classical journal -'the marines of athens' by john f. charles, 1948

7/27/2019 Classical Journal -'The Marines of Athens' by John F. Charles, 1948

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The Marines of AthensAuthor(s): John F. CharlesSource: The Classical Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Dec., 1948), pp. 181-188Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and SouthStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3292569 .

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I i I' I, 1 111a'----- ---.

._--- - --- -----~ ~-~- I- - Volume 44 Number 3

DECEMBER 19480

"TheEpibataehave andedand have the situation well in hand."T h e M a r in e s o f A t h e n s

JohnF. CharlesF A MARINE be definedas a fighteron ship-board, heoriginof marinesscontemporarywith that of warships, before the dawn ofhistory;for the first StoneAge man who puthimselfand his axe in a dug-outcanoe withmalice prepense against his neighborwas amarine.A narrowerdefinitionwould confinetheterm to regularlyorganizedoot-soldiers erv-ingon boardshipsespeciallydesigned or war.

Such were the soldiers who sailed on thewarshipsof ThutmoseIII in his Syriancam-paigns,'or those represented n combatwith"peoples of the sea" in the murals ofRamesesIII at Medinet Habu.2 Such alsowould be the hosts who sailedagainstTroyin the armadaof Agamemnon,kindred,nodoubt,of those very peoplesof the sea. Andwe would similarlyclassify the Vikingsintheir dragonshipswho terrorized he coastaland river towns of Europe n the ninth andtenth centuries of our era. But even suchwarriorsarenot what we usuallymeanwhenwe speak of marines. The Homeric heroesand the Norsemen were land-fighterswhousedships to get to the sceneof fighting,andusually rowed, themselves, the ships theysailed.3The marines of modern times arerathersoldiers especially trained to serve on ship-board, ntended to fighton or fromthe decksof ships,or to makeup landingparties oper-ating out of ships. They are clearly distin-

guished from the sailors who make up thecrew, as any Americanmarineor sailor willvery quicklyinformyou. At the sametime,they arenot merelyinfantrywho happentofind themselveson a ship; they are part ofthe total naval establishmentof the nation.We would expect such specialization o de-velopfirstin a highly organizedleetandin anation which regardeditself primarilyasasea-power.The first modernmarines underthis definitionappeared n the BritishNavyin 1664,in the midstof England'snaval warswith the Dutch.The AmericanMarineCorpswas formed at the very inception of theNavy in I775.Among the ancients the highest degreeof naval specializationwould be expectedfrom he Athenians,who were the sea-powerparexcellence;andthe sea-soldiers f Athensare the mainsubjectof this paper,althoughmarines n our sense of the term must haveappeared s earlyas the naval battlebetweenCorinth and Corcyra in 704.4The regularword for marine was epibates, which thelexicographersdefineas one who sails in atriremenot to row but to fight.5There arethree ways to use a warship:asa meansof locomotionto get to the fight;asa platformto fight on; and as a weapon tofightwith. The firsttheory is representedbythe Vikings and the Homeric warriors;inmodern times by the troop-carryingde-stroyersthat played so prominenta role in

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JOHN F. CHARLESthe Pacificcampaigns,notably the "TokyoExpress"of the Solomons'"Slot," and thehost of LC's and LS's of the United StatesNavy.

As between the two other uses, no finaldecision was reached until after the Napo-leonic Wars when the developmentof long-range guns madeboardingoperationsa prac-tical impossibility.Even so, as late as 1941,a boarders'battle took placein a Norwegianfjord between HM destroyer Cossackandthe Germanprison ship Altmarck.6On thewhole, the more skillful sea-faringpeopleshave tended to use the shipas a weapon,theless skillful as a platform.This was certainlytrue in antiquity.Fleet maneuvering eachedits highest development among the fifth-centuryAthenians;whereas he landlubberlyRomans n their one realnavalcontest reliedon the corvus(a combinationgrappling-ironand drawbridge)and the legionary soldier.Development f MarineTactics

OBvIoUSLYthe number of marines requiredand their employment depends largely onthe philosophyof naval tactics of the belliger-ents. In his descriptionof the battlebetweenCorinthandCorcyra tSybota n433,Thucyd-ides tells how both sides crowded theirdecks with hoplites, bowmen and javelinmen. He adds rather patronizingly that"they were organizedin the old manner,rather unskillfully . . it was more like aland than a sea battle."7Again before thebattlein the GreatHarborof Syracusen 413,the Athenians, realizingthat fighting in sonarrowa spacewould give little opportunityfor maneuver, embarkedlarge numbers ofinfantry.8Thoughancientauthorsarenot lavishwithdata on the number of marinesat varioustimes, it does appearthat it was greaterbe-fore the rise of Athenian sea,powerand theperfectionof fleet maneuvering han it waslater.At the battle of Ladein 494, betweenthe Persiansand the revolting lonians, weread that the Chian ships each carried 40chosen infantryas marines.9Fourteen yearslaterat Salamis,however, the new andmod-ernizedAthenian squadroncarriedonly 18

per ship, 14 hoplites and four archers.10 hePersian ships still had 30.1In the Athenian fleet of the fifth andfourth centuries, io seems to have been thestandardnumber,as we see froman inscrip-tion,'2and from severalpassageswhere wecandivide the numberof infantry n a landingby the numberof ships involved.l3On theexpeditionto Sicily in 415, however, for 60fightingships, we have 700 marines,14 hichwould mean II or 12 per ship.Of course a warship might carry moretroops than its regularcomplementof ma-rines. The Athenian fleet which operatedaroundthe Peloponnesus n 431 carried,inaddition, 400 archers,presumably our to aship.15These we may classify as marines,althoughthey were not regularly assigned.Quite frequently greater numbers sailedwith the fleet. In the expeditionto Orneaein 416 there were 600 men on 30 ships.16When the fleet sailedagainstMelos in 428,there were 2,ooo on 60 ships.17Twelve yearslateragainstthe same sland,30 shipscarried1,520 troops.18The expedition against Syra-cuse n 415had5,Ioosoldierson a totalof 134triremes.19n cases like these, of course, thetroopswere not servingas marines,but weremerely being transportedto the battlefield.Sometimes,no doubt, the fightingmen weredisposed through the whole fleet, and theships thus became temporarily transports.At other times, the troops are carried inspecialtransports,stratiotides, otablyin theSicilianexpedition,where we aretold that ofthe Ioo Athenian ships, 40 were transports.

SocialStatusof MarinesIT ISA TRUISMhat the class that fights thebattlesof the state is likelyto have socialandpoliticalstatus correspondingo its militaryimportance.There is certainly a connectionbetween the chariotwarriorsof the Homeric

poemsand the aristocraticmonarchyof theheroicage;between the pre-eminence f thephalanxn the classicalperiodand the hoplitefranchisewe meet with so frequentlyin thefifth century; and between the Athenianfleets rowed by the proletariat,and the ex-tremedemocracy f that city. It is only to be

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THE MARINES OF ATHENSexpectedthat the statusof the marinewouldvary according o the militaryand politicalsystem of the individualcity. Generallywefind that the marine has the same status asthe infantryman,which is appreciablyhigherthanthat of the commonsailor.In the Persian leet at the beginningof thefifthcenturythe crewsaremadeup fromthesubjectmaritimestates which furnishedtheships: lonians, Cilicians, Phoenicians andEgyptians.But the marinesare the elite in-fantryof the Empire,he Persians hemselves,the Medes, the Sacae,and the warriorcastesof Egypt.20Roughly the same situation obtained inthe Spartan fleet. At least an Athenianspeakern 369saysthat in a Spartan leet thecaptainsand probably he marineswould beLacedaemonians,ut the sailorseitherhelotsor mercenaries.21nd if Spartacouldfurnishcitizenmarineswhen hertotalpopulationhadfallento aboutI,Soo,22heundoubtedlydidsoin the preceding entury.There is otherevidencethat generally hemarinesrated as more importantthan thesailors.Aristotle tells us that sailorsneednotbe freemen, but that marines will be, andthat they controlthe ship.23n manypassagesthe marinesare bracketedwith the captainsand officersas the elite of the ship.24This isnot at all surprising n a state like Spartawhose social and economic system wouldpermitno fullcitizento be a seaman.Butevenin democraticAthens the marines eemto bein some ways a privileged group, althoughthe distinction is not so clear-cut. BeforeSalamis t is to the marines,not the sailorsthat Themistoclesmakeshisrallyingspeech.25When the oratorLysias is accusingan op-ponent of never having served the state, hesays that he was neither horsemannor hop-lite, neithercaptainnor marine.26When theSicilianexpeditionis about to leave Athens,the libations aremadeby the commanders-andthe marines.27Some of these remarks, .g. those referringto the eve of Salamisand the departure orSicily, are to be explainedby the fact thateverysailorhadaspecificpostandajobto do,whereas he marines,beingmerelypassengers

until the shipwas in action,would be freetohearspeechesand makeibations.Sailorsand Marines

BUT WAS THERE any real distinction ineconomicclass between sailorsand marines?Specifically,we know that the sailors ofAthens were from the lowest propertyclass,the thetes.Were the marines hetes, or werethey fromthe class above, the zeugitae, .e.regularhoplites drawn from the catalog,ormuster-roll?Two passagesseem to make it clearthatthe marineswere thetes. In describingthemuster of the Athenian forces at Corcyra n4I5, Thucydides distinguishes clearly theI,500 hoplites from the muster-rolls28romthe 700 thetes epibataeof the 60 fightingships.29 ut in the summer f 412,whenAthe-nian navalfortunes were at their lowest ebbbefore Aegospotamoi, Leon and Diomedonsailedwith anAthenianfleetto Chioshavingon boardmarinesdraftedcompulsorily romthe muster-rolls.30It seems obvious that the procedurein415 before Athens had sufferedany navallosses and when she was preparinghe might-iest armada n her history would be morenormal han that of 412after the tremendousloss in ships and seafaringmen at Syracuse.In 412, when half her empirewas in revolt(andAthens thus cut off fromher usualre-cruiting groundsfor sailors)every availablethete was needed for the rowing bench;whereasthe hopliteclass,which hadsufferedless severely and was not needed for otherservice at present,mightwell be draftedforshipboardduty.31The theory that marines were usuallydrawn fromthe hoplite class,32 nd that theuse of thetes in 415 was unique33r at leastthe firstoccasion,34an scarcelybe basedonthese two passages.Sometimesan argumenthas been drawnfromThucydides'statementthat the marineswho died in Aetolia in 426 were "the bestmen who fell in this war."35The word forbest is ji8XrLOTro,hich can refer to socialclass,of course."This war"obviouslymeansthe ArchidamianWar. If we take "best" in

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J1OHNF. CHARLESthe sense of social status, the statement36sincomprehensible,or no matter what classthese men belonged o, it wouldnot be supe-rior to thatof the regularhopliteswho fell atPotidaeaor Deliumor Amphilpolis.But it isperfectlyunderstandablef we interpret t asreferringto military virtue,37 or they maywell have been a specialgrouppickedfromthe whole corpsof marines.38We can only conjecturewhat the exactorganizationndmakeup f the MarineCorpswas. The epibataewere probablya groupofabout ,500oo-2,ooohetes, equipped by thestate and trainedin shipboard ighting,andperhapsorganized n tribes like the hoplites.When.a ship was to sail, its trierarchwoulddraft his quota of marines,like his citizensailors, from the tribal rolls. I would con.jecture that the somewhatprivilegedstatusof the Athenian marinesmay have been inpart due to their being Athenian citizensingreatermeasurethan the seamen,who hadthe reputationof being largelymercenaries.39SailorsNon-Combatants

THESAILORSndoarsmennormallydidnotparticipate n the fighting, but occasionallythey carriedarms40ndnot infrequentlywereprovidedwith armsby the commanderf theexpedition and employed as light-armedtroops41or even as hoplites.42Herodotus,possiblyexaggerating,describes he crews ofall the Persian leet as armed n theirnationalfashion.43 his, of course, did not makema-rinesof such seamen, incetheiremploymentas soldiers was incidental and exceptional.The same custom exists in modernnavies,where partiesof blue-jackets reoccasionallyusedas landingparties.44The tactics and armamentof marineswhen used as landing parties calls for nospecial comment, for they fought like anyother land troops, with whom, of course,they were often brigaded.The sameis trueof boarders'battles, which Thucydidestellsus weremuch ikeland battles.45n the meleeof maneuvering hips, the marinesmadeuseof arrows, avelins,and long-thrusting pearsagainstenemymarinesandeven the oarsmenin so far as the latter were not sheltered

by a sort of armorbelt.46When a grapplingironwas used. o immobilize n enemyvesselin orderto board,it was, of course,the ma-rines who operated t.47In manyaccountsof navalexpeditionswearetold that extrahopliteswent along,and,once landed,no distinction would be madebetween the two forces. Even more often nomentionis madeof the size of the landforceandwe arethus unable o tellwhetherregularhoplites were included or not. Neverthelessthere areenoughcampaignsn which we aretold that marinesaloneparticipated,or mayreasonably onjecture hat this was the case,to give us some idea of the role of the sea-soldiersin the building and defense of theAthenianempire.We aretoldnothingaboutthe compositionof the force that landedfromships and de-feated the Persiansat Mycale in 479. It isclearhoweverthat:at the very timewhen thePlataeacampaignwas going on, no hoplitescould have been spared to serve with thefleet, and that the fightingmust have beendone by the marinesand such Ionianand is-land Greeksas hadjoinedtheircountrymen.48To the marinesmust also be assigned thesiegeandcaptureof Sestoson the Hellespontin the following winter, since it was con-ductedby the Atheniancontingentfromthesame fleet.49A few yearslater Cimonwon avictorymuch ikeMycale at the mouthof theEurymedonRiver in Pamphylia.The mainaction was fought on land by troops disem-barked romthe 2oo Atheniantriremeswhenthe Persiansdeclineda sea battle. The bulk

of thesemen wereof coursemarines,althoughPlutarchtells us that the ships had been es-peciallyreconstructedo carrymoresoldiers.50Landing Parties

IN ATHENS'FIRST onflict with the Pel-oponnesiansn the middleof the fifthcenturythe marineswere prominent.The descentonHalieisin 459 was a landingfromships, un-doubtedlyby marines.51he siege of Aegina(458-7) requiredregularhoplites, of course;but the original andingandinvestingof thetown seems to have been made by marines.For Thucydides tells us that immediately

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THE MARINES OF ATHENSafter their naval victory off the island, theAthenians landed and besiegedAegina. It isimprobable hat extra hoplites would havebeencarriedon shipswhich expecteda navalengagementwith a fleet as efficient as theAeginetanandlargeenoughto lose70 ships.52The Athenians probablyhad 1oo ships, giv-ing a marine force of about iooo, strongenoughto start preliminary iege operationsagainsta demoralizedity.The expeditionof 2ooshipssentbyAthensin 459 to assist the Egyptianrevolt againstPersiacarriedno troops but marines;and tothem is due the credit of capturingMemphisandholding t fornearly iveyears.53Pericles' expedition to the CorinthianGulf in 453 in which he attackedSicyonandjoined the Achaeans in a campaignagainstOeniadaewas a marinecampaignf the ioootroops54really sailed on ioo triremes, asPlutarch ells us.55

Throughout the PeloponnesianWar theAthenian marineswere constantlyemployed.This is particularlyrue of the ArchidamianWar, from 431 to 421; for during that timethe Athenian fleet had almost undisputedcontrol of the sea,and full-dressnavalbattleswere few. Athenian strategy called for con-stant nuisanceraidson exposedpointsof theenemy coast, and occasionalseizureof forti-fied posts and beachheads rom which moreextensive campaigns nland could be organ-ized.Suchoperationswere the natural askofmarines hen as now.Marines Alone

THERE ARE SOME cases in which figuresgiven makeit clear that only marines wereinvolved. These include a sweep of ioo tri-remes around the Peloponnese in 431;56 anexpeditioninto Acarnaniain the winter of429/8 by Phormio and 400 marines from thesquadronat Naupactus on the CorinthianGulf;57 he voyage of Demosthenes in 424throughthe CorinthianGulf, when he failedto get his 400 marinesand an armyof alliesto Boeotia n timefor the Deliumcampaign.58In some other campaignsno forces otherthan marinesare mentionedor implied,andthey very probablyshouldbe assigned o the

marines.In the summerof 431 a fleet of 30operated off Locris, landing marines whoseizedThroniumand Atalante and defeatedin pitched battle the field force of the Lo-crians.59The first expedition sent to blockthe revolt of Mitylene in 428 consistedof 40ships,and apparentlyno troopsbut marines,althoughreinforcementswere soon broughtin fromLemnosandImbros.60n 428AsopusraidedaroundLaconia o Oeniadaeand Leu-cas, where he finallylost his life and part ofhis marine contingent.61At the time ofBrasidas' eizureof Amphipolis n 424 it wasthe timely arrivalof Thucydides'eight shipsand their marinesthat preventedthe fall ofEion.62Ominously indicative of a common em-ployment of marinesin the fourth centurywere two small expeditions to Caria, in430/29 and 428, partly to put down piracy,but chieflyfor what the Athenians quaintlyreferred o as "silvercollecting."Bothendeddisastrously.63During the first Athenian expedition toSicily in 427-23, Athenian participation nthe landfightingwas confined o the marineswho won a numberof successesin landingoperations:at Mylae and Locris n 426, andMessina n 425.64The battle of Cyzicus in 410, where theSpartansost the best partof a fleet of 60 andtheir admiralMindaros, was chiefly a landbattlebetween the marinesof Alcibiadesandthose of Mindaros.65Perhaps he most elaboratemarineexpedi-tion of the war was that conductedby De-

mosthenes n a squadronof 30 shipsin 426.66With his 300marinesas anucleus,andgather-ing a force of Acarnanians ndotherallies,heoperated againstLeucasand finallyAetolia,where he met disaster, osingnearlyhalf hiscontingent.67 he shipsandsurvivingmarineswere sent home. The following winter De-mosthenes,commandinga force of westernallies, inflicted a catastrophicdefeat on theAmbraciotsand their Peloponnesianallies.68The only Athenian force specificallymen-tioned was a groupof 60 archers.69 ut the"few Athenians"70later mentioned as re-ceivinga third of the spoil,71 ndas departing



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JOHN F. CHARLESwith Demosthenes72eemto play a more im-portantrole in the story than we would ex-pect of 60 light-armed rchers. t seemsveryprobablethat Demosthenes also had underhis commandthe 200 marines from the 20shipsof Aristoteles which were operating nthe sameregionat the time.73

Marinesat PylosTHE PYLOS-SPHACTERIAcampaignin 425eventually involved all branches of theAthenianforces n largenumbers,butit seemslikelythat the originalseizureand defenseofPylos was made largely by marines,againunderDemosthenes.We aretold that40shipswere despatchedto Sicily under commandof Sophoclesand Eurymedon.74 o force ofhoplites is mentioned, and as the earliersquadronto Sicily had carriednothing butmarinesand seamen, t is likely that this onedid too,75especiallyas Thucydidesmakes tclear that it was ships that were needed inSicily.76After Pyloshad beenhastilyfortified,the generalssailed off leaving Demostheneswith five ships to hold the place.77Demos-thenes aterdecreasedhisnumberby sendingtwo ships with a call for help to the fleet atCorcyra.78At the time when the Pelopon-nesiansmadetheir firstattack,Demostheneshad armedhis sailorsas best he could, andhad received a reinforcementof 40 Messe-nians roma passingprivateer.79nmakinghispreparationsor defensehe picked60 hoplitesto preventa landingat the oneplacewhere itcould be expected; the rest, and the light

armed, guarded the stockade.80ProbablyDemostheneshad go hoplitesunder his com-mand: he 40 Messeniansand the 5omarinesfrom the ships, provided that he had heldbackthe marines romthe two ships sent toCorcyra.81n additionhe had somethingbet,ter than Soosailorsarmedas skirmishers.t isquite reasonable hat when the attack camehe employedtwo thirds of his shocktroopsto beat offthe landing.Sinceno othersoldiersarementioned,andthe figuresagreewith theassumption hat only marineswere present,it seemslegitimateto credit that corpswiththe initialcaptureof Pylos.

The activities of the marinesn the Corin-thian War of 395-86 can also be traced. In394 after their victory over the Peloponne-sians off Cnidus, Pharnabazusand Cononsailed among the islands expelling Spartanharmostsand garrisons,a job that must havebeen done by marines, hough probably ewwere from Athens.82 n the next springtheysailed to Greece with a large fleet "havinghiredin additiona largemercenary orce."83Since this was not for a land campaignbutmerely o raidthe enemyshore,the mercenar-ies were undoubtedly Greeks hired as ma-rines to stiffen a fleet made up largely oforientalseamen;just as Cyrus a few yearsearlierhadhiredGreekmercenarieso stiffenthe armywith which he hadwarreduponhisbrother.These samemarines eizedCythera,a grievousblow to Sparta.84The expeditionof Thrasybulus n 390/89which restored Athenian control in theHellespontandLesboswas madewith a forceof 400 marines rom40 ships,and includedasignalvictoryoveragroupof Spartanmarinesunder Therimachus.But it ended with thedeathof Thrasybulus nd apartof hisforce na landingat Aspendus.85It would be exaggerated,of course toclaim as a marinecampaignevery Athenianexpeditionwhich made a landing in enemyterritory. The most striking Athenian suc-cesses of the ArchidamianWar, the captureof Sphacteria,Cythera and Methone, andthe raidson Thyrea and other places, weremadewith largeforces; hat againstCythera,forexample,hada few cavalryand2,ooohop-lites, of which only 600 could have beenmarines.86 he force that raidedthe Corin-thiad andtook Methone was madeup of 200horsemenand 2,000 soldiers, 800 of themmarines.87 ut it is obviousthat in any cam-paign n whichmarinesmadeup roughlyone-third of the force, and which consisted ofwinning a beach-head n a hostile shore,themarines,especially trained for this type ofwarfare,must have playeda very importantrole.And it is worthyof note that the actionswhich reallyhurt Spartaand gave the Athe-nians the upper hand in this war were justsuchcampaigns.

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THE MARINES OF ATHENSNOTES

(Referencesare to Thucydides unless otherwise speci,fied.)1Breasted,Ancient Recordsof Egypt(Chicago, I906)2. 454, 460, 468, 472 and n. a.2 Breasted, Historyof Egypt (New York, 1912) fig.

I23.3 I. 10. 4.4 I. 3. 4.5E.g. Hesychius, Harpocration,Suidas,s.v. bria3rTaL.6 Cf. G. Cant, The War at Sea (New York, I942)57-68.7 I. 49. I-2.8 7. 67. 2.9Herodotus 6. 5.10PlutarchThemistocles 4.11Herodotus7. 184.12 CIA II. 959.13 3. 91. I and 95. 2; 2. 69. I and 92. 7 and Io2. I;4. 3I. I, 32. 2 and 76.I and ioI. 3; XenophonHellenica4. 8. 25 and 28.14 6. 43.15 2. 23. 2.166. 7. 2.17 3. 91. I185. 84. I.19 6. 43.20 Herodotus 7. 96, I84; 8. I30; 9. 32.21XenophonHellenica7. I. I2.22K. J. Beloch,GriechischeGeschichte, (Berlin, 922)282.23 Politics I327 b.24XenophonHellenica . i. 28; Herodotus 8. 83; Plu,tarchPericles28.25Herodotus 8. 83.26Lysias6. 46.276. 32. I.286. 43: (K KaraXoyov.29 raxeat.308. 24. 2: iKKaraX6'yovaa'YKoarovs.31So G. Busolt, GriechischeGeschichte 3 (Gotha,1904) 872.32 A. Cartault,La triereathenienne Paris, I88I) 236;andR. Sargent n CP 22 (1927) 274.33P. Paris in Daremberg-Saglio.v. epibatae.34E. Meyer, Forschungenur alten GeschichteHalle,1899) 2. I59-60.353. 98. 4: cf. 3. 95. 2.

36 Poppo-Stahledition (Leipzig, 875) ad loc. Crawley(Modern Library edition) translates "by far the bestmen"; J. B. Bury, History of Greece (London, 1927)p. 424: "the very finest men," which does nothing toclearup the questionof class.37J. Classen's edition (Berlin, I875) ad loc.: "tap-fersten";Busolt op. cit. 3. 1069: "tiichtigsten."38Jowett in his commentary Oxford, I80o) refersto"chosenbattalions."39 I. I21. 3.40 7. I. 3: ^croi U7! eLxov 5rXa.41 4. 32. 2; Xenophon Hellenica 1. 2. 1.

42 8. 17. I; 7. I. 3; XenophonHellenicaS. I; i. I. 24.437. 89-95.44 Cf. the British naval detachment at Antwerp in1914: W. Churchill, The World Crisis (New York,I93I) pp. I96 ff.46 I. 49. I-2.46 7. 70. 5. On protection for oarsmen,cf. C. Torr,Ancient Ships (Cambridge,I895) p. 5S. Plato LachesI83 D-i84 A mentions a long spearwith a sickleon theend asunusual.It mayhave beenintended to cut enemyrigging.Cf. CaesarBell.Gall. 3. I4.474. 25. 4; 7. 62. 3; 7. 65. 2.48No figures are given for the Greek forces. Thefleet is numbered as iio by Herod. 8. 131; as 25o byDiodorus ii. 34. 2, a discrepancythat Glotz (Histoiregrecque2 [Paris, I938] 93) explains by the addition ofthe Atheniancontingent between the muster at Aeginaand the departurefrom Samos. Glotz (apparently ol-lowing How and Wells Commentaryon Herodotus[Oxford, 1912] 2. 395-396) speaks of 6000 Greeks atMycale; Beloch(op. cit. 2. X. 59 n. 2), using Diodorus'figures,of 2000ooo-3000.eloch's figureswould give i8-27 marinesper ship; Glotz' an averageof 24. The num,ber on the Athenian ships at Salamiswas i8 accordingto Plutarch Themistocles14. It is certainly unlikelythat morehopliteswouldhavebeenwith the fleetduringthe Plataeacampaign.49 Herodotus 9. 114, 117--18.50Plutarch Cimon 12; Diodorus II. 60-62; Belochop. cit. 2. 2. i6o.51Whether an Athenian defeat as in i. I05. I, or avictory, Diodorus II. 78. 2.52I. 105. 2. The Aeginetans had won the prize ofvalor at Salamisonly i8 yearsbefore:Herodotus8. 93.53 I. 04, 109.54 I. III. 2.65Pericles 9. Diodorus II. 8s. I gives the numberas50. Busolt (3. 334 n. 3) rejects both figures on thegroundsthat no such numberof ships could have beenstationed at Pagae. But Thucydides' concise narrativedoes not say that they were a permanentsquadronthere. A cruise of Iootriremeswasnot unusual,andtheymaysimplyhave been at Pagaeon theirway somewherewhen the decisionwas madeto send them to the Corin-thian Gulf.562. 23, 25, 30,31; Diodorus 12. 42. 7-8; 43.572. 102.8 4. 77. I-2; IxI. 3-4.59 2. 26, 32; Diodorus I2. 44. I-2.603 3.2; 3. 5. - 2.61 3. 762 4. io6. 3-4.63apyvpo)oyit. 2. 69; 3. I9.4 3. 90. 3; 3. 99 and 103. 3; 4. 25. I.65 Xenophon Hellenica i. I. 17-I8.66 3. 9 . I.673. 94-98.68 3. I5-II4.

69 Ibid., 107. 1.70 Ibid., 4.71Ibid.,1 63. .

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9/9

I8888 W. C. s.. C. s.72Ibid., 114. .73Ibid., Io5. 3;112. 7.744. 2. 2.75 The mention of taxiarchs here might give the imapressionthat regular nfantrywere involved, as officers

of this nameregularlycommanded he tribalregiments.But if the regular nfantrycommanderswere with thefleet, the implication would be that the bulk of theAthenian field force was with them, several thousandat least, obviously impossibleon so small a numberofships as 40. These taxiarchs must have been navalofficersof some kind, as suggested by Lammert(PWs.v. raoilapxos)on the evidence of XenophonHellenicai. 6. 29, 35; I. 7. 30, 3I. Similarsuggestion by Arn,apudPoppo.Stahledition of Thucydides, ad loc.

72Ibid., 114. .73Ibid., Io5. 3;112. 7.744. 2. 2.75 The mention of taxiarchs here might give the imapressionthat regular nfantrywere involved, as officersof this nameregularlycommanded he tribalregiments.But if the regular nfantrycommanderswere with thefleet, the implication would be that the bulk of theAthenian field force was with them, several thousandat least, obviously impossibleon so small a numberofships as 40. These taxiarchs must have been navalofficersof some kind, as suggested by Lammert(PWs.v. raoilapxos)on the evidence of XenophonHellenicai. 6. 29, 35; I. 7. 30, 3I. Similarsuggestion by Arn,apudPoppo.Stahledition of Thucydides, ad loc.

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ULYSSESWAS the first draftdodger,declared anofficer of Selective Service Headquarters in aninterview published by UP September 30, andMoses held the first draftregistration.He relatedhow Ulysses feigned insanity but dropped thepretense when his infant son was placed in thepath of his plow, and then was requiredto joinwith other Greeks n the TrojanWar. The officermade it clear that the draft bill of Moses wasdivinely ordered;and he did his best to make acaseagainstthe crafty son of Laertes:"If Ulyssestried to pull a stunt like that nowadays, it wouldconstitute willful violationof the selective serviceact. Under such a violation, Ulysses would beliable to five years imprisonment,or a fine of$io,ooo, or both."ANOTHER HOMERIC ECHO was detected in theSATURDAY EVENING POST of September 18 byProfessorVirginia Moscrip of the University ofRochester. From the story "Tugboat AnnieRaces the Tide" by Norman Reilly Raine, she

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ULYSSESWAS the first draftdodger,declared anofficer of Selective Service Headquarters in aninterview published by UP September 30, andMoses held the first draftregistration.He relatedhow Ulysses feigned insanity but dropped thepretense when his infant son was placed in thepath of his plow, and then was requiredto joinwith other Greeks n the TrojanWar. The officermade it clear that the draft bill of Moses wasdivinely ordered;and he did his best to make acaseagainstthe crafty son of Laertes:"If Ulyssestried to pull a stunt like that nowadays, it wouldconstitute willful violationof the selective serviceact. Under such a violation, Ulysses would beliable to five years imprisonment,or a fine of$io,ooo, or both."ANOTHER HOMERIC ECHO was detected in theSATURDAY EVENING POST of September 18 byProfessorVirginia Moscrip of the University ofRochester. From the story "Tugboat AnnieRaces the Tide" by Norman Reilly Raine, she

76 3. IIS. 3-4.77 4. . 2.78 4. 8. 3.79 4 ..80 4. 9. 2.81As Classensuggests; though why he says the ma-rines were "in derRegel 20 auf die Triere" is not clear.82 Xenophon Hellenica4. 8. i-2. Though some maybe included in the vbrrpecriasmentionedin HellenicaOxyrhynchia . i.83XenophonHellenica4. 8. 7.84Ibid., 4. 8. 8.85 Ibid., 4. 8. 25-30.864 53. I.87 4. 42. I.

76 3. IIS. 3-4.77 4. . 2.78 4. 8. 3.79 4 ..80 4. 9. 2.81As Classensuggests; though why he says the ma-rines were "in derRegel 20 auf die Triere" is not clear.82 Xenophon Hellenica4. 8. i-2. Though some maybe included in the vbrrpecriasmentionedin HellenicaOxyrhynchia . i.83XenophonHellenica4. 8. 7.84Ibid., 4. 8. 8.85 Ibid., 4. 8. 25-30.864 53. I.87 4. 42. I.

quotesa speech ecallinghewordsof TiresiasoOdysseus Od. II.I2I-I32): "Not me, brother!I'mgonnafinishup the businesso' Bullwinklean' that loggin'company; hen I'll take mesavin's, uch as they is, an'sticka oarovermeshoulder n'startwalkin'nland, n' when some-bodyaxesmewhat the oar s, thereI'll settle!"

AND NOW A VERGILIAN parallel, submitted byProfessorE. AdelaideHahnof HunterCollege.The New York HERALDTRIBUNE f October I7reportedhat volumesof carbondioxide mittedover MammothHot Springs n YellowstoneNationalParkwerekillingbirds lyingoverthesprings.Dr. HahncitesVergil.Aen.6.239-241,on LakeAvernus:quam super haud ullae poterant impunevolantestendere terpinnis; alis sesehalitusatrisfaucibusffundensuper dconvexaerebat.Sherefersalsoto the descriptionf the place nLucretius,.738-768.REFLECTING N the dearth of news from Ru-mania,where "foreigncorrespondentsre nolongerwelcome," he writerof "Topicsof theTimes" n the New YorkTIMESf October30,slyly suggests hat there may be a revivalofinterest n the reportsof a formerBalkan or-respondent,omeof whosedispatches ereaptlytitledTristia.He describes he circumstancesfOvid's relegatioand toucheson someof thestrange hingsthat he found to report.Tomis"hadbeenvisitedby Medea, hesame ruel adywho wasappearingnthe New York heatreust

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quotesa speech ecallinghewordsof TiresiasoOdysseus Od. II.I2I-I32): "Not me, brother!I'mgonnafinishup the businesso' Bullwinklean' that loggin'company; hen I'll take mesavin's, uch as they is, an'sticka oarovermeshoulder n'startwalkin'nland, n' when some-bodyaxesmewhat the oar s, thereI'll settle!"

AND NOW A VERGILIAN parallel, submitted byProfessorE. AdelaideHahnof HunterCollege.The New York HERALDTRIBUNE f October I7reportedhat volumesof carbondioxide mittedover MammothHot Springs n YellowstoneNationalParkwerekillingbirds lyingoverthesprings.Dr. HahncitesVergil.Aen.6.239-241,on LakeAvernus:quam super haud ullae poterant impunevolantestendere terpinnis; alis sesehalitusatrisfaucibusffundensuper dconvexaerebat.Sherefersalsoto the descriptionf the place nLucretius,.738-768.REFLECTING N the dearth of news from Ru-mania,where "foreigncorrespondentsre nolongerwelcome," he writerof "Topicsof theTimes" n the New YorkTIMESf October30,slyly suggests hat there may be a revivalofinterest n the reportsof a formerBalkan or-respondent,omeof whosedispatches ereaptlytitledTristia.He describes he circumstancesfOvid's relegatioand toucheson someof thestrange hingsthat he found to report.Tomis"hadbeenvisitedby Medea, hesame ruel adywho wasappearingnthe New York heatreust

PLEASE URN TOPAGE194

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classical journal -'the marines of athens' by john f. charles, 1948

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