on the Judicial Commission of Enquiry and its leadership.19 Eventually the Commission of Enquiry concluded its assignment and submits a report to the State Governor without the traditional overview and a few recommendations. For several months the state government shelved the much-‐awaited report without making its contents public and to worsen matters it failed to release a white paper within reasonable time with several IDPs scattered across the State waiting in Limbo while their destiny and hopes seems condemned to eternity. The Governor in what seems to be an afterthought or a policy summersault announced the constitution of an over bloated and weird 70-‐man of a Peace and Reconciliation Committee after claiming that “as far as he are concerned actually the government has already started implementing the recommendations of the Judicial Commission of Enquiry which you established”20 This unwise act provoked this writer to sent an Open Letter to the Governor titled Open Letter on Peace and Reconciliation Committee on April 2011 Post-‐Election Ethno-‐Religious Cleansing in Southern Kaduna21. Two Private individuals, who though prompted by the government that seemed embarrassed by the open letter were not the official spokesmen of the regime, dignified it, unlike in previous cases, with two replies22.
18 Capt. Mohammed Joji (2011) Travesty of Justice at the Kaduna State Commission of Enquiry on 2011 Post Election Violence 19 Coalition of Muslim Victims (2011), Kaduna Post Election Violence: Group Petitions Governor, the Nation Newspaper, Monday, 01 August 2011
20 H.E Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa (2011) Interview in Sunday Trust Newspaper of 16th October 2011 on pages 4 and 5 21 Sanusi Maikudi (2011) “Open Letter on Peace and Reconciliation Committee on April 2011 Post-‐Election Ethno-‐Religious Cleansing in Southern Kaduna”, Daily Trust Newspaper, 22 Pastor Isaac Makama Et al (2011) Kaduna South Youths give Conditions for Hausa/Fulani return to Zonkwa. The Nation Newspaper
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The Peace and Reconciliation Committee did not provide a level playground for all the parties in the disputes at member level. Partisan persons who regard migration and its attendant result of national integration as an ‘internal colonialism’ as consultants who in their over zealousness imported several issues unrelated to the crises at hand to down play the enormity of crime committed against humanity in the name of post election violence. Observers were least surprised when some members of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee renounced their membership of the committee and it the end it failed to achieve consensus thereby resulting in a minority report. Only time would tell if the final report of the Peace and Reconciliation Committee is worth the value of the papers on which it is written. Perhaps it should be placed on record that neither the Judicial Commission of Enquiry nor the Peace and Reconciliation Committee visited the IDPs camp at Hajj Camp Mando or any other Camp for that matter to see for themselves the pathetic conditions of the IDPs. To further complicate matters and efforts of Reconciliation and rehabilitation none of the afore mentioned committees deemed it fit to visit the ruins of any the settlements destroyed in the crises, one wonders how, without first hand information they can recommend actionable course of action in the search for acceptable and sustainable solutions. The potential of possible return of displaced persons to their respective places of their habitation prior to the crises was sealed via a letter published in the print media by the Zonkwa Youths most of who participated in the genocide of 18th and 19th April, 2011 and ought to have been facing trial for their heinous crimes developed the audacity to issue conditions to be fulfilled by displaced Nigerians before they could be allowed to return to a place of their choice in their country! All efforts to establish the action of the Kaduna State Government under Sir Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa proved abortive to date. Since there was no public sanction against such unconstitutional demand secret government support for it cannot be entirely ruled out.
While the Peace and Reconciliation was going on a notorious Gun Runner was arrested on his way from Jos to Kafanchan but nothing was heard about him!
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The gross failure to manage the fall out of the 2011 post election violence in Kaduna State where about 80 percent of the total lives were lost and property worth more than 15 Billion Naira was lost to looting, arson and vandalism opened the gate for another horrible challenge of over night armed attacks in rural areas. CSW’s Special Ambassador Stuart Windsor said, “It is extremely worrying that the phenomenon of night time raids, which has already claimed lives in villages in Bauchi and most recently in Plateau State, is now occurring in Kaduna.”23
The SOKAPU and its apologists that inadvertently took a partisan stand against justice, reconciliation and inclusive development by shielding criminals and murderers is now surprisingly shedding crocodile’s tears. Dr Ephraim Goje, says there had been 54 invasions of Southern Kaduna communities since 2011, with 545 lives lost and not less than 1,000 homes damaged. The majority of the attacks took place in Kaura LGA, according to him.24 Perhaps we ought to have been guided aright be the song of late Mamman Shata25 of blessed memory who advised that whosoever intend to dig a hole for wickedness on the road should make it shallow, lest one should incase happens to fall into it. Management Procedure at the IDPs Camp The central objective any IDP Camp management is to ensure that IDPs are properly rehabilitated or assisted to enable them return to as close to a normal life as possible and to prevent the outbreak of diseases, the risk of which lurks around the corner.
Where possible, chaplain and counseling services are provided to calm down the IDPs from their traumatized predicaments and to restore their hopes, dreams and inspire them for better future in spite of their present setbacks. The IDPs had arrive the Camp with their traditional and religious leaders who transplanted their authorities into the new domain thereby reducing initial disorder. Accordingly, Network for Justice liaised with respective community leaders, addressed as Sarkin Hausawa in Zonkwa, Matsirga, Kamuru-‐Ikulu and Maraban Rido, who nominated their community representatives to the Central Camp Management Committee, Sub-‐committees and eventually Room leaders. Male and Female IDPs of each community were housed separately but were interlaced based on their traditions and familiarity to each other and since there were no single rooms for couple to have the luxury of living together. Each community constituted its Room Management Sub-‐committee and while food preparation was assigned to Community Cooking Sub-‐committees.
23 Stuart Windsor (2011) Nigeria: Soldiers sent to southern Kaduna State following an armed attack on a Village, Christian Solidarity World Wide 24 Luka Binniyat (2013) “Gory Death Scenes: Women, Children worst hit in Kaduna three-‐way attacks that killed 119”, Vanguard Newspaper, Lagos Nigeria.
25Alhaji Mamman Shata ( ……………….. ) is a popular Hausa Musician from Katsina State.
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A centrally located hall was converted into a central store for collection of relief materials with a detailed register of collections and distribution of relief materials kept and counter signed by not less than three people from different communities for any action on the relief materials. Major classes of relief materials received included assorted food items, beddings, clothing, and livelihood support items such as tailoring machines, irrigation, grinding and car washing machines and sometimes money. The members of the Camp Management Committee based in the Camp met daily to implement decisions of the Central committee that met weekly to take inventory of donations and determine whether it would be adequate to meet
Management Procedure at the IDPs Camp
i. Solicitation for Donations
The Management Committee solicited the assistance of various organizations groups and individuals towards the upkeep of the up-‐keep of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at Mando Hajj Camp and other sixteen (16) camps scattered all over the state.
Notably, the major donors are Dangote Group that donated N100,000.00 to 1,218 Internally Displaced Persons representing 30% of the eligible Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Mando Hajj Camp.
Also another individual who did not want his name to be mentioned assisted 70 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with N100,000.00 each (totaling N7,000,000.00).
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One Alhaji Nuhu Shitu for about 18 months has been donating 20 bags of Rice, 5 Nos. 20 litres of Vegetable and Palm Oil, 5 Cartons of Maggi cubes 5 Bags of sugar and 5 bags of salt till when they vacated the camp.
Other groups and individuals have been trickling in with all kinds of donations ranging from money; clothes and food items,
ii. Distribution of Donated Items
All donations in cash and kind are received at the camp Central Store. The donors were given Stores Received Voucher (SRV) /acknowledgement as the case may be.
The Main Committee meets on weekly basis to review all donations received and make allocations as appropriate. Where we have enough stock, all other camps are allocated with various items and cash.
The Committee maintained a comprehensive Register for all items received and distributed. The records in the store are open for public scrutiny throughout the period of the IDPs’ stay in the Camp.
The main committee was made up of three (3) officers from Network for Justice and the representatives of all the communities that inhabited the camp, namely Zonkwa, Kamuru Ikulu, Gidan Maga, Matsirga and Mararaban Rido.
The representative of the various communities were fully involved in the day-‐to-‐day running of the store and other affairs of the camp.
iii. Health Challenges Of The IDPs
At the take off, Kaduna State Government set up a Clinic with Doctor, Nurses and drugs but at a later stage withdrew them. From that point FOMWAN and Jinya Hospitals stepped in and continued to provide free medical services to the IDPs.
Muslim Professional in Da'awah from Abuja also came with a full medical team – Doctors, Nurses, Pharmacists, Lab Scientists and Environmentalists on weekly basis to consult and treat patients at the Camp in late 2013, which lasted for three months. Also the Psychiatric Hospital, Kaduna had been visited the camp periodically and attending to the IDPs. As well as the National Eye Centre, Kaduna and NASFAT also rendered medical services at the Camp.
In addition, Al-‐hidayah and Ummulkhair organizations sponsored many IDPs, who were sick for various surgical operations at the 44 Nigerian Army Reference Hospital, Kaduna and also at the Malam Aninu Kano teaching Hospital, Kano.
iv. Marriages
15 widows and 5 girls were married out during their sojourns at the camp with the consent of their family or relations. Al-‐ Hidayah Organization assisted them with their basic need to settle down at their matrimonial homes.
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In all the instances the potential couple undertook voluntary HIV/AIDS Screening prior to the consummation of the marriage.
Others married mostly men on their own.
v. Adoption
Although Network had assembled an expert task team to develop an adoption framework based on the Nigerian Laws and the Cultural traditions of the IDPs, in the end none of the IDPs children or the Orphans amongst them was adopted.
vi. Business/Entrepreneurship
To promote income generating activities of the IDPs, The Abuja based Muslim Professionals in Da'awah and Al-‐ Hidayah Organization organized vocational training for the IDPs in the camp in various trades. After the training, the beneficiaries were assisted with tools relating to their trade such as car washing machines, motorcycles, generators/barbing equipment’s, vulcanizing machines/tools and take off capital.
Some of the economically active IDPs started earning incomes within and around the Camp by practicing their micro enterprises as well as daily laborers at the nearby Nigerian Defense Academy construction Site.
vii. Media Affairs
The 2011 Post-‐election Violence was precipitated a major Humanitarian challenge that attracted the attention of Local and International media including online bloggers.
Various electronics such as BBC, DW, VOA, RFI, Radio Iran, Aljazeerah, Radio Nagarta, DITV/Alheri Radio and Print Media such as Daily Trust, Peoples Daily among others visited the camp on many occasions and covered all the happenings.
As dictated by the circumstances, the management committee granted several media briefings, press conferences and published open letters on matters that seemed beneficial to the IDPs.
These activities have prompted the general public to be aware of the situation and became proactive hence the result achieved in terms of donations and other areas.
viii. Local and International Liaison
The Management Committee liaised with Local and International Organizations on the plight of the IDPs, which resulted in the intervention of Human Rights Watch, National Human Rights Commission, House of Lords London, etc.
Other categories of persons interested in the Camp were Human Rights Activists, Post Graduate Students researching on Violent Conflicts, Human Rights, and Internal Displacements.
The major groups that deliberately refused to visit the Camp up to it was closed included, the National Human Rights Commission, the Kaduna State House of Assembly, the Judicial Commission of Enquiry on the 2011 Post Election Violence and the Peace and Reconciliation of the Committee.
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Appreciation To Key Donors/Volunteers And Other Stake Holders
The task of managing the various needs of the Camp successfully for three years could be possible without the supports, contributions and donations of several institutions, individuals and groups that generously assisted or advised the Management Committee.
Several individuals and institutions that made open and anonymous donors have made a huge humanitarian intervention to the fellow humans in distress deserved commendation.
The historic visit of the Emir of Katsina with trailer loads of relief materials and the encouraging addressed to the IDPs served its purpose of calming them spiritually.
One of the Prominent Volunteers who concentrated her efforts at the welfare of the children in the Camp.
Recommendations
To manage internal displacements as a humanitarian challenge we recommend that:-‐
a) Federal government should clarify which of its agency would be responsible for Internally Displaced Persons between the National Emergency Management Agency and the National Commission for Refugees.
b) The Nigerian Government should domesticate the Kampala Protocol of the African Union on
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Internally Displaced Persons. c) State governments should also develop institutions and practices for managing Internally
Displaced Persons Camps adequately.
And In order to avoid further violence or reprisal attacks we wish to recommend as follows:-‐
d) All recommendations in all the White Papers (Federal and State) be fully implemented. e) All those indicted should be brought to Justice. f) Government (State and Federal) should fully compensate all the victims and encourage
them to return to their original places of abode. That action will promote integration and sense of belonging also will further eliminate the line of divide in terms of ethnicity, tribe and religion.
g) Traditional authorities should be empowered to promote peaceful co-‐ existence and equally be held accountable for any breach of the peace in their respective domain.
h) Permanent security should be put in place in all the flash points in the State and the personnel should reflect the diversity of the State.
The IDPs to Instituted an Action Against the Federal Government at the ECOWAS Community Court.
Conclusion
The ugly phenomenon of internal displacement and its cousin, refugees are best managed by eliminating the factors that caused their occurrence in the first place namely particularly the man made factors such as violent conflicts, insurgency, war and others.
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The unacceptable increase in violent conflicts and insurgency in Nigeria is further causing increasing displacements that would call for new and expanding IDPs and refugees Camps that needs proper management either by government agencies or as in this case by the non-‐governmental organizations.
This case study is intended share our experience with those who may be involved in IDPs management as part of their careers or their voluntary contribution to the society.
Finally, we pray we shall never witness such an unfortunate situation ever again.