DO THE FADING ELECTORAL FORTUNES OF THE SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SIGNAL THE EROSION OF SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY?

Henry Milner

Université de Montréal

Draft Chapter for the conference The Crisis of Social Democracy? at the University of Edinburgh, March 11th, 2011.

INTRODUCTION

In the latter 1980s my research focused on social democracy in Sweden. As the title of the book that emerged (Milner 1989) portrayed it, in Sweden, social democracy was not merely the program of a party, but in effect constituted a way of life incorporated into the institutions of society. Despite some overreaching in the 1970s, and the ensuing backlash in the early 1980s, the social democratic way of life, I argued, had become entrenched in what had come to be known as the “Swedish model.” The model consisted of a logically coherent set of policies and institutions, at the core of which lay the program and record in power of the Swedish Social Democratic party (SAP).

In the mid 1990s, I returned to the question in the context of a wide-reaching challenge to the welfare state identified with globalization, the neoconservative policies of Reagan and Thatcher and the public choice ideas underlying them. I argued (Milner 1994) that the adaptations to these challenges, not only in Sweden, but in Finland, Norway and Denmark, did not undermine the fundamentals of the model: Indeed, the policy choices effectively defied the stark logic of public choice: supporting the welfare state constituted a rational choice for Scandinavians.

In the intervening decade and a half, I observed Scandinavian developments from more of a distance, as my work shifted toward comparative analysis. I now again focus on Sweden and return to the questions posed earlier – except in a new context. The old image of a “democratic class struggle,” in which, in Sweden, labour held the upper hand in politics, seems to have given way to a general acceptance of the possibility that social democratic parties have outlived their usefulness. As suggested here by Keating and McCrone: “the social support base of social democracy is eroding, so that it is no longer possible to put together the coalitions of interests that underpinned social democratic projects in the various states of Europe in the past.” Put more widely, that erosion is seen as reflecting developments in a globalized world in which the dominant factors are no longer those of class and state but rather of new communications technologies.

1. THE NEW POLITICAL CONTEXT

Superficially at least, recent developments in Sweden seem to fit the above characterization. If so, this is significant indeed since Sweden was the cradle of 20 th century social democracy. The immediate event spurring such reflection was the September 2010 Swedish election, which saw the defeat of the Social Democrats and the entry of the anti-immigrant Swedish Democrats into the Parliament. The SAP defeat was unprecedented. The party, in power for 83 per cent of the years 1932 to 2010,

marked its worst results since 1914, with 30.6 per cent of the vote, a mere 0.6 percentage points ahead of the Moderates (Conservatives). The outcome is the final nail in the coffin of SAP hegemony. Swedish exceptionalism, as based on a social democratic party perpetually in or near power, is a thing of the past.

Yet such hegemony has long been absent among Sweden’s Nordic neighbours, where social democratic parties in recent years have been out of government as often as in power, and in power only in a coalition. But Sweden’s exceptionalism made it the touchstone of Scandinavian social democracy. Erosion of the SAPs political position thus constitutes, at least symbolically, a development that transcends Swedish borders.

If it is more than symbolic, then the implications of recent Swedish political developments are indeed wide-ranging. Social democracy in practice via the Swedish model has effectively provided a real alternative to market fundamentalism. Hence the question as to whether the model is still viable in the current context is not simply academic. A viable Swedish social-democratic welfare state undermines the claim that in the globalized world in which we live the only durable and effective socioeconomic system is one based on market fundamentalism.

In thus looking at recent developments in the Nordic world, Sweden in particular, I take an approach somewhat outside the mainstream of work on the social-democratic welfare state. I focus less on social and economic policy choices, and more on the institutions and the shared “cultural” understandings that underpin them, especially those concerned with what I term civic literacy (i.e., capacity of citizens to make sense of the political world and thus choose effectively among alternatives).

In my past work (Milner 2002), I have shown that the Northern European, especially the Scandinavian, countries are higher in civic literacy than English-speaking ones, and that this correlates with levels of political participation. Countries high in civic literacy achieve informed political participation in particular among those who are elsewhere excluded from the democratic political process, and, thus, whose needs and interests attract the attention of policymakers and find their way into policy outcomes. High civic literacy is found in societies that practice nonmaterial redistribution, reducing disparities not only in material but also intellectual/cultural resources. Bringing those on the lower rungs of society to higher levels of knowledge augments their economic opportunities, and it enhances their capacity to exercise political influence through informed political participation.i By enhancing citizenship skills and knowledge through nonmaterial redistribution, the countries high in civic literacy spread well-being more widely, evidence of which can be found in the various cross-national indicators of life expectancy, infant mortality, life satisfaction, etc (see Wilkinson and Pickett 2009ii).

Non material redistribution was a key element in the evolution of the political culture of the Social Democratic party and its partners in the labour movement during the years that they dominated Swedish political life (see Milner 1989). Andersson (2009) shows that while, like its policies in power, the ideas of the movement evolved with the changing economic, technological and communications context, the evolution constituted not a rejection but a “rearticulation” of the traditional discourse. In particular, she notes the stress on popular education as a means of achieving one’s potential as a free individual through mastering the skills required by emerging workplace

technologies, up to and including the current emphasis on policies and efforts to meet the challenge of the knowledge-based IT economy.

If indeed the political culture of the labour movement is at the core of the Swedish model, the question posed is whether it can be sustained over time in the absence of a hegemonic SAP. To begin to address this question we need to place this cultural dimension in context, to situate it among what may be termed the seven pillars of Scandinavian social democracy.

Pillars of Scandinavian social democracy:

1: Strong trade union and other popular representative organizations with structured input into relevant social and economic policy decisions

2. A strong social democratic party linked to the above, committed to low disparities in income, wealth and power

3. Political institutions are administratively decentralized and based on the principle of proportional representation, i.e. the strength of partisan representation reflects support in the population, and necessitating some degree of structured cooperation in policy making and administration at every level.

4. Productive industries capable of maintaining good but internationally competitive salaries and working conditions, (driving out low-paying jobs, thus resulting in wage solidarity – the Rehn-Meidner model), necessitating a high level of structured cooperation between employers and trade unions in the labour market.

5: An education and training system that provides and upgrades the skills needed for employment in such rapidly changing industries.

6: Social and labour market policies based on the principle of universal services, in health, pensions, unemployment insurance, child care, etc. – along with education and training, to complement retraining and mobility.

7: An emphasis on the “non-material” side of redistribution, e.g. via adult education, subsidies for study circles, support for public service media, newspaper subsidies popular libraries, etc.iii

In the next section I first briefly describe the situation with regard to the other pillars in the light of political and socioeconomic developments. I then turn to recent developments that affect the subjective, cultural dimension that rests on the seventh pillar. Finally I return to an analysis of recent political developments in light of the above.

2. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

It is first worth noting the absence from the above list of certain elements normally associated with the Swedish model. Full employment, considered a fundamental element of the model in the postwar years, is a thing of the past, unsustainable in the globalized world that emerged in the 1980s. (Average unemployment rates in Sweden were around 9 percent in August 2009, with a very high 30 percent of those aged 15-24

out of work.) The same is true of the major role played by state-owned industries especially in services, transportation, and communication. Here, change came about due to globalization, but also in reaction to efforts among leading elements in the labour movement in the 1970s to challenge the fourth pillar. The idea was to use state intervention in the labour market rather than structured cooperation to attain egalitarian goals, most notably via the wage-earner funds, but also through several laws that sought to impose forms of industrial democracy. By allowing them to raise the threat of confiscation, these initiatives played into the hands of those employers who sought to weaken the process of accommodation via centralized negotiations and representation on various councils and

As a result, by the latter 1980s the tendency toward confrontation on the labour market had eased, and policies that gave a greater role to market based institutions introduced. For example, after long discussion, in 2000 the pension system was reformed with the support of five of the six parties. Within the public scheme, private individual pension accounts could be set up, with the retirement benefits they generate depending solely on the contributions (up to 2.5%) made into them and the actual returns they earn. In 2008, 785 private investment funds were registered.iv

Another factor in these changes has been a gradual decline in union density in decline (see Table 1), a decline that particularly affected the blue collar, SAP-affiliated LO, whose members constituted 74 percent of trade unionists in 1960, and only 49 percent in 2007 (Kjellberg 2009). Nevertheless, as we can see in Table 2: despite the decline, union density is still highest in Sweden (and Denmark). Hence, on the whole, organized labour has been able to adapt to a situation in which its SAP allies are out of power. In the labour market and the economic sphere generally, the labour movement has been able to use its publicly recognized place in the institutions of structured cooperation to preserve the key elements of the model as set out in the relevant pillars. This includes the municipal and regional level of politics and administration (as set out in pillar 3), where, in key instances, the SAP has proven better able to maintain its position.

Such strategies, it will be argued below, potentially preserve the accomplishments of the social democratic regimes with the SAP out of power in Stockholm, an approach necessitated by the fact that emerging generations have not experienced the battles to erect the pillars in the first place. Hence they do not necessarily associate supporting the policies and institutions the Social Democrats created during their years in power with voting for them in elections.

While it is not possible to provide – or indeed see - anything like a comprehensive picture, it seems fair to suggest that the overall situation is one in which the pillars on which the economy and labour market rest remain solid. Sweden remains a small open economy, dependent on relatively large exporting companies, and highly vulnerable to external factors, to which it must adapt. It continues to do so through a relatively centralized collective bargaining system, which keeps wage levels aligned across industries, thus allowing efficient and advanced export industries to successfully compete – pillar 4 (and support the social policies through taxes – pillars 5 and 6), forcing less productive companies to rationalize production through investment in new production technology or workforce reduction.

Such restructuring is accepted by and large by the partners in the labour market and entails a set of agreed-upon measures to support workers to find new jobs in more productive industries. Though short-term job creation measures by government are used during recessions, the emphasis is on training and incentives through job security councils and the like (See Figure 1). Just as non-productive industries in textile and related manufacturing sectors were eliminated in the postwar decades, in recent years we have seen a fundamental restructuring of Swedish industry, from a heavy dependence on manufacturing industries, towards a more knowledge-intensive high tech industry, which has resulted in a solid record of economic performance. Productivity levels have remained stable, partly by abandoning low productivity jobs and sectors, partly by investment in new technologies and high value added sectors. Instead of maintaining the existing production structure, public policy is oriented toward developing the infrastructure and resources that stimulate new industries and investments.

This approach is illustrated by the government’s treatment of the ongoing crisis in the automotive sector (See Bergstrom 2009). Unlike in North America, there was no question of direct government bailout – SAAB would have closed had it not been bought out at the last minute by a foreign company. Instead, in accordance with the model, the basis for this program lay in collective agreements implemented at the company level. In Sweden, the ‘Agreement on temporary lay-offs’, concluded in March 2009 for blue-collar manufacturing workers and extended to professional technical staff, provides for compensation of losses in income resulting from working time reductions. The agreement has been implemented via job-saving agreements, most prominent among which are those concluded at Volvo and Scania. At Volvo, jobs were saved by reducing working time, mainly via flexible working time accounts, with wages almost fully maintained. At Scania a similar agreement limits losses in pay to 10 per cent (with a reduction of working time by 20 per cent) and provides for training funded by the European Social Fund (See Glassner and Keune 2010).

3. THE CULTURAL/ATTITUDINAL CONTEXT

The technological world today is dramatically different from that in the postwar decade when the economic model was developed. Yet the fundamental principles, differently applied to be sure, seem still to be in place. To understand this, we must give due weight to the final – cultural - pillar, i.e. the non-material side of redistribution, via adult education, subsidies for study circles, support for public service media, popular libraries, etc. These strengthen the underpinnings of the entire model. Indeed they potentially constitute a basis for its continuity among a generation that does not necessarily link supporting the principles of the social democratic welfare state with voting for the SAP and is somewhat less predisposed to joining trade unions.

Civic Literacy

With this in mind we turn to the relevant data. The first category of such data is linked to civic literacy. I argued in my earlier work that the capacity of the Scandinavian social-democratic welfare state to adapt policy to achieve relatively egalitarian outcomes

reflects the quality of the information that enters the decision process. This relationship holds not just at the elite level, but also at the level of “ordinary” citizen, since informed individuals are better able to identify the appropriate policies – and the actors to implement those policies – in order to achieve desired welfare outcomes. In the context of appropriate institutions – the “supply side” of civic literacy – citizens are also more knowledgeable about the effect their individual choices will have on the institutional arrangements themselves. In a complex, economically-interdependent world, it is by no means self-evident just what the effects of particular choices will be. To make choices that reinforce the capacity to redistribute without undermining the capacity to adapt requires appropriate information linking actors, policies, institutions and outcomes. If informed individuals can better identify the effects that alternative policy options have upon their own interests and those of others, societies with a larger proportion of informed citizens can be expected to be more egalitarian in their outcomes.

Consistently high electoral turnout without compulsory voting is one indicator that civic literacy remains high. Having declined to a still comparatively very high 80 percent in 2002, Swedish turnout rose to 82 percent in 2006, and again in 2010 to 85 percent. The turnout reflects high levels of political attentiveness, as reflected by the data on political knowledge. The Swedish election survey 1985 to 2006 (and a preliminary assessment of the 2010 responses) shows (see Table 3) – unlike elsewhere - no overall decline in political knowledge (though we should note that analyzing knowledge level changes across time is a very challenging task, since the difficulty of a single indicator will vary across time).

Attitudes toward the welfare State

What of public opinion toward the welfare state? Does reduced support for the SAP indicate reduced support for the welfare state that it founded; or, rather, does it reflect the fact that the Conservatives (Moderata) moved toward a much greater acceptance of the welfare state. An answer is to be found in the recent work of Stefan Svallfors, who has been conducting surveys on attitudes toward the welfare state in Sweden for several decades. Here I paraphrase his conclusions from a recent paper,v which reports on Swedish attitudes towards the welfare state from 1981 to 2010. Svallfors finds, overall, a large degree of stability in attitudes. Indeed, whatever change there has been in recent years tends to go in the direction of increasing support, for example in the willingness to pay higher taxes toward welfare-state programs. The proportion of Swedes ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ willing to pay more taxes if those taxes went to welfare state purposes was stable from 1997 to 2002, but rose dramatically between 2002 and 2010.

Another indicator with similar results is the support for the collective financing of social insurance (unemployment, pensions, and health) as opposed to via insurance fees combined with lower taxes and employer contributions. The greatest increase in such support (and in the case of unemployment a reversal from the decrease in support between 1992 and 2006) is from 2006 to 2010. A similar trend is noted in attitudes toward negative aspects of the welfare state, such as cheating, as well as perceptions of ‘moral hazard’ and ‘over-consumption’. In response to whether the unemployed really want a job, and whether those who report themselves sick are really sick, Svallfors

found suspicion about welfare abuse to be in 2010 its lowest level ever, with the change since the mid-1980s especially salient - and all the more striking as they coincide with a widening political and media debate about welfare cheating and abuse. “It would seem that worsening labour market situation may induce some voters to turn away from the SAP for solutions, they do not reject the fundamental premises of the SAP’s welfare state policies.”

Interestingly, middle class and working class respondents differ less on these questions in 2010 than in earlier surveys, with “middle-class non-manual groups gradually coming to resemble workers.... The lower- and middle-level non-manual groups increase index values continuously from 1992, and in 2010 the former group is on a par with the workers.... The middle class is now firmly included among the supporters of collective financing of the welfare state.” Svallfors’ conclusion merits citing at length:

What seems to have taken place in the last few years is that since their main party – the Moderates – have embraced the core aspects of the welfare state, even the higher salariat and the self-employed have increasingly become supporters of a collective welfare state. The Social Democratic Party may be in dire straits electorally, but the social democratic welfare state is more popular than ever.... The changes in institutional practices and political rhetoric that have taken place in the 1990s and 2000s have further strengthened middle-class support for the welfare state. In an ironic twist of fate, market-emulating reforms of the welfare state and the changed political rhetoric of the political right-of-centre completed the full ideological integration of the middle class into the welfare state. While the Social Democratic party suffers, the social democratic welfare state thrives.

The answer for Svallfors is clear. The decline of the SAP and the rise of the Moderates reflect not changing attitudes towards the welfare state, but rather the Moderates’ embracing of the key aspects of the Swedish welfare state. Svallfors does not ask whether this situation is likely to continue, but his analysis suggests that could very likely be the case. If voters, especially middle-class voters, are coming around to trust the non-socialists more than the SAP with administering the welfare state, it does not bode well for the latter’s electoral prospects.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS AND STRATEGY IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT

We can now reformulate the question posed at the outset insofar as Sweden is concerned: if the social support base for the Social Democratic party is eroding, is it necessarily the case that it is no longer possible to put together the coalition of interests that underpins the social democratic project. Svallfors’ conclusion suggests that the answer need not be a negative one. But what this new “coalition of interests” might look like is uncertain in the context of recent political developments – to which we now return.

In the 2006 election, the Social Democrats faced a united opposition, the “Alliance for Sweden” formed by the Moderates with the Liberals, Center, and the Christian Democrats. When the popularity of the new Alliance government plummeted after 2006, the SAP under Mona Sahlin sat back and awaited its “inevitable” return to power. There

was no need for the SAP to look for innovative alternative approaches, such as those being advanced by its local branches in Gothenburg and Malmo. Little thought was given to the implications of the fact that the Conservatives had in 2004 definitively reconciled themselves to the core components of the welfare state, imitating Tony Blair’s “new Labour” restyling themselves as the “new Moderates.”

A key factor in the Alliance’s victory was that, unlike earlier non-socialist blocs, its spokespersons consistently presenting a common and coherent election platform. True, the early days of the Alliance in power proved shaky. Unpaid taxes led to two ministerial resignations, and a number of early political decisions reflected their lack of experience in government, especially one ending the tax-exempt status of union membership fees. They Alliance also had trouble winning popular support for tighter restrictions on social-security eligibility and sick leave, as well as a reform of the property tax system and abolition of the wealth tax.

We should note that the Alliance’s tax reforms were more complementary than contradictory to the existing system. The reform of the property tax and abolition of the wealth tax were criticized by the trade unions and Social Democrats, but, overall, made little dent in the redistributive fiscal system. Moreover, one tax reform, to the RUT, the tax deductibility of payments to people or companies engaged to do household repairs, child care, etc., proved very popular. This measure had long been resisted by the Swedish labour movement as leading to the exploitation of workers. Failure by the SAP in power to act on this forced many otherwise law-abiding Swedes to hire help “in the black” to at least avoid the onerous charges they were expected to pay. And it helped the Alliance win in 2006, especially among urban middle-class swing voters. Another important reform in this regard was the earned-income tax credit, which raised the disposable income of lower-paid groups, and thus served as an incentive to work rather than seek social-security benefits. Reluctantly, the Social Democrats – despite the vocal opposition of the Left party – voiced support for the reform.

The main innovation brought by Sahlin was the creation of an alliance on the left to oppose the Moderate-led one. This was a new stance for the SAP, and one borrowed from the Norwegians, where the Labour party governed with the Greens and Socialist Left party. Efforts to create such a Red-Green alliance constituted an acknowledgement of the end of SAP hegemony, an evolution that reflected Sahlin’s more conciliatory personality than that of her predecessor Göran Persson. While coherent cooperation with the Greens proved attainable, the same was not the case with the Left Party. Before (and during) the 2010 campaign, the Left Party emphasized those areas of policy that were most unsettling for middle-class voters in the bigger cities, precisely the voters lost by the centre-left in 2006. At one point, the Social Democrats and the Greens announced that, given differences over fiscal policy, the Left party would be excluded. However, faced with an uproar in the labour movement, they soon reversed themselves.

Sahlin’s authority was undercut by such squabbles. With the polls turning toward the Alliance, she revealed a certain programmatic incoherence. According to a December-2010 report by the party’s crisis commission tasked with carrying out a fact-based analysis of the election results, the main cause of SAP loss of support was its budget proposal which would raise the property and petrol taxes of its potential supporters. Moreover, combined with her sudden promise of big tax cuts for pensioners, Sahlin was

unable to effectively assert the SAP’s traditional claim to being the best economic manager.

This failure was, ironically, due in part to the previous Social Democratic government’s iron grip on public finances. When hit by the economic downturn, cash was available for stimulus projects to speed up recovery. It was also due to the effectiveness of the shrewd young finance minister, Anders Borg. A remarkably articulate communicator and, apparently, administrator, Borg’s reputation for economic competence steadily grew as the 2010 election neared. Indeed, the SAP would probably have done worse if the Sweden Democrats hadn’t surged in the late polls, polls which also showed that Sahlin effectively rallied lukewarm supporters around opposition to this threat in the last ten days of the campaign.

The election marked the end of innocence on immigration and integration. The Sweden Democrats (SD) entered Parliament by crossing the 4 per cent threshold, winning 5.3 per cent of the vote. But the result is not the “nightmare scenario” of the far right in the driver’s seat that some evoked. Government and opposition were both explicit on refusing to allow the SD to use its “balance-of-power position to win policy concessions. Moreover, while early on some Swedish Democrats sounded like the old Nazi sympathizers portrayed in the first volume of Stieg Larsson’s Millennium (entitled, in the original Swedish version, The Men who Hate Women), under its current 31-year-old leader, web designer Jimmy Akensson, the SD cleaned house of overtly racist elements, insisting that they were “not against immigrants, just immigration policy.” Too much immigration, they claim, is undermining the Swedish welfare state, which they seek to secure, not tear down. Indeed, except in their position on immigration and harsher punishment for youth offenders, the Sweden Democrats’ policies are not out of the mainstream.

Elsewhere in Europe the expression of such views is only to be expected. Hence very surprising to outsiders was the shock that greeted the SD breakthrough. With an effective leader and real experience in local councils in southern Sweden, it was inevitable that they would improve their organization and showing. It is this, rather than changing attitudes, that explains the Sweden Democrats’ success. That their showing was widely seen among Swedes as a fundamental threat is due in good part to the fact that serious public debate about immigration and integration is largely absent. The crime, violence and other problems associated with immigrant-dominated suburbs are little covered in the media and ignored by mainstream politicians seeking to avoid any possible hint of racist attitudes – which leaves the field open to the Sweden Democrats and their one-sided analysis.

Politically, Mona Sahlin’s legacy – she announced her resignation soon after the defeat – may be one of placing anti-racism at the core of the SAP’s identity, opposing the Swedish Democrats and everything they stood for. The political impact of this stance is unclear. The SAP reached out to immigrant groups, which account for 14 per cent of the Swedish population, and a larger portion of its unemployed. The party has commendably sought to attract candidates from these communities, naming to important positions individuals from an immigrant background, notably party secretary Ibrahim Baylan. Yet its shrill denunciations of the Swedish Democrats and any hints of racism may prove counterproductive since political participation among immigrant

groups is low, while it weakens the SAP’s identity as the party of workers. The political problems inherent in this approach were manifested in the poor showing of the SAP in the regional and local Stockholm elections in which the Conservatives and their allies, especially the Center party,vi strengthened their already strong position.

Yet developments elsewhere indicate that the SAP can still appeal to the urban voter. In contrast with the Stockholm region, in 2010 the SAP and its allies maintained control not only of the cities in their northern bastions, but also of Sweden’s second and third largest cities, Gothenburg and Malmö. In both cities, far sighted local administrations were able to retain their working class base while appealing to a sophisticated emerging middle class with a well articulated program emphasising sustainable economic development based on the new communications technologies. In the former, Anneli Hulthén has managed to follow in the footsteps of her predecessor, Göran Johansson from whom she took over at the beginning of 2009. Johansson, an old-style SAP trade-unionist, placed the role of the city’s scientific and artistic communities at the forefront of its development. In Malmö, SAP Mayor Ilmar Reepalu has presided over its profound transition from the classic deteriorating smokestack city to a beacon of high-tech, sustainable development.vii In these regions, SAP-led administrations were able to identify the labour movement with a development project based on research and education. Yet, in the national election debate, it was the Alliance, and especially the Liberals, who made educational reform and modernization their issue. Without such a clearly articulated national project, the SAP did a poor job of distinguishing its position from that projected by its allies. This has already been noted with regard to the Left party, whose stance on taxes and economic issues as well as radical foreign policy scared off middle-class voters. The converse problem with the Greens and its traditional working class base was well expressed in an article in October 2010, by Niklas Nordström a social democratic member of the Stockholm Regional Council,

“The Social Democrats and unions have always agreed that the redistribution of wealth requires, well, wealth. The party has also contended that economic growth is the key to developing new and greener technology for a more sustainable future. Sweden’s Greens, however, increasingly perceive economic growth to be incompatible with their lofty environmental aspirations. The global financial crisis only served to cement this view….

The Green Party did improve its share of the electorate, but it mainly siphoned voters from the Social Democrats. The strategy to attract young, environmentally aware, urbanites who would have traditionally voted centre-right simply never panned out. Distrust of the Green Party was especially high in historically Social Democrat strongholds. I have experienced this suspicion firsthand when talking to family and friends in northern Sweden. ‘They want to take away our way of life. They want to close our factories, take our cars and our snow scooters. They want to restrict hunting and travel. We have absolutely nothing in common. Their values aren’t my values. Why are we in bed with this party?’viii

CONCLUSION

Why indeed? Yet going it alone is no solution either. The abandonment of the Red-Green coalition, which in effect took place soon after the election, was necessary, and many traditional SAP supporters are no doubt more comfortable. But as long as the Alliance remains coherent, it will be hard to avoid putting up some kind of alternative coalition as the next election nears. And, whatever happens, prospects for a SAP return to power will be bleak as long as Sweden’s economic management continues along its current successful course. In early 2011, Borg’s accomplishments at steering Sweden’s economy drew the plaudits of the OECD, its growth being described as “strong as Pippi Longstocking.” ix A month later, in its Global Competitiveness Report for 2010-2011, the World's Economic Forum placed Sweden second (after Switzerland), for having “the world's most transparent and efficient public institutions, with very low levels of corruption and undue influence and a government that is considered to be one of the most efficient in the world."x

It will be necessary to take the long view. Red-Green did better among young voters in the 2010 election, though not quite as well as indicated by a poll on June 30, 3 months before the election in which Red-Green led among 18 to 29-year-olds, while all other age groups showed greater support for the Alliance.xi And, as noted above, the SAP and its allies maintained control not only of the cities in their northern bastion, but also, despite low support for their Riksdag lists, of Sweden’s second and third largest cities, Gothenburg and Malmö, in the Southwest. Apparently a strategy of high-tech “green growth” combined can be combined with an affirmation of the basic principles of the Scandinavian welfare state so as to attract young and not so young workers and professionals.

What the SAP cannot do is return to power on the basis of its past economic and social achievements. Swedes today cannot be counted on to automatically go from supporting the policies and institutions the Social Democrats created during their years in power to voting for them in elections. Rather than making retaking power nationally as their immediate, overriding goal, the SAP must rather ensure that it remain a potent political force at all levels of political life,xii and thus guarantee that the institutional edifice that the Swedish labour movement built remains solid.

Overall, the 2010 election served to affirm basic Swedish values and achievements and the desire to find innovative ways of securing that achievement. One manifestation of this is in the high level of political trust. In the exit poll, a remarkable 70 per cent stated that they trusted politicians – quite different from elsewhere - and from Sweden in previous decades. In this sense, the 2010 election takes us back to an earlier period of consensus around a shared model – even if the outcome in partisan terms was dramatically different.

REFERENCESAndersson, Jenny. 2009. The Library and the Workshop. Social Democracy and Capitalism in an Age of Knowledge, Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Bergström, Ola. 2009. Anticipating and Managing Restructuring Sweden. European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal opportunities, unit working conditions and adaptation to change.

Glassner, Vera and Maarten Keune 2010. “Collective bargaining responses to the economic crisis in Europe.” ETUI Policy Brief, European Economic and Employment Policy.

Grönlund Kimmo, and Henry Milner. 2006. “The Determinants of Political Knowledge in Comparative Perspective.” Scandinavian Political Studies, 29,4.

Kjellberg, Anders. 2009. “The Swedish Model of Industrial Relations: Self-Regulation and Combined Centralisation-Decentralisation.” in Phelan, Craig ed., Trade Unionism since 1945: Towards a Global History.  Peter Lang 2009.

Milner, Henry. 2002. Civic Literacy: How Informed Citizens Make Democracy Work. Hanover N.H: University Press of New England.

---------- 1994. Social Democracy and Rational Choice: The Scandinavian Experience and Beyond. London: Routledge.

---------- 1989. Sweden: Social Democracy in Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Oscarsson, Henrik. 2007. “A Matter of Fact? Knowledge Effects on the Vote in Swedish General Elections,1985–2002.“ Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 30 – No. 3.

Wilkinson, Richard G., and Kate Pickett. 2009. The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger. Penguin.

TABLE 1. Union density by age and category in Sweden 1990-2007 (%) Age/ Category

1990 1993 2000 2006 2007 1990-2007

1993-2007

16-24 62 69 52 46 40 -22 -29 25-29 78 81 74 68 64 -14 -17 Sum 16-29

69 76 64 58 53 -16 -23

30-44 85 86 82 77 74 -11 -12 45-64 88 89 88 85 82 -6 -7 Sum 16-64

81 85 81 77 73 -8 -12

Blue-collar workers

82 86 83 77 74 -8 -12

White-collar workers

81 83 79 77 73 -8 -10

TABLE 2 : Trade Union Membership Rates 1999-2007

Source: Bergström, 2009: 43

TABLE 3. POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE IN SWEDEN

Factual knowledge of current state-of-affairs 1985-2006,Year. 85

88

91

94

98

02 06

Open unemployment in Sweden is today lower than 5 percent 40 59 58 92 87 45 26

Varies

Denmark is a member of the EU – – 88 – – – - true Spain is a member of the EU – – – 69 75 80 83 true A euro is today worth more than 10 Swedish kronas – – – – – 77 - false The sickness benefit is today 90 percent of the wage/salary from 1st day of sick leave

76 82 65 81 83 81 83 varies

About 10 percent of all who live in Sweden are born abroad – – – 45 59 – - false Price increases (inflation) have so far in [year] been higher than 9 percent

57 56 – – – – - false

There is a wage earners’ fund in each county 56 45 43 – – – - false Last year, about 20,000 people applied for asylum in Sweden – – – – – 42 true Swedish foreign aid to developing countries is 1 percent of gross national income – – – – – 34 44 false

Last year, Sweden received more than 50,000 refugees from other countries – – 33 – – – - false

The state budget deficit has increased during the past year 26 – – – – – - false Factual knowledge of the political system and its workings You must cross a candidate on the party list, otherwise your vote will be invalid – – – – 88 – false

The Swedish Riksdag has 349 members – – 69 69 74 72 74 true Riksdag voted to store abroad highly radioactive waste from nuclear power stations – 52 46 58 72 – - false

During the period 1998–2002, Sweden had a social democratic one-party government – – – – – 47 45 true

Affiliation of candidates and party officials. Anna Lindh – – – – – 83 - sd Karin Söder 81 – – – – – - c Erik Åsbrink – – – – 80 – - sd Bosse Ringholm – – – – – 78 - sd Åsa Domeij – – – – – 76 - green Göran Persson – – 54 76 – – - sd Ingvar Carlsson 75 – – – – – - sd Thage G. Petersson – 75 – – – – - sd Eva Goës – 69 75 – – – - green Birgit Friggebo 65 71 68 68 – – - lib Derived from Oscarsson 2007 supplemented by his recent data.xiii The results show the percentage of all respondents providing correct answers to the questions indicated.

FIGURE 1

Source: Bergstrom, 2009: 39

NOTES

i Grönlund and Milner (2006) used political knowledge questions asked in national election surveys to test this contention, finding that in the more economically unequal countries, relative levels of education had a greater impact on political knowledge.ii Wilkinson and Pickett’s data are generally accurate, but their material equality-based explanation is simplistic. The fact that the more equal Nordic societies have fewer social problems is due to a whole set of complex policy and institutional choices above and beyond redistributing income. A fundamental element underlying these choices is the high level of civic literacy resulting from non-material redistribution policies iii Note that while Sweden and Finland are just at the OECD average in the percentage of 5-19 year olds in school (data from 2007), they led by far when it comes to those 20 to 29 and 30 to 39. The OECD average is, respectively, 25 and 6; for Finland it is 43 and 14, and for Sweden, 35 and 13. Facts and figures 2009: Pre-school activities, school-age childcare, schools and adult education in Sweden, Swedish National Agency for Education, Summary of report 335, 2010. p.84.iv Patrick Marier: “Improving Canada’s Retirement Saving, Lessons from Abroad, Ideas from Home,” IRPP 2010-12-08.

v Svallfors, Stefan. 2011. “A Bedrock of Support? Trends in Welfare State Attitudes in Sweden, 1981–2010.” Unpublished paper. January 2011.

vi The Center party found a space vacated by the Moderates on the right wing, i.e. neo-liberal, side of the Alliance, seeking urban votes to replace those from its declining rural base. This has puzzled its supporters and activists in the periphery, some of whom are still involved in old style cooperation with local social democrats. vii Reepalu, Ilmar and Göran Rosberg. 2010. ”Malmö: Green Policies Transform an Industrial City”. Inroads 27. Fall 2010

viii Published, October 21st 2010, on the website of the Policy Network, a progressive London based think tankix http://www.swedishwire.com/economy/8170-swedens-economy-strong-as-pippi-longstocking

x http://www.thelocal.se/32092/20110216/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=222

xi The poll showed that the centre-left red-greens had 56 percent support among 18 to 29-year-olds compared with 32 percent for the centre-right Alliance. The party with the highest youth support was the Social Democrats at 34 percent with the Green Party at 16 percent, and the Left Party at around 6 percent.

xii One temptation will be for the big parties to push for a majoritarian system to replace the proportional one. This is something that might appeal as well to the Moderates if their coalition becomes fractious. But this still unlikely plan would be unlikely to succeed: public opinion can be expected to side with the small parties in defence of the 3rd pillar. The reality of the American two-party system is not very appealing from a European perspective. xiii http://www.valforskning.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1220/1220324_Oscarsson___Holmberg__2008__Valjarkunskap.pdf