toward a final nuclear deal with iran

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1 Center for American Progress |   Toward a Fi nal Nuc lear Dea l wi th I ran  T oward a Final Nuclear Deal wi th Iran By Benjamin Armbruster July 17, 2014 Te Unied Saes and is ve inernaional parners, he Unied Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Germanyknown as he P5+1are nearing heir sel-imposed July 20 deadline o reach a nal agreemen wih Iran on he uure o he counry’s nuclear program. Te paries are currenly in Vienna, Ausria, working ou he conours o a comprehensive deal. Diplomas are elling reporers ha he wo sides remain ar apar on key issues and alks o exend he negoiaion process have reporedly begun. Te general ouline o wha he P5+1 and Iran hope o achieve his week was laid ou in he Join Plan o Acion, or JPOAhe inerim agreemen signed in Geneva, Swizerland, in November 2013 ha roze Iran’ s nuclear program and allowed or increased inspecions in exchange or modes sancions relie. 1  Te Inerna ional Aomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, he Unied Naion s’ nuclear wachdog, has since repored ha ehran has been in ull compliance wi h ha inerim deal. 2   According o he JPOA, he wo sides agreed ha he nal deal w ould be “ a long-erm comprehensive soluion” o he Iranian nuclear issue. Te deal would las or a decade or more, according o senior adminisraion ocials, and “involve a muually dened enrichmen program wih pracical limis and ransparency measures o ensure he peaceul naure o he program.”  A negoiaed ag reemen wih he Iranians ha en sures is nuclear progr am is used only or peaceul purposes would require he ollowing hree key componens. 1. Strong and effective verification and monitoring mechanisms Te mos imporan componen o a nal deal wih Iran will be he scope and size o he vericaion regime monioring Iran’ s nuclear program. Iran is pary o he reay on he Non-Prolieraion o Nuclear Weapons and subjec o IAE A monioring o is declared nuclear aciliies. Te long crisis over Iran ’s nuclear ambiions sems rom is lack o ransparency wih he I AEA and evi dence o a secre weapons program. Te inerim nuclear agreemen reached las November in Geneva dramaically increased he scope o inspecions and he inormaion ha he inernaional communiy has on Iran’ s eors; a nal deal w ill require an even more robus program o ull ransparency.

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8/12/2019 Toward a Final Nuclear Deal with Iran

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1 Center for American Progress | Toward a Final Nuclear Deal wi th I ran

Toward a Final Nuclear Deal with IranBy Benjamin Armbruster July 17, 2014

Te Uni ed S a es and i s ve in erna ional par ners, he Uni ed Kingdom, France,China, Russia, and Germany known as he P5+1 are nearing heir sel -imposed July20 deadline o reach a nal agreemen wi h Iran on he u ure o he coun ry’s nuclearprogram. Te par ies are curren ly in Vienna, Aus ria, working ou he con ours o acomprehensive deal. Diploma s are elling repor ers ha he wo sides remain ar aparon key issues and alks o ex end he nego ia ion process have repor edly begun.

Te general ou line o wha he P5+1 and Iran hope o achieve his week was laidou in he Join Plan o Ac ion, or JPOA he in erim agreemen signed in Geneva,Swi zerland, in November 2013 ha roze Iran’s nuclear program and allowed orincreased inspec ions in exchange or modes sanc ions relie .1 Te In erna ional A omicEnergy Agency, or IAEA, he Uni ed Na ions’ nuclear wa chdog, has since repor ed haehran has been in ull compliance wi h ha in erim deal.2

According o he JPOA, he wo sides agreed ha he nal deal would be “a long- ermcomprehensive solu ion” o he Iranian nuclear issue. Te deal would las or a decade

or more, according o senior adminis ra ion officials, and “involve a mu ually denedenrichmen program wi h prac ical limi s and ransparency measures o ensure hepeace ul na ure o he program.”

A nego ia ed agreemen wi h he Iranians ha ensures i s nuclear program is used onlyor peace ul purposes would require he ollowing hree key componen s.

1. Strong and effective verification and monitoring mechanisms

Te mos impor an componen o a nal deal wi h Iran will be he scope and size ohe verica ion regime moni oring Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is par y o he rea y

on he Non-Proli era ion o Nuclear Weapons and subjec o IAEA moni oring o i sdeclared nuclear acili ies. Te long crisis over Iran’s nuclear ambi ions s ems rom i slack o ransparency wi h he IAEA and evidence o a secre weapons program. Tein erim nuclear agreemen reached las November in Geneva drama ically increased hescope o inspec ions and he in orma ion ha he in erna ional communi y has on Iran’seffor s; a nal deal will require an even more robus program o ull ransparency.

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2 Center for American Progress | Toward a Final Nuclear Deal wi th I ran

o be comprehensive, any agreemen will have o include implemen a ion o he“Addi ional Pro ocol” o Iran’s sa eguards agreemen wi h he IAEA, giving he U.N.nuclear wa chdog he au hori y o inspec nuclear-rela ed si es ou side o Iran’s declaredprogram, including any nondeclared si es wi hou prior no ica ion. Te later, as he Arms Con rol Associa ion, or ACA, no es, “is a s rong de erren agains any clandes inenuclear weapons work.”3 Many o her na ions have aken similar s eps, including Sou h

A rica, which abandoned i s nuclear weapons program in he 1990s and announcedin 2002 ha i would adhere o he Addi ional Pro ocol.4 And Sou h Korea disclosedi s nuclear work afer ra i ying he Addi ional Pro ocol in 2004.5 Iran i sel signed he Addi ional Pro ocol in 2003, bu i s parliamen never ra ied i ,6 and Iran announced in2006 ha i would cease i s implemen a ion.7

A s rong moni oring and verica ion program will be he primary guard agains a so-called breakou a si ua ion in which Iran decides o use i s nuclear acili ies o enrichuranium o weapons-grade levels. I he Iranians decided o re urn o a weapons-gradeenrichmen program, close inspec ions would be able o de ec i and would allow he

Uni ed S a es and i s in erna ional par ners enough ime o respond o preven Iran rom building a nuclear weapon.

2. A limited civilian nuclear program

As he JPOA s a es, all sides mus agree on he size and scope o Iran’s civilian nuclearprogram. Tere are wo pa hs oward crea ing he ma erial needed or a nuclear weapon using plu onium or uranium. Iran curren ly has he capaci y or bo h.

The plutonium path at Arak

On he plu onium side, he nal deal will likely de ermine he u ure o Iran’s ye - o- be-comple ed heavy-wa er reac or a Arak. Iran agreed o reeze cons ruc ion a Arakas par o he in erim agreemen and has hus ar done so. A he same ime, i main-

ains ha he reac or will be used o produce medical iso opes, bu he Uni ed S a esand i s allies ear Arak’s po en ial, as exper s say he acili y can also be congured odevelop nuclear weapons.

Iranian leaders have said hey oppose shuting down he acili y as par o he nal deal, bu hey have also indica ed ha hey are willing o modi y i s design o reduce heamoun o weapons-grade plu onium available in i s spen uel while a he same imekeeping he Arak reac or running or medical purposes.

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Te head o Iran’s a omic energy organiza ion, Ali Akbar Salehi, indica ed as much lasmon h, saying he amoun o plu onium he reac or will produce will be drawn down

rom around 22 pounds per year o around 2 pounds per year.8 Exper s say 20 pounds o22 pounds o plu onium is needed or one nuclear weapon.9

“We are curren ly busy redesigning ha reac or o arrange or ha al era ion,” Salehi

repor edly old Iranian media.

While bo h sides have repor edly said he Arak issue is no longer a problem, he keyissue is whe her Iran will agree o recongure Arak in such a way ha will make i moredifficul o rever he acili y back o i s original design.10

The uranium path: Subterfuge and centrifuges

U.S. in elligence concluded in 2007 ha Iran hal ed i s work on nuclear weapons in

2003; op in elligence officials have since said ha he Iranians have no decided on whe her o build a nuclear weapon bu are keeping he op ion open.11 Because o heirrela ive mas ery o he uranium pa h versus he plu onium pa h, i he Iranians were odecide o build a nuclear weapon, hey would probably choose he uranium pa h andmos likely a undeclared enrichmen acul ies.12 Tis uranium enrichmen program has been he ocus o in erna ional scru iny or more han a decade as he IAEA revealed heex en o ehran’s evasion abou he na ure o i s uranium program.

Given Iran’s his orical lack o ransparency and he likelihood o a nuclear programexis ing prior o 2004, he Uni ed S a es and i s allies should be skep ical when Iran

main ains ha he curren uranium program is en irely peace ul.13

According o he JPOA, he u ure o Iran’s uranium nuclear program as par o he nal deal will be“consis en wi h i s prac ical needs” in erms o curren and u ure civilian energy.However, de ermining and agreeing on wha Iran’s prac ical needs are is he mos di -cul aspec o he nego ia ions, and disagreemen s on his issue could delay or evenderail a nal deal.

Ta enrichmen capaci y and “prac ical needs” designa ion res s on he number ocen ri uges Iran deploys, opera es, and develops. Iran curren ly has jus over 19,000rs -genera ion IR-1 cen ri uges ins alled wi h nearly 10,000 in opera ion a wosepara e acili ies in Na anz and Fordow, and abou 1,000 advanced IR-2M machines aNa anz.14 Te IR-2M machines can enrich uranium o weapons grade a a much as erpace han he rs -genera ion model. According o a recen repor by he ACA, “Exper sassess ha 25,000 IR-2M cen ri uges would likely have a similar capaci y as 100,000IR-1 cen ri uges.”15

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As no ed above, assessmen s o Iran’s “prac ical needs” vary widely based on he poin so view o he respec ive governmen s involved in he nego ia ions. Indeed, some say

ha he Iranians can mee heir energy needs wi h 20 percen o i s curren capac-i y by opera ing jus 2,000 IR-1 machines ins ead o he 10,000 i curren ly uses, and wi h coopera ion by he in erna ional communi y in supplying addi ional nuclear uel.Meanwhile, Iranian officials, including he supreme leader via witer, have said Iran

would need well over 100,000 IR-1 cen ri uges in opera ion, or some varia ion hereo ,o mee curren and u ure demands, including allowances or research and develop-

men o more modern nuclear echnologies.16

A deal lies somewhere in he middle o hese wo posi ions. As such, reaching agreemenon his issue will require crea ive hinking and difficul compromises o address Iran’sprac ical needs or civilian nuclear energy bu also o ensure ha Iran will no be able oquickly break ou and enrich uranium o weapons-grade levels i i chooses o do so.

Possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program

Te Iranians will also have o address ques ions abou pas possible mili ary dimensions,or PMD, o i s nuclear program in order or he IAEA o make a ull and comprehensiveassessmen ha Iran’s program is en irely peace ul. Moreover, de ermining how ar heIranians have come in mas ering o her aspec s o weaponizing nuclear ma erial ou sideo he uranium enrichmen process, including work on explosive riggers and deliverydevices, will give he in erna ional communi y a more in orma ive pic ure o exac lyhow long i would ake or Iran o assemble he ma erials needed or a weapon and o build and es i .

IAEA Direc or General Yukiya Amano recen ly said ha Iran is showing signs ocoopera ion on his issue, as i has no done in he pas .17 Bu he IAEA’s PMD probe oIran is unlikely o be nished be ore any nuclear deal be ween he P5+1 and Iran. Teconclusion o his process likely will prove o be difficul given he probabili y ha Iranhad previously engaged in nuclear weapons work, coupled wi h heir insis ence ha heyhave never sough nuclear weapons.

Ballistic missiles

Te U.N. Securi y Council has previously called on Iran o suspend uranium enrich-men and cease work on ballis ic missile echnology, he presumed delivery vehicle oan Iranian nuclear weapon, while nego ia ions o resolve he crisis ake place. Te JoinPlan o Ac ion says ha a comprehensive deal mus address hose U.N. Securi y Councilresolu ions “wi h a view oward bringing o a sa is ac ory conclusion he U.N. Securi yCouncil’s considera ion o his mater.”

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5 Center for American Progress | Toward a Final Nuclear Deal wi th I ran

While he in erim agreemen has essen ially implemen ed he enrichmen reeze heUni ed Na ions had sough , Iran s ill con inues work on ballis ic missiles. Te leadU.S. nego ia or wi h Iran, Undersecre ary o S a e Wendy Sherman, addressed hisissue during a congressional hearing back in February. “[I] we can ge o he veri-able assurance ha [ he Iranians] canno ob ain a nuclear weapon, ... hen a deliverymechanism, impor an as i is, is less impor an ,” she said.18 None heless, Iran will

need o reassure he in erna ional communi y abou i s ballis ic missile programas he Uni ed S a es and i s allies remain concerned abou Iranian missiles ha candeliver a nuclear weapon.19

3. Sanctions relief

Te Obama adminis ra ion assembled a s rong and comprehensive in erna ionalcoali ion on Iran and imposed wi h he help o he U.S. Congress a se o cripplingsanc ions on he Islamic Republic ha was a key ac or in bringing he Iranians o he

nego ia ing able.

Te JPOA orecas s ha a nal nuclear agreemen would “comprehensively lif UNSecuri y Council, mul ila eral and na ional nuclear-rela ed sanc ions, includings eps on access in areas o rade, echnology, nance, and energy, on a schedule o beagreed upon.”

In he even ha such a deal is reached, he Obama adminis ra ion will need o work wi h Congress o progressively lif nuclear-rela ed sanc ions as i is able o veri y ha

ehran is in ull compliance. Presiden Barack Obama should exercise his execu ive

au hori y o waive he nuclear-rela ed sanc ions or a period o ime, perhaps a year orwo, o allow he Iranians o gain condence wi h he in erna ional communi y ha iis in ull compliance wi h he nal agreemen . Doing his would keep sanc ions on he books in case o backsliding and makes sense or an in erim period. I ehran con in-ues o s ay in compliance, Congress would even ually need o amend he legisla ion opermanen ly lif he sanc ions.

By ha ime, sanc ions exper Kenne h Ka zman o he Congressional Research Servicerecen ly said, “Iran would be presumably complying or wo years. And you would havea wo-year rack record where Iran would say, we have ullled wha we promised or

wo years. … we would have a wo-year rack record o Iran complying and a ha poinIran would be demanding ermina ion o some sanc ions.”20

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Conclusion

Te Uni ed S a es and i s allies and par ners in he Middle Eas , par icularly Israel, will be more secure wi h Iran’s nuclear program under lock and key, wi h a robus in erna-

ional sys em o inspec ions o veri y ha Iran has no nuclear weapons program. Tis ispossible i a nal deal can be reached wi h a s rong inspec ions program. In addi ion, his

will be he bes way o reduce he likelihood o o her undesirable scenarios in he regionsuch as nuclear proli era ion by o her s a es, erroris groups gaining access o ssilema erial or nuclear weapons, or ano her conic in he Middle Eas , should a possibleIranian nuclear weapons program spark a mili ary s rike by he Uni ed S a es or Israel.

I he P5+1 reach a nal nuclear deal wi h Iran, opponen s ace a choice be ween sup-por ing an agreemen ha will pu inspec ors on he ground wi h unpreceden ed access

o Iran’s nuclear acili ies and beyond or a grea er likelihood o an Iranian bomb wi hhe prospec o ano her war in he Middle Eas . Te comprehensive deal laid ou in he

Join Plan o Ac ion is a good deal or American securi y. I is he bes pa h o preven an

Iranian bomb and o avoid ano her war.

Benjamin Armbruster works with the National Security team at the Center for American Progress.

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Endnotes

1 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Joint Plan of Action”(2013), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Docu-ments/Infcircs/2013/infcirc855.pdf .

2 Hayes Brown, “New IAEA Shows Iran Complying with Nucle-ar Agreement,” ThinkProgress, February 20, 2014, availableat http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/02/20/3313861/iaea-report-shows-iran-complying-nuclear-agreement/ .

3 Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Greg, Thielmann,“Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle: Toward a Realistic andEffective Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement” (Washing-ton: Arms Control Association, 2014), available at http://armscontrol.org/les/les/ACA_Iran_Brieng_Book_Up-date_June_2014.pdf.

4 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: IAEA SafeguardsAgreements and Additional Protocols” (2005), available athttp://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/nuke.pdf .

5 Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments,”James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Novem-ber 9, 2004, available at http://cns.miis.edu/stories/041109.htm.

6 United States Institute of Peace, “Timeline of Iran’s NuclearActivities,” available athttp://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities (last accessed July 2014).

7 Paul K. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliancewith International Obligations” (Washington: CongressionalResearch Service, 2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40094.pdf .

8 Fredrik Dahl and Michelle Moghtader, “Iran Says it isRedesigning Arak Reactor to Cut Plutonium Capacity,”Reuters, June 12, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/12/us-iran-nuclear-arak-idUSKBN0EN-0WK20140612.

9 Ibid.

10 Louis Charbonneu and Parisa Hafezi, “Exclusive: CentrifugesEmerge as Key Sticking Point in Iran Nuclear Talks,” Reuters,May 15, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/ar-ticle/2014/05/15/us-iran-nuclear-idUSBREA4E0GI20140515.

11 The New York Times , “Key Judgments from a National Intel-ligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Activity,” December 4,2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/washington/04itext.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& .

12 Ben Armbruster, “Israeli Intelligence Agrees with U.S. andIAEA that Iran has not Decided on Nuke Weapons,” Think-Progress, March 19, 2012, available at http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/03/19/446997/isreal-iran-us-iaea-nukes/ .

13 The New York Times , “Key Judgments from a National Intel-ligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Activity.”

14 Davenport, Kimball, and Thielmann, “Solving the IranianNuclear Puzzle: Toward a Realistic and Effective Comprehen-sive Nuclear Agreement.”

15 Ibid.

16 Siavosh Ghazi, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Reveals Demands inNuclear Talks,” Agence France-Presse, July 8, 2014, availableat http://news.yahoo.com/nuclear-team-defend-irans-rights-khamenei-194020395.html .

17 Fredrik Dahl, “U.N. Nuclear Chief Upbeat on Iran but saysBomb Probe Will Take Time,” Reuters, June 2, 2014, availableat http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/us-iran-nuclear-iaea-idUSKBN0ED0S020140602.

18 Greg Thielmann, “Iranian Missiles and the ComprehensiveNuclear Deal” (Washington: Arms Control Association,2014), available at http://armscontrol.org/les/Iran_Brief_Iranian_Missiles_Comprehensive_Nuclear_Deal.pdf .

19 Louis Charbonneu and Parisa Hafezi, “Exclusive: IranPursues Ballistic Missile Work, Complicating Nuclear Talks,”Reuters, May 15, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/15/us-iran-nuclear-missiles-idUSBRE-A4E11V20140515.

20 Ben Armbruster, “Pro-Diplomacy Groups Ask House Com-mittee Leaders To Clarify Iran Letter On Lif ting Sanctions,” ThinkProgress, June 19, 2014, available at http://think-progress.org/world/2014/06/19/3450794/pro-diplomacy-groups-ask-house-committee-leaders-to-clarify-iran-letter-on-lifting-sanctions/.