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1. THIRD DIVISION[G.R. NO. 171124 : February 13, 2008]ALEJANDRO NG WEE,Petitioner,v.MANUEL TANKIANSEE,Respondent.D E C I S I O NNACHURA,J.:Before the Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 14, 2005 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90130 and its January 6, 2006 Resolution2denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.The facts are undisputed. Petitioner Alejandro Ng Wee, a valued client of Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank), made several money placements totalingP210,595,991.62 with the bank's affiliate, Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp), a domestic entity engaged in the business of an investment house with the authority and license to extend credit.3Sometime in February 2000, petitioner received disturbing news on Wincorp's financial condition prompting him to inquire about and investigate the company's operations and transactions with its borrowers. He then discovered that the company extended a loan equal to his total money placement to a corporation [Power Merge] with a subscribed capital of onlyP37.5M. This credit facility originated from another loan of aboutP1.5B extended by Wincorp to another corporation [Hottick Holdings]. When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a case against it and its surety. Settlement was, however, reached in which Hottick's president, Luis Juan L. Virata (Virata), assumed the obligation of the surety.4Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick's president, petitioner's money placements were transferred without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the latter of any liability. Allegedly, through the false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner was enticed to roll over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge.5Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit and connived with Wincorp's officers and directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention of paying the said placements, petitioner instituted, on October 19, 2000, Civil Case No. 00-99006 for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.6One of the defendants impleaded in the complaint is herein respondent Manuel Tankiansee, Vice-Chairman and Director of Wincorp.7On October 26, 2000, on the basis of the allegations in the complaint and the October 12, 2000 Affidavit8of petitioner, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties not exempt from execution of all the defendants in the civil case subject, among others, to petitioner's filing of aP50M-bond.9The writ was, consequently, issued on November 6, 2000.10Arguing that the writ was improperly issued and that the bond furnished was grossly insufficient, respondent, on December 22, 2000, moved for the discharge of the attachment.11The other defendants likewise filed similar motions.12On October 23, 2001, the RTC, in an Omnibus Order,13denied all the motions for the discharge of the attachment. The defendants, including respondent herein, filed their respective motions for reconsideration14but the trial court denied the same on October 14, 2002.15Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question anymore the said orders, his co-defendants, Virata and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UEM-MARA), assailed the same viacertiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74610]. The appellate court, however, denied thecertioraripetition on August 21, 2003,16and the motion for reconsideration thereof on March 16, 2004.17In a Petition for Review onCertioraribefore this Court, inG.R. No. 162928,we denied the petition and affirmed the CA rulings on May 19, 2004 for Virata's and UEM-MARA's failure to sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible error.18We subsequently denied the petition with finality on August 23, 2004.19On September 30, 2004, respondent filed before the trial court another Motion to Discharge Attachment,20re-pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the following additional grounds: (1) that he was not present in Wincorp's board meetings approving the questionable transactions;21and (2) that he could not have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he and Pearlbank Securities, Inc., in which he is a major stockholder, filed cases against the company as they were also victimized by its fraudulent schemes.22Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders affirmed by the CA and this Court, and that the additional grounds were respondent's affirmative defenses that properly pertained to the merits of the case, the trial court denied the motion in its January 6, 2005 Order.23With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,24respondent filed acertioraripetition before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90130. On September 14, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision25reversing and setting aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court and lifting the November 6, 2000 Writ of Preliminary Attachment26to the extent that it concerned respondent's properties. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling, but the CA denied the same in its January 6, 2006 Resolution.27Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition on the following grounds:A. IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY RESPONDENT, SINCE IT MERELY RAISED ERRORS IN JUDGMENT, WHICH, UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE, ARE NOT THE PROPER SUBJECTS OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.B. MOREOVER, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN RESOLVING FAVORABLY THE GROUNDS ALLEGED BY RESPONDENT IN HIS PETITION AND (SIC) LIFTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT, SINCE THESE GROUNDS ALREADY RELATE TO THE MERITS OF CIVIL CASE NO. 00-99006 WHICH, UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE, CANNOT BE USED AS BASIS (SIC) FOR DISCHARGING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT.C. LIKEWISE, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ERRORS IN JUDGMENT ALLEGED BY RESPONDENT, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THESE ARE BELIED BY THE VERY DOCUMENTS HE SUBMITTED AS PROOF OF SUCH ERRORS, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THESE HAD EARLIER BEEN RESOLVED WITH FINALITY BY THE LOWER COURT.28For his part, respondent counters, among others, that the general and sweeping allegation of fraud against respondent in petitioner's affidavit-respondent as an officer and director of Wincorp allegedly connived with the other defendants to defraud petitioner-is not sufficient basis for the trial court to order the attachment of respondent's properties. Nowhere in the said affidavit does petitioner mention the name of respondent and any specific act committed by the latter to defraud the former. A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting perfunctorily the words of the Rules. Connivance cannot also be based on mere association but must be particularly alleged and established as a fact. Respondent further contends that the trial court, in resolving the Motion to Discharge Attachment, need not actually delve into the merits of the case. All that the court has to examine are the allegations in the complaint and the supporting affidavit. Petitioner cannot also rely on the decisions of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 74610 and this Court in G.R. No. 162928 to support his claim because respondent is not a party to the said cases.29We agree with respondent's contentions and deny the petition.In the case at bench, the basis of petitioner's application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of respondent is Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which pertinently reads:Section 1.Grounds upon which attachment may issue. -At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:x x x(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.30The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.31InLiberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,32we explained as follows:To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case.33In the instant case, petitioner's October 12, 2000 Affidavit34is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge, which, by the way, explains why this Court, in G.R. No. 162928, affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter. As to the participation of respondent in the said transaction, the affidavit merely states that respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants in the civil case to defraud petitioner of his money placements. No other factual averment or circumstance details how respondent committed a fraud or how he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued upon. In other words, petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud.The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ,35must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ.36Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.37In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated38because established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.39Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company does not necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud. While under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons, to whom liability will directly attach, this is only done when the wrongdoing has been clearly and convincingly established.40Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance.41The rules governing its issuance are, therefore, strictly construed against the applicant,42such that if the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the court shall refrain from issuing it, for, otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.43Likewise, the writ should not be abused to cause unnecessary prejudice. If it is wrongfully issued on the basis of false or insufficient allegations, it should at once be corrected.44Considering, therefore, that, in this case, petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of respondent.We are not unmindful of the rule enunciated inG.B. Inc., etc. v. Sanchez, et al.,45that[t]he merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment otherwise an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on his motion.46However, the principle finds no application here because petitioner has not yet fulfilled the requirements set by the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ against the properties of respondent.47The evil sought to be prevented by the said ruling will not arise, because the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the writ in this case can be determined by simply reading the complaint and the affidavit in support of the application.Furthermore, our ruling in G.R. No. 162928, to the effect that the writ of attachment is properly issued insofar as it concerns the properties of Virata and UEM-MARA, does not affect respondent herein, for, as correctly ruled by the CA, respondent is "never a party thereto."48Also, he is not in the same situation as Virata and UEM-MARA since, as aforesaid, while petitioner's affidavit detailed the alleged fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Virata and/or Power Merge, only a general allegation of fraud was made against respondent.We state, in closing, that our ruling herein deals only with the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the properties of respondent-it does not concern the other parties in the civil case, nor affect the trial court's resolution on the merits of the aforesaid civil case.WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition isDENIED.The September 14, 2005 Decision and the January 6, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90130 areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

2. THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 125027. August 12, 2002.]ANITA MANGILA,Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA,Respondents.

D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City. The trial court upheld the writ of attachment and the declaration of default on petitioner while ordering her to pay private respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per annum, 25 percent attorneys fees and costs of suit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Facts

Petitioner Anita Mangila ("petitioner" for brevity) is an exporter of sea foods and doing business under the name and style of Seafoods Products. Private respondent Loreta Guina ("private respondent" for brevity) is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding business.

Sometime in January 1988, petitioner contracted the freight forwarding services of private respondent for shipment of petitioners products, such as crabs, prawns and assorted fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Petitioner agreed to pay private respondent cash on delivery. Private respondents invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts. In case of suit, the same invoice stipulates attorneys fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit. 3

On the first shipment, petitioner requested for seven days within which to pay privateRespondent. However, for the next three shipments, March 17, 24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to P109,376.95. 4

Despite several demands, petitioner never paid privateRespondent. Thus, on June 10, 1988, private respondent filed Civil Case No. 5875 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for collection of sum of money.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriffs Return showing that summons was not served on petitioner. A woman found at petitioners house informed the sheriff that petitioner transferred her residence to Sto. Nio, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner had left the Philippines for Guam. 5

Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing petitioners departure from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her creditors, private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment. On September 26, 1988, the trial court issued an Order of Preliminary Attachment 6 against petitioner. The following day, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

The trial court granted the request of its sheriff for assistance from their counterparts in RTC, Pampanga. Thus, on October 28, 1988, Sheriff Alfredo San Miguel of RTC Pampanga served on petitioners household help in San Fernando, Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond. 7

On November 7, 1988, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment 8 without submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person. 9

In the hearing of the Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment on November 11, 1988, private respondent sought and was granted a re-setting to December 9, 1988. On that date, private respondents counsel did not appear, so the Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment was deemed submitted for resolution. 10

The trial court granted the Motion to Discharge Attachment on January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioners counter-bond. The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.

On December 26, 1988, private respondent applied for an alias summons, which the trial court issued on January 19, 1989. 11 It was only on January 26, 1989 that summons was finally served on petitioner. 12

On February 9, 1989, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of improper venue. Private respondents invoice for the freight forwarding service stipulates that "if court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection . . . the agreed venue for such action is Makati, Metro Manila." 13 Private respondent filed an Opposition asserting that although "Makati" appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely an inadvertence by the printing press whose general manager executed an affidavit 14 admitting such inadvertence. Moreover, private respondent claimed that petitioner knew that private respondent was holding office in Pasay City and not in Makati. 15 The lower court, finding credence in private respondents assertion, denied the Motion to Dismiss and gave petitioner five days to file her Answer. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this too was denied.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner filed her Answer 16 on June 16, 1989, maintaining her contention that the venue was improperly laid.

On June 26, 1989, the trial court issued an Order setting the pre-trial for July 18, 1989 at 8:30 a.m. and requiring the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs. Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion to Sell Attached Properties but the trial court denied the motion.

On motion of petitioner, the trial court issued an Order resetting the pre-trial from July 18, 1989 to August 24, 1989 at 8:30 a.m..

On August 24, 1989, the day of the pre-trial, the trial court issued an Order 17 terminating the pre-trial and allowing the private respondent to present evidence ex-parte on September 12, 1989 at 8:30 a.m. The Order stated that when the case was called for pre-trial at 8:31 a.m., only the counsel for private respondent appeared. Upon the trial courts second call 20 minutes later, petitioners counsel was still nowhere to be found. Thus, upon motion of private respondent, the pre-trial was considered terminated.

On September 12, 1989, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order terminating the pre-trial. Petitioner explained that her counsel arrived 5 minutes after the second call, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes, and was late because of heavy traffic. Petitioner claims that the lower court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex-parte since there was no Order considering the petitioner as in default. Petitioner contends that the Order of August 24, 1989 did not state that petitioner was declared as in default but still the court allowed private respondent to present evidence ex-parte. 18

On October 6, 1989, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and scheduled the presentation of private respondents evidence ex-parte on October 10, 1989.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On October 10, 1989, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion stating that the presentation of evidence ex-parte should be suspended because there was no declaration of petitioner as in default and petitioners counsel was not absent, but merely late.

On October 18, 1989, the trial court denied the Omnibus Motion. 19

On November 20, 1989, the petitioner received a copy of the Decision of November 10, 1989, ordering petitioner to pay respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent interest per annum, 25 percent attorneys fees and costs of suit. Private respondent filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal but the trial court denied the same.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On December 15, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment and sustained the filing of the action in the RTC of Pasay. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the declaration of default on petitioner and concluded that the trial court did not commit any reversible error.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 5, 1996 but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated May 20, 1996.

Hence, this petition.The Issues

The issues raised by petitioner may be re-stated as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw libraryI. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT WAS IMPROPERLY-ISSUED AND SERVED;II. WHETHER THERE WAS A VALID DECLARATION OF DEFAULT;III. WHETHER THERE WAS IMPROPER VENUE.IV. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER IS OBLIGED TO PAY P109,376.95, PLUS ATTORNEYS FEES. 20

The Ruling of the Court

Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment

Petitioner ascribes several errors to the issuance and implementation of the writ of attachment. Among petitioners arguments are: first, there was no ground for the issuance of the writ since the intent to defraud her creditors had not been established; second, the value of the properties levied exceeded the value of private respondents claim. However, the crux of petitioners arguments rests on the question of the validity of the writ of attachment. Because of failure to serve summons on her before or simultaneously with the writs implementation, petitioner claims that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person and thus the service of the writ is void.

As a preliminary note, a distinction should be made between issuance and implementation of the writ of attachment. It is necessary to distinguish between the two to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired to validly implement the writ. This distinction is crucial in resolving whether there is merit in petitioners argument.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

This Court has long settled the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at anytime thereafter." 21 This phrase refers to the date of filing of the complaint which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the action." The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.

In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 22 this Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the courts authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. 23

In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served only on January 26, 1989 or almost three months after the implementation of the writ of attachment.

The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on September 27 since a motion for its issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the action." However, on the day the writ was implemented, the trial court should have, previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ, acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as was shown in the records of the case, the summons was actually served on petitioner several months after the writ had been implemented.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Private respondent, nevertheless, claims that the prior or contemporaneous service of summons contemplated in Section 5 of Rule 57 provides for exceptions. Among such exceptions are "where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts or where the defendant is a resident temporarily absent therefrom . . ." Private respondent asserts that when she commenced this action, she tried to serve summons on petitioner but the latter could not be located at her customary address in Kamuning, Quezon City or at her new address in Guagua, Pampanga. 24 Furthermore, respondent claims that petitioner was not even in Pampanga; rather, she was in Guam purportedly on a business trip.

Private respondent never showed that she effected substituted service on petitioner after her personal service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she had some other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be effected on a party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever the defendants "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation . . ." Thus, if petitioners whereabouts could not be ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons at her given address, then respondent could have immediately asked the court for service of summons by publication on petitioner.25cralaw:red

Moreover, as private respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of the service of summons, this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of the country. This is the exact situation contemplated in Section 16, 26 Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for service of summons by publication.

In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. 27 The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.chanrobles.com.ph : red

Improper Venue

Petitioner assails the filing of this case in the RTC of Pasay and points to a provision in private respondents invoice which contains the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3. If court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection, an additional equivalent (sic) to 25% of the principal amount will be charged. The agreed venue for such action is Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines." 28

Based on this provision, petitioner contends that the action should have been instituted in the RTC of Makati and to do otherwise would be a ground for the dismissal of the case.

We resolve to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue but not for the reason stated by petitioner.

The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on which an action should be brought. 29 However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. 30 The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. 31 In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. 32

In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention of the parties that Makati is the "only or exclusive" venue where the action could be instituted. We therefore agree with private respondent that Makati is not the only venue where this case could be filed.

Nevertheless, we hold that Pasay is not the proper venue for this case.

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule is venue in personal actions is "where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." 33 The exception to this rule is when the parties agree on an exclusive venue other than the places mentioned in the rules. But, as we have discussed, this exception is not applicable in this case. Hence, following the general rule, the instant case may be brought in the place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff (private respondent herein).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In the instant case, the residence of private respondent (plaintiff in the lower court) was not alleged in the complaint. Rather, what was alleged was the postal address of her sole proprietorship, Air Swift International. It was only when private respondent testified in court, after petitioner was declared in default, that she mentioned her residence to be in Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City.

In the earlier case of Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc., 34 the reverse happened. The plaintiff in that case was Tyson Enterprises, Inc., a corporation owned and managed by Dominador Ti. The complaint, however, did not allege the office or place of business of the corporation, which was in Binondo, Manila. What was alleged was the residence of Dominador Ti, who lived in San Juan, Rizal. The case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig. The Court there held that the evident purpose of alleging the address of the corporations president and manager was to justify the filing of the suit in Rizal, Pasig instead of in Manila. Thus, the Court ruled that there was no question that venue was improperly laid in that case and held that the place of business of Tyson Enterprises, Inc. is considered as its residence for purposes of venue. Furthermore, the Court held that the residence of its president is not the residence of the corporation because a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its officers and stockholders.

In the instant case, it was established in the lower court that petitioner resides in San Fernando, Pampanga 35 while private respondent resides in Paraaque City. 36 However, this case was brought in Pasay City, where the business of private respondent is found. This would have been permissible had private respondents business been a corporation, just like the case in Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc. However, as admitted by private respondent in her Complaint 37 in the lower court, her business is a sole proprietorship, and as such, does not have a separate juridical personality that could enable it to file a suit in court. 38 In fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court. 39

A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. 40 The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. 41 The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court. 42

Thus, not being vested with legal personality to file this case, the sole proprietorship is not the plaintiff in this case but rather Loreta Guina in her personal capacity. In fact, the complaint in the lower court acknowledges in its caption that the plaintiff and defendant are Loreta Guina and Anita Mangila, respectively. The title of the petition before us does not state, and rightly so, Anita Mangila v. Air Swift International, but rather Anita Mangila v. Loreta Guina. Logically then, it is the residence of private respondent Guina, the proprietor with the juridical personality, which should be considered as one of the proper venues for this case.

All these considered, private respondent should have filed this case either in San Fernando, Pampanga (petitioners residence) or Paraaque (private respondents residence). Since private respondent (complainant below) filed this case in Pasay, we hold that the case should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.

Although petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment in the lower court, petitioner expressly stated that she was filing the motion without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. At that time, petitioner had not been served the summons and a copy of the complaint. 43 Thereafter, petitioner timely filed a Motion to Dismiss 44 on the ground of improper venue. Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion to dismiss may be filed" [W]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim." Petitioner even raised the issue of improper venue in his Answer 45 as a special and affirmative defense. Petitioner also continued to raise the issue of improper venue in her Petition for Review 46 before this Court. We thus hold that the dismissal of this case on the ground of improper venue is warranted.

The rules on venue, like other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose where to file the complaint or petition. 47

We find no reason to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED on the grounds of improper venue and invalidity of the service of the writ of attachment. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the order of respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 5875 is hereby dismissed without prejudice to refiling it in the proper venue. The attached properties of petitioner are ordered returned to her immediately.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrarySO ORDERED.Puno and Panganiban,JJ., concur.Sandoval-Gutierrez,J., is on leave.

3. EN BANC[G.R. No. L-24581. January 31, 1966.]MIGUEL PEREZ RUBIO,Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SAMUEL REYES, ROBERT O. PHILLIPS and MAGDALENA YSMAEL PHILLIPS,Respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for the petitioner.

Calapatia, Gaviola & Maclang; A. Padilla & Associates; Meer, Meer & Meer, for the respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CERTIORARI; AMENDMENT; AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION MAY BE ADMITTED WITHOUT NEED OF DISCUSSING ITS MERITS. An amended supplemental petition forcertiorarito implead additional parties and prays that certain parties be cited for contempt; that a preliminary injunction with writ of attachment be issued; that petitioners be declared entitled to a vendors lien over the shares of stock sold to respondents on installment; that petitioners be permitted to collect the balance of the purchase price of the sold shares of Hacienda Benito, Inc.; and that the injunction issued by respondent court be dissolved, is admissible without first discussing the facts alleged therein because those facts are deemed sufficient if proven to entitle petitioners to relief against the additional parties named therein.

2. ID.; INCIDENTAL MOTIONS WHICH REQUIRE INQUIRY INTO THE MAIN ISSUE BEFORE BEING RESOLVED SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH THE MAIN CASE. The incidental petitions that the original as well as the new respondents be cited for contempt and for the issuance of a mandatory injunction with writ of preliminary attachment should be taken only after a full hearing of the case on its merits because their resolution will one way or the other necessarily require the consideration of the main issues involved in the main case.

R E S O L U T I O NDIZON,J.:

Upon the facts alleged in the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 8632 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Robert O. Phillips and Sons Inc. Et. Al., v. Miguel Perez Rubio, said plaintiffs prayed for judgment as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That a temporary restraining order and/or ex parte writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant to prevent and restrain them from further unlawful and willful interference with the transaction between the plaintiff corporation with Alfonso T. Yuchengco on the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc., and from enforcing whatever amount he may claim to be due to them from the plaintiffs under the Agreements (Annexes "A", "A-1" and "A-2"), after the approval of the injunction bond;

2. That, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendant:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) Restraining him from willfully and unlawfully interfering with the transaction of the plaintiffs with Alfonso T. Yuchengco on the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc.;

b) Declaring that the defendant has no right to rescind the Agreements as referred to in Annexes "A", "A-1" and "A-2" ;

c) Declaring that the defendant has no vendors lien over the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc., sold by them to the plaintiff corporation;

d) Restraining the defendant from enforcing any collection action against the plaintiffs until the obligations, if any, mature;

e) Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;

f) Sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiffs;

(1) P2,500,000.00 more or less, as actual damages;

(2) Moral damages which this Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable;

(3) Exemplary damages, which this Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable;

(4) P50,000.00, as attorneys fees; and

(5) Costs of suit; and

2. That the plaintiffs be granted such further and other reliefs to which they may be entitled in law and in equity."cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon an ex-parte petition filed by the plaintiffs, the respondent judge issued on April 1, 1965 a writ of preliminary injunction to be mentioned again later. Subsequently, the respondent judge also denied Perez Rubios motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

It appears that the Perez Rubio spouses owned shares of stock in Hacienda Benito Inc. registered in their names and in the names of Joaquin Ramirez and Joaquin Ramirez Jr. On April 13, 1963 the Perez Rubios, with the conformity of the Ramirezes, sold said shares to Robert O. Phillips and Sons Inc. for P5,500,000.00 payable in installments and other conditions agreed upon as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw libraryxxx

"3. That for and in consideration of the mutual agreements and promises, MIGUEL and MARIA LUISA hereby sell to PHILLIPS all the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. registered in their names and in the names of Joaquin Ramirez and Joaquin Ramirez, Jr. for the total price of FIVE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P5,500,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) upon execution of this agreement.

b. ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,200,000.00) within sixty (60) days from this date.

c. ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P1,250,000.00) on April 30, 1964 less the amount of P96,830.56 due the Hacienda Benito, Inc. from MARIA LUISA and the amount of P127,096.09 from MIGUEL; hereby authorizing PHILLIPS to deduct said amounts and to pay the same to Hacienda Benito, Inc.

d. ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P1,250,000.00) on or before April 30, 1966.

e. ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P1,250,000.00) on or before April 30, 1966.

f. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) on or before April 30, 1967.

"4. That should PHILLIPS fails to pay the amount of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,200,000.00) due sixty (60) days from this date and to execute the letter of credit and/or bond or both to secure the payment of the remaining installments, as agreed upon, then the Sellers shall have the right, at their discretion, either to rescind this agreement or to enforce the same, provided that any number of days used by the SELLERS to consider the acceptability of the bank or bonding company proposed by PHILLIPS shall be added to the period of sixty (60) days herein mentioned;

"5. That in case of default, PHILLIPS shall pay interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum on all amounts in arrears until paid in full either by the guaranteeing bank, bonding company or Phillips;

"6. That all the installments due during the years 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1967 with all the conditions above mentioned, shall be jointly and severally guaranteed by means of Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit from a bank in favor of MIGUEL and MARIA LUISA, in the proportion they may agree, which shall be communicated to the bank and to PHILLIPS before final contract is entered into with the bank, or by a bond from a bonding company duly approved by MIGUEL and MARIA LUISA;

"7. That the stock certificates corresponding to the shares sold, including those in the names of Joaquin Ramirez and Joaquin Ramirez, Jr. shall not be transferred to PHILLIPS until the installment due within sixty (60) days from this date is paid in full;"

On June 23, 1964 Robert O. Phillips and Sons Inc., and Robert O. Phillips, himself and his wife, entered into an agreement with the Perez Rubios deferring payment of the April 30, 1964 installment already overdue to August 31, 1964 under the following conditions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) The deferred installment would bear an interest of eight (8%) per cent per annum from April 30, 1964 although partial payments on the principal and on the interest due may be paid during the period granted, in such amounts and at such times as funds as available to Robert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc.;

"(b) Should Robert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc. fail to pay the particular installment now due on August 31, 1964 or any of the subsequent installments on the exact date due, the whole obligation would become immediately demandable without notice;

"(c) In consideration of this extension granted to Robert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc., Robert O. Phillips himself and his wife, Magdalena Ysmael Phillips, jointly and severally guaranteed all the installments and other obligations of Robert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc., under the original contract of sale dated April 13, 1963.

In the meantime, Robert O. Phillips, in his behalf and in that of his wife and Robert O. Phillips and Sons Inc., entered into negotiations for the sale of their shares of stock in Hacienda Benito Inc. to Alfonso Yuchengco. Upon being informed of this, the Perez Rubios, through their attorney-in-fact, Joaquin Ramirez, reminded the Phillips spouses and the Phillips corporation in writing of their obligations under the contract of sale of April 13, 1963 and reminded them in particular that the shares subject matter thereof were still subject to the payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price. They gave a similar notice to Alfonso Yuchengco, but expressed no objection to the sale provided the obligations in their favor were satisfied.

On March 26, 1965, the Phillips (individuals and corporation), through their attorney, Juan T. David, sent a letter to the Perez Rubios telling them, in substance, that the only obstacle to the consummation of the Phillips-Yuchengco sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito Inc. was their letter of November 24, 1964 and warned that unless the same was withdrawn by March 29, they would seek redress elsewhere. On March 27, 1965, the Perez Rubios, for their part, wrote the Phillips that due to the latters inability to comply with the formers conditions, the negotiations going on between them were cancelled, and should the full amount due to them remained unpaid by noon of March 31, 1965, they would file action in court in the afternoon thereof. However, on March 30, 1965, stealing a march on the Perez Rubios, the Phillips (individuals and corporation) filed Civil Case No. 8632 mentioned heretofore where they obtained, ex-parte, a preliminary injunction to this effect:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned Judge of the Court of First Instance that, until further orders, you, all your attorneys, representatives, agents, and any other person assisting you, REFRAIN from interfering with the transaction between the plaintiff corporation with Alfonso T. Yuchengco on the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc., and from enforcing whatever amount he may claim to be due to them from the plaintiffs under the Agreements (Annexes A, A-1, and A-2) mentioned in the complaint."cralaw virtua1aw library

On April 8, 1965 the Perez Rubios filed a motion to dissolve the above reproduced writ of preliminary injunction, which the respondent judge denied on May 6, 1964. But even before the motion aforesaid could be acted upon, they also filed their answer to the complaint with a counterclaim of P4,500,000.00 representing the unpaid balance of the sale price of their shares. Because of this the Perez Rubios were charged with contempt.

The original petition forcertiorarifiled in this case is based principally on the allegation that, in taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 8632 and in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction ex-parte mentioned heretofore, the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion and, as a consequence, the petition prayed that the respondent judge be restrained from in any way proceeding with the case, and to restrain the respondent Phillips from proceeding with the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc. or any of its assets to Alfonso Yuchengco or to any other person, or from performing any act which will diminish the value of said shares of stock or deplete the assets of the company.

On October 4, 1965, Miguel Perez Rubio, to whom all the Perez Rubio shares had been assigned, filed in this Court a motion for the admission of an amended supplemental petition impleading the following additional parties: Victoria Valley Development Corporation and Manufacturers Bank and Trust Co., who objected to their inclusion as such on different grounds. The supplemental petition also prayed that certain parties be cited and later punished for contempt; for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and a writ of attachment as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The Manufacturers Bank & Trust Company and/or Victoria Valley Development Corporation be ordered to return the properties it bought from Hacienda Benito, Inc., to Hacienda Benito, Inc.;

"2. That a writ of attachment be issued in favor of your petitioner against the properties of the Respondents Phillips including those Hacienda Benito, Inc., or against the proceeds of their sale in the ordinary course of business and of the other corporations who were defendants in Civil Case No. 8766 for an amount equivalent to your petitioners counterclaim;

"3. Respondents Phillips be held in contempt of this Honorable Court;

"4. Alfonso Yuchengco, Antonio de las Alas, Ambrosio Padilla, Leonides S. Virata, Macario Tiu, Romeo Villonco be summoned before this Honorable Court to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of this Honorable Court.

"Petitioner likewise prays that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. He be declared to have had a vendors lien over the shares of stock he sold to Respondents Phillips on installment and which up to now remain unpaid;

2. He be permitted to sue and collect on the outstanding balance of P4,250,000 due for sale of the shares of Hacienda Benito, Inc., to Respondents Phillips; and, therefore,

3. The injunction and order of the Respondent Court dated April 1, 1965 (Annex 1) be revoked and be declared null and void.

"Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises."cralaw virtua1aw library

When the original petition was filed, We issued a preliminary injunction to this effect:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You, your agents, your representatives and/or any person or persons acting in your behalf, are hereby enjoined: (FIRST) from proceeding with Civil Case No. 8632 (Robert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc. v. Miguel Perez Rubio); (SECOND) from proceeding with the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc., or any of its assets to Alfonso Yuchengco or to any other person; and (THIRD) from performing any act which will either diminish the value of said shares of stock or deplete the assets of said Hacienda, subject matter of the above-mentioned case."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thereafter, respondents filed an ex-parte petition either for the modification of the preliminary injunction issued by Us or for its dissolution upon a counter bond.

The first question to be resolved now is the admission of the amended supplemental petition. In this connection we do not deem it necessary nor advisable at this stage of the proceedings to lengthily discuss the merits of the facts alleged therein. Suffice it to say that we deem them sufficient if proven to entitle petitioners to relief against the additional parties therein named. The same is, therefore, admitted.

On the other hand, the petition that the original respondents as well as the new parties be cited for contempt, and the petition for the issuance of a mandatory injunction and a writ of preliminary attachment may best and properly be taken up only after a full hearing of this case on the merits, for to resolve them now one way or the other will necessarily require a consideration of the main issue involved herein.

In connection with the urgent ex-parte petition filed by the respondents (except the respondent judge) for a modification of the preliminary injunction herein granted or for its dissolution upon the filing of a bond, it appears that the Hacienda Benito, Inc. is not a party respondent neither upon the original petition nor upon the amended supplemental petition, although it is plain from the allegations made in both that the shares of stock of said company, and naturally its assets, are the very subject of controversy. However, the injunction issued in this case is directed exclusively to the parties herein and, in connection with the assets of said hacienda, they are the only ones enjoined from performing any act which will either diminish the value of said shares of stock or deplete the assets of said hacienda. The petition for modification in this regard is, therefore, not well founded and is denied.

Inasmuch as the petition for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued by Us in this case, upon the filing of a bond, is ex-parte, the respondents are hereby ordered to serve a copy thereof upon petitioner, who is hereby required to submit his comments in connection therewith, if he so desires, within ten days from receipt thereof.

Bengzon,C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Regala, Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P.,JJ., concur.

Barrera and Zaldivar,JJ., took no part.

4. EN BANC[G.R. No. L-23851. March 26, 1976.]WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff appellant, v. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN,Defendants-Appellees.Leonardo Abola, forPlaintiff-Appellant.

B.A. Tan, Jr. for defendant-appellee B.A. Tan.Alfonso V. Agcaoli and Ramon A. Barcelona for defendant-appellee Lee E. Won.

SYNOPSISLee E. Won and Bienvenido Tan both claimed ownership over Wack Wack Golf and Country Clubs membership fee certificate 201, the former, by virtue of the decision rendered in Civil Case 26044 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and of membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1478 issued pursuant to a court order in said case, and the latter by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1199 issued to him in July 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by the original owner and holder thereof. The corporation filed an action of interpleader in the court a quo to have defendants litigate among themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. In separate motions, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complainant to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription. Finding the first two grounds well taken, the trial court dismissed the complain. Hence, this appeal, the determinative issue of which is the timeless of the remedy of interpleader availed of by the Corporation.

The Supreme Court held that because the Corporation had allowed itself to be sued to final judgment and be made independently liable in civil case 26044 and the appellee Lee had already established in said case his rights to membership fee certificate 201, its action of interpleader is barred by laches.

Order affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; INTERPLEADER; A REMEDY TO DETERMINE CONFLICTING CLAIMS ON PROPERTY. The actions of interpleader under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his posession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.

2. ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND NEW RULES OF COURT DISTINGUISHED. The procedure under Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court is the same as that under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation.

3. ID.; ID.; ACTION TO BE FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER A DISPUTE ARISES. A stakeholder, meaning a person entrusted with the custody of property or money that is subject of ligitation or of contention between rival claimants in which the holder claims no right or property interest, should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

4. ID.; ID.; ACTION BARRED IF NOT TIMELY MADE. When a stakeholders action is filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered, the interpleader suit is too late and will be barred by laches or undue delay.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. The Corporation was aware of the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed its interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26004) and to defend itself therein. Final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been executed. It is now therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY WHO HAS SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED A RIGHT CANNOT BE LATTER IMPLEADED. A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

D E C I S I O N

CASTRO,J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in civil case 7656, dismissing the plaintiff-appellants complaint of interpleader upon the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and res judicata.

In its amended and supplemental complaint of October 23, 1963, the Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation), alleged, for its first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila, entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee v. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc." and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued on October 17, 1963 by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the president and the secretary of the Corporation and of the Peoples Bank & Trust Company as transfer agent of the said Corporation, pursuant to the order of September 23, 1963 in the said case; that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201; that under its articles of incorporation and by-laws the Corporation is authorized to issue a maximum of 400 membership fee certificates to persons duly elected or admitted to proprietary membership, all of which have been issued as early as December 30, 1939; that it claims no interest whatsoever in the said membership fee certificate 201; that it has no means of determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof; that it is without power to issue two separate certificates for the same membership fee certificate 201, or to issue another membership fee certificate to the defendant Lee, without violating its articles of incorporation and by-laws; and that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 held by the defendant Tan and the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued to the defendant Lee proceed from the same membership fee certificate 201, originally issued in the name of "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz"

For its second cause of action, it alleged that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the Corporation is null and void because issued in violation of its by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is not binding upon the defendant Tan, holder of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199; that Tan is made a party because of his refusal to join it in this action or bring a separate action to protect his rights despite the fact that he has a legal and beneficial interest in the subject-matter of this litigation; and that he is made a party so that complete relief may be accorded herein.

The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.

In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription. 1 These motions were duly opposed by the Corporation. Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action well taken, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs against the Corporation.

In this appeal, the Corporation contends that the court a quo erred (1) in finding that the allegations in its amended and supplemental complaint do not constitute a valid ground for an action of interpleader, and in holding that "the principal motive for the present action is to reopen the Manila Case and collaterally attack the decision of the said Court" ; (2) in finding that the decision in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila constitutes res judicata and bars its present action; and (3) in dismissing its action instead of compelling the appellees to interplead and litigate between themselves their respective claims.

The Corporations position may be stated elsewise as follows: The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, instead of compelling the appellees to interplead because there actually are conflicting claims between the latter with respect to the ownership of membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is no identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action, between civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have been dismissed upon the ground of res judicata.

On the other hand, the appellees argue that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint, because, having the effect of reopening civil case 26044, the present action is barred by res judicata.

Although res judicata or bar by a prior judgment was the principal ground availed of by the appellees in moving for the dismissal of the complaint and upon which the trial court actually dismissed the complaint, the determinative issue, as can be gleaned from the pleadings of the parties, relates to the propriety and timeliness of the remedy of the interpleader.

The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 2 is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. 3 The procedure under the Rules of Court 4 is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure, 5 except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation.

There is no question that the subject-matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining.

A stakeholder 6 should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. 7 He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. 8 He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. 9 Otherwise, he may be barred by laches 10 or undue delay. 11 But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. 12

Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view of all the circumstances, such that it may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of the conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been executed. It is now therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.

It has been held that a stakeholders action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, 13 especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter. 14 In one case, 15 it was declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The record here discloses that long before the rendition of the judgment in favor of relators against the Hanover Fire Insurance Company the latter had notice of the adverse claim of South to the proceeds of the policy. No reason is shown why the Insurance Company did not implead South in the former suit and have the conflicting claims there determined. The Insurance Company elected not to do so and that suit proceeded to a final judgment in favor of relators. The Company thereby became independently liable to relators. It was then too late for such company to invoke the remedy of interpleader."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing.

"It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order of interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become independently liable to any of the claimants. 25 Tex. Jur. p. 52, Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p. 218, Section 8.

"It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being especially true when the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which the judgment was rendered. United Producers Pipe Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v. McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 A.L.R., note 5, p. 275." 16

Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper because it was filed much too late.

"If a stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to proceed so far as a judgment against him without filing a bill of interpleader, it then becomes too late for him to do so. Union Bank v. Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. 460; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Gaulk, 86 Md. 385, 390, 38 A. 901; Gonia v. OBrien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787. It is one of the main offices of a bill of interpleader to restrain a separate proceeding at law by claimant so as to avoid the resulting partial judgment; and if the stakeholder acquiesces in one claimants trying out his claim and establishing it at law, he cannot then have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. 4 Pomeroys Eq. Juris. # 162; Mitfors Eq. Pleading (Tylers Ed.) 147 and 236; Langdells Summary of Eq. Pleading, # 162; De Zouche v. Carrison, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A. 450." 17

"It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefor is delayed until after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and that this is especially true where the holder of the fund had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such judgment and an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which such judgment was rendered. (See notes and cases cited 36 Am. Dec. 703, Am. St. Rep. 598; also 5 Pomeroys Eq. Juris. Sec. 41.).

"The evidence in the opinion of the majority shows beyond dispute that the appellant permitted the Parker county suit to proceed to judgment in favor of Britton with full notice of the adverse claims of the defendants in the present suit other than the assignees of that judgment (the bank and Mrs. Pabb) and no excuse is shown why he did not implead them in that suit." 18

To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latters successful establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done because having elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the facts, the Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.

"The act providing for the proceeding has nothing to say touching the right of one, after contesting a claim of one of the claimants to final judgment unsuccessfully, to involve the successful litigant in litigation anew by bringing an interpleader action. The question seems to be one of first impression here, but, in other jurisdictions, from which the substance of the act was apparently taken, the rule prevails that the action cannot be resorted to after an unsuccessful trial against one of the claimants.

"It is well settled, both by reasons and authority, that one who asks the interposition of a court of equity to compel others, claiming property in his hands, to interplead, must do so before putting them to the test of trials at law. Yarborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. 291 (41 Am. Dec. 626); Gornish v. Tanner, 1 You. & Jer. 333; Haseltine v. Brickery, 16 Grat. (Va.) 116. The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and hazard of two or more actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with knowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success in the actions at law, ought to submit to the consequences of defeat. To permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of others the burden which he asks may be taken from his own . . .

"It is urged, however, that the American Surety Company of New York was not in position to file an interpleader until it had tested the claim of relatrix to final judgment, and that, failing to meet with success, it promptly filed the interpleader. The reason why, it urges, it was not in such position until then is that had it succeeded before this court in sustaining its construction of the bond and the law governing the bond, it would not have been called upon to file an interpleader, since there would have been sufficient funds in its hands to have satisfied all lawful claimants. It may be observed, however, that the surety company was acquainted with all of the facts, and hence that it simply took its chances of meeting with success by its own construction of the bond and the law. Having failed to sustain it, it cannot now force relatrix into litigation anew with others, involving most likely a repetition of what has been decided, or force her to accept a pro rata part of a fund, which is far from benefits of the judgment." 19

Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

"The jurisprudence of this state and the common law states is well-settled that a claimant who has been put to test of a trial by a surety, and has established his claim, may not be impleaded later by the surety in an interpleader suit, and compelled to prove his claim again with other adverse claimants. American Surety Company of New York v. Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727; American Surety Company of New York v. Brim (In Re Lyong Lumber Company), 176 La. 867, 147 So. 18; Dugas v. N.Y. Casualty Co., 181 La. 322, 159 So. 572, 15 Ruling Case Law, 228; 33 Corpus Juris, 477; 4 Pomeroys Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) 3172; 2 Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence, 1023; Royal Neighbors of America v. Lowary (D.C.) 46 F2d 565; Brackett v. Graves, 30 App. Div. 162, 51 N.Y.S. 895; De Zouche v. Garrison, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A. 450, 451; Manufacturers Finance Co. v. W.I. Jones Co. 141 Ga., 519, 81 S.E. 1033; Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lawder, 22 R.I. 416, 84 A. 383.

"There can be no doubt that relators claim has been finally and definitely established, because that matter was passed upon by three courts in definitive judgments. The only remaining item is the value of the use of the land during the time that relator occupied it. The case was remanded solely and only for the purpose of determining the amount of that credit. In all other respects the judgment is final." 20

"It is generally held by the cases it is the office of interpleader to protect a party, not against double liability, but against double vexation on account of one liability. Gonia v. OBrien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787. And so it is said that it is too late for the remedy of interpleader if the party seeking this relief has contested the claim of one of the parties and suffered judgment to be taken.

"In United P.P.I. Co. v. Britton (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S.W. 576, 578, it was said: It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefor is delayed until after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and this is especially true where the holder of the fund had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such judgment and an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which such judgment was rendered. See notes and cases cited 35 Am. Dec. 703; 91 An. St. Rep. 598; also 5 Pomeroys Equity Jurisprudence # 41.

"The principle thus stated has been recognized in many cases in other jurisdictions, among which may be cited American Surety Co. v. OBrien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787; Phillips v. Taylor, 148 Md. 157, 129 A. 18; Moore v. Hill, 59 Ga. 760, 761; Yarborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. (11 Miss.) 291, 41 Am. Dec. 626. See, also 33 C.J. p. 447, # 30; Nash v. McCullum, (Tex. Civ. App.) 74 S.W. 2d 1042, 1047.

"It would seem that this rule should logically follow since, after the recovery of judgment, the interpleading of the judgment creditor is in effect a collateral attack upon the judgment." 21

In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.

ACCORDINGLY, the order of May 28, 1964, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed, at appellants costs.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr.,JJ., concur.

Barredo and Martin,JJ., took no part.

Fernando,J., is on official leave.

5. THIRD DIVISION[G.R. NO. 158290 : October 23, 2006]HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES,Petitioners,v.LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,Respondents.R E S O L U T I O N

QUISUMBING,J.:Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ ofmandamuscommanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996,1the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region,2a study of the Asian Development Bank,3the Manila Observatory4and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources5(DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) - complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions - have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10,a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million.8The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following:'Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million.'Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million.'Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of propane and butane,10is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOxemissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.11Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ ofmandamusto order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling inOposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13and Section 414of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ ofmandamusis not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which amandamusis, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 2616of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required