CIVPRO CASES 08-10-15RULE 141. VILLAROSA v. BENITOTHIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 136426. August 6, 1999.]E.B.VILLAROSA& PARTNER CO., LTD.,petitioner,vs. HON. HERMINIO I.BENITO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132, Makati City and IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondent.Capuyan Quimpo & Salazarfor petitioner.Ermitao Sangco Manzano & Associatesfor private respondent.SYNOPSISIn this instant petition, E.B.Villarosaand Partner Co., Ltd. contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person because the summons intended for it was improperly served on its Branch Manager.The Court agreed with petitioner. Designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule must be strictly observed, service must be made to one named in the statute.Petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant, can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.SYLLABUS1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; SUMMONS; "AGENTS" NO LONGER AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE SUMMONS FOR CORPORATION. Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager; a corporation's assistant manager; ordinary clerk of a corporation; private secretary of corporate executives; retained counsel; officials who had charge or control of the operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager; or the corporations Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. In these cases, these persons were considered as "agent" within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DESIGNATION OF PERSONS OR OFFICERS AUTHORIZED TO RECEIVE SUMMONS FOR DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS, LIMITED. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule, . . . It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. (Delta Motor Sales Corporationvs. Mangosing, 70 SCRA 598 [1976])3.ID.. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION NOT ACQUIRED WHERE SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS MADE ON BRANCH MANAGER. Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.4.ID.; ID.; ID.; INEFFECTIVE SERVICE OF SUMMONS; FILING OF MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE. The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This doctrine has been abandoned in the case ofLa Naval Drug Corporationvs. Court of Appeals, et al.; which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules, Section 20 now provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance." The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.D E C I S I O NGONZAGA-REYES,Jp:Before this Court is a petition forcertiorariand prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated August 5, 1998 and November 20, 1998 of the public respondent Judge Herminio I.Benitoof the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 and praying that the public respondent court be ordered to desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 98-824.LLjurPetitioner E.B.Villarosa& Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein.1Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City2but the Sheriff's Return of Service3stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B.Villarosa& Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SABULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons."On June 9, 1998, defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss4alleging that on May 6, 1998, "summons intended for defendant" was served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee of defendant at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be made.Meanwhile, on June 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default5alleging that defendant has failed to file an Answer despite its receipt allegedly on May 5, 1998 of the summons and the complaint, as shown in the Sheriff's Return.On June 22, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss6alleging that the records show that defendant, through its branch manager, Engr. Wendell Sabulbero actually received the summons and the complaint on May 8, 1998 as evidenced by the signature appearing on the copy of the summons and not on May 5, 1998 as stated in the Sheriff's Return nor on May 6, 1998 as stated in the motion to dismiss; that defendant has transferred its office from Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro to its new office address at Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro; and that the purpose of the rule is to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.On August 5, 1998, the trial court issued an Order7denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. Defendant was given ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading. The trial court stated that since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its branch manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.cdasiaOn August 19, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Motion for Reconsideration8alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director.On August 27, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to defendant's Motion for Reconsideration9alleging that defendant's branch manager "did bring home" to the defendant-corporation the notice of the filing of the action and by virtue of which a motion to dismiss was filed; and that it was one (1) month after receipt of the summons and the complaint that defendant chose to file a motion to dismiss.On September 4, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Reply10contending that the changes in the new rules are substantial and not just general semantics.Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Order dated November 20, 1998.11Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motions to dismiss and for reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because the summons intended for it was improperly served. Petitioner invokes Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Private respondent filed its Comment to the petition citing the cases ofKanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc.vs. NLRC12wherein it was held that service upon a construction project manager is valid and inGesulgonvs. NLRC13which held that a corporation is bound by the service of summons upon its assistant manager.The only issue for resolution is whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.When the complaint was filed by Petitioner on April 3, 1998, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was already in force.14Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:"When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner,general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel." (underscoring supplied).This provision revised the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that:"SECTION 13.Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president,manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors." (underscoring supplied).Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory constructionexpressio unios est exclusio alteriusand argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.We agree with petitioner.Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager15; a corporation's assistant manager16; ordinary clerk of a corporation17; private secretary of corporate executives18; retained counsel19; officials who had charge or control of the operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager20; or the corporation's Chief Finance and Administrative Officer21. In these cases, these persons were considered as "agent" within the contemplation of the old rule.22Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.cdrepThe cases cited by private respondent are therefore not in point.In the Kanlaon case, this Court ruled that under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail on the party himself; if the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent, summons shall be served on such person. In said case, summons was served on one Engr. Estacio who managed and supervised the construction project in Iligan City (although the principal address of the corporation is in Quezon City) and supervised the work of the employees. It was held that as manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner such that summons for petitioner was validly served on him as agent and authorized representative of petitioner. Also in the Gesulgon case cited by private respondent, the summons was received by the clerk in the office of the Assistant Manager (at principal office address) and under Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule), summons may be made upon the clerk who is regarded as agent within the contemplation of the rule.The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:23". . . the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to 'be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.'The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word 'agent' of the corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose very appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service isan illustration of the need for this revised section with limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from an independent practitioner." (underscoring supplied)Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee, stated that "(T)he rule must be strictly observed. Service must be made to one named in (the) statute . . .".24It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case ofDelta Motor Sales Corporationvs. Mangosing,25the Court held:"Astrict compliancewith the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . . . .The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, 'to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.' . . . .The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation. . . . ." (underscoring supplied).Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper.26Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firm's branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at the firm's principal office. InFirst Integrated Bonding & Ins. Co., Inc.vs. Dizon,27it was held that the service of summons on the general manager of the insurance firm's Cebu branch was improper; default order could have been obviated had the summons been served at the firm's principal office.And in the case ofSolar Team Entertainment, Inc.vs. Hon. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et al.28the Court succinctly clarified that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, "strictest" compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (on Priorities in modes of service and filing) is mandated and the Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.cdtaiAccordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons.29Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.30This doctrine has been abandoned in the case ofLa Naval Drug Corporationvs. Court of Appeals, et al.,31which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules.Section 20 now provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance." The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and void.32WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the public respondent trial court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 98-824, and all its orders and issuances in connection therewith are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.Melo, Vitug, PanganibanandPurisima, JJ.,concur.|||(E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Benito, G.R. No. 136426, [August 6, 1999])

2. GALURA v. MATH AGROFIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 167230. August 14, 2009.]SPOUSES DANTE and MA. TERESA L.GALURA,petitioners,vs.MATH-AGROCORPORATION,respondent.DECISIONCARPIO,Jp:The CaseThis is a petition1for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition challenges the 25 January and 28 February 2005 Resolutions2of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88088 dismissing the petition3for annulment of judgment and final order and denying the motion4for reconsideration, respectively, filed by Dante and Ma. Teresa L.Galura(SpousesGalura). The SpousesGalurasought to annul the 27 June 2001 Decision5and 10 November 2004 Order6of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 3, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 473-M-2000.The FactsIn March 1997, the SpousesGalurapurchased broiler starters and finishers worth P426,000 fromMath-AgroCorporation (MAC). The SpousesGalurapaid MAC P72,500. Despite several demands, they failed to pay the P353,500 unpaid balance.MAC engaged the services of a certain Atty. Ronolfo S. Pasamba (Atty. Pasamba) for the purpose of collecting the P353,500 unpaid balance from the SpousesGalura. In his letter7dated 13 November 1998 and addressed to the SpousesGalura, Atty. Pasamba stated:Ang kinatawan ng aming kliyente naMathAgroCorporation na may tanggapan sa Balagtas,Bulacan,ay lumapit sa aming tanggapan at kinuha ang aming paglilingkod bilang manananggol kaugnay sa inyong natitirang pagkakautang sa kanila na halagangP353,500.00,na hanggang sa ngayon ay hindi pa ninyo nababayaran.Dahilan dito, kayo ay binibigyan namin ng limang(5)araw mula sa pagkatanggap ng sulat na ito upang bayaran ang aming nabanggit na kliyente, pati na ang kaukulang tubo nito. Ikinalulungkot naming sabihin sa inyo na kung hindi ninyo bibigyang pansin ang mga bagay na ito, mapipilitan na kaming magsampa ng kaukulang dimanda sa hukuman laban sa inyo upang mapangalagaan namin ang karapatan at interes ng aming nabanggit na kliyente.THAECcInaasahan namin na bibigyang pansin ninyo ang mga bagay na ito.In its complaint8dated 21 June 2000 and filed with the RTC, MAC prayed that the RTC order the SpousesGalurato pay the P353,500 unpaid balance and P60,000 attorney's fees and litigation expenses. In the complaint, MAC stated that "defendants are both of legal age, spouses, and residents of G.L. CalayanAgroSystem Inc., Bo. Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac, and/or 230 Apo St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, where they may be served with summonses and other processes of this Honorable Court".Clerk of Court Emmanuel L. Ortega issued the corresponding summons9dated 15 August 2000 requiring the SpousesGalurato file their answer within 15 days, otherwise judgment by default would be taken against them.On 17 September 2000, Court Process Server Faustino B. Sildo (Sildo) went to 230 Apo Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, to serve the summons. There, DanteGalura's father, DominadorGalura, told Sildo that the SpousesGalurawere presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. On 22 September 2000, Sildo went to G.L. CalayanAgroSystem, Inc. in Barrio Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac to serve the summons. Sildo learned that the property had been foreclosed and that the SpousesGalurano longer resided there. On 26 September 2000, Sildo went to Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, to serve the summons. Sildo served the summons on Teresa L.Galura's sister, Victoria Lapuz (Lapuz). In his return of service10dated 4 October 2000, Sildo stated:THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on September 22, 2000 the undersigned went to the given address of the defendant at G. Bo. Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac for the purpose of serving the summons, issued in the above-entitled caseThat the defendants is [sic] no longer residing at the given address and their property was foreclose [sic] by the Bank,That on September 17, the undersigned went to the given address of the defendants at 230 Apo St., Sta Mesa Heights, Quezon City;That the defendants is [sic] not residing at the given address as per information given by Mr. DominadorGalurafather of the defendants.That Mr. DominadorGaluragive [sic] the address of the defendant where they are presently residing at Tierra Fura [sic] Subd. at Tandang Sora, Quezon City.That on September 26, 2000 the undersigned went to Tandang Sora where the defendants presently residing [sic] Tierra Fura [sic] Subd. for the purpose of serving the summons, complaint together with the annexes,That Ms. Victoria Lapuz sister-in-Law of DanteGalurareceived the copy of said summons, as evidence [sic] by her signature appearing on the face of original summons.aDIHCTThe SpousesGalurafailed to file their answer. In its Order dated 23 January 2001, the RTC declared the SpousesGalurain default and allowed MAC to present its evidenceex parte.In its 27 June 2001 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of MAC and ordered the SpousesGalurato pay the P353,500 unpaid balance, P30,000 attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation. The RTC stated:Based on the facts and findings established above, the Court is of the considered view that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is in order. Likewise, this Court strongly believes that the failure of the defendants or their refusal to file any answer to the complaint is a clear admission on their part of their obligation to the plaintiff. It may even be safely presumed that by their inaction, defendants have no valid defense against the claim of the plaintiff such that under the circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to pass judgment on the issued [sic] based on the evidence on record.The award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 is justified under the premises in view of the court's finding that the defendants acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the following:1.The sum of P353,500.00 representing the unpaid purchase price of the poultry products plus interest of 6% per annum accruing from the date of defendants' receipt of the first demand letter on October 18, 1998 until full payment is made;2.The sum of P30,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and3.The costs of suit.SO ORDERED.11In its Order dated 10 November 2004, the RTC issued a writ of execution to implement the 27 June 2001 Decision. The RTC stated:In support of the motion, it is alleged among others that on June 27, 2001, the Decision was rendered in the above-entitled case, has become final and executory on August 1, 2001 and was duly recorded in the Book of Entry of Judgment.On the other hand, the fifteen (15) days period given to the defendants, from receipt of the order of the Court dated November 11, 2003 had already lapsed without complying therewith, hence his right to file comment on the Motion for Execution filed by the plaintiff was waived.For reasons heretofore made apparent, the Court resolves to grant the motion for execution.12cCTIaSOn 13 December 2004, the SpousesGalurareceived "from their parents-in-law" a copy of the 10 November 2004 Order. On 6 January 2005, the SpousesGalurafiled with the Court of Appeals a petition13for annulment of judgment and final order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The SpousesGaluraclaimed that the RTC's 27 June 2001 Decision and 10 November 2004 Order were void for two reasons: (1) the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because the substituted service of summons was invalid, and (2) there was extrinsic fraud because MAC made them believe that it would not file a case against them. The SpousesGalurastated:The assailed decision dated June 27, 2001 and the order of execution dated November 10, 2004, issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 473-M-2000, should be annulled pursuant to Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Court.1.The assailed decision and order of execution are null and void having been rendered and issued despite failure of the courta quoto first acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners, on account of the improper service of summons upon them.2.The assailed decision and order of execution were rendered with extrinsic fraud in attendance. The owner ofMath-Agroand herein petitioners had an existing agreement for the settlement of their obligation, and herein petitioners were complying with the agreement.Math-Agro, despite the commitment of its owner not to file the complaint, did so. Such an act on the part ofMath-Agroand its owner constitutes extrinsic fraud, as it prevented petitioners from defending themselves in the action lodged with the courta quo.14The Court of Appeals' RulingIn its 25 January 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals held that there was a valid substituted service of summons, that the allegation of extrinsic fraud was unbelievable, and that the SpousesGalurashould have first availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief. The Court of Appeals stated:1.Petitioners make no denial that insofar as known by the respondentMath-AgroCorporation, their address at the time of the filing of the complaint on July 25, 2000 was at G.L. CalayaanAgroSystem Inc., Bo. Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac and/or 230 Apo St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. They likewise do not deny the proceedings taken by Court Process Server Paulino Sildo as narrated in his Return of Service dated October 4, 2000 . . . .Under the circumstances, we believe, and so hold, that there was a valid substituted service of summons on the petitioners as defendants in the case. To begin with, the petitioners never took the bother of informing the creditorMath-AgroCorporation that they were leaving their address known to the latter and were moving on to another place of residence, so the process server took it upon himself to diligently trace the whereabouts of the petitioners until he was able to effect service of the summons on Victoria Lapuz, a sister-in-law of petitioner DanteGaluraat Tierra Fura Subdivision in Tandang Sora, Quezon City, where the defendants were then residing. What they claim is that substituted service was immediately resorted to without the process server first exhausting all opportunities for personal service which is improper. . . .cDAITSFar from being improper, the actuations taken and the efforts exerted by the process server are highly commendable for he started looking for the petitioners in the addresses given by them to their creditor and alleged by the latter in the complaint. Finding them not to be there, he methodically traced their whereabouts until he came upon their latest address at Tierra Fura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, as given by DominadorGalura, father of petitioner-husband, DanteGalura. Quite conspicuously, the petitioner do not deny that they were residing at that place when service of the summons was made on petitioner-husband's sister-in-law, Victoria Lapuz.xxx xxx xxx2.Petitioners' posturing that they are at the receiving end of extrinsic fraud because they had an existing payment arrangement with their creditor,Math-AgroCorporation, that the latter would not resort to judicial action for as long as payments are being made by them and that they had been paying their obligation until July, 2004 is hard to be believed in. This is but a bare and vagrant allegation without any visible means of support for nowhere in their petition, as well as in their joint affidavit of merit, did they attach copies of the corresponding receipts of their payments. . . .3.Prescinding from the foregoing records also show that contrary to Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners have not availed themselves first of the ordinary remedies of a motion to lift order of default, new trial, appeal, petition for relief before resorting to this extra-ordinary action for annulment of judgment.15The SpousesGalurafiled a motion for reconsideration dated 14 February 2005. In its Resolution dated 28 February 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.Hence, the present petition.The IssuesIn their petition dated 8 April 2005, the SpousesGaluraraised as issues that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that (1) there was a valid substituted service of summons; (2) the allegation of extrinsic fraud was unbelievable; and (3) they should have availed first of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief.In its Resolution16dated 27 April 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Court of Appeals from implementing its 25 January and 28 February 2005 Resolutions.The Court's RulingThe petition is meritorious.The SpousesGaluraclaim that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because the substituted service of summons was invalid. They stated:The resort of the process server to what purports to be a substituted service, when he left the summons with Ms. Victoria Lapuz is clearly unjustified, as it was premature. He could still serve the summons personally upon herein petitioners had he exerted efforts to do so. Unfortunately, he did not, and he immediately resorted to a substituted service of the summons. Clearly, the acts of the trial court's process server contravenes the rulings espoused by the Honorable Supreme Court that summons must be served personally on the defendant as much as possible.AHECcTxxx xxx xxxThe process server, in his return of service above, did not state that his attempts to serve the summons by personal service upon the petitioners at the Tierra Pura Subdivision address failed, and that the same could not be made within a reasonable time. He likewise failed to state facts and circumstances showing why personal service of the summons upon the petitioners at the said address was impossible. Finally, he also failed to state that Ms. Victoria Lapuz, the person with whom he left the summons, was a person of sufficient age and discretion, and residing in the said Tierra Pura address.17The Court agrees. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that, "Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him." Section 7 states:SEC. 7.Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.InSandoval IIv. HRET,18the Court enumerated the requisites of a valid substituted service: (1) service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant; (3) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion; (4) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendant's place of residence; and (5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the return of service. InSandoval,the Court held that "statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed".In the present case, there is no showing that personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible. On 17 September 2000, Sildo went to 230 Apo Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, to serve the summons. There, DominadorGaluratold him that the SpousesGalurawere presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Despite being told of the SpousesGalura's correct address, Sildo still went to G.L. CalayanAgroSystem, Inc. in Barrio Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac to serve the summons, only to find out that the property had already been foreclosed and that the SpousesGalurano longer resided there. On 26 September 2000, Sildo went to Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, and, without any explanation, served the summons on Lapuz. In his 4 October 2000 return of service, Sildo stated:That on September 26, 2000 the undersigned went to Tandang Sora where the defendants presently residing [sic] Tierra Fura [sic] Subd. for the purpose of serving the summons, complaint together with the annexes,That Ms. Victoria Lapuz sister-in-Law of DanteGalurareceived the copy of said summons, as evidence [sic] by her signature appearing on the face of original summons.Whenever practicable, the summons must be served on the defendant in person. Substituted service may be resorted to only when service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible. Impossibility of prompt service should appear in the return of service the efforts exerted to find the defendant and the fact that such efforts failed must be stated in the return of service. InKeisterv. Judge Navarro,19the Court held:Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void. This process is solely for the benefit of the defendant. Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.SaHTCEThe summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this method of service is "in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute". Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him.In the present case, there was no showing in the return of service (1) of the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time; (2) that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was served, was of suitable age and discretion; and (3) that Lapuz resided in the residence of the SpousesGalura. Consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the SpousesGalura, and thus the SpousesGaluraare not bound by the RTC's 27 June 2001 Decision and 10 November 2004 Order.20The SpousesGaluraclaim that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that they should have first availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief. The SpousesGalurastated:In the case at bar, the assailed decision was rendered in June 27, 2001. More than three years have passed since the said decision, clearly the remedies for a motion to lift order of default, new trial, appeal, petition for relief, have already prescribed. Herein petitioners, therefore, are left only with the remedy of a petition for the annulment of judgment.21The Court agrees. When a petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the petitioner does not need to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief are no longer available through no fault of his or her own. InAnchetav. Ancheta,22the Court held:[T]he Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jursdiction*of the RTC over the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.TAaHIEIn a case where a petition for annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondentor over the nature or subject of the action,the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own.This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order an any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. (Emphasis supplied)WHEREFORE, the Court (1)GRANTSthe petition, (2)SETS ASIDEthe 25 January and 28 February 2005 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88088, (3)MAKES PERMANENTthe temporary restraining order issued on 27 April 2005, and (4)SETS ASIDEthe 27 2001 Decision and 10 November 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 3, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 473-M-2000.SO ORDERED.Puno, C.J., Corona, Leonardo-de CastroandBersamin, JJ.,concur.|||(Spouses Galura v. Math-Agro Corp., G.R. No. 167230, [August 14, 2009], 612 PHIL 1112-1127)

3. CITIZENS SURETY v. HERRERAEN BANC[G.R. No. L-32170. March 31, 1971.]CITIZENS'SURETY& INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, SANTIAGO DACANAY, and JOSEFINA DACANAY,respondents.Dayos, Tesoro & Gloria, Jr.for petitioner.Respondent Judgefor and in his own behalf.SYLLABUS1.REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ACTION IN PERSONAM; PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS REQUIRED. We agree with respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent a personal service of summons within the forum. We have explicitly so ruled in Pantaleonvs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 765, pointing out without such personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of due process. In the aforecited case this Court, through Justice Roberto Concepcion, now Chief Justice, ruled as follows: . . . "It is a well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntary submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants. 'Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. . . . 'Although a state legislature has more control over the form of service on its own residents than nonresidents, it has been held that in actions in personam . . . service by publication on resident defendants who are personally within the state and can be found therein is not "due process of law," and statute allowing it is unconstitutional.' (16A C.J.S., pp. 786, 789; Emphasis our)"2.CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CREDITORS; REMEDY AGAINST ABSCONDING DEBTORS. The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, Sec. l(f), in which case, the enactment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective But because debtors who abscond and conceal themselves are also quite adept at concealing their properties, the dismissal of the case below by respondent Judge should be set aside and the case held pending in the court's archives, until petitioner as plaintiff succeed in determining the whereabouts of the defendants' person or properties and causes valid summons to be served personally or by publication as the case may be. In this manner, the tolling of the period of prescription for as long as the debtor remains in hiding would properly be a matter of court record, and he can not emerge after a sufficient lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to profit from his own misdeed and claim prescription of his just debt.D E C I S I O NREYES, J.B.L.,Jp:PetitionerCitizens'Surety& Insurance Company, Inc. seeks review of an order of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 77134 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, entitled "Citizens'Surety& Insurance Co., Inc.vs. Santiago Dacanay and Josefina Dacanay," dismissing the complaint for lack of proper service of summons upon defendants.The record is to the effect that petitioner had filed its complaint in the Court below, alleging that at request of defendant Santiago Dacanay, the plaintiffSuretyCompany had issued itsSuretyBonds Nos. 4942 and 4944, the first, in favor of Gregorio Fajardo to guarantee payment of a P5,000-promissory note executed by said Dacanay, and the second, in favor of Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co., to guarantee payment of another promissory note in like amount; that in consideration of said bonds, Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed Indemnity Agreements, binding themselves jointly and severally to indemnify plaintiff for any losses, costs and expenses which it might sustain in connection with the issuance of the bonds aforesaid, with interest at 12% per annum; that as additional security, the Dacanays mortgaged to plaintiff a parcel of land in Baguio City, covered by Certificate of Title No. T-8116, the mortgage having been duly recorded; that the promissory notes were not paid .and as a result, plaintiffSuretywas compelled to pay P5,000.00 to Gregorio Fajardo and P4,081.69 to the Manufacturers' Bank; that the Dacanays failed to reimburse theSuretyfor such payments, whereupon theSuretycaused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage to pay its claim of P12,941.69 representing its payments, interest and stipulated liquidated damages: that at the foreclosure sale, the land mortgaged was sold to plaintiff, as highest bidder, for the sum of P2,000.00 leaving an unsatisfied balance of P10,491.69, that plaintiff sought to recover from defendants Dacanay, plus 10% thereof as attorneys' fees, and the costs.At petitioner's request, respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the newspaper Philippines Herald. But despite the publication and deposit of a prepaid copy of the complaint at the Manila post office, defendants did not appear within the period of 60 days from last publication, as required by the summons.Plaintiff then asked that defendants be declared in default; but :instead, the Judge, by order of May 16, 1970, asked it to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, the suit beingin personamand defendants not having appeared. Then, on May 29, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the case, despite plaintiffSurety's argument that the summons by publication was sufficient and valid under section 16 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.We agree with respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner, beingin personam, the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent apersonalservice of summonswithinthe forum. We have explicitly so ruled inPantaleonvs. Asuncin, 105 Phil. 765, pointing out without such personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of due process. In the aforecited case this Court, through Justice Roberto Concepcin, now Chief Justice, ruled as follows:"Apart from the foregoing, it is well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly inpersonam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum. is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.'Due process of law requirespersonalservice to support a personal judgment, and. when the proceeding is strictlyin personambrought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties,personalservice within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case isessential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. . . .'Although a state legislature has more control over the form of service on its own residents than nonresidents, it has been held thatin actions in personam . . . service by publication on resident defendants,who are personally within the state and can be found thereinis not "due process of law,"and astatute allowing it is unconstitutional.' (16A C.J.S., pp. 786, 789; Emphasis ours.)"The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, section 1(f), in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceedingin remorquasi in remand the summons by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective.But because debtors who abscond and conceal themselves are also quite adept at concealing their properties, the dismissal of the case below by respondent Judge should be set aside and the case held pending in the court's archives, until petitioner as plaintiff succeeds in determining the whereabouts of the defendants' person or properties and causes valid summons to be served personally or by publication as the case may be. In this manner, the tolling of the period of prescription for as long as the debtor remains in hiding would properly be a matter of court records and he can not emerge after a sufficient lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to profit from his own misdeed and claim prescription of his just debt.WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the case issued by the Court below is hereby set aside, and in the interest of justice, the proceedings are ordered suspended, to be held pending until the plaintiff petitioner succeeds in ascertaining the whereabouts of the defendants and/or locating properties of the same, to enable proper summons to be issued conformably to this Opinion. No costs.Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, VillamorandMakasiar, JJ., concur.DizonandCastro, JJ., reserve their votes.|||(Citizens' Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera, G.R. No. L-32170, [March 31, 1971], 148 PHIL 381-386)

4. PNOC v. SANTOSFIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 170943. September 23, 2008.]PEDRO T.SANTOS, JR.,petitioner,vs.PNOCEXPLORATION CORPORATION,respondent.D E C I S I O NCORONA,Jp:This is a petition for review1of the September 22, 2005 decision2and December 29, 2005 resolution3of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.HDCTAcOn December 23, 2002, respondentPNOCExploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro T.Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 69262, sought to collect the amount of P698,502.10 representing petitioner's unpaid balance of the car loan4advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent's motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication.Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate5and an affidavit of service of respondent's employee6to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner's last known address.When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved that the case be set for the reception of its evidenceex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated September 11, 2003.Respondent proceeded with theex partepresentation and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer". He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondent's evidenceex partebe stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted.Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied with the rules on service by publication. Moreover, pursuant to the September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in default for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner's answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. He contended that the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. He imputed the following errors to the trial court: taking cognizance of the case despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes, particularly the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity and justice.During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit.7Meanwhile, on September 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision8sustaining the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied reconsideration.9Thus, this petition.Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely, lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes including the September 11, 2003 order and preference for technicality rather than justice and equity. In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actionsin rem,not actionsin personamlike a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not respondent's messenger.The petition lacks merit.PROPRIETY OFSERVICE BY PUBLICATIONSection 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 14.Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any actionwhere the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, orwhenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulationand in such places and for such times as the court may order. (emphasis supplied)STcEICSince petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.Petitioner invokes the distinction between an actionin remand an actionin personamand claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an actionin rem. Petitioner is wrong. Thein rem/in personamdistinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable.10Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule toin remactions only.11This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam,in remorquasi in rem.12Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19,13Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:. . . an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons bypublicationis complemented by service of summons byregistered mailto the defendant's last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address."The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective,the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the actionagainst him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:SEC. 20.Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer".14This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.ENTITLEMENT TONOTICE OF PROCEEDINGSThe trial court allowed respondent to present its evidenceex parteon account of petitioner's failure to file his answer within the prescribed period. Petitioner assails this action on the part of the trial court as well as the said court's failure to furnish him with copies of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings.The effects of a defendant's failure to file an answer within the time allowed therefor are governed by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect of Failure to Plead) of the Rules of Court:SEC. 3.Default; declaration of.If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.SEC. 4.Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedingsbut not to take part in the trial. (emphasis supplied)If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed to file his answer on time. That was in fact why he had to file an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration andto Admit Attached Answer". But respondent moved only for theex partepresentation of evidence, not for the declaration of petitioner in default. In its February 6, 2004 order, the trial court stated:ADSTCaThe disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely ordered that "despite and notwithstanding service of summons by publication, no answer has been filed with the Court within the required period and/or forthcoming.["]Effectively[,] that was a finding that the defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was in default for failure to file an answer or any responsive pleading within the period fixedin the publication as precisely the defendant [could not] be found and for which reason, service of summons by publication was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of the summons. In other words, it was reasonable to expect that the defendant will not receive any notice or order in his last known address. Hence, [it was] impractical to send any notice or order to him.Nonetheless, the record[s] will bear out that a copy of the order of September 11, 2003 was mailed to the defendant at his last known addressbut it was not claimed. (emphasis supplied)As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to permitting respondent to present its evidenceex partebut in effect issued an order of default. But the trial court could not validly do that as an order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party.15Since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default order should have been issued.To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in default is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who has not been declared in default be entitled to such notice. But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not known or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be done.16Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.17Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.18Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in default, he could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his last known address but it was unclaimed.CORRECTNESS OFNON-ADMISSION OF ANSWERPetitioner failed to file his answer within the required period. Indeed, he would not have moved for the admission of his answer had he filed it on time. Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission.Petitioner's plea for equity must fail in the face of the clear and express language of the rules of procedure and of the September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is available only in the absence of law, not as its replacement.19Equity may be applied only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Puno, C.J., Carpio, AzcunaandLeonardo-de Castro, JJ.,concur.|||(Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corp. , G.R. No. 170943, [September 23, 2008], 587 PHIL 713-724)

5. RAPID CITY v. VILLAFIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 184197. February 11, 2010.]RAPIDCITYREALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner,vs. ORLANDOVILLAand LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA,1respondents.DECISIONCARPIO MORALES,Jp:Sometime in 2004,RapidCityRealty and Development Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . .mandamusand damages against several defendants including Spouses Orlando and LourdesVilla(respondents). The complaint, which was docketed at the Regional Trial Court of AntipoloCityas Civil Case No. 04-7350, was lodged at Branch 71 thereof.After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, Gregorio Zapanta (Zapanta), court process server, resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents' househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. Thus Zapanta stated in the Return of Summons:THIS IS TO CERTIFY that onSeptember 24, 2004, the undersigned caused the service of summons together with a copy of the complaint with its annexes to defendant Spouses Lourdes Estudillo Paez-Cline and OrlandoVillaat their given address at 905 Padre Faura Street, Ermita Manila, asper information given by two lady househelps who are also residing at the said address,the defendant spouses are not aroundat that time. On the 27th of September, 2004, I returned to the same placeto serve the summons.I served the summons and the copy of the complaint with its annexes to the two ladies(The same lady househelp I met on Sept. 24, 2004) but they refused to sign to acknowledge receipt and they refused to tell their name as per instruction of the defendants. With me who can attest to the said incident is Mr. Jun Llanes, who was with me at that time.2. . . (emphasis and underscoring supplied)Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default" which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005.cDIaASMore than eight months thereafter or on January 30, 2006, respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default,3claiming that on January 27, 2006 they "officially receivedall pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. Motion to Dismiss of the Solicitor General and the ORDER dated May 3, 2005 granting the Motion to Declare [them] in Default." And they denied the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to receive the documents.4By Order of July 17, 2006, the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did not file an Answer, drawing petitioner toagainfile a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial courtagaingranted by Order of February 21, 2007.On April 18, 2007, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons.The trial court denied respondents' Omnibus Motion by Order of May 22, 2007 and proceeded to receiveex parteevidence for petitioner.Respondents, viacertiorari,challenged the trial court's February 21, 2007 and April 18, 2007 Orders before the Court of Appeals.In the meantime, the trial court, by Decision of September 4, 2007, rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.By Decision of April 29, 2008,5the appellate court annulled the trial court's Orders declaring respondents in default for the second time in this wise:In assailing the orders of the trial court through theirMotion to Lift.. . and later theirOmnibus Motion. . . the petitioners [herein-respondents] never raised any other defense in avoidance of the respondents' [herein petitioners] claim, and instead focused all their energies on questioning the said court's jurisdiction.Thelatter motionclearly stated prefatorily their counsel's reservation or "special appearance to question jurisdiction" over the persons of the petitioners. "A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court."6(citation omitted; italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied)Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of August 12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition for review oncertiorari,arguing in the main that respondents, in filing thefirstMotion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.SHTaIDThe petition is impressed with merit.It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 20.Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.AndPhilippine Commercial International Bankv. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al.enlightens:Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer,for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, isconsidered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however,is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such thata party who makes aspecial appearanceto challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:(1)Special appearanceoperates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;(2)Accordingly,objections to the jurisdiction of the courtover the person of the defendantmust beexplicitly made,i.e.,set forth in an unequivocal manner; and(3)Failure to do soconstitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.7(italics and underscoring supplied)In theirfirstMotion to Lift the Order of Default8dated January 30, 2006, respondents alleged:xxx xxx xxx4.In the case of respondents, there is no reason why they should not receive the Orders of this Honorable Court since the subject of the case is their multi-million real estate property and naturally they would not want to be declared in default or lose the same outright without the benefit of a trial on the merits;5.It would be the height of injustice if the respondents is[sic]denied the equal protection of the laws[;]HTAIcD6.Respondents must be afforded "Due process of Law" as enshrined in the New Constitution, which is a basic right of every Filipino, since they were not furnished copies of pleadings by the plaintiff and the Order dated May 3, 2005;xxx xxx xxx9and accordingly prayed as follows:WHEREFORE, . . . it is most respectfully prayed . . . that the Order dated May 5, 2005 declaring [them] in default be LIFTED.10Respondentsdid not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of April 29, 2008 isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.Let the original records of Civil Case No. 04-7350 be remanded to the court of origin, Regional Trial Court of AntipoloCity, Branch 71.SO ORDERED.Puno, C.J., Nachura,*BersaminandVillarama, Jr., JJ.,concur.|||(Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation v. Spouses Villa, G.R. No. 184197, [February 11, 2010], 626 PHIL 211-217)

6. PALMA v. GALVEZTHIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 165273. March 10, 2010.]LEAHPALMA,petitioner,vs. HON. DANILO P.GALVEZ, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 24; and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO,respondents.DECISIONPERALTA,Jp:Assailed in this petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Orders dated May 7, 20041and July 21, 20042of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 24, granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent Psyche Elena Agudo and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.On July 28, 2003, petitioner LeahPalmafiled with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of somebody else. Defendants filed their respective Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private respondent Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them.On February 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private respondent was out of the country.3On March 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer4stating that he was just engaged by private respondent's husband as she was out of the country and the Answer was already due.TIEHSAOn March 15, 2004, private respondent's counsel filed a Motion for Another Extension of Time to File Answer,5and stating that while the draft answer was already finished, the same would be sent to private respondent for her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the counsel prayed for another 20 days to file the Answer.On March 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss6on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons, since she was temporarily out of the country; that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner filed her Opposition7to the motion to dismiss, arguing that a substituted service of summons on private respondent's husband was valid and binding on her; that service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service,i.e.,by personal or substituted service. Private respondent filed a Comment8on petitioner's Opposition, and petitioner filed a Reply9thereto.On May 7, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss. It found that while the summons was served at private respondent's house and received by respondent's husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the summons was served, thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not validly served with summons; that substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that private respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on her by publication.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order dated July 21, 2004.Petitioner is now before us alleging that the public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that:I.Substituted service of summons upon private respondent, a defendant residing in the Philippines but temporarily outside the country is invalid;II.Section 16, Rule 14, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits the mode of service of summons upon a defendant residing in the Philippines, but temporarily outside the country, exclusively to extraterritorial service of summons under section 15 of the same rule;III.In not ruling that by filing two (2) motions for extension of time to file Answer, private respondent had voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, hence, equivalent to having been served with summons;IV.The cases cited in his challenged Order of May 7, 2004 constitutestare decisisdespite his own admission that the factual landscape in those decided cases are entirely different from those in this case.10TcEAIHPetitioner claims that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Section 16, Rule 14, limits the service of summons upon the defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the country exclusively by means of extraterritorial service,i.e.,by personal service or by publication, pursuant to Section 15 of the same Rule. Petitioner further argues that in filing two motions for extension of time to file answer, private respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.In her Comment, private respondent claims that petitioner'scertiorariunder Rule 65 is not the proper remedy but a petition for review under Rule 45, since the RTC ruling cannot be considered as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion; that the petition was not properly verified because while the verification was dated September 15, 2004, the petition was dated September 30, 2004. She insists that since she was out of the country at the time the service of summons was made, such service should be governed by Section 16, in relation to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; that there was no voluntary appearance on her part when her counsel filed two motions for extension of time to file answer, since she filed her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction within the period provided under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.In her Reply, petitioner claims that the draft of the petition and the verification and certification against forum shopping were sent to her for her signature earlier than the date of the finalized petition, since the petition could not be filed without her signed verification. Petitioner avers that when private respondent filed her two motions for extension of time to file answer, no special appearance was made to challenge the validity of the service of summons on her.The parties subsequently filed their respective memoranda as required.We shall first resolve the procedural issues raised by private respondent.Private respondent's claim that the petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 is a wrong remedy thus the petition should be dismissed, is not persuasive. A petition forcertiorariis proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.11There is "grave abuse of discretion" when public respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the case; that no appeal may be taken from (a) an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of execution;(g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action forcertiorariunder Rule 65.acCITSIn this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves several defendants, and the complaint for damages against these defendants is still pending.12Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special civil action forcertiorariis proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal.13Anent private respondent's allegation that the petition was not properly verified, we find the same to be devoid of merit. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative.14In this instance, petitioner attached a verification to her petition although dated earlier than the filing of her petition. Petitioner explains that since a draft of the petition and the verification were earlier sent to her in New York for her signature, the verification was earlier dated than the petition forcertiorarifiled with us. We accept such explanation. While Section 1, Rule 65 requires that the petition forcertioraribe verified, this is not an absolute necessity where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions raised are mainly of law.15In this case, the issue raised is purely of law.Now on the merits, the issue for resolution is whether there was a valid service of summons on private respondent.In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter's voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former.16Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides:Sec. 16.Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, servicemay, by leave of court, bealsoeffected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied)The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of extraterritorial service, thus:SEC. 15.Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.aCSEcAThe RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the service of summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of summons may be made only by publication.We do not agree.InMontefalconv. Vasquez,17we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.18InMontalbanv. Maximo,19we held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suitin personamagainst residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. In the same case, we expounded on the rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines.. . . A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a