csis on iran nuclear deal

8/12/2019 CSIS on Iran Nuclear Deal

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intelligence Assessment

Evaluation dii renseignement

SECRET/I

CSIS IA 2013 14/90

Iran Nuclear Agreement: Good Deal But Will It Hold?

20140107

On November 24, 2013, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany P5+1 and Iran concluded a Joint Plan of Action W A governing Irans nuclear program. TheWA , w hic h has yet to be implemented, is a six-month agreement that forms the basis fo r thenegotiation of a long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

Key Assessments

CSIS SCRS

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Projected Way Forward

Th e WA is to last for sixmonths renewable while theparties negotiate acomprehensive solution to thenuclear issue A JointCommission of the P5+1 and

Iran is to be established tomonitor implementation, withthe International Atomic EnergyAgency IAEA responsible fo rnuclear related verification.

Th e final agreement, to bereached within one year, willhave a specified long termduration, after which theIranian nuclear program willbe treated in the same manneras that of an y non nuclearweapon state party to the NPT Nuclear Non ProliferationTreaty .


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Constraints on the Iranian Nuclear Program

The Joint Plan of Action mandates significant constraints on the Iranian nuclear program. Itessentially freezes the program in its current state, with some limited degree of roll-back inrelation to Irans stock of 20 percent enriched uranium. This includes a cap on the number ofcentrifuges and the size of its stockpile of five percent enriched uranium,at their current levels;cessation of production of 20 percent enriched uranium, while eliminating the current stocks; an da delay in the commissioning of the Arak heavy water research reactor HWRR , which couldprovide Iran with an alternative source of fissile material plutonium for weapons purposes fo rfurther details, see Annex .

2. Also of considerable significance, Iran agrees to a number of measures enhancing themonitoring of its program by the IAEA. Most of these respond to longstanding IAEA demandsfor implementation of the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of its SubsidiaryArrangements providing the Agency with greater access to Irans nuclear fuel cycle facilities andearly design information on ne w installations. In addition, Iran is to provide daily inspectoraccess to the enrichment plants at Fordow and Natanz.

Incentives to Iran

3. In return for these Iranian concessions, the P5+1 agrees: not to impose any new sanctions, orpush current buyers of Iranian oil to further reduce their imports; to provide limited relief ofexisting sanctions in the areas of insurance and transportation services for oil sales, Iranspetrochemical exports, gold and precious metals, Irans auto industry, and spare parts for civilaviation; to allow Iran to repatriate a portion of its oil revenue held abroad; a nd to establish afinancial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade food and medicine, etc. , as well as thepayment of tuition fo r Iranian students studying abroad.

4.

the interim agreement provides more than just modest sanctionsrelief to Iran. Of particular importance to it and a source of much complaint from critics of theagreement the JPA implicitly recognizes Irans right to enrichment by including among the

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elements of the more omprehensive greement to come a mutually defined enri hmentprogramme with mutually agreed parameters

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Prospects for a Final Comprehensive Solution

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Equally clearly, however, underan y agreement acceptable to the P5+1, Iran will have to make concessions far in excess of wh tit has lre dy greed to under the interim accord. The WA refers to restrictions on enrichmentconsistent with irans practical needs, but these are difficult to define especially as itsdecl red aim of m int ining the indigenous capacityto enrich uranium to fuel its ow n powerre ctors would require an infrastructure even larger th n what it has today, whereas its currentinfrastructure is sufficient already to produce enough highly enriched uranium 1-IEU fo r theweapons that underlie the concern about its program in the first place. As of early November2013, Iran had installed 19,509 centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow, of which pproxim tely half 9,842 were enriching.

In addition, the P5+1 has previously called or can be expectedto call for the shipment of quantities of enriched uranium outside of the country, to reduce the

r ni n stockpile currently at 7,154 kilograms enriched up to five percent, and 196 kilograms to20 percent ; for the closure of the Fordow enrichment plant; and for the elimination orconversion to light water of the research reactorat Arak.

Irans Leadership and Nuclear Decision Making

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11 Khamenei is the arbiter of Irans nuclear policy

Rohani and the Nuclear File

12 Shortly after Rohani s election in June 2013 the hardline newspaper Keyhan the mouthpieceof the Supreme Leader reminded iranians that defining the systems policies is on e of the[constitutional] responsibilities of the Supreme Leader and that therefore the policies of thesystem will not change after the election of Mr Rohani

13 Soon after his inauguration in August Rohani named his own nuclear negotiating team andtransferred responsibility fo r the f ile from the SNSC to the Foreign Ministry where his newForeign Minister Zarif became the countrys lead negotiator

In a speech delivered three days after the JPA was signedKhamenei remarked that we do not interfere in the details of these negotiations bu t that thereare certain red l ines and l imits in this regard We have said this to officials in charge and it istheir responsibility to observe these limits Khamenei has praised the president and offered histhanks to the iranian negotiating team on concluding the JPA Since Rohani assumed off icein ugust 2013 Khamenei has made several public statements suggesting that he supports thepresidents attempt to ease tensions with the international community in an effort to mitigatesanctions

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Ir an s Re d L in es

14 The ran ia n au th o ri t ies have in previous rounds o f negotiations made clear th ei r red line: theofficial rec ogn itio n on the part of the P5 1 of ran s right to enrich uranium in sid e Iran An yfinal ag ree me nt that curta iled or failed to ack n o w le d ge this right would be u n ac cep tab le toTehran It is th ere for e not surprising th a t th e W has received mixed rev iew s in the h ar d lin econ ser v at iv e reg im e a ffili a ted Iranian press Fo r example the hardline daily Keyhan c rit ic iz edth e W for not ex p li ci tl y ackn o w le dg ing Irans right to enrichment while the h ar d lin eco nse rva tive daily Kh ora san gave a qualified endorsement It claimed tha t Irans co n ce ss ion sdid not cross any o f our red lines but it caution ed that the real challenge would be to re ach ac om pre hen siv e solution

16 Du rin g the Ju n e 2013 election campaign Roh ani won the backing of ref o rm ist s andp ra g m atic co n se rva ti ve s by ackn o w le dg ing the need for an improv ement of econ o m ic co n d itio n sand de cre asin g ten si on s with th e international community in order to ease th e current sanc tion s

re g im e ag ain st Iran

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ANNEX: Constraints on the Iranian Nuclear Program

Under the terms of the November 24 , 2013, Joint Plan of Action:

Iran agrees no t to make any further advances of its activities at its two enrichment plants Natanz and Fordow an d heavy water research reactor HWRR) under construction the IR-40 atArak . In practice, this means that the number and type of centrifuges at Natanz an d Fordow arefrozen, alleviating the fear that Iran will continue to expand the number of first-generation JR-ior more advanced IR-2m centrifuges th e latter are considered especially threatening as they are times as efficient as the IR - is). Neither will Iran activate the 1,000 IR-2ms previouslyinstalled but no t yet operating at Natanz, as it has agreed not to feed uranium hexafluoride UF6 into an y centrifuges not already enriching.

By agreeing to convert uranium newly enriched to less than percent to an oxide form, Iraneffectively caps its stockpile of this lower enriched material at its existing level, no t adding to theamount that could potentially be enriched further to weapons-grade. At Arak, its agreement among other things no t to install remaining components further delays the commissioning of anHWRR that could provide it with an alternative source of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

in terms of future plans, Iran agrees, for the six-month period of the WA, no t to establish anynew facilities for either enrichment or reprocessing of spent fuel. It had announced in August2010 that it planned to build ten ne w enrichment facilities although its capacity to do so at thetime was widely doubted . It ha d no t previously undertaken formally to refrain from processingspent fuel or constructing facilities for this purpose.

As for its acquisition of 20 percent enriched uranium, considered most troubling because thistakes it 90 percent of the wa y to weapons-grade, Iran agrees to cease its production entirely forthe life of the agreement and render its existing stockpile less suitable fo r further enrichment toweapons-grade by converting half of it to oxide fo r fuel an d diluting the remainder to 5 percentor less. It further constrains its ability to make use of the oxide for further enrichment byagreeing not to establish a reconversion line.

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csis on iran nuclear deal

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