iran deal definitive guide

The IranNuclear DealA Definitive Guide

August 2015

The IranNuclear DealA Definitive Guide

Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsHarvard Kennedy School79 JFK StreetCambridge, MA 02138Fax: (617) 495-8963Email: [email protected]: http://belfercenter.orgDesign & Layout by Andrew FaciniCover Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Iranian ForeignMinister Javad Zarif one-on-one in the Palais Coburg Blue Salon, Vienna,Austria on July 1, 2015. (State Dept. Photo)Copyright 2015, President and Fellows of Harvard CollegePrinted in the United States of America

August 2015

Lead Author and EditorContributors to the Iran Briefing Book havereviewed the draft and provided their commentsand advice. While the substance and analysis inthis report are presented as objectively as possible,contributors do have differing views on a number ofissues. These differences are reflected in the report.Contributors do not endorse every judgment andassessment in the report. The Belfer Center as aninstitution does not take positions on public policyissues and thus does not take a position on whetherCongress should accept, reject, or modify the JointComprehensive Plan of Action. Individuals at theCenter are free to make such recommendations intheir personal capacity.

AcknowledgmentsResearch for this briefing book conducted by BelferCenter research assistant Henry Rome.

Gary SamoreExecutive Director for Research,Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsTelephone: 617-496-4410Email: [email protected]

ContributorsGraham Allison

Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy SchoolDirector, Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsTelephone: 617-496-6099Email: [email protected]

Aaron Arnold

Associate, Project on Managing the Atom,Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsEmail: [email protected]

Matthew BunnFor more information...To speak with the contributors to this publication, contactAssociate Director of Communications Sharon Wilke,[email protected].

Professor of Practice, Harvard Kennedy SchoolCo-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom,Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsTelephone: 617-495-9916Email: [email protected]

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School

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Nicholas Burns

Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics,Harvard Kennedy SchoolTelephone: 617-495-2495Email: [email protected]

Shai Feldman

Professor of Politics, Brandeis UniversityJudith and Sidney Swartz Director of the Crown Center for Middle EastStudies, Brandeis UniversityTelephone: 781-736-5321Email: [email protected]

Chuck Freilich

Senior Fellow, International Security Program,Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsTelephone: 617-495-8898Email: [email protected]

Olli Heinonen

Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsTelephone: 857-334-8377Email: [email protected]

Martin B. Malin

Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom,Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsTelephone: 617-496-0432Email: [email protected]

Steven E. Miller

Director, International Security ProgramEditor-in-Chief, International SecurityCo-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom,Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsTelephone: 617-495-1411Email: [email protected]

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The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide

Payam Mohseni

Inaugural Director, Belfer Centers Iran ProjectFellow for Iran Studies, Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsVisiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Government atHarvard UniversityTelephone: 617-496-0461Email: [email protected]

Richard Nephew

Program Director, Economic Statecraft, Sanctions and Energy MarketsCenter on Global Energy Policy, School of International and Public Affairs,Columbia UniversityTelephone: 212-854-9016Email: [email protected]

Laura Rockwood

Executive DirectorVienna Center for Disarmament and Non-ProliferationEmail: [email protected]

James K. Sebenius

Gordon Donaldson Professor of Business Administration,Harvard Business SchoolTelephone: 617-495-9334Email: [email protected]

William Tobey

Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International AffairsTelephone: 617-496-0518Email: [email protected]


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Table of ContentsIntroduction........................................................................... 1

6. Procurement Channel..................................................... 486.1 Description.............................................................................................48

1. Executive Summary.......................................................... 4Limits on Fissile Material Production2. Plutonium........................................................................ 182.1 Description.............................................................................................18

6.2 Assessment.............................................................................................49

7. Joint Commission and Dispute Resolution .................. 527.1 Description.............................................................................................527.2 Assessment.............................................................................................54

2.2 Assessment.............................................................................................20

Sanctions Relief and Nuclear Cooperation3. Uranium........................................................................... 23

8. Sanctions Relief............................................................... 58

3.1 Description.............................................................................................23

8.1 Description..............................................................................................58

3.2 Assessment.............................................................................................27

8.1.1 United Nations Security Council Sanctions........................................................... 588.1.2 United States Sanctions............................................................................................. 59

Verification and Compliance4. Inspections and Monitoring ......................................... 314.1 Description.............................................................................................314.1.1 Monitoring of declared facilities.............................................................................. 32

8.1.3 European Union Sanctions....................................................................................... 60

8.2 Assessment.............................................................................................608.2.1 Lifting Sanctions.......................................................................................................... 618.2.2 Untangling the U.S., UN, and EU Designated Entities Lists............................... 618.2.3 Re-imposing Sanctions ............................................................................................. 62

4.1.2 Access to undeclared facilities.................................................................................. 344.1.3 Drawing the Broader Conclusion............................................................................ 36

9. Civil Nuclear Cooperation.............................................. 65

4.2 Assessment.............................................................................................37

9.1 Description.............................................................................................65

5. Possible Military Dimensions/Weaponization.............. 42

9.2 Assessment ............................................................................................66

5.1 Description.............................................................................................425.1.1 Limitations on weaponization activity.................................................................. 44

5.2 Assessment.............................................................................................45


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The UN Security Council votes in favor of a resolutionendorsing the Iran nuclear deal, Monday, July 20, 2015.(AP Photo/Mark Lennihan)

IntroductionIn Vienna, Austria, on July 14, 2015, negotiators from Iran andthe P5+1 countries (the U.S., U.K. France, Germany, Russia, andChina), along with the EU, announced completion of a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iranotherwise known as theJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).The product of nearly two years of intense international negotiations, and 13 years after Irans clandestine nuclear activitieswere initially exposed, the JCPOA is a lengthy and complicateddocument, including the main agreement and five annexes.1To endorse and operationalize the JCPOA, the United NationsSecurity Council passed Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015, whichcontains two annexes.2 Several documents relevant to the overallagreement are not public, including a side agreement amongthe P5+1 on future UN action in 10 years and the contents ofIrans enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, which Iran willeventually submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).On July 14, 2015, the same day that the JCPOA was announced,IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the head of theAtomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, signeda Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present OutstandingIssues to resolve issues associated with the IAEAs investigation1 Annex I: Nuclear-related Measures; Annex II: Sanctions-related commitments; Annex III: Civil Nuclear Cooperation; Annex IV: Joint Commission;and Annex V: Implementation.2 Annex A: the JCPOA and Annex B: a joint P5+1 statement.


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of past and possible ongoing weaponization activity. However,the specific measures required by the Roadmap are not public.The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at theHarvard Kennedy School has produced this briefing book on theIran deal in the interest of contributing to informed Congressional review and public discourse on the agreement. First, wehave provided a concise description of the complex agreementand the accompanying UN Security Council Resolution 2231,including areas that appear ambiguous. Second, we have triedto provide a balanced assessment of the agreements strengthsand weaknesses with respect to its central objective to preventIran from acquiring nuclear weapons. We have not tried toaddress larger political questions, such as the implications ofthe agreement on Irans behavior in the region and domesticpolitics, implications of the agreement on regional dynamics inthe Middle East and the larger non-proliferation regime, or therelationship between the nuclear issue and other areas of disputebetween the U.S. and Iran.

the agreement itself. The Belfer Center as an institution doesnot take positions on public policy issues and thus does nottake a position on whether Congress should accept, reject, ormodify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Individuals atthe Center are free to make such recommendations in their personal capacity. In this case, some of us would advise Congress toaccept the agreement as the best option among possible alternatives to address the Iranian nuclear threat, while others wouldurge Congress to reject the agreement and seek to intensifysanctions in order to negotiate better terms. We hope that ourassessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the JCPOA willassist Congress as it makes that decision.We invite readers who disagree with our presentation or whohave additional questions or points to send their comments [email protected]. If suitable, we will post thesecontributions with attribution on our website Iran Matters.

Our focus is on the merits and drawbacks within the four corners of the agreement itself. The team of experts who preparedthis report includes Democrats, Republicans, independents,and internationals. Noting areas of disagreements amongthemselves, they ultimately agreed that this report provides anaccurate description and balanced assessment of the agreement.Of course, we recognize that members of Congress and thepublic will form an overall judgment of the agreement basedon broader considerations and factors beyond the elements of

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1. Executive SummaryThe Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is intendedto stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. If fully implemented, the physical constraints and verification provisions ofthis comprehensive nuclear agreement will effectively preventIran from producing fissile material for nuclear weapons at itsdeclared nuclear facilities for at least 10 to 15 years. During thisperiod, the provisions of the JCPOAalong with continuingnational intelligence effortsincrease the likelihood of detectingany Iranian attempts to build covert facilities to produce fissilematerial, thus helping to deter Tehran from attempting to do so.Over 10 to 15 years, the physical constraints on fissile materialproduction at declared facilities and most of the specializedverification and enforcement provisions of the JCPOA expire.At that point, Iran could expand its nuclear capabilities withina few years to create more practical options to produce fissilematerial for nuclear weapons, whether at declared or secret facilities. Actual production of nuclear weapons would violate Iranssafeguards agreement with the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), the JCPOA, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). The agreement poses no restrictions on what the U.S. orother countries could do in that circumstance.The central nuclear limits of the JCPOA are physical restrictionson Irans ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons(either separated plutonium or enriched uranium) at its declarednuclear facilities.33 No plausible agreement could reliably detect and prevent the wild cardoption of Iran buying nuclear weapons-ready materials or even nuclearweapons themselves from other states. U.S. and international nuclearsecurity measures are intended to reduce this risk.

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The Plutonium RouteThe physical limits on plutonium production in the JCPOAessentially close that pathway for the foreseeable future. Theredesigned Arak heavy-water research reactor will not be ableto produce large amounts of plutonium, its spent fuel will beshipped out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor, andIran is not allowed to build additional heavy-water reactors ora reprocessing facility to separate plutonium from spent fuelfor at least 15 years. Any Iranian attempt to secretly produce ordivert plutonium from the Bushehr nuclear power plant wouldbe quickly detected. Even after 15 years, when the ban on building new heavy-water reactors and a reprocessing plant becomesvoluntary (i.e. Iran expresses the intent not to build suchfacilities), Iran would require years to build them. Although theArak reactor will not be dismantled, it would require at least afew years to convert the reactor back to its original specificationsand the effort would be easily detected.

The Uranium RouteThe physical limits on enrichment at declared facilities in theJCPOA are less robust. While the agreement requires Iran to dismantle two-thirds of its installed centrifuges and eliminate 98%of its current enriched uranium stock, it permits Iran to retain asubstantial uranium enrichment infrastructure and to begin toexpand that infrastructure after 10 years. For 10 to 15 years, Iranwill restrict the number and types of centrifuges installed andoperating at Natanz, end enrichment at Fordow, limit researchand development on advanced centrifuges, maintain a smallstockpile of low-enriched uranium, and cap the level of enrichment. While these measures are reversible over a period of a fewmonths to a few years, any reversal would be quickly detected.


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Under these limits, breakout time at Natanz over the nextdecade would be extended to roughly a year, from the current

Such a facility could make breakout a more credible option,and the availability of advanced centrifuges and large stocks of

estimated breakout time of 2 to 3 months.4 From year 11 to year15, breakout time at Natanz will decline as Iran is permitted toreplace its first-generation centrifuges with limited numbers ofadvanced models, although the restrictions on enriched uranium stocks and enrichment level continue through year 15.Estimating breakout time during years 11 to 15 is difficult. Thenumber and type of advanced centrifuges that Iran is permittedto deploy during this period is not public, and the performanceof advanced centrifuge models under development is uncertain.

enriched uranium would create additional options for Iran topursue secret enrichment activities, especially as the specializedmonitoring provisions of the JCPOA expire. Once the cap onenrichment level expires in 15 years, Iran could also claim thatit needs to begin producing highly enriched uranium undersafeguards for civil uses, such as research-reactor fuel or isotopeproduction. If Iran accumulated a stockpile of material thatcould be directly used to produce nuclear weapons, it couldachieve the same threshold status as countries like Japan.

Some contributors to this report believe that breakout timeby year 15 could be comparable to what it is todaya fewmonthswhile others believe it could be reduced to a fewweeks. In any event, Iran is unlikely to attempt breakout atNatanz during this period because detection would be swiftand the risk of provoking a military attack would be high. Sinceall enrichment will be limited to Natanz for 15 years under theJCPOA, Irans nuclear program would be vulnerable to militaryattack.

The Covert Option

After 15 years, all physical constraints on enrichment imposedby the agreement will be lifted. At that point, Iran could buildan enrichment plant large enough to produce low-enriched uranium to fuel a nuclear power reactor within a matter of years.4 Breakout time is a technical benchmark for measuring enrichmentcapacity in terms of how long it would take to produce a significantquantity of highly enriched uranium, nominally enough for a singlenuclear device. Whether breakout at a declared facility is a practicaloption for producing nuclear weapons depends on a host of other considerations, such as the likelihood and timing of detection and possibleinternational responses.

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If the agreement effectively deters Iran from producing fissilematerial for nuclear weapons at its declared nuclear facilitiesfor at least 10 to 15 years, will it deter or detect Iranian cheating on the agreement by producing fissile material for nuclearweapons at undeclared facilities? On one hand, the verificationregime of the JCPOA will make it more difficult for Iran toconceal covert nuclear activities, while the provisions for reinstating UN sanctions increase the likelihood of penalties if Iranis caught cheating. If U.S. and allied intelligence capabilities aremaintained at their current level, there is a high probability ofdetecting major covert activity (e.g., construction of a secretconversion or enrichment plant). The provisions of the JCPOAimprove the odds that intelligence agencies and internationalinspectors would detect covert facilities to process nuclearmaterial.On the other hand, the provisions of the JCPOA (as well asnational intelligence) are less likely to deter or detect moreincremental Iranian cheating, such as covert nuclear weaponsBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School

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research or advanced centrifuge research. While such activitiesare less significant than covert fissile material production, they

more apparent in 15 years. Assuming that Irans motivationshave not fundamentally changed, the risk is less that Iran will

could enhance and accelerate Irans nuclear weapons optionsif fissile material for nuclear weapons production becomesavailable. Finally, the detection of covert activities is heavilydependent on effective intelligence, and some nuclear activities, such as weaponization, are inherently difficult intelligencetargets because they involve a small number of people and relatively little infrastructure. To the extent that Iran improves itsability to hide nuclear activities from U.S. and allied intelligenceagencies, the likelihood of detecting covert nuclear activities willbe diminished.

suddenly dash for a bomb after 15 years, because Irans declarednuclear facilities will still be vulnerable to military attack. Themore likely risk is that Iran will begin to gradually expand itsenrichment capabilities and enrich at higher levels to create amore credible option to break out on short notice or to buildcovert facilities. At that point, the U.S. would have the option ofaccusing Iran of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability underthe guise of an expanded enrichment program, or of producing higher levels of enrichment that are unnecessary for itsnuclear power needs. However, rallying international supportfor renewed sanctions or military action to block Irans efforts islikely to be difficult once all nuclear sanctions have been removedand after Iran has complied with the JCPOA for 15 years.

Long Term ImplicationsThe long term implications of the JCPOA for Irans nuclearprogram are extremely difficult to predict and assess. TheJCPOA constrains Irans nuclear option for at least 10 to 15 yearsthrough a combination of physical limits on fissile materialproduction and verification provisions. It does not eliminate therisk that Iran will seek to acquire nuclear weapons after 15 years.JCPOA proponents argue that it could ultimately undermineadvocates of nuclear weapons inside Iran by reducing the threatof military conflict with the U.S. and increasing the benefitsof economic integration, all of which would be jeopardized ifIran pursues nuclear weapons. JCPOA opponents argue that itwill legitimize Irans nuclear program and will not fundamentally change Tehrans hostility toward the U.S., including theperceived need for nuclear weapons to defend itself against theGreat Satan and to assert the Islamic Republics dominance inthe region.While it is impossible to resolve this issue, answers may become8

Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal

Approve or Reject?The ultimate question for Congress and the American public iswhether to approve or reject the existing agreement.Supporters of the JCPOA believe that U.S. rejection of the agreement would likely lead Iran to resume nuclear activities that arecurrently limited under the interim agreement of November2013. Without the agreement in place, Iran could manufacture, install, and bring more centrifuges on line (including themore advanced centrifuges); accelerate research on even moreadvanced centrifuges; increase its stockpile of low-enrichedand near 20% enriched uranium; and resume construction ofthe Arak heavy-water research reactor. While precise estimatesof how fast and how far Iran could go are difficult, Iran couldclearly achieve a greater capacity to produce fissile material fasterwithout an agreement than it could under the limits imposed byBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School

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the JCPOA over 15 years. Moreover, this expansion would takeplace without the additional monitoring and verification pro-

they argue that any nuclear advances Iran makes in the meantime will be limited by Irans desire to avoid triggering a military

visions of the JCPOA, increasing the risk that Iran could buildcovert nuclear facilities without detection and produce nuclearweapons before it could be stopped.

attack.

Opponents of the JCPOA argue that the U.S. should hold out fora better deal. First, opponents advocate tighter restrictions onIrans enrichment infrastructure, including reducing the numberof centrifuges at Natanz, eliminating centrifuges at Fordow, anddismantling (rather than storing) retired centrifuges. Second,they advocate a longer duration for the physical limits on Iransnuclear program and specialized inspection provisions or linking duration of the agreement to verified changes in Iranianbehavior rather than the passage of time. Finally, they demandmore robust inspection and verification provisions, including full Iranian cooperation to resolve the Possible MilitaryDimensions (PMD) issue and anytime, anywhere challengeinspections (or a deadline for access shorter than the challengeinspection procedure in the JCPOA).Opponents of the JCPOA also argue that the U.S. can reject theagreement and still mobilize international support for moreintense sanctions against Iran because most countries willchoose to protect their economic and political relationship withthe U.S. over the potential for economic opportunities and betterrelations with Iran. Over time, opponents of the JCPOA argue,the economic pressure against Iran will be sufficient to compelIran to make greater nuclear concessions than it was prepared tomake in the latest round of negotiations. Most opponents of theJCPOA concede that any new negotiations are not likely to takeplace until the next U.S. administration takes office in 2017, but

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Supporters of the JCPOA argue that proposals to reject the current agreement, sustain sanctions and negotiate a better dealare highly risky. If the United States unilaterally rejects a dealthat the rest of the P5+1 and the worlds other leading economicpowers support, the coalition that the U.S. painstakingly builtto pressure Iran would likely unravel, and much of the globalsanctions effort, beyond just U.S. sanctions, would crumble withit. U.S. rejection of the JCPOA would discredit Iranian leaderswho have advocated compromise, enable Iran to blame the U.S.for walking away from a diplomatic settlement, and hobbleU.S. efforts to retain, much less intensify, the existing sanctionsregime. Thus, the U.S. would be left with less leverage, whileIran would have more freedom to advance its nuclear program.Despite the economic costs of sanctions, Iran has withstoodinternational pressure for nearly a decade and there is no way ofknowing whether or when Iran can be compelled to make largerconcessions.Proponents and opponents of the Iran deal also differ on itsimplications for the politics and security of the Middle East. Byreducing the chance that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons, proponents argue that the JCPOA improves the security of Israel,the Gulf States, and others in the region, and also enhancesefforts by the U.S. and its regional allies and partners to dealwith the other security threats that Iran poses. Moreover, theyargue that the deal and the resulting increased integration ofIrans economy with the rest of the world are likely to strengthenmoderate political factions in Iran and could moderate Irans


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behavior or create increased opportunities for cooperation inother areas where Western and Iranian interests overlap (suchas the fight against the Islamic State). Critics, by contrast, arguethat leaving a substantial uranium enrichment infrastructure inIran is likely to provoke Arab states to seek comparable capabilities of their own, setting off a nascent nuclear competition. Theyalso argue that the sanctions relief offered by the JCPOA, including access to frozen funds, will give Iran more money to financeaggression and terrorism in the region.

Figure 1: Key Nuclear Actions BeforeSanctions Relief1

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Plutonium Route

Down-blend to naturaluranium or sell allenriched uranium inexcess of 300 kg LEUUF6 or equivalent inother chemical forms.2

Remove and renderinoperable existingcalandria for Arakreactor.9

Fabricate into fuelplates, export, or diluteall uranium oxideenriched to between5% and 20%.3

ConclusionIf Iran complies, the JCPOA buys at least 10 to 15 years beforeTehran can significantly expand its nuclear capabilities. If Irancheats during this period, JCPOA monitoring and nationalintelligence are likely to detect major violations, which wouldenhance U.S. and international options to intensify sanctionsand take military action if necessary. If the agreement survivesafter 15 years, Iran will be able to expand its nuclear program tocreate more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options.There are different views on whether the JCPOA will createconditions that help to reduce Irans incentives to pursue nuclearweapons in the long term. Ultimately, the decision to supportor oppose the existing agreement boils down to assessing relative risksaccepting the current agreement (with its knownstrengths and weaknesses) or taking the chance that a betteragreement can be achieved down the road. That choice will haveprofound implications for U.S. foreign policy, the politics ofthe Middle East and relations among the major powers, international economics, and the global effort to stem the spread ofnuclear weapons.

Uranium Route

Modify existing Arakfuel production line.10 Make all excess heavywater available forexport.11

Natanz: Remove andstore under continuousIAEA monitoring all but5,060 IR-1 centrifuges.4 Fordow: Remove nuclear material and ceaseuranium enrichment.5Remove and storeunder monitoring allbut 1,044 IR-1s (348IR-1s will produce stableisotopes).6 Continue enrichmentonly at or below 3.67%.7 Remove ~1,000 IR-2mand remove advancedcentrifuges, exceptindividual machinesand small cascadespermitted under agreedR&D program.8

Inspections,Monitoring,Verification Provisionally applyAdditional Protocol.12 Implement ModifiedCode 3.1.13 Declare to IAEA initialinventory of centrifugerotor tubes andbellows, and declare alllocations and relatedequipment.14 Complete all activitiesin paragraphs 2, 4, 5,and 6 of Iran-IAEA RoadMap to resolve PMDissue.15 Store under continuousIAEA monitoringall natural uraniumpellets and IR-40 fuelassemblies.16 Declare to IAEAinventory at heavywater production plantand allow monitoring.17 Complete the modalities and facilities-specific arrangements toallow the IAEA to implement all transparencymeasures provided forin Annex I.18

1

Per UNSCR 2231 Operative 5, Iran must take steps outlined in Annex V 15.1-15.11 of JCPOA before receiving sanctions relief.

9 Annex I 3, as called for in Annex V 15.1, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 5

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Iran will receive natural uranium in return for any LEU sold on theinternational market. Annex I 57 as called for in Annex V 15.7, as calledfor in UNSCR 2231 Operative 5

10 Annex I 10, as called for in Annex V 15.1, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 5

3

Annex I 58 as called for in Annex V 15.7, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 5

4

Annex I 27, 29, 29.1, 29.2, as called for in Annex V 15.3, as called for inUNSCR 2231 Operative 5. Stock of excess IR-1 will be used as replacementfor broken machines. Annex I 62 as called for in Annex V 15.8, as calledfor in UNSCR 2231 Operative 5

5

Annex I 45 as called for in Annex V 15.5, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 5

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Annex I 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 as called for in Annex V 15.5, as calledfor in UNSCR 2231 Operative 5

7

Annex I 28, as called for in Annex V 15.3, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 5

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Annex I 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42 as called for in Annex V 15.4, as called for in UNSCR 2231 Operative 5. Uranium testing can onlyoccur at PFEP and mechanical testing can only occur at PFEP and TehranResearch Center. See Annex I 40.Agree on definitions and standards foradvanced centrifuge type and performance. Annex I 52, 54, 55 as calledfor in Annex V 15.6, as called for in UNSCR 2231 Operative 5

11 Annex I 14, as called for in Annex V 15.2, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 512 Annex I 64, as called for in Annex V 15.10, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 513 Annex I 65, as called for in Annex V 15.10, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 514 Annex I 80.1, 80.2, as called for in Annex V 15.11, as called for in UNSCR2231 Operative 515 Annex I 66, as called for in Annex V 9. See Iran-IAEA Road Map.Notmandatory under UNSCR 2231 but required under Adoption periodin JCPOA.16 Annex I 10, as called for in Annex V 15.1, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 517 Annex I 15, as called for in Annex V 15.2, as called for in UNSCR 2231Operative 518 Annex V 15.9, as called for in UNSCR 2231 Operative 5


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Figure 2: Durations of JCPOA ProvisionsDuration1

Uranium Route

PlutoniumRoute

Inspections,Monitoring,Verification

UN Sanctions

Duration

Ban on sale to Iranof major weaponssystems*2

5 years

Ban on sale by Iranof all arms*3Iran called uponnot to undertakeballistic missileactivity related tonuclear weapons*4

8 years

Restrictions onballistic missiletrade*5Natanz FEP:Maximum5,060 IR-1 incurrent cascadeconfiguration6

Mandatory useof procurementchannel*11

15 years

UNSCR 223112Automaticsnapbackprocedure13

Uranium testingonly with IR-4,5, 6, 87

Note: some R&D restrictions lifted at year 8.5

10 years

Mechanical testingonly with IR-2m, 4,5, 6, 6s, 7, 88No mechanicaltesting on newmodels withoutapproval9No R&D for otherforms of uraniumseparation10

Uranium Route

Plutonium Route

Inspections,Monitoring,Verification

Maximum enrichmentlevel 3.67%14

All excess heavy waterexported21

Special challengeinspection procedure25

Maximum stockpile 300kg 3.67% UF6 (or equivalent in different chemicalforms)15

No spent fuel reprocessing or R&D except forirradiated enriched uranium targets for medical /industrial use 22

Continuous monitoringof excess centrifuges atNatanz Hall B26

Fordow: No uraniumenrichment orenrichment R&D. Nonuclear material16;Maximum 1,044 IR-117;Only 348 IR-1 will workwith stable isotopesat a time, with othercentrifuges on stand-by18

No spent fuel separationfacilities (small hot-cellpermitted at Arak) 23No additional heavywater reactors24

Daily access to Natanzbuildings27No engagement with anyother country on enrichment or enrichment R&Dwithout approval28IAEA use of modern monitoring technology29

No other enrichmentfacilities19

No production of Pu or Umetals or alloys or R&Don Pu or U metallurgy30

No facilities forconverting fuel plates orscrap back to UF620

No production oracquisition of separatedplutonium or HEU31

20 years

Monitoring of centrifugerotor tubes and bellows32

25 years

Monitoring of uraniumore concentrateproduction and transferto Esfahan33

Permanent

All spent fuel exportedfor lifetime of Arakreactor34

Unspecifiedduration

Additional Protocol andModified Code 3.135Certain activitiesrelated to design anddevelopment of weaponprohibited36Joint Commission inexistence37

* Denotes sanction that terminates prior to listed date if IAEA issues Broader Conclusion.1 Depending on each provision, the clock begins either on Adoption Day or Implementation Day. In general, nuclear restrictions take effect uponImplementation Day, as does the relief of U.S., EU and UN sanctions. But remaining UN sanctions on arms and ballistic missiles are clocked fromAdoption Day. This distinction is not incorporated into the above chart for simplicitys sake.2 UNSCR 2231, Operative 7(b) and Annex B 53 UNSCR 2231, Operative 7(b) and Annex B 6(b)4 UNSCR 2231, Operative 7(b) and Annex B 35 UNSCR 2231, Operative 7(b) and Annex B 46 Annex I 277 Annex I 32; no accumulation of enriched uranium; Annex I 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 53, 63 detail specific limits on R&D for each IR model8 Annex I 329 Annex I 4310 Annex I 81, footnote 211 UNSCR 2231, Annex B 2; Annex IV 6 and all sub-components therein UNSCR 2231, Operative 8. At least one aspect of the Procurement Channelextends beyond 10 years. According to the Verification Assessment Report submitted by the State Department to Congress, procurement of hot-cellrelated equipment will be handled through the Channel for 15 years.12 UNSCR 2231, Operative 813 JCPOA 36 and UNSCR 2231, Operative 8. The U.S. administration has indicated that this duration will extend by 5 years beyond year 10, perunreleased political agreement.

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14 Annex I 28

27 Annex I 71

15 Annex I 56

28 Annex I 73

16 Annex I 45

29 Annex I 67, 67.1, 67.2, 67.3, with specification of 15 years of longer

17 Annex I 46, 46.1, 46.2

30 Annex I 24, with exception in 26

18 Annex I 46, 46.1, 46.2, 49, 50

31 Annex I 25

19 Annex I 31, 72

32 Annex I 79, 80, 80.1, 80.2

20 Annex I 58

33 Annex I 68

21 Annex I 14

34 Annex I 11

22 Annex I 18-19

35 Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1 are permanent as long asIran remains party to the NPT.

23 Annex I 20, 21, 22, 2324 JCPOA 1025 Limitation in JCPOA 15; description of procedure in Annex I 74, 75,76, 77, 78.

36 Annex I 82, 82.1, 82.2, 82.3, 82.437 Annex IV

26 Annex I 70


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Tehran Research ReactorLight water reactor provided bythe United States in 1967.

Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR-40)Construction halted. If operational at original power levelof 40 MW, the reactor would produce 1 to 2 bombs worthof weapons grade plutonium annually. On same site isfacility for production of heavy water.

Comprehensive agreement:Arak reactor to be redesignedand rebuilt to reduceplutonium production

NPT/Additional ProtocolSome weaponization activities prohibitedAll spent fuel from Arak shipped out of country for lifetime of reactorMonitoring of uranium ore concentrate productionMonitoring of centrifuge production

ParchinMilitary complex is site of high-explosive testingbelieved connected to nuclear weapons development.

Fordow Fuel Enrichment PlantConstructed secretly on military base insidemountain near the holy city of Qom. Currently holds 2,700 IR-1 centrifuges. Main location forproduction of 20% enriched uranium.

Natanz Fuel Enrichment PlantPrimary facility for uranium enrichment. Designed tohold 50,000 centrifuges. Currently has 15,000 IR-1 and1,000 IR-2m, of which about 9,000 IR-1s are producing5% enriched uranium. Adjacent to FEP is pilot facilityfor R&D. Constructed secretly underground.

Esfahan Uranium Conversion FacilityUCF converts natural uranium to compounds forfuel fabrication or enrichment.

Bushehr Light Water Power Reactor1000 MWe plant constructed by Russia, which alsofabricates plants fuel and takes custody of spent fuel.Currently supplying electricity.

Years Post-Agreement

No uranium enrichment above 3.67%, maximum LEU stockpile 300 kgFordow: 1,044 centrifuges (not enriching)No other enrichment facilitiesLimitations on R&D using advanced centrifuges

10

No additional heavy-water reactors or excess heavy waterNo spent fuel reprocessing facilitySpecial challenge inspection procedureProcurement channelNatanz: 5,060 centrifugesNo accumulation of LEU using advanced centrifuges

5

15

20

Figure 3: Duration of Select Nuclear-Related Provisions

0

Plutonium Route

Uranium Route

Verification / Monitoring

Comprehensive agreement:Natanz facility limited to5,060 IR-1s for 10 years

Comprehensive agreement:Fordow facility limited to1,044 IR-1s for 15 years

25

17Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy SchoolThe Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide16

Figure 4: Primary Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Provision

Limits on Fissile Material Production

2. Plutonium2.1 DescriptionIrans primary option to produce plutonium for nuclear weaponsis the Arak heavy-water research reactor, which, if completedand operated as planned, could produce enough weapons gradeplutonium in its spent fuel for one or two nuclear weaponsannually.5 Under the JCPOA, Iran will work with an international consortium (including all of the P5+1) to redesign andrebuild the Arak reactor to a new design agreed to by the P5+1.The new design will reduce the reactors power level from 40megawatts-thermal (MWt) to 20 MWt, and replace the naturaluranium fuel with low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel enrichedto 3.67% U-235 (see Figure 5). The initial fuel load for theredesigned reactor will be manufactured outside of Iran, andthe international consortium will provide technical assistanceto help Iran build facilities to test and fabricate fuel thereafter.Iran will cease production of the original natural uranium fuelfor Arak and destroy the original calandria or core for the Arakreactor by filling the openings with concrete.In addition to redesigning Arak, the comprehensive agreementcalls for Iran to ship all of the spent fuel from Arak out of the

5 The Russian-built Bushehr light-water power reactor produces largeamounts of plutoniumabout 200 kg annuallybut Iran has agreedto return all Russian-origin spent fuel to Russia for the lifetime of thereactor. In addition, IAEA safeguards at Bushehr would detect with highconfidence diversion of spent fuel or irradiation of clandestine targets toproduce plutonium.

18


country.6 Under the JCPOA, Iran will not build any additionalheavy-water reactors for at least 15 years. Iran will sell on theinternational market all of its heavy water that is not needed forArak and a supporting zero-power test reactor, and will keepdoing so for 15 years. The JCPOA estimates that Iran will needroughly 130 tons of heavy water until the redesigned Arak reactor begins operations and roughly 90 tons thereafter. Iran willallow the IAEA to monitor its heavy-water stocks and heavy-water production plant to verify this commitment indefinitely.Reprocessing is the technology for chemically separating plutonium contained in the spent fuel from uranium and highlyradioactive waste products. Under the accord, Iran will notconduct research and development on reprocessing or build anyfacilities capable of reprocessing for at least 15 years. Duringthat period, Iran will only be permitted to build small (less thansix cubic meters) hot cells for producing medical isotopes. Forthe same period, Iran can only examine spent fuel non-destructivelythat is, no chemical processing of the fuel, which couldcontribute to reprocessing knowledge in Iran. Instead, the P5+1will make available their facilities to allow for destructivepost-irradiation examination of fuel outside Iran.After 15 years, the restrictions and limits of the JCPOA withrespect to heavy-water reactors, spent fuel, and reprocessingare expressed as Irans plans and intentions rather than firmcommitments. In effect, Iran states that it plans to rely onlight-water reactors rather than heavy-water reactors for itspower and research reactors; intends to ship out spent fuel6 This must take place within one year of when it is unloaded from thereactor, or as soon as the recipient country thinks it has cooled enough tobe safe to ship.


19

from all present and future power and research reactors; anddoes not intend to engage in any spent fuel reprocessing orconstruction of a reprocessing facility. (Light-water reactorsare less suitable for producing weapons grade plutonium thanheavy-water reactors.)

2.2 AssessmentThe JCPOA effectively blocks the plutonium pathway for morethan 15 years. The result of the Arak redesign will be a dramaticreduction in the amount of plutonium that will be produced inthe spent fuel. Rather than producing six to eight kilograms ofplutonium per year, the reactor will produce just over one kilogram of plutonium per year. At that rate it would take severalyears for the reactor to produce enough plutonium for a singlebomb. Moreover, the plutonium produced will not be weapons-grade, because it will have more of the undesirable higherplutonium isotopes than it would have had under the originaldesign. (Nuclear weapons can be made with reactor-grade plutonium, although this requires relatively sophisticated nuclearweapons designs.)Once the reactor begins operating and becomes intensely radioactive, it will be difficult to reverse the modification in order toproduce more plutonium. Iran would need to manufacture anew core and swap it in, a process that would likely take 1.5 to2.5 years and be highly visible. Also, the accord means that Iranwill not complete testing of the fuel for the original design orproduce any more fuel for the original design, further reducingthe plausibility of any effort to reverse the modification. Irancould attempt to operate the redesigned reactor to producemore plutonium (for example, by inserting additional uranium20


targets), but this would only modestly increase plutonium production and would be readily detectable.Additionally, the fuel from the Arak reactor will be shipped outof Iran for the lifetime of the reactor, and Iran will not build thefacilities needed to separate plutonium from the spent fuel for15 years. Any change in these arrangements, such as any haltin shipments of spent fuel out of the country, would be noticedquickly, long before Iran could produce enough plutonium for abomb. Any attempt by Iran to build a covert reprocessing plantor a covert reactorboth large-scale facilities with distinctivesignaturesis likely to be detected. Irans commitment to shipout surplus heavy water not required by Arak and to purchasereactor components and hot cells through the monitored Procurement Channel (see Section 6) further limits options to builda covert reactor and reprocessing facility.But like the other elements of the agreement, the restraint onthe plutonium pathway is not absolute. Once the Arak reactorgoes hot, any future military strike on it would likely causeincreased environmental damage. Several of Irans key obligationsincluding the commitment not to build heavy-waterreactors or reprocessing facilitiesshift from commitments todeclared intentions after 15 years. Even if Iran changes its intentions at that point, however, it would take several years for Iranto build indigenous reactors to produce plutonium and a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from spent fuel.


21

General plutonium restrictions

Arak reactor

Figure 5: Plutonium Pathway RestrictionsBefore InterimAgreement Reached(November 2013)

After JCPOAImplemented

Power level

40 megawatts-thermal

20 megawatts-thermal

Fuel type

Natural uranium(~0.7% U-235)

Low-enriched uranium(3.67% U-235)

Bombsworth ofplutoniumproduced*

1 or 2 bombs/year

Less than 1/6 of onebomb/year

Plutoniumquality

Weapons-gradeplutonium

Fuel-grade plutonium(somewhat more difficultto weaponize)

Spent fuel

No restrictions

All spent fuel exported forlifetime of reactor (andsame intended for futurereactors)

Plutoniumseparationfromspent fuel(reprocessing)

No restrictions

No spent fuel separationfacilities or R&D for 15years (and no intentionthereafter)

Futureheavy-waterreactors

No restrictions

No additional heavywater reactors for 15years

Excess heavywater

No restrictions

All excess heavy waterexported for 15 years

Foreignprocurement

Illicit procurement

Procurement permittedonly in declared,monitored channel for10 years

* After reprocessing. IAEA defines one Significant Quantity as 8 kg of plutonium.

3. Uranium3.1 DescriptionIrans current enrichment program consists of nearly 18,500first generation IR-1 centrifuges (approximately 15,500 installedat Natanz and 3,000 installed at Fordow) and another 1,000more-advanced IR-2 centrifuges at Natanz, for a total of about19,500 centrifuges, with an additional nearly 400 more-advancedcentrifuge machines undergoing various tests and experimentation at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. Of the total,approximately 9,200 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and 700 IR-1centrifuges at Fordow are actually enriching uranium.7 Iranscurrent stockpile of enriched uranium includes about 7.6 tonsof low-enriched uranium (up to 3.67% U-235) in the form ofUF6, and about 2.4 tons of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in theform of oxide (or being converted to oxide). None of Irans near20% enriched uranium remains in the form of UF6, but it retainsabout 230 kilograms of near 20% enriched uranium oxide.8The JCPOA includes a detailed set of physical limits on numbersand types of centrifuges, centrifuge research and development,centrifuge manufacturing, locations and levels of enrichment,and stocks of enriched uranium. The physical limits phase outover 10 to 15 years (see Figure 6).7 Enrichment is a process to increase the concentration of U-235 relativeto U-238. In natural uranium, the U-235 concentration is 0.7%. Lowenriched uranium is typically used for fuel for light water power reactors.Depending on their design, research reactors can be fueled with naturaluranium, low enriched uranium, nearly 20% U-235, or even highlyenriched uranium (about 90% U-235). Typically, nuclear weapons usehighly enriched uranium.8 The oxide is either in powder form, in the process of conversion to oxide,or has been used to fabricate fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.

22



23

Under the agreement, Iran is required to remove about twothirds of its installed centrifuge machines (or about one-third of

allowed to accumulate enriched uranium. Iran also commits notto pursue any research and development on enrichment tech-

its operating centrifuges), leaving it with about 5,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow(see Figure 7).

nologies other than gas centrifuge technology for 10 years.

The excess centrifuge machines and related enrichment infrastructure removed from Natanz and Fordow will be storedat Natanz under IAEA monitoring. For 10 years, enrichmentcapacity at Natanz is capped at about 5,000 IR-1 machines intheir current cascade configuration, which will continue to produce LEU.9 At Fordow, one-third of the remaining 1,000 IR-1centrifuges will be converted to produce stable isotopes (i.e., noturanium) for medical or industrial purposes and the remainingtwo-thirds will be kept on standby status. No uranium enrichment or nuclear material is permitted at Fordow for 15 years.The agreement also defines the range of centrifuge research anddevelopment permitted at Natanz over 10 years, specifying thetype and number of advanced machines that can be tested andthe type of tests that can be conducted. For example, Iran mustdismantle the 164-machine test cascades of IR-2m and IR-4centrifuges during the initial implementation of the JCPOA,thus preventing Iran from continuing to experiment with production-scale cascades of advanced centrifuges for 10 years.But, Iran can continue research on the IR-6 and IR-8 centrifugesits most advanced designsand is permitted to scale upto 30-machine test cascades of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges at year8.5. None of the test activities during this 10-year period are9 The JCPOA requires the IAEA and Iran to agree on a procedure to measure and define centrifuge performance data so that any significantimprovement in the performance of the IR-1 would exceed the 10-yearenrichment cap.

24


Under the JCPOA, Irans centrifuge manufacturing is limited tomeeting the enrichment and enrichment research and development requirements of the agreement. In particular, productionof additional IR-1 centrifuges is suspended for 10 years unlessthe reserve stock of machines in storage (which are used toreplace failed or damaged machines at Natanz and Fordow)falls below 500 centrifuges. At that point, Iran can resume IR-1production to maintain a stock of 500 machines. Production ofmore-advanced machines will not exceed the requirements ofthe initial research and development plan. However, at the endof year 8, Iran is allowed to begin production of IR-6 and IR-8centrifuges without rotors at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges peryear through year 10. After year 10, Iran can begin producingcomplete IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges at the rate of 200 per yearof each type and can begin installing the necessary enrichmentinfrastructure for IR-8 centrifuges at Natanz. The JCPOA doesnot appear to impose any limits on production of IR-2m andIR-4 centrifuges after year 10.Between year 11 and year 15 of the JCPOA, Iran is allowedto begin replacing the 5,000 IR-1 centrifuges with more-advanced machines, according to an enrichment and enrichmentR&D plan that Iran will submit to the IAEA during the initialimplementation of the JCPOA. The contents of the enrichmentplan are not public and are not included in the JCPOA, but thesubstance of the plan is known to U.S. officials and has beenprovided to Congress. Reportedly, the plan calls for Iran toreplace its entire inventory of operating IR-1 centrifuges with a


25

few thousand IR-2m or IR-4 centrifuges by the end of year 13 ofthe agreement. The IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges are expected tobe 3 to 5 times more powerful than the IR-1. After year 13, Iranplans to deploy the more advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifugesfor enrichment at Natanz. At that point, according to the centrifuge production schedule, Iran could have upwards of 1,000machines of each type available for deployment. During thisperiod, enrichment levels will continue to be limited to LEU (upto 3.67% U-235), the stockpile of LEU will be capped at 300 kg,and enrichment will be limited to the Natanz facility.The JCPOA limits Irans stockpile of enriched uranium. For 15years, Iran will maintain a total stockpile of no more than 300kg of LEU, whether as UF6 or other chemical forms. Excessenriched uraniumnearly 12 tons of LEU in various chemicalforms at presentwill be down-blended to natural uraniumor sold on the international market in exchange for naturaluranium. The 300-kg limit includes various scrap and wastematerials containing low-enriched uranium but does notinclude enriched uranium that has been fabricated into fuelelements for Irans reactors, including the near 20% enricheduranium produced by Iran for fabrication of fuel for the TehranResearch Reactor. Iran will not build or operate a facility to convert fuel back to UF6 for 15 years.After 15 years, all physical restraints on enrichment areremoved, including numbers and types of centrifuge machines,enrichment levels, locations for enrichment facilities, and stocksof enriched uranium.

26


3.2 AssessmentAs a benchmark to measure enrichment capacity, breakouttime is defined as the time required to produce a single significant quantity of weapons grade uranium. One significantquantity is defined by the IAEA as 25 kilograms of U-235 metal,equal to about 28 kilograms of 90% enriched uranium metal orabout 40 kilograms of 90% enriched UF6. Currently, Irans estimated breakout time is in the range of 2 to 3 months, assumingIran used all the centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordow andits stock of LEU.For the first 10 years of the JCPOA, the reduction in the numberand type of centrifuges and stockpile of LEU will extend breakout time to roughly one year. This estimate is based on theobserved performance of the IR-1 centrifuge, which is severaltimes below theoretical capacity, and the current configurationof cascades at Natanz, which are not optimized for productionof high-enriched uranium (HEU).Some non-government experts have argued that breakouttime during the initial 10 years could be reduced by a fewmonths or more if Iran improves the performance of the IR-1,re-configures cascades for more efficient production of HEU,accumulates more than 300 kg of LEU, and reinstalls centrifuges stored at Natanz. In addition, the definition of significantquantity is somewhat arbitrary because Iran could theoreticallymake a nuclear implosion device with less than 25 kg of U-235metal. As a practical matter, however, Iran cannot be confidentof calculating precise breakout time because of the possibility ofencountering unanticipated technical problems in the production of HEU, which it has never practiced.


27

From years 11 to 15 of the JCPOA, breakout time will graduallyshorten below one year as Iran phases out the first generation IR-1

Figure 6: Uranium Pathway Restrictions

centrifuges and replaces them with more-advanced centrifugessuch as the IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6, and IR-8. Estimating the decline inbreakout time during this period is difficult because Irans enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, which specifies the number andtype of centrifuges that Iran is permitted to deploy, is not public.Moreover, the performance characteristics for the advanced centrifuges have not been defined, and it is uncertain whether Irancan achieve these goals, especially for the most-advanced IR-6 andIR-8 models. The continuing cap on enrichment level and stockof LEU over 15 years will limit the decline in breakout time. Somecontributors believe that breakout time at year 15 will be comparable to todays rate of 2 to 3 months, while others believe it couldbe shortened to a few weeks, if Iran can perfect its more-advancedcentrifuges. Because breakout at declared facilities would bequickly detected by the IAEA, however, Iran is unlikely to run therisk of provoking swift international reaction by using declaredfacilities to produce weapons-grade uranium for a single device.On the plus side, the JCPOA imposes physical limits on Iransenrichment capacity that makes break out at its declared enrichmentfacilities impractical for at least the next 15 years. In the absence ofthe agreement, Iran could expand its enrichment capabilities morequickly by deploying more centrifuges, more advanced centrifuges,and a larger stock of LEU that might shrink breakout time to a fewweeks or daysperhaps to the point where breakout becomes a morecredible (though still risky) maneuver. The JCPOA postpones thatday. On the negative side, the JCPOA allows Iran to retain a substantial enrichment infrastructure, with the technical capacity to expandits enrichment program after 15 years if it makes a political decisionto do so.

28


Before interimagreementreached(Nov. 2013)1

JCPOA physicallimits(1015 years)

After 15 years

First-gen(IR-1)centrifuges

18,472

Capped at 6,104

Unconstrained

Second-gen(IR-2)centrifuges

1,008

None2

Unconstrained

Breakouttime1

12 months

Approximately12 months

Unknown

R&D of newcentrifugetechnology

Unconstrained

Constrained

Unconstrained

Stockpile oflow-enrichedUF64

7,154 kg5

Capped at300 kg6

Unconstrained

Stockpile of20%-enrichedUF6

196 kg7

None

Unconstrained

Maximumenrichmentlevel

No restrictions

3.67%

Unconstrained

Unconstrained

Constrained toproducing onlyreplacement IR-1for 10 years; noproduction of IR-6or IR-8 for 8 years

Unconstrained

Centrifugeproduction

1234567

As described in IAEA GOV/2013/56 on November 14, 2013.Except for mechanical testing.Defined as time required for produce 25 kg of 90% enriched uranium.In addition, Iran fed into conversion 53 kg of LEU UF6 that produced 27.2 kg of UO2.Includes 7,154 kg in uranium hexafluoride form and 53 kg converted to oxide.Certain forms of uranium mass are exempted from this cap.In addition, Iran fed into conversion 213.5 kg of UF6 enriched to near-20% thatproduced 104.2 kg of U3O8 plus scrap and waste.


29

2006

Operating

Installed

20072008

Stuxnet attack

200920102012

Installation of newcentrifuges stoppedfall 2013 during interimagreement negotiations

Number of operatingcentrifuges remains at~10,000 from early 2012

20112013

Nov. 2013 agreement

Comprehensive accord:

6,104 installed;5,060 operating for 10 years

20142015

Once implemented

Comprehensive agreement

for 10 years*

2016


Figure 7: IR-1 Centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow, 2007-present

20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0*After 10 years, Iran will begin to replace the IR-1 with moreadvanced machines. The precise plan is not publicly available.

30

Verification and Compliance

4. Inspections andMonitoring4.1 DescriptionInternational monitoring of Irans nuclear program under theJCPOA consists of three tiers: (1) Irans Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, which it currentlyimplements; (2) the Additional Protocol (AP) to Irans CSA,which Iran will implement under the JCPOA; and (3) additionalverification measures in the JCPOA, which are unique to theagreement. Initially, Iran will implement the AP on a provisionalbasis (as it did from 2003 to 2005). Iran will seek ratificationby the Majles (Irans parliament) when the IAEA reaches thebroader conclusion that all of Irans nuclear material is in peaceful uses, or after 8 years, whichever comes first. Iranian adherenceto the CSA and the AP is permanent, so long as Iran remainsparty to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The specific JCPOAverification measures remain in effect for 10 to 25 years.Overall, the JCPOA verification regime has two basic objectives. First, it is intended to verify that specified limits are beingobserved at declared nuclear facilities, such as Natanz, Fordow,Arak, and Esfahan, and that nuclear material at these facilities isnot diverted to undeclared uses. Second, the verification regime isdesigned to complement national intelligence efforts to help deteror detect any Iranian effort to engage in clandestine or undeclarednuclear activities prohibited by the JCPOA.


31

4.1.1 Monitoring of declared facilitiesComprehensive Safeguards AgreementUnder Irans existing safeguards agreement, Iran is required todeclare to the IAEA a complete inventory of the quantities andlocations of all nuclear material in the country and the activitiesassociated with this material.10 Iran will also accept the modified version of Code 3.1, which requires Iran to give the IAEAnotice of a new facility as soon as Iran decides to build it, ratherthan just before it introduces nuclear material. Modified Code3.1 gives the IAEA a better understanding of a countrys nuclearplans and eases the process of designing safeguards approachesfor facilities as they are being built.Additional ProtocolThe Additional Protocol (AP) requires Iran to provide the IAEAadditional information about its nuclear program and additionalaccess to nuclear-related facilities. Under the AP, Iran is requiredto provide additional information on the sites of nuclear facilities and other locations normally associated with nuclearmaterial; nuclear material not otherwise routinely inspectedunder a CSA; key activities associated with the nuclear-fuelcycle; and exports and imports of specified nuclear-fuel cyclerelated equipment and materials. For example, the AP requiresIran to declare information on fuel-cycle-related research anddevelopment activities that do not involve nuclear materials,information on uranium mines and concentration plants, andinformation on the scale and location of facilities involved inmanufacturing equipment for enrichment or reprocessing.10 Nuclear material refers to any nuclear material of a composition andpurity suitable for fuel fabrication or enrichment.

32


The AP also bolsters IAEA access to nuclear-related facilities,beyond the routine inspections of nuclear facilities and designinformation verification under the traditional safeguards agreement. Under the AP, the IAEA can request short-notice accessto any location on the site of declared nuclear facilities througha provision known as complementary access. The notificationtime of the IAEAs intention to carry out complementary accessis 2hours if the IAEA is already on a nuclear site carrying out aninspection or design information verification and 24 hours in allother cases. As discussed below, the AP also gives the IAEA theright to access locations outside of declared nuclear facilities ifneeded to fulfill its verification responsibilities.JCPOAUnder the JCPOA, the IAEA will have the authority to inspectand monitor to confirm that Iran it is implementing the JCPOAsterms, including a set of monitoring measures that go beyondwhat the CSA and AP normally require. At declared facilitiessuch as Natanz, Iran will provide the IAEA with daily accessto all relevant buildings for 15 years and will let the IAEA usemodern technologiessuch as equipment for continuouslymonitoring the enrichment level of uranium and electronicseals that automatically communicate changes in their status toinspectorsfor 15 years or longer. The IAEA will be able to useequipment that sends its measurements electronically to inspectors at the nuclear site (though it will not be able to beam thedata directly back to IAEA headquarters in Vienna, as is donein some countries). Iran also will expand the number of peopleauthorized to carry out inspections in Iran. But it will only designate inspectors from countries that have diplomatic relationswith Iran.


33

Additional monitoring measures include: For 25 years, declaration and monitoring of all of Iransstocks of uranium ore concentrate, which could be converted into uranium hexafluoride for enrichment. For 20 years, declaration and monitoring of Irans stocksof centrifuge rotors and bellows that it could use to makenew centrifuges, along with key equipment for centrifugeproduction (such as flow-forming machines for metal centrifuges and filament-winding machines for those made ofcarbon fiber). For 15 years, continuous monitoring of excess centrifugesstored in Natanz Hall B. For 10 years, mandatory use of Procurement Channel(see Section 6).

4.1.2 Access to undeclared facilitiesComprehensive Safeguards AgreementUnder Irans Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, theIAEA can seek access to an undeclared site through a specialinspection if the IAEA Director General believes that access isrequired to confirm the correctness and completeness of information provided by Iran. In circumstances that may lead to aspecial inspection, the IAEA is required to consult with Iran.There is no deadline specified in the CSA for resolving disputesbetween the IAEA and Iran over special inspections, but theDirector General would normally report the situation to theIAEA Board of Governors.

34


Additional ProtocolThe Additional Protocol permits the IAEA broader access on amore routine basis to follow up questions or inconsistencies. Inthe event of a question or inconsistency, the IAEA is requiredto provide Iran with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate theresolution of the question or inconsistency before the requestfor access is made (unless the IAEA considers that any delayin access would prejudice the purpose for which the access issought). In any event, the IAEA may not draw any conclusionsregarding the question or inconsistency until Iran has been provided with such an opportunity. If Iran is unable to provide therequested access, it is required to make every reasonable effortto satisfy the IAEAs requirements, without delay, through othermeans.The IAEA is required to offer Iran at least 24 hours notice beforeaccess occurs in order to explain the reason for seeking access,and to give Iran an opportunity to resolve issues by other means.If Iran is unable to allow access at the requested location, thereis no deadline specified in the AP for resolving disputes overcomplementary access to suspect sites. The AP also allows formanaged access to sites in order to protect sensitive or proprietary information.JCPOAThe JCPOA incorporates a mechanism designed to strengthenthe IAEAs ability to gain access to any facility within a definedtime if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclearmaterials or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA. This accessprovisiona euphemism for challenge inspectionsincludesany facility in Iran, including military facilities, with the caveat


35

that the inspections are designed to verify compliance withnuclear obligations and not aimed at interfering with Iranian

tools available under the agreement, the IAEA will eventually beable to make this broader assessment. In particular, certain sanc-

military or other national security activities.

tions will only be liftedand Iran will only move to ratify theAP, making its application in Iran permanentwhen the IAEAhas reached the broader conclusion or 8 years have elapsed,whichever comes first.

The mechanism provides for a specific timetable and disputeresolution mechanism (see Section 7).11 Upon the IAEAs requestfor access to a suspect facility, Iran and the IAEA have 14 daysto make arrangements for access to the facility or to establishalternative means to resolve the IAEAs concerns. If this procedure fails, the issue is referred to the Joint Commission, whichhas 7 days to decide on appropriate action either by consensusor by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members. Iran then has 3days to implement the Joint Commissions decision. Failure tocomply could trigger the procedure to re-impose internationalsanctions. The access mechanism in the JCPOA expires after 15years.

4.1.3 Drawing the Broader ConclusionThe IAEA has confirmed that none of Irans declared nuclearmaterial has been diverted since 2005, but the IAEA has neverreceived the cooperation from Iran needed to draw the broaderconclusion that all of Irans nuclear material has been declaredto the IAEA and is under safeguards. This includes the IAEAinvestigation of Irans past weaponization activities, known asPossible Military Dimensions. (See Section 5.) The JCPOAenvisions that, with the AP and the full set of other verification11 Prior to seeking access, the IAEA is required to raise its concerns withIran and seek clarification, allowing Iran an unspecified period of timeto provide an explanation. If this explanation does not resolve the IAEAsconcerns, the IAEA may request access, beginning the 24-day clock. Sincethere is no time limit specified in the JCPOA for the initial exchange, theentire procedure will be longer than 24 days.

36


4.2 AssessmentThe verification arrangements of the JCPOA have strengthsand weaknesses. At declared facilities, the JCPOA verificationregime provides the IAEA with sufficient tools to verify withhigh confidence that Iran is complying with the nuclear limitsand to detect and report in a timely manner any substantialdiversion of nuclear material or use of undeclared material. As apractical matter, these measures prevent Iran from using significant amounts of nuclear material from its declared facilities insecret nuclear activities without a high risk of detection. In otherwords, to build nuclear weapons secretly using HEU, Iran wouldneed to acquire or build a separate and secret fuel cycleasecret source of natural uranium, a secret conversion facility toproduce UF6, and a secret enrichment plant to producehigh-enriched uranium, plus secret facilities to produce uranium metal and fabricate nuclear weapons components.This is not impossible, but seems very unlikely if U.S. and alliedintelligence agencies continue to effectively monitor Iransnuclear program. Intelligence is the key. The IAEA is very effective at verifying compliance at declared, inspected facilities,but intelligence agencies are most likely to detect clandestineactivities. For example, both Natanz and Fordow were originally detected by Western intelligence agencies before the firstBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School

37

centrifuges were installed, without expanded inspections orconstraints in place. Under the JCPOA, inspections and intel-

cannot be hidden or removed in that time period. Moreover, theIAEAworking with member statesis likely to delay a request

ligence would work in tandem. Information obtained by IAEAinspections under the agreement will strengthen collection andassessment by intelligence agencies, and intelligence informationwill help guide IAEA inspections. For example, the most likelyscenario for triggering the 24-day (plus) access mechanism is arequest from the IAEA based on credible information that theCIA or another intelligence agency has provided to the IAEA.The 24-day (plus) deadline and provisions for automaticallyrestoring UN sanctions strengthen the IAEAs standard specialinspection provisions, which have no deadline for action orspecified penalty for non-compliance.

for clarification or access until construction of the facility istoo advanced to conceal but before the facility is operational.Even small-scale activities that involve nuclear material may bedifficult to hide. For example, Iran had more than six monthsto sanitize the Kalaye Electric Company (a centrifuge researchfacility) in 2003 after it was publicly identified before allowingthe IAEA access to take samples. Nevertheless, the samplesrevealed the presence of enriched uranium particles.

Nevertheless, confidence in the absence of covert facilities andactivities will always be lower than confidence in verificationat declared, inspected facilities. Confidence will be lowest withrespect to small-scale nuclear-related activities that do notinvolve nuclear material, such as initial mechanical testing ofa new centrifuge design or explosives testing, and highest withrespect to covert activities involving processing of nuclear materials. Fortunately, it is the nuclear material production activitiesthat are the most fundamental constraint on Irans ability tobuild a nuclear bomb.Evaluating the 24-day access procedureWhether the 24-day (plus) procedure is effective depends on thenature of the secret facility or activity involved and Iranian perception of the consequences if it fails to comply. At one extreme,if the secret activity involves construction of a facility to processnuclear materials (like a conversion or enrichment facility), thenthe 24-day (plus) procedure will be sufficient because the facility38


At the other extreme, if the secret activity involves small-scaleactivities not involving nuclear material, such as research onnuclear weapons, production of non-nuclear weapons components, or non-nuclear work with centrifuges, it is less likely thatthe 24-day (plus) procedure will be effective because Iran cantake steps to remove evidence or sanitize the site. In 2004, forexample, Iran bulldozed the Lavisan-Shian facility (suspected ofconducting research on centrifuges and nuclear weapons) andplanted a garden and constructed a playground before allowinginspectors access to the site, at which point no traces of nuclearactivity were found. Of course, any suspect facility designatedby the IAEA for access will be closely monitored by U.S. andother intelligence agencies for evidence of concealment duringthe 24-day (plus) process. Finally, even if the 24-day (plus)measure fails to expose a secret activity because Iran is able tosuccessfully hide and remove evidence, the U.S. (and other governments) could still conclude that Iran was cheating and adjusttheir policies toward the agreement and toward Iran itself.


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Verifying additional constraintsNone of the provisions under the JCPOA that are beyond theAP are perfectly verifiable. The JCPOA requires Iran to declareits entire stock of centrifuges, but the IAEA may not be ableto verify that Iran has declared all of its centrifuges and othersensitive uranium enrichment equipment. Key dual-use manufacturing equipment and materials, such as flow-formingand filament-winding machines, maraging steel, high-strengthaluminum, and high-quality carbon fiber, are used for otherpurposes in Iran, particularly by the ballistic missile program.Since Iran is not required to declare and allow inspections ofthis equipment and material involved in non-nuclear use, it ispossible that Iran could secretly divert this equipment and material to centrifuge production in the future. Similarly, Iran mightattempt to circumvent the Procurement Channel by purchasingnuclear and dual-use materials and equipment on the blackmarket (see Section 6).

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The JCPOA also includes a number of provisions designed tofurther hem in any potential nuclear weapons program in Iran,which are discussed in detail in Section 5. While it is useful toprohibit these activities (there is evidence to suggest that Iranhas conducted most of these activities in the past), these prohibitions will be quite difficult to verify using the provisions ofthe JCPOA. Similarly, it will be difficult to know for sure thatIran is not testing centrifuges on a small scale at an undeclaredlocation or storing additional centrifuges beyond those declared.In some cases, the U.S. or allied intelligence agencies may haveinformation indicating that Iran is conducting activities in violation of the JCPOA but may choose not to share that informationwith the IAEA, either to protect sensitive intelligence sourcesand methods or because it is judged that the access procedure isunlikely to expose a violation. Rather than seek to expose illicitactivities, governments may choose to monitor them to gaininformation or mount covert operations to sabotage them.


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5. Possible MilitaryDimensions/Weaponization

Undeclared procurement activities

5.1 Description

Initiation of high explosives and associated experiments

Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) refers to the IAEAslong-running investigation of Irans program to develop nuclearweapons prior to 2003 and possible continuing research anddevelopment on nuclear weapons since then. In November 2011,the IAEA reported that:

Undeclared nuclear material acquisition Work on nuclear components for an explosive device Detonator development

Hydrodynamic experiments (testing nuclear weaponsdesigns without fissile material) Modeling and calculations on explosive compression ofhighly enriched uranium Neutron initiator manufacture Planning and preparatory experimentation for a nuclear test

Since 2002, the Agency has become increasinglyconcerned about the possible existence in Iran ofundisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities relatedto the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.12The November 2011 report also warned: There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of anuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that somemay still be ongoing.13 The possible military dimensions of theIranian nuclear program identified by the IAEA consist of: A program management structure overseen by the Iranianmilitary12 International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPTSafeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011,p. 7 as of July 17, 2015, available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf

Engineering studies to integrate a spherical payload into amissile delivery vehicle Studies on a fuzing, firing, and arming systemThe Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present OutstandingIssues, signed by Iran and the IAEA prior to the announcementof the JCPOA, is based on the 2013 Framework for Cooperationthat was never fully implemented by Iran. The roadmap includesthe provision by Iran ofexplanations regarding outstandingissues. It provides for technical expert meetings, technicalmeasures and discussions, as well as a separate arrangementregarding the issue of Parchin (a military research and development complex and testing ground). Iran is to provide writtenexplanations by August 15, 2015, with the IAEA responseincluding follow-up questions on any ambiguities by September 15, 2015. The joint work is to be completed by October 15,2015. Completion of these measures as verified by the IAEA isrequired before Implementation Day, when sanctions relief

13 IAEA, November 8, 2011, p. 8.

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is provided. The IAEA Director General will submit his finalassessment on the resolution of all past and present outstandingissues to the Board of Governors by December 15, 2015. Thespecific measures that Iran is committed to take with respect totechnical expert meetings and discussions and access to Parchinare contained in two separate documents between Iran and theIAEA that are not public.

5.1.1 Limitations on weaponization activityIn addition to the resolution of PMD, the JCPOA containsseveral provisions intended to limit Iranian activities relatedto research and development of nuclear weapons. For 15 years,Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium orhighly enriched uranium and will not produce or acquire anyplutonium or uranium metals or alloys, or do any research anddevelopment on plutonium and uranium metallurgy, casting,forming, or machining. The one exception, which must beapproved by the Joint Commission, would allow Iran to conductresearch on uranium metal fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.In perpetuity, Iran will not engage in the following activitiesthat could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosivedevice: Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computermodels to simulate nuclear explosive devices. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or usingmulti-point explosive detonation systems suitable for anuclear explosive device, unless approved by the JointCommission for non-nuclear purposes and subject tomonitoring.

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Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or usingexplosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framingcameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for thedevelopment of a nuclear explosive device, unless approvedby the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes andsubject to monitoring. Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or usingexplosively driven neutron sources or specialized materialsfor explosively driven neutron sources.

5.2 AssessmentThe provisions of the JCPOA to resolve the PMD issue cannotbe fully evaluated because the actions required by Iran are notpublic. Whatever the details of the agreement between the IAEAand Iran, however, it seems unlikely that Iran is prepared to provide the IAEA with genuine access to documents, individuals,and locations that would be necessary for the IAEA to verify acomplete and correct declaration of Iranian past and possiblypresent nuclear weapons-related activities. Instead, Iran probably intends to meet the letter of the Roadmap requirements,while continuing to deny that it was engaged in a nuclear weapons research and development program before 2003 or since.Iran will continue to reject evidence to the contrary, such assubstantial documentation that Iran claims are forgeries. If theIAEA is granted access to Parchin, it is unlikely to yield evidenceof nuclear weapons research since the facility has been extensively modified in recent years.In this scenario, the IAEA will complete its final report on thebasis of the available evidence, including Iranian denials andrefusal to provide complete cooperation to resolve outstandingBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School

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issues. Depending on the substance of the final report, Iran willpresumably contest any conclusion that it was pursuing nuclear

The prohibitions under the JCPOA on future Iranian activitiesrelated to nuclear weapons research and development are helpful

weapons development, and the IAEA Board of Governors wouldlikely approve a resolution endorsing the Director Generals reportand calling on Iran to comply with the requirements in the JCPOAthat prohibit future activities related to nuclear weapons development. Lack of genuine Iranian cooperation will likely delay orprevent the IAEA from reaching its broader conclusion that allnuclear material in Iran is in peaceful uses.

as benchmarks to evaluate Irans nuclear intentions and as possible constraints on Irans actual behavior. As discussed in Section4, however, most of these provisions would be difficult to verifyunder the inspection and monitoring provisions of the JCPOA.Nonetheless, detection of such prohibited Iranian nuclear weapons research in the future could provide a basis for a range ofactions, such as restoring sanctions, conducting covert operations, and considering military options.

This resolution of the PMD issue will be controversial. On thenegative side, it will allow Tehran to maintain the fiction that itsnuclear program has always been purely peaceful. Politically, theabsence of any Iranian acknowledgment of past nuclear weapons-related research undermines confidence in the sincerity ofIranian commitments under the JCPOA to not pursue nuclearweapons in the future. More practically, if Tehran does not disclose who did what work, and where and when they did it, it willbe more difficult for the IAEA to monitor Iranian nuclear activitiesto ensure that any weapons work has ceased and will not recur.On the other hand, proponents of this plan argue that it is politically unrealistic to expect Tehran to admit its past behavior anddoing so is practically unnecessary, because the most essentialdetails of Irans previous nuclear weapons program, includingwho was involved, are already well known. Any additional detailsthat would come from a complete accounting are relatively secondary. Even if Tehran were willing to cooperate, proponentsargue that it would not provide confidence about future activity.A full accounting would likely take years to complete and wouldimpede implementation of the JCPOA, which is focused on futurebehavior.

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6. Procurement Channel6.1 DescriptionThe JCPOA calls for, and Resolution 2231 codifies, a Procurement Channel. Under the resolution, all states are legallyrequired to seek prior approval from the UN Security Council,on a case-by-case basis, to transfer or sell directly or indirectlyto Iran all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technologyc

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