FIRST DIVISIONMARIANO NOCOM, G.R. No. 182984 Petitioner, Present: - versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO,CORONA, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.OSCAR CAMERINO, EFREN CAMERINO, CORNELIO MANTILE and MILDRED DEL ROSARIO, in her capacity as legal heir and representative of NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO,Respondents. Promulgated: February 10, 2009X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XDECISIONAZCUNA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated February 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and dismissed petitioners appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court for lack of jurisdiction and its Resolution dated May 23, 2008 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.The present case is an offshoot of the prior case, G.R. No. 161029, entitled Springsun Management Systems Corporation v. Oscar Camerino, Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez, which was promulgated on January 19, 2005 (449 SCRA 65) and became final and executory on May 4, 2005 as recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment. The factual antecedents are as follows:G.R. No. 161029:Respondent Oscar Camerino and respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, the deceased Nolasco Del Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez were the tenants who were tilling on the parcels of land planted to rice and corn previously owned by Victoria Homes, Inc. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 289237, now S-6135 (109,451 square meters); S-72244 (73,849 square meters); and 289236, now S-35855 (109,452 square meters). On February 9, 1983, without notifying the respondents, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold the said lots to Springsun Management Systems Corporation (SMSC) for P9,790,612. The three deeds of sale were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and new titles were issued in the name of SMSC. Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its loans amounting to P11,545,000. As SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, later, was adjudged the highest bidder. On May 10, 2000, SMSC redeemed the lots from BF. Earlier, on March 7, 1995, respondents filed a complaint against SMSC and BF for Prohibition/Certiorari, Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-020, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256.On January 25, 2002, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, found respondents to be tenants who have been tilling on the subject land planted to rice and corn since 1967 and, thus, authorized them to redeem the subject lots. The dispositive portion of the decision states: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby as follows:1. Declaring that plaintiffs are entitled (sic) to redeem, and ordering the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation (now petitioner) to allow plaintiffs to redeem the landholdings in question within 180 days from finality of this decision at the total price of P9,790,612.00; upon full payment of the redemption price, the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation is ordered to deliver plaintiffs the titles and the corresponding Deed of Redemption so that the titles to the properties in litigation can be transferred in the name of the plaintiffs;[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Declaring plaintiffs entitled to possession, and ordering the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation and all persons claiming under it to vacate the lands in question and to surrender the same to the plaintiffs;[if !supportLists]3. [endif]Dismissing the case against Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank;4. Ordering the defendant Springsun Management Systems Corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus costs.SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]On September 23, 2003, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 72475, affirmed with modification the RTC by declaring the respondents to be tenants or agricultural lessees on the disputed lots and, thus, entitled to exercise their right of redemption, but deleted the award of P200,000 attorneys fees for lack of legal basis. On January 19, 2005, this Court, in G.R. No. 161029, affirmed the CA and reiterated that being agricultural tenants of Victoria Homes, Inc. that had sold the lots to SMSC without notifying them, respondents had the right to redeem the subject properties from SMSC. This Court denied SMSCs motions for reconsideration and for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and, on May 4, 2005, an Entry of Judgment was made. The present G.R. No. 182984:On December 3, 2003, petitioner Mariano Nocom gave the respondents several Philtrust Bank Managers Checks amounting to P500,000 each, which the latter encashed, representing the price of their inchoate and contingent rights over the subject lots which they sold to him. On December 18, 2003, respondents, with the marital consent of their wives, executed an Irrevocable Power of Attorney which was notarized by their counsel Atty. Arturo S. Santos. Thus,IRREVOCABLE POWER OFATTORNEY[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: WE, OSCAR CAMERINO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Teresita L. Magbanua: EFREN CAMERINO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Susana Camerino, CORNELIO MANTILE, of legal age, Filipino, married to Maria Fe Alon, NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Mildred Joplo, and DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ, of legal age, Filipino, married to Dionicia Enriquez whose residences are stated under our respective names, hereby APPOINT, NAME, and CONSTITUTE MARIANO NOCOM, of legal age, Filipino, married to Anacoreta Nocom and with office at No. 2315 Aurora Blvd, Pasay City, in an irrevocable manner, coupled with interest, for us and in our stead, to do all or any of the following acts and deeds:[if !supportLists]1. [endif]To sell, assign, transfer, dispose of, mortgage and alienate the properties described in TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and 123872 of the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City, currently in the name of Springsun Management Systems Corporation, consisting of 292,752 square meters subject matter of Civil Case No. 95-020 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The said court, in its decision dated January 25, 2002 which was affirmed with modification of the Court of Appeals in its decision dated September 24, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72475, adjudged that we are legally entitled to redeem the lands from Springsun Management Systems Corporation;[if !supportLists]2. [endif]To comply with the said decision by paying the redemption price to Springsun Management Systems Corporation and/or to the court, and upon such payment, to secure execution of the judgment so that the titles can be issued in the name of our attorney-in-fact;[if !supportLists]3. [endif]To accept and receive for his exclusive benefit all the proceeds which may be derived from the sale, mortgage, transfer or deposition thereof;[if !supportLists]4. [endif]To sign and execute all the necessary papers, deed and documents that may be necessary or the accomplishment of purposes of the Deed of Assignment, and to issue receipts and proper discharges therefor;[if !supportLists]5. [endif]To negotiate, deal and transact with all the persons and entities involved in Civil Case No. 95-020, RTC, Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, with full power and authority to compromise with them;[if !supportLists]6. [endif]To procure all documents and papers in government agencies relative to the said properties and case in court; and[if !supportLists]7. [endif]To procure the necessary transfer certificate of titles in his name as the absolute owner of said properties.GIVING AND GRANTING full power and authority to our said attorney-in-fact to do all things requisite and necessary with legal effects as if done by us when present.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto affixed [our] signatures this 18th day of December, 2003.(Sgd.) OSCAR CAMERINO (Sgd.) EFREN CAMERINO Principal PrincipalSparrow St., Diamond Park San Antonio, San PedroVictoria Homes, Tunasan LagunaMuntinlupa City(Sgd.) CORNELIO MANTILE (Sgd.) NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO Principal PrincipalVictoria Ave., Tunasan Esmido St., Diamond ParkMuntinlupa City Victoria Homes, Muntinlupa City (Sgd.) DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ Principal Tunasan Proper, Arandia Tunasan, Muntinlupa City WITH OUR MARITAL CONSENT:(Sgd.) TERESITA MAGBANUA (Sgd.) SUSANA CAMERINO Wife of Oscar Camerino Wife of Efren Camerino(Sgd.) MARIA FE ALON ALON (Sgd.) MILDRED JOPLO Wife of Cornelio Mantile Wife of Nolasco del Rosario (Sgd.) DIONICIA ENRIQUEZ Wife of Domingo EnriquezCONFORME:(Sgd.) MARIANO NOCOM Attorney-in-Fact Meanwhile, on July 21, 2005, the respondents, in Civil Case No. 95-020 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, filed a Motion for Execution with Prayer to Order the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to divest SMSC of title to the subject lots and have the same vested on them. As SMSC refused to accept the redemption amount of P9,790,612 plus P147,059.18 as commission given by the petitioner, the respondents deposited, on August 4, 2005, the amounts of P9,790,612, P73,529.59, and P73,529.59, duly evidenced by official receipts, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 granted respondents motion for execution and, consequently, TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and 123872 in the name of SMSC were cancelled and TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in the names of the respondents. It also ordered that the Irrevocable Power of Attorney, executed on December 18, 2003 by respondents in favor of petitioner, be annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897.On October 24, 2005, respondent Oscar Camerino filed a complaint against petitioner, captioned as Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-172, in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, seeking to annul the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated December 18, 2003, the turnover of the titles to the properties in his favor, and the payment of attorneys fees and other legal fees.Respondent Oscar Camerinos complaint alleged that he and co-respondents were asked by their counsel, Atty. Arturo S. Santos, to sign a document with the representation that it was urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC; that the contents of the said document were not explained to him; that in the first week of September 2005, he learned that TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in their favor by the Register of Deeds; that he discovered that the annotation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney on the said titles was pursuant to the Order of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 dated August 31, 2005; that the Irrevocable Power of Attorney turned out to be the same document which Atty. Santos required him and the other respondents to sign on December 18, 2003; that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to surrender the owners duplicate copies of the said titles; that petitioner had retained ownership over the subject lots; that he had no intention of naming, appointing, or constituting anyone, including petitioner, to sell, assign, dispose, or encumber the subject parcels of land; and that he executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was annotated on the titles involving the subject lots.In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner countered that on September 3, 2003, Atty. Santos informed him of the desire of his clients, herein respondents, to sell and assign to him their inchoate and contingent rights and interests over the subject lots because they were in dire need of money and could no longer wait until the termination of the proceedings as SMSC would probably appeal the CAs Decision to this Court; that they did not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to redeem the subject lots; that on December 18, 2003, he decided to buy the contingent rights of the respondents and paid each of them P500,000 or a total of P2,500,000 as evidenced by Philtrust Bank Managers Check Nos. MV 0002060 (for respondent Oscar Camerino), MV 0002061 (for respondent Efren Camerino), MV 0002062 (for respondent Cornelio Mantile), MV 0002063 (for Nolasco Del Rosario), and MV 0002064 (for Domingo Enriquez) which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003; that on August 4, 2005, he also paid the amount of P147,059.18 as commission; that simultaneous with the aforesaid payment, respondents and their spouses voluntarily signed the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated December 18, 2003; that being coupled with interest, the Irrevocable Power of Attorney cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties; and that having received just and reasonable compensation for their contingent rights, respondents had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of P1,000,000 moral damages, P500,000 exemplary damages, and P500,000 attorneys fees plus costs. On January 17, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his special and/or affirmative defense that respondent Oscar Camerino had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots because the latter and his wife received the proceeds of the Philtrust Bank Managers check in the sum of P500,000 which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003 and that being coupled with interest, the Irrevocable Power of Attorney cannot be revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties. On January 26, 2006, respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir and representative of Nolasco Del Rosario, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit the Complaint-in-Intervention with the attached Complaint-in-Intervention, dated January 26, 2006, seeking the nullification of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney for being contrary to law and public policy and the annotation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney on the titles of the subject lots with prayer that petitioner be ordered to deliver to them the copies of the owners duplicate certificate of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897. Their Complaint-in-Intervention alleged that they had a legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy and would either be directly injured or benefited by the judgment in Civil Case No. 05-172; that they were co-signatories or co-grantors of respondent Oscar Camerino in the Irrevocable Power of Attorney they executed in favor of the petitioner; that their consent was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, machination, mistake and undue influence perpetrated by their own counsel, Atty. Santos, and petitioner; that sometime in December 2003, Atty. Santos called for a meeting which was attended by petitioner and one Judge Alberto Lerma where petitioner gave them checks in the amount of P500,000 each as Christmas gifts; and that the Irrevocable Power of Attorney was void ab initio as the same was contrary to law and public policy and for being a champertous contract. On January 30, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that since the existence of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney was admitted by petitioner, the only issue to be resolved was whether the said document was coupled with interest and whether it was revocable in contemplation of law and jurisprudence; that Summary Judgment was proper because petitioner did not raise any issue relevant to the contents of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney; and that in an Affidavit dated January 23, 2005, he admitted receipt of a check amounting to P500,000.00 which was given to him by petitioner as financial assistance.On February 3, 2006, petitioner opposed respondent Oscar Camerinos motion on the ground that there were factual issues that required the presentation of evidence. On February 14, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the petition for the cancellation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney was actually an action to recover the titles and ownership over the properties; that since respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in paragraph 29 of his Motion for Summary Judgment that the assessed value of the subject lots amounted to P600,000,000, the case partook of the nature of a real action and, thus, the docket fees of P3,929 was insufficient; and that due to insufficient docket fee, his complaint should be dismissed as the RTC was not vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. On February 22, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino opposed petitioners motion for preliminary hearing of special and/or affirmative defenses alleging that it was dilatory and that he had a cause of action. On March 9, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed his Reply to petitioners Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that the determinative issue of whether or not the amount of P500,000 given to him by petitioner rendered the power of attorney irrevocable can be determined from the allegations in the pleadings and affidavits on record without the need of introduction of evidence. On May 5, 2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed an Opposition to petitioners Motion to Dismiss stating that the instant case was a personal action for the revocation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney and not for the recovery of real property and, thus, the correct docket fees were paid. On June 9, 2006, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention because the movants-intervenors ([herein respondents] Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario) have legal interest in the subject properties in litigation and in the success of the petitioner [herein respondent Oscar Camerino], who was precisely their co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 95-020, entitled Oscar Camerino, et al. v. Springsun Management Systems Corporation et al., where they are the prevailing parties against the defendant therein [SMSC], with respect to the same properties, subject of this case, in a decision rendered by Branch 256 of this Court. The RTC, Branch 203, also granted the Motion for Summary Judgment because a meticulous scrutiny of the material facts admitted in the pleadings of the parties reveals that there is really no genuine issue of fact presented therein that needs to be tried to enable the court to arrive at a judicious resolution of a matter of law if the issues presented by the pleadings are not genuine issues as to any material fact but are patently unsubstantial issues that do not require a hearing on the merits. Thus, The instant Motion to Dismiss by the respondent is therefore DENIED, PROVIDED, the petitioner should pay the balance of the docket fees remaining unpaid, if any, pursuant to Rule 141, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The Motion for Intervention timely filed by intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario, as opposed by the respondent, is hereby GRANTED.x x x Petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. Consequently, respondents Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his Special and Affirmative Defenses is deemed moot and academic. SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]On June 15, 2006, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 rendered a Summary Judgment annulling the Irrevocable Power of Attorney for being contrary to law and public policy. The pertinent portions of the trial courts decision state that: Irrespective of whether the Power of Attorney in question is coupled with interest, or not, the same can be revoked or annulled, firstly, because it is contrary to law and secondly it is against public policy.As aptly pointed out by the intervenors, the assailed Special Power of Attorney which under its ultimate paragraph among others, authorizes the respondent (Nocom) to procure the necessary Transfer Certificate of Title in his name, as the absolute owner of the said properties is a disguised conveyance or assignment of the signatories statutory rights of redemption and therefore prohibited under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3844, Sec. 62 which provides:Sec. 62. Limitation on Land Rights.Except in case of heredity succession by one heir, landholdings acquired under this Code may not be resold, mortgaged, encumbered, or transferred until after the lapse of ten years from the date of full payment and acquisition and after such ten year period, any transfer, sale or disposition may be made only in favor of persons qualified to acquire economic family-size farm units in accordance with the provisions of this Code xxx. (underlining supplied) The assailed power of attorney which was executed on December 18, 2003 is void ab initio for being contrary to the express prohibition or spirit of the aforesaid law or the declared state and public policy on the qualification of the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. It bears stressing that the redemption price of the subject lots was paid only on August 4, 2005 or 1 year, 8 months and 14 days after the execution of the assailed power of attorney. If pursuant to the spirit of the Agrarian Reform Law, the tenant cannot even sell or dispose of his landholding within ten (10) years after he already acquired the same or even thereafter to persons not qualified to acquire economic size farm units in accordance with the provisions of the Agrarian Reform Code, with more reason should the tenant not be allowed to alienate or sell his landholding before he actually acquires the same. The right of redemption of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 as upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is founded on a piece of social legislation known as Agrarian Reform Code. Enunciated in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, et al., vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989) is the policy of the State on agrarian reform legislation. Said State policy emphasizes the Land for the Landless slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of land among the people. Furthermore, the assailed Special Power of Attorney is a champertous contract and therefore void for being against public policy. The pleadings of the parties show that the same special power of attorney was executed by the petitioner, et al. through the intercession of Atty. Arturo Santos and at the behest of the respondent. In his own answer to the instant petition which he is estopped to deny, the respondent alleges that the actual agreement was for the respondent to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the rights of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 without any provision for reimbursement. In other words, the respondents, through the intercession of Atty. Santos, petitioners attorney, had agreed to carry on with the action for the petitioner et al. at his own expense in consideration of procuring for himself the title to the lots in question as the absolute owner thereof, with the respondent paying the redemption price of said lots, as well as separate amounts of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) to each of the five (5) co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, including herein petitioner, or a total sum of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). Under the premises, the aforesaid contract brokered by Atty. Arturo Santos has all really the earmarks of a champertous contract which is against public policy as it violates the fiduciary relations between the lawyer and his client, whose weakness or disadvantage is being exploited by the former. In other words, the situation created under the given premises is a clear circumvention of the prohibition against the execution of champertous contracts between a lawyer and a client. A champertous contract is defined as a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the stranger pursues the partys claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under the judgment; a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. (Blacks Dictionary; Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co., Inc. Mo. App. 525 S.W. 2d 819, 823). An Agreement whereby the attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the clients rights is champertous. [JBP Holding Corporation v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at its own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 225 F. 242 (1918). The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanction. The intention of the law in prohibiting this kind of contract is to prevent a lawyer from acquiring an interest in the subject of the litigation and to avoid a conflict of interest between him and his client. In the instant case, it seems that Atty. Santos and the respondent colluded and conspired to circumvent these prohibitions. Considering therefore that Atty. Santos, then petitioners counsel, brokered the alleged deal between petitioners et al. and the respondent with respect to the lands subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 95-020, the deal contracted is illegal for being a champertous agreement and therefore it cannot be enforced.Be that as it may, granting the agency established in the assailed Power of Attorney is coupled with interest, the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, who are the present intervenors, are not revoking the Power of Attorney at will but have precisely gone to court and filed the instant petition for its cancellation or revocation. What is prohibited by law and jurisprudence is the arbitrary and whimsical revocation of a power of attorney or agency coupled with interest, at will by a party, without court declaration.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:(1) Nullifying the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in question dated December 18, 2003, signed by the petitioner [herein respondent Oscar Camerino] and his co-plaintiffs [herein respondents who were the movant-intervenors] in Civil Case No. 95-020 in favor of the respondent [herein petitioner];(2) Ordering the respondent to turnover the Certificates of Title Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 covering the lots, the subject of this case, to the petitioner and the intervenors;(3) Ordering the respondent to pay the petitioner attorneys fees and all other legal fees incurred by the latter in connection with this case;(4) Ordering the petitioner and the intervenors to return to the respondent the amount of P7,790,612 paid by the latter as redemption price of the lots in question plus commission of P147,049.18; and(5) Ordering the petitioner Oscar Camerino and the intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco Del Rosario or his heirs and Domingo Enriquez, who are petitioners co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, to return to the respondent the total amount of P2,500,000.00 or P500,000.00 from each of them paid by the respondent to them under Philtrust Bank Check Nos. MV 0002060, MV 0002061, MV 0002062, MV 0002063, and MV 0002064 which checks were encashed by them with the drawee bank.SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] On July 3, 2006 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set aside the trial courts Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 which was opposed by the respondents. On July 4, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Final Decision/Appeal which was opposed by petitioner. On August 14, 2006, the trial court issued an order denying petitioners Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. Within the reglementary period, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and paid the corresponding appeal docket fees.On February 14, 2008, the CA affirmed the trial courts Joint Order dated June 9, 2006 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 and dismissed the petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The CA ruled that as the RTC rendered the assailed Summary Judgment based on the pleadings and documents on record, without any trial or reception of evidence, the same did not involve factual matters. The CA found the issues raised by the petitioner in his appeal to be questions of law, to wit: (a) whether Summary Judgment was proper under the admitted facts and circumstances obtaining in the present case; (b) whether undue haste attended the rendition of the Summary Judgment; (c) whether the Summary Judgment was valid for failure of the RTC to implead an indispensable party; (d) whether the RTC erred in allowing the intervention of respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario; and (e) whether the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case despite nonpayment of the required docket fees. The CA concluded that since the issues involved questions of law, the proper mode of appeal should have been through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court directly to this Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 thereof and, thus, petitioners appeal to the CA should be dismissed outright pursuant to this Courts Circular No. 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, mandating the dismissal of appeals involving pure questions of law erroneously brought to the CA. In its Resolution of May 23, 2008, the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26, 2008. Hence, this present petition.Petitioner raises the following issues:IWHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS APPEAL.IIWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT RAISED IN PETITIONERS ANSWER.IIIWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN NOT VOIDING THE ASSAILED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY.IVWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 05-172 FOR NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES.Petitioner contends that the CA erred in dismissing his appeal as the case involves questions of fact; that summary judgment was not proper as there were genuine issues of fact raised in his Answer; that respondents failed to implead their lawyer, Atty. Arturo S. Santos, as an indispensable party-defendant, who, according to them, allegedly connived with him in making them sign the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in his favor; and that since the case partakes of the nature of an action to recover ownership and titles to the properties, respondents complaint should be dismissed for failure to pay the correct docket fees.Respondent Oscar Camerino argues that the sole issue to be resolved pertains to the legal issue of whether the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) denominated as irrevocable may be revoked; that three material facts have been established, i.e., that the SPA was executed, that Atty. Santos facilitated the signing and execution of the SPA, and that petitioner paid P500,000 to each of the respondents in consideration for the signing of the SPA and, thus, summary judgment was proper; and that pure questions of law are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules.Respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario, aver that petitioners petition is insufficient in form, i.e., due to defective verification as the word personal was not stated when referring to personal knowledge, and in substance, i.e., there is no genuine issue to be resolved as the factual allegations of the petitioner are unsubstantial and that Atty. Santos is not an indispensable party to the case. The petition has merit.In dismissing petitioners appeal, the CA erroneously relied on the rationale that the petitioners appeal raised questions of law and, therefore, it had no recourse but to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The summary judgment rendered by the trial court has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and, thus, the petitioner, being the aggrieved party, correctly appealed the adverse decision of the RTC to the CA by filing a notice of appeal coupled with the appellants brief under Rule 41 of the Rules. Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, the present case involves certain factual issues which remove it from the coverage of a summary judgment.Under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]The present case should not be decided via a summary judgment. Summary judgment is not warranted when there are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Summary judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties. In this present case, while both parties acknowledge or admit the existence of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney, the variance in the allegations in the pleadings of the petitioner vis--vis that of the respondents require the presentation of evidence on the issue of the validity of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney to determine whether its execution was attended by the vices of consent and whether the respondents and their spouses did not freely and voluntarily execute the same. In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner denied the material allegations of respondent Oscar Camerinos complaint for being false and baseless as respondents were informed that the document they signed was the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in his favor and that they had received the full consideration of the transaction and, thus, had no legal right over the three parcels of land. Indeed, the presentation of evidence is necessary to determine the validity and legality of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney, dated December 18, 2003, executed by the respondents in favor of the petitioner. From said main factual issue, other relevant issues spring therefrom, to wit: whether the said Irrevocable Power of Attorney was coupled with interest; whether it had been obtained through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation or other vices of consent; whether the five (5) Philtrust Bank Managers checks given by petitioner to the respondents amounting to P500,000 each were in consideration of the inchoate and contingent rights of the respondents in favor of the petitioner; whether Atty. Santos connived with petitioner in causing the preparation of the said document and, therefore, should be impleaded as party-defendant together with the petitioner; whether respondents deposited the amount of P9,790,612.00 plus P147,059.18 with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256; and whether the sale of respondents inchoate and contingent rights amounted to a champertous contract. The incongruence and disparity in the material allegations of both parties have been evident. Respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in his complaint that he and his co-respondents were required by their counsel, Atty. Santos, to sign a document on the representation that it was urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC which turned out to be the Irrevocable Power of Attorney; but petitioner disproved the vitiated consent on the part of the respondents as they knew fully well that the document they signed, voluntarily and intelligently, on December 18, 2003, was the said Irrevocable Power of Attorney. Respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in his complaint that he has no intention of naming, appointing or constituting anyone, including the petitioner, to sell, assign, dispose or encumber the lots in question; but petitioner maintained that respondent Oscar Camerino agreed to sell and assign to him his inchoate and contingent rights and interests over the subject lot for and in consideration of the sum of P500,000, plus the redemption price of P9,790,612. Respondents claimed that the amount they received was grossly disproportionate to the value of the subject land; but petitioner countered that the respondents did not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to redeem the subject lots, so he decided to buy their contingent rights and paid each of them P500,000 or a total of P2,500,000 as evidenced by five (5) Philtrust Bank Managers Check which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003, that he also paid the amount of P147,059.18 as commission on August 4, 2005, that simultaneous with the aforesaid payment, respondents and their spouses voluntarily signed the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated December 18, 2003, and that being coupled with interest, the Irrevocable Power of Attorney cannot be revoked at will by any of the parties.Respondents maintain that they were deceived into executing the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in favor of the petitioner which was done through the maneuverings of their own lawyer, Atty. Santos, who, according to them, had connived with petitioner in order to effect the fraudulent transaction. In this regard, respondents should have impleaded Atty. Santos as an indispensable party-defendant early on when the case was still with the RTC, but they failed to do so. However, their procedural lapse did not constitute a sufficient ground for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172.In Domingo v. Scheer,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] the Court explained that the non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. There is lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner or plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner or plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint or petition for the petitioner or plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In the present case, the RTC and the CA did not require the respondents to implead Atty. Santos as party-defendant or respondent in the case. The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172 would be the refusal of respondents to comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case.In his petition, petitioner prays for the reversal of the Decision dated February 14, 2008 of the CA which affirmed the Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and dismissed petitioners appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules for lack of jurisdiction and its Resolution dated May 23, 2008 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration; the annulment of the RTCs Summary Judgment rendered on June 15, 2006; and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172 filed with the RTC on the ground that respondents failed to pay the correct docket fees as the action actually sought the recovery of ownership over the subject properties.The record shows that Civil Case No. 05-172 is a complaint filed by respondent Oscar Camerino against petitioner, denominated as Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney, that seeks to nullify the Irrevocable Power of Attorney coupled with interest dated December 18, 2003; that petitioner be ordered to turn over TCT No. 15898, 15896, and 15897 to him; and that petitioner be ordered to pay the attorneys fees and other legal fees as a consequence of the suit. This case is therefore not an action to recover the titles and ownership over the subject properties. For now, the nature of the suit remains that of personal action and not a real action in contemplation of Rule 4 of the Rules. Hence, the docket fees paid by the respondents were in order. Should the complaint be amended to seek recovery of ownership of the land, then the proper docket fees should be paid and collected.While the RTC erred in rendering the summary judgment, Civil Case No. 05-172 should not perforce be dismissed. Instead, this present case should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and proper disposition according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 14, 2008 which affirmed the Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and dismissed petitioners appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 2008 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 87656 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.No costs.SO ORDERED. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate JusticeWE CONCUR:REYNATO S. PUNOChief JusticeChairpersonANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Associate JusticeTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate JusticeCERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

[if !supportFootnotes]

[endif][if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Rollo, pp. 49-50.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Rollo, pp. 154-155.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Rollo, pp. 188, 190.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Rollo, pp. 500-503.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Solidbank Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 120010, October 3, 2002, 390 SCRA 241.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Ong v. Roban Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 172592, July 9, 2008.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Tan v. De la Vega, G.R. No. 168809, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 538.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 468.

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 148864. August 21, 2003]SPOUSES EDUARDO B. EVANGELISTA and EPIFANIA C. EVANGELISTA, petitioners, vs. MERCATOR FINANCE CORP., LYDIA P. SALAZAR, LAMECS** REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO, J.:Petitioners, Spouses Evangelista (Petitioners), are before this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing their petition.Petitioners filed a complaint[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] for annulment of titles against respondents, Mercator Finance Corporation, Lydia P. Salazar, Lamecs Realty and Development Corporation, and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioners claimed being the registered owners of five (5) parcels of land[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] contained in the Real Estate Mortgage[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] executed by them and Embassy Farms, Inc. (Embassy Farms). They alleged that they executed the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Mercator Financing Corporation (Mercator) only as officers of Embassy Farms. They did not receive the proceeds of the loan evidenced by a promissory note, as all of it went to Embassy Farms. Thus, they contended that the mortgage was without any consideration as to them since they did not personally obtain any loan or credit accommodations. There being no principal obligation on which the mortgage rests, the real estate mortgage is void.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] With the void mortgage, they assailed the validity of the foreclosure proceedings conducted by Mercator, the sale to it as the highest bidder in the public auction, the issuance of the transfer certificates of title to it, the subsequent sale of the same parcels of land to respondent Lydia P. Salazar (Salazar), and the transfer of the titles to her name, and lastly, the sale and transfer of the properties to respondent Lamecs Realty & Development Corporation (Lamecs).Mercator admitted that petitioners were the owners of the subject parcels of land. It, however, contended that on February 16, 1982, plaintiffs executed a Mortgage in favor of defendant Mercator Finance Corporation for and in consideration of certain loans, and/or other forms of credit accommodations obtained from the Mortgagee (defendant Mercator Finance Corporation) amounting to EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE & 78/100 (P844,625.78) PESOS, Philippine Currency and to secure the payment of the same and those others that the MORTGAGEE may extend to the MORTGAGOR (plaintiffs) x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] It contended that since petitioners and Embassy Farms signed the promissory note[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] as co-makers, aside from the Continuing Suretyship Agreement[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] subsequently executed to guarantee the indebtedness of Embassy Farms, and the succeeding promissory notes[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] restructuring the loan, then petitioners are jointly and severally liable with Embassy Farms. Due to their failure to pay the obligation, the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the mortgaged properties are valid.Respondents Salazar and Lamecs asserted that they are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, relying on the validity of the title of Mercator. Lamecs admitted the prior ownership of petitioners of the subject parcels of land, but alleged that they are the present registered owner. Both respondents likewise assailed the long silence and inaction by petitioners as it was only after a lapse of almost ten (10) years from the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent sales that they made their claim. Thus, Salazar and Lamecs averred that petitioners are in estoppel and guilty of laches.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]During pre-trial, the parties agreed on the following issues:a. Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage executed by the plaintiffs in favor of defendant Mercator Finance Corp. is null and void;b. Whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings undertaken on subject parcels of land to satisfy the indebtedness of Embassy Farms, Inc. is (sic) null and void;c. Whether or not the sale made by defendant Mercator Finance Corp. in favor of Lydia Salazar and that executed by the latter in favor of defendant Lamecs Realty and Development Corp. are null and void;d. Whether or not the parties are entitled to damages.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]After pre-trial, Mercator moved for summary judgment on the ground that except as to the amount of damages, there is no factual issue to be litigated. Mercator argued that petitioners had admitted in their pre-trial brief the existence of the promissory note, the continuing suretyship agreement and the subsequent promissory notes restructuring the loan, hence, there is no genuine issue regarding their liability. The mortgage, foreclosure proceedings and the subsequent sales are valid and the complaint must be dismissed.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]Petitioners opposed the motion for summary judgment claiming that because their personal liability to Mercator is at issue, there is a need for a full-blown trial.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]The RTC granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. It held:A reading of the promissory notes show (sic) that the liability of the signatories thereto are solidary in view of the phrase jointly and severally. On the promissory note appears (sic) the signatures of Eduardo B. Evangelista, Epifania C. Evangelista and another signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista below the words Embassy Farms, Inc. It is crystal clear then that the plaintiffs-spouses signed the promissory note not only as officers of Embassy Farms, Inc. but in their personal capacity as well(.) Plaintiffs(,) by affixing their signatures thereon in a dual capacity have bound themselves as solidary debtor(s) with Embassy Farms, Inc. to pay defendant Mercator Finance Corporation the amount of indebtedness. That the principal contract of loan is void for lack of consideration, in the light of the foregoing is untenable.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Thus, petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals, but again were unsuccessful. The appellate court held:The appellants insistence that the loans secured by the mortgage they executed were not personally theirs but those of Embassy Farms, Inc. is clearly self-serving and misplaced. The fact that they signed the subject promissory notes in the(ir) personal capacities and as officers of the said debtor corporation is manifest on the very face of the said documents of indebtedness (pp. 118, 128-131, Orig. Rec.). Even assuming arguendo that they did not, the appellants lose sight of the fact that third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property (Lustan vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663, 675). x x x. In constituting a mortgage over their own property in order to secure the purported corporate debt of Embassy Farms, Inc., the appellants undeniably assumed the personality of persons interested in the fulfillment of the principal obligation who, to save the subject realities from foreclosure and with a view towards being subrogated to the rights of the creditor, were free to discharge the same by payment (Articles 1302 [3] and 1303, Civil Code of the Philippines).[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] (emphases in the original)The appellate court also observed that if the appellants really felt aggrieved by the foreclosure of the subject mortgage and the subsequent sales of the realties to other parties, why then did they commence the suit only on August 12, 1997 (when the certificate of sale was issued on January 12, 1987, and the certificates of title in the name of Mercator on September 27, 1988)? Petitioners procrastination for about nine (9) years is difficult to understand. On so flimsy a ground as lack of consideration, (w)e may even venture to say that the complaint was not worth the time of the courts.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]A motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Thus, this petition where they allege that:THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE MAY 4, 1998 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND ITS NON-ENTITLEMENT TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.[IF !SUPPORTFOOTNOTES][18][ENDIF]We affirm.Summary judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] The crucial question in a motion for summary judgment is whether the issues raised in the pleadings are genuine or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] To forestall summary judgment, it is essential for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of genuine issues where he has substantial, plausible and fairly arguable defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the presentation of evidence upon which a reasonable finding of fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party. The proper inquiry would therefore be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issue of fact requiring a full-blown trial.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]In the case at bar, there are no genuine issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners do not deny that they obtained a loan from Mercator. They merely claim that they got the loan as officers of Embassy Farms without intending to personally bind themselves or their property. However, a simple perusal of the promissory note and the continuing suretyship agreement shows otherwise. These documentary evidence prove that petitioners are solidary obligors with Embassy Farms.The promissory note[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] states:For value received, I/We jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of MERCATOR FINANCE CORPORATION at its office, the principal sum of EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS & 78/100 (P 844,625.78), Philippine currency, x x x, in installments as follows:September 16, 1982 - P154,267.87October 16, 1982 - P154,267.87November 16, 1982 - P154,267.87December 16, 1982 - P154,267.87January 16, 1983 - P154,267.87February 16, 1983 - P154,267.87x x x x x x x x x.The note was signed at the bottom by petitioners Eduardo B. Evangelista and Epifania C. Evangelista, and Embassy Farms, Inc. with the signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista below it.The Continuing Suretyship Agreement[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] also proves the solidary obligation of petitioners, viz:(Embassy Farms, Inc.) Principal(Eduardo B. Evangelista) Surety(Epifania C. Evangelista) Surety(Mercator Finance Corporation) CreditorTo: MERCATOR FINANCE COPORATION(1) For valuable and/or other consideration, EDUARDO B. EVANGELISTA and EPIFANIA C. EVANGELISTA (hereinafter called Surety), jointly and severally unconditionally guarantees (sic) to MERCATOR FINANCE COPORATION (hereinafter called Creditor), the full, faithful and prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness of EMBASSY FARMS, INC. (hereinafter called Principal) to the Creditor.x x x x x x x x x(3) The obligations hereunder are joint and several and independent of the obligations of the Principal. A separate action or actions may be brought and prosecuted against the Surety whether or not the action is also brought and prosecuted against the Principal and whether or not the Principal be joined in any such action or actions.x x x x x x x x x.The agreement was signed by petitioners on February 16, 1982. The promissory notes[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] subsequently executed by petitioners and Embassy Farms, restructuring their loan, likewise prove that petitioners are solidarily liable with Embassy Farms.Petitioners further allege that there is an ambiguity in the wording of the promissory note and claim that since it was Mercator who provided the form, then the ambiguity should be resolved against it.Courts can interpret a contract only if there is doubt in its letter.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] But, an examination of the promissory note shows no such ambiguity. Besides, assuming arguendo that there is an ambiguity, Section 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Law states, viz:SECTION 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply:x x x x x x x x x(g) Where an instrument containing the word I promise to pay is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon.Petitioners also insist that the promissory note does not convey their true intent in executing the document. The defense is unavailing. Even if petitioners intended to sign the note merely as officers of Embassy Farms, still this does not erase the fact that they subsequently executed a continuing suretyship agreement. A surety is one who is solidarily liable with the principal.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Petitioners cannot claim that they did not personally receive any consideration for the contract for well-entrenched is the rule that the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need not pass directly to the surety, a consideration moving to the principal alone being sufficient. A surety is bound by the same consideration that makes the contract effective between the principal parties thereto.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] Having executed the suretyship agreement, there can be no dispute on the personal liability of petitioners.Lastly, the parol evidence rule does not apply in this case.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] We held in Tarnate v. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] that where the parties admitted the existence of the loans and the mortgage deeds and the fact of default on the due repayments but raised the contention that they were misled by respondent bank to believe that the loans were long-term accommodations, then the parties could not be allowed to introduce evidence of conditions allegedly agreed upon by them other than those stipulated in the loan documents because when they reduced their agreement in writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. Treble costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., on official leave.[if !supportFootnotes]

[endif]** Sometimes spelled as Lamecs.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 85, Rollo, pp. 23-29.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] With Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-193458, T-192133, T-193136, T-193137 and T-193138; Id. at 30-39.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Id. at 40.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Id. at 26.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Id. at 63.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Id. at 71.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Id. at 72-73.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] Id. at 80-83.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Id. at 85-97.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] Id. at 118.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] Id. at 119-123.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] Id. at 128-131.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Id. at 134, dated May 4, 1998.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Id. at 159, dated July 17, 1998.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Id. at 222-223, Decision dated May 12, 2000.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Id. at 223.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Id. at 234, dated May 14, 2001.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Id. at 12.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] Evadel Realty and Development Corporation v. Soriano, 357 SCRA 395 (2001).[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank v. Rafael Ma. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804, February 19, 2003.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Spouses Guillermo Agbada & Maxima Agbada v. Inter-urban Developers, et al., G.R. No. 144029, September 19, 2002.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] Rollo, p. 71.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Id. at 72-73.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] Id. at 80-83.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. (Civil Code of the Philippines); Ong Yong, et al., v. David S. Tiu, et al., G.R. Nos. 144476 & 144629, February 1, 2002.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Goldenrod, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 217 (2001).[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] Charles Lee v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 117913-14, February 1, 2002.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;(c) The validity of the written agreement; or(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties of their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.The term agreement includes wills.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] 241 SCRA 254 (1995).

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 153126. September 11, 2003]MONTEREY FOODS CORP. and RAMON F. LLANOS, petitioners, vs. VICTORINO E. ESERJOSE, and the Branch Sheriff assigned to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, National Capital Judicial Region, respondents.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:This is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 2001, which upheld the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-98-36421.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]It is alleged in the petition that for a period of twelve years, respondent bought from petitioner Monterey Foods Corporation live cattle and hogs which he in turn sold and distributed to his customers. The transactions were covered by invoices and delivery receipts and were payable within ten days from invoice date. Due to respondents inability to pay for his purchases, his overdue account amounted to P87,434,689.37, and as a consequence, petitioner corporation ceased its transactions with respondent.Sometime in 1998, during the existence of the contractual relations between the parties, they entered into a contract growing agreement whereby petitioner corporation supplied livestock for respondent to grow, care for and nurture in his farm located in San Jose, Batangas. After five months of operation, petitioner corporation withdrew from the contract without paying respondent for his services, alleging that respondent failed to post the requisite bond under the contract and poorly performed his farm management functions to the detriment of the animals.Respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioner corporation pay him for his services under the contract, amounting to P1,280,000.00. His demands went unheeded; thus, he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, an action for sum of money and damages against petitioner corporation and its President, petitioner Ramon F. Llanes, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-36421.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] After petitioners filed their Joint Answer, the case was scheduled for pre-trial conference on May 14, 1999.At the pre-trial conference, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, and an Order was issued declaring them as in default and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] On May 24, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay the former the following:1. P1,280,000.00 representing the principal obligation;2. P100,000.00, jointly and severally, as damages; and3. P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.IT IS SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]Petitioners filed a motion for new trial,[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] which the trial court granted.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Hence, the case was again set for pre-trial conference and both parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]After the pre-trial, respondent submitted a manifestation and motion alleging that petitioners have admitted their liability under the contract growing agreement at least to the extent of P482,766.88 when they alleged in their Joint Answer: In accordance with the standard contract growing fee provision plaintiff [respondent herein] was entitled to a compensation of net P482,766.88.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Respondent thus prayed that reverse trial be conducted.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]Petitioners opposed the manifestation and motion, stating that the reverse trial order has no basis since the amount allegedly admitted was dramatically less than the total of P1,280,000.00 claimed by respondent.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif]At the initial hearing of the case, petitioners confirmed in open court that they indeed entered into a contract growing agreement with respondent and that the latter was entitled to a net compensation of P482,766.88 under the said contract.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] The trial court, acting on petitioners judicial admission, rendered partial summary judgment insofar as the amount of P482,766.88 was concerned, and set the case for trial for the presentation of evidence on petitioners claim for damages.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Respondent moved for the execution of the partial summary judgment, which the trial court granted.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Accordingly, on December 15, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to cause the execution of the partial summary decision.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]On December 17, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56305.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] On November 21, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]Petitioners are now before us assigning the following errors:A.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SANCTIONED THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT OF A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH WAS NOT YET FINAL IN CHARACTER.B.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUED ON AN EX-PARTE MOTION THAT DENIED PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.C.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUED ON THE BASIS THAT A BOND IS SUFFICIENT REASON FOR DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION TO ISSUE.D.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ON THE BASIS OF A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT IS PATENTLY INVALIDE.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT WAS RENDERED IN DISPARAGEMENT OF DUE PROCESS.F.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE TRIAL COURTS PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUED ON THE BASIS THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACTG.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE OF THE TRIAL COURT FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]Simply put, the primordial question to be resolved hinges on whether summary judgment is proper in the case at bar.A summary judgment or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Its object is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial so that only the latter may subject a party in interest to the burden of trial.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Moreover, said summary judgment must be premised on the absence of any other triable genuine issues of fact.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Otherwise, the movant cannot be allowed to obtain immediate relief. A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]Rule 35, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in affirming the assailed orders of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition must be denied.The record shows that at the hearing on November 25, 1999, petitioners admitted liability under the contract growing agreement in the amount of P482,766.88.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] As a result, respondent agreed to waive all his other claims in the complaint, including his claim for consequential damages.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] Correspondingly, insofar as the complaint was concerned, there was no other genuine issue left for which the complaint for sum of money and damages may be prosecuted. Also by reason of such admission, petitioners, in effect, likewise waived whatever defenses they may have to deter recovery by respondent under the said contract. Thus, respondent became entitled, as a matter of law, to the execution of the partial summary judgment. When there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. In short, since the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]Clearly, the judgment finally disposed of all the reliefs sought in the complaint. The order granting summary judgment was akin to a judgment on the merits made after a full-blown trial. Its consequent execution, therefore, may issue as a matter of right in favor of respondent unless appeal was seasonably made therein, which petitioners failed to do. Instead of filing a notice of appeal with the trial court, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.Petitioners maintain that the order granting partial summary judgment was merely interlocutory in nature and did not dispose of the action in its entirety. They cite the doctrines laid down in Province of Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] and Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] where the Court categorically stated that a partial summary judgment is not a final or appealable judgment.Petitioners position is untenable.The rulings in Province of Pangasinan and Guevarra is not applicable in the case at bar. The said cases specifically delved on the appeal of a partial summary judgment, which did not dispose of all the reliefs sought in the complaint. In the case at bar, other than the admitted liability of petitioners to respondents under the contract growing agreement, all other reliefs sought under the complaint had already been expressly waived by respondent before the trial court. Accordingly, the assailed November 25, 1999 Order of the trial court which granted partial summary judgment in favor of respondent was in the nature of a final order which leaves nothing more for the court to adjudicate in respect to the complaint. In Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] the Court distinguished a final judgment or order from an interlocutory issuance in this wise:The concept of a final judgment or order, distinguished form an interlocutory issuance, is that the former decisively puts to a close, or disposes of a case or a disputed issue leaving nothing else to be done by the court in respect thereto. Once that judgment or order is rendered, the adjudicative task of the court is likewise ended on the particular matter involved. An order is interlocutory, upon the other hand, if its effects would only be provisional in character and would still leave substantial proceedings to be further had by the issuing court in order to put the controversy to rest.We are not unmindful of petitioners counterclaim. However, our cursory evaluation of the same fails to convince us that the issues raised therein are closely related to or intertwined with the growing contract agreement. The issues raised therein clearly involved transactions distinct and separate from the growing contract agreement; they refer to the alleged obligations of respondent under their separate contract for the sale and distribution of cattle and hogs. As such, these are in the nature of permissive counterclaims which can be litigated independently of the main complaint.Petitioners also argue that they were denied an opportunity to be heard on the motion to execute the summary judgment; and that the summary judgment was rendered in disregard of due process.The argument is not well-taken.A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Contrary to petitioners claims, the record shows that petitioners were duly represented by counsel when the motion for summary judgment as well as the execution of the same were heard by the trial court. Petitioners counsel did not register any opposition to respondents oral motion for summary judgment, saying that under the Rules of Court it should be furnished a written motion for summary judgment at least 10 days before it is heard. We find, however, that the absence of the written notice did not divest the trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion made in open court. The order of the court granting the motion for summary judgment and its execution thereof despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive the court of its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court, or to appeal from the final judgment, and not thru certiorari.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]In fact, the counsel for petitioners actively participated in disposing of the reliefs prayed for in the complaint when he sought the reduction in respondents claim to P482,766.88. Besides, we find from the records that petitioners expressly agreed to the summary judgment[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] and to the execution of the same after respondent posts a bond in an amount fixed by the court.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] In short, petitioners were never deprived of their day in court. Thus, they cannot now be allowed to claim that they were denied due process. The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]Thus, in Ley Construction and Development Corporation v. Union Bank of the Philippines,[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] it was held:Admittedly, there is nothing in the records which indicates that Judge Arcangel conducted a hearing before he resolved respondents motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, as explained in Carcon Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in proceedings for summary judgment, the court is merely expected to act chiefly on the basis of what is in the records of the case and that the hearing contemplated in the Rules is not de riguer as its purpose is merely to determine whether the issues are genuine or not, and not to receive evidence on the issues set up in the pleadings.xxx. In view of the fact that they admitted having incurred the obligation which is the basis of the complaint, a hearing would have served no pertinent purpose. The records already provide sufficient basis for the court to resolve respondents motion. Thus, we find that even if the trial court did not conduct a hearing, this fact would not affect the validity of the summary judgment rendered by Judge Arcangel.Neither does the fact that respondents motion to resolve its motion for summary judgment was filed ex parte affect the validity of Judge Arcangels resolution. The requirement in Rule 35, 3 that the opposing party be furnished a copy of the motion 10 days before the time specified for the hearing applies to the motion for summary judgment itself and not to the motion to resolve such motion. xxx. Thus, it could not be said that they were deprived of the opportunity to question the motion.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56305, which affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, directing the execution of partial summary judgment in Civil Case No. Q-98-36421, is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.Azcuna, J., on official leave.[if !supportFootnotes]

[endif][if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. De Los Santos.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Rollo, pp. 96-99; penned by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Rollo, pp. 100-103.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Rollo, p. 133.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Id., p. 131.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Id., pp. 134-152.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Id., pp. 157-160.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] RTC Record, Vol. I, p. 214.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Joint Answer, p. 9, par. (c); Rollo, p. 113.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] Rollo, p. 161.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] Id., p. 167.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, p. 66.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Supra, note 2; TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 73-74.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Supra, note 3.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] Supra, note 4.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Rollo, pp. 65-95.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Id., pp. 57-64.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] Id., p. 256.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] Petition, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 18-19.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Spouses Agbada v. Inter-Urban Developers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 144029, 19 September 2002, citing Excelsa Industries, Inc. v. CA, 317 Phil. 664 (1995).[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Solidbank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120010, 3 October 2002.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804, 19 February 2003.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Solidbank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, p. 66.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 27-29.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Supra, note 26.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] G.R. No. 104266, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 726.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] G.R. Nos. L-49017 and L-49024, 30 August 1983, 124 SCRA 297.[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] 355 Phil. 804, 811 (1998).[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Alauya, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 152151-52, 22 January 2003; See Rule 15, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides: All motions shall be in writing except those made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] See Galvez v. CA, G.R. No. 114046, 24 October 1994, 237 SCRA 685, 698, citing People, et al. v. Vergara, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 101557-58, 28 April 1993, 221 SCRA 560, 570-571.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 42-50.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, pp. 68-69.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] 389 Phil. 788, 799 (2000).

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.DECISIONPANGANIBAN, J.:A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision2 and July 29, 2003 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).4The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."6Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court."7The Antecedent ProceedingsOn January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,8 specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. x x x."x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss x x x."9After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law."10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."11After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.Hence, this Petition for Review.12This Court, in a Resolution13 dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective comments. In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the opportunity to comment, if they so desired.On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14The IssuesIn his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory re