VALDE Z VS CA

Actions; Possession; Ejectment; Jurisdictions; Three Kinds of Actions Available to Recover Possession of Real Property; Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico), the jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.—Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.—Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

Same; Same; Same; Same; To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered—such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer, not forcible entry.—To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the

plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257 (1968): But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made. If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate. x x x x A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible entry.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer.—It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Same; Same; Same; Same; To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.—To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997 decision1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,

Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.

This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:

2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex "B";

3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof;

4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;

5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;

6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex "C";

7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional services of counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D";

8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x2

In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They

also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.

Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.

In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents’ possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners’ complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior material possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:

An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the right to occupy the premises, which right has now [been] extinguished.

x x x

In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court before which the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction.3

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998.4

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration5:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.

Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.

In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the property in question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance or permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by an implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.

The petition is not meritorious.

Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.8 The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.9

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12

It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.14

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

x x x x

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry . Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.18 (Underlining supplied)

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.19

The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.20

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v.

Court of Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled23:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz,24 petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession. x x x

x x x x

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondent’s occupation of the

property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioner’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.25

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC AND NAPOCOR VS SUNVAR

Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.—In Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338 (2010), the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. “The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.”

Same; Summary Procedure; Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.—Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage. The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition. Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition, but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.

Unlawful Detainer; Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may—by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation—bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.—Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may—by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation—bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs. Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.

Same; Elements of a Cause of Action for Unlawful Detainer.—Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following elements: 1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff. 2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession. 3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment. 4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.

SAMPAYAN

Actions; Ejectment; Forcible Entry; In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of

force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.—The arguments put forward by the petitioner crystallize to one pivotal question: will the complaint for forcible entry in this case prosper? To resolve this, however, we must first determine as to who between the herein parties was in prior actual physical possession of the subject lot at the time the complaint was filed in the MCTC. For, as we have said in Gaza vs. Lim, “x x x In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. x x x” We emphasize, absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants the dismissal of his complaint.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during the trial; Exceptions.—The issue of prior physical possession is one of fact, and settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA, we wrote: “[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties’ during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.” To our mind, exceptions (5) and (11) are present in this case.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Pleadings and Practice; For the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts—the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case.—For the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth. The complaint in this case makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for

forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction. [Sampayan vs. Court of Appeals, 448 SCRA 220(2005)]

SARMIENTO

Actions; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; Ejectment; Jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, is determined by the averments in the complaint.—The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the averments in the complaint. Accordingly, the issue in the instant case can only be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the facts averred in the complaint reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute, the same must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.—A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71 square meters involved.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Forcible Entry” and “Unlawful Detainer,”Distinguished.—Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What determines the cause of action—whether for forcible entry or unlawful detainer—is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land.—What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.—To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.—If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession.—We have held that in giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right, the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. [Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108(1995)]

EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.

 

REGALADO, J.:

The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 32263 1 reversing the decision of the regional trial court, as well as its resolution of June 29, 1994 denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are assailed in this petition for review on certiorari.

This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by herein private respondent Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against herein petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case No. 899, which complaint alleges these material facts:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-A of the subd. plan, Psd-03-0345 being a portion of Lot 2, covered by TCT No. T-147219, located at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan, containing as area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of the title is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof and for taxation purposes, the same is declared in the name of the plaintiff, xerox copy of the tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B" of this complaint;

3. That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by the family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid but the same is being used and occupied by the defendant where a house was constructed thereon;

4. That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein mentioned, it was found out by the Geodetic Engineer that the defendant is encroaching on her lot for about 71 square meters, copy of the relocation sketch by said surveyor is hereto attached as Annex "C" hereof;

5. That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant that she would like to remove the old fence so that she could construct a new fence which will cover the true area of her property, the defendant vehemently refused to let the plaintiff remov(e) the said fence and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff remove(d) the said fence to construct a new one, she would take action against the plaintiff legally or otherwise;

6. For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing the fence encroaching on her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial relief;

7. That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang Pambarangay of Mabuco for settlement, however, the efforts of the Lupon Tagapamayapa turned futile, as evidenced by a certification to file action issued by the Lupon secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman, copy of the certification to file action is hereto attached as Annex "D" hereof;

8. Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation because she is poor but nevertheless she consulted the undersigned counsel and a demand letter was sent to the defendant for conference and/or settlement but the defendant stood pat that she will not allow the removal of the fence, thus depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said portion of her lot (71 square meters) which is being occupied by the defendant for several years, xerox copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex "E" of this complaint;

9. That by virtue of the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to have the fence dismantled and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is deprived of the possession and she was forced to hire the services of counsel for which she contracted to pay the sum of P2,000.00 plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until the termination of this case before this Honorable Court. 2

xxx xxx xxx

On January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the defendant to file her answer to the complaint. 3 This was opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground that Section 15(e) of the Rule on Summary Procedure does not allow the filing of motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers. 4 Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her "Answer with Motion to Dismiss." 5 Plaintiff filed and ex-parte motion reiterating her contention that the filing by defendant of her aforesaid answer with motion was barred for reason that her preceding motion for extension of time to file an answer is a prohibited pleading. 6 On February 4, 1993, the trial court, finding merit in plaintiff's ex-parte motion, ordered that defendant's answer be stricken from the records for having been filed out of time. 7 The case was then submitted for decision.

On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter:

1. To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the defendant and allowing the plaintiff to remove the old fence permanently and (to) make the necessary enclosure of the area pertaining to the herein plaintiff containing an area of 280 square meters, more or less;

2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,500.00 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to damages;

3. To pay the cost(s) of this suit. 8 (Corrections in parentheses supplied.)

Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment, but the same was denied by the trial court for lack of merit in its order dated March 2, 1993. 9

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No DH-121-93, defendant assailed the jurisdiction of the court a quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court rendered judgment, stating in part as follows:

A perusal of the records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the adversaries led this court to the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the instant appealed case based on (the) reason that the said case should be one of question of ownership or accion rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible entry as the(re) was no allegation of prior possession by the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as required by law and jurisprudence. Absence of allegations and proof by the plaintiff in forcible entry case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic) cannot be said that defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal remedy sought by the plaintiff is not the proper one as it should have been accion publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria, as the case may be, and the forum of which is the Regional Trial Court.

This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by the defendant/appellant considering that the resolution on jurisdiction renders the same moot and academic. 10 (Corrections in parentheses ours.)

Therein plaintiffs motion for reconsideration having been denied in said lower court's order dated August 12, 1993, 11 she elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari, purportedly on pure questions of law. This Court, treating the petition as a special civil action for certiorari, referred the case to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 12

On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 13

reversing the decision of the regional trial court and reinstating that of the municipal circuit trial court, hence the present petition.

The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the averments in the complaint. 14 Accordingly, the issue in the instant case can only be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.

A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71 square meters involved.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession

under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entity, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession. 15

What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand. 16

In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner's alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon the land and constructed the house and the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner's possession became legal before private respondent made a demand on her to remove the fence. The complaint merely avers that the lot being occupied by petitioner is owned by a third person, not a party to the case, and that said lot is enclosed by a fence which private respondent claims is an encroachment on the adjacent lot belonging to her.

Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the said fence was already in existence on that lot at the time private respondent bought her own lot and it was only after a relocation survey was made that it was found out that petitioner is allegedly encroaching on the lot of the former. Consequently, there is here no contract, express or implied, between petitioner and private respondent as would qualify it as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that the possession of the disputed portion of said lot was acquired by petitioner through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry.

Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner's possession of the controverted portion was by mere tolerance since that fact was never alleged in the former's basic complaint, and this argument was raised in her later pleadings more as an afterthought. Also, it would be absurd to argue that private respondent tolerated a state of affairs of which she was not even then aware. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. 17

Indeed, and this was definitely not the situation that obtained in and gave rise to the ejectment suit, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine, for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the lawful possessor, the violation of which right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the Rules. If a period of one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy and the aggrieved possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a

demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription from setting in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable, especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 18

To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. 19 The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 20

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trialcourt. 21

If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.

We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of a controverted proprietary right, the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. 22

On the foregoing premises and with these conclusions, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. DH-121-93 is REINSTATED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LORENZO

Contempt; Words and Phrases; In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body, while in its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court; There ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.—Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Same; Kinds of Contempt.—Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.

Same; Due Process; The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute—such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law; In contrast, the proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the

observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.—The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons. In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.—The word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.

Same; The exercise of the summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.—The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without further proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt committed directly under its eye or within its view. But there must be adequate facts to support a summary order for contempt in the presence of the court. The exercise of the summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or

oppressive conclusions. The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.

Same; Classes of Contempt; A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act; A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein; In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose.—Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action. They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein. It is at times difficult to determine whether the pro ceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights.

Same; Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect; A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights—to constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.—Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect. There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is

ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

Same; The Court has long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels.—We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. We have no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and respect, for the Court has long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970): xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public consumption. xxx Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx

Same; The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.—The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that the power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 155849               August 31, 2011

LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING LINES CORPORATION, SULPICIO LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners, vs.DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO, and CORA CURAY, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

The petitioners filed this petition to charge the respondents with indirect contempt of court for including allegedly contemptuous statements in their so-called Sea Transport Update concerning the Court’s resolutions dated June 5, 2002 and August 12, 2002 issued in G.R. No. 152914 entitled Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, et al. v. Administrator Oscar Sevilla, Maritime Industry Authority, et al.

Antecedents

On June 4, 2001, the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution,1

advising respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153).

For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994.2

On July 2, 2001, in order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). On November 29, 2001,3 however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001.4 Later, on April 10, 2002, the CA denied DMAP’s motion for reconsideration.5

DMAP appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 152914), but on June 5, 2002,6 the Court denied DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners’ failure to: (a) take the appeal within

the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time to file the petition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of P202.00 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."

On August 12, 2002,7 the Court denied with finality DMAP’s motion for reconsideration.

In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update,8 which is reproduced as follows:

SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE

Oct. 2002 GMM

20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE

1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented.

Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial (like the amount of filing fee lacking & failure to indicate date of receipt of court resolution)

> Some technical matters that could cause denial

- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings

- Failure to provide copies to respondents.

> Legal issue DMAP presented

- Public Service Act

- Regulated or Deregulated

- MC 153

- Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months.

WHAT TO EXPECT?

1. Liners will pressure members to pay the 20% GRI

WHAT TO DO?

1. As advised by DMAP counsel, use the following arguments:

- DMAP case was denied based on technicalities and not on merits of the case

- Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of reasonableness of freight is not under their jurisdiction but with MARINA

- DSA's argument that DMAP's case prematurely (sic) file (sic) as there is a pending case filed before MARINA.

- Therefore, DSA & DMAP will be going back to MARINA for resolution

2. Meantime, DMAP members enjoined not to pay until resolved by MARINA

3. However, continue collaboration with liners so shipping service may not suffer

NEXT MOVE

Another group (most likely consumers) or any party will file the same case and may be using the same arguments. (emphasis supplied)

Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo"9 to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months."10 They averred that the respondents’ purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!"11

In their comment dated January 20, 2003,12 the respondents denied any intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court.13 They explained that their statement that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month time only, normal lead time is at least three to six months" 14 was not per se contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the resolution of petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the petition was to be denied on technicality, and more or less from three to six months, if the petition was to be given due course; that what made the petitioners describe the statement as contemptuous was not the real or actual intention of the author but rather the petitioners’ false, malicious, scurrilous and tasteless insinuations and interpretation; and that the petitioners, not being themselves present during the GMM, had no basis to assert that the DMAP’s presentor, the author of the material, or any of the speakers during the GMM had any evil intention or made any malicious insinuations.15

The respondents further stated that the term time frame was layman’s parlance to explain to DMAP members that the petition had been dismissed due to a technicality, considering that the appeals process in the case before the Court had taken only a month instead of the expected three to six months;16 that the term lead time, although not the proper legal term to describe the process that the respondents’ petition had undergone in the Court, was common parlance in the business sector in which the respondents belonged; that the discussions during the presentation focused on the legal options of DMAP with respect to the 20% increase, i.e., to go back to MARINA for the resolution of the propriety and reasonableness of the 20% increase;17 that a lead time was indicated in the presentation material simply to tell DMAP members that the lead time to go back to MARINA had been cut short in view of the denial of the petition for review; and that, on the other hand, had the Court given due course to the petition, the expected time for the Court to resolve the appeal on the merits would have been from three to six months, a normal expectation.18

Lastly, the respondents submitted that a serious study and analysis of the decision of the CA, which the Court affirmed, revealed that the decision of the CA centered only on the constitutionality of the assailed executive issuances, and did not include any determination of the reasonableness and propriety of the 20% increase; that, accordingly, the discussion of the recourse with respect to the 20% increase, which was to go back to MARINA for the resolution on the matter, could not be considered as a defiance of the order of the Court because the CA itself decreed that the propriety and reasonableness of the 20% increase should be brought to and resolved by MARINA;19 and that considering that there was yet no entry of judgment in relation to the denial of the petition at the time of the GMM on October 17, 2002, the respondents were not defying any final order or writ of the Court and thereby commit any act of indirect contempt.20

Issue

Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court?

Ruling

We dismiss the petition.

IContempt of Court: Concept and Classes

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.21 The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.22

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts,23 and need not be specifically granted by statute.24 It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system.25 Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.26 The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice.27 The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.28

Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.29

The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae.30 The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law.31 There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself.32 Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt,33 although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons.34

In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.35

Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.36

A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what

procedures must attend the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process.37

The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without further proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt

committed directly under its eye or within its view.38 But there must be adequate facts to support a summary order for contempt in the presence of the court.39 The exercise of the summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.40 The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.41

Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action.42 They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein.43 It is at times difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the

contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose.44 The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.45 Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal.46 Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights.47

Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces

another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)

Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect.48 There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense.49 Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.50 Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character.51 A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. 52 To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.53

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by a lawyer, a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

II.Utterances in Sea Transport Update,Not Contemptuous

The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents’ publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra.

The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months,"54 was insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt.

Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea Transport Update stating: "The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented",55 or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update reading "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months." Contrary to the petitioners’ urging that such phrases be considered as "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless innuendo" 56 and as indicative that "the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners"57 or that "the point that respondents wanted to convey was crystal clear: ‘defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!’",58 we find the phrases as not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No. 152914 were issued, or as inciting DMAP’s members to defy the resolutions. The unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform DMAP’s members of the developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.1avvphi1

We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. We have no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and respect, for the Court has long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:59

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public consumption.

xxx

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx

xxx

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx

x x x

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (bold emphasis supplied)60

The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that the power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.61 As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.62

WHEREFORE, the petition for indirect contempt is DISMISSED.