Cracking export markets withgenetically modified cropsWhat is the entry mode strategy?

Grant E. IsaacCollege of Commerce, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada

Nicholas PerdikisSchool of Management, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, and

William A. KerrDepartment of Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon,

Canada

Keywords International marketing, Food crops, Market segmentation, Agriculture,Food technology, Exports

Abstract Public and private policy responses to the introduction of genetically modified (GM)crops have differed across countries and regions, resulting in market fragmentation that is inconflict with the entry mode strategy of standardisation that has dominated the food distributionsystem for a century. To deal with the new market reality, an alternative entry mode strategy mustbe established which is capable of segregation – or identity preservation (IP) – of the commoditysupply system. A multi-mode strategy is presented that combines the economic transaction costperspective with the institutional theory perspective. A seemingly paradoxical result emerges:standardisation is the solution to market differentiation. That is, an IP entry mode strategy mustfirst be built on a foundation of standardised norms and protocols, which then makes it easier totarget specific entry mode strategies to meet the divergent export market access rules resultingfrom the differential public policy and private strategies in various countries and regions.

IntroductionThe research, development and commercialisation of genetically modified (GM)varieties of agricultural crops has created a significant export marketing challenge forfood companies such as Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, Nestle, Unilever and GeneralMills. These companies and their marketing managers must adapt their traditionalentry mode strategy of standardisation to embrace an entry mode strategy ofdifferentiation based on the establishment of identity preservation (IP) systems thateffectively segregate GM from non-GM varieties.

In this paper, the export marketing challenge created by the commercialisation ofGM crops is analysed and a conceptual entry mode strategy is developed. The paper isorganized as follows. In the next section an assessment is presented of the impact thatthe introduction of GM crops has had on the international agri-food supply chain. Inthe following section, various entry mode strategies are investigated and, based on thisinvestigation, a conceptual strategy capable of addressing the export marketingchallenge of GM crops is presented. In the final section, research conclusions arepresented.

The Emerald Research Register for this journal is available at The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister www.emeraldinsight.com/0265-1335.htm

IMR21,4/5

536

Received March 2003Revised October 2003Accepted January 2004

International Marketing ReviewVol. 21 No. 4/5, 2004pp. 536-548q Emerald Group Publishing Limited0265-1335DOI 10.1108/02651330410547180

The international agri-food supply chain and GM cropsIn order to assess the impact that the introduction of GM crops has had on theinternational agri-food supply chain, it is essential to examine the traditional supplychain for conventional (non-GM) products, followed by an examination of what GMcrops are and how they are different from conventional crops. Next, the arguments forand against the introduction of GM crops are presented, along with an assessment ofthe effect that these arguments have had on both public (regulatory) and private(commercial) policy responses to GM crops.

In a general sense, there are six links in the international agri-food supply chain.Beginning at the production end, the first link is composed of crop developers, amyriad of small, medium and large firms (e.g. Aventis, Monsanto and Syngenta)engaged in the development of agricultural crops to ensure enhanced quantity (yield)and/or quality (value). In the next link are the customers of these crop developers, i.e.the producers/farmers who purchase seeds according to their specific croppingrequirements. The farmers’ customers are found in the distribution link composed ofthe grain and oilseed handlers who purchase farm production and blend the crops intomuch larger bulk units to be passed along to the brokers, such as the US-based Cargilland Archer Daniels Midland, who match these bulk volumes with the next link in thechain, i.e. food companies. These companies, such as Nestle, Unilever and GeneralMills, use the grains and oilseeds in the production of various food products. Thecustomers of the food companies are found in the next link: the food retailers, whorange from large companies such as Wal-Mart, Sainsburys and Tesco who developtheir own-brand food products, to small convenience stores as well as hotel, restaurantand institutional (HRI) establishments. Finally, the last link in the chain is the endconsumer, who purchases and consumes the food product.

There are two reasons for this general structure of the international agri-foodsupply chain. First, a convergence of regional and global consumption patterns hasdecreased the need to differentiate both bulk food stuffs and in many cases processedfood products from country to country (Traill, 1996; Connor, 1994). Second,improvements in production and transportation technologies have simultaneouslyincreased the ability to move food products over vast distances while decreasing thecosts of doing so (Spriggs and Isaac, 2001). This structure has made possible the exportmarketing strategy of standardisation, where distribution and food companies havecreated an international value chain built on international product development,sourcing and advertising (Prakash and Hart, 2000). The result of this strategy is thatexporting food companies can achieve economies of scale by lowering productioncosts, reducing transaction costs and dispersing risks (Phillips and Khachatourians,2001).

At this point, it is crucial to note that agricultural crops typically move along thischain through spot-market transactions where varieties are bulked together, with theresult that there is often no interaction between the seed developer or the farmer on theone hand and the end consumer on the other.

While the standardised structure of the international agri-food supply chain hasprevailed for the better part of a century, the commercialisation of GM crops posescomplex new challenges to this structure and to marketing managers. Advances inmodern biotechnology have yielded new crop development technologies such asgenetic modification, which may be defined as the ability to alter the expression of

Cracking exportmarkets

537

traits to produce organisms with particular attributes (McHughen, 2000; Ho, 2000).Three types of GM crops can be developed (Isaac, 2002; Gaisford et al., 2001). The firstare production-trait crops, such as insect-resistant or herbicide tolerant-varieties,which have been modified to have enhanced agronomic characteristics but to besubstantially equivalent to conventional varieties in processing or final consumption.That is, production-trait crops are for farmers, not for end consumers, and they aretypically sold into the regular commodity supply chain co-mingled with conventionalvarieties. The second type of GM crops is output-trait crops, which are modified tomeet the needs of specific downstream users such as livestock feeders or foodproducers, and sometimes the final consumer. For managers to extract the value ofsuch crops for their companies, they must be segregated from conventional varietiesthrough identity preservation systems such that co-mingling does not occur. The thirdtype of GM crops is bio-engineered, non-food products such as plant-madepharmaceuticals or industrial products. Again, they must be carefully segregatedfrom conventional crops destined for the food supply.

In 2002, over 100 million acres of GM crops such as corn (maize), canola (rapeseed),cotton and tobacco were grown, primarily in the USA, Argentina, Canada and China,where 98 percent of these GM crops were production-trait varieties (James, 1997-2002;Phillips and Kerr, 2002). Furthermore, these production-trait GM crops have beencommercialised by multinational life-science companies such as Aventis, Monsantoand Syngenta for use in intensive agricultural production systems.

This dominance of production-trait GM crops has several important implicationsfor the international supply of agricultural crops, and hence for the market entrystrategies of food companies. Production-trait GM crops, such as insect-resistant andherbicide-tolerant varieties, have been developed for and marketed to farmers to meettheir agronomic challenges, and not to end consumers to meet their demands forenhanced consumption attributes. This has created an enormous information gapbetween those producing and commercialising the technology and those whoultimately must consume it. Complicating this information gap is the fact that becauseproduction-trait GM crops target agronomic characteristics while leaving the end-usecharacteristics of the crop substantially the same as conventional varieties, they havebeen commercially approved in the US, Canada and Argentina as substantiallyequivalent to conventional varieties (Isaac, 2002). The result is that GM and non-GMcrops are co-mingled in the supply chain. Given that these three countries make up 99percent of the total production of such GM crops, if no segregation occurs domesticallythen the crops will not be segregated for export markets.

To supporters, production-trait GM crops represent another innovation along acontinuum of agricultural crop development technologies. Such crops presentbiological solutions to agronomic challenges that are currently mostly addressedthrough the use of synthetic chemicals. That is, GM crops are seen as a pathway to thesustainable intensification of agricultural production. Consequently, the lack ofsegregation between GM and non-GM varieties is not seen as a problem.

To critics, production-trait GM crops do not represent another innovation along atechnology continuum, but instead represent novel uses of new and untested scientifictechniques. There are four types of consumer concerns associated with GM crops thatdifferentiate them from conventional crops (Isaac, 2002). The first are economicconcerns that GM crops are providing no economic benefit to consumers (Hoban, 1997).

IMR21,4/5

538

Indeed, any production cost savings that may result from the use of GM cropsdisappears when GM and non-GM varieties are not segregated. The second are humansafety and health concerns about possible toxic, pathogenic or invective changes to theplant that might result from the use of GM techniques and the impact of these changesupon human health. The third are biodiversity concerns about the safety and health ofthe flora and fauna – both insects and animals – that interact with GM crops. Thefourth are moral and ethical concerns linked with notions of playing God and owninglife. For example, a commonly cited concern is that multinational companies holdingpatents on biological processes essentially have monopoly control over the global foodsupply (Ho, 2000). Given this range of concerns, it should come as no surprise thatcritics find the lack of segregation between GM and non-GM varieties quiteunacceptable because it prevents consumer sovereignty in the marketplace.

Of particular challenge to the standardisation entry mode strategy is the asymmetryof consumer concerns between countries and regions and the impact that this has hadon public and private policy initiatives. Broadly speaking, consumers in Europe andJapan have responded to biotechnology more quickly and more negatively than haveconsumers in North America (Isaac, 2002; Gaisford et al., 2001). As a result, publicpolicy initiatives and private sector responses to these concerns have differed acrosscountries and regions. Consider first North America (and Argentina), where theintroduction of biotechnology has been met largely with indifference. The developmentof public policies pertaining to the technology has had a focus on fosteringtechnological progress (Isaac, 2002). While rigorous, the regulation of production-traitGM crops has been based on the principle of substantial equivalence, and has generallyfocused only on the consumer concerns pertaining to human health and safety andbiodiversity while economic and moral/ethical concerns are outside regulatoryconsideration (Isaac and Hobbs, 2002). Similarly, private policy initiatives in NorthAmerica have reflected a focus on technological progress as private firms haveinvested heavily in biotechnology. Given that the investments required to have a newproduct of biotechnology licensed and brought to full commercialisation are very high,firms require access to a wide variety of markets. As a result, firms based in NorthAmerica have become aggressive competitors in export markets in the field ofbiotechnology.

In contrast, both public policies and private initiatives in the European Union can becharacterised as reflecting technological precaution, not progress (Isaac, 2002; Perdikis,2000). With respect to public policies, there has been considerable reluctance on thepart of governments to officially embrace the technology, especially its agriculturalapplications. Instead of seeing biotechnology’s benefits, the focus has been on the risks(Isaac and Hobbs, 2002). The public principle that is guiding policy development isprecaution, reflecting the absence of trust in science and scientific experts ensuring thatdecisions regarding technology are made on a political basis (Strienz, 1998). As a result,production-trait GM crops are not seen as substantially equivalent to conventionalvarieties. Instead, they are regulated as new varieties and there is a requirement toensure that these new varieties are segregated from conventional varieties in themarketplace. With respect to private policy initiatives, many food firms in the EU(e.g. Sainsbury’s, Tesco and Carrefour) have sought to capitalize on anti-GMsentiments by reformulating their own brands and marketing their products as

Cracking exportmarkets

539

GM-free (although other biotechnology ingredients such as GM enzymes and reagentshave not been removed).

The effect of these differing public and private responses has been to fragment theinternational agri-food supply chain. At the production end, crop developers andfarmers continue to produce homogenous, unsegregated production-trait GM crops inNorth America and Argentina. At the consumer end, concerns have risen and, as aresult, various public and private policy initiatives have been adopted that aredesigned to track, label and sometimes prohibit the use of GM crops in food products.Caught in the middle are the food distributors and food companies, who buyunsegregated food stuffs yet face demands for segregation such as the currentapproach towards labelling regulations in the EU. These firms must alter their entrymode strategies in order to meet the very different business environments that haveemerged in various countries and regions due to the commercialisation ofproduction-trait GM crops.

From the discussion above, it appears that if food distribution firms and foodcompanies can develop entry mode strategies built on effective identity preservation(IP) systems capable of ensuring the segregation of GM and non-GM crops throughextensive supply-chain management and coordination along all six links of atraditionally disparate international agri-food supply chain, then they can overcomethe export marketing challenges posed by the commercialisation of production-traitGM crops. In the next section we outline the principal entry mode strategy models andwhat is implied by them.

Entry mode strategiesTogether, the differential public policies and private initiatives have fragmentedexport markets and encouraged the differentiation of the international agri-food supplychain through identity preservation (IP), which stands in stark contrast to thelong-standing food industry trend of standardisation having the central role in exportstrategies.

The standardisation versus differentiation debate has been a particularly importantresearch issue in the entry-mode strategy literature (Baalbaki and Malhotra, 1993). Thegoal of standardisation is to realise scale effects of world product mandates (Feinberg,2000), reducing transaction costs and risks or maximising profits (Meyer, 2001;Hamilton and Kashlak, 1999; Jain, 1989; Rugman, 1976). Achieving these benefitsrequires the centripetal forces of international convergence, including production andprocess standardisation (Griffith et al., 2000), internationalisation of the firm (Reeb et al.,1998) and international advertising standardisation (Laroche et al., 2001). Recentresearch has focussed on the general challenges facing the internationalstandardisation of technology (Cantwell, 1989; Pavitt, 1988), as well as thechallenges facing the international standardisation of biotechnology (Madhok andOsegowitsch, 2000).

Competing with the centripetal forces of standardisation are the countervailingcentrifugal forces of public and private policies that threaten the scale benefits byfragmenting foreign markets. The need for international strategies to adapt todifferential market conditions is no surprise (Meyer, 2001; Oxley, 1999; Dalli, 1995).There are several important factors commonly cited for fragmenting export markets,including cultural and language differences (Griffith et al., 2000; Agarwal and

IMR21,4/5

540

Ramaswamy, 1992; Dunning, 1995), structural economic differences (Grossman andHelpman, 1991) and structural political differences (Gilpin, 2001). A more recentphenomenon is the rise of anti-globalisation sentiments targeted at multinationalenterprises (MNEs). In a general sense, the principal economic agents behindagricultural biotechnology standardisation are “classic” MNEs (e.g. Aventis, Monsantoand Syngenta) that have worked with nation states to create a competitive advantage(Eden, 1995; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). An important implication of this is thatwith biotechnology there is a confluence of two very important centrifugal forces: theanti-genetic engineering forces (Isaac, 2002) and the anti-MNEs forces (Eden andLenway, 2001; Rugman, 1993).

Consequently, the international food system manager must choose an effectiveentry mode strategy which is capable of balancing the centripetal forces ofstandardisation and the centrifugal forces of differentiation. In the contemporary entrymode literature, two theoretical perspectives are particularly relevant to the problem athand: an economic transaction costs perspective (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Andersonand Gatignon, 1986) and institutional perspective (Davis et al., 2000). The economictransaction costs perspective provides a thorough explanation for the motivationsbehind the standardisation of the international agri-food supply chain: it has evolvedaccording to a cost-minimisation strategy for the distribution of homogeneouscommodities. Yet, while this perspective is appropriate for explaining the centripetalforces of standardisation, it is not adequate for assessing the export managementchallenges that emerge from the regional differentiation of public and private policiesassociated with GM crops because of the limited treatment of the institutionalenvironment (Duffy, 1996; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986).

The institutional perspective focuses on the institutional environment, suggestingthat the entry mode strategy chosen is a function of two distinct factors:

(1) The institutional environment of the international firm.

(2) The institutional environment of the host country (Davis et al., 2000).

This is the heart of the production-trait GM crops issue: 99 percent of these crops aregrown under regulatory regimes that do not require segregation, yet are exported tomarkets where either public or private policy initiatives require segregation. Therefore,according to the institutional theory perspective, there is a clash between theinstitutional environment of the international firms (where a standardisation entrymode strategy has been developed) and the institutional environment of the hostcountry (where a differentiation entry mode strategy is required).

The review of the entry mode strategy literature reveals that while there is no currentresearch on the challenges facing the introduction of an identity preservation (IP) system tothe global food supply in order to deal with GM crops, there are two entry modeperspectives, i.e. the economic transaction costs perspective and the institutionalperspective, that each appear to aid in understanding the problem at hand. Taken together,they provide a novel perspective on the issue in hand. In the next section a conceptualapproach combining the two perspectives (a multi-mode strategy) is developed.

Entry mode strategy for GM crops: a conceptual multi-mode approachThe traditional entry-mode strategy for the international food supply system (shown inFigure 1) is consistent with the economic transactions cost approach (Buckley and

Cracking exportmarkets

541

Casson, 1998; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). From the perspective of an internationalfood supply firm, the goal of the traditional entry mode strategy is to minimisetransaction costs by sourcing crops through spot-market transactions and selling intoforeign markets through standardisation strategies. An example might be a firmbuying its cut-flower requirements at the daily international flower market in TheNetherlands and exporting and distributing them through independent flower shopsall over Europe. The auction market is transaction-cost efficient because it brings largenumbers of buyers and sellers together in a convenient place while the long-termcontractual arrangement with the flower shops reduces the costs associated withassessing the reliability of customers (Hobbs and Kerr, 1999).

The important assumptions underlying the standardisation entry mode strategy arethe homogeneity of both the supply of agricultural crops and the demand from variousexport markets. When these assumptions hold – and indeed they have held in theinternational food supply system for quite some time – the economic transaction costsperspective fully explains the standardisation strategy as an effort to minimise costs.

While the traditional standardisation entry mode strategy has worked well, itsefficacy has come into question as the introduction of GM crops has undermined thehomogeneity assumptions. Indeed, what is missing from this entry mode strategy is asystematic treatment of the case where the homogeneity assumptions do not holdbecause of institutional differences created by differential public and private policyresponses to GM crops in various export markets.

In Figure 2, a differentiated entry mode strategy is shown that combines theeconomic transaction costs perspective described above with the institutional theoryperspective. The former perspective continues to have a significant influence over theforeign market entry mode strategy. That is, even with the introduction of GM cropsinto the food supply system, the strategy of standardisation in order to minimise costswill remain an important dimension.

Figure 1.Traditional entry modestrategy

IMR21,4/5

542

Despite this similarity, the entry mode strategy depicted in Figure 2 differs from thetraditional strategy in two important ways. First, the assumption of homogeneity offoreign markets is suspended in favour of the more realistic specification that eachforeign market has different public and private policy responses to the introduction ofGM crops in the food supply system. The impact of the differential public and privatesector responses is that each of the five export markets has specific institutionaldifferences that must be fully understood by the international food supply firm if theyare to penetrate the foreign market. An institutional theory perspective is useful inunderstanding such differences and their impact on the differentiated entry modestrategy.

Second, given the differential public and private policy responses in the variousforeign markets, the homogeneity of agricultural crops assumption is suspended infavour of the specification that GM and non-GM varieties of commodity crops must beidentity-preserved. An important implication of the differential foreign market accessrules is that it only takes one foreign market to force identity preservation on the entiresystem (assuming, of course, that the foreign market is important enough so that

Figure 2.A multi-mode entry

strategy for GM crops

Cracking exportmarkets

543

simply abandoning the market is not an option). That is, even though foreign marketsone through four may be indifferent to the presence of GM crops, if foreign market fiveis not, then identity preservation can be forced on the entire food supply system. Due tothe fact that the ability to identify preserve is a central requirement for a multi-modeentry strategy, the mechanics of identity preservation will be discussed next.

The mechanics of identity preservationThe multi-mode entry strategy developed above only works if the internationalagri-food supply chain can be segregated from seed developers through to endconsumers. This requires monitoring and enforcement along supply chains as well ascertification and labelling in order to capture the value of segregation.

While it is easy to conceptualise the segregation of agricultural products, the realityis that other than fresh fruit, vegetables and meat and a few staples such as rice, littlefood is unprocessed. In particular, the major cereals and oilseeds that comprise the bulkof GM production are not consumed raw, but are processed and mixed with otheringredients in food products. For example, it has been estimated that processedsoybean products are found in over 60 percent of processed foods (Kerr, 1999). Hence,adapting the physical distribution, transportation and handling systems and the foodproduction facilities along the agri-food supply chain entails large-scale, long-terminfrastructure investments that are certain to increase the price of final food products.In fact, one recent estimate suggests that an IP system could raise the market price ofGM crops by 5-15 percent (European Commission, 2001). Unfortunately, however, littleresearch has been done on the willingness to pay for such changes in the agri-foodsupply chain (Gaisford et al., 2001). What little research there is suggests thatconsumers are willing to pay more to avoid GM crops (Noussair et al., 2002; EuropeanCommission, 2000).

The threat of legal liability may provide an incentive for firms downstream in thesupply chain to monitor closely the activities of their upstream suppliers (Hobbs andKerr, 1992). Actively monitoring the distant activities of foreign upstream supplierscan involve considerable costs. Even in the absence of legal liability, the potential lossof reputation associated with a failure in the segregation system will leadsupermarkets and large HRI chains to have an increased interest in the activities oftheir suppliers.

Difficulties with, and/or the high costs associated with, directly monitoring otherindependent firms along the agri-food supply chain and the employment of monitoringand certification agents may suggest that the most cost-effective way to ensuresegregation is to integrate vertically (Klein et al., 1998). This brings the monitoringprocess under one management structure and may yield additional benefits byreducing the number of tests required, if appropriate (Kerr, 1999). Vertical integrationimplies self-provisioning. Firms not selected for merger or acquisition will be excludedfrom the integrated supply chain. The need to segregate can become a barrier to entryand constrain competition.

Vertical integration of supply chains for non-GM foods is, however, a complex process.One of the major difficulties arises at the farm level of the supply chain. Despite therhetoric surrounding “corporate farming”, food processing and distribution firms havebeen reluctant to become directly involved in farming, preferring rather not to shoulderthe considerable risks associated with primary production (Klein and Kerr, 1995).

IMR21,4/5

544

Much of the difficulty with segregation at the farm level and in the bulk commoditysegments of supply chains relates to sunk investments. These existing systems aredesigned for low-cost bulk handling with large tolerances for mixing of commodities,and were not constructed to be cleaned after use to the standards required forsegregation. Thus, GM products may be traced through these systems but non-GMproducts cannot be segregated easily. Thus, there has been considerable internationaldebate surrounding the degree of tolerance for contamination that will be allowed insegregated systems. While the costs of ensuring purity to the 95 percent level forinternational shipments, for example, have been considered acceptable by some in theindustry, purity at the 99 percent level is perceived as being unacceptably costly(European Commission, 2001). Thus, the costs of segregation are not linear in purity.Investing in new supply chain infrastructure specifically designed to providesegregation is likely to lower the costs of segregation. Without international regulatorycertainty, however, food firms have been understandably reluctant to make suchlong-term investments.

The multi-mode entry strategy requires segregation at all links in the supply chain,particularly when considering processed foods. However, this requires costlyinvestment. The high cost involved may lead to vertical integration with suppliers,which might have a negative effect on competition by raising entry barriers. One wayto lower the costs of segregation is to ensure international regulatory certainty.

ConclusionsIn this study it has been shown that the commercialisation of GM crops has created asignificant export marketing challenge for food companies such as Cargill, ArcherDaniels Midland, Nestle, Unilever and General Mills. Marketing managers must adapttheir traditional standardisation entry mode strategy in order to embrace a multi-modeentry strategy capable of differentiating GM and non-GM crops through an effectiveidentity preservation (IP) system. Without this approach, penetrating foreign marketswill be difficult, if not impossible. This multi-mode entry strategy is essentially atwo-step strategy. First, it requires the standardisation of the norms and protocolsgoverning the IP system so that firms are able to spread the costs of adopting thesystem across all markets. Consistent with the economic transaction cost perspective,such an approach will ensure that the costs of IP are minimised.

Once international IP norms and protocols are standardised, the second step is todraw on the institutional theory perspective to develop differentiated entry modestrategies capable of meeting the unique institutional environments that have resultedin different public and private policy initiatives in various countries and regions.

The multi-mode entry strategy suggested here also requires companies to engageclosely with both governmental and inter-governmental agencies as well as consumergroups in determining the regulatory environments in which they have to operate. Thiswill be a substantial challenge to the traditional approach currently adopted.

References

Agarwal, S. and Ramaswamy, S. (1992), “Choice of foreign market entry mode: impact ofownership, location and internationalization factors”, Journal of International BusinessStudies, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 1-28.

Cracking exportmarkets

545

Anderson, E. and Gatignon, H. (1986), “Modes of foreign entry: a transactions cost analysis andpropositions”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 1-26.

Baalbaki, I.S. and Malhotra, N.K. (1993), “Marketing management and international marketsegmentation: an alternative look at the standardization-customization debate”,International Marketing Review, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 19-44.

Buckley, P.J. and Casson, M.C. (1998), “Analyzing foreign market entry strategies: extending theinternationalization approach”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 29 No. 3,pp. 539-62.

Cantwell, J.A. (1989), Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations, Basil Blackwell,Oxford.

Connor, J. (1994), “North America as a precursor of changes in Western European foodpurchasing patterns”, European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 21 No. 2,pp. 155-73.

Dalli, D. (1995), “The organization of exporting activities: relationships between internal-externalarrangements”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 107-16.

Davis, P.S., Desai, A.B. and Francis, J.D. (2000), “Mode of international entry: an isomorphismperspective”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 239-58.

Duffy, R. (1996), “Moving into the global marketplace: stages of development”, in Lambrix, R.and Sanghvi, S. (Eds), Global Finance 2000: A Handbook of Strategy and Organization,The Conference Board, New York, NY.

Dunning, J.H. (1995), “Reappraising the eclectic paradigm in an age of alliance capitalism”,Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 461-92.

Eden, L. (1995), “Foreign direct investment in Canada: charting a policy direction”, CanadianForeign Policy, Vol. 3, pp. 43-60.

Eden, L. and Lenway, S. (2001), “Introduction to the symposium multinationals: the Janus face ofglobalization”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 379-400.

European Commission (2000), Les europeens et la biotechnologie moderne, Eurobarometre, DGXII, Luxembourg.

European Commission (2001), “The economic impact of genetically modified crops on theagri-food sector”, working document, revision No. 2, DG-VI Agriculture, Brussels.

Feinberg, S.E. (2000), “Do world product mandates really matter?”, Journal of InternationalBusiness Studies, Vol. 31 No. 1, pp. 155-68.

Gaisford, J., Hobbs, J.E., Kerr, W.A., Perdikis, N. and Plunkett, M. (2001), The Economics ofBiotechnology, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Gilpin, R. (2001), Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order,Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Griffith, D.A., Hu, M.Y. and Ryans, J.K. Jr (2000), “Process standardization across intra- andinter-cultural relationships”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 31 No. 2,pp. 303-24.

Grossman, M. and Helpman, E. (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, MIT Press,Cambridge, MA.

Hamilton, R.D. and Kashlak, R.J. (1999), “National influences on multinational control systemselection”, Management International Review, Vol. 39 No. 2, pp. 167-90.

Ho, M.-W. (2000), Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare?, Continuum Press, New York, NY.

Hoban, T.J. (1997), “Consumer acceptance of biotechnology: an international perspective”,Nature, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 232-4.

IMR21,4/5

546

Hobbs, J.E. and Kerr, W.A. (1992), “Costs of monitoring food safety and vertical coordination inagribusiness: what can be learned from the British Food Safety Act, 1990?”, Agribusiness:An International Journal, Vol. 8 No. 6, pp. 575-84.

Hobbs, J.E. and Kerr, W.A. (1999), “Transaction costs”, in Bhagwan Dahiya, S. (Ed.), The CurrentState of Economic Science, No. 4, Spellbound Publications, Rohtak, pp. 2111-33.

Isaac, G.E. (2002), Agricultural Biotechnology and Transatlantic Trade: Regulatory Barriers toGM Crops, CABI Publishing, Wallingford.

Isaac, G.E. and Hobbs, J.E. (2002), “Food regulations: Canadian debates”, Canadian Journal ofPolicy Research, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 105-13.

Jain, S. (1989), “Standardization of international marketing strategy: some hypotheses”, Journalof Marketing, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 70-9.

James, C. (1997-2002), Global Status of Transgenic Crops, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,ISAAA briefs 1, 5, 8, 12, 21, 23, 24, ISAAA, Ithaca, NY, available at: http://isaaa.org/publications/briefs/isaaa_briefs.htm

Kerr, W.A. (1999), “Genetically modified organisms, consumer scepticism and trade law:implications for the organization of international supply chains”, Supply ChainManagement, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 67-74.

Klein, K.K. and Kerr, W.A. (1995), “The globalization of agriculture: a view from the farm gate”,Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 551-63.

Klein, K.K., Kerr, W.A. and Hobbs, J.E. (1998), “The impact of biotechnology on agriculturalmarkets”, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 46 No. 4, pp. 441-53.

Laroche, M., Kirpalani, V.H., Pons, F. and Zhou, L. (2001), “Model of advertising standardizationin multinational corporations”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 32 No. 2,pp. 249-66.

McHughen, A. (2000), Pandora’s Picnic Basket, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Madhok, A. and Osegowitsch, T. (2000), “International biotechnology industry: a dynamiccapabilities perspective”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 31 No. 2,pp. 325-36.

Meyer, K.E. (2001), “Institutions, transaction costs and entry mode choice in Eastern Europe”,Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 357-67.

Noussair, C., Robbins, S. and Ruffieux, B. (2002), “Do consumers not care about biotech foods ordo they not read the labels?”, Economic Letters, Vol. 75, pp. 45-53.

Oxley, J.E. (1999), “Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact onintellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances”, Journal ofEconomic Behaviour and Organization, Vol. 24, pp. 283-310.

Pavitt, K. (1988), “International patterns of technology accumulation”, in Hood, N. and Vahlne,J.E. (Eds), Strategies in Global Competition, Wiley, New York, NY.

Perdikis, N. (2000), “A conflict of legitimate concerns or pandering to vested interests?Conflicting attitudes towards regulation of trade in genetically modified foods: the EU andUSA”, Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 51-65.

Phillips, P.W.B. and Kerr, W.A. (2002), “Frustrating competition through regulatory uncertainty:international trade in the products of biotechnology”, World Competition Law andEconomics Review, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 81-99.

Phillips, P.W.B. and Khachatourians, G.G. (Eds) (2001), The Biotechnology Revolution in GlobalAgriculture: Invention, Innovation and Investment in the Canola Sector, CABI Publishing,Wallingford.

Cracking exportmarkets

547

Prakash, A. and Hart, J. (Eds) (2000), Coping with Globalization, Routledge, London.

Reeb, D., Kwok, C.C.Y. and Baek, Y. (1998), “Systematic risk of the multinational corporation”,Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 263-80.

Rugman, A. (1976), “Risk reduction by international diversification”, Journal of InternationalBusiness Studies, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 75-80.

Rugman, A. (1993), “Drawing the border for a multinational enterprise and a nation”, in Eden, L.and Potter, E. (Eds),Multinationals in the Global Political Economy, St Martin’s Press, NewYork, NY.

Spriggs, J. and Isaac, G.E. (2001), Food Safety and International Competitiveness: The Case ofBeef, CABI Publishing, Wallingford.

Strienz, R. (1998), “The precautionary principle in food law”, European Food Law Review, Vol. 18No. 4, pp. 413-32.

Traill, B. (1996), “Globalization in the food industry”, Discussion Paper No. 26, Structural Changein European Food Industries, University of Reading, Reading.

Further reading

Chang, S.J. (1995), “International expansion strategy of Japanese firms: capacity building throughsequential entry”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38 No. 2, pp. 383-407.

Einsiedel, E. (2000), Biotechnology and the Canadian Public: 1997 and 2000, University ofCalgary, Calgary.

Kaitzandonakes, N. and Marks, L.A. (1999), “Public opinion of agbiotech in the USA and UK: acontent analysis approach”, paper presented at the American Agricultural EconomicsAssociation Meetings, Nashville, TN.

Leonidou, L.C. and Katsikeas, C.S. (1996), “Export development process: an integrative review ofempirical models”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 517-52.

Li, J. (1995), “Foreign entry and survival: effects of strategic choices on performance ininternational markets”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 16 No. 5, pp. 333-51.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2000), Regulatory Developments inBiotechnology in OECD Member Countries, OECD, Paris, available at: www.oecd.org/ehs/country.htm

IMR21,4/5

548