country civil-military guidelines: rehash, refocus, or shred?

COUNTRY CIV-MIL GUIDELINES |1

Country Civil-Military Guidelines

REHASH, REFOCUS, or SHRED?

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ABOUT THE APCMCOE

The Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence was established in November 2008, in recognition of

the growing importance of civil-military (CIV-MIL) interaction, and is evidence of Australia's commitment

to sustainable peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and globally. The Centre’s mission is to support

the development of national CIV-MIL capabilities to prevent, prepare for and respond more effectively to

conflicts and disasters overseas. At its core is a multi-agency approach, with staff from a number of

Australian Government departments and agencies, the New Zealand Government and the NGO sector.

The Centre promotes best practice in civil-military-police engagement in conflict and disaster

management through its research and lessons learned program, training, education and doctrine

development. As part of this program, and in support of strengthening CIV-MIL cooperation in complex

environments, it commissioned this nine-month study assessing the current set of multi-agency, country

CIV-MIL guidelines.

ABOUT THE RESEARCH TEAM

The research team was made up of four people - associates of Beechwood International, a UK-based

strategy consultancy - with combined specialist in-country experience across all the target countries. The

team leader was Dr Edwina Thompson, the director of the firm’s non-corporate practice. She is the

author of the report.


“We need to train together with NGOs and private companies before,

so we’re not exchanging business cards on the tarmac.”

– Lt. General P. K. Keen, deputy director of the US Southern Command,

reflecting on his time in charge of the US military relief effort


Table of contents

Acronyms

5

Executive Summary 6

1. Introduction

- Objectives - Approach - Interviews - Assumptions

9

2. What are Country CIV-MIL Guidelines?

- Background - Purpose

Scope

11

3. Key Findings

- Best practices

- Inherent limitations

- Obstacles to uptake and dissemination

23

Conclusion 48

Recommendations and Future Directions

49

- Adoption

- Representation

- Coordination

- Institutional memory

Annex 1 Context of Guidelines 52 Annex 2 Interview logic and semi-structured questions 59 Annex 3 Interview reporting template (example) 61


Acronyms ACBAR The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief AFP Australian Federal Police ASF Afghan Security Forces AU African Union CAS Civilian Affairs Section CCCM Camp Coordination Camp Management Cluster CENTCOM US Central Command CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Programme CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation CMCoord UN Civil-Military Co-ordination CMTF Australian Civil-Military Task Force CNDP Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (DRC) CPIA Provincial Inter-agency Committee (DRC) DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations EJOC Emergency Joint Operations Center (Haiti) FARDC Les Forces armées de la RDC / Armed Forces of the DRC (DRC) FDLR Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération de Rwanda (DRC) FET Female Engagement Team GHDI Good Humanitarian Donor Initiative GoS Government of Sudan HC Humanitarian Coordinator HCT Humanitarian Country Team HTT Human Terrain Team IHL International Humanitarian Law INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Center (Haiti) JOTC Joint Operations and Tasking Centre JRT Joint Regional Team MIF Multinational Interim Force (Haiti) MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUSCO UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Afghanistan) MSF Médecins Sans Frontières NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO Non-Governmental Organisation OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OFDA United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance OMA Office of Military Affairs PoC Protection of Civilians PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team QIP Quick Impact Project RC/HC United Nations Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator RJOC Regional Joint Operations Center (Haiti) SGBV Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence SOCOM US Special Operations Command SOP Standing Operating Procedure SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army TCCs Troop Contributing Countries TTPs Training, Techniques and Procedures UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDSS United Nations Department of Safety and Security UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan UNPOL United Nations Police USAID United States Agency for International Development


Executive Summary

What is the purpose of civil-military guidelines? Who are the authors and their intended audience?

What is the extent of their readership? How can they help practitioners improve humanitarian

outcomes? These were the kind of questions asked of more than 200 field personnel over a nine-

month period for this investigation into the utility of the current set of multi-agency, country-specific

civil-military guidelines (‘the Guidelines’).

At least seven sets of specific guidance have been developed to facilitate civil-military cooperation in

complex environments (Afghanistan, DRC, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Sudan; Pakistan in process). Based in

large part on a number of agreed, non-binding international guidelines and subsequent revisions,

practitioners and policy-makers within United Nations (UN) missions and humanitarian aid

organisations instigated the development of more specific country guidance from 2006 to 2010.

Today, however, the utility of the existing Guidelines is yet to be fully demonstrated and the degree to

which they have made a difference ‘in practice’ is still unclear.

The study relied predominantly on the inputs of those who currently operate in the countries covered

by the Guidelines. The interview sample included peacekeepers from different Troop Contributing

Countries (TCCs), regional and host nation troops, officials from the United Nations Department of

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Best Practice Section and Office of Military Affairs, Red Cross

delegates, NGO operational staff, local people, and practitioners within the UN’s Civil-Military

Coordination (CMCoord) section. Towards the end of the research, two workshops were conducted in

Australia, where key civilian, police and military practitioners (including members of the Civil-Military

Task Force – CMTF) considered the interim findings.

Certain assumptions were made about people’s exposure to the Guidelines and their content. It was

anticipated that while awareness was likely to be low, people would find the substance relevant if they

could see how it might apply to their day-to-day work. Therefore, where an interviewee did not

possess specific knowledge of the Guidelines, the researchers weaved applicable portions of the

content into discussions, and helped relate their experience to it.

The research was divided into a desk-based study and intensive interviews conducted both in the field

and at various HQ locations. Chapter 1 lays out the results from the comparative textual review of the

background, purpose and scope of the current Guidelines, while Chapter 2 outlines the key findings

from the interviews. Various best practices are identified, followed by a consideration of the inherent

limitations to the Guidelines, and an investigation into the reasons behind the low level of uptake and

awareness among the various stakeholders – military (regional, UNPKO-led, US and host nation), UN

(OCHA and UN humanitarian agencies), NGOs (international and local) and the local community – in

complex environments. Chapter 3 provides a brief conclusion followed by some more detailed

recommendations to help guide the future direction of written guidance in the civil-military space.

KEY FINDINGS

Content of the Guidelines is sound; adoption remains low.

Although awareness is minimal, most interviewees found the substance of current country

Guidelines to be sound and relevant when helped to see how they might apply to their day-to-day

work. People expressed that their potential to foster a more functional CIVMIL dialogue would

increase if the ‘process’ supporting their development is to be considered as important as the

‘product’. The Guidelines were seen to be important to act as a vehicle for the different parties to

compare and contrast their respective ‘codes of conduct’, principles, standards, ethics and

guidelines.


Views were wide-ranging regarding the scope – some reported that the Guidelines were too

general, while others argued that they could never be specific enough to be useful. Considerable

debate revolved around which parties should be included, with one clear omission being the

police.

Questions were raised about the form in which the Guidelines presently take – especially in an

environment of ‘information overload’, the pressures of operating in complex emergency

situations, and the constant need to update operational arrangements to reflect the fluid reality on

the ground. While to be successful the Guidelines must be integrated into the daily routine or

thought processes of practitioners, there is currently a lack of perceived relevance and ownership.

It was also noted that politics within and between all organisations will continue to interfere with

efforts to collaborate.

Most field practitioners identified problems created by a disconnect between HQ and the field, and

argued for guidelines that are developed through consultation from the ground-up. Lead time

featured as key to ensuring proper consultation, as did having the right people in the discussions.

Logisticians tend to be forgotten in both the civilian and military camps – they are essential for a

more realistic sense of how the civil-military interface operates in practice.

Joint training events and workshops are the key vehicle for disseminating the Guidelines, as

well as promoting mutual respect and understanding.

Those who have experienced in-country OCHA CMCoord training cited this as a very positive

experience in fostering a better civil-military dialogue and understanding. It has provided a useful

‘one-stop-shop’ for practitioners to discover available guidance, but still requires follow-up to

remain useful at the operational level.

Readiness and continuous learning are crucial drivers of constructive and dynamic civil-

military relations.

A key determinant of more successful engagement in an ever-changing environment is a practical

process to anticipate and address issues early on. The Guidelines provide the essential structure

and substance for common focus between disparate parties, but there is a perceived lack of

support from international bodies such as the IASC to ensure that existing best practice is

captured and carried forward in the field.

A cohesive and reflective humanitarian community operating from a similar framework will

engage more successfully with military counterparts.

While a diversity of approaches will always prevail, each of the country studies shows that even

very different aid agencies can develop common positions where there is constructive dialogue.

Effectiveness of the Guidelines ultimately depends on dialogue, which in turn depends on how

individuals – rather than organisations – relate to and represent their respective organisational

aims and objectives to one another.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The possible future directions outlined in this report concentrate on those issues that are feasible to

tackle in the next five years, summarised under four main headings:

(1) increasing adoption of civil-military guidance;

(2) improving representation of key stakeholders;

(3) strengthening civil-military coordination in the field; and

(4) building and sustaining institutional memory.


The report considers that these will either make an immediate impact on the operational environment

of the country contexts under review, or should be considered as part of a longer term strategy for the

international community.


1. Introduction

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this research project is to test the effectiveness of current field-based civil-military

(CIVMIL) guidelines developed to support multi-agency coordination of humanitarian action (hereafter

referred to as ‘the Guidelines’). In helping to identify areas of good practice that can be incorporated

into existing guidelines, and used to advance the development of future guidance, the project also

serves to highlight areas within the CIVMIL space which demand greater consideration, and address

obstacles in the way of implementation or uptake of existing guidelines. In turn, it will explore ongoing

challenges in CIVMIL cooperation, necessary differences between guidelines in natural disaster

response and complex emergencies, and the limitations of current guidelines in addressing state-of-

the-art or emerging dynamics at the CIVMIL interface.

APPROACH

During a 9-month period, over 200 individuals were interviewed through intensive field visits in

Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Sudan (with a focus on South Sudan) to build

a qualitative picture of what people in key operational positions think about the role and contribution of

country Guidelines. Haiti was selected on the basis of its continued relevance to natural disaster

response and its diverse representation of CIVMIL engagement with both national and foreign forces;

the African sites were selected because of their specific focus on UN military missions in a complex

emergency; and Afghanistan featured strongly due to its pivotal role in defining civil-military

engagement in an environment where Coalition troops are operating. (See the table in Annex 1 for

further detail on the range of country contexts under review.)

In April-May 2011, two workshops were conducted in Australia, where key civilian, police and military

practitioners (including members of the Civil-Military Task Force – CMTF) considered the interim

findings. Further HQ consultations took place through one-on-one interviews with key stakeholders

based in New York, Washington DC, London and Geneva.

The visits were complemented by the insights of the lead researcher who has practical experience in

five of the countries that have specific Guidelines, spanning much of the period in which they were

developed. And the field research was also complemented by a comparative textual desk-based

review of existing guidelines, and any relevant secondary materials that may cast light on the broader

context of CIVMIL practice and guidance in each of the specified country contexts (Afghanistan, DRC,

Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Pakistan, Sudan).

INTERVIEWS

In each country context, the interview sample drew upon existing professional contacts and networks,

such as the CMTF in Australia, InterAction in the US, the NGO-Military Contact Group (NMCG) and

British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) in the UK, and the Consultative Group on the Use

of MCDA in Geneva. Overall, there was a good cross-section of the military and international aid

communities actively engaged in civil-military dialogue, including peacekeepers from different Troop

Contributing Countries (TCCs), NATO and host nation troops, officials from the DPKO Best Practice

Unit, Office of Military Affairs, Red Cross delegates, NGO operational staff, local people, and

practitioners within the UN’s Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) section. In South Sudan and

Pakistan (using information gathered from a previous project sponsored by then Pakistan’s UN

Humanitarian Coordinator), national NGOs were also consulted. Sources are anonymously cited in

the report, with reference to their function and type of organisation only where it seems relevant.


Each interview was recorded with the participant’s permission, supplemented by note-taking, and

followed the format of a pre-determined set of semi-structured questions, adapted and expanded to

each country context. Upon completion of each set of interviews, notes and recordings were

transferred to a matrix for analysis of key themes, feeding into the broader desktop review.

Annex 2-A demonstrates the interview logic, while Annex 2-B outlines some of the semi-structured

questions that were used in the interviews. The interviews were adjusted according to the research

participant’s level of awareness of the actual documents.

ASSUMPTIONS

It was anticipated that exposure to the Guidelines would be very low, if non-existent, among field

personnel, but that there would nonetheless be practical mechanisms in place and ad hoc processes

for civil-military engagement that would be worthy of observation. Indeed it was confirmed during the

research that less than five per cent were either aware of the Guidelines or had used them in practice.

More surprising was the lack of awareness among people with key coordination functions, such as

positions within NGO peak bodies and UNOCHA.

It was also anticipated that people would find the guidance relevant if they could see how it might

apply to their day-to-day work. Therefore, where an interviewee did not possess specific knowledge

of the Guidelines, the researcher weaved applicable portions of the content into discussions to help

relate their experience to it. The aim was to draw from general civil-military concepts about distinction

and coordination on the one hand, while raising awareness of the more practical recommendations for

operational arrangements in the context. Specific questions were also asked, conforming to the flow

in Annex 2, and a reporting template used in several of the contexts (for an example, see Annex 3).

Lastly, it was anticipated that people would use the study as an opportunity to raise extreme examples

of bad behaviour of the lesser-known ‘other’. From the outset, the usual signs of a culture clash were

certainly evident. Terms like “mutually incompatible”, “opposite ends of the spectrum”, and

“maddening” were raised regularly. Extreme examples aside, the study did provide space for people

to confide that interaction between the two is not all that bad – in fact, some even noted a certain

sense of relief when the other was seated at the table. In Haiti, for example, one NGO worker

commented on the welcome presence of uniformed soldiers at coordination meetings, due to their

tendency to “get their point across clearly and quickly”. It was also possible to uncover what is

currently working well, and to confirm that some very constructive innovations are in play.


2. What are Country CIV-MIL Guidelines?

BACKGROUND

One of the biggest challenges in the area of civil-military (CIV-MIL) engagement is how to create an

authentic, mutual understanding between the various stakeholders. Without a silver bullet on offer,

the international community has established guidelines and training to enable a better understanding,

and also experiments in different theatres with ad hoc innovations and context-specific practices.

At least seven sets of multi-agency, field based, country civil-military guidelines (‘the Guidelines’) have

been developed to facilitate cooperation between humanitarian and military personnel in complex

environments. The countries include Afghanistan, DRC, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Sudan, and Pakistan –

the latter is the only set of Guidelines yet to be finalised, pending approval by the Government of

Pakistan. The Guidelines are based in large part on the following agreed, non-binding international

guidance and subsequent revisions:

- (2003) Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United

Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (‘MCDA Guidelines’)

- (2004) Inter-agency Standing Committee Civil-Military Reference Paper: Civil-Military

Relationship for Complex Emergencies (‘IASC Reference Paper’)

- (2001) (2004) (2010) Standing Committee on Humanitarian Position Paper on

Humanitarian-Military Relations (‘SCHR Position Paper’)

This study used these current field-based Guidelines as a means of engaging actors on the

usefulness of written guidance, and on the broader questions of current CIV-MIL practice. Key

innovations taking place at the field level were also observed, in order to gather some best practices

for the future development of guidance and training. In the process of surveying aid and military

personnel, obstacles to the uptake of Guidelines became evident. While some of these obstacles are

well-known, the analysis takes stock of the issues that underlie them, so that a better response can be

developed.

As the 2010 SCHR Position Paper states, the positions, actions and strategies of armed forces play

an essential role in securing or endangering the scope for humanitarian action in situations of armed

conflict, as do the positions, actions and behaviour of the humanitarian actors themselves: ‘The

relations between humanitarian and military actors thus play a key role in the future scope of

humanitarian action’ (SCHR, page 1).

The various revisions that have been made to these and other civil-military guidelines is due to the

fluid operating environment of humanitarian organisations, which is today perceived as the most

politicised and insecure for humanitarian actors and populations affected by crisis. The number of

humanitarian workers killed, injured or abducted, and of humanitarian assets attacked, destroyed or

stolen has indeed risen to unprecedented levels (see Chart 1).


Aid workers claim that the perceived associations between humanitarian organisations and political

agendas in the ‘global war on terror’ have led to a decreasing level of acceptance of neutral, impartial,

and independent humanitarian action by political and military authorities and armed opposition in

situations of conflict. The result is a considerable restriction in access to the people affected by

conflict and in need of assistance and protection, and a failure to fulfil the ‘humanitarian imperative’ –

providing humanitarian assistance where there is the greatest need.

The main authors of the country Guidelines comprise policy and operational communities within the

humanitarian sector, such as the Policy Development and Studies Branch of OCHA, and the Special

Representatives of the UN Secretary General in-country. Afghanistan is the only case where the

authorship is seen to be shared between the international aid community, foreign military and national

government representatives, through the then Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group. Interestingly,

however, the foreign military actors refer to the guidance as the ‘ACBAR Guidelines’, rather than the

‘Afghanistan CIV-MIL Guidelines’, implying the view that the Guidelines process was driven by the aid

community.

The motivation of the authors is to develop guidance that will protect humanitarian operating space in

emergency operations, where both humanitarian/civilian and military actors are present. The

promotion of humanitarian principles is seen to be a key aspect of the guidance, in addition to the

importance of avoiding competition, minimising inconsistency, and – when appropriate – pursuing

common goals between these actors.

UN OCHA’s Civil-Military Coordination Section in Geneva supports the development of country-

specific Guidelines, and is also the custodian of the ‘Oslo’ and ‘MCDA Guidelines’ on the use of

MCDA in natural, technological and environmental disasters and in complex emergencies,

respectively. Underpinning its support of these guidelines is its theory of the ‘civil-military continuum

of engagement’, which ranges from co-operation to co-existence.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

CHART 1: MAJOR ATTACKS ON AID WORKERS: 2000-2010

Source: Aid Worker Security Database, www.aidworkersecurity.org, figures as of 14 April 2011.

Total kidnapped (live release orescape)

Total wounded

Total killed

Total incidents

Total international staff victims

CIV-MIL CONTINUUM OF ENGAGEMENT

CO-OPERATION CO-ORDINATION CO-EXISTENCE


Co-operation entails a degree of joint planning, joint implementation and/or alignment of goals,

objectives or strategies. This often involves a humanitarian agency’s use of military assets for

protection or delivery of relief in extreme circumstances. Co-ordination is a process to avoid

duplication, ensure the best use of available resources and ensure the safety of the recipient

population and humanitarian staff in the theatre of operations of armed actors, whilst retaining

independent operational decision-making. This involves the active sharing of information regarding

plans and procedures to ensure mutual understanding. Co-existence occurs where humanitarian

actors simply share operational space with military actors (i.e. state forces, rebel groups,

paramilitaries), but active coordination is either inappropriate or impossible.

An extensive study on NGO engagement with armed actors commissioned by World Vision found that

one country programme can have interactions at multiple points along the continuum, implying that the

situation on the ground is fluid and requiring continual reassessment.1

Whichever way the continuum is configured, the main point is that every context or situation will

require nuanced thinking regarding where to position the engagement. In OCHA’s guidance, it is

advised that co-operation should never be a strategy for complex emergencies. Experience shows,

however, that this clear-cut distinction is not always possible in practice.

Country-specific civil-military guidance is aimed to provide aid and military communities with a

practicable framework for use in a particular context, as practitioners negotiate this continuum of

engagement. Their perceived value at the HQ-level is clear from various statements and

recommendations of inter-agency fora. For example, in late 2010, the IASC Informal Forum on

Humanitarian Civil-Military Relations initiated a ‘gap analysis’ of humanitarian civil-military

coordination, in consultation with the IASC Core Group on Humanitarian Space. The analysis

revealed four strategic and operational gaps that it considered to be essential for effective

‘humanitarian CIVMIL coordination’. Two of the four gaps, and three of the resulting seven

recommendations, related to the need for more written guidance (see Box 1).

The utility of the Guidelines is, however, yet to be fully demonstrated and the degree to which they

have made a difference ‘in practice’ remains unclear. The purpose of this study is therefore to assess

their use and potential utility going forward.

1 Thompson, Edwina (2008) Principled Pragmatism: NGO Engagement with Armed Actors (World Vision International)

BOX 1: IASC RECOMMENDATIONS

1.1 Review the application of the Global Health Cluster Position Paper on Civil-Military Coordination &

Humanitarian Health Action with a view to developing similar guidance for other relevant Clusters, to include

similar inter-cluster guidance.

2.1 Develop and/or update regional/country-specific humanitarian civil-military coordination guidelines in a regular

and consistent manner for both natural disaster and complex emergency settings.

3.1 Review and conclude if an update/revision of the 2001 [Guidelines on Armed Escorts] would add value.

Review to start with:

a field study among humanitarian agencies to identify real-time needs with regard to guidance on the use

of military or armed escorts; and

consultations with all main agencies and UN departments concerned, in particular UNDSS.

Source: IASC Gap Analysis of Humanitarian CIVMIL Coordination (5 Jan 2011)


The next two sections provide further background on the stated purpose, scope and content of the

Guidelines, drawing from a desk-based comparative review.

PURPOSE & SCOPE

It is clear from the purpose statements contained in each of the Guidelines that constructive and

transparent civil-military coordination, which respects differences and encourages an increased

mutual understanding, is seen to produce better humanitarian outcomes (see Box 2).

In each of the country contexts, members of the policy community decided to produce more specific

guidance because of either the complexity of the situations concerned, or the large scale of the

humanitarian emergency – both in need of good coordination. All of the contexts are ‘complex’, in the

sense that there are multiple actors involved, the situation is unstable or violent, and there is a high

level of humanitarian need. However, they do not necessarily conform to the formal definition of a

‘complex emergency’, as defined in the early 1990s by UN agencies and several influential analysts.2

The intention then was to characterise humanitarian crises of a multi-causal nature, requiring a large-

scale, system-wide response. High levels of insecurity and either an inability or unwillingness of local

authorities to provide adequate assistance were also key characteristics, while the definition was to

rule out strictly ‘natural disaster’ events.3

In an attempt to differentiate between the two types of situations, the UN formed the aforementioned

sets of civil-military guidance: the ‘MCDA’ and ‘Oslo’ Guidelines. Today’s emergencies are

nonetheless often protracted, or a result of a combination of natural and political factors; therefore it

can be problematic to draw a clear line between the two in certain contexts (see Box 6 in Chapter 2 for

an example from Haiti).

Liberia is the only country context where the Guidelines were designed for a more advanced stage in

the ‘recovery’ from conflict and transition to nation- and peace-building efforts. The approach is

broader, taking into account interactions between the UN military and other actors, such as the local

population, NGOs, UN Agencies, UNMIL civilian sections and the Government of Liberia.

With the exception of Liberia, each of the Guidelines focuses on humanitarian actors and

organisations as comprising the ‘civil’ component in the ‘CIV-MIL’ relationship. The category

encompasses the implementing/operational humanitarian agencies which occupy the same space as

military actors. While some agencies, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Action Contra la

Faim (ACF), adopt a far stricter interpretation of neutrality than others, the Guidelines are intended to

cover all aid workers who conform to accepted humanitarian standards, such as the Red Cross Code

of Conduct. The various Guidelines recognise that this includes agencies that have multiple

mandates. As will be discussed in the section on limitations, the Guidelines are not intended to cover

other key civil-military relationships, which are increasingly becoming the focus of key Western

governments.

2 The 2004 IASC definition of ‘complex emergency’ is ‘a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or

considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme’. 3 Duffield, Mark (1994) ‘Complex Emergencies and the Crises of Developmentalism,’ pp.3-4


Regarding the main categories of security actors covered by the Guidelines, there appears to be a

bias towards foreign militaries and international peacekeepers. Figure 1 overleaf shows a breakdown

of country contexts according to the type of security actor-engagement, and the year in which each set

of Guidelines was published. While they provide explicit guidance for civil-‘military’ interaction, several

Guidelines include reference to other security actors, such as the host nation police force (c.f.

Afghanistan and Iraq). Iraq has the only set of Guidelines covering armed non-state actors; it was not

possible to travel to this site during the research, therefore it is outside the scope of this study to

comment on whether the inclusion of non-state actors in the Guidelines has translated to a different

experience on the ground.

BOX 2: PURPOSE STATEMENTS IN THE GUIDELINES

Afghanistan: “... to establish principles and practices for constructive civilian-military relations, and for effective

coordination, which is critical for achieving security and stability in Afghanistan. The Guidelines are intended to

address civil-military coordination, and not CIMIC activities, which are substantially broader in scope. The

Guidelines are intended to support the development of a relationship between military and humanitarian actors in

which differences are recognized and respected.”

DRC: “... aims at improving the interaction between the MONUC peacekeeping force (MONUC military) and the

humanitarian organizations.”

Haiti 1: “In order to continue our humanitarian mission and programs in Haiti, I have decided to issue some

guidelines to provide the framework for consistent, co-ordinate and transparent relations between UN personnel

and international military forces, which do not compromise the neutrality, impartiality and security of our staff.”

Haiti 2: “Given the context and gap between disaster needs and capacities on [sic] ground, the use of foreign

military assets in Haiti is not only in keeping with the principles of the Oslo Guidelines but desperately needed

and supported by the authorities. Further, as significant bilateral assistance [sic] continues to flow through

military forces, close collaboration is vital to avoid duplication.”

Iraq: “... to provide a practical and overarching framework to ensure a more coordinated and transparent

interaction between humanitarian actors and the military [and other armed actors] on issues of mutual concern.

Whilst as a matter of policy compliance for UN organizations, they may also usefully provide guidance to other

humanitarian actors where appropriate, and in keeping with their respective mandates, diversity and codes of

conduct.”

Liberia: “... to develop a policy that would outline civilian-military relations in the context of the recovery phase of

present day Liberia. ... The purpose of this guidance is to supplement not supplant current UN CIMIC doctrine

and further an ongoing effort on the part of UNMIL military to educate the force on the “Do No Harm” principle and

address additional considerations not in current CIMIC doctrine. ... It is envisaged that this guidance will foster

greater understanding of the respective actors’ roles in the future of Liberia and will enable better coordination,

standardize and promote effective and efficient use of UN military assets to cultivate development and a lasting

peace.”

Pakistan: “Acknowledging the need for both humanitarian actors and military actors to operate effectively within

the same environment, these Guidelines aim to establish agreed principles and practices for constructive civil-

military relations in Pakistan.”

Sudan: “... to address civil-military relations for humanitarian action in the context of present-day Sudan, and to

provide non-binding practical guidance to humanitarian organisations and military, police and other security

actors (hereafter referred to as military/security actors) operating within the country.”


FIGURE 1: GUIDELINES COVERAGE

COUNTRY DATE TYPE OF SECURITY ACTOR

UN military Foreign – bilateral

Foreign – multi-lateral

Host – military

Host –

police

Non-state

Afghanistan 2008

DRC 2006

Haiti 2010

Iraq 2008

Liberia 2007

Pakistan 2010

Sudan 2008

The stated purpose of most of the Guidelines is that they are working documents. Specific allowance

is made, for example, in the Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia and Sudan Guidelines for ‘Action Plans’ and

other arrangements that would help practitioners to ‘operationalise’ the guidance. The Guidelines

tend to emphasise that they should only serve as the first commitment in a series of operational steps

that will improve civil-military interaction, and provide very specific suggestions for follow-up.

By way of example, Section 15 of the Afghanistan Guidelines regarding the monitoring and resolution

of disputes advises that breaches of the Guidelines should be documented and reported as soon as

possible to UNAMA, or alternatively to INGO coordination platforms, and reviewed on a periodic basis

by a Civil-Military Working Group. In the Liberia Guidelines, there is a section dedicated to ‘Mode of

Implementation’, which is linked to a ‘CIMIC Request Flow Chart’ in an annex of the Guidelines.

Meanwhile, the operational steps outlined in the Sudan Guidelines are an example of how detailed

some of the directions can be in this regard (see the extracts in Figure 2).

FIGURE 2: SUDAN GUIDELINES: OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) will be developed by both UNMIS and UNAMID, based on these

guidelines and in close consultation with the humanitarian community, detailing activities that require regular and

close coordination. In addition, it is envisaged that the office of the RC/NC will be promulgating an ‘Action Plan’,

which will operationalise the various recommendations of these guidelines on the humanitarian side. This will be

augmented by a series of training initiatives, targeting both humanitarian and mission personnel.

Review of the Guidelines

19. These guidelines will be reviewed and updated periodically, in consultation with all stakeholders. In this

context the establishment of a country-wide UN CMCoord working-group, to include representation from both

UN missions, preferably including the respective COS (FC), and the humanitarian community (including UN

Agencies and NGOs) and chaired by the RC/HC (or his/her delegate), is proposed. This working-group would

meet monthly, via teleconference, to address issues arising as well as reviewing this document as needed.

It is recommended that:

a) an Area Security Management Team (ASMT) be established in each area / region that the UNCT operates in,

as an advisory body to the respective Area Security Coordinator (ASC) / area representative of the respective

Designated Official (DO) ...

(Sud, pages 3, 8, 22)

The next section turns to an overview of the specific content in the Guidelines.


CONTENT

Each of the Guidelines follows a very similar formula, covering the areas listed in the box below to a

varying degree of detail. There are very small, but notable, exceptions in some cases, which are

elaborated in the analysis below.

Guiding principles

Drawing from internationally agreed but non-binding guidance, the country Guidelines (on the whole)

recognise the need for ‘distinction’; in other words, a situation in which civil and military boundaries

and roles are delineated and respected by both parties. The Iraq Guidelines characterise this as a

‘clear division of labor: namely, humanitarian actors to provide adequate assistance and protection,

whilst military actors concentrate on security-related tasks under established mandates’. This

distinction has become increasingly controversial in light of the international military campaigns in Iraq

and Afghanistan, where there has been a ‘blurring’ of roles and responsibilities. NATO’s counter-

insurgency (COIN) strategy encourages the military’s increased engagement and support of the

population through Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and other forms of support aimed at ‘winning hearts

and minds’. Because of this, both sets of Guidelines have a clear emphasis on the respect for

international humanitarian law (IHL), and the laws, culture and customs of the local context.

While all of the Guidelines contain a strong emphasis on the operational independence of

humanitarian action, coordination of civilian and military actors is also highlighted across the

documents as an important and shared responsibility. The Iraq Guidelines provide a helpful rationale

for why humanitarian actors may ‘at times be required to interact with one or more of the whole range

of armed state and non-state actors’ operating in that context:

... in order to: (i) ensure timely provision of assistance and protection for populations in

need; (ii) safeguard humanitarian space; (iii) negotiate humanitarian access and (iv)

advocate for fulfilment of the legal obligations of relevant actors to protect the civilian

population. (IQ, page 4)

The Sudan Guidelines call attention to the interdependence of the two parties, and the ‘need for

complementarity’:

To be successful the UN mission’s mandated activities and the work of the humanitarian

community have to be complementary. Furthermore, and notwithstanding the differences in

mandate and approach, it has to be recognized that both the humanitarian community and

the respective mission, including its military and police components, will benefit from each

others’ success, i.e. humanitarian action will benefit from the mission establishing a secure

environment while the mission will benefit, at least indirectly, from the successful delivery of

humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance. (Sud, page 5)

This is likely to be because the Guidelines refer to the UN military as the main security actor

concerned, rather than other military or security actors in the context. The DRC Guidelines provide a

similarly balanced picture of the need for ‘cooperation’ on the one hand, and ‘distinction’ on the other.

The ‘principle of cooperation’ between MONUC military and humanitarian actors is described as

necessary due to the ‘close interrelation of the respective actor’s role in protection and assistance

activities’:

Context | Guiding principles │ Terminology │ Key actors, their roles and mandates │ Liaison and coordination

arrangements │ Information sharing │ Needs assessments │ Use of military assets for disaster relief │ Use of

military/armed protection for humanitarian security │ Training │ Gender


In protection, MONUC military is able to achieve tasks such as securing or control of areas,

deterrence of violence, removal of threats, escorts to populations or establishment of buffer

zones or protected areas. For their part, humanitarians are involved in the monitoring of

protection risks, in securing returns of displaced or refugee population, in advocacy and

support action to vulnerable groups such as women or children associated with armed

groups and in various other activities such as mediation. (DRC, page 6)

The Pakistan Guidelines contain the only reference to the principle of state sovereignty. Citing the

Guiding Principles of UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, the Guidelines state that:

The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance

should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of

an appeal by the affected country. (Pak, page 6)

The Pakistan Guidelines hold the principle of territorial integrity in close tension with the responsibility

to provide sustainable and free humanitarian access to ‘all vulnerable populations in all crisis-affected

areas’ – also a responsibility that accompanies the principle of sovereignty (c.f. UN General Assembly

Resolution 46/182, which calls upon States ‘to facilitate the work of [humanitarian] organizations in

implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of food, medicines, shelter and health

care, for which access to victims is essential’). Most specifically to the CIV-MIL relationship, the

Guidelines refer to coordination with the military as necessary only ‘to the extent that it facilitates,

secures and sustains, not hinders, humanitarian access’ (Pak, page 6).

Lastly, a common principle to steer the content of the Guidelines is that of ‘Do No Harm’. The Liberia

Guidelines have the strongest emphasis on this principle, with particular reference to ‘educating the

force’ (Lib, page 1). They helpfully translate this principle into practical guidance, outlining specific

projects that are either ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’ within the scope of military assistance (Lib, page

4). Useful questions for assessing the potential inadvertent impact on other communities, including the

effects of resources on local perceptions, are also displayed in checklists (Lib, page 5-6). In the Sudan

Guidelines, the description of the ‘Do No Harm’ principle also highlights the need for practitioners to

have an ‘in-depth awareness of the local context, and local protection concerns, including who controls

resources, in order to resolve rather than exacerbate local conflicts and power struggles’ (Sud, page 5-

6).

Information sharing and needs assessments

All of the Guidelines emphasise the importance of maintaining open lines of communication for the

sharing of information on security, logistics, contingency planning and for rapid response to security

matters and humanitarian emergencies. The Sudan Guidelines provide a good example of this (see a

partial extract in Box 3 overleaf).

The Sudan Guidelines also contain helpful checklists of how to approach needs assessments.

Despite this, however, the interviews in South Sudan revealed it to be the only context where

humanitarians were very concerned by the UN military’s reporting of humanitarian needs:

“DPKO are always coming back to us with Humanitarian Needs Assessments, but so many

times I have seen the place they have “assessed” and it is obvious that they have just listed

down what the locals are saying, not actually done any assessments. So I had to say ‘guys,

you need to stop doing this, or I will start telling you military strategies’. This is also risky,

because it means they raise the expectations of people they are ‘assessing’, which is

something that has to be recognised when we divide up our responsibilities.”

– UN humanitarian worker


It is difficult to determine whether the problem would be fixed with more awareness of the Guidelines;

nevertheless, it seems sensible to assume that better training on this aspect of the civil-military

interface could only improve the current status. Later sections of the report will cover training and

adoption challenges.

For operational civil-military coordination in disaster response during peacetime, the Pakistan

Guidelines provide specific parameters for the platforms for information-sharing:

As a matter of principle, information-sharing between military and humanitarian actors

should occur through the relevant civilian government forums and through the humanitarian

clusters. In addition, information relevant to the humanitarian response generated by

United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) or Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC)

may also be shared with military or police actors subject to the determination of the relevant

cluster. (Pak, page 16)

Similarly useful guidance is provided in the sections on use of military and civilian defence assets.

Use of military assets

This section of the Guidelines is always divided into two parts: the use of military assets for disaster

and humanitarian relief operations, and the use of military assets for the armed protection or security

of humanitarian agencies. The ‘last resort’ criteria, established in the Oslo and MCDA Guidelines,

underpins both – i.e. that military assets should be used only on a case-by-case basis, when no

alternative civilian means are available, and limited to the extent and duration necessary to undertake

the required assistance.

BOX 3: SUDAN GUIDELINES EXTRACT ON INFORMATION SHARING

Suggested information flows

… from the humanitarian community to the military/security actors:

a) Security information: information relevant to the security of civilians and humanitarian staff including the

coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities in the military operating theatre

b) Humanitarian and relief activities: plans and information on humanitarian and relief activities, including

routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts in order to avoid accidental strikes on humanitarian

operations or to warn of any conflicting activities

c) Mine-action activities: information relevant of mine-action activities, and

d) Population movements: information on major movements of civilians.

… from the military to the humanitarian community:

a) Security information: Any information that might have a direct impact on the security of humanitarian

personnel or operations, including planned military operations to the extent feasible

b) Post-strike information: information on strike locations and explosive munitions used during military

campaigns to assist with the planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities

c) Relief needs: observed by the military or other security actors to be communicated to OCHA or the RC’s

office via the respective HRD or HALU office

d) Population movements: information on major movements of civilians, and

e) Planned relief activities of the military and/or other security actors, to be coordinated at the planning stage

with the humanitarian community.


Timeliness, clear humanitarian direction, and the time-limited nature of the use of military assets are

also key criteria stated across the Guidelines (see Sud, page 22, 26). The Pakistan Guidelines outline

some key logistical tasks (including aerial and land transport) where it may be deemed appropriate for

military actors to provide support in joint civil-military interventions (see Box 4).

In terms of the military itself conducting humanitarian tasks, the DRC, Liberia and Afghanistan

Guidelines stand out as particularly interesting. In the DRC context, it is accepted that the MONUC

military will carry out ‘Winning Hearts and Minds Activities’ (or WHAMS) from the unit to battalion level.

These are ‘intended to create a positive relationship between the different deployed units and their

host community’ (DRC, page 16). The Guidelines encourage the use of WHAMS in the post-conflict

or peace-building phase in the following fields:

1. Infrastructure:

Rehabilitation of buildings (churches, schools, clinics)

Reconstruction or maintenance of roads and bridges

2. Public services

Rehabilitation of water and sanitation services

Rehabilitation and maintenance of electricity supply

3. Social services

Training of medical personnel

Provision of teachers, for example, in English

4. Economic activities

Rehabilitation of market

Training or other support in specific fields

5. Socio-cultural and sport activities

Support for cultural activities like traditional ceremonies

Support for sport activities

Support for environmental initiatives

(DRC, page 16-17)

Conversely, the Afghanistan Guidelines reaffirm the approach agreed in the earlier Policy Note of the

PRT Executive Steering Committee, ‘PRT Coordination and Intervention in Humanitarian Assistance’,

which instructs that humanitarian assistance ‘must not be used for the purpose of political gain,

relationship-building, or ‘winning hearts and minds. It must be distributed on the basis of need and

must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality’.

The Liberia Guidelines provide a more human context for the development of WHAMS, explaining

that:

BOX 4: PAKISTAN GUIDELINES EXTRACT ON APPROPRIATE JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

Humanitarian assessments carried out by United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) or other humanitarian actors.

Life-saving search and rescue missions carried out by actors such as the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG).

Life-saving humanitarian responses for vulnerable populations in remote/inaccessible areas.

Time-sensitive rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads and bridges to optimise humanitarian access to vulnerable populations.

(Pak, Page 15)


Soldiers serving in peacekeeping operations desire to be involved in helping the

population. Participating in or assisting the humanitarian/recovery effort gives soldiers a

needed sense of accomplishment and/or fulfillment.

(Lib, page 2-3)

Guidance follows on appropriate areas of military support to humanitarian/recovery efforts, which is

supported by a detailed table in an annex on the specific types of activities, their advantages and

limitations.

Across most of the Guidelines, the issue of local perceptions is raised as the reason for concern with

the use of military assets for humanitarian activities. With the exception of Haiti and Liberia, they

advise that the independence and civilian nature of humanitarian assistance should be clear at all

times: ‘Failure to observe this distinction could compromise the perception of neutrality and impartiality

of humanitarian activities and thereby endanger humanitarian personnel and intended beneficiaries’

(AFG, page 8).

One notable shortfall in these sections of the Guidelines is that they tend to refer to foreign MCDA,

rather than national MCDA, which are more often than not the assets in question. Even where

national governments are included in the Guidelines, the guidance tends to rely on the content of

existing guidelines for support, which relate primarily to foreign MCDA.

Cross-cutting issues

The Guidelines treat cross-cutting issues, such as gender and respect for human rights and IHL, in

different ways – for example, they are singled-out clearly in the Afghanistan Guidelines, but weaved

into the other parts of the guidance in the Liberia and Iraq Guidelines. In light of the horrific realities of

sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in DRC, it is interesting to note that there is actually no

mention of gender in the DRC Guidelines – this makes it stand out from all the other Guidelines.

While the situation certainly seems to warrant a particular focus on how to interact on the issue of

protecting civilians, and particularly women and children, the feedback from interview participants

working in the area of protection indicated that current or future civil-military guidelines should not

concentrate on gender. The following statement from an INGO worker explains why:

“Gender and sexual violence is a core component of all of the issues being discussed. Of

course we need more women in posts, but there needs to be a balance. There is ‘SGBV

overload’ – organisations are beginning to get annoyed by the extent to which it has taken

over the broader conflict discourse.”

– INGO worker, DRC

Human rights organisations and some humanitarian agencies in DRC are concerned that the attention

dedicated to victims of SGBV is preventing the conversation that needs to be taking place about the

causes of the violence. Without this, aid workers argued that the international community will not

come any closer to helping the Congolese people fight this problem over the long term.

Training

The importance of training and awareness-raising on both civil-military coordination and the nature of

‘humanitarian’ response is emphasised across the Guidelines. Box 5 overleaf highlights some

examples from the DRC and Pakistan Guidelines, with the latter providing the sound rationale for why

the assistance community should invest in such training and awareness-raising.

The DRC extract clearly indicates that training is needed for both parties – the MONUC military

requires training on humanitarian affairs, and the humanitarians require training on military issues. It


also recommends the use of joint training sessions or exercises, which could facilitate discussion on

practical cases of concern.

The Pakistan Guidelines emphasise that training provides the ‘foundation for effective dialogue

between humanitarian and military/police actors’. This is overlooked in most of the other Guidelines’

sections on training, which tend to focus instead on the more technical contributions of training to

increased knowledge, skills and changed attitudes. Interestingly, in an earlier draft of the Afghanistan

Guidelines (29 April 2004), the section on training was labelled ‘Training and Dialogue’. It argued that:

All assistance community agencies and military forces will benefit from a continued

dialogue regarding their respective mandates, roles, and procedures. This dialogue

should help to maintain mutual recognition of the areas requiring coexistence,

coordination, cooperation or collaboration.

The next chapter will now turn to the key findings of the research, drawing from the desk-based review

of the Guidelines, and information collected through the interviews and field visits.

BOX 5: EXTRACTS OF GUIDANCE ON TRAINING

DRC

8.1. Training of MONUC military on humanitarian affairs: Every new contingent or troops to the mission

should be, upon arrival to the mission, clearly briefed about the civilian component of MONUC as well as about

the roles, activities and principle [sic] of action of humanitarian agencies and organizations. The same briefing

should take place, in detail [sic], upon arrival at the place of duty. If necessary, MONUC military should call on its

civilian partners to help them in this training.

8.2. Training of humanitarians on military issues: Good coordination requires mutual understanding of

objectives, roles, activities and principles of action. Therefore MONUC military should organize, at field level,

special training sessions for humanitarians on the basic principles of MONUC military action, in order to help them

better understand and accept its modus operandi and procedures.

8.3. Joint training sessions or exercises: Joint training sessions at field level should enable mutual

understanding and allow in a common sessions to reach objectives mentioned under 8.1 and 8.2 above. It could

also involve discussions on practical cases.

PAKISTAN

Training and Awareness-Raising on Civil-Military Coordination [in Complex Emergencies]

Training provides the foundation for effective dialogue between humanitarian and military/police actors, and is a

vital part of increasing an understanding of respective mandates, ways of working, and professional cultures.

Training can also provide a basis for developing a common vocabulary necessary to underpin effective

coordination and information-sharing.

In order to promote a coherent interpretation and application of civil-military principles, both actors should ensure

an effective dissemination of agreed concepts and principles for civil-military coordination, and guide their

personnel in the practical application of these principles.


3. Key findings

This chapter builds on the desk-based comparative review of the Guidelines and uses interviews

conducted for this study as a means of identifying: (i) best practices arising from the creation of the

current Guidelines; (ii) any inherent limitations; and (iii) obstacles to uptake or dissemination.

(i) Best practices

In view of best practices, four key areas emerged as worthy of review: linked training initiatives and

workshops; a cohesive and reflective humanitarian community; experimentation with tools; and an

emphasis of the process as much as the product.

Linked training initiatives and workshops

The interview feedback indicated positive potential for Guidelines to act as a vehicle for civilian and

military or police actors to compare and contrast their respective ‘codes of conduct’, ‘principles’,

‘standards’, ‘ethics’ and ‘guidelines’, and how well they are adhered to, reinforced and enforced. This

is perceived to be important to fostering a greater mutual understanding and respect. Joint training

workshops were identified as absolutely fundamental to bringing Guidelines to life, and building the

necessary relationships for a constructive civil-military interface.

“There is an issue of respect, at the end of the day. There needs to be mutual respect

between both parties. And that has to develop through dialogue. Which means we need

opportunities for greater dialogue. The military needs to learn more about us, we need to

learn more about them. How can Guidelines help this process?”

– Discussion with INGOs in Port-au-Prince

During an OCHA CMCoord training workshop in North Darfur, an interesting conversation developed

between the peacekeepers and aid workers regarding what they perceived to be the needs of the

population:

“The military said that the people needed water, shelter, food and education for their children;

the aid workers said that the people needed security.”

– INGO reflection on Sudan training

The combination of shared anecdotes and education on the different principles and standards that this

workshop format allowed was central to breaking down preconceived ideas about the ‘other’, and for

sharing thoughts on what the focus of the respective efforts should be.

An NGO worker in Chad remarked that OCHA had hosted two workshops on civil-military issues with

MINURCAT, but that “the discussion sort of ended when the workshop ended”. This experience was

replicated in Sudan, where it appears that there had been an intensive effort over a short period to

conduct training workshops, but that these were not sustained. In that case, a rotating CMCoord

officer from Darfur was reportedly made available for a couple of months in Juba. Another similar

experience occurred in DRC in late 2006 to mid 2007 with the UN mission’s civil-military Guidelines

dissemination workshops – roughly 16 workshops were facilitated in the eastern region, but no follow-

up was provided. DRC has never had an OCHA CMCoord presence on the ground.

Best practice, therefore, occurs when training is offered on an ongoing basis, with “refreshers and

overviews” provided not only at induction, but for the duration of military tours and aid deployments.

According to one experienced INGO worker:


“Any training needs adequate follow-up and forums for continuing the discussion. Once

we’ve got the military, civil affairs, humanitarians and UN agencies in the same room, the

discussion must continue.”

– INGO Head of a provincial office, DRC

Universally, people’s feedback on OCHA’s CMCoord training was positive; in fact, there were calls for

more of it, and more follow-up, to ensure that the training was part of a strategic narrative of civil-

military interaction in a particular country context.

Catering beyond the international humanitarian and military communities, one INGO in Afghanistan

recently took the initiative to develop Afghanistan-specific illustrated booklets on civil-military

engagement, in conjunction with a series of workshops aimed at educating the local community about

the civil-military dynamics in the Afghan context. The booklets draw from global and country-specific

CIV-MIL principles, notions of IHL, Taliban code of conduct, and principles of NGO relations to parties

to the conflict. The project director claimed that:

“Illiteracy rates are high in the areas where we are operational, and most of the people do

not speak English. So all the fancy guidelines don’t really have an impact on them at all.

There is clear need to speak their language when dealing with CIV-MIL and we have

translated the booklet to Dari and Pashto”.

– Aid worker, CARE International

In response to the outreach education delivered during a CIV-MIL workshop organised in Mazar-i-

sharif this year, a participant at the end is reported to have commented: “This was great, I learned

loads. It would have been better if somebody did it 5 years ago though”.

Initiatives like this, while rare, have the potential to move one step closer to redressing the historical

lack of an ‘Afghan voice’ in the CIV-MIL debate, despite ‘the number of Afghan individuals and

organisations who deal with civil-military relations on a daily basis’.4

In South Sudan, OCHA and INGOs noted that there has been no real effort to educate locals on the

distinction between the identities, functions and roles of humanitarian personnel and those of the

military and other security actors, despite the emphasis within the Sudan Guidelines on local

perceptions of this distinction providing ‘the main protection for humanitarian workers and operations

in respect of armed groups and the population’.

National aid workers frequently cover the 'last mile' in delivering assistance to beneficiaries, and so

they are also the most likely to be operating in an environment where armed actors control areas. A

series of workshops undertaken in Islamabad with Pakistan NGOs working in conflict-affected areas

during 2009 indicated that national NGOs bring a much-needed local understanding of how the

international community’s ‘guiding principles’ are interpreted by ordinary people. The workshop

facilitators found that the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct5 and aspects of international civil-military

guidance provided a useful starting point for grounding the dialogue in the local context.

A group of 30 national NGOs was asked to imagine a scenario in which a major earthquake strikes

South Waziristan, where the Government is engaged in active hostilities, and the Pakistan military

offers assets to the humanitarians (such as helicopters or escorts) to reach the beneficiaries. Using

an interactive software package on a wirelessly-connected network of laptops, we asked them to

4 Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Sippi, Mirwais Wardak, Idrees Zaman & Annabel Taylor (2008) ‘Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds:

Exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations,’ BAAG-ENNA, p.5. The report goes further by arguing for an ‘Afghanisation’ of CIVMIL relations processes, institutions and principles 5 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

in Disaster Relief –www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I259EN.pdf


respond anonymously to the following question: ‘who has the right to make the decision?’. The

answer was unambiguous: “the community itself must decide, but the decision should be

participatory”.

Underlying all the feedback collected on best practices and training was the recognition that it is

people who engage in dialogue, not organisations. The Guidelines have the scope to provide a useful

starting-point for such a dialogue between the parties on key differences and interdependencies.

Increasing local participation can only assist in understanding and influencing the perceptions of those

who are being relied upon for a safe operational environment.

When provided to the interview participants, the guidance on information sharing was generally

viewed as comprehensive and helpful. Most humanitarians in the interview sample revealed a good

understanding of the sensitive nature of military information, but stressed overall in the UN mission

environments that peacekeepers should be more open to sharing analysis and forecasting within

coordination bodies, particularly if there is an expectation that humanitarians will relay their protection-

related concerns to the military. This level of understanding is, again, enhanced by small workshops

and training that contribute to bringing the Guidelines to life.

A cohesive and reflective humanitarian community

The differences in the humanitarian sector notwithstanding, INGOs across all of the sites shared

positive examples of civil-military interaction where there was a “cohesive and reflective humanitarian

community”.6 This, it was generally espoused, is a key pre-requisite for constructive engagement on

civil-military issues.

The Guidelines can help foster a sense of cohesion, and greater reflection, on civil-military issues,

which then contributes to more informed operational and advocacy positions. In the case of

Afghanistan, the aid community invested a huge amount of time conducting advocacy on the

Coalition’s use of white vehicles (especially white Land Cruisers) to transport military personnel and

assets. Humanitarians fear that this blurs the lines in a way that directly increases the security risks to

aid workers. White vehicles, it is argued, are commonly associated with humanitarian action in most

conflict zones, the colour representing “actors who provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population

irrespective of political, religious or military considerations and who are not parties to the conflict”.7

Eventually a perceived victory was won on this issue in April 2009 when the NATO HQ issued the

‘Policy on White Vehicles’, which mandated that:

... all NATO-owned vehicles that are coloured white only are to have that colour changed,

either in full or to a degree sufficient to render the vehicle clearly and obviously multi-

coloured. Operators of non-NATO (nationally owned) vehicles are encouraged to take

[similar] action.8

While it is debatable whether Coalition nations have indeed followed suit (the main counter-argument

being that their security is also in jeopardy), it is clear that the Guidelines made a positive contribution

to the considered advocacy undertaken by the humanitarian agencies concerned.

6 MSF is the obvious exception here, given their support of bilateral military engagement for ensuring the safe passage of goods

and personnel, and absence from coordination meetings. However, one MSF director argues on page 17 that their ‘opting-out’ of meetings (or at least the formal record) is not necessarily due to a principled stand, but because of the inefficiencies in the coordination system. 7 Joint INGO Letter to NATO Defence Minister (March 2009)

8 NATO/ISAF Unclassified 8052.10/HQ ISAF/COS/09 ‘Policy on White Vehicles’ (10 April 2009); FRAGO/204-2008 DTG

170930D+30JUL08


COHERENCE

REFLECTION

FOCUS

Discussions with single agencies revealed that it is almost as important to foster cohesion and a

reflective environment within an INGO amidst seeming chaos, as between humanitarian agencies.

The research revealed that civil-military guidelines have usefully been integrated into certain

interactive decision-making tools, which are able to create a more consistent intra-agency approach to

CIV-MIL issues.

Experimentation with tools

A number of INGOs are increasingly making use of innovative humanitarian decision-making

processes. These provide a framework that tie existing commitments, guidelines and principles into

daily management practices; the result is more nuanced decision-making, which is linked to clear

action plans.

Several members of one INGO commented on their organisation’s use of the civil-military decision-

making tool called HISS-CAM.9 The director of the DRC country office claimed that the tool proved

“critical in deciding to outsource IHL and PoC training of the FARDC to local partners ... Other NGOs

would benefit from exposure to a framework that forces them to think through their interaction with

non-UN armed actors”.

During the Haiti earthquake response, the same tool worked very well internally to help generate

cohesion, clarity and reflection on bilateral military engagement in food distributions. The process

obliges groups to capture and record their logic for interpreting civil-military guidance in a particular

context; hence, from a learning perspective, this helps to create institutional memory and consistency

in an organisation’s approach when teams rotate in and out of complex settings.

While the HISS-CAM tool succeeded in facilitating a refocusing of priorities and internal cohesion

during a large-scale emergency, which ultimately created a better response from that organisation in

line with the Guidelines, the broader effect/impact was limited in that the same process was not being

applied across the sector.

At an inter-agency level, there are signs of experimentation with similar tools and simple technologies

to navigate dilemmas in complex environments.10

A discussion is currently underway regarding how

to apply such innovations to the dilemma of using armed escorts. While it is too early to evaluate the

9 The ‘HISS-CAM’ model is a copyrighted tool designed and developed at World Vision International for the purpose of assisting

individuals and/or organisations in making difficult decisions in regards to engagement with State and Non-State Armed Actors. For further information, see Clements, Ashley & Edwina Thompson (2009) ‘Making the Tough Calls: Decision-making in complex humanitarian environments,’ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 44, Overseas Development Institute, available at <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3025>. 10

An example is a web-based inter-agency tool still under development (see www.decision-navigator.com).

GUIDELINES

THE VIRTUOUS

CIRCLE


results of such an application, it seems promising in that the main purpose is to bring good guidance

to life, through a practical process.

Process

“Guidance is always more about the process than the result. It was the process in

Afghanistan that proved most effective in shifting perspectives at the time.”

– White House official

“It must be really hard for OCHA to try to put all this down on paper. In a way, it’s very

military to try to codify guidance in a doctrinal way. In fact, I’m rather sceptical that you

can put this sort of stuff down on paper. ... What we do is about the process of doing it, of

building relationships with real people. Not about guidance. Which is not to say don’t have

your guidance. Have it, but don’t build barriers pre-emptively. Have guidance about

principles, but you need to be flexible on the operational side.”

– INGO director

Lastly, but certainly not least importantly, interviewees who had either been involved in the drafting of

Guidelines or in discussions around their development implied that process is indeed often as much, if

not more, important than the final agreed content. A civilian working within MONUC around the time

that the DRC Guidelines were developed and then disseminated recalled a “tense” exchange between

a UNICEF worker and his peacekeeper colleagues in one of the dissemination workshops. He

expressed clear frustration about his inability to use mission assets, such as helicopters, to transport

medicines, and the peacekeepers explained their constraints. The process that they were engaged in

allowed for the mutual sharing of concerns and clarification of issues that might otherwise percolate

into further negative sentiment.

Despite good processes, however, implementation remains an issue. One recent report claims that

the ‘Afghanistan Guidelines have been met with limited uptake, enforcement and success from all

parties.11

If indeed this is the case, when that particular process of development is by many accounts

seen to be sound, what can answer for the blockage to implementation? The rest of this chapter

considers some of the potential reasons by turning to both the inherent limitations of the Guidelines

themselves, and the obstacles to uptake and dissemination that emerged through the research.

(ii) Inherent limitations

Form

The pressures of operating in complex environments, in addition to recent technological advances,

magnify the importance of the format in which people receive information. Interviews across all of the

contexts identified the current form of country Guidelines as inherently limiting to their uptake and

dissemination. As written documents stretching from between 2 to 35 pages (10 on average), there is

the challenge of competing with the exponential increase in the volume of readily accessible

information and ease of interactivity. Communications are frequently reduced to informal email

exchanges, or sometimes even ‘tweets’, and reading to skimming. There is thus a narrowing window

for any idea to be either accepted or rejected – the target audience in both the aid and military

communities is as quick to judge as any other professional group, and is likely to move on to other

pressing ‘priorities’, rather than invest the time in reading a set of Guidelines, particularly where there

is the foreboding expectation that “the next version is only just around the corner”. A member of the

DPKO Best Practices Unit confided that people are also experiencing “guidance overload” or

“saturation point”.

11

Sparrow, Phil (2011) ‘In it for the Long Haul? Delivering Australian Aid to Afghanistan,’ ACFID Research in Development Series, Report No.1 (March), page 24


The reflections of a UN civil affairs officer within MONUC commented that, “in order to get busy people

to read the Guidelines, you would have to persuade them to take time out from their daily work and

consider the abstract”. When reminded that the Guidelines actually contain very specific points of

guidance (such as on Liaison Arrangements and Information Sharing), the response was that, “Yes,

but the DRC is an emergency situation. It is in a protracted state of emergency. People don’t have

time to read documents and conduct more routine activities”. Such a dynamic environment, she went

on, would require a full-time individual or team to keep the Guidelines in tune with changing

operational arrangements and ad hoc innovations that are designed to facilitate the civil-military

interface. This raises questions regarding the perceived or actual need for them to guide interaction in

the first place. The same person asked: “is it product-driven, or important for CIV-MIL engagement?”

Part of the challenge, it was argued, is that aid workers are not necessarily “culturally receptive” to

written guidance. A fresh CIMIC officer within NATO’s civil-military ‘Synchronisation Cell’ remarked

during the study:

“Having never worked with NGOs before, and just arriving in Afghanistan, all I’ve heard is

that NGOs don’t like to be at the receiving end of coordination! They’re also not hard-wired

to written guidance because they’re laid out horizontally, and don’t take well to top-down

orders and SOPs”.

– US soldier, Afghanistan

An American interviewee who works as both a reserve logistics officer with the US military and an

emergency logistics co-ordinator with a major INGO noted the almost opposite receptiveness of

Western militaries to principles and codes of conduct: “They can ‘get it’ ... relate with written guidance

on a very direct level”.

While operationally, aid workers sense the need for guidance support, in practice, they do not

habitually exploit what exists. A recurring example from this research was the use of military, police

and other armed escorts to gain greater access to vulnerable populations. When the author worked

as Civil-Military-Police Advisor to World Vision International, she found that the various check-lists in

the guidelines can steer a fruitful and more strategic discussion about whether to request an escort –

therefore these were incorporated into an internal civil-military Operations Manual. The research did

not reveal any parallel experiences of this – potentially due to the lack of dedicated civil-military

personnel in the aid sector and thus opportunities to customise the guidance.

Scope

The distinguishing feature of country Guidelines is their specificity to the context. And yet, the

interviews revealed criticisms of the current Guidelines ranging from being too general or too

prescriptive to be useful in a dynamic environment. This is an inherent limitation of having any written

form of guidance that aims to cover complex issues – and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to

resolve this tension.

A number of participants actually challenged the usefulness of a national-level focus in country

guidelines, despite the good intent. The point was made that there are “contexts within contexts”, so

even if the Guidelines are “country-context specific”, they lack the level of specificity required to

operate at a local level. In a case such as Sudan, where there is huge variation in the country, and a

recently-seceded South, this was certainly seen to be the case:

“Guidelines need to be country-specific, but probably a lower level than even that. For

example, Abyei is a bit different to Juba, which is certainly different to Darfur”.

– Vice President, International Programmes, INGO


In terms of the respective Guidelines’ content, which was surveyed in Chapter 1, the research

revealed no gaps. However, there do appear to be inherent limitations in the lack of specificity under

each of the headings. The sections covering ‘use of military assets’ are a case in point. Findings from

DRC, Haiti, Pakistan, and South Sudan demonstrate that much of the discussion about CIV-MIL

engagement revolves around the use of military or police assets for protection – whether desired, or

coerced. Both the humanitarian community and military representatives in the interview sample

highlighted the need for guidance to help aid agencies understand the capabilities and decision-

making criteria of respective forces in their allocation of resources. This would clarify any confusion,

and diminish the frustration often expressed by aid agencies that are unable to see the constraints of

a military. Many INGO representatives could simply not understand why some requests for assets

were approved for the transportation of humanitarian goods, and others denied: “we have little sense

on how such requests are evaluated and processed”.

In the Haiti, for example, the most recent guidance encouraged humanitarians to make use of military

assets, but failed to provide the detailed breakdown necessary for understanding the capabilities and

decision-making criteria of respective forces in their allocation of resources in such a fluid

environment.12

“My ideal CIV-MIL environment is one in which humanitarians know what we can provide

them; we know that we can get coordination on the big, time-sensitive stuff from their end.”

– Lieutenant Colonel, MINUSTAH

A more useful set of guidance would include information flow on military capabilities, organisational

structure, assets and limitations in a disaster-prone environment. Humanitarians also advocated for

clearer messages from the militaries concerned about the conditions that accompany the use of such

assets. One INGO worker reported that, on receiving a heavy digger from a military contingent for a

construction project, it arrived with a small security attachment to guard it. The troops were unwilling

to leave the digger, and the aid workers were unsure what they could request in terms of changes to

the SOP. If such conditions are a requirement, these should be more clearly outlined in the

Guidelines.

Existing formal distinctions made between natural disaster contexts and complex emergencies,

which frame the definitions of the broader country context in existing Guidelines, and the advice on

appropriateness of using MCDA, also have inherent limitations. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, this

clear-cut distinction is not always possible in practice. The difference of opinion expressed by

interview participants on the environment surrounding the Haiti earthquake response is a case in

point.

12

MINUSTAH U-3 prepared such a document for the Hurricane Response, which was shared with SOUTHCOM and USAID/OFDA. In addition, lessons reports from two Inter-agency Disaster Response Coordination table-top exercises highlighted further gaps in MINUSTAH and UN emergency response capacity. These assessments, however, were unavailable to humanitarians at the time of writing, because they were not involved in the original briefings, and unaware of how to access the materials.


Haiti provides the only instance where the specific policy guidance that was issued from the UN in

January 2010 uses the ‘Oslo Guidelines’ to explain its qualification of the situation as a ‘last resort’,

requiring full co-operation between humanitarian and military actors. It actively encourages the use

of military assets and involvement of military personnel in needs assessments, with particular

reference to the US military.

Opinion among the interview participants (see Box 3) was completely divided between those who

found the content “uncontroversial” and those who considered it to be “deeply political”; and there

was universal disagreement with the statement that there was a ‘community-wide desire to

collaborate closely’ with all stakeholders, including national and foreign troops. Interview

participants raised many concerns regarding the fact that the guidance note does not question the

appropriateness of using MCDA. Even though it is well understood that the civil-military interface is

less contentious in a large-scale natural disaster, it was argued that the history of US engagement in

Haiti could hardly be characterised as benign.

In Pakistan, the definitions of the broader environment are linked to a specific ‘coordination strategy’,

using the Civil-Military Continuum of Engagement to interpret the appropriate level of CIV-MIL

engagement. The first strategy – for ‘Operational Coordination in Complex Emergencies’ – is one of

‘co-existence’, while the second strategy – for ‘Operational Coordination for Disasters in Peacetime’

– is one of ‘co-operation’.

The reality of a country like Pakistan, however, is that a disaster rarely takes place ‘in peacetime’.

The country is vulnerable to regular flash flooding, earthquakes, droughts and other natural hazards in

many of the same areas where soldiers are conducting COIN operations. It also has a strong military

and disaster management system in place. Pressures to coordinate with these structures in spite of

the socio-political situation on the ground are likely to continue; therefore, it appears inherently limiting

to set out clear coordination strategies, when the continuum could be used as a basis for decision-

makers of lead agencies to apply flexibly in response to the various realities of working in such an

environment. At any one time, for example, it is valid for the humanitarian community to decide on a

different coordination strategy in different parts of the country, during the same response.

BOX 6: HAITI – A ‘NATURAL DISASTER’ OR ‘COMPLEX EMERGENCY’?

“No, not a natural disaster, not today. Today it’s definitely a complex emergency. I mean, the UN’s here as a

stabilisation mission, right? MINUSTAH’s got guns. There’s a reason for that. It was complex to begin with,

and the earthquake added a natural disaster aspect to it.” – EJOC

“Complex. It’s a complex emergency with a natural disaster in the middle of it.” – UN commander

“Unambiguously a natural disaster, with some security concerns.” – NGO security

“We treat it as a natural disaster. We just provide logistical support and technical assistance.” – UN logistics

“It was a complex emergency on Jan 11th, and a natural disaster on Jan 12

th. Now it’s somewhere in-between.”

– UN military

“It’s a natural disaster in the middle of a complex emergency.” – NGO director

“I’d say it was a natural disaster, but it’s not like when I’m in Haiti I ever got the sense that people feel safe.

There are a lot of roadblocks, kidnappings, that sort of thing.” – NGO director

“I’d say a complex emergency… but not a heavy one.” – UN civilian

“I don’t really agree that it can be referred to simply as a natural disaster. Then again, if this guidance was written

around Jan 12th, I could see how they might see it that way. Personally, I think this situation should have been

considered ‘Oslo Plus’.” – UN civilian


Defining the context in which operations are taking place raises into question, then, the continued

relevance of the established categories contained in the generic Oslo and MCDA guidance.

Regarding the ambition or purpose in each of the Guidelines, some interview participants were

insistent that they should remain a statement of intent, while others saw more benefit in guidelines

acting as live, working documents within a specific context. The sample of comments in Figure 3

indicates the divided opinion on this matter. FIGURE 3: SAMPLE OPINIONS ON SCOPE

COUNTRY PROFILE COMMENT

Haiti Senior logistics,

UN military “What we don’t need is more guidance that tells us what we already know.”

Haiti Country director,

INGO

“We absolutely do need to refer to written guidance in our work. We need

operational documents; easy to read, easy to implement.”

DRC Country director,

INGO “Guidelines can’t operate in the abstract.”

Afghanistan ISAF soldier “We need guidance that provides a general statement or purpose for why we

should engage.”

Questions regarding who should be covered by the document itself and included in the consultation

process during development also generated much debate.

Participation

The research revealed that an inherent limitation of the present Guidelines is that groups who

arguably make the most impact on the civil-military space have been largely excluded from their

development:13

“Three groups have been largely excluded: the locals, police, and host government.”

The usefulness of the Guidelines may be severely diminished without their adequate representation.

A recent piece of research conducted by the Eastern Mennonite University’s 3-D Security Initiative in

the US demonstrates the need to include ‘local civil society’ in guidance on civil-military interaction,

particularly in light of the increased engagement between Western militaries and local populations as

a result of COIN strategies. Much of the emphasis of Western militaries is also on their relationship

with government civilian counterparts and contractors due to the policy shift towards ‘whole-of-

government’ and ‘comprehensive’ approaches in fragile states. Likewise, UN peacekeeping forces

focus increasingly on their relationship with the civilian components of the mission itself due to the

move towards UN ‘integrated’ missions. Therefore, the reference to ‘humanitarians’ as the civil

component in the majority of current country Guidelines is inherently limited to the humanitarian-

military interface.

In terms of the participation and coverage of armed actors, the interviews revealed that there is little

consensus across contexts regarding which type should be covered by a set of country guidelines. In

the DRC, for instance, there was universal agreement among interviewees that the Guidelines should

not include national armed forces and the various armed militia groups. It was argued that specific

guidelines for engaging with them would likely be unhelpful because of the fragmented and

unaccountable nature of the groups, and the necessarily context-specific nature of NGO-military

interaction:

13

In the previously mentioned World Vision study, which was carried out in 22 countries in the INGO’s most ‘hostile’ or ‘insecure’ operating environments, the research revealed that by far the greatest interaction between its staff and an armed/security actor occurs with the national police, followed by the national government. Thompson (2008) Principled Pragmatism (World Vision International)


“NGOs should be left to develop these on their own. We don’t want to do too much with the

FARDC because of their role as human rights abusers. We do a lot of reflection and have

intense discussions when we engage with them, but it is very specific to the context and the

contingent of the FARDC we are dealing with [i.e. ex-CNDP or FARDC]. Similarly,

interactions with other armed actors should be decided on a case-by-case basis.”

– INGO protection manager, DRC

Some were sceptical that guidelines covering host government engagement would even be allowed

by the state in question: “The state forbids us to talk to them. Any interaction needs to be under the

wire.”

Conversely, interviews conducted in South Sudan indicated that aid workers would prefer guidance

that included local military actors, and in particular the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), over

the current focus on the UN military. The rationale was provided by one senior UN official:

“For many practical purposes, coordination with the SPLA is far more important than with

UNMIS. You don’t see UNMIS anywhere, but the SPLA is everywhere. So we pay the SPLA

for protection, which is something that UNMIS staff sometimes question, but I ask, what

could we do if we didn’t do that? There is no UNMIS military to help, or certainly not in time

and with the pace to allow the delivery of assistance.”

– Head of a UN humanitarian agency, South Sudan

In contrast to this variable opinion, the interviews across all contexts revealed a majority view that

international police should be included in the development of any future Guidelines. The Sudan

Guidelines process did, in fact, consult closely with UNAMID Police Commissioner. But this is a rare

example. Bringing police into discussions on principles of protection and civil-military engagement is

vital because ‘policing, in all its various forms, is right between assistance and protection … where

assistance and protection overlap.’14

The Brahimi Report recognised this, stating that the ‘demand for

civilian peace operations dealing with intra-state conflict is likely to remain high on any list of

requirements for helping a war-torn society restore conditions for social, economic and political

stability’,15

and that a ‘doctrinal shift’ needed to take place ‘in the use of civilian police in United

Nations peace operations, to focus primarily on reform and restructuring of local police forces in

addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring tasks.’16

Although the Australian Federal Police (AFP) makes a relatively small contribution to some of the

more international theatres, such as Afghanistan (see Box 7 overleaf), it has the potential to share its

unique experience of working deeply and over a sustained period in the fragile region of the Pacific.17

An AFP officer consulted in this study urged:

“Yes we are civilians, but we are separate. We need to elevate the discussion to be included

in the ‘CIV’ component, if it’s not possible to create a civil-military-POL configuration”.

– AFP officer, Canberra

14

Professor Raymond Apthorpe, Australian Senate Committee Hansard (5 September 2007), p.35 15

UN General Assembly (2000) Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations (‘Brahimi Report’), para. 118 16

Brahimi Report, para. 119 17

See descriptions of the AFP’s International Deployment Group (IDG) and the police support to Papua New Guinea in Smart Power. Braithwaite – restorative justice?


This echoes other evidence-based papers and roundtable discussions comprising police contingents

that there should be an adjusted category that will help redress the issue of police exclusion from the

Guidelines process.18

This has not, however, taken effect. A senior civilian DPKO officer with direct

experience in past attempts to bring police more into the CIV-MIL discussion explained his viewpoint:

“... in many respects, police are the missing element in everything… never really

discussed or engaged with as a stakeholder like they should be. It’s really civilians,

military, police – those are the three pillars. But there just hasn’t been as much of an

issue with the police. I mean, with civilians and military interacting, there’s a clear problem

statement, and you need to stake out principles like humanitarian neutrality. But there’s

no real issue around civilians and military working with police. This just wasn’t a value-

added thing.”

– DPKO official, New York

More work needs to be done to evaluate the ways in which police involvement at the strategic and

operational levels of civil-military discussions, from the start of a mission, when it counts, will alter the

nature of a mission. Because military peacekeepers are frequently deployed prior to policing

contingents, but are neither trained nor equipped to handle civil unrest and law and order problems,

there certainly tends to be a ‘deployment gap’ or ‘security vacuum’ created. But how this would be

rectified through an enhancement of Guidelines is yet to be seen.

In Liberia, it was suggested that the police were deliberately excluded from the process of developing

the Guidelines because they were unarmed, and therefore not considered to be at an equal level with

the military. This is surprising given that the Guidelines marked the transition from the ‘emergency’ to

the ‘recovery’ phase of development, where police certainly play a key role. This continued exclusion

and prejudice raises serious doubts in the minds of both expeditionary police and aid workers that this

will change in the near future. If this issue remains unresolved, it may continue to affect the

Guidelines’ applicability, effectiveness, and ownership. Nowhere is this more apparent than in

18

Thompson, Principled Pragmatism, p.14; Roundtable discussion at AFP International Deployment Group NGO Forum: Cooperation and Understanding (28 May 2009)

BOX 7: SUMMARY OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE (AFP) SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN

AFP engagement in Afghanistan began in October 2007 with an initial deployment of four AFP Officers to provide

expertise in counter-narcotics and policy capacity development. By the end of 2008, the number of AFP deployed

had increased to 12. Additional AFP officers were added to the Afghanistan contingent in 2009 to mentor Afghan

and international training staff involved in rebuilding and retraining the Afghan National Police (ANP). They are

attached to ISAF-led training activities in Uruzgan Province and undertake other support activities where

appropriate.

Since 2009, the AFP has helped train more than 500 ANP officers in Uruzgan Province, and additional members

deployed in 2010 further helped with the development of the Provincial Training Centre in Tarin Kowt.

As well as police training and mentoring in Uruzgan, the AFP in Afghanistan have taken on an active role in

developing the capacity of the Afghan National Police and in reinforcing the rule of law through placements in

Kabul and Kandahar. The AFP has received funding of $32.1 million over two years to undertake this role.

Additionally, an AFP commander was appointed as Senior Police Advisor position to the United Nations

Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNA MA) in 2010. The advisor position involves the coordination of law

enforcement programs and activities on behalf of UNA MA in partnership with the ANP and the coalition law

enforcement bodies.

Source: In it for the Long Haul, page 8, drawing from official data on www.afp.gov.au.


‘transition’ countries, where control of security is handed back over to the national government

security forces.

Reflecting today on the previous lack of deep participation of national police actors during the

development of the Afghanistan Guidelines, a former UN Civil-Military Liaison Officer suggests that a

wrong emphasis was placed on the international military contingents. Through a lack of involvement,

and dissemination of the Guidelines to Afghan National Police (ANP) over recent years, the ANP are

therefore less prepared than they could have been, had the process been managed differently.

Representation in the formulation of guidelines is therefore considered to be very important. From the

international perspective, a military, for example, must be represented by individuals who are

authorised to make decisions, which is not often the case with CIMIC personnel. On the humanitarian

side, the policy community tends to dominate the process to the exclusion of those at the operational

interface with military actors. There were no examples raised, for instance, of logisticians and supply

chain managers being included in any of the existing guidelines processes, despite their close

interface with security actors.

Overall, when considering best practices arising from the creation of the current Guidelines, the

majority view from the interview sample is that the principles that they enshrine, which aim to delineate

clear roles and safeguard humanitarian action, are welcomed by people in the field. In fact,

international civilian and military actors proposed that much of their ‘culture clash’ could be addressed

by using the Guidelines as a framework to raise greater awareness of these principles, and encourage

dialogue. Due to the lack of awareness of the Guidelines themselves, however, it was difficult to

unravel their actual practical value on the ground.

(iii) Obstacles to uptake and dissemination

Awareness

Overall, the existing Guidelines generated harsh criticism from field personnel. A common line was

that: “All this stuff is a rehashed, rehash of a rehash, and nothing’s changing”. The remarks about the

lack of utility are difficult to judge, however, when there is such little awareness of them in the first

place – less than five per cent of 200 people interviewed were either aware of the Guidelines or had

used them in practice. More surprising was the lack of awareness among people with key

coordination functions, such as positions within NGO peak bodies and OCHA.

While this could be used as a defence of the Guidelines’ content, it also raises questions regarding the

perceived or actual need for them to guide interaction in the first place. In commercial parlance, how

can we refocus so that we start with ‘the need rather than the product’?

This problem is linked to the point in the previous section about people (a) not being inclined to read

documents, and (b) especially disinclined to read those that are perceived to lack operational

relevance in today’s environment. To state the obvious, if people are unaware of the Guidelines, they

do not have a chance in being implemented.

Needless to say, then, the sound operational arrangements contained in the Guidelines have not been

adopted in the contexts under review; if this advice had been followed through, as intended, the

Guidelines may have added a lot more value to the present situations. Interviews undertaken among

practitioners in Haiti revealed that they believed there was no precedent for what they achieved in the

Joint Operations Tasking Centre (JOTC). The Liberia Guidelines, however, contain a flow chart which

is likely to have been useful in the Centre’s formation. Instead, those responsible for the allocation of

military assets thought that the Centre was created successfully out of a guidance vacuum.


Disconnect between HQ and the field

With the exception of Afghanistan and Sudan (for those in Khartoum), the general impression among

field personnel across all sites is that the present Guidelines have not been developed from the

ground-up, in a consultative process with the relevant stakeholders. One set of Guidelines that did

come from the field was developed by only one or two individuals, without the collective input of key

stakeholders. Figure 4 illustrates a representative sample of comments from inside one country

context. The third quotation is rather alarming, given that it belongs to the actual person responsible

for sharing the guidance with the humanitarian community in-country. This could point to a lack of

pre-deployment preparation, or a sign that HQ did not feel that the guidance was important enough to

disseminate onwards. It would go towards explaining why the UN CMCoord team did not ‘finalise’ the

Guidelines in-country as a means to ‘alleviate misunderstandings’, as HQ stated would happen.

FIGURE 4: SAMPLE OF OBSERVATIONS FROM ONE COUNTRY CONTEXT ON HQ-FIELD DISCONNECT

PROFILE COMMENT

Military

“My first take on this guidance is that it was written from a distance. I mean, it’s pretty close to the mark,

but it all kind of rings a little hollow. Seems to be written by someone who had outside knowledge about

how [this country] works, and it’s not updated for today.”

Humanitarian

“I think the Guidelines probably would have been useful had I seen them during the disaster. We

absolutely do need to refer to written guidance in our work. We need operational documents, easy to

read, easy to implement.”

UNOCHA

“I don’t recall seeing this guidance before, ever. You would have thought that HQ would have given it to

me, the on-the-ground CMCoord officer, but to my knowledge – and my knowledge isn’t perfect – I never

got it. It’s hard to know that there’s guidance unless you’re told that it’s out there.”

Another concern with developing guidance from the ‘capital’ is that the guidelines become overly

idealistic. Reflections from the South Sudan research revealed that the process of drawing up

guidelines may be useful at the Khartoum level for institutionalising a forum in which people have to

think about coordination. This process reportedly becomes self-defeating, however, because the

participants feel pressured into including a rosy picture, comprising idealistic assumptions about what

they would like to be in the Guidelines, rather than attempting to coordinate and plan for the reality in

which they will work.

Among INGOs and UN humanitarian agencies in Juba and Malakand, the interviews suggested that

the idea of ‘CIV-MIL’ is linked directly to protection of civilians, and the need to advocate to UNMIS to

fulfil their protection mandate. While there have reportedly been issues of NGO harassment by SPLA,

these incidents “tend to be hushed up by NGOs to maintain their presence, and by the UN because of

the CPA focus” (INGO advocacy and policy officer, Juba). The association between CIV-MIL and

protection might go some way to explaining the lack of interest in and uptake of the Sudan Guidelines.

This experience also intimates that a better appreciation of the authors of the Guidelines may well

have led to a more relevant set of guidance for practitioners based there.

While the widespread perception of those interviewed was that value could only be added if the

process for developing guidance is directed by those who must then implement it, there is an

alternative argument for having robust engagement from HQ – particularly from policy makers who

have had operational experience or exposure to similar contexts. Furthermore, the experience of an

author can sometimes be painful due to the level of consultation required, and type of comments that

are often received, often drawing out the approval process. A UN CMCoord officer in one context sent

the following group email to involved parties:

“Please note that a large number of different stakeholders have now commented on

virtually each and every paragraph / sentence, at times even requesting / suggesting the

opposite from what the previous comment from somebody else did. Therefore I would

request addressees not to bother too much with minor / linguistic details or to request the


(re-)inclusion of something that had just been dropped but rather to verify / confirm that

the present draft now addresses all of their major concerns / reflects the principles that

they are operating under, even if at times they might have wished for a slightly different

sentence / phrase. But if you do see something completely wrong / missing then by all

means please do let me know.”

– UN CMCoord officer, email exchange

In the Afghanistan case, many versions of the Guidelines were produced until they were finally

approved four years later. One of the original authors within UNAMA claims that, “once I left in 2004,

we were onto ‘Draft 12’, two years after the process began. By the time the Guidelines were

published in 2008, the substance had barely changed, and there was very similar wording”.

Role of OCHA

The majority of NGO workers interviewed for the study expressed an expectation that OCHA should

be the place to turn to provide strategic guidance and coordination through the cluster system, and its

other coordination functions, such as CMCoord. An even greater number of interviewees criticised

OCHA for failing to act as a facilitator of, and forum for, much-needed discussion on civil-military

issues. The strategic value of OCHA was succinctly referred to by one interviewee as “day late, dime

short”. In a meeting of two people working within the OCHA CMCoord team in one context, the

following remark was made:

“We should have had a humanitarian country team (HCT) laying down priorities from above,

which the [coordination cell] would enact. Instead, it was down to individuals, individual

initiative, people with their own ideas on the spot. I’d say they got it about 80 per cent

correct, but there wasn’t that strategic direction. So for anything to work in the future, we

need a new HCT. And we would need the HC to have a deputy, because right now that

position is too much responsibility for one person.”

OCHA’s perceived ineffectiveness across almost all of the sites was attributed to poor and

inconsistent leadership, and inadequate resourcing – each influencing directly the lack of uptake of

civil-military guidance. In particular, aid workers identified the high turn-over rate of OCHA personnel

(in some areas, four heads of office in two years) as a huge hindrance to OCHA’s ability to provide

strategic guidance or leadership on civil-military coordination. Despite some optimism expressed

about new leadership in several country contexts, OCHA’s ability to deepen engagement between the

civilian and military communities continues to be limited by a lack of capacity and personnel. Key

offices, such as in South and North Kivu of the DRC, for example, have never had a dedicated

CMCoord position, while most employees at OCHA have reportedly received very little, if any, specific

civil-military training. The profile of CMCoord officers was also identified as a barrier for humanitarians

outside the UN system to provide a coordination role. The pool of CMCoord candidates seems to be

biased towards people with a military background, which leads to a perceived favouritism towards the

military in-theatre. This is regretful given the potential of this role providing a necessary bridge

between policy-makers at HQ and implementing agencies in the field.

Despite the need for CIV-MIL support to the humanitarian sector, interviews with OCHA employees

affirmed that, given resource constraints and competing priorities, civil-military coordination is simply

not seen as a vital area on which to focus.

Politics

Many interviewees emphasised the need for greater realism about the politics at play in the civil-

military realm. Politics within the humanitarian system itself can create obstacles to the uptake of

Guidelines. In particular, in-fighting between the humanitarian agencies inside the UN family creates


huge difficulties for the INGOs. The latter tend to wish for OCHA to lead, but OCHA is often

preoccupied with what other major players within the UN think.

“CIV-MIL is about politics, not just technical issues.”

– Head of Civil Affairs, UN mission

In light of the tendency for civil-military issues to be treated in a technical sense, this comment from a

senior UN practitioner acted as a simple but powerful reminder of the types of obstacles to uptake and

dissemination of Guidelines that may well fall outside the control of operational staff. On the surface,

it seems that there are two agendas represented in the civil-military relationship – the ‘humanitarian’,

driven by needs, and the ‘military’, which is driven by politics. A senior Australian public servant

highlighted, however, that the reality is quite different – international donors are motivated by their

national interests, so “politics will always prevail”, even in decisions to allocate humanitarian support in

an emergency.

A similar principle applies in the deployment of multi-national military deployments. Afghanistan

presents the clearest current example of where a ‘coalition of the willing’ does not necessarily

translate to a coherent political or humanitarian mission. This dynamic goes some way to explaining

why, despite a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) being issued by the ISAF commander in Afghanistan in

2008, immediately following the joint approval of the civil-military Guidelines, there is an incredibly low

awareness of them still today – and even questions among some about whether they were ever

approved. Militaries use FRAGOs to alert subordinate and supporting commanders to modifications

of existing orders, while providing notification to higher and adjacent commands. In effect, these

orders are the most up-to-date command to troops on how they should be doing business. But in

Afghanistan, these do not necessarily influence behaviour on the ground. An experienced contractor

in Afghanistan provided his explanation for why this is the case:

“There are 52 Generals here, all reporting to Ambassadorial masters. This political aspect

of NATO seriously hampers the ability for FRAGOs to have effect. I don’t think the dynamic

has ever been like this in any other theatre”. – US contractor

When asked why it extended over a three-year period, one of the main facilitators of the Afghanistan

Guidelines drafting process replied that “egos, changeover of personnel, and national caveats” were

the main obstacles to earlier uptake. To a lesser extent, but equally instructive, was the question of

bilateral military support in the Haiti earthquake response. UN logisticians and policy-makers in Port-

au-Prince interviewed for the study complained that the bilaterals “show up every time there’s an

emergency, and do not fit within our framework. We can’t stop them from coming, and we need their

capacity – but they can’t continue to sit outside our way of doing things here”. But even within the UN

mission there appears to be evidence of a difference of approach between contingents. For example,

despite the overwhelmingly positive portrayal of the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC),

stood up as a mechanism for streamlining the disparate asset requests, the research uncovered many

ad hoc arrangements through which INGOs have been working with various forces, particularly in the

early periods of the earthquake response. One INGO claimed that, “if need be, we use discrete

means of requesting things, and for coordination – not the JOTC”. WFP seemed well-aware of the

alternative channels of coordination outside the JOTC:

“You know, a lot of coordination stuff goes on outside JOTC and U9. The contingents do

their own CIMIC all the time… NGOs going straight to the Brazilians to get help with water

distributions, school ground leveling, whatever. All the contingents do it. It’s not coordinated.

Often, it’s the contingent’s own government funds – the Guatemalans built a school with their

own funds, in their own area of operation, for example.” – WFP logistics cluster


UN troops and those in key coordination positions also emphasised their dilemma in terms of host

nation politics and support:

“We’re [MINUSTAH/UN] here because of low government capacity to respond, but yes we

want to promote a government-led process. But the government wants to be seen as

stronger than it is right now – it has stepped in in an ad hoc way, with a minister here, a

minister there, dozens of people. It’s taken a long time to sort that out”.

– Chief, JOTC

In a different sense, host nation politics appear to have played a significant role in the lack of interest

among humanitarians in the DRC Guidelines. As mentioned previously, the DRC Guidelines do not

cover the national armed forces, police or irregular armed groups. While a number of interview

participants cited this as one of the main shortfalls – simply because the Guidelines do not have

relevance for one of the main CIV-MIL interfaces in the country, others suggested that the problem

rests more with the lack of illumination of the politics surrounding the UN mission’s relationship with

the host nation.

As way of background, since the Guidelines were published in 2006, conflict has persisted in the

eastern provinces of DRC with various peaks in the violence, causing major internal displacement and

humanitarian need. Within this context of continued instability, several conflict and policy

developments significantly impacted civil-military relations over the ensuing five years, and gave rise

to new institutional arrangements that have led to confusion over where exactly UN agencies are

situated within the humanitarian landscape. The development of the Guidelines, for example, was

concurrent with the introduction of the integrated mission concept, in which the various agencies

operating in the DRC were placed under the ‘one UN’ umbrella and the direction of the RC/HC.

The political – rather than ‘humanitarian’ – mandate of the UN mission was later reinforced during the

joint military operations of 2009-2011. The rapprochement between the Governments of Rwanda and

DRC, and the integration of the CNDP into the national armed forces of the DRC (FARDC), prompted

a series of offensive military operations aimed at routing out the Forces Démocratiques pour la

Libération de Rwanda (FDLR), a 6,000-strong armed group some of whose members were implicated

in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.19

MONUC provided significant material, logistical, and operational

support to the FARDC during these operations despite the reports of widespread FARDC abuses

against civilians.

MONUC’s decision to provide such support led to an outcry: civil society protested and in places like

Lubero called for the UN’s withdrawal; NGOs issued petition letters; and the ICRC released an

unprecedented statement categorising MONUC as party to the conflict, thereby eroding the UN

mission’s status as a neutral party protected under international humanitarian law. MONUC’s

involvement in the operations, particularly Kimia II, had a palpable impact on the relationship between

humanitarians and the peacekeeping force, and greatly compromised civil-military coordination.

MONUC was asked to step down as Protection Cluster co-lead, OCHA withdrew from the Provincial

Inter-agency Committee (CPIA), and humanitarians became much more reluctant to engage with the

UN for fear of being perceived as partial – at a time when security deteriorated and access was more

limited.

In 2010, the mission adopted a ‘conditionality policy’ under which support became contingent on joint

planning and the FARDC’s respect for IHL. This policy change has done much to restore relations

between humanitarians and the UN. Unfortunately, however, the conditionality policy has in practice

proved largely unenforceable given the disorganisation and lack of accountability within the FARDC,

19

Three sets of operations have taken place: Umoja Wetu, January – February 2009; Kimia II, March – December 2009; and Amani Leo, January 2010 - present.


and politics within the Government. Despite its international posturing, the last five years have

revealed that the state leadership is more interested in preserving and strengthening its own power

than in democratic and equitable peace building for the benefit of the country’s population – hence its

persistent intransigence on meaningful security sector reform in the presence of largely untrained

national forces that commit widespread human rights abuses. As a former senior UN official

recounted:

“We assumed in 2006 that it is a question of little capacity but lots of goodwill. We were

wrong – there was little capacity and little goodwill”.

– UN civilian, DRC

The ongoing relationship between MONUSCO and the FARDC does not sit well with many

humanitarian organisations and continues to inform the level and type of engagement they are willing

to have with peacekeepers. A lack of clarity on the surrounding politics seems likely to have further

blocked the uptake of the Guidelines in their present form.

In the case of Pakistan, the Guidelines are yet to receive formal recognition by the Government of

Pakistan – a major partner or subject of the Guidelines. Without their endorsement, the Guidelines

remain only a statement of agreement among humanitarian agencies. This is still useful, particularly

in a country which experiences such extreme cases of disaster and insurgency in the same areas.

For the Guidelines to be taken up and have their full effect, however, the Government will need to

recognise them.

From the donor side, possibly the most important politics to present an obstacle to uptake and

dissemination of several existing Guidelines revolve around the US Government. An aid worker, who

is also a US military reserve officer, reflected on her time at SOUTHCOM during the Haiti earthquake

response and concluded: “US political agendas in practice trumped adherence to guidance”. In actual

fact, the Guidance Note that was issued from HQ at the time promoted the active involvement of the

US military in direct humanitarian assistance. Reflecting on this, a senior logistics manager identified

a political purpose for the Guidelines:

“If this document was written to give ‘reassurance’ to dogmatic or wavering humanitarian

organisations ... on why and how US military capacities should be incorporated into

humanitarian relief operations ... I guess it generally achieved its purpose”.

– UN Chief, Haiti

Nowhere is the politics of the US Government more apparent than in Afghanistan, which has

experienced almost 10 years of an international military presence. As shown in Chart 2, US troop

numbers reached 90,000 in July 2011, which in comparison to the less than 10,000 troops from the

next largest troop contributing country (TCC), demonstrates how large the US footprint has been on

the ground. Due to its disproportionately large contribution to Afghanistan, the attitudes, behaviours

and policies of the US military are crucially important to the CIV-MIL interface in the country.

Roughly 7,000 US Special Forces are counted in the overall numbers of personnel in Afghanistan.

During the announcement of the upcoming draw-down of up to 30,000 conventional US troops,

President Obama is reported to have pledged a ‘mini-surge’ of Navy Seals, Army ‘Green Beret’

Rangers, and other special units being drafted from across the world, to ensure that there is enough

combat power to expand covert raids. This is a direct consequence of the political imperative to bring

significant amounts of troops back to America over the next 15 months.


As a backdrop to these developments, ongoing attempts are being made to reinforce the distinction

between humanitarian and military activities. For example, after years of lobbying from the

humanitarian community, ISAF recently approved a number of Standard Operating Procedures

(SOPs) to guide military decision-making on where to conduct development and reconstruction

activities. The SOPs now oblige forces to consult with the Afghan Government and share plans with

the aid community before decisions are taken that potentially blur the CIV-MIL distinction – US forces,

however, remain exempt. It is unclear whether this is because of a conscientious objection to the new

SOPs which reinforce key aspects of the Guidelines, or rather a result of the necessary preoccupation

with other tasks in the drawdown.

Linking of aid and stability

Another obstacle to emerge in the uptake and dissemination of Guidelines is the stabilisation agenda

of ‘integrated missions’ in the UN and ‘whole-of-government’ Western government interventions. A

UN mission such as MONUSCO in DRC focuses on stabilisation, with a view to an eventual

drawdown of the peacekeeping presence. Some interviewees argue that this has confused priorities,

blurred the lines between development and assistance programming, and entrenched the UN’s partial

position towards the state.

In Afghanistan, during the summer of 2002, there was a recognised need to accelerate simultaneously

both security and reconstruction efforts in order to effect a smooth transition from the conflict. The

notion was that a peacekeeping force should be created to spread the ISAF ‘effect’, even if ISAF itself

continued to be restricted to Kabul and its surrounding area. This led to the creation of a Joint

Regional Team (JRT) concept, instigated by US Central Command (CENTCOM).20

The JRTs evolved

into the current Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that combine the use of military and civilian

assets from various governmental agencies, including diplomats and specialists in economic

development. The mission of the PRTs is to:

promote and enhance security;

extend the reach of the Afghan central government; and

facilitate humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations.

20

See Stapleton, Barbara (2003) ‘A BAAG Briefing Paper on the Development of Joint Regional Teams in Afghanistan,’ BAAG (January)

90.0

9.5

4.8 3.9

3.9 2.9 2.6

CHART 2: '000 FOREIGN TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN: JULY 2011

Source: www.guardian.co.uk

United States

United Kingdom

Germany

France

Italy

Canada

Poland


In the agreed policy note cited earlier in Chapter 1, PRTs ‘must not be used for the purpose of political

gain, relationship-building, or “winning hearts and minds”’. In practice, however, it is well understood

that the projects are just that – aimed to win local trust and favour.

Western donor strategies that increasingly couple their aid programming with political and military

strategic and operational objectives are most visible in their aid allocations to countries such as

Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq. For example, Chart 3 shows that the breakdown of Australian official

development assistance (ODA)-eligible expenditure in Afghanistan has been fairly evenly divided

between AusAID and the Department of Defence over recent years, and actually biased towards

Defence in 2008-9.

The OECD DAC defines ODA as having ‘the promotion of economic development and welfare of

developing countries as its main objective’, while additional costs incurred for the use of a donor’s

military forces to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services are ODA-eligible.21

These donor strategies have translated to a very blurred divide between traditional aid and military

activities on the ground, particularly through the large USAID-funded projects. A controversial

programme that has resulted from this evolution in strategy is the Food Insecurity Response for Urban

Populations (FIRUP) programme. With the explicit aim of supporting the overarching COIN strategy,

FIRUP is to promote:

... stability through temporary employment and income generation in targeted populations

to reduce the number of food-insecure and/or unemployed Afghans joining the

insurgency. Project activities are implemented in close coordination with coalition forces

engaged in clearing operations, or in advance of clearing operations to pave the way for a

smooth transition. Key provinces are located in the South and East, as well as those in

the North and West considered ready for the transition from ‘hold’ to ‘build’. The focus in

the South and East (‘clear’ to ‘hold’ phase) is on quick impact programs that provide

short-term livelihood opportunities in support of broader stabilization efforts.

– USAID Afghanistan22

USAID contracts for FIRUP and other programmes demand that aid organisations demonstrate

programmatic flexibility to implement ‘post-battlefield cleanup’ operations, including work with

communities in the aftermath of a battle, and alongside PRT officials, while communicating to the

21

OECD-DAC ‘Is it ODA?’, available at < http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf> 22

March 2009 - September 2010, available at <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/146/Food_Insecurity_Response_for_Urban_Populations_FIRUP>

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Defence AusAID AFP Immigration ACIAR E, E & WR

%

CHART 3: ODA-ELIGIBLE EXPENDITURE IN AFGHANISTAN

2007-08 actual

2008-09 actual

2009-10 estimate


general public a US Government story regarding alternative development. This is part of the broader

whole-of-government strategy to fight the insurgency and reduce poverty.

FIGURE 5: USAID PRESENTATION: ‘SUPPORTING STABILIZATION AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL’

An Acting USAID Mission Director in Afghanistan explains the direct and clear role for USAID in the

‘shape’ phase of the US military’s COIN strategy in a presentation detailing AID’s involvement in civil-

military stability planning and the prepositioning of assets (see Figure 5 above). By linking its

implementing partners, such as INGOs, with the US Government’s political and military objectives,

USAID is directly challenging the principle of independence of humanitarian action enshrined in IHL,

and agreed in the Afghanistan Guidelines.

From the US military perspective, commanders are actually instructed in the US Army/Marine Corps

Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 that ‘counter-insurgency is armed social work’. A new

acronym – MAAWS – also entered the formal US Army lexicon in 2009, to describe a commander’s

use of ‘Money as a Weapons System’. For some time, it has thus been considered appropriate for

troop commanders to commission humanitarian and reconstruction projects to foster greater

stability.23

‘Small-scale projects’ are deemed to fall under a USD 500,000 ceiling, and there has been

considerable downward pressure on soldiers to spend funds ‘fast’.

In 2007, then US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates explained the purpose of funds dedicated by

the Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP) to Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in Iraq

and Afghanistan:

“... a relatively small piece of the war-related budgets – $456 million in the FY 2007

Supplemental, and $977 million in the FY 2008 GWOT Request. But because they can

be dispensed quickly and applied directly to local needs, they have had a tremendous

impact – far beyond the dollar value – on the ability of our troops to succeed in Iraq and

23

See InterAction (2011) ‘The US Military's Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance,’ (Washington DC: InterAction, January) with reference to the US military’s expanding role in the delivery of foreign assistance.


Afghanistan. By building trust and confidence in Coalition forces, these CERP projects

increase the flow of intelligence to commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and

Afghans against insurgents and terrorists”.24

The result is a ‘WHAMS’ strategy, which directly contradicts the agreed positions that informed the

current Afghanistan Guidelines.25

Despite the fact that major donors do now appear to be listening to

research which challenges the assumption that aid brings stability,26

the damage may have already

been done through the ‘blurring of lines’ over an 8 to 10 year period. The point to draw from this is

that, while Guidelines can be useful for the humanitarian community in helping to underscore

commitments to IHL etc, it is not in the interests of militaries, governments or PK operations to support

these principles and uphold non-binding obligations if their tactical strategies are directly contradictory.

They will therefore either avoid investment in the civil-military processes that bring greater

accountability to these commitments, or actively block their progress. The answer to how this practice

is allowed to continue is linked to the next obstacle – perceived self-sufficiency due to size of an

organisation.

Perceived self-sufficiency

As mentioned above, a surfeit of funds, and pressure to spend money fast, can lead to distorted

priorities that lead to poor aid effectiveness. The research found that the size of an organisation can

also distort priorities at the expense of genuine collaboration. A number of aid organisations in the

study referred to their size and capabilities, implying that they are large enough to advocate their own

interests, protect their staff, arrange evacuation and leverage relationships with the government and

other stakeholders, without resorting to participating in demanding coordination efforts and subscribing

to Guidelines. Ironically these are the very organisations that offer the greatest potential value and

harm in the civil-military space.

Competition for funding among humanitarian agencies, in light of pressures on resources, can also

lead to a lack of collaboration around strategic issues such as civil-military coordination. Two INGO

directors commented that “funding independence” – in other words, a lack of reliance on particular

donors – allows an NGO more freedom to take a more principled stance on CIV-MIL issues. The

larger budget of MSF in Haiti during the response was used as an example:

“MSF is more an organisation with a strong independent identity. But this is tied up in

funding: MSF has 80 million Euros for Haiti, we have 6 million. They do an excellent job,

of course – really, really good. But they have the freedom to do what they like in a more

principled way [due to their financial resources].”

– INGO director, Port-au-Prince

Issues relating to both size and funding therefore skew the way priorities are set, and block the uptake

and interest in disseminating CIV-MIL Guidelines.

24

‘Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee,’ Testimony As Submitted By US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (Washington, DC, 6 February 2007), available at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1121> 25

Recent research has shown that a surfeit of funds or sources, such as with CERP, can cause pressure to spend money and distort priorities. In reality, there has been little transparency and accountability for the use of this money in Afghanistan, and the effectiveness of military-led aid efforts in contributing to the COIN strategy has recently been challenged through a number of high-profiled statements and reports. One US soldier recalls spending USD8 million of development funds during his one-year deployment to Afghanistan, only to have his ‘investment’ in local governance nullified by his successor, who “wanted to do things differently”. For a summary of the latest thinking on the counterproductive link between aid and stability, see the W ilton Park Conference Report – Thompson, Edwina (2010) ‘Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the effectiveness of development aid in COIN operations,’ Wilton Park Conference 1022 (March); Gordon, Stuart (2011) ‘Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province,’ (April). 26

US Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations (2011) Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan (8 June); see also an earlier US Congress review of PRTs, which demonstrates their short-sightedness. US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigations, ‘Agency Stovepipes versus Strategic Agility,’ April 2008.


Rotation cycles and talent retention

Short rotations and talent retention were cited as key obstacles to the uptake of the Guidelines across

every context. In the DRC, several senior officials spoke of the difficulty in attracting skilled

humanitarians to the country due to the francophone environment and the complexity of the conflict. It

was also noted that the francophone humanitarian community is culturally less inclined to engage with

the military, adopting a more isolationist, and less reflective, approach to CIV-MIL issues than the

Anglophone community. In the UN peacekeeping missions under review, a high turnover of

humanitarian staff and the short duration of deployments were cited as factors that lead to weak

institutional memory and contextual knowledge – two factors that were stressed as critical to an

appreciation for civil-military sensitivities, and the need for guidance.

An ICRC delegate in Afghanistan explained the immense challenge of raising awareness, and

disseminating guidance on humanitarian principles in complex theatres, where rotations are frequent,

and the size of the force is immense:

“The ICRC endeavours to build a dialogue with all parties to a conflict. This is for our

acceptance, access to victims, carrying out our humanitarian actions to meet most urgent

needs where we can, and for our own security. We do so in a very deliberate fashion by

trying to identify, to establish and to sustain personal contact with selected people who

have the ability to influence the humanitarian situation on the ground. ... Of course, our

dialogue with a global actor such as the US Military is daunting and there are no magical

solutions. We just have to keep at it in a slow and persistent fashion. We have made

some steady progress in our dialogue ... but have some way to go when you consider all

Training and Education institutions, Combatant Commands, Combat Training Centres,

etc – and I am only talking about the US Army. We try to maintain coherence and

continuity in our messaging in all phases of military operations from Pre-Deployment,

Employment and Post-Deployment activities, and so the circle continues.”

– ICRC Armed Security and Forces Delegate, Kabul

As this delegate rightly points out, to have proper effect, training needs to have continuity, and occur

before military personnel deploy. Indeed, many of the interview participants commented that the

sections on training in the Guidelines are only useful if they are taken into account by military and

humanitarian communities prior to deployment. It is too late to tell people that they ‘should’ have

undertaken certain training if it is not available in theatre. Alternatively, when it is available, it was

suggested that this section would provide people with a very useful guide on what is on offer – there

would just need to be accessible platforms for disseminating this information to all parties.

In terms of engagement with the US military, coverage of the full force has undoubtedly been

impossible for humanitarians over recent years. A recent development, however, has taken place

which may provide further opportunities to target a more substantial section of the US armed forces’

command structure, and disseminate or even ‘diffuse’ elements of the Afghanistan Guidelines among

the contingents to avoid repetition of past mistakes in the CIV-MIL space. In November 2010, the US

Secretary of Defense approved nine ‘Coin Qualification Standards’ (CQS), with the aim of providing a

better focus for units on priority areas in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan. According to the

former Director of the US Army’s COIN Centre, the most innovative of the CQS is Task 7 – “Create

Conditions for Stability”. Core to this task is the clear centrality of the CIV-MIL interface at the ground

level, which is an area that aid organisations can provide real value to education and training

initiatives. From mid-2011, the US Army/US Marine Corp’s COIN Centre at Fort Leavenworth will host

intensive training over a week-long period prior to each battalion’s deployment to Afghanistan. This is

the first time that every battalion will be exposed to the same training institution, even if for a short

period of time, before deployment to Afghanistan.


If such a high number of commanders can be reached in one training session, the exposure to

humanitarians with experience in Afghanistan may help the US armed forces to understand better the

sensitivities of civil-military engagement on the ground, and why for example humanitarians find it

difficult to follow the guidance found in the Liaison and Coordination Arrangements section of the

Afghanistan Guidelines, which stipulates that: “Given military hierarchy, humanitarian actors should

ensure that all communication and humanitarian advocacy is directed to the appropriate authorities

within the chain of command.” Humanitarians on the ground ask:

“But what is the chain of command? How do we find those people? And how can we be

assured that they are aware of who we are, what we do, and why we can’t do cooperate

in certain ways?”

– Humanitarian actor in Afghanistan

On an individual basis, there is a positive case of the US Army reaching out to the INGOs over a more

sustained period. The NGO/International Organizations Liaison officer at the NATO Training Mission-

Afghanistan/CSTC-A was offered a 6-month posting, but only accepted on the basis that it would be

extended to a 3-year post in recognition of the need to allocate appropriate time for building an

understanding of the context, along with relationships with the aid community. Unfortunately,

however, this has not led to a significant change in the state of affairs because fatigue has already set

in among aid workers, who are now slow to respond to such outreach. In the words of several people

interviewed for the study in Afghanistan, “the train has well and truly left the station”.

Propensity to learn lessons

Although every policy and research document seems to underscore the importance of learning

lessons, they continue not to be learned. Aid organisations are especially singled-out as disinclined to

learn, despite the many evaluations that take place in the sector. What is perhaps new from the

interviews is an alternative perspective about military personnel having their own issues in relation to

receiving and retaining information:

“Does the military retain information and guidance better than civilians? Maybe. Maybe. I

mean, yes, they have a vertical hierarchy and a culture based on SOPs. But remember:

militaries get rid of info, too. They lose the programming. Sometimes it just gets cleaned

off the hard-drive, or doesn’t get handed over for whatever reason to the next rotation.”

– Project Officer, EJOC, Office of the Chief of Staff, MINUSTAH

An interview with an official within the DPKO Best Practices Section also challenged the assumption

that security forces are more inclined to read and absorb guidance:

Now, the first thing I have to say on this is, there is – I think I can say with confidence –

universally a very low awareness of doctrine in general within the UN system. There’s just

not a culture of doctrine at the UN… that’s strongly the case at DPKO. There’s certainly

no corporate sense of doctrine, of guidelines. And of course, getting that willingness to

actually read, and implement that doctrine, is the hardest part.

– Team Leader, Guidance Team, DPKO Best Practices Section

The research’s investigation into the low adoption and awareness of the Afghanistan Guidelines also

suggests that lost memory, troop rotations, and lack of interest in written guidance are partly to blame.

In addition, despite a strong consultation process in-country that extended over several years and

involved US troops from the combatant commands and contributions to ISAF, a parallel process was

set in place ‘stateside’, in Washington D.C., spearheaded by the US peak body of INGOs, InterAction.

Negotiations resulted in the production of a separate set of Guidelines for relations between ‘US

Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile


Environments’. When asked why there was such little awareness of the Afghanistan Guidelines

among US troops on the ground, and more attention invested at the HQ-level in the “InterAction

Guidelines” following the approval of the former, a Colonel working with OSD Policy in the US

Department of Defense surmised:

“There has been a complete turnover of personnel in Afghanistan since the FRAGO was

issued regarding the joint country Guidelines. The problem is that a command reaches a

certain level of usefulness and appreciation of what went before them, and then an

entirely new crop of people arrives. The process is undone, and information is not

retained in the system.”

– US Colonel, US Department of Defense

An INGO advocacy advisor in Kabul suggested that the confusion around these two sets of guidelines

has created a “non-debate” and duplication of effort with little positive effect. In a cynical fashion, she

suggested that it is almost as though people wake up in the morning and ask, “Between the “ACBAR”

Guidelines and the “InterAction Guidelines”, which are we going to choose to do nothing about

today?”

Poor representation of the aid community by peak bodies is also a part of the problem. The relevant

person at InterAction claims in this case that:

“No one was talking about it. In theory, our NGOs were supposed to be bringing this to

light. And those reps weren’t talking to their field. Not surprising really – when I worked

with [a major US INGO], for seven years, we never knew we were even part of

InterAction!”

A seasoned humanitarian worker interviewed for the study put this down to “bad habits” that people

can develop in reaction to the demand for wide consultation in a very “crowded” sector. As mentioned

at the start of this section, a further issue to emerge is that it tends to be policy personnel who author

guidance, and they are perceived to be “writing from a distance”, whether it be from Kabul or

Khartoum, rather than Jalalabad or Juba. On the ground, the dynamics of a large-scale disaster or

complex emergency, in which the implementing aid workers find themselves, can create a polarising

effect, with some humanitarian workers electing to focus on practical tasks that at times translate to a

transactional attitude towards military, and others taking an extreme principled stance of avoiding

engagement altogether. Few lessons are shared between the two communities.

Instead, entrenched (and sometimes ineffective, or unprincipled) ways of operating persist. The

management of aid worker security in Somalia provides a good context from which to draw this

lesson. Somalia has no formal civil-military guidance, despite presenting a situation in which all

humanitarian agencies are using private militia groups for protection. This practice has continued for

over 16 years. While for good reason this context has been seen to present a clear situation of ‘last

resort’, there has been a lack of questioning of past practice and evaluations of what inadvertent harm

this prolonged use of local armed assets could have produced in the context.

In the UN system, humanitarian agencies operating inside integrated missions criticise what they

perceive as their diminished access to insecure or ‘contested areas’ and the whittling away of

humanitarian principles, due to the requirements on them to abide by certain SOPs on security and

escorts. According to UNDSS, roughly 94 per cent of North and South Kivu in DRC is off-limit without

UN escort. In other contexts, some INGOs continue to default to military support when in fact there

are other equally viable civilian alternatives. IRC’s former director of its rapid response team in South

Kivu lamented:


“CIV-MIL thinking often underestimates what humanitarians can do on their own. We

reached the farthest areas of the province without escorts.”

– Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Ottawa

There is some hope, however, that more dedicated reflection and action will be taking place on the

issue of armed escorts given the recent interest in reviewing escort procedures, and explorations into

the potential for integrating the existing international guidance on armed escorts27

into more practical

tools for people to use on the ground.

By way of conclusion to this chapter, it is helpful to recall that the methodology followed in the

research covered the content of the Guidelines through semi-structured interviews aimed at prompting

people without prior knowledge of the Guidelines to engage with the subject matter. This approach

revealed that there are no gaps in the current content. The research also highlighted that the

suggested operational arrangements contained in the Guidelines are perceived to be sound, but

difficult to follow without dedicated resources, and in light of the various constraints on the ground.

Questions therefore remain as to how awareness and adoption could be increased.

27

OCHA Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (September 2001)


Conclusion

International military and humanitarian assistance providers can expect to find themselves sharing the

same ‘space’ in complex environments – from conflict to protracted transitions out of conflict – in the

years ahead. While combat operations impose great obstacles to humanitarian access, the global war

on terror and reach of the US military, plus the scale and regularity of natural disasters, has made the

search for open dialogue and constructive relationships an urgent requirement. For this to succeed, it

will be essential to promote a greater understanding of, and sensitivity to, the operational norms and

imperatives of humanitarian relief and reconstruction providers among military commanders – and

vice versa.

The present study made one matter amply clear – that it is people, rather than organisations, who

engage in civil-military relations. At every level, then, the success of civil-military engagement will be

a function of how individuals relate and represent their respective organisational aims and objectives

to one another. Field practitioners under enormous pressure particularly need and warrant support,

which at the civil-military interface must include relevant guidance on how to conduct such

relationships between people of different cultures, mandates and expectations. Leaders in both the

civilian and military camps also require more support, for strong personal leadership is ultimately the

critical determinant of constructive civil-military relations. One strong example of leadership stands

out in the research – in stark contrast to his counterpart in the neighbouring area of operation, the

openness, energy and practical problem-solving ability of one Pakistani brigade commander led to a

successful break-down of barriers and innovation on shared humanitarian-military concerns – namely,

that of protecting civilians from imminent harm.

Training initiatives and workshops have the most promise in bringing this guidance to life, so it is

important to involve the most proactive and influential participants from both sides to engage and

practise together in-mission how to apply the discipline to specific issues that arise at the civil-military

interface. Repeating this experience in real life situations will reinforce the benefits, embed the

process, and build mutual understanding and respect.

A refined training process may reveal that the main benefit of existing country Guidelines is their

inherent beacon that focuses attention on the twin principles in civil-military engagement – distinction

and interdependence. These principles are likely to be held in tension across most mission contexts

for the foreseeable future. Due to the simple but clear message that is conveyed through these

principles, and the fluidity of situations on the ground which can quickly outpace the speed with which

country Guidelines are able to be amended, it is likely that the generic civil-military guidelines will

emerge as a more important doctrine to disseminate.

The research concludes on the note that each main party currently represented in the Guidelines –

namely, foreign militaries and humanitarian actors – should view the other through the lens of the local

community, whose perspective of each side is the main motivation for creating civil-military guidance

in the first place. Aid agencies seek local acceptance of their activities, as a form of self-protection,

while military forces seek the ‘hearts and minds’ of local people to help forge stability in conflict-

affected environments. While there is still more that needs to be done to understand local perceptions

of the civil-military interface, any changes to existing Guidelines should ultimately be determined by a

greater involvement of the local community.


Recommendations and future directions

The research has shown that, although the intent and principles of the Guidelines are welcomed, there

are various inherent limitations and obstacles to overcome before they influence practice. Some are

particularly difficult to address, such as politics, government doctrine and talent retention; others,

however, present opportunities for potential improvement.

The recommendations and possible future directions in this report concentrate on those issues that

are possible to tackle in the next five years. The report considers that these will either make an

immediate impact on the operational environment of the country contexts under review, or should be

considered as part of a longer term strategy for the international community. The recommendations

fall into three main areas for change: (1) increasing adoption of civil-military guidance; (2) improving

representation of key stakeholders; (3) strengthening civil-military coordination in the field; (4)

building and sustaining institutional memory. They are targeted at three main policy audiences –

the United Nations, the Australian Government, and the wider humanitarian community.

1. Adoption

Raise awareness and adapt the format of existing guidance.

Because written lists of guidelines have not been widely adopted in practice, this report

concludes that they should be refocused to incorporate an interactive training element,

enabled by today’s available technologies. During this process, the opportunity should be

taken to carry out some limited ‘rehashing’ and even ‘shredding’ where the benefits of

reverting to generic Guidelines outweigh the attraction of having time-limited country-specific

guidance.

At a global and regional level, knowledge and awareness of generic civil-military guidance

(e.g. the Oslo and MCDA Guidelines, IASC Reference Paper, SCHR Position Paper, OCHA

Discussion Paper on Armed Escorts) must also be raised, in conjunction with increased

support at an operational level for linked training initiatives and workshops in-country that help

raise awareness of the most useful guidance for each context.

People’s widespread lack of awareness of the existing international guidance on armed

escorts is evidence that this needs to be presented in a more practical format. The Australian

Government could use the opportunity to leverage its strengthened engagement in Africa by

supporting a specific review process of the civil-military situation and the use of private armed

escorts for protection in Somalia. There have never been country civil-military guidelines in

Somalia, the context presenting a situation in which all humanitarian agencies are using

private militia groups for protection. This practice has existed for over 16 years, and there is

no known effort to take stock of the inadvertent consequences.

Prioritise investment in the provision of training and “outreach education”.

Pre-deployment training for expeditionary military forces should focus more on the mission

context, including an actor mapping process, and involve a wider selection of civilian

practitioners. Greater civilian involvement, in turn, requires an increased commitment of

resources. For UN forces, a particular investment in protection of civilians and gender training

prior to deployment was seen to be vital in ensuring that peacekeeping personnel understand

and are committed to their role.

Training must be offered on an ongoing basis, with “refreshers and overviews” provided not

only at induction, but for the duration of military tours. ICRC pre-deployment briefs delivered

to military contingents on humanitarian principles before they head to the field are important,

but they require something ‘in situ’ to help bring those principles to life.


OCHA could develop information leaflets that explain the mandates and the various

components of the international community in a country context, including a flow chart and

“who’s who” documents. For complex UN mission contexts, this “outreach education” is seen

to be particularly important where the political, military and humanitarian components of a

mission are sometimes difficult to differentiate.

Given the size of the US footprint, the humanitarian community, through ICRC or peak bodies

and coalitions such as InterAction, should identify key entry points to US military and

government civilian personnel who are deployable to complex environments, and leverage the

best opportunities to gain the best coverage. Possible examples include the formal pre-

deployment Personnel and Readiness course that is run by the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, and the US military’s roll-out of the CQS, hosted by the US Army/US Marine Corp’s

COIN Centre at Fort Leavenworth, which includes week-long training sessions for each

battalion’s deployment to Afghanistan.

While many of the INGO representatives emphasised the need to train military personnel on

humanitarian principles, it was also highlighted that training for NGOs is critical, and not just

for those in charge of security. As an interim measure, there is immediate scope to

incorporate a civil-military component into pre-deployment or field safety briefings, which are

compulsory at least for all UN staff, and the majority of NGO staff.

In Africa, the Australian Government could engage relevant political decision-makers,

including the AU Peace and Security Council, AU regional peacekeeping training centres and

key TCCs, and support them in developing and implementing bespoke interactive training

programmes.

In South Asia, the Australian Government could also exploit its position as a leader in civil-

military learning and encourage other interested countries to introduce similar training

programmes and lessons exercises in leading TCCs, such as Pakistan and India.

Scale-up and further fine-tune OCHA CMCoord training.

The research revealed that the OCHA CMCoord training is showing strong signs of success in

helping to build greater mutual civil-military understanding. This training is particularly

valuable where it is offered in-country and on an ongoing basis, therefore it is recommended

that this is sustained in several key sites over an intensive period to gather case-study

evidence of the difference such training can make on the ground. The profile of those to be

trained should be revised to include more sector specialists, such as logisticians and

engineers.

2. Representation

Involve civil society in future development of Guidelines

CIVMIL Guidelines developed for complex environments ultimately serve the purpose of

delineating clear roles and safeguarding humanitarian action. Meanwhile, aid agencies rely

on the acceptance of the local community to continue operations and reach vulnerable

populations. A key stakeholder is therefore the local civil society and other national groups

who influence perceptions on the ground. It is important to achieve a greater understanding

of how these stakeholders perceive the rightful limitations of CIVMIL interaction in their

specific context.

Local perceptions will change in fluid environments and so both civilian and military

personnel must be flexible enough to adapt accordingly.

At a minimum, INGOs should actively encourage their implementing partners and other

national NGOs to participate meaningfully in future Guidelines processes, due to their ability

to bring a much-needed local understanding of how the international community’s ‘guiding


principles’ are interpreted by ordinary people; ultimately, this will introduce a ‘reality-check’

on the final content included in the Guidelines.

Involve domestic military and police forces, where appropriate, in future development of

Guidelines

A light revision of the Afghanistan Guidelines should be undertaken given the transition to

Afghan security force control; it is strongly advised that the scope of participation is broadened

to include a balanced representation of civil, military and police actors (including female

Afghan security forces). In terms of critical US military participation, the revision process

should aim to include experienced members of the Human Terrain and Female Engagement

Teams (HTTs and FETs), and representatives from CENTCOM and US Special Operations

Command (to incorporate learnings from the recent Village Stability Operations (VSOs) and

lay out clearly any exemptions for the Special Forces). As part of this process, best practice

and lessons from the 10+ years of an international military presence must be actively

considered.

3. Coordination

Address personnel and capacity issues.

A common refrain in the field is, “without a good CIMIC officer, there is little hope”. It is

recommended that DPKO and OCHA support the active recruitment of capable CIMIC

officers, and that the pool of CMCoord officers is broadened to include practitioners with a

lesser bias towards a past military career.

CIMIC officers must undergo more rigorous training on civil-military affairs, and when he or

she arrives to take up the post, it would be helpful to have a ‘shadow period’ where they work

alongside their predecessor. Time should be taken to introduce the new officer to the NGOs

and the various UN agencies.

Dedicated humanitarian staff could be appointed to liaise with the various armed actors,

mirroring the military and police’s efforts for liaison. Given the resource constraints, however,

the general consensus is that OCHA should supply these personnel.

Foster greater collaboration across the humanitarian sector.

INGOs should take up the challenge of converting competition into greater collaboration and

cooperation, by pooling their limited resources and working together on dilemmas that affect

all agencies in the same operating environment.28

This is a means to improving the overall

response and to creating a more coherent position vis-à-vis military interaction.

Some INGOs are testing innovative humanitarian decision-making processes to foster greater

collaboration and reflection in their interaction with armed actors, and to build institutional

memory on the navigation of key dilemmas in complex environments. These provide a

framework that tie existing commitments and principles into daily management practices; the

result is more nuanced decision-making, which is linked to clear action plans. OCHA should

support efforts to scale-up these initiatives by providing in-country contacts who might

facilitate the decision-making on issues such as escorts and use of military assets.

It is recommended that the Australian Government provide greater funding and policy support

for such efforts that influence the ability of INGOs to engage meaningfully on civil-military

issues. It might also consider supporting the creation of innovative funding streams in the

28

This is a key recommendation of a recent report pubished jointly by the APCMCOE and ACFID, the Australian peak body for NGOs. See Lipner, Michele & Louis Henley (2010) Working Better Together: An NGO Perspective on Improving Australia’s Coordination in Disaster Response, page 22.


Asia-Pacific region, such as ELHRA’s recently launched Humanitarian Innovation Fund grant

in the UK.

Review the civil-military coordination role of OCHA.

If OCHA is to deliver its civil-military coordination role more effectively, the leadership role of

CMCoord needs to be strengthened – this will involve bringing to light some of the internal

resistance to OCHA’s role in this space. It is recommended that a workshop be convened

among the main UN agencies, including WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF, to map the issues and

a plan for how to address the demonstrated need for country-specific fora that allows for more

strategic, long-term planning on civil-military engagement with all the actors in high-profile

contexts.

Boost IASC support to development of best practice.

It is recommended that the IASC considers supporting the development of a ‘best practice

note’ on how to develop future country-specific civil-military guidance. This would build on key

lessons gathered by the select number of field practitioners who have been involved in the

drafting and dissemination of previous Guidelines, such as how to generate ownership and

reflect the realities of the specific operating environment, while remaining useful at a

principled/framework level. The Afghanistan case provides one of the best examples of this

process; therefore engagement with the people who influenced that process between 2006-08

would be strongly advised.

The United Nations or IASC could help to establish a formal system for updating the generic

guidelines on an ongoing basis, following the model of the SCHR Position Paper, which is

updated to reflect significant changes in the civil-military landscape. Feedback from

practitioners outside policy circles, such as logisticians and supply chain managers, should be

actively sought and included in the revision process. Duplication of effort should also be

avoided by consulting those within the DPKO’s OMA who recently compiled the ‘UN CIMIC’

handbook – a “one-stop-shop for civil-military guidelines”.

Create opportunities and spaces for interactive dialogue.

Formal and informal opportunities exist for greater CIVMIL interaction that in turn will break

down mutual stereotyping. These can be encouraged through a focus on common tasks or

problems where collaboration will result in a more effective response. The use of simple tools

that help focus on specific tasks, such as decision-making and protection of civilians, should

be scaled-up.

4. Institutional memory

Learn from what works well, and improve on it.

There are a good number of encouraging innovations taking place from the ground-up. Rapid

reviews of these structures and processes should be undertaken to identify strengths and

overcome weaknesses. This could form ‘best practice’ to be shared with other theatres, and

improve on what works well in real-time.

Break the vicious circle of repeating the same mistakes.

CIV-MIL lessons-learned and review exercises should take place directly after crisis

situations. Existing evaluations (including Real Time Evaluations) take too long to conduct


and release from the onset of a crisis, and do not necessarily reflect the candid perspectives

of those who were present at the time of the event.

The UNDPKO’s Best Practices Unit (PBPU) should communicate on a continuous basis with

TCCs regarding its lessons-learned procedures, and actively assist in the dissemination of

best practice during the life of a mission.

NATO and bilateral military learning institutions (such as the Center for US Army Lessons

Learned and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute) should establish a

process for incorporating input and feedback from key interlocutors in the civilian humanitarian

and reconstruction community to update and revise doctrine, training, techniques and

procedures (TTPs).


THE RESEARCH TEAM

Dr Josiah Kaplan is a Research Fellow at Oxford University’s Humanitarian Innovation Project, where he

continues his doctoral work on issues related to non-Western military actors, US foreign policy, and

international peacekeeping. He has experience working with ODI and a range of humanitarian and UN

agencies, including UNDPKO, UNDP-Sierra Leone, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,

and Médecins Sans Frontiers – mainly in Africa. Josiah has worked with Beechwood on an assignment

instigated by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Pakistan and at Wilton Park conferences.

Dr Emily Paddon is a lecturer and Trudeau scholar in International Relations at the University of Oxford

where she is also a co-founder of the Oxford Central Africa Forum (OCAF). Her research focuses on UN

intervention and civilian protection in the Great Lakes region. She has conducted extensive field research

in the DRC, including projects for the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Corporates for Crisis, and

the Refugee Studies Centre (RSC) at Oxford. She is Deputy Course Director of the Rift Valley Institute

Great Lakes Course.

Dr Edwina Thompson has spent 15 years working as a humanitarian practitioner or applied academic in

complex environments - from South Central Somalia, Sudan, the DRC and Sri Lanka to Papua New

Guinea, Pakistan, Haiti and Afghanistan - and has supported teams remotely in their difficult negotiations

at the CIV-MIL interface. Edwina was one of a three-member international team that revised the

international Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response’s Guidelines on Humanitarian-Military

Relations. In her role as Director of Beechwood International she has worked on peacebuilding, security

sector reform and humanitarian projects with non-Western governments such as Afghanistan, Pakistan,

Papua New Guinea and Lebanon (in relation to Syria) and with Western governments on defining what

‘smart power’ looks like in relation to fragile states. Earlier in Edwina’s career, she worked for Amnesty

International and the Red Cross in refugee case management, and in 1998, she joined the British Royal

Navy as a Reserve Officer.

Jacob Townsend has developed unique expertise in developing networks of civil society organisations

across South Sudan and other countries experiencing conflict, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has

spent several years collecting and analysing security and political information from remote areas of South

Sudan, including through contact with a range of officials in the UNDPKO. Jacob has worked for the UN in

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Timor-Leste, and with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on issues

affecting Australia's security interests.

country civil-military guidelines: rehash, refocus, or shred?

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